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V 


./' 


By  the  same  Author. 

A  History  of  Rome  for  Beginners,  from  the  foundation 
of  the  city  to  the  death  of  Augustus.  Illustrated. 
Globe  8vo.     3s.  6d. 

Journal  of  Educaticn. — "  It  is  written  throughout  in  a  simple 
and  straightforward  style,  which  is  equally  exempt  from  pedantry 
and  puerility." 

Caml)ridge  Review. — "  It  is  reliable,  clear,  well  printed,  and  full 
of  good  maps  and  plans. " 

Acadejuy. — "The  story  of  nearly  eight  hundred  years  is  told 
with  admirable  brevity  and  due  sense  of  proportion." 


MACMILLAN   AND  CO.,  Ltd. 


A  HISTORY  OF  ROME 


S 


HISTORY    OF    ROME 


TO  THE  BATTLE  OF  ACTIUM 


BY 

EVELYN   SHIRLEY   SHUCKBURGH,   M.A. 

LATE    FELLOW  OF    EMMANUEL   COLLEGE,    CAMBRIDGH 

AUTHOR   OF 

A    TRANSLATION    OF    POLYBIUS,   ETC. 


WITH     MAPS    AND    PLANS 


iLontron 
MACMILLAN    AND    CO.,   Ltd. 

NEW  YORK  :   THE  MACMILLAN  CO. 
1896 

A II  rights  rcscTved 


First  Edition  1894.     Reprinted  1 


IN  •  HONOREM  • 

MATRIS  •  NOSTRAE  •  ALTRICIS  • 

MAGISTRO  •  SOCIIS  •  QUE  • 

COLLEGII  •  EMMANUELIS  •  CANTABRIGIAE 


PREFACE 

To  write  the  history  of  a  great  people  during  a  course  of  more 
than  seven  hundred  years  in  about  as  many  pages  is  a  task  of 
which  the  difficulty,  best  appreciated  by  those  who  have  attempted 
it,  may  not  unfairly  plead  for  leniency  of  construction.  No  one 
can  be  more  conscious  than  the  author  of  such  a  book  that  there 
are  many  fhings  that  had  better  have  been  otherwise  than  they 
are ;  that  expansion  would  have  been  advisable  here  and  com- 
pression there ;  that  much  is  to  be  said  against  some  views  that 
he  has  adopted  as  true,  and  much  in  favour  of  others  that  he  has 
passed  by  or  rejected.  Such  a  writer  can  only  plead  that  he  has 
used  his  judgment  honestly,  and  studied  his  authorities  with  such 
diligence  and  intelligence  as  he  possessed ;  and  that  neither  space 
nor  the  purpose  of  his  book  admitted  of  frequent  or  lengthy  dis- 
cussions on  disputed  points. 

As  it  was  my  object  to  present  in  as  vivid  a  manner  as  possible 
the  wonderful  story  of  the  gradual  extension  of  the  power  of  a 
single  city  over  so  large  a  part  of  the  known  world,  I  have  dwelt 
perhaps  sometimes  at  too  great  length  on  the  state  of  the  countries 
conquered  and  the  details  of  their  conquest.  But  Vergil  saw  that 
the  keynote  of  Roman  history  was  paixere  siibiedis  et  debeUare 
superbos^  and  it  is  impossible,  I  think,  that  a  history  of  Rome  and 
her  mission  in  the  world  can  be  other  than  a  warlike  one.     The 


Viii  HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Republic  won  what  the  Empire  organised ;  and  as  each  province 
was  added  some  new  principle  of  management  was  evolved 
which  has  had  to  be  noticed  at  the  time.  I  have,  however, 
treated  in  separate  chapters  the  internal  development  of  the  State 
up  to  the  time  of  the  Gracchi.  The  constitutional  changes  after 
that  time  are  so  closely  entangled  with  foreign  affairs  that  it  is 
hardly  possible  to  treat  them  so  entirely  by  themselves.  Yet 
I  have  attempted  to  set  them  forth  clearly  in  the  course  of  my 
narrative,  along  with  some  indication  of  the  development  of 
literature  and  the  change  of  social  habits.^  By  the  mechanical 
means  of  printing  at  the  head  of  the  chapters  the  names  and 
dates  of  Italian  colonies,  provinces,  and  numbers  of  the  census, 
I  have  tried  to  draw  attention  to  the  gradual  expansion  of  the 
people  and  their  Empire. 

The  book  is  founded  throughout  on  the  ancient  authorities  ; 
and  I  have  placed  at  the  end  of  each  chapter  the  names  of  those 
authorities  on  which  it  rests,  as  likely  to  be  useful  to  students 
who  care  to  read  and  compare  for  themselves;  but  except  in 
special  cases  I  have  not  given  references  for  each  statement  of 
the  text.  I  shall  seem  no  doubt  to  some  to  have  been  too 
credulous  in  regard  to  them.  But  the  great  genius  of  Niebuhr 
seems  almost  a  warning  against  the  construction  of  history  by 
arbitrary  selection  of  what  to  believe  or  disbelieve  among  a 
number  of  facts  resting  on  precisely  the  same  authority ;  and  I 
must  be  pardoned  if  I  cannot  always  follow  Lewis  or  Ihne  in 
the  summary  rejection  of  all  history  up  to  and  often  beyond  the 
time  of  Pyrrhus ;  and  if  it  has  seemed  to  me  that  small  discrep- 
ancies and  apparent,  though  often  not  real,  contradictions  and 
repetitions  have  been  seized  upon  to  discredit  this  or  that  writer's 

^  If  chapters  viii.  xiii.  xvi.  xxi.  xxvi.  xxxv.  xl.  are  read  consecutively,  what 
I  have  to  say  on  this  branch  of  the  subject  will  be  made  clear. 


PREFACE 


statement  when  it  conflicts  with  a  favourite  theory  or  a  modern 
notion  of  the  probable.  I  have  tried  to  judge  fairly  in  each 
instance,  and  have  not  hesitated  to  reject  when  a  good  case  has 
been  made  out.  No  doubt  human  nature  is  the  same  now  as  it 
was  two  thousand  years  ago;  but  human  knowledge  is  not  the 
same,  and  we  must  sometimes  admit  that  men  acted  then  as 
they  would  not  act  to-day.  Even  now  the  unreasonableness  of 
a  measure  is  not  a  complete  security  against  its  being  adopted. 

Though  the  book  is  grounded  on  the  ancient  writers,  it  is 
almost  superfluous  to  say  that  I  also  owe  infinite  obligations, 
directly  or  indirectly,  to  the  great  names  that  have  illuminated 
Roman  history,  from  Niebuhr  and  Arnold  to  Schwegler,  Momm- 
sen,  Drumann,  Ihne,  Merivale,  Duruy,  and  Pelham ;  to  the  ency- 
clopaedic work  on  Roman  Antiquities  and  Polity  of  Marquardt  and 
Mommsen;  to  our  own  dictionaries  of  Biography,  Geography, 
and  Antiquities  ;  to  Willem's  le  Senat  and  Droit  Public  Romain  ; 
and  to  many  works  on  separate  episodes,  such  as  Reinach's 
Mithridate  Eupator ;  Napoleon's  and  Col.  Stoffel's  Jules  Cesar ; 
and  others.  It  was  impossible  to  acknowledge  such  obligations  in 
detail.    Every  one  knows  that  these  books  must  be  continually  used. 

Lastly,  I  have  the  pleasant  task  of  acknowledging  the  help  of 
various  friends,  who  have  read  parts  of  my  book  in  proof  and 
helped  me  with  suggestions  and  corrections.  They  are  Mr.  W.  T. 
Arnold,  author  oi  Roman  Provincial  Administration  ;  Mr.  A.  W.  W. 
Dale,  Fellow  of  Trinity  Hall ;  Messrs.  W.  Chawner  and  P.  Giles, 
Fellows  of  Emmanuel  College ;  Mr.  A.  A.  Tilley,  Fellow  of  King's 
College.  I  would  add  a  word  of  thanks  to  the  Printers,  whose 
patience,  I  fear,  has  often  been  tried  but  has  never  failed  ;  and  to 
my  friends  the  Publishers,  who  have  been  always  indulgent  in 
granting  requests  and  pardoning  delays. 


Cambridge,  April  1894. 


CONTENTS 

The  Beginnings  of  Rome  and  the  Regal  Period 
B.C.  753-509 

CHAPTER    I 

The  consolidation  of  Italy — Four  periods  of  Roman  history  :  I.  Rise  of  the  city  ; 
II.  Conquest  of  Italy  ;  III.  The  growth  of  a  foreign  dominion  ;  IV.  Civil 
wars,  leading  to  the  rule  of  a  single  Emperor — The  place  of  Roman  in 
universal  history — Its  continuity  ....  Page  i 

CHAPTER    II 

The  lie  of  the  Italian  peninsula — The  ancient  limitation  of  the  name — Its  sub- 
sequent enlargement,  first,  about  B.C.  280,  up  to  the  Rubicon,  and  secondly, 
in  the  time  of  Augustus,  up  to  the  Alps — The  parcelling  out  of  the  peninsula 
by  the  Apennines — The  different  character  of  the  Apennines  in  the  centre 
and  south  of  Italy — Their  contiguity  to  the  sea,  and  the  consequent  fewness 
of  important  rivers — On  the  north  of  the  Apennines,  GaUia  Cisalpina  ;  on 
the  west,  Etruria,  Latium,  Campania;  on  the  east,  the  Senones,  Picenum, 
Pretutiani,  Vestini,  Marrucini,  Frentani,  Apulia,  Calabria  ;  in  the  centre, 
Umbria,  Samnium  (  =  Sabini,  Marsi,  Samnites),  Picentini  :  continued  into 
Lucania  and  Bruttium — Effect  of  the  geographical  formation  on  the  history 
of  Italy,  early  causing  a  struggle  between  highlanders  and  men  of  the  plain. 

Page  5 

CHAPTER    III 

The  inhabitants  of  Italy — Iberian  and  Ligurian  tribes  in  Italy  before  the  beginning 
of  history — First  to  arrive  the  Oscans  and  Iapygians  ;  followed  by  the 
Umbro-Latins,  dividing  into  Umbrians  and  Latini — (2)  The  Sabellians 
or  Sabines,  which  branch  off  as  Samnites,  Picentes,  Peligni,  and  perhaps 
Marsi,  Marrucini,  and  Vestini — The  Samnites  branch  off  into  Frentani, 
Lucani,  Apulia,  Bruttium — (3)  The  Etruscans,  their  occupation  of  the 
north  basin  of  the  Po,  and  partial  occupation  of  the  south — Their  gradual 
expulsion  by  (3)  the  Celts,  who  came  over  the  Alps  in  various  waves, 
whence  North  Italy  is  called  Gallia  Cisalpina,  which  includes  the  probably 
distinct  tribes  of  the  Ligures  and  Veneti — (4)  The  Greek  colonies  in  southern 
Italy  mingle  with  Oenotrians  and  Ausonians  and  Itali,  but  are  eventually 
overrun  by  Bruttii,  Lucani,  and  Apuli,  who  give  their  names  to  the 
districts  .......  Page  10 


xii  HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAPTER    IV 

Origin  of  Rome — Heroic  legends  of  its  foundation — Settlement  of  Aeneas  in 
Italy — His  wars  with  the  Rutuli — His  supremacy  over  the  Prisci  Latini — His 
son  removes  to  Alba  from  Lavinium — The  Alban  kings — The  two  sons  of 
Proca,  Numitor  and  Amulius — The  birth  of  Romulus  and  Remus,  and  their 
education  by  shepherds — They  restore  their  grandfather  Numitor  to  the  throne 
of  Alba — Their  foundation  of  a  new  city — Death  of  Remus — Romulus  founds 
the  city  on  the  Palatine  and  calls  it  Rome — The  gradual  extension  of  the 
Palatine  city  to  include  the  Septimontium — The  Roman  era  B.C.  753 

Page  21 

CHAPTER    V 

The  situation  of  Rome — Latium,  its  different  meanings — Romulus,  753-716 
— The  foundation  of  the  city  and  earliest  institutions — The  joint  reign 
with  Titus  Tatius — Laws  of  Romulus,  and  his  death — Numa  Pompilius, 
his  religious  institutions  and  laws — The  temple  of  Vesta  and  the  Regia  ;  the 
fliamens,  vestals,  and  Salii — His  calendar — TuLLUS  Hostilius — The  de- 
struction of  Alba  Longa  —  Wars  with  the  Sabines  —  The  Horatii  and 
Curiatii— Provocatio — Angus  Marcius— Makes  the  sacra  known  to  all — 
Wars  with  the  Latins — The  jus  fetiale — The  pons  sublicius  a.nd  fossa  quiritium 
— L.  Tarquinius  Priscus — His  arrival  from  'farquinii,  begins  temple  on 
Capitoline,  city  walls,  circus  maximus,  and  cloacae — His  murder — Servius 
TuLLius,  the  agger  and  completion  of  town  walls — His  reforms,  the  four 
tribes,  and  the  193  centuries  distributed  in  five  classes— The  comitia  curiata 
and  comitia  cetituriata — The  object  and  results  of  his  reform — The  patricians 
and  plebeians — His  first  census — His  death — Tarquinius  Superbus — His 
oppression  of  the  Senate — His  wars  with  the  Volscians — Capture  of  Gabii — 
His  works  in  Rome  and  his  colonies — The  Sibyl — Embassy  to  Delphi — Siege 
of  Ardea — The  story  of  Lucretia — Expulsion  of  the  Tarquins — The  credibility 
of  the  legends — The  authorities  on  which  they  rest — Their  value         Page  28 


The  Growth  of  Rome  to  the  end  of  the  Latin  League 
B.C.  509-338 

CHAPTER  VI 

The  effect  of  the  Revolution  on  the  position  of  Rome  in  Latium — Attempts  of  the 
Tarquins  to  recover  their,  property  and  royalty — Battle  with  the  Veientines 
and  people  of  Tarquinii  on  the  Naebian  meadow — Etruscan  invasion  under 
Porsena — Stories  of  Scaevola  and  Cloelia — Subjection  of  Rome  to  the  Etrus- 
cans— Defeat  of  Etruscans  before  Aricia — Isolation  of  Rome  in  Latium — The 
Latins  attack  Rome — Battle  of  the  lake  Regillus — Gradual  recovery  of  Roman 
power,  and  return  to  the  Latin  League  (492) — Wars  with  the  Sabines, 
Volscians,  Aequians,  Hernici — Effect  upon  the  Roman  character — Tales  of 
Coriolanus  and  Cincinnatus       .....  Page  61 

CHAPTER  VII 

Enmity  of  Veii  and  Rome — State  of  Etruria  in  fifth  century  B.C. — General  move- 
ment against  Hellenism — The  Fabii — Farther  movements  of  Veientines  and 


CONTENTS  xui 


8abines — Fidenae  and  Veii — A.  Cornelius  Cossus  and  the  spolia  opima — The 
Etruscan  League  refuse  help  to  Veii — Twenty  years'  truce  {425) — Samnites 
drive  the  Etruscans  from  Campania — Last  war  with  Veii,  its  siege  and  fall 
(405-396) — The  effect  of  the  long  siege — The  Alban  lake — M.  Furius  Camillus 
— Stories  connected  with  the  fall  of  Veii— Fall  of  Melpum — Capture  of  Falerii, 
Volsinii,  and  Sutrium    ......  Page  tj 


CHAPTER  VIII 

The  early  Republican  goverriment  founded  on  that  of  the  kings — Consuls, 
quaestors,  and  people — Effect  of  Servian  reforms — Disabilities  of  the  plebs — 
Roman  civitas — -Laws  and  Patria  Potestas — Perduellio  afid  quaestiones — 
Provocatio — Other  laivs  of  Poplicola—  The  ownership  of  land — Law  of  debt — 
The  nexi — Appius  Claudius  refuses  relief  to  the  nexi — Secession  to  the  Sacred 
Mount — Tribunes  of  the  plebs  appointed:  their  powers,  duties,  number,  and 
manner  of  election — Aediles  and  their  duties — Agrarian  law  of  Spurius 
Cassius  :  His  impeachment  and  death  {./6'j)— Lex  Publiha  Voleronis  {4Ti) — 
Proposal  by  Terentilius  to  limit  and  define  the  power  of  the  consuls —  The 
embassy  to  Greece  {4S3) — The  first  decemvirate  [4S1) — The  ten  tables — The 
second  decemvirate  {4S0) — Change  in  policy  of  Appius  Claudius — The  two  new 
tables — Murder  of  Sicinius  and  story  of  Virginia — Decemvirs  deposed  and 
consuls  and  tribunes  elected — Valerio-Horatian  laws — Their  effects — The  laws 
of  the  twelve  tables — The  lex  Canuleia  {44s) — Tribuni  militares  consular! 
potestate — Appointment  of  censors — Increase  of  poverty — Murder  of  Spurius 
Maelius  {43^) — The  four  quaestorships  open  to  plebeians  {421) — £xile  of 
Camillus — The  tribunes  in  the  Senate — The  Gallic  invasion— Summary  of 
laws  .......  Page  89 


CHAPTER    IX 

The  Gauls  in  Italy — The  Senones  and  Lingones  attack  Clusium— Roman 
envoys  at  Clusium  join  in  the  battle — The  Romans  refuse  satisfaction — 
Advance  of  Brennus  on  Rome — Battle  of  the  Allia  (midsummer  390) — Burn- 
ing of  Rome  and  defence  of  the  Capitol  by  Manlius — Camillus  at  Ardea — His 
recall  and  appointment  as  dictator — Saving  of  the  Capitol  by  the  geese — 
Exhaustion  of  the  Gauls  by  pestilence — They  overrun  the  Campagna — 
Recalled  home  by  an  invasion  of  the  Veneti — Camillus  said  to  have  attacked 
and  retaken  gold  and  standards — Effects  of  the  capture  on  Rome     Page  114 


CHAPTER    X    . 

Hostilities  break  out  against  Rome  after  the  departure  of  the  Gauls — Camillus 
conquers  the  Etruscans,  Volscians,  and  Aequians  (389) — Fresh  war  with 
Volscians  and  Etruscans ;  capture  of  Sutrium  and  Nepete  (386) — The 
Volscians  joined  by  some  of  the  Latini  and  Hernici  ;  colony  sent  to  Satricum 
(385) — Pestilence — Rebellions  at  Lanuvium,  Circeii,  Velitrae,  Praeneste  (383- 
382)— War  with  Volscians  and  rebellion  at  Tusculum  (381) — Cincinnatus 
conquers  the  rebellious  Praenestines  (380) — -A  Roman  disaster  in  Volscian 
territory  (379)— Conquest  of  Volscians  and  Latins  (378-377)- — The  Gauls 
(367-282) — The  first  Samnite  war  (343-342) — The  Latin  rebellion — T,  Man- 
lius Torquatus  (340-339) — Dissolution  of  the  Latin  League,  and  last  struggles 
of  the  Latin  towns  (338-336) — First  dramatic  shows   .  .  Page  123 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


The  Conquest  of  Italy,  b.c.  326-265 

CHAPTER    XI 

Magna  Graecia — Invitation  from  Tarentum  to  Archidamus  (338)  and  Alexander 
{333) — Alexander's  treaty  with  Rome — Palaepolis  garrisoned  by  Samnites — 
2nd  War  declared  with  Samnites  (326) — Treaty  with  Neapolis — Confederacy 
in  South  Italy— The  Caudine  Forks — The  Senate  refuse  the  terms  of  Pontius 
(321) — Revolt  of  Volscian  towns — Capture  of  Luceria,  victories  in  Apulia 
and  Lucania,  revolt  and  recovery  of  Sora  (320-314) — Destruction  of  Ausones 
and  colonising  of  Luceria  (314-313)— Victory  over  Samnites  at  Cinna  (313) — 
Development  of  Roman  power  in  Italy,  and  growth  of  navy  (313-312) — 
Etruscan  war  and  battle  at  the  Vadimonian  lake  (311-309) — Wars  with 
Samnites  and  Hernici  (308-306) — Peace  with  Samnites  (304)  .  Page  135 

CHAPTER    XII 

Between  the  second  and  third  Samnite  wars  (303-298) — Complaint  of  the  Lucan- 
ians  and  the  beginning  of  the  third  Samnite  war  (298) — -The  Samnites  league 
■  with  Etruscans  and  Gauls  (296) — Failures  of  Appius  Claudius  Caecus  (296) 
— Battle  of  Sentinum  (295) — Last  five  years  of  the  war  (294-290) — The 
legiones  lititeatae — Battle  of  Aquilonia  (293) — Capture  and  execution  of 
C.  Pontius  (292) — Peace  with  the  Samnites  (290),  and  their  subsequent 
attitude  towards  Rome  .....  Page  152 

CHAPTER    XIII 

The  period  [jgo- 286)  full  of  wars,  and  not  marked  by  literary  production — Great 
groivth  of  Rome  witnessed  by  iticrease  of  tribes,  nuinbers,  colonies — The 
struggles  betwee?i  patricians  afid  plebeians — Proposed  relief  of  poverty  ;  M. 
Manlius  {38^) — Measures  against  usury  {378-2g7) — Abolition  of  nexMS  [326) 
— Licinian  rogatiotis  proposed  (376)  .•  their  purpose,  resistance  to  them, 
carried  {367) — The  praetor — Curule  aedile — Decernviri  sacrorum — The 
comitia  tributa — First  plebeian  censor  {331) — Leges  Publiliae  (jjp) — 
First  plebeian  praetor  {336) — Censorship  of  Appius  Claudius  Caecus  {312- 
3og) — His  innovations  and  their  aim — Cn.  Flavins  publishes  the  legal 
formulae  [303) — Lex  Ogulnia  {2g6) —  Lex  Hortensia  {286) — The  new 
nobility  and  the  Senate — Stories  of  the  wife  of  Licinius  and  of  the  Chapel  of 
Castitas  Patricia — First  law  against  ambitus  {35S) — Laws  against  usury — 
Sumptuary  laws  ......  Page  163 

CHAPTER    XIV 

From  the  end  of  the  third  Samnite  war  to  the  invasion  of  Pyrrhus  (b.c.  290-280) 
— Wars  with  Senones  and  Boii  with  Etruscan  contingents — Defeat  of  the 
Lucani  and  Bruttii  in  the  territory  of  Thurii— ^Quarrel  with  Tarentum,  and 
the  invitation  to  Pyrrhus  .....  Page  176 

CHAPTER  XV 

Early  life  of  Pyrrhus — He  comes  to  Tarentum — Message  to  the  Roman  consul 
—Battles  of  Pandosia  (Heraclea),  Asculum  (280-279) — State  of  Sicily— 


CONTENTS 


Pyrrhus  goes  to  Syracuse — Attacks  the  Mamertines  and  Carthaginians  :  takes 
Agrigentum,  Panormus,  Hercte,  and  other  towns — Besieges  Lilybaeum  un- 
successfully— Recalled  to  Italy  (278-275) — Battle  of  Beneventum  (275) — 
Pyrrhus  retires  to  Tarentum  and  returns  to  Epirus  (274) — The  Romans  take 
Tarentum  and  Rhegium  :  subdue  Lucania,  Bruttiuni,  and  Calabria,  and  the 
Picentines,  and  become  supreme  in  Italy  (274-265)      .  .  Page  183 


Contest  with  Carthage  for  supremacy   in  the 
Mediterranean,  b.c.   264-201. 

CHAPTER  XVI 

The  limitations  of  consular  powers^  and  their  devolution  on  other  curule  magis- 
trates, censors,  and  praetors — The  aediles,  quaestors,  praefectus  urbis,  and 
sacred  colleges — The  legion,  its  enrolment,  numbers,  officers,  discipline,  en- 
campment, and  disposition  in  thejield  .  .  .  Page  202 

CHAPTER  XVII 

Seeds  of  hostility  between  Rome  and  Carthage — Object  of  the  first  Punic  war  was 
Sicily — The  Phoenicians  and  Greeks  in  Sicily — The  Sicani,  Elymi,  and  Siceli 
confused  by  the  Romans  with  Greek  Siceliots — Character  of  Sicilian  Greeks — 
Power  of  Syracuse — Carthage,  its  foundation,  constitution,  and  the  char- 
acter of  its  people — Their  possessions  in  Sicily — The  boundary  of  the  Halycus 
— Cause  of  the  Romans  coming  to  Sicily,  and  the  results  of  the  war  to  the 
two  peoples  contrasted — Romans  and  Carthaginians  compared — Judgment 
of  Polybius — The  city  and  harbours  of  Carthage  .  .  Page  219 

CHAPTER   XVIII 

First  Punic  war — First  Period  (264-262) — Help  sent  to  Messana  at  the  request  of 
the  Mamertini — Claudius  enters  Messana — Battle  with  Hiero,  and  with  the 
Carthaginians — The  siege  of  Syracuse  (263) — The  consuls  lay  siege  to  Agri- 
gentum— Hiero  makes  alliance  with  Rome — Many  cities  in  Italy  join  the 
Romans  —  Fall  of  Agrigentum  (262).  Second  Period  (261-255)  —  The 
Romans  build  a  fleet — Loss  of  the  consul  Scipio — Victory  of  Duilius  at 
Mylae  (260) — Relief  of  Segesta,  siege  of  Hippana,  Mytistratum,  Camarina 
(259-258)  —  Naval  battle  off  Tyndaris  (257)  —  Battle  of  Ecnomus,  the 
Romans  land  in  Africa  :  after  successful  campaign  Regulus  is  left  for  the 
winter  at  Clupea  with  half  the  army  (256) — Defeat  and  capture  of  Regulus 
(255)      ........  Page  233 

CHAPTER  XIX 

Third  Period  (255-251) — The  Romans  increase  their  fleet,  but  abandon  Clupea 
— The  fleet  is  lost  in  a  storm  (259) — A  fleet  is  again  built  and  Panormus  is 
taken  (254) — The  Roman  fleet  is  again  wrecked  (253) — The  Romans  abandon 
the  sea,  but  Himera,  Thermae,  and  Lipara  are  taken,  the  last  by  help  of  ships 
from  Hiero  (252) — Victory  of  Metellus  at  Panormus — Alleged  mission  of  M. 
Regulus — The  Carthaginians  remove  the  people  of  Selinus  to  Lilybaeum 
(251).    Fourth  Period  (250-241)— The  Romans  again  build  a  fleet  and  invest 


XVI  HISTORY  OF  ROME 


LiLYBAEUM  (250) — Great  defeat  of  Claudius  at  Drepana — Wreck  of  a  large 
fieet  of  transports  carrying  provisions  to  the  camp  at  Lilybaeum — C.  Junius 
PuUus  seizes  Eryx  (249) — Siege  of  Lilybaeum  continued  (248) — Hamilcar 
Barcas  comes  to  Sicily,  and  occupies  Hercte  (247) — Hasdrubal  seizes  Eryx 
and  besieges  the  Romans  on  the  summit  of  the  mountain,  and  is  himself 
besieged  in  Eryx — Frequent  but  indecisive  engagements  at  Lilybaeum,  Eryx, 
and  Hercte  (246-243) — The  Romans  once  more  build  a  fleet  (243) — Great 
victory  of  Lutatius  at  the  Aegates  islands  (loth  March) — the  Carthaginians 
evacuate  Sicily,  which  became  a  Province  (241)       .  .         Page  253 


CHAPTER  XX 

Progress  in  Italy  during  the  first  Punic  war — Six  days'  campaign  against  Falerii 
(241) — Mutiny  of  mercenaries  in  Carthage — The  "  truceless  war  "  (241-238) 
— Sardinia  surrendered  to  Rome  (238) — Wars  with  Liguriansand  Boii  (239- 
237) — Temple  of  Janus  closed  (235) — Illyrian  war  (229-228) — Embassies  to 
Aetolian  and  Achaean  Leagues  (228) — Agrarian  law  of  Gaius  Flaminius  (232) 
— Gallic  war  (225-221) — The  Via  Flaminia  (220)  .  .  Page  269 


CHAPTER  XXI 

Social  distinctions — Apparent  change  in  character  and  influence  of  Senate  and 
the  aristocracy — Increase  in  number  of  slaves,  and  consequences  of  it —  The 
Libertini  and  Peregrini — The  games — Gladiators — Funerals — Women  and 
divorce — New  nobles — Greek  influence  on  personal  habits,  and  on  literature — 
Livius  Andronicus — Cn.  Naevius — Absence  of  prose  writings  Page  283 


CHAPTER  XXII 

Second  Punic  war — First  Period,  from  219  to  spring  of  217 — Origin  of  the  war, 
Carthaginian  expansion  in  Spain,  Hamilcar,  238-229  ;  Hasdrubal,  229-221  ; 
Hannibal,  221-218 — Roman  treaty  with  Hasdrubal  confining  the  Cartha- 
ginian supremacy  in  Spain  to  the  country  south  of  the  Ebro  (228) — Founding 
of  New  Carthage  about  the  same  time — The  Romans  make  treaty  of  friend- 
ship with  the  semi-Greek  communities  of  Emporiae  and  Saguntum — Hannibal 
becomes  general  of  the  Carthaginian  forces  in  Africa  and  Spain  (221) — He 
subdues  the  Olcades  (221),  the  Vaccaei  (220) — The  Saguntines  in  alarm 
appeal  to  Rome — Roman  commissioners  visit  Hannibal  in  the  winter  220, 
ordering  him  to  abstain  from  attacking  Saguntum,  or  from  crossing  the  Ebro 
— They  then  go  to  Carthage — The  second  Illyrian  war  (219) — Hannibal  takes 
Saguntum  after  a  siege  of  seven  months  (219) — The  Romans  send  an  embassy 
to  Carthage  demanding  the  surrender  of  Hannibal,  and  on  the  refusal  of  the 
Carthaginian  Senate  Fabius  declares  war  (219-218) — Hannibal  starts  from 
New  Carthage  in  the  early  summer  of  218 — Subdues  Spain  north  of  the  Ebro, 
and  puts  it  under  the  care  of  Hanno  ;  crosses  the  Pyrenees  and  arrives  at  the 
Rhone  while  Scipio  is  still  only  at  Marseilles  (September,  218) — P.  Cornelius 
Scipio  finding  himself  too  late,  sends  on  his  brother  Gnaeus  to  Spain,  returns 
himself  to  Italy  with  a  few  men,  and  takes  over  the  legions  of  the  praetors 
and  awaits  Hannibal  on  the  Po — Hannibal  crosses  the  Alps  and  descends 
into  the  basin  of  the  Po,  takes  Turin  and  defeats  Scipio's  cavalry  on  the 
TiciNUS — Scipio  (wounded)  retires  to  the  Trebia  near  Placentia,  south  of  the 
Po — He  is  joined  by  the  other  consul  Sempronius  Longus  from  Ariminum — 


CONTENTS  xvn 


Defeat  of  Sempronius  on  the  Trebia — The  Romans  go  into  winter  quarters  at 
Placentia  and  Cremona — Meanwhile  Gnaeus  Scipio  defeats  and  captures 
Hanno  in  Spain,  and  secures  the  country  north  of  the  Ebro  (summer  of 
218)  ........  Page  289 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

Flaminius  enters  upon  his  consulship  at  Ariminum  (217) — Hannibal  marches  into 
Etruria — His  sufferings  in  the  marshes  of  the  Arno — Battle  of  the  Thrasy- 
MENE  Lake — Q.  Fabius  Maximus  Verrucosus  (Cunctator)  baffles  Hannibal, 
who  enters  Campania,  but  finds  it  unsuitable  for  winter  quarters — He  makes 
his  way  back  to  Apulia  by  a  stratagem,  and  encamps  near  Gerunium — 
Minucius  made  equal  to  Fabius,  but  defeated  by  Hannibal — Preparations  in 
the  winter  of  217-216 — P.  Terentius  Varro — The  Battle  of  Cannae — 
Courage  and  activity  of  Varro  after  the  battle — His  return  to  Rome 

Page  313 

CHAPTER  XXIV 

{2nd  Period) 

Hannibal,  after  Cannae,  is  joined  by  Italian  towns — Enters  Campania,  recoils 
from  Naples,  but  is  joined  by  Capua — Movements  of  Marcellus — The  Castra 
Claudiana.  Spain — Defeat  of  Hasdrubal  and  diversion  of  Carthaginian 
reinforcements  from  Italy  (216) — Hannibal  winters  in  Capua  (216-215) — 
Takes  Casilinum  (215) — Fall  of  Postumius.  Sicily — Death  of  Hiero — 
Hieronymus  joins  Carthage — Revolution  at  Syracuse  and  death  of  Hierony- 
mus  (215) — Hippocrates  and  Epicydes  at  Syracuse  defy  the  Romans — Mar- 
cellus in  Sicily — Siege  of  Syracuse  (214-212) — The  inventions  of  Archimedes 
— ^^Hanno  at  Agrigentum  (212).  Italy  (214-207) — Hannibal  in  Campania 
— Goes  to  Tarentum  (214) — Fabius  takes  Arpi — Hannibal  takes  Tarentum 
(212) — Livius  holds  the  citadel  (212-210) — Siege  of  Capua — Hannibal's 
march  on  Rome — Fall  of  Capua  and  settlement  of  Campania  (211) — Fall  of 
Cn.  Fulvius  at  Herdonia — Three  days'  fighting  in  Lucania — Marcellus  con- 
fined to  Venusia  (210) — Fabius  recovers  Tarentum  (209) — Fall  of  Marcellus 
(208) — Defeat  of  Hasdrubal  on  the  Metaurus  (207)     .  .  Page  331 

CHAPTER  XXV 

{2>^d  Period) 

Change  in  the  location  of  the  war — Events  in  Sicily  from  210  and  settlement  of 
the  island — The  war  in  Spain  from  215 — Recovery  of  Saguntum — Syphax — 
Fall  of  the  Scipios  (212) — Gallantry  of  L.  Marcius — C.  Claudius  in  Spain  out- 
witted by  Hasdrubal  (211-210) — Character  of  P.  Cornelius  Scipio — Elected 
proconsul  for  Spain  (2ii)-^His  first  year  in  Spain  spent  in  negotiations  (210- 
209) — Capture  of  New  Carthage  and  release  of  hostages  (209) — Battle  of 
Baecula  and  departure  of  Hasdrubal  for  Italy  (208) — Battle  of  Ilipa — Scipio's 
visit  to  Syphax  :  his  illness,  and  the  mutiny  on  the  Sucro — His  interview  with 
Masannasa — The  defeat  of  Indibilis  and  Mandonius  (207-206) — Scipio  returns 
to  Rome  (206-205) — Scipio  elected  consul  has  Sicily  as  his  province,  and 
prepares  to  invade  Africa  (205) — The  disturbance  at  Locri  and  accusations  of 
Scipio  (205-204) — He  crosses  to  Africa,  is  joined  by  Masannasa,  and  winters 
near  Utica  (204-203) — Storm  and  burning  of  the  camps  of  Hasdrubal  and 
Syphax  (203) — Hannibal  returns  to  Africa  (203) — Negotiations  for  peace 
broken  off — Hannibal's  interview  with  Scipio — Victory  at  Zama  and  terms 
imposed  on  Carthage  (202)     .....         Page  360 


xvill  HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Growth  of  the  Provincial   Empire,  b.c.  200-133 
CHAPTER    XXVI 

Settlement  of  Italy  after  the  second  Punic  war — Changes  in  Roman  life  during 
the  epoch — The  Senate — The  army — Tendency  to  leave  country  life — Litera- 
ture: Ennius,  Plautus — Their  illustration  of  city  life — Their  identification 
of  Greek  and  Roman  gods — CaIlO  and  country  life       .  .  P3,ge  395 

CHAPTER    XXVn 

The  state  of  Asia  and  Greece  from  323  to  215 — The  development  of  the  three 
great  kingdoms  of  Egypt,  Asia,  and  Macedonia — The  lesser  Asiatic  powers, 
Pergamos,  Bithynia,  Cappadocia,  and  Galatia — The  extent  of  the  Mace- 
donian influence  in  Asia  and  Greece — The  Achaean  and  Aetolian  Leagues — 
The  accession  of  Philip  V. — He  conceives  the  idea  of  invading  Italy — His 
treaty  with  Hannibal — The  Romans  declare  war  with  him  (215) — His  defeat 
at  Apollonia — His  vigorous  measures  and  victory  over  the  Aetolians  at  Lamia 
(209) — The  war  languishes  for  some  time  (208-206),  but  the  Romans,  by 
the  advice  of  Sulpicius,  are  unwilling  to  make  peace — The  Aetolians  there- 
fore make  a  separate  peace  with  Philip  :  followed  by  general  pacification  at 
Phoenice  (205)  ......  Page  408 

CHAPTER    XXVni 

The  conduct  of  king  Philip  during  the  peace  of  205-200 — His  league  with 
Antiochus  against  Egypt  (205),  and  his  attacks  on  the  Cyclades  and  Thracian 
Chersonese  of  Asia  (202-201) — The  Rhodians  and  king  Attains  declare  war 
with  him  (201) — Appeals  from  Ptolemy  and  the  Greek  states  to  Rome — 
The  Roman  commissioners  in  Egypt  and  Greece  (203-201) — The  Romans 
proclaim  war  (200) — P.  Sulpicius  Galba  lands  in  Epirus  and  sends  aid  to 
Athens — Ineffective  campaigns  of  200  and  199 — Arrival  of  T.  Quintius 
Flamininus  (198) — Victory  of  Flamininus  in  the  Antigoneian  Pass  and  his 
march  through  Greece — The  Achaean  League  join  Rome  (198)  —  Peace 
congress  of  Nicaea  fails  (198-197) — Campaign  of  197  and  battle  of  Cynos- 
CEPHALAE — Freedom  of  some  Greek  states  proclaimed  at  Isthmian  games 
(196) — War  with  Nabis  of  Sparta,  settlement  of  Greece  and  triumph  of 
Flamininus  (195-194) .  .....  Page  423 

CHAPTER    XXIX 

I.  The  Boil — The  importance  of  the  struggle  with  them  and  the  Ligures — The 
Boii  attack  Cremona  and  Placentia  (199) — The  Insubres  help  the  Boii,  and 
are  defeated  by  C.  Cornelius  Cethegus  (197) — Marcellus  takes  Felsina  (196) 
— L.  Cornelius  Merula  defeats  the  Boii,  but  is  refused  a  triumph  (193) — 
Scipio  Nasica  finally  conquers  the  Boii  (191) — The  province  of  Gaul  informal 
from  191,  formal  from  181 — Road  made  from  Bononia  to  Arretium,  and  the 
construction  of  the  via  Aemilia  (187) — Colonies  at  Pollentia,  Pisaurum, 
Bononia,  Parma,  Mutina,  and  Aquileia  (189-183) — Ligures  :  The 
Friniates  and  Apuani  threaten  Pisae  and  Bononia  (187),  defeat  Q.  Marcius 
(186),  but  are  defeated  by  M.  Sempronius  Tuditanus  (186),  and  finally 
crushed  by  L.  Aemilius  PauUus  (181),  and  are  transferred  by  M.  Baebius  to 


CONTENTS 


Samnium  (i8o) — Colonies  at  PiSAE  and  LUNA.  II.  Spain — Extent  of  Roman 
power  in  Spain — The  limits  of  the  provinces  of  Hispania  Citerior  and  Ulterior 
—  Hostility  of  the  Celtiberi  (205-198)  —  Appointment  of  two  additional 
praetors  for  Spain  (197) — Serious  risings  (197-196) — Cato  comes  to  Spain  as 
consul,  defeats  the  Spaniards  near  Emporiae,  and  advances  to  Tarraco — 
Causes  the  towns  to  throw  down  their  walls — Assists  the  praetor  of  Hispania 
Ulterior — Takes  Vergium  Castrum  (195-194)  —  Reverses  of  Sex.  Digitius 
(194-193) — P.  Cornelius  Scipio  Cn.  f.  conquers  the  Lusitani — C.  Flaminius 
the  Oretani  (193-192) — Twelve  years  comparative  peace  in  Spain  (191-179) 
Great  Celtiberian  rising  (i 81-179) — Victories  of  Tib.  Sempronius  Gracchus 
and  his  settlement  (179-178)  .....  Page  450 

CHAPTER    XXX 

Greece  after  the  settlement  of  Flamininus  (194-193) — Discontent  of  the  Aetolians 
— They  resolve  to  call  in  Antiochus — The  kingdom  and  early  reign  of 
Antiochus — His  confederacy  with  Philip  for  the  partition  of  Egypt — He 
occupies  the  Thracian  Chersonese  —  His  haughty  answer  to  the  Roman 
envoys — Hannibal  at  his  court — Hannibal's  plan  rejected — Nabis  of  Sparta 
breaks  the  terms  of  his  treaty,  and  the  Roman  fleet  come  to  Peloponnesus — 
Death  of  Nabis  (192) — Preparations  in  Rome  —  The  Aetohans  occupy 
Demetrias  and  invite  Antiochus  to  liberate  Greece — Antiochus  arrives  in 
Phthiotis  and  is  proclaimed  strategus  of  the  Aetolians  at  the  congress  at 
Lamia — He  takes  Chalcis  (192) — He  attempts  to  form  a  Greek  confedera- 
tion— Decay  of  his  forces  in  the  winter  of  192-191 — M'.  Acilius  Glabrio 
comes  to  Thessaly  in  190 — Defeat  of  Antiochus  at  Thermopylae  ,  who  returns 
to  Asia — L.  Cornelius  Scipio  with  his  brother  Africanus  come  to  Greece  in 
July  189,  grant  six  months'  truce  to  the  Aetolians  and  march  to  the 
Hellespont — Meanwhile  the  Roman  fleet  had  taken  Sestos,  and  sailing  to 
Samos  shut  up  the  king's  fleet  at  Ephesus — Reduction  of  towns  in  Caria — 
Failure  at  Patara — Great  defeat  of  the  king's  fleet  in  the  bay  of  Teos — In 
October  190  the  consul  Scipio  crosses  the  Hellespont,  and  in  November 
conquers  the  king  at  Magnesia,  who  is  forced  to  evacuate  Asia  Minor — 
Settlement  of  Asia  and  victories  over  Pisidians  and  Gauls  by  Cn.  Manlius 
Vulso  (189-188) — End  of  the  Aetolian  war  and  capture  of  Ambracia  by  M. 
Fulvius  Nobilior  (189-188)      .....  Page  464 

CHAPTER    XXXI 

Last  days  of  Antiochus,  Hannibal,  and  Scipio- — ^The  anti-Roman  policy  of  Philip  V. 
in  the  last  years  of  his  life — Death  of  his  son  Demetrius — Death  of  Philip 
and  succession  of  Perseus  (179) — Character  of  Perseus — His  activity  and 
schemes  for  asserting  the  independence  of  Macedonia  and  regaining  supremacy 
in  Greece — The  jealousy  of  Rome  and  the  complaints  against  Perseus  made 
by  Eumenes — The  Senate  decide  to  go  to  war  (172) — The  first  campaign  in 
Thessaly  and  defeat  of  Licinius — Reduction  of  Boeotia  (171) — The  second 
campaign  in  Thessaly  also  abortive — Rising  in  Epirus  (170) — Third  cam- 
paign :  Marcius  Philippus  enters  Macedonia — Perseus  intrigues  with  Gen- 
thius,  Rhodes,  and  Eumenes,  but  is  only  helped  materially  by  Cotys  (169) — 
Fourth  campaign — Aemilius  Paulus  defeats  Perseus  at  Pydna,  who  is  captured 
in  Samothrace  (168) — Division  and  settlement  of  Macedonia — Punishment 
of  Epirus,  Aetolia,  and  the  Macedonia  party  in  Greek  states — Deportation 
of  Achaean  statesmen — Supremacy  of  Rome — Antiochus  and  Popilius  at 
Pelusium         .......  Page  498 


XX  HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAPTER    XXXII 

Suspension  of  the  tributum,  growing  luxury  and  consequent  cases  of  peculation 
and  embezzlement  —  Laws,  Calpurnia  de  repetundis  (149)  —  Sumptuary: 
Orchia  (182),  Fannia  (161),  Didia  (143) — Greek  literature  and  teachers — 
Writers  imitating  Greek  literature — Terence,  Pacuvius,  Statius  Caecilius — 
Cato's  opposition — Expulsion  of  Greek  rhetors  (161) — Visit  of  the  philoso- 
phers (155) — Demolition  of  stone  theatre  (151) — The  Bacchanalia  (186) — 
Laws  against  bribery,  Aemilia  Baebia  (182),  Cornelia  Fulvia  (159) — Ballot 
laws,  Gabinia  (139),  Cassia  (137) — Macedonia  between  167-146,  the  dis- 
contents arising  from  the  Roman  settlement  :  war  with  the  pseudo-Philippus, 
and  formation  of  the  province  (148-146) — Destruction  of  Corinth  and  settle- 
ment of  Greece  (146) — Carthage,  the  Roman  policy  in  favouring  Masannasa 
— Immediate  causes  of  the  third  Punic  war — Consuls  land  at  Utica  (149) 
Inefficient  conduct  of  the  war  (149-148) — Rising  reputation  of  Scipio  the 
younger  Africanus  (147) — Destruction  of  Carthage — The  province  of  Africa 
(146)  .......  Page  517 


CHAPTER    XXXIII 

Wars  with  Ligurians  and  Dalmatians  (168-155) — State  of  Spain  after  the  settle- 
ment of  Gracchus  (176).  I.  The  Lusitani  invade  tribes  subject  to  Rome 
(154) — Campaigns  of  L.  Mummius  and  M.  Atilius  (154-152) — Treacherous 
massacre  of  the  Lusitani  by  Galba  (150) — Rise  of  Viriathus  (147)  and 
disasters  of  Vetilius,  G.  Plautius,  and  Claudius  Unimanus  (147-145) — Cam- 
paigns of  Q.  Fabius  Aemilianus  (145-144) — Defeat  of  L.  Quinctius  (143) — 
Peace  made  by  Q.  Fabius  Servilianus  (142-141),  but  rejected  by  Q.  Servilius 
Caepio,  who  causes  the  murder  of  Viriathus  (141 -140)  —  Campaigns  of 
Decimus  Junius  Brutus  in  north-west  Spain  (138-136).  II.  Celtiberian 
Wars — the  Titthi,  Belli,  and  Arevaci — Disasters  of  Q.  Julvius  Nobilior 
(153-152) — M.  Claudius  Marcellus  makes  terms  and  founds  the  town  of 
Corduba  (i  52-151) — War  with  the  Arevaci  at  Numantia  and  the  Vaccaei 
continued  by  L.  Licinius  Lucullus  (151-150) — Five  years  peace  (149-144) — 
The  Arevaci  again  revolt  (144) — Campaigns  of  Q.  Caecilius  Metellus,  Q. 
Pompeius  Rufus,  M.  Popilius  Rufus,  C.  Hostilius  Mancinus,  Q.  Calpurnius 
Piso  (144-134) — Scipio  AemiHanus  sent  to  Numantia,  which  he  takes  after  a 
long  siege  (134-133)    ......  Page  537 


Period  of  Revolution  and  Civil  War,  b.c.   133-31 

CHAPTER    XXXIV 

State  of  Sicily  since  205 — Speculations  in  land — Miseries  of  the  slaves — Disorders 
in  the  island  from  about  139 — Murder  of  Demophilus,  and  organisation  of 
rebellion  under  Eunus  and  Cleon — Defeat  of  the  praetors — M.  Perpenna 
retakes  Henna  —  Defeat  of  Hypsaeus  —  Campaigns  of  C.  Fulvius  Flaccus 
(134-132)  and  P.  Rupilius — Capture  of  Tauromenium — The  lex  Rupilia 
(132) — Second  war  in  103— Fraudulent  reduction  to  slavery — Legal  decisions 
of  Licinius  Nerva  liberating  800  slaves — Protests  by  the  landowners — Out- 


I 


CONTENTS  XXI 


break  under  Tryphon  and  Athenion — L.   Licinius   Lucullus  (103-102) — C. 
Servilius  (102-101) — M'.  Aquillius  ends  the  war  (101-99)         •  Page  546 

CHAPTER    XXXy 

Depopulation  of  Italy  —  The  ager  publicus  —  Tiberius  Sempronius  Gracchus, 
tribunus  plebis  in  rjj,  attempts  to  re-enforce  the  Licinian  law — Diffi- 
culties of  the  attetnpt — Deposition  of  his  colleague  Octavius — The  law  passed 
and  a  land  commission  formed — He  promises  other  reforms,  but  is  killed 
while  seeking  re-election  as  tribune  for  ij2 — His  younger  brother  Gaius 
returns  to  Italy  in  ij2 — Supports  Carbo's  law  for  allowing  re-election  of 
tribunes — The  Italian  holders  of  ager  publicus /rc/^j^  against  the  resumption 
of  their  allotments — Scipio  supports  them  and  transfers  the  pidicial power  of 
the  commissioners  to  the  consuls — Death  of  Scipio  {i2g) — Foreign  affairs 
from  i2g  to  12^ — Gaius  Gracchus  in  Sa?-dinia  {126-12J) — Elected  tribune 
for  I2J — His  legislation:  (7)  de  provocatione,  [2)  lex  frumentaria,  (j)  lex 
militaris,  {4)  lex  judiciaria,  [5)  for  the  collection  of  the  taxes  in  Asia,  (6)  de 
provinciis,  (7)  de  sociis — His  roads,  bridges,  and  colonies  at  Fabrateria, 
Tarentum,  Capua,  and  Carthage — Outbidden  by  the  tribune  Livius  Drusus 
— Not  re-elected  a  third  time  as  tribune  for  121 — Proposal  to  annul  his 
colony  of  Junonia  at  Carthage — Death  of  Gracchus  dtiring  the  riot  on  the 
day  of  voting — Prosecution  of  his  followers — Results  of  the  movement 

Page  551 

CHAPTER   XXXVI 

The  formation  of  the  first  province  in  Transalpine  Gaul — Wars  with  Gauls,  the 
Balearic  islands,  and  Dalmatia — The  CiMBRi  defeat  Cn.  Papirius  Carbo 
at  Noreia  (113),  and  Manlius  and  Caepio  in  Gaul  (105) — History  of  Jugurtha 
— His  bribery  at  Rome — His  murder  of  Massiva — The  Jugurthine  war 
( 1 12-106) — Scandalous  misconduct  of  the  Roman  commanders — Successful 
campaign  of  Metellus  (109-108) — Marius  consul  (107) — Capture  of  Jugurtha 
(106) — Five  consecutive  consulships  of  Marius  (104-100) — His  conduct  of  the 
Cimbric  war — Great  defeat  of  the  Teutones  and  Ambrones  at  Aquae  Sextiae 
(102),  and  of  the  Cimbri  at  Vercellae  (loi)     .  .  .  Page  568 


CHAPTER    XXXVII 

Political  parties  at  Rome — The  Senate  and  the  equestrian  order — Frequent  scenes 
of  violence — Marius  and  the  reformed  army — The  second  tribunate  of  L. 
Appuleius  Saturninus — Murder  of  Nonius — Agrarian  law  of  Saturninus 
and  banishment  of  Metellus — Murder  of  Memmius — Death  of  Saturninus  and 
Glaucia  (100) — Events  abroad  from  102  to  92 — The  lex  Licinia  Marcia  and 
alienation  of  the  Italians  (95) — Compromises  proposed  by  M.  Livius  Drusus 
(91) — Death  of  Drusus — Prosecutions  of  Varius — The  Marsic  or  Social  war 
(90-88)  —  Sulla  consul  with  command  of  the  Mithridatic  war  —  Revolu- 
tionary proposals  of  Sulpicius  and  the  substitution  of  Marius  for  Sulla—Sulla 
advances  on  Rome — Death  of  Sulpicius  and  flight  of  Marius  (88) — Cinna 
consul  in  87 — Expelled  from  Rome,  raises  army  and  returns  with  Marius — 
Reign  of  terror  in  Rome — Death  of  Marius  in  his  seventh  consulship  (86) — 
Successive  consulships  of  Cinna,  persecution  of  the  party  of  Sulla,  and 
preparations  to  prevent  Sulla's  return  (85-84) — Death  of  Cinna  (84) 

Page  581 


xxu  HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAPTER    XXXVIII 

The  origin  and  state  of  the  Roman  province  of  Asia — Causes  of  discontent — Rise 
of  the  kingdom  of  Pontus  (315-121) — Early  life  and  character  of  Mithridates 
Eupator  ( 1 20-11 1) — His  victories  in  the  Crimea  and  extension  of  the  Pontic 
kingdom  north  of  the  Black  Sea  (i  11- 102) — His  tour  in  Asia  (105) — He  joins 
Nicomedes  of  Bithynia  in  an  attack  upon  Paphlagonia  (104) — Obeys  Roman 
commissioners  and  evacuates  Paphlagonia,  but  occupies  Galatia — Breach 
between  Nicomedes  and  Mithridates  in  regard  to  Cappadocia — Meeting  of 
Marius  and  Mithridates  (98) — The  Senate  order  Mithridates  to  evacuate  Cap- 
padocia (94) — Tigranes  of  Armenia  allied  with  Mithridates — Sulla  restores 
Ariobarzanes  (92) — M'.  Aquillius  in  Asia  (90-89) — Mithridates  determines  on 
war  (88) — Defeat  of  the  Roman  forces  and  massacre  of  the  Itahans  (88)— 
Mithridates  attacks  Rhodes,  and  his  general  Archelaus  occupies  Athens  (88- 
87) — Sulla  arrives  in  Greece  with  five  legions  (87)        .  .  Page  600 


CHAPTER    XXXIX 

Success  of  the  quaestor  Q.  Bruttius  Sura  in  the  spring  of  87 — Sulla  lands  in 
Epirus  in  the  early  summer,  and  marches  to  Athens — Revolution  of  feeling 
in  Greece — Siege  of  Athens  and  the  Peiraeus  (87-86) — Lucullus  sent  to  Egypt 
and  the  islands  to  collect  a  fleet  (86-85) — Capture  of  Athens  (86) — Destruction 
of  the  Peiraeus — Battleof  Chaeroneia  (86) — Unpopularity  of  the  government 
of  Mithridates  in  Asia  and  revolt  of  Ephesus  (86) — Dorylaus  defeated  by 
Sulla  at  Orchomenus  (85) — The  Romans  again  supreme  in  Greece — L. 
Valerius  Flaccus  sent  out  to  supersede  Sulla  is  murdered  by  Fimbria  (85) — 
Fimbria  overruns  Bithynia  (85) — Mithridates  takes  refuge  in  Pitane  (85-84) 
— Arrival  of  Lucullus  with  fleet,  and  negotiations  with  Mithridates  at 
Pergamus — Death  of  Fimbria  (84) — Return  of  Sulla  to  Italy  (83)     Page  623 


CHAPTER    XL 

Sulla  lands  in  Italy — He  is  joined  by  Metellus,  Pompey,  Crassus,  and  many  others 
— His  march  to  Rome — Defeat  of  Norbanus  and  the  younger  Marius  at  Tifata 
— Surrender  of  Scipio  and  Sertorius  at  Teanum — Fire  at  the  Capitol  (83) — 
Campaigns  of  82 — Defeat  of  Marius  at  Sacriportus,  and  siege  of  Praeneste — 
Victory  of  Metellus  on  the  Aesis — The  war  in  Etruria  and  Gallia  Cisalpina — 
Battles  of  Saturnia,  Clusium,  Faventia,  Fidentia — Flight  of  Norbanus  and 
Carbo — Defeat  of  the  Samnites  at  the  Colline  Gate — Fall  of  Praeneste  and 
Norba  (November  82) — Sulla  at  Rome — The  proscriptions — Sulla  dictator — 
His  political  reforms — His  code  of  laws — Fall  of  Nola  and  Volaterrae — 
Devastation  of  Samnium  (82-80) — Pompey  in  Sicily  and  Africa  (81) — Abdi- 
cation of  Sulla  (79) — His  death  (78) — Rome  expanded  into  Italy — Change 
in  the  colonial  system — Exte?it  of  Empire — Number  of  provinces — Their 
contributiofts  to  the  Roman  exchequer — Indifference  at  Rome  to  foreign  affairs 
—  The  new  generation — Devlopment  of  oratory  and  literature  .  Page  640 

CHAPTER    XLI 

Lepidus  attempts  to  rescind  Sulla's  acts — He  is  sent  to  Etruria  (78) — Attacks 
Rome — Is  defeated  and  goes  to  Sardinia  {77) — Sertorius  in  Spain — Defeats 
many  Roman  armies — The  campaigns  of  Metellus  (79-76) — Sertorius  joined 


CONTENTS 


by  Perpenna  and  partisans  of  Lepidus  {77) — Negotiates  with  Mithridates 
(75-74) — Ponipey  in  Spain  (76-74) — Death  of  Sertorius  (72) — RebelHon  of 
gladiators  and  slaves  under  Spartacus  (73-71)— Victories  of  Crassus  (72-71) 
— Second  war  with  Mithridates  under  Murena  (83-81) — Wars  with  Thracians 
and  with  the  pirates  (78-74) — Third  war  with  Mithridates  and  campaigns  of 
Lucullus  (74-67) — BiTHYNiA  left  to  the  Roman  people  (74) — Battle  at  Chal- 
cedon  and  siege  of  Cyzicus  (73) — Naval  victories  (72) — Battle  of  Cabira  (71) 
Mithridates  in  Armenia  (71-69) — Lucullus  invades  Armenia,  battle  at  Tigra- 
nocerta  (69) — Battle  ofArsanias  (68) — Mutiny  in  the  Roman  army  (67) — 
Recall  of  Lucullus  (67)  .  .  .  .  .  Page  659 

CHAPTER    XLII 

Pompey's  first  consulship — Censors — Restoration  of  Tribunician  power — The 
judices  (70)— Pompey  and  the  war  with  pirates  (67-66) — The  lex  Manilla 
appointing  him  to  Bithynia  and  the  Mithridatic  war — He  goes  to  Pontus — 
Two  defeats  of  Mithridates,  who  retires  across  the  Caucasus — Capture  of 
Artaxata  and  submission  of  Tigranes — Victory  over  the  Albani  (66) — Victory 
over  the  Iberes — Reduction  of  Pontus  and  settlement  of  Asia  (65) — Syria 
taken  from  Tigranes — Dispute  in  ludaea  between  Hyrcanus  and  Aristobulus 
— Pompey's  arrival  in  Damascus  (64) — Death  of  Mithridates — Pompey  takes 
Jerusalem  (63) — Returns  to  Amisos — Makes  final  arrangements  in  Pontus 
and  Asia — Returns  to  Rome  (62) — New  Provinces  :  Bithynia  and  Pontus 
(74-63),  Cyrene  (74)  joined  with  Crete  (67),  Syria  (64)      .         Page  679 


CHAPTER    XLHI 

State  of  parties  at  Pompey's  return — The  leaders  of  the  Optimates — The  Popu- 
lares  without  a  leader — C.  lulius  Caesar — His  early  career — His  support  of 
popular  measures  (73-68) — Quaestor  in  Spain  (68) — Supports  the  Gabinian 
(67)  and  Manilian  laws  (66) — Aedile  (65) — Fails  to  get  appointed  to  Egypt — 
Index  quaestio7iis  (64) — As  duovir  capitalis  condemns  C.  Rabirius — The 
Catiline  conspiracy  crushed  by  Cicero  as  consul — Caesar  advises  against 
executing  the  conspirators — His  election  as  pontifex  raaximus  (63) — Caesar's 
praetorship — His  contests  with  the  Senate — Fall  of  Catiline  (62) — Caesar 
propraetor  in  Spain  (61) — Caesar  returns  from  Spain  to  stand  for  consulship 
— Is  not  allowed  to  be  a  candidate  without  entering  Rome — Elected  consul, 
and  forms  a  league  with  Pompey  and  Crassus  (60) — His  consulship  and  laws 
(59) — P-  Clodius — His  violation  of  the  mysteries  (62) — His  adoption  into  a 
plebeian  gens  and  election  as  tribune  (59) — Cicero  is  banished  and  Caesar 
goes  as  proconsul  to  Gaul  (58) — Clodius'  laws — Quarrels  with  Pompey  who 
supports  the  recall  of  Cicero  (57) — 'Pom'pey  praefectus  annonae  for  five  years 
— Goes  to  the  congress  at  Lucca  on  Caesar's  invitation  (56)    .  Page  692 


CHAPTER    XLIV 

Caesar  vainly  attacked  for  actions  during  his  consulship  (58)— First  campaign 
in  Gaul  against  the  Helvetii  and  Ger7nans  under  Ariovistus  (58).  Second, 
against  the  Belgae  and  Nervii{$'j) — Attacks  upon  Caesar  in  Rome  by  Aheno- 
barbus,  and  the  conference  at  Lucca  (57-56).  Third  campaign  in  Gaul,  the 
Veneti — Consulship  of  Pompey  and  Crassus  (55).  Fourth  campaign,  de- 
feat of  Germans  on  the  Meuse — Crossing  the  Rhine — First  invasion  of  Britain 


XXIV  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

(5S).  Fifth  campaign,  second  invasion  of  Britain — Outbreak  in  North 
Gaul  and  loss  of  a  legion  (54).  Sixth  campaign,  the  Nervii  and  Tre- 
yeri — Second  crossing  of  the  Rhine  (53).  Seventh  campaign,  Rebellion 
in  southern  Gaul — Capture  of  Avaricum — Failure  at  Gergovia — Capture  of 
Alesia  (52).  Eighth  and  Ninth  campaigns,  reduction  and  pacification  of 
Gaul  (51-50)— Events  leading  to  the  Civil  war  (55-50) — The  Senate  decide 
to  give  Caesar  a  successor — Refuse  to  consider  his  despatch — Expel  the 
tribunes— Caesar  crosses  the  Rubicon  [January  49]      .  .  Page  718 


CHAPTER   XLV 

Civil  war — Preparations  for  the  defence  of  Italy — Caesar's  rapid  advance — Fruit- 
less negotiations — Pompey  leaves  Italy — Caesar  at  Rome — Siege  of  Massilia 
— Campaign  in  Spain — Surrender  of  Massilia — Caesar  declared  dictator  holds 
elections  (49).  Caesar  as  consul  crosses  to  Macedonia  to  attack  Pompey — 
His  difficulties — Beleaguers  Pompey's  camp — Pompey  pierces  his  lines — 
Retreat  to  Thessaly — Battle  of  Pharsalus — Death  of  Pompey  in  Egypt  (48). 
Alexandrine  war  (48-47) — Expedition  into  Pontus — Battle  of  Zela — Second 
dictatorship  (47) — Pompeians  in  Africa  (48-46) — Caesar's  campaign  in  Africa 
— Battle  of  Thapsus — Province  of  New  Africa — Rectification  of  calendar 
and  legislation,  year  of  445  days  (46).  Campaign  in  Spain  against  Pompey's 
sons — Battle  of  Munda — Third  dictatorship  (45) — Plans  for  enlargement  of 
Rome — Scheme  of  colonies— Preparations  for  Parthian  expedition — The  con- 
spiracy— Murder  of  Caesar  (44)  ....  Page  738 


CHAPTER   XLVI 

Antony  and  the  acta  of  Caesar — Popular  feeling  against  the  assassins — Change  in 
the  provincial  arrangements  of  Caesar— M.  Brutus  and  C.  Cassius  resist — 
Arrival  of  C.  Octavius  (May) — His  disputes  with  Antony — He  enrols  a  legion 
of  veterans — Antony  made  governor  of  Cisalpine  Gaul  for  43,  besieges  Dec. 
Brutus  in  Mutina  (44) — Decrees  of  Senate  against  Antony — Battle  near 
Mutina — Antony  in  Gaul,  joined  by  Lepidus,  Pollio,  and  Plancus — Death  of 
Decimus  Brutus — Octavius  (now  C.  Caesar  Octavianus)  comes  to  Rome  and 
is  elected  consul  (19th  August) — Makes  terms  with  Antony — The  Triumvirate 
— The  proscriptions  and  death  of  Cicero  (43) — M.  Brutus  and  C.  Cassius  in 
Macedonia  and  Syria — Sext.  Pompeius  in  Sicily — Battles  of  Philippi — Death 
of  Brutus  and  Cassius — Division  of  the  provinces  (42) — L.  Antonius  and  the 
siege  of  Perusia — M.  Antonius  and  Cleopatra — Disputes  between  Caesar  and 
Antony — Peace  of  Brundisium  (40) — Peace  of  Misenum  with  Sext.  Pompeius 
(39) — Defeat  and  death  of  Pompeius  (36-35) — Lepidus  deprived  of  power 
(35) — Antonius  in  the  East — Wars  in  Parthia  and  Armenia  (38-36)— 
Cleopatra's  renewed  influence  (36-33) — Battle  of  AcTiUM  (31) — Death  of 
Antony  and  Cleopatra  (30) — Province  of  Egypt — The  new  constitution — 
Literature  at  the  end  of  the  Republic — New  buildings  begun  at  Rome 

Page  763 


MAPS   AND   PLANS 


" 

PAGE 

The  Great  Divisions  of  Italy 

7 

Magna  Graecia 

i8 

Rome,  with  the  Walls  of  Servius   . 

24 

Latium     .             .             .             •             • 

30 

Campania             .... 

128 

The  Samnite  Wars 

137 

Etruria  ... 

148 

Sicily       .             .             .             • 

220 

Carthaginian  Possessions 

225 

Battle  of  Ecnomus 

247 

Spain        .            .            .            • 

292 

Gallia  Cisalpina 

30s 

The  Thrasymene  Lake 

31S 

Hannibal's  March  down  Italy 

.     318 

Cannae   .... 

.      326 

Syracusae 

•      338 

Harbour  of  Tarentum 

•     344 

Thessaly  and  Southern  Macedonia 

•     440 

Carthage 

•     533 

XXVI 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Asia  Minor 

Sulla's  Campaign  in  Boeotia  . 

Gaul  at  the  time  of  Caesar 

Caesar's  Lines  near  Dyrrachium 

North  Africa    . 

The  Roman  Empire 


PAGE 

60 1 
628 
721 
743 
751 
784 


CHAPTER   I 


PRELIMINARY 


le  consolidation  of  Italy — Four  periods  of  Roman  history  :  I.  Rise  of  the 
city  ;  II.  Conquest  of  Italy  ;  III.  the  growth  of  a  foreign  dominion  ;  IV.  Civil 
wars,  leading  to  the  rule  of  a  single  Emperor — The  place  of  Roman  in 
universal  history — Its  continuity. 


When,  after  the  victories  at  Philippi  in  42,  Antony  and   Octavian  Italy 
were  settling  the  division  of  the  Roman  world  between  them,  among  becomes  th. 
the  provinces  to  be  allotted  no  mention,  we  are  told,  was  made  of  •^^^^^• 
Italy,      They  assumed  that  everything  they  had  been  doing  had  been 
done,  not  to  gain  possession  of  Italy,  but  in  behalf  of  the  authority 
of  Italy  over  the  rest  of  the  Empire.^ 

Now  when  Rome  first  appears  as  a  corporate  town  it  had  only  a 
small  territory,  probably  not  more  than  five  miles  in  extent  in  any 
direction.  Its  history  should  teach  us  how  it  came  to  pass  that  Italy 
could  thus  be  spoken  of  as  constituting  the  Roman  State  and  not 
merely  the  city  of  Rome  :  how  first  the  city  on  the  Palatine  absorbed 
other  townships  and  became  Rome  of  the  Seven  Hills  ;  how  Rome 
of  the  Seven  Hills  secured  dominion  first  over  all  Latium  and  then 
over  all  Italy  ;  how  farther  it  was  led  step  by  step  to  extend  its 
power  over  Sicily,  Sardinia  and  Corsica,  Africa,  Spain  and  Gaul  in 
the  West,  and  eastward  to  Illyricum,  Macedonia,  Greece,  Asia  Minor, 
and  Syria. 

The  time  was  to  come  when,  one  man  being  at  the  head  of  the 
State,  all  these  countries  and  more  were  to  be  combined  into  one 
great  Empire,  in  which  all  free  inhabitants  possessed  equal  rights  of 
citizenship.  But  for  a  long  time  the  peoples  of  the  countries  external 
to   Italy  remained  in   the  position  of  conquered  subjects,   retaining 


IE 


^  Dio  48,  2  ;  cp.  id.  41,  52  ;  Caes.  B.  Civ.  i.  35. 
B 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


indeed  certain  local  freedoms  and  in  many  cases  even  their  native 
rulers,  but  being  really  subject  to  men  of  another  race,  who  ruled  and 
did  not  amalgamate  with  them. 

With  Italy  the  case  was  different.  There  too  the  supremacy  of 
Rome  was  the  consequence  of  success  in  war,  and  there  too  local 
freedom  and  local  forms  of  government  often  continued  to  exist. 
But  not  only  was  it  covered  with  a  network  of  colonies,  in  which 
the  settlers  retained  the  full  rights  of  Roman  citizens,  or  the  partial 
rights  known  under  the  name  of  Latinitas^  but  its  native  races  were 
also  gradually  organised  under  a  form  of  government  which  tended 
more  and  more  to  uniformity,  until  after  the  Social  war  the  lex 
Julia  (89)  gave  the  full  Roman  citizenship  to  all  the  cities  of  Italy 
below  a  line  marked  by  the  river  Rubicon  on  the  east  and  the  Macra 
on  the  west.  The  conquest  of  Italy  by  the  Romans,  therefore,  may 
in  one  point  of  view  be  rather  called  the  consolidation  of  all  Italians 
within  this  limit  into  one  nation. 

Yet  historical  continuity  was  preserved  by  the  fact  that  Italians 
possessed  the  sovereign  rights  of  a  nation  over  the  subject  provinces, 
not  as  Italians,  but  as  cives  Roinani.  For  though  Italy  became  in 
a  certain  sense  a  nation,  with  a  capital  city,  yet  Rome  was  more 
than  a  modern  capital.  The  idea  of  the  urban  state  was  strictly 
maintained.  The  magistrates,  whether  possessing  or  not  the 
full  powers  included  under  the  word  imperiimi^  could  not  be 
elected  elsewhere  ;  laws  could  only  be  passed  there  ;  treaties  and 
conditions  of  peace  must  be  confirmed  there.  At  Rome  alone 
could  the  Senate  properly  meet  ;  and  from  Rome  came  all  regulations 
for  the  provinces  and  all  provincial  governors.  Even  when  the 
government  became  practically  vested  in  the  person  of  one  man,  the 
ancient  forms  of  election  were  for  some  time  maintained  ;  the  names 
and  some  of  the  functions  of  the  republican  magistrates  were  still 
unaltered  ;  the  authority  of  the  Emperor  was  the  sum  of  the  powers 
of  various  city  magistrates  vested  in  a  single  man  for  life  ;  and  though 
both  Augustus  and  Tiberius,  in  fact,  conducted  the  affairs  of  their 
great  Empire  at  their  sole  discretion,  the  government  was  still 
directed  in  theory  by  the  Senatus  populusque  Roinanus. 

The  abolition  by  Tiberius  of  the  empty  form  of  popular  election 
marks  the  completion  of  the  first  step  in  a  change  which  was 
gradually  to  reduce  the  position  of  Rome  to  that  of  a  modern  capital, 
in  which  the  chief  seat  of  government  is  placed  for  convenience, 
though  nothing  is  held  to  prevent  the  highest  functions  from  being 
bestowed  and  exercised  elsewhere  ;  and  which  later,  when  (in  the  words 
of  Tacitus)  the  secret  had  long  been  revealed  "that  an  Emperor 
could  be  created  elsewhere  than  in  Rome,"  was  to  lower  it  still  more 
almost  to  the  level  of  a  provincial  city,  seldom  if  ever  visited  by  the 


CONTINUITY    OF    ROMAN    HISTORY 


Emperor,  and  whose  Senate  had  little  more  power  than  that  of  an 
ordinary  town  council. 

This,  however,  was  long  after  the  period  included  in  this  book.  The  four 
Our  history  up  to  the  reign  of  Augustus  falls  naturally  into  four  periods. 
periods.  First,  the  development  of  the  city  on  the  Palatine  into 
Rome,  and  the  extension  of  its  territory  in  Latium.  Secondly, 
Rome's  gradual  annexation  of  all  Italy.  Thirdly,  the  acquisition  of 
a  wide  foreign  dominion  outside  Italy  ;  and  its  government  of  the 
dominion  when  acquired.  Side  by  side  with  this  we  shall  have 
to  trace  the  changes  in  the  government  of  Rome  itself:  first 
under  kings,  next  under  a  republic  which,  beginning  as  a  close 
oligarchy  of  birth,  passes  to  an  oligarchy  of  wealth  ;  thence  to  a 
system  of  apparent  equality,  which  through  various  corruptions 
induces  a  series  of  civil  wars  leading  to  our  fourth  period,  in  which 
power  became  centred  in  the  person  of  one  man,  though  with  many 
of  the  republican  forms  still  maintained. 

The  interest  of  the  first  two  periods  is  confined  to  Italy.  In  the 
two  last  Roman  history  takes  its  place  in  the  line  of  universal 
history.  From  the  gradual  disruption  of  the  great  Empire  won  and 
civilised  by  the  Romans  the  modern  countries  of  Europe  have  mostly 
sprung,  many  of  them  still  Latin  in  speech,  in  law,  and  habits. 
As  their  lands  are  still  marked  by  Roman  works,  temples,  roads,  and 
walls,  so,  where  the  deluge  of  barbarian  invasion  has  not  succeeded 
in  wiping  out  its  traces,  the  peoples  of  modern  Europe  still  bear 
indelible  marks  of  Roman  rule.  Thus  Roman  history  is  not  an 
isolated  episode ;  it  supplies  the  true  origines  of  modern  history, 
without  which  much  of  it  must  be  unintelligible. 

There  is  also  an  inner  continuity,  a  necessary  connexion  between  Connexio 
the  periods  of  Roman  history  itself  The  Republic  is  not  fully  between 
intelligible  without  a  knowledge  of  the  traditions  of  the  kingly  period  ;  ^'^^'^' 
nor  the  Imperial  system  without  a  knowledge  of  the  struggles, 
reforms,  failures,  and  victories  of  the  RepubUc.  Many  of  the  enact- 
ments in  the  famous  body  of  Roman  law,  the  foundation  of  modern 
jurisprudence,  were  passed  in  the  time  of  the  Republic.  Many  of 
the  questions  touching  the  relations  of  citizens  to  each  other  and  to 
the  State  were  settled  in  the  struggles  between  rich  and  poor, 
privileged  and  unprivileged,  patrician  and  plebeian.  In  this  point  of 
view  the  "  fall  of  the  Republic  "  is  a  somewhat  misleading  phrase. 
In  a  sense  the  Republic  did  not  fall  in  the  time  of  Augustus  or  his 
successors.  Though  their  powers  and  function  were  altered  or 
curtailed  the  old  magistrates  were  still  appointed ;  the  old  laws 
were  still  in  force  ;  and  the  absolute  powers  of  the  Emperor 
were  generally  exercised  under  cover  of  an  authority  resting  on  the 
exercise   of  the   functions  of  consul,   censor,    or   tribune.      He   was 


HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap. 


tacitly  assumed  to  be  the  chosen  of  the  people  and  to  represent  in 
his  person  the  authority  of  the  old  populiis  Romanus^  to  whom,  there- 
fore, that  appeal  against  the  decision  of  other  magistrates  was 
addressed,  which  was  regarded  as  the  chief  safeguard  of  a  citizen's 
rights. 

Outside  Italy  the  Emperor  was  supreme  in  precisely  the  same 
way— by  absorbing,  that  is,  the  functions  of  the  proconsuls  or  pro- 
praetors of  former  times.  Here  there  was  even  less  break  of  con- 
tinuity. These  governors  .had  continued  to  do  really  what  the 
consuls  had  originally  done  at  home,  but  had  long  ceased  to  do. 
They  commanded  armies,  sat  as  judges,  collected  taxes.  These 
things  continued  to  be  done  by  representatives  of  the  Emperor,  who 
was  head  of  the  army  and  had  control  of  the  public  purse,  and  was 
the  ultimate  court  of  appeal. 

Thus  the  successive  periods  of  Roman  history  are  inextricably 
connected.  The  magistrates  divided  among  them  the  powers  once 
exercised  by  a  single  king  ;  the  Emperor  combined  again  the  powers 
of  the  magistrates  in  his  single  person.  The  conquests  of  one 
generation  led  inevitably  to  the  conquests  of  the  next.  The  civil 
difficulties  of  one  period  were  the  inheritance  from  the  difficulties  or 
mistakes  of  that  which  preceded.  No  period  must  be  omitted  if 
we  wish  to  understand  any. 


CHAPTER   II 

ITALY 

The  lie  of  the  Italian  peninsula — The  ancient  limitation  of  the  name — Its  sub- 
sequent enlargement,  first,  about  B.  c.  280,  up  to  the  Rubicon,  and  secondly, 
in  the  time  of  Augustus,  up  to  the  Alps — The  parcelling  out  of  the  peninsula 
by  the  Apennines — The  different  character  of  the  Apennines  in  the  centre  and 
south  of  Italy — Their  contiguity  to  the  sea,  and  the  consequent  fewness  of 
important  rivers — On  the  north  of  the  Apennines,  Gallia  Cisalpina  ;  on  the 
west,  Etruria,  Latium,  Campania  ;  on  the  east,  the  Senones,  Picenum, 
Pratutiani,  Vestini,  Marrucini,  Frentani,  Apulia,  Calabria ;  in  the  centre, 
Umbria,  Samnium  {  =  Sabini,  Marsi,  Samnites),  Picentini  :  continued  into 
Lucania  and  Bruttium — Effect  of  the  geographical  formation  on  the  history  of 
Italy,  early  causing  a  struggle  between  highlanders  and  men  of  the  plain. 

Of  the  three  great   Mediterranean   peninsulas,   that  which  has  for  The  lie  of 
more  than   two  thousand  years  been  known  as   Italy  lies  between  the'penin- 
46°  10'  and  37°  50'  N.  latitude.      It  slopes  so  much  to  the  south-east  ^'^''^' 
that  whereas  its  north-western  frontier  is  only  a  little  more  than   5°, 
its  south-eastern  extremity  is  more  than   16°  east  of  the  meridian 
of  Greenwich.      Its  natural  boundaries  are  the  Alps  on  the  north  and 
north-west,  and  the  sea  on  all  other  parts. 

This  is  Italy  as  we  know  it,  and  as  the  Romans  regarded  it  from   The  appH- 
about  B.C.  27.      But  for  a  long  time  this  name  was  not  applied  to  by  ^^^^^«  of 
any  means  all  the  peninsula.     Within  historical   knowledge   it  had   rf  ^^^f 
belonged  to  only  a  small  part  of  it,  south  of  a  line  drawn  from   about  different 
Metapontum  on,  the  gulf  of  Tarentum  to  Paestum,  nearly  fifty  miles  epochs. 
south  of  Naples,   including  the  districts  afterwards   called    Lucania 
and  Bruttium  ;  and  perhaps  earlier  still  was  confined  to  the  latter  of 
these  two. 

Again,  it  was  not  until  the  time  of  Augustus  that  the  basin  of  the 
Po  was  reckoned,  except  in  colloquial  language,  a  part  of  Italy.  All 
between  the  Alps  and  the  Apennines  was  known  by  separate  names, 
derived  from  its  inhabitants — Liguria,  Gallia,  Venetia ;  or  was 
spoken  of  by  the  general  term  Gallia  Cisalpina.      The  official  frontier 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Italy 
below  the 
Rubicon. 
General 
configura- 
tion.    The 
Apennines. 


Results  of 
the  lie 
of  the 
Apennines. 


of  Italy  was  first  the  Aesis,^  and  then  the  Rubicon  on  the  east,  and 
the  Macra,  just  above  Luna,  on  the  west,  the  Apennines  filling  up 
the  line  between  the  two  streams. 

This  part  of  the  peninsula,  then,  from  the  Rubicon  to  the 
southern  extremities,  had  obtained  the  name  Italia  from  about 
the  time  of  the  invasion  of  Pyrrhus  (281-275),  and  it  is  in  this 
sense  we  shall  speak  of  it  until  its  extension  to  the  Alps  in  the 
time  of  Augustus.  But  until  about  the  time  of  Pyrrhus  it  seems 
not  to  have  been  spoken  of  by  this  general  term.  The  various 
divisions,  such  as  Etruria,  Umbria,  Samnium,  and  the  like,  were 
specified;  and  if  the  name  Italia  was  used,  it  referred  to  the  southern 
portion  already  described  as  below  the  line  between  Paestum  and 
Metapontum. 

The  entire  peninsula  is  roughly  portioned  off  by  the  ramifica- 
tions of  the  Apennines.  From  their  point  of  junction  with  the 
Maritime  Alps — somewhere  about  Vada  Sabbata — the  Apennines 
stretch  across  the  country  in  a  direction  nearly  parallel  to  the  Po, 
almost  to  the  shore  of  the  Adriatic,  a  little  north  of  Ariminum,  about 
the  parallel  44°  N.  latitude.  Then,  leaving  Gallia  Cisalpina  to  the 
north,  they  bend  to  the  south,  and  run  in  a  direction  roughly 
parallel  to  the  eastern  shore  of  Italy  to  about  42°  N,  latitude,  the 
eastern  slopes  leaving  a  district  between  themselves  and  the  sea 
averaging  about  forty  miles  in  breadth,  while  the  average  distance 
between  the  western  slopes  to  the  Tyrrhenian  sea  is  about  double 
that  distance.  Thus  the  district  of  Etruria  is  left  on  the  west, 
intersected  indeed  by  less  elevated  mountains,  but  embracing 
also  considerable  plains  and  several  lakes  of  importance.  From 
42°  N.  latitude  the  mountains  take  a  more  westerly  direction,  en- 
closing between  themselves  and  the  sea  the  broad  undulating  plain 
of  Latium  and  Campania,  and  then,  still  bending  westward,  spread 
out  through  the  whole  of  Lucania  and  Bruttium,  from  Metapontum 
to  the  promontory  of  Leucopetra,  leaving  on  the  east  the  great  low- 
lands of  Apulia  and  Calabria.  The  south-west  range,  thus 
running  to  the  toe  of  Italy,  was  called  Sila,  and  was  looked 
upon  as  ending  with  Leucopetra ;  but  it  is  truly  continued  by 
the  mountains  of  Northern  Sicily,  the  Montes  Nebrodes  {inonti 
di  Madonia\  which,  like  the  Sila,  are  moderate  in  elevation  and 
covered  with  forest. 

One  consequence  of  the  peculiar  configuration  of  the  Apennines 
is  that,  forming  as  they  do  the  watershed  of  the  peninsula,  they  are 
too  near  to  either  sea  to  allow  of  many  great  or  important  rivers. 


^  The  Aesis  separated  Picenum  from  the  Senones.      When  the  Senones  were 
destroyed  {about  285-283)  the  boundary  of  Italy  was  extended  to  the  Rubicon. 


GEOGRAPHY    OF    ITALY 


The  Arnus,  the  Tiber,  the  Liris,  and  the  Volturnus  are  the  only 
considerable  streams  on  the  west;  while  on  the  east  no  river  of 
any  importance,  south  of  the  Po,  falls  into  the  Adriatic  until  41°  20' 


i      ~     ' 

1 
1 

-i^    , 

Y%\ 

K\ 

J 

I-            S     "■ 

I 

1^ 
■5  J 

S| 

SS 

2< 

2: 

i 

5„ 

5^ 

s- 

0,-"     ^ 

-a 

H 

1 

N.  latitude,  where  the  Aufidus,  with  its  affluents,  after  a  course  of 
some  length  from  the  eastern  slopes  above  Mount  Voltur,  finds  its 
way  to  the  sea.  Still,  from  the  eastern  slopes  of  the  Apennines 
at  least  fifteen  other  streams  fall  into  the  Adriatic,  which  at  certain 


8  HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Four  Sfcat 


times  of  the  year  are  formidable  torrents,  bringing  down  consider- 
able volumes  of  water,  i 

Again  in  Central  Italy  the  Apennines  (mod.  Abruzzi)  are  very 
lofty,  and  form  a  true  mountain  country,  with  upland  valleys,  table- 
lands, and  passes  ;  but  in  the  south  they  are  not  nearly  so  lofty, 
except  in  the  case  of  some  isolated  peaks ;  and  thus  Lucania 
(Oenotria)  and  Bruttium  (Italia),  though  still  to  be  called  moun- 
tainous districts,  are  neither  so  wild  nor  so  rugged  as  Central 
Italy.  Their  shores,  indeed,  form  a  district  proverbial  for  its  beauty 
and  pleasantness,  and  were  so  fringed  with  Greek  colonies  that 
they  acquired  the  name  of  Magna  Graecia. 

To  sum  up  the  general  facts  of  Italian  geography.      The  natural 


dtvtswns—-  divisions  into  which  the  peninsula  falls  are — (i)  The  basin  of  the  Fo, 

basin.  ^  (2)  between   the    Alps   and    the    Apennines,    including  Venetia,    Gallia 

Districts       Cisalpina,     Liguria,     sometimes     spoken    of    in    general    terms    as 

on  the  Gallia  Cisalpina.     (2)  07t  the  west^  between  the  Apennines  and 

Tyrrhen-     ^j^e  Etruscan  sea,  Etruria,  Latium,  and  Campania,  the  boundary 

C  ?)  Dis-      between  the  first  and  second  being  the  Tiber,  and  between  the  second 

tricts  on  the  and  third  the  Liris,  or  the  range   of  mountains   immediately  to  the 

Adriatic,     south-east  of  that  river,  according  as  the  ager  Falernus  is  counted 

{4)  Central  \^  Latium  or  Campania.      (3)   On  the  east,  taking  the  Rubicon  as 

"'^'  the  southern  boundary  of  Gallia  Cisalpina,   we   have  between  the 

Apennines  and  the  sea  a  maritime  district  extending  from  Ariminum 

to  the  river  Aesis  occupied  by  the  Senones.     From  the  river  Aesis, 

just  north  of  Ancona,  to  the  river   Matrinus,  south  of  Hatria,  the 

AGER  PiCENUS,  the  south  part  of  which  was  properly  called  Praetu- 

tianus  ager.      Between  the  river  Matrinus  and  the  river  Frento  come 

three  smaller  districts    occupied  respectively  by  the  Vestini,    Mar- 

RUCINI,  and  Frentani.     And  south  of  the  river  Frento  come  the  two 

large  districts  of  Apulia  and  Calabria,  occupying  the  great  space 

of  comparatively  flat  country  left  by  the  Apennines,  as  they  bend  to 

the  west,  between  themselves  and  the  Adriatic,  and  forming  the  heel 

of   Italy.      (4)    Central  Italy.,   consisting  of  the   mountainous   tract 

which  traverses  the  peninsula  in  a  slanting  direction,  following  the 

line  of  the  Apennines.     It  begins  with  Umbria  on  the  west  of  the 

Senones  ;  goes  on  with  a  great  district  sometimes  called  collectively 

Samnium,   sometimes  divided  into  the   separate   territories   of  the 

Sabini,  Mar  si.,  and  Sajnitites.      It  extends  from  the  river  Nar  to  the 

river   Silarus,   touching   the   western   coast   along   a  narrow  line  of 

shore  inhabited  by  the  Picentini  between   Salernum  and   Paestum. 

Of   this    central    district    LuCANiA    and    Bruttium    are,    properly 

1  The  Ariminus,  Crustumius,  Pisaurus,  Metaurus,  Aesis,  Potentia,  Flusor, 
Truentus,  Vomanus,  Aternus,  Sagrus,  Triniiis,  Tifernus,  Frento,  Cerbalus, 
following  the  order  of  the  rivers  from  north  to  south. 


II  RESULTS   OF   THE    GEOGRAPHICAL   FEATURES  9 

speaking,  a  continuation,  though,  as  has  been  said,  the  mountains 
which  nearly  cover  them  are  of  a  different  character  to  those  in  the 
more  northern  part,  and  constitute  a  highland  region  fitted  for 
pastoral  folk,  not  intersected  with  the  vast  heights  which  effectually 
separate  tribes  ;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  interval  between  the 
mountains  and  sea  is  comparatively  narrow,  and  therefore  gives  less 
room  for  the  distinction  between  natives  of  highlands  and  those  of 
maritime  plains,  conspicuous  elsewhere. 

These  are  the  broad  outlines   of  the  geography  of  Italy.      The 
particular  features  of  each  district,  the  mountains  and  rivers  which 
subdivide    it,    are    often    most    necessary   to    be    known    in    study- 
ing popular  movements   or  campaigns.      But  they   must  partly  be 
described  as  we  go  on  ;  partly  must  be  learnt  from  other  books  and 
maps.      Some  general  facts,  closely  connected  with   this  geography, 
must  be  kept  in  mind.     The  long  eastern  coast  line  has  few  indenta-   Wara  of 
tions  or  harbours,  and  therefore  the  people  did  not  readily  take  to  harbours 
the  sea  or  make  their  way  to  the  Greek  shore  ;  but  on  the  west  and  ^p    f 
south  the  outlets  are  more  numerous,  and  therefore  the  dealings  of 
the  Italians  with  other  nations  were  mostly  to  and  from  the  west  and 
south.      Secondly,  the  Alps  are  easier  of  ascent  from  the  north  than 
from    the   south,    and    thus    migrations    into    Italy   were    frequent, 
from    Italy   northwards    almost   unknown.       Lastly,    Italian    history 
for  a  long  time  deals  with  the  struggles  of  peoples  living  on  plains  The  divi- 
and   by   the    sea — and   therefore   agricultural   or  mercantile — with  «f«  ^''^^^ 
tribes  living  in  central  mountains,  who  are  therefore  mainly  pastoral  "■ighland 
in  their  way  of  life,  less  settled,  less  civilised,  and,  accordingly,  less  ^^^^^ 
capable  of  permanent  progress  and  continuous  dominion.      In  such  peoples. 
a  struggle  ultimate  victory  is  usually  with  those  who  are  the  more 
capable  of  civilisation,  of  progress  in  the  arts  and  in  material  pros- 
perity, if  they  have  the  power  or  the  good  fortune  to  repel  the  first 
assaults  of  the  more  hardy  mountaineers. 


CHAPTER    III 


INHABITANTS   OF    ITALY 


The  inhabitants  of  Italy — Iberian  and  Ligurian  tribes  in  Italy  before  the  beginning 
of  history — First  to  arrive  the  OscANS  and  Iapygians  ;  followed  by  the 
Umbro-Latins,  dividing  into  Umbrians  and  Latini — (2)  The  Sabellians 
or  Sabines,  which  branch  off  as  Samnites,  Picentes,  Peligni,  and  perhaps 
Marsi,  Marrucini,  and  Vestini — The  Samnites  branch  off  into  Frentani, 
Lucani,  Apulia,  Bruttium — (3)  The  Etruscans,  their  occupation  of  the  north 
basin  of  the  Po,  and  partial  occupation  of  the  south — Their  gradual  expulsion 
by  (3)  the  Celts,  who  came  over  the  Alps  in  various  waves,  whence  North 
Italy  is  called  Gallia  Cisalpina,  which  includes  the  probably  distinct  tribes  of 
the  Ligures  and  Veneti — (4)  The  Greek  colonies  in  Southern  Italy  mingle  with 
Oenotrians  and  Ausonians  and  Itali,  but  are  eventually  overrun  by  Bruttii, 
Lucani,  and  Apuli,  who  give  their  names  to  the  districts. 


Early  in- 
habitants 
of  Italy. 
Litnits  of 
the  inquiry. 


Iberians 
and  Ligur- 
ians. 


It  is  not  the  province  of  the  historian  of  Rome  to  trace  to  remote 
times,  even  were  it  possible  to  do  so,  the  migrations  of  races.  We 
have  to  deal  with  Italy  as  it  was  from  the  eighth  century  B.C.  down- 
wards, and  the  origin  of  the  various  peoples  inhabiting  it  need  only 
be  noticed  so  far  as  it  helps  to  explain  the  state  of  things  then 
actually  existing,  and  the  mutual  relations  of  its  various  parts.  Even 
the  little  that  must  be  said  here  on  this  subject  is  encompassed  by 
difficulties,  and  though  we  may  beheve  ourselves  to  have  a  theory 
which,  on  the  whole,  reasonably  accounts  for  many  of  the  known 
facts,  we  must  remember  that  direct  evidence  is  exceedingly  scanty, 
if,  indeed,  it  may  be  said  to  exist,  and  that  most  statements  are 
inferences  drawn  from  researches  made  in  a  great  variety  of  ways, 
and  variously  interpreted. 

There  is  reason  for  believing  that  before  the  arrival  of  the  Aryan 
peoples, — that  is,  peoples  speaking  some  variety  of  the  languages 
grouped  by  philologists  under  this  collective  title, — Italy  was  in- 
habited by  Iberian  and  Ligurian  tribes.  Whether  these  were  the 
aborigines  of  whom  Livy  and  Dionysius  speak  we  cannot  be  sure 
but  it  seems  probable  that  they  were  for  the  most  part  in  occupation 
of  the  peninsula  when  the  Umbro-Latin  people  arrived  there.      At 


I 


CHAP.  Ill    lAPYGIANS,  OPICI,  UMBRIANS,  SABELLIANS  ii 

what   time,   in   what  order,  and  from  what   lands   the  new   stocks 

came  we  cannot  pretend  to  determine.     The  people  farthest  south.   The  lapy- 

the  lapygians^  found  in  historical  times  in  the  extremity  of  Calabria,  gians. 

were  so  Hellenised  by  Greek  colonists  from  Epirus,  that  it  remains 

uncertain  whether  they  really   came   originally  from  the  north   (as 

some  few  words  of  their  language  which  survive  seem  to  indicate)  or 

found  their  way  there  by  sea.     At  any  rate,  in  spite  of  this  Hellenisa- 

tion,  they  retained  in  historical  times  sufficient  peculiarities  to  mark 

them  off  from  the  other  inhabitants  of  Italy. 

In  the  centre  of  Italy  another  race  of  men,  whose  language 
survived  their  conquest,  is  still  to  a  certain  extent  known  to  us  in 
extant  inscriptions,  and  has  certain  affinities  with  Latin.  These  are  The  Osci 
the  Osci  or  OPici,  who  appear  to  have  occupied  the  district  from  ^^  Opici. 
the  borders  of  Latium  and  Campania  to  the  Adriatic,  and  perhaps 
penetrated  to  Lucania  and  mingled  with  original  inhabitants  there, 
the  Itali  or  Oettotrii,  who  are  believed  to  have  been  of  what  is  called 
Pelasgian,^  that  is,  of  old  Greek,  stock. 

Upon  Italy,  thus  partly  inhabited,  came  two  other  great  invasions  The  Um- 
or  immigrations.      First  the  Umbro-Latins.      Those  of  them  who  ^^i^"-^- 
took   or   retained   the  name   of    Umbrians'^   spread   over  the  north 
central  part  of  the  peninsula  from  the  Adriatic  to  the  Tyrrhenian 
sea,  including  not  only  the  district  which  afterwards  preserved  their 
name,  but  a  considerable  part  of  what  was  afterwards  Etruria,      The 
kindred  Latmi  settled  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Tiber  in  the  small  Latini  of 
district  afterwards  known  as  Vetus  Latium^  bordered  on   the  east   Vetus 
and  south  by  the  Oscan  tribes  of  Aeqtn,  Hernici^  and  Volsci^  who  ^^^^^^' 
were  afterwards  included  in  the  greater  Latium,  and  whose  language 
indicates  either  an  original  kinship  or  a  subsequent  amalgamation. 

Again  another  great  family,  classed  sometimes  under  the  general 
name  of  Sabellians,  settled  first  on  the  high  ground  of  the  central  The  "  Sab- 
Apennines.    Hence  they  spread  under  various  appellations  in  various  ellians." 
directions.      Thus  the  Sabini  occupied  the  district  bounded  on  the 
north-west  by  the   Tiber  and  its   affluent   the  Nar,  and  bordering 
on  the  south  upon  the  Latini.      From   them  apparently  came  the 
Sainnites^  and  occupied  the  mountain  district  of  the  Abruzzi  down  Samniies, 
to   Campania ;    while   the   Peligni  and   Picentes^    and   perhaps   the  Pf^j-ig^^, 
Marsz,  Marrucini^  and  Vestini — smaller  offshoots  of  the  same  stock     ^^^"^  ^^' 
— occupied  some  less  extensive  districts  in  Central  and  Eastern  Italy. 
The  Samnites  became  the  most  important  of  all,  and  extended  their 

1  Who  the  Pelasgi  were,  of  whom  we  hear  in  Homer,  Herodotus,  Thucydides, 
and  other  writers,  is  a  vexed  question.  I  here  use  the  word  as  indicating  inhabit- 
ants of  Greece  prior  to  the  Hellenic  settlers,  whoever  they  may  have  been. 

^  Helbig  identifies  the  Umbrians  with  the  people  who  constructed  the  Swiss  pile 
dwellings,  and  who  afterwards  constructed  similar  dwellings  in  the  Italian  lakes. 


12 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Frentani, 
Lucani,^ 
Apuli, 
Bruttii. 


The  Etrus- 
cans. 


Mythical 

originfrom 

Lydia. 


Their  con- 
nexion 
with  other 
Italians 
and  Greeks. 

In  the  basin 
of  the  Po.  . 


Driven 

ijito 

Etruria. 


conquests  in  various  directions.  One  branch,  called  Frentani., 
occupied  a  district  on  the  Adriatic  ;  while  others  gave  their  names 
to  Lucania,  Apulia,  and  Bruttium,  which  they  gradually  overran  and 
occupied.! 

Subsequently,  as  it  appears,  Italy  was  entered  by  another  people, 
whose  greatness  is  evident  even  from  the  scanty  information  which 
we  possess.  The  Etruscans,  whom  the  Greeks  called  Tursenoi  or 
Tyrrhenoi,  and  who  apparently  called  themselves  Ras  or  Rasenna, 
are  first  heard  of  as  a  "  Pelasgic"  tribe  at  the  head  of  the  Adriatic 
and  about  the  Rhaetian  Alps.  An  ancient  tradition  brought  them 
from  Lydia,  where  there  was  a  town  Tvppa,  the  people  of  which 
were  called  Tvpprjvoi  or  Tvppr]f3oL.^  Their  real  origin  is  shrouded 
in  mystery.  Their  language,  as  has  now  been  ascertained,  bears  no 
analogy  to  any  other  Indo-European  dialect,  and  cannot  help  us  to 
connect  them  with  the  other  peoples  of  the  peninsula.^  Yet  their 
alphabet,  and  their  religion  and  mythology,  as  represented  on  their 
tombs,  indicate,  if  not  unity  of  origin,  at  least  very  early  intercourse 
with  the  Greeks.  They  appear  to  have  come  upon  the  Umbrian 
settlers  after  the  discovery  of  the  use  of  bronze,  and  before  the  middle 
of  the  eleventh  century  B.C.  The  district  between  the  Po  and  the 
Alps,  bounded  on  the  west  by  the  Ligurians,  would  seem  to  have 
been  occupied  by  them  entirely  ;  while  south  of  the  Po,  between  it 
and  the  Apennines,  there  arose  a  mixed  population  of  Etruscans  and 
Umbrians.  From  the  more  northern  of  these  two  districts  they 
were  early  displaced  by  an  invasion  or  invasions  of  Celts.  Their 
occupation  of  the  more  southern  district,  between  the  Po  and 
the  Apennines,  was  more  prolonged  ;  but  from  this  too  they  were 
in  time  displaced,  and  established  themselves  farther  south  still, 
in  the  country  which  ultimately  retained  their  name,  stretching  from 


1  The  generally  received  ethnology  of  the  Sabellians  may  be  thus  tabulated  :— 
(Sabellians.) 
Sabini. 


I 
Samnites. 

1 


Peligni.         Picentes.         QMarsi,Marr74cini,  Vestini.) 


Frentani^  Lucani,  Apuli,  Bruttii. 


It  must  not  be  supposed,  however,  that  these  "  Sabellian"  races  are  to  be  clearly 
distinguished,  either  by  language  or  national  characteristics,  from  the  Oscans.  The 
Bruttii,  for  instance,  are  said  to  have  derived  their  name  from  the  Oscan  vv^ord 
for  a  runaway  slave,  Brutt  or  Brett  {Strabo  vi.  i,  4  ;   Diodor.  xvi.  15). 

^  An  Etruscan  inscription  found  in  the  island  of  Lemnos  (1886)  has  been 
held  to  confirm  their  Aegean,  and  perhaps  Asian,  origin  (Thucyd.  iv.  109). 

3  The  discovery  of  a  great  part  of  an  Etruscan  book  on  a  linen  mummy- 
wrapper  in  1 89 1  has  still  farther  shown  the  isolated  nature  of  the  language. 


Ill  ETRUSCANS  AND  LIGURIANS  13 

the   Apennines   to  the   Tiber.^      They  were   a  commercial    people, 
and   early   became   celebrated   for   their  work    in   bronze   and    iron.   Their  em- 
Their  corsairs  infested  the  seas  round   Italy,  and  their  merchants  ployments, 
competed  with  those  of  the  Greek  communities  established  on  the  ^^  !^^"^' 

.        ■  .  ,       ,  ^        .  .  ,  -  nexion 

coasts,  at  first  m   combmation   with   the  great   Semitic   traders  of  ^^^f^  ^^^. 
Carthage,  whose  jealous  rivalry  at  a  later  time  curtailed  their  ex-  thage. 
tension,  and  eventually  contributed  largely  to  the  weakness  which 
ended  in  their  absorption  by  the  growing  power  of  Latium  under 
the  leadership  of  Rome.     When  at  the  height  of  their  power  their 
activity  was   shown,  among   other  things,    by  their  settlements   in  Their 
Campania,2  which  were  wrung  from  them  by  the  Samnites  about  B.C.  ^ftt^^^^nts 
424-420,  much  about  the  same  time  as  their  commerce  was  crippled  >,^„^-^ 
by  the  rising  power  of  the  Syracusans,  while  they  were  being  hard 
pressed  also  by  Celtic  attacks  in  the  north.      From  the  time  of  the 
fall  of  Melpum,  which  is  said  to  have  taken  place  in  the  same  year 
as  the  fall  of  Veii  (391),  they  were  almost  entirely  confined  to  the 
district  known  as  Etruria.^ 

North  of  the  Apennines,  between  them  and  the  Alps,  lived  the 
so-called    Celtic    tribes    of  the    Gauls,    who    one    after    the    other  The "  Cel- 
sought   the    rich   basin   of  the    Po    from   the   overcrowded   regions  ^^'^ "  Gauls. 
beyond   the   Alps,   or  the  northern   slopes  of  the  Alps  themselves. 
They  expelled  the  Etruscans,   took  possession  of  their  land,   and 
gave  their  name  to  the  district. 

One  part  of  North  Italy  they  did  not  overrun.  In  the  extreme  TheLigur- 
north-west,  between  the  upper  Po  and  the  sea,  from  Nicaea  to  Luna,  i'^^^- 
the  Ligurians  had  lived  from  time  immemorial.  Whether  they  were 
connected  in  blood  with  the  Gauls  who  came  into  Italy,  or  were,  as 
seems  most  probable,  allied  with  the  Aquitani  of  Caesar  and  their 
descendants  the  modern  Basques,  is  a  question  which  we  have  not 
full  means  of  deciding.  Some  of  their  customs  and  characteristics 
agree  with  those  of  the  Gauls,  and  they  seem  at  first  to  have  main- 
tained friendly  relations  with  the  tribes  that  came  over  the  Alps. 
On  the  other  hand,  Polybius  distinguishes  between  Gauls,  Iberians, 
and  Ligurians  ;    and   Strabo  states   that  they  were  of  a    different 

^  The  cities  in  Gallia  Cisalpina  believed  to  be  of  Etruscan  origin,  the  names 
of  which  are  known,  are  Felsina  (Bononia),  Mantua,  Adria,  Melpum  (?  Milan), 
Ravenna,  and  perhaps  Adria  in  Picenum,  with  Cupra. 

^  The  cities  in  Campania  believed  to  be  Etruscan  were  Capua,  Nola,  Pompeii, 
Herculaneum,  Surrentum,  Marcina,  Salernum. 

3  Etruria  thus  constituted  was  regarded  as  a  league  of  twelve  cities,  which 
perhaps  varied  in  number  from  time  to  time.  Those  certain  are  Tarquinii, 
Veii,  Volsinii,  Clusium,  Volaterrae,  Vetulonia,  Perusia,  Cortona,  Arretium.  As 
to  the  other  three  there  was  apparently  a  variation.  Among  those  sometimes 
named  are  Caere,  Falerii,  Faesulae,  Rusellae,  Pisae,  Volci  (Livy  iv.  23  ; 
Strabo  v.  2,  9  ;  Dionys.  vi.  75). 


14 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


The  Gallic 
immigra- 
tions— 
Laevi  and 
Lebecii. 
Insubres. 


CenoTnani. 
Veneti. 


Ananes, 
Boii,  Lin- 
gones, 
Senones, 
Salluvii. 


Displace- 
ment of 
Etruscans 
and  Um- 
brians. 

Description 
of  the 
Gauls. 


race  from  the  Gauls,  though  resembhng  them  in  their  manner  of 
life.1 

According  to  Polybius,^  the  first  tribes  that  crossed  the  Alps 
and  settled  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Po  nearest  its  source  were  the 
Laevi  and  Lebecii^  though  Livy  ^  counts  the  Laevi  among  Ligurian 
tribes,  and  calls  the  latter  Libui.  Next  came  the  Insubres^  the 
largest  tribe  of  all,  whom  Livy  describes  as  a  mixed  host  of  Bituriges, 
and  six  other  tribes  led  by  Bellovisus,  a  nephew  of  the  king  of  the 
Bituriges,  about  the  time  of  Tarquinius  Priscus.  But  he  somewhat 
absurdly  accounts  for  their  adopting  the  name  of  Insubres  from  the 
fact  of  finding  a  district  called  by  that  name  which  they  had  known 
as  belonging  to  a  canton  of  the  Haedui.  It  seems  more  likely  that 
the  Insubres  were,  as  Polybius  says,  a  Gallic  tribe  who  brought  their 
name  with  them  to  this  district,  of  which  Mediolanum  became  the 
capital,  and  that  Livy's  story  of  Bellovisus  and  his  mixed  host  is  only 
a  tradition  of  a  second  immigration,  perhaps  invited  by  the  original 
settlers.  These  were  followed  by  the  Cenoma?iz^  who  also  settled  on 
the  right  bank  of  the  Po,  but  more  to  the  east,  bordering  on  the 
Veneti,  who  had  been  long  established  on  the  shore  of  the  Adriatic 
between  Aquileia  and  the  mouths  of  the  Po,  their  territory  being 
bounded  on  the  west  by  the  river  Athesis.  These  last  were  allied  in 
race  to  the  Gauls,  but  differed  from  them  both  in  language  and  dress. 
South  of  the  Po  settled  the  Ananes j  next  them  the  Boiij  and  next, 
on  the  coast  of  the  Adriatic,  the  Lingones j  and  south  of  these  the 
Seiiones.  Livy  mentions,  besides  these,  the  Salluvii,  who  settled 
on  the  left  bank  of  the  Po  near  the  Ticinus. 

By  these  invasions  the  Etruscans  were  gradually  thrust  out  of 
the  district  between  the  Po  and  the  Alps,  and  both  Etruscans  and 
Umbrians  from  the  district  between  the  Po  and  the  Apennines. 
Those  communities  which  remained  had  to  submit  to  the  Gauls, 
and  either  dwindled  away  or  became  absorbed. 

The  Gauls  themselves  are  described  to  us  as  being  in  a  very 
primitive  state  of  civilisation.  They  cared  for  nothing  but  "  war  and 
agriculture,"  by  which  last  is  meant  not  the  cultivation  of  the  land, 
but  the  pasturing  and  breeding  of  cattle.  They  raised  no  fortifications, 
but  lived  in  open  villages  or  collections  of  huts,  in  which  were  no 
cumbrous  articles  of  furniture.  Their  beds  were  mere  heaps  of  straw 
or  leaves  ;  and  their  only  wealth  was  cattle  and  gold,  which  could  be 
easily  moved  from  place  to  place.  They  do  not  appear  to  have  as  yet 
fallen  under  the  influence,  half  ecclesiastical  and  half  legal,  which 
Caesar  found  prevailing  in  Transalpine  Gaul  under  the  direction  of 


1  Polyb.   xii.    28  ;   Strabo  ii.   5,   28.      Polybius   uses  K^Xrat   and   sometimes 
FaXdrat  for  all  Gauls  indifferently ;  he  never  applies  either  term  to  the  Ligurians. 

2  Polyb.  ii.  15-17. 


3  Livy  V.  35. 


Ill  THE  ITALIAN  GAULS  15 

the  Druids. 1  A  chief  or  king  indeed  commanded  his  tribe ;  but  his 
authority  rested  on  his  personal  influence,  his  reputation  as  a  warrior, 
or  his  skill  in  stirring  his  unruly  subjects  by  his  harangues.  The 
men  of  chief  power  in  the  tribes  were  those  who  by  fear  or  affection 
attached  to  their  persons  the  largest  number  of  followers  or  clients  ; 
and  though  the  chiefs  could  lead  their  tribes  to  the  field  or  on  a 
foray,  they  could  not  persuade  them  to  endure  the  fatigue  of  a  long 
siege  or  the  dangers  of  a  prolonged  campaign.  Bold,  restless, 
and  undisciplined,  these  tall,  blue  -  eyed,  flaxen  -  haired  warriors  ^ 
scoured  the  countries  far  and  wide  through  which  they  marched,  or 
in  which  they  set  up  their  quarters.  But  they  had  not  the  qualities 
which  enable  conquerors  to  make  durable  settlements.  The  plunder, 
which  they  successfully  drove  or  carried  off  in  their  raids,  was  not 
unfrequently  destroyed  in  the  quarrels  which  attended  its  division  ; 
and  if  they  behaved  like  gallant  warriors  on  the  field,  their  victory 
was  often  followed  by  scenes  of  brutal  drunkenness  and  barbaric 
gluttony.^  They  had,  in  fact,  the  virtues  and  vices  of  savages. 
Improvements  and  developments  even  in  the  art  of  war  they  disliked 
or  neglected.  They  preferred  to  enter  a  battlefield  half  naked,  trust- 
ing to  their  strength  or  their  agility,  and  hoping  to  terrify  their  enemy 
by  their  hideous  yells,  the  blare  of  their  horns  and  trumpets,  or  the 
barbaric  splendour  of  their  ornaments.'*  Their  swords  were  poor 
weapons,  only  fit  for  a  down  stroke,  without  point  for  thrusting,  and 
of  such  bad  material  that  they  were  often  useless  after  the  first 
blow.^  Yet  they  were  also  good  horsemen,  and  early  adopted  the 
use  of  the  chariot  in  war.  They  were  able  to  shift  their  quarters 
with  astonishing  speed  ;  and  being  used  to  support  themselves  on  the 
produce  of  pillage,  could  live  wherever  they  could  find  cattle  to  be 
killed  or  to  supply  them  with  milk.  It  is  not  surprising  that  such  a 
people  should  spread  terror  wherever  they  went,  through  Europe  and 
Asia,  nor  that  they  should  have  failed  to  establish  stable  kingdoms 
or  states.  They  could  win  battles,  but  not  a  campaign  ;  they  could 
burn  and  pillage,  they  could  not  build  up  or  organise. 

1  Caes.  B.G.  v.  11-14. 

^  This  description  of  the  Gauls  in  North  Italy  does  not  suit  those  whom  we  call 
"  Celts."  Yet  it  is  confirmed  by  every  ancient  writer  who  speaks  of  them,  and 
seems  to  prove  that  they  were  generally  of  the  stock  of  the  Belgic  Gauls,  nearly 
aUied  to  the  Teutons.  The  most  important  account  of  them,  next  to  that  in 
Polybius  ii.  17,  is  in  Diodorus  v.  25-32.  The  best  modern  account  is  Helbig's 
Die  Italiker  in  der  Poebene. 

3  Polyb.  ii.  17,  19.  4  Polyb.  ii.  29, 

^  Ensis  is  the  stabbing  sword  in  'LaX.m;  gladius,  the  cutting  sword,  is  said  to  be 
a  Celtic  word,  found  in  the  old  Irish  claideh.  The  light  spear,  lancea,  is  also  said 
by  Diodorus  (v,  30)  to  be  a  Gallic  word,  but  by  Varro  ( Aul.  Gell.  xv.  30)  is  declared 
to  be  Spanish. 


i6 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


The  Greeki 
in  Italy. 


Names  of 
Greek 
towns  : 

{i)/n 
Fetus 
Italia. 


Strabo,  writing  shortly  before  the  Christian  era,  says  of  Magna 
Graecia,  that  with  the  exception  of  Tarentum,  Rhegium,  and  Naples 
it  had  all  become  de-Hellenised  (eK^e/^a/s^a/awo-^at).  Cicero  in  his 
dialogue  on  Friendship  puts  into  the  mouth  of  Laelius,  supposed  to 
be  speaking  in  B.C.  129,  the  remark  that  "Magna  Graecia  once 
flourishing  was  now  utterly  destroyed"  {deleta  est).  But  up  to  the 
time  of  the  Punic  wars,  though  their  decadence  had  been  long 
progressing,  these  Hellenic  towns  were  sufficiently  important  to 
demand  a  place  in  an  account  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  Italian 
peninsula.  They  never,  indeed,  fully  amalgamated  with  their  neigh- 
bours. They  remained  exotics,  Italiotae  and  not  Itali,  Their 
settlement  had  been  for  the  purposes  of  agriculture  or  trade,  or  to 
relieve  some  over-populated  town  in  Greece  ;  but  though  they  suc- 
ceeded for  a  time  in  Hellenising  some  districts  in  Italy,  they  had 
brought  with  them  the  habit,  which  had  ever  been  the  curse  of 
Hellenism,  of  jealous  separation  and  frequent  war  between  town  and 
town,  as  well  as  internal  feuds  in  the  several  cities  themselves.^ 

These  towns  may  be  conveniently  placed  in  three  groups.  Those 
in  Vetus  Italia,  that  is,  in  parts  of  Lucania  or  Bruttium,  those  in 
lapygia,  and  those  north  of  Vetus  ItaHa. 

I.  The  towns  in  Vetus  Italia  were  Sybaris.,  an  Achaean  colony 
of  B.C.  720,  from  which  were  founded  Metapontuju^  about  700- 
680;  Posidonia  (Paestum),  about  600;  and  Laus  and  Scidrus, 
in  which  the  remnants  of  the  Sybarites  took  refuge  at  the  time  of 
the  destruction  of  their  town  (510);  Crotona^  also  an  Achaean 
colony  of  about  710,  from  which  were  founded  Terina  and  Cattlonia, 
perhaps  with  additional  colonists  from  the  mother  country.  From 
Locri  Epizephyrii.,  a  colony  of  the  Ozolian  Locrians  (about  710), 
came  Hipponiuin  and  Medma.  Siris,  probably  an  Ionian  colony 
about  690-660,  was  believed  by  some  to  have  been  originally  settled 
by  fugitives  from  Troy.  The  stream  of  Hellenic  settlers  had  long 
ceased  to  flow  towards  Italy,  at  any  rate  with  its  old  strength,  when 
the  last  two  Greek  colonies  were  formed  in  this  district.  These  were 
Thurii.)  a  mixed  colony,  promoted  by  Pericles,  and  consisting  partly 
of  a  remnant  of  the  old  Sybarites,  partly  of  settlers  from  Athens  and 
various  cities  in  Peloponnese,  sent  out  in  the  spring  of  443  ;  and 
Heracleia^  founded  in  B.C.  432  by  a  mixed  body  from  Tarentum  and 
Thurii.2 

1  The  term  Magna  Graecia  is  first  found  in  the  writings  of  Polybius  (xard  ttjv 
/xeydXrjv  'EXXdSa,  ii.  39)  ;  but  he  uses  it  as  a  well-known  designation  ;  and  it  had 
apparently  been  for  some  time  employed  to  indicate  the  Greek  colonies  in  Southern 
Italy.  Strabo  (vi.  i,  2)  would  include  under  the  name  the  Greek  cities  in  Sicily 
also,  but  that  does  not  appear  to  have  been  the  general  practice. 

2  Besides  these  Greek  colonies  there  were  certain  other  towns  which,  though 
not   colonies,   were   more  or  less   Hellenised,    Skylletium  or  Skylacium,    which 


MAGNA  GRAECIA  17 


2.  In  lAPYGlAthe  chief  town  was  Tarentwn^  colonised  by  Spartans  (2)  In 
in   708,  which  rose  to  great  wealth,  and  became  notorious  for  the  iopygia- 
luxury  of  its  citizens.      Callipolis,  also  founded  from  Sparta,  with  the 
assistance  of  the  Tarentines.      The  Salle?ttiftt,  who  inhabited  several 
cities,  one  of  which  was  Verctuvi^  at  the  extreme  heel  of  Italy,  were 
believed  to  be  of  Cretan  origin,  as  were  also  Brundisiiwi^  Hyria^ 

and  Hydruntwn J  but  to  these  towns,  though  always  mentioned  as 
undoubtedly  Greek,  or  with  the  inhabitants  at  least  partly  Greek,  we 
cannot  assign  with  certainty  either  time  or  place  of  origin. 

3.  Of   Greek    towns    north    of   Bruttium    or    Vetus    Italia,    the  (j)  North 
most  ancient  of  all  Greek  colonies  was  that  of  Cuvtae,  the  founda-  of^^^^- 
tion  of  which  was  placed,  though  without  good  evidence,  in  io$o.    A 

joint  colony  from  Cyme  in  Aeolis  and  the  Chalcidians  of  Euboea, 
it  rapidly  rose  to  wealth  and  power,  and  long  governed  a  considerable 
district  of  Campania.  From  this,  combined  with  fresh  colonists 
from  Chalcis  and  Athens,  probably  came  the  colony  of  Palaepolis  or 
Neapolis  (the  name  changing  with  a  change  of  locality),  which 
eventually  became  the  most  important  city  in  the  district.  Vclia  or 
Elca^  established  by  Phocaeans,  in  544,  who  fled  before  the  victorious 
general  of  Cyrus,  became  famous  for  a  school  of  philosophy  founded 
by  Xenophanes  (about  540-520)  and  Parmenides  (about  480-460). 
Pyxus  (afterwards  Buxentuni)  was  probably  at  first  a  colony  of  Siris, 
supplemented  by  settlers  from  Rhegium  in  470. 

So  long  as  these  Greek  cities  had  only  to  deal  with  the  Oenotrian  Causes  of 
inhabitants  of  South  Italy,  who  were  themselves  probably  of  Pelasgic  their  de- 
ox  old-Greek  origin,  they  seem  to  have  experienced  little  difficulty  in 
uniting  and  living  at  peace  with  them.  They  were  active  in  trade  ; 
learning  and  philosophy  found  congenial  homes  among  them  ;  and 
they  rapidly  became  both  wealthy  and  powerful.  Some  of  them 
became  also  notorious  for  their  luxury,  it  being  reported,  for  instance, 
that  at  Tarentum  there  were  more  public  festivals  than  days  in  the 
year  ;  while  Sybaris  furnished  a  word  for  a  debauchee  which  has 
never  been  forgotten.  This  may  have  contributed  to  the  decline  of 
Magna  Graecia^  but  a  more  potent  cause  was  the  quarrelsomeness 
habitual  to  Greek  states,  both  of  town  with  town,  and  of  parties 
within  the  several  towns  themselves.  Thus  a  revolution  in  Sybaris, 
which  made  Talys  its  tyrant  and  drove  out  a  number  of  the  oli- 
garchical party,  led  to  a  war  with   Croton,  which  had  offered  the 

according  to  some  was  an  Athenian  colony  ;  Pandosia,  which  appears  to  have 
been  an  important  Oenotrian  town,  and  afterwards  to  have  received  Greek 
settlers,  perhaps  from  Crotona  ;  Petelia,  a  town  of  the  Oenotrian  Chones,  and  for 
some  time  subject  to  Crotona  ;  Temesa,  an  Ausonian  city,  believed  to  have  been  also 
colonised  by  Aetolians,  but  at  any  rate  Hellcnised,  and  at  one  time  under  the  power 
of  the  Locrians. 


dine. 


i8 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


exiles  its  hospitality,  the  result  of  which  was  the  entire  destruction 
of  Sybaris  (510).  And  this  was  followed  by  a  general  revolu- 
tionary  movement   in   several   cities.      The    details  as   well   as   the 


Thapsits 
ISyracuse 


^ 


MAGNA   GRAECIA 


0   100 

STADfA 
500 

.00 

P    '.0 

ROMAN    MILES 

.     .    £.0 

__i3o 

9    ip 

ENGLISH      MILES 
.      ,     5,0 

iqo 

flelCenized  Towns  underlined...  Sipontum 


East  of  14  Greenwich 


ll'all-er  &■  Boutall  sc 


origin  of  it  are  obscure  ;  but  it  took  the  form  of  an  outbreak  against 
the  followers  of  the  mysterious  philosopher  Pythagoras,  who  had 
spent  the  last  part  of  his  life  in  Croton,  and  whose  disciples  in  their 


DECADENCE  OF  MAGNA  GRAECIA  19 

various  clubs  or  schools   in  many  of  the   towns  of  Magna  Graecia 
appear  to  have  combined  with  philosophy  some  sort  of  association 
for  the  maintenance  of  political   power   in  the  hands  of  the  upper 
classes.      Not  long  after  the  fall  of  Sybaris,  therefore,  there  seems 
to  have  been  a  very  general  uprising  of  the  democratic  party  in  the 
several  towns.      The  Pythagorean  schools  or  club-houses  were  burnt,   The  burn- 
and  great  disorder  and  confusion  prevailed.      At  length  an  appeal  '^^g  ^f  the 
was  made  to   the  Achaeans,  who   had   been  long  living  under  the    Lfe^^ 
government  of  a  League  of  twelve  cities,^  enjoyed  a  high  reputa-  schools. 
tion   for  justice  in    Greece,  and   were   also    the   original  authors  of 
several  of  the  Hellenic  colonies  in  Italy  ;  and  the  result  of  this  arbitra- 
tion was  an  attempt  for  a  time  to  unite  the   Greek  colonies  by  a 
somewhat  similar  League.      But  the  arrangement,  if  it  worked  at  all, 
was    very    short-lived.      There   is   no   trace   in    the   mention  of  the 
Italiots  by  Thucydides  of  any  common  action  on  their  part ;  and  the 
history  of  the  dissensions   of  Thurii    (443-413),  with   the  bloody  Thurii. 
quarrels   which   characterised   its   earliest   years    and   the   alternate 
exclusion    of  the   democratic   and   oligarchical   parties   in   the  next 
generation,  offers   a   specimen   of  one   of  the  causes  constantly  at 
work  to  weaken  and  destroy  Hellenism  in  Italy.      This  was  followed 
by  the  more  obvious   dangers    arising  from   external   attack.     One 
of  the   chief  sources   of  these   was   the  jealousy  of  the   Siceliots, 
especially  of  Dionysius  of  Syracuse    (405-367),      For  a  time  this  Defeat  of 
danger  drew   the    Italian    cities    together.      A  general   League    was  Italian 
formed  to  resist    Dionysius,    but  proved   ineffectual ;    and   its   com-  ^_^f^^^  ^y 
bined  forces  were  defeated  in  a  great  battle  near  Caulonia,  on  the  ^0^^"^^' 
river   Helorus.      This    was   followed   by   the   emigration   of  a    large 
number  of  Caulonians  to  Syracuse,  and  by  the  siege  and  submission 
of  Rhegium  (about   393-391).      But   Dionysius  was  not  their  only 
enemy.     They  were   being  hard   pressed  about  the  same  time  by 
the  incursions  of  the  Umbrian  tribes  of  Lucani,  Bruttii,  and  Apuli.    Theinva- 
The  Lucani  first  attacked  Posidonia,  next  Tarentum,  and  the  towns  ^ions  of  the 
immediately   round    it,  and    then   overran    the    territory   of   Thurii,  t^^^^^' 
and  defeated  its  army.      This  was  followed  about   356   by  incursions  and  Apuli. 
of  Bruttii,  who  captured  Terina  and  Hipponium,  and  devastated  the 
districts  of  Rhegium,  Locri,  and  Croton.      Harassed  within  and  with- 
out, the  Greek  cities  of  Italy,  like  those  in  Greece,  sought  help  from 
foreign  princes, — from  Archidamus,  king  of  Sparta,  against  the  Lucani 
{33^)  ;  from  Alexander,  king  of  the  Molossi,  against  Samnites  and  Ruin  of 
Lucani    combined    (332) ;    from   Cleonymus   of  Sparta  against  the  ^^-^^^f 
Lucani  and  Metapontum  (303).  But  the  final  result  was  that  the  Bruttii,  ^'''^^'^*'^- 
Lucani,   and  Apuli  became  the  prevailing  inhabitants  of  Southern 

^  Herod,  ii.  145. 


HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap,  hi 


Italy,  and  gave  their  names  to  districts  in  it.  The  Greek  cities  had 
not  ceased  to  exist,  or  in  the  main  to  be  Greek,  but  independence  and 
Hellenism  were  alike  disappearing.  Their  appeal  for  foreign  help 
had  also  brought  upon  them  another  power  external  to  all  aHke  ;  and 
when,  finally,  Tarentum  asked  the  help  of  Pyrrhus  (280)  it  was  not 
against  Apulians  or  Lucanians,  but  against  Rome.  The  loss  of  in- 
dependence which  followed  was  consummated  by  the  ruin  of  many 
of  the  towns  during  the  Hannibalian  war,  and  their  replenishment, 
not  by  Greek  but  Roman  colonists,  till  Hellenism  in  South  Italy, 
except  in  the  three  towns  of  Tarentum,  Rhegium,  and  Neapolis, 
became  a  mere  memory  of  the  past. 


I 


CHAPTER    IV 

THE    ORIGIN    OF    ROME 

Origin  of  Rome — Heroic  legends  of  its  foundation — Settlement  of  Aeneas  in 
Italy — His  wars  with  the  Rutuli — His  supremacy  over  the  Prisci  Latini — His 
son  removes  to  Alba  from  Lavinium — The  Alban  kings — The  two  sons  of 
Proca,  Numitor  and  Amulius — The  birth  of  Romulus  and  Remus,  and  their 
education  by  shepherds — They  restore  their  grandfather  Numitor  to  the  throne 
of  Alba — Their  foundation  of  a  new  city — Death  of  Remus — Romulus  founds 
the  city  on  the  Palatine  and  calls  it  Rome — The  gradual  extension  of  the 
Palatine  city  to  include  the  Septimontium — The  Roman  era  b.  c.  753, 

Every  people   that  has   risen  to  be  of  importance  has  had  heroic   The  heroic 
legends  connected   with  its  origin  or  its  early   struggles.       As  the  legends  of 
English  chroniclers,  it  is  impossible  to  say  on  what  ground,  referred  ^^^f^^^'^- 
the   first   settlement  of  Britain   to  Brute  the  Trojan,  so  the  Roman  ^^^,^{ 
annalists,  or  the  Greek  historians  for  them,  invented  or  pieced  to- 
gether the  legend  of  Aeneas. 

When  Troy  was  taken,  they  said,  Aeneas  with  his  father  and  Aeneas. 
son  and  a  considerable  band  of  followers  escaped  from  the  burning- 
city,  and  sailed  away  in  search  of  a  land  destined  by  the  fates  for 
him  and  his  descendants.  After  trying  in  vain  to  find  this  promised 
land  in  Macedonia  and  in  Sicily,  he  at  last  reached  the  Italian  shore 
near  Laurentum,  some  few  miles  south  of  the  Tiber.  The  Trojans, 
who  in  their  long  voyage  had  suffered  much  from  a  scarcity  of  pro- 
visions, began  to  plunder  the  country  round,  in  which  Latinus  was 
ruling  over  a  people  called  Aborigines.  The  king  mustered  his 
forces  and  came  out  to  repel  the  marauders  ;  but  he  was  worsted 
in  the  field,  and  therefore  made  peace  with  the  newcomers  ;  and,  as 
the  wife  of  Aeneas  had  perished  in  the  escape  from  Troy,  he  gave 
him  his  daughter  Lavinia  in  marriage,  and  granted  him  land  whereon 
to  found  a  city.  Aeneas  called  his  new  city  Lavinium,  after  his  wife 
Lavinia,  and  begat  a  son  called  Ascanius.  Then  followed  wars  with 
the  neighbouring  nation  of  the  Rutuli,  whose  king  Turnus  had  been 
affianced  to   Lavinia.      Neither  side  was  wholly  victorious,   yet  the 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Rutuli  found  it  necessary  to  retire  across  the  Tiber  and  join 
Mezentius,  the  king  of  Caere  in  Etruria.  But  in  the  course  of  the 
struggle  king  Latinus  had  fallen,  and  Aeneas  now  reigned  over  his 
people,  whom  he  called  Latini  in  his  honour.  He  ruled  well  and 
wisely,  and  the  Trojans  and  Latini  rapidly  became  one  people, 
strong  enough  to  repel  the  attacks  of  the  Etruscans,  the  most  power- 
ful nation  in  all  Italy,  At  length  he  fell  in  a  great  battle  against 
them,  and  his  grateful  people  buried  him  by  the  river  Numicus,  and 
worshipped  him  under  the  name  of  Jupiter  Indiges. 

His  son  Ascanius  succeeded  him  in  his  kingdom,  and  presently 
quitted  Lavinium,  which  was  becoming  crowded,  and  founded  Alba 
Longa  to  receive  the  surplus  population.  His  power  was  so  great 
that  the  Etruscans  made  terms  with  him,  and  agreed  that  the  Albula, 
afterwards  called  the  Tiber,  should  be  the  frontier  of  their  respective 
dominions.  A  long  list  of  kings  reigning  at  Alba  succeeded  him — 
Silvius,  Aeneas  Silvius,  Latinus  Silvius,  Alba,  Atys,  Capys,  Capetus, 
Tiberinus  (whose  drowning  in  the  Albula  gave  the  name  to  the  river), 
Agrippa,  Romulus  Silvius,  Aventinus,  Proca. 

Now  Proca  had  two  sons,  Numitor  and  Amulius.  To  Numitor, 
as  the  elder,  the  royal  power  descended  ;  but  his  brother  Amulius 
gathered  a  party  round  him,  drove  Numitor  from  the  throne,  killed 
all  his  male  offspring,  and,  under  pretence  of  doing  him  honour, 
doomed  his  race  to  extinction  by  making  his  daughter  Rea  Silvia  a 
Vestal,  bound  to  virginity.  Nevertheless  Rea  brought  forth  twin  sons, 
of  whom  the  god  Mars  was  father.  Amulius  doomed  the  mother  to 
perpetual  imprisonment,  and  ordered  the  boys  to  be  thrown  into  the 
Tiber.  The  servant  to  whom  the  destruction  of  the  children  was 
entrusted  carried  them  away  to  the  then  deserted  region  which  lay 
between  the  Palatine  Mount  and  the  Tiber ;  and,  as  the  river  was 
overflowing  its  banks,  contented  himself  with  placing  the  vessel  in 
which  they  lay  in  the  shallow  flood  water.  The  river  presently  sank 
back  to  its  ordinary  channel,  and  the  children  were  left  on  dry  land, 
at  the  foot  of  a  tree,  long  afterwards  preserved  and  called  the  Ficus 
Ruminalis,  "the  fig  of  suckling."  A  she-wolf  that  had  lost  her  cubs, 
attracted  by  the  cry  of  the  children,  and  impelled  by  the  pain  of  her 
distended  udder,  gave  them  suck  ;  and  presently  a  shepherd  named 
Faustulus,  who  had  watched  the  wolf  often  going  and  coming  to  the 
place,  found  the  boys,  and  took  them  to  his  wife  Laurentia,  who 
brought  them  up  and  called  them  Romulus  and  Remus.  When  they 
grew  to  manhood  they  made  themselves  conspicuous  among  the 
neighbouring  shepherds  for  their  gallant  bearing,  and  their  prowess 
in  repelling  robbers,  and  rescuing  the  flocks  and  herds  which  were 
being  driven  off.  Some  of  these  robbers  determined  to  be  revenged; 
they  therefore  lay  in  wait  for  the  brothers  when  they  were  engaged 


1 


LEGEND  OF  ROMULUS  23 


in  a  rustic  festival  on  the  Palatine,  instituted  many  years  before  by 
the  Arcadian  Evander.  Romulus  managed  to  escape  capture  ;  but 
Remus  was  taken,  and,  being  carried  before  Amulius,  was  accused 
of  having  plundered  the  land  of  the  king's  brother  Numitor,  To 
save  Remus  the  shepherd  Faustulus  imparted  to  Romulus  the  secret 
of  his  birth  ;  who,  collecting  the  shepherds  round  about,  prepared  to 
rescue  his  brother.  Meanwhile  Numitor  had  seen  and  questioned 
Remus,  and  had  himself  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  twins 
were  his  grandsons.  Thus  from  more  than  one  quarter  at  once  an 
attack  was  prepared  against  Amulius.  He  was  killed,  and  Numitor 
was  restored  to  the  throne  of  Alba. 

But  the  boys,  though  they  had  restored  their  grandfather,  had  They  quit 
been  so  used  to  rule  that  they  could  not  tamely  settle  down  to  the  ^^^^  ^^^ 
position  of  subjects.  Moreover,  there  were  again  more  inhabitants  ^^^"^^^^ 
in  Alba  and  Lavinium  than  there  was  well  room  for.  They  therefore  paiatine. 
determined  to  found  a  new  city.  And  what  better  site  than  those 
hills,  near  which  they  had  been  exposed  for  death  as  infants,  and 
about  which  they  had  dwelt  with  shepherds  as  young  men  ?  But  a 
new  city  must  have  a  founder  and  a  name-hero  :  which  of  the  two 
should  he  be  ?  As  none  knew  which  of  them  was  the  elder,  they 
determined  to  settle  the  difficulty  by  an  appeal  to  augury.  Romulus 
took  up  his  position  on  the  Palatine,  Remus  on  the  Aventine,  to 
watch  for  omens.  They  proved  ambiguous.  Remus  was  the  first 
to  see  a  flight  of  six  vultures  ;  but,  just  as  his  companions  were 
announcing  this  favourable  declaration  of  the  gods,  Romulus  sighted 
double  the  number.  Both  therefore  claimed  to  have  been  divinely 
selected  to  be  founder,  and  in  the  quarrel  that  ensued  Remus  was 
killed  ;  or,  as  some  said,  when  Romulus,  acting  on  the  omens,  had 
begun  to  build  the  city  walls,  Remus  in  derision  leapt  over  them  and 
fell  by  the  spear  of  his  angry  brother.  Thus  Romulus  became  the 
founder  of  Rome,  and  proceeded  to  build  his  fortifications  on  the 
Palatine,  where  he  had  been  brought  up.  Within  these  walls  he 
gathered  all  that  he  could  collect  round  about  to  join  the  settlers 
from  Alba  and  Lavinium,  and  gave  them  laws. 

Whatever  the  origin  of  this  famous  legend,  whether  some  real   The  city 
tradition,  or  some  ancient  ballad  handed  down  among  the  pastoral  of  the 
folk  who  once  fed  their  flocks  about  the  seven  hills,  or  deliberately  P^^^^^^^^- 
invented,  as  some  think,  by  late  Greek  sophists,  there  seems  to  be 
this  truth  at  the   bottom   of  it,  that  on  the  Palatine  was    the  first 
township    or    fortress,    established    originally    by    a    shepherd  -  folk, 
which  gradually   grew   to   be    Rome.      This    is   attested   first   of  all 
by  the    remains    of  the    ancient    Roma    Quadrata,   still    to   a   small 
extent  visible,  and  much  more  evident   in  the  time  of  Tacitus  ;  by 


24 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


the  existence  in  historical  times  of  the  festival  of  the  Lupercalia 
( I  5th  February)  on  the  Palatine,  which  was  a  pastoral  ceremony  of 
purification  or  "beating  the  bounds"  of  the  old  city  ;^  and  of  the 
Palilia  (21st  April),  a  festival  of  the  rustic  goddess  Pales,  to  celebrate 
its  foundation  ;  and  again,  by  the  well-established  position  of  two  of 
the  gates  in  the  original  wall,  the  Porta  Mugionis  ("  gate  of  lowing  "), 
somewhat  to  the  east  of  the  present  entrance  to  the  Palatine  from 
the  road  above  the  Forum,  and  the  Porta  Romanula  ("gate  of  the 
river"),  which  was  reached  by  steps  from  the  Velabrum,  near  the 


ROME 

with  the  Walls  of  Servius, 


ROMAN     FEET 

1000  2q00         3000 


IValker  &•  Botitall . 


modern  church  of  S.  Giorgio  in  Velabro,  on  the  north  side  of 
the  Palatine.2  Thus  the  course  of  the  Pomoerium  of  the  ancient 
city  may  be  traced  with  tolerable  certainty.^ 

But  this    city  did  not  all  at  once  expand  into  the  greater  city 
enclosed  by  the  Servian  walls.      Before  that  there  were  several  ex- 

1  Varro,  L.  L.  v.  13.  -  Varro,  L.  L.  v.  164,  165. 

2  Lanciani  {Ancient  Rome,  ch.  ii. )  thinks  also  that  archasological  discoveries 
have  proved  that  a  shepherd  community  came  from  Alba  to  the  site  of  Rome 
(which  he  derives  from  rotnnon,  "  a  river")  in  search  of  better  and  safer  pasture 
when  the  eruptions  of  the  volcano,  of  which  the  Alban  lake  is  the  crater,  made 
the  neighbourhood  of  Alba  insecure. 


ROMA  QUADRATA  25 


tensions  of  the  bounds,  even,  it  was  believed,  in  the  lifetime  of  the  The  Septi 
founder.  Livy  tells  us  that  the  city  increased  by  gradual  inclusion  montium. 
of  one  spot  after  another,  although  there  were  not  as  yet  citizens 
enough  to  fill  them.i  But  the  new  enclosures  would  hardly  be  made 
unless  they  were  in  some  way  needed.  The  simplest  explanation 
is  that  on  each  of  these  spots  there  were  cottages  or  hamlets,  the 
inhabitants  of  which  desired  to  be  under  the  protection  of  the  city, 
and  that  they  were  accordingly  united  to  the  wall  on  the  Palatine  by 
loop  walls,  which,  though  of  lighter  construction,  were  yet  of  use 
against  marauders,  or  perhaps  by  ditches  or  fossae^  such  as  the 
fossa  Ouiritium  attributed  to  Ancus.  Enclosures  so  made  would 
naturally  contain  considerable  vacant  spaces,  and  this  would  account 
for  the  tradition  followed  by  Livy  that  the  city  included  a  greater 
amount  of  ground  than  there  were  citizens  to  fill.  The  gradual 
additions  appear  to  have  been  commemorated  by  the  "  festival  of 
the  seven  mounts,"  septimonthun,  which,  Varro  says,  was  not  a  festival 
of  the  whole  people,  but  only  of  the  Montam,  which  may  plausibly 
be  held  to  mean  the  inhabitants  of  the  Mons  Palatinus  and  its  six 
adjuncts,  and  perhaps  originally  only  those  of  the  Palatine  itself^ 
These  inferior  fortifications  would  naturally  disappear  when  the  Servian 
wall  was  built,  streets  and  buildings  taking  their  place,  and  a  united 
town,  irregular  in  its  arrangement,  was  the  result. 

That  a  similar  fort  or  township  existed  at  the  same  time  on  at  The 
least  one  of  the  other  hills  is  not  improbable  in  itself,  and  has  been  Quirinal. 
inferred  from  the  existence  of  a  Capitolium  iietus^  with  a  sanctuary 
of  Jupiter,  Juno,  and  Minerva  on  the  Quirinal,  prior  to  that  on  the 
Mons  Capitolinus  ;  from  the  double  worship  of  Mars  on  the  Palatine 
and  Quirinal ;  from  the  existence  of  two  primitive  colleges  both  of 
the  Salii  and  the  Luperci,  one  connected  with  the  Palatine,  the  other 
with  the  Quirinal ;  and  lastly,  from  the  indications  that  the  inhabit- 
ants of  the  Mons  Palatinus  and  Collis  Ouirinalis  were  distinguished 
by  the  names  Monta7ti  and  Collini^  "  mount  men  "  and  "  hill  men  "  ; 
whence  we  have  the  Porta  Collina^  the  Salii  Collini  opposed  to  the 
Salii  Palatini^  and  the  tribus  Collina  in  the  Servian  division. 

In  the  absence  of  all  means  of  arriving  at  a  certainty  as  to  the   The 
date  of  the  founding  of  the  Palatine  city,  we  must  be  content  to  Roman 
accept    the    traditional    calculation.      If   walls    were    built,    whether  ^^^' ^•^^ 

^  i.  8,  alia  atque  alia  adpetendo  loca. 

2  Mommsen  (i.  52)  identifies  the  six  suburbs  with  the  Velia  (connecting  the 
Palatine  and  Esquiline)  ;  the  Cermahis  (the  slope  of  the  Palatine  towards  the 
Capitoline)  ;  the  three  points  of  the  Esquiline — the  Fagutal,  Oppius,  and  Cespius  ; 
and  the  Subura  (between  the  Esquiline  and  Quirinal).  The  festival  of  Septi- 
montium  was  celebrated  down  to  a  late  date,  but  its  cause  was  indistinctly 
remembered,  and  it  was  vaguely  supposed  to  refer  to  the  seven  hills  of  the  later 
and  larger  Rome. 


26  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap. 

round  an  uninhabited  hill-top,  marked  out  for  the  first  time  by  the 
ploughshare  of  the  founder,  or  round  a  village  community  that  had 
gradually  been  growing  there,  and  now  received  the  defences  neces- 
sary for  its  existence  in  such  times  and  with  such  neighbours,  it  is 
clear  that  there  must  have  been  some  year  and  day  in  which  they 
were  begun.  The  Greek  and  Roman  antiquaries  and  annalists  who 
ventured  upon  the  calculation  arrived  at  different  conclusions,  but 
not  as  widely  different  as  might  have  been  expected.  The  Greeks 
usually  accommodated  it  to  their  chronology  by  observing  the  coin- 
cidence of  events  with  the  Eponymous  archons  of  Athens,  the 
Olympic  victors,  or  the  priestesses  of  Her^  at  Argos  ;  or  reckoned 
the  years  (generally  408)  from  the  fall  of  Troy  to  the  first 
Olympic  festival  (B.C.  776).  By  what  means  they  made  the  reigns 
of  Aeneas  and  the  Alban  kings  fit  into  the  required  period  we  cannot 
tell ;  but  the  result  was  that  the  foundation  of  Rome  was  assigned  by 
most  of  them  to  the  second  year  of  the  seventh  Olympiad  (b.c.  751). 
Timaeus,  indeed,  declared  it  to  have  taken  place  in  the  thirty-eighth 
year  before  the  first  Olympiad  (B.C.  813);  but  Polybius,  apparently 
on  the  authority  of  documents  in  the  custody  of  the  Pontifices, 
arrived  at  the  date  Olympiad  7.2  (B.C.  751). 

The  Romans  themselves  do  not  appear  to  have  used  the  founda- 
tion of  the  city  as  an  era  until  late  in  the  first  century  B.C.  They 
dated  the  years  by  the  names  of  the  consuls  as  they  appeared  in 
the  Fasti,  and  if  they  calculated  from  any  epoch  at  all  it  was 
usually  from  the  first  year  of  the  Republic.  Thus,  if  the  list  of  con- 
suls in  the  Fasti  for  the  years  before  the  capture  of  the  city  in  B.C. 
390  were  to  be  trusted,  it  was  easy  enough  to  count  the  years  from 
any  given  event  to  the  year  of  the  expulsion  of  the  kings,  and  we 
should  have  no  difficulty  in  assigning  that  event  to  the  year  B.C.  510. 
But,  unfortunately,  the  Fasti  for  the  period  between  the  expulsion  of 
Tarquin  and  B.C.  390  were  far  from  being  certain  or  regular,  and 
therefore  the  exactness  of  the  calculation  must  remain  doubtful.  We 
need  not,  however,  think  it  to  be  seriously  wrong,  and  from  B.C.  390 
downwards  the  lists  are  as  certain  as  we  can  hope  anything  so  far 
back  to  be.  If  we  accept,  then,  as  the  date  of  the  regifugium  the 
year  of  the  city  244  (B.C.  510),  we  see  that  for  the  regal  period  the 
Roman  antiquaries  had  nothing  for  it  but  to  count  backward  the 
sum  of  the  years  traditionally  assigned  to  each  reign.  This  gavei 
244.  Cato,  indeed,  made  another  calculation,  starting  from  the  falll 
of  Troy,  and  arrived  at  a  result  which  would  make  the  year  of  thej 
foundation  answer  to  B.C.  752  ;  while  the  poet  Ennius,  writing  about 
B.C.  1 7  2,  speaks  of  Rome  having  been  founded  roughly  700 years  before^ 
which  would  agree  more  nearly  with  the  era  of  Timaeus  than  witl 
any  other.     The  computation  that  eventually  prevailed  was  that  ojl 


THE  ROMAN  ERA  27 


Varro,  which  was  accepted  by  the  most  learned  Romans  of  the  day, 
such  as  Cicero  and  Atticus.  He  assigned  the  foundation  to  the 
spring  of  the  third  year  of  the  sixth  Olympiad,  which,  according  to 
the  usual  calculation,  answers  to  the  year  B.C.  753.  From  thence- 
forward this  was  the  official  era  ;  and  in  A.D.  47  the  ludi  seculares 
were  held  on  the  ground  that  it  was  the  Sooth  year  of  the  city. 
Even  the  day  of  the  first  act  of  foundation  was  believed  to  be  fixed, 
and  was  commemorated  on  the  first  day  of  the  pastoral  festival,  the 
Palilia^  the  21st  of  April  (xi.  Kal.  Mai.)  ^ 

^  Dionys.  i.  74  ;  Cic.  de  Rep.  2,  §  18  ;  Varro,  R.  R.  iii.  i  ;  Ovid.  Fast.  iv. 
721  ;  Plutarch,  Rom.  12  ;  Tacitus,  Ann.  xi.  11.  The  authorities  for  the  early 
legends  are  Livy  and  Dionysius,  and  Vlntarch's  Life  of  Romulus.  The  sources 
from  which  they  drew,  and  other  scattered  records  which  we  possess,  are  discussed 
at  the  end  of  chap.  v. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  REGAL  PERIOD 
753-510 

The  situation  of  Rome  —  Latium,  its  different  meanings  —  RoMUHJS,  753-716 
—  The  foundation  of  the  city  and  earliest  institutions  —  The  joint  reign 
with  Titus  Tatius — Laws  of  Romulus,  and  his  death — NUMA  Pompilius, 
his  religious  institutions  and  laws — The  temple  of  Vesta  and  the  Regia  ;  the 
flamens,  vestals,  and  Salii  —  His  calendar — Tullus  Hostilius  —  The  de- 
struction of  Alba  Longa  —  Wars  with  the  Sabines  —  The  Horatii  and 
Curiatii — Provocatio — Angus  Marcius — Makes  the  sacra  known  to  all — 
Wars  with  the  Latins — The.  jus  fetiale — The  pons  sub  licius  and  fossa  Quiritium 
— L.  Tarquinius  Priscus — His  arrival  from  Tarquinii,  begins  temple  on 
Capitoline,  city  walls,  circus  maximus,  and  cloacae — His  murder — Servius 
TULLius,  the  agger  and  completion  of  town  walls — His  reforms,  the  four 
tribes,  and  the  193  centuries  distributed  in  five  classes — The  comitia  curiata 
and  comitia  centuriata — The  object  and  results  of  his  reform — The  patricians 
and  plebeians — His  first  census — His  death — Tarquinius  Superbus — His 
oppression  of  the  Senate — His  wars  with  the  Volscians — Capture  of  Gabii — 
His  works  in  Rome  and  his  colonies — The  Sibyl — Embassy  to  Delphi — Siege 
of  Ardea — The  story  of  Lucretia — Expulsion  of  the  Tarquins — The  credibility 
of  the  legends — The  authorities  on  which  they  rest — Their  value. 

The  advan-  THE  advantages  of  the  situation  of  Rome  both  for  security  and  com- 
tageous  merce,  in  being  at  some  distance  from  the  sea  and  yet  having  a 
situation  of  convenient  access  to  it,  are  noticed  by  Cicero  and  attributed  by  him 

Rome  .  .  ■ 

to  the  wisdom  of  its  founder.  About  eighteen  miles  from  the  mouth 
of  the  Tiber,  it  was  sufficiently  far  from  the  sea  to  be  safe  from 
sudden  surprises  by  a  piratic  fleet,  while  the  river  afforded  an  easy 
highway  for  its  merchandise.  The  amphitheatre  of  hills  which 
encloses  the  meadows  in  the  bend  of  the  river,  which  afterwards 
became  the  Campus  Martins,  varying  from  120  to  180  feet  above 
the  stream,  offered  heights  sufficiently  elevated  and  abrupt  for  forti- 
fication, yet  without  difficulties  for  the  builder  or  cultivator.  On  the 
opposite  or  right  bank  of  the  river  a  chain  of  low  hills,  extending  for 
about  a  mile  and  a  half,  afforded  a  protection  from  the  north  ;  while 


VETUS  LATIUxM  29 


on  both  sides  of  the  river  there  was  an  excellent  line  of  country  for 
connecting  the  capital  with  its  harbour. 

The  district  in  which  it  stood  was  called  Latium.  But  Latium,  The 
in  the  later  acceptation  of  the  term,  was  not,  when  Rome  began,  peoples  of 
inhabited  entirely  by  Latins.  The  Aequi  lived  in  the  north-east  ^  ^"^* 
corner  of  it,  a  hilly  district  beyond  Tibur  {Tivoli).  To  the  west  the 
Volsci  and  Aurunci  held  nearly  half  of  it,  with  a  coast-line  stretching 
from  Antium  to  Sinuessa.  Between  the  Aequi  and  Volsci  dwelt  the 
Hernici.  Even  in  the  remaining  portions  to  the  west,  bounded  on 
the  north  by  the  Tiber,  there  were  other  tribes  besides  the  Latins. 
The  Rutuli  inhabited  Ardea  and  its  neighbourhood,  about  twenty 
miles  south  of  Rome  ;  and  even  the  people  of  Aricia,  afterwards  the 
first  stage  on  the  Appian  Way,  only  fifteen  miles  from  Rome,  were 
said  to  be  of  a  different  stock.  Up  the  river  the  Latins  extended 
for  about  twelve  miles  to  Crustumerium,  which,  according  to  some 
writers,  was  partly  a  Sabine  town  ;  while  some  of  the  territory  of  the 
Aequi,  from  Antium  to  Circeii,  had  once  been  occupied  by  them. 
But  from  this  they  had  been  driven  out  or  had  been  absorbed  by  the 
Aequi ;  and  on  the  whole  the  Latini,  who  were  afterwards  to  give 
their  name  to  the  larger  tract  of  country  reaching  as  far  south  as 
Sinuessa,  were  in  the  early  days  of  Rome  being  pushed  from  their 
lands  by  the  surrounding  tribes,  though  at  times  they  rallied  and 
recovered  lost  ground. 

Old  Latium,  therefore,  was  not  marked  off  by  any  natural  Veins 
frontiers,  and  varied  in  extent  at  different  times,  but  was  at  best  but  ^(^ii^»^' 
a  small  part  of  the  later  Latium.  The  Latins  in  it  formed,  it  is 
said,  a  League  of  thirty  cities,  of  which  the  common  meeting-ground 
and  place  of  worship  was  the  temple  of  Jupiter  Latiaris,  on  the 
Alban  mount.  Although  the  number  of  cities  in  the  League  was 
nominally  thirty,  both  the  particular  towns  and  the  total  number 
varied.  Dionysius  ^  gives  the  names  of  twenty-nine,  some  of  which 
are  of  importance  in  early  Roman  history,  and  from  receiving 
Roman  colonies,  or  for  some  other  reason,  remained  in  varying 
degrees  of  prosperity  or  decadence  till  late  times  ;  while  of  the 
others  some  were  never  important,  and  some  perished  so  early  and 
so  entirely  that  their  site  was  unknown.  Pliny  reckons  as  many  as 
fifty-three  separate  communities  in  Latium  which  in  his  time  had 
thus  perished  without  leaving  any  traces.^ 

The  ager  Romanus  was  at  first  apparently  among  the  smallest   The  ager 
of  the  territories  in  this  smaller  Latium,  extending  in  no  direction  Romanus. 
beyond  the  city  wall  for  more  than  five  miles.      Rome,  however,  very 
early  stretched  out  her  arms  to  secure  the  free  use  of  the  Tiber,  the 

1  Dionys.  v.  71.  2  pijny,  N.  H,  iii.  5,  70. 


Illl!il!!ll*:iiiiiiihiillilii!iliiiiliiiiiii!iinwifii 


THE  SEVEN  KINGS  31 


navigation  of  which  was  the  origin  of  her  commercial  importance. 
Thus  the  founding  of  the  harbour  town  Ostia,  at  the  mouth  of  the  river, 
sixteen  miles  from  Rome,  was,  according  to  a  consistent  and  undeviat- 
ing  tradition,  attributed  to  the  fourth  king,  Ancus  Marcius  ;  to  whom 
is  also  assigned  the  first  occupation  and  fortification  of  the  Jani- 
culum,  and  its  union  with  Rome  by  the  pons  sublicius.  While, 
still  earlier,  the  capture  and  colonisation  of  Fidenae,  which  com- 
manded the  bridge  across  the  Tiber  above  Rome,  was  attributed  to 
Romulus.  It  was  a  city  thus  small  in  itself  and  in  its  territory, 
whose  gradual  rise  to  a  commanding  position  in  Latium,  under  the 
rule  of  seven  successive  kings,  is  described  by  the  later  Roman  and 
Greek  historians. 

I.  Romulus  {753-716)  ^ 

To  Romulus  is  ascribed  the  foundation  of  the  Palatine  city  with  Foundation 
full   Etruscan   rites.      The  plough,  with  share  of  bronze,  was  drawn  ^f^^ 
round  to  mark  the  line  of  its  wall,  and  lifted  where  a  gate  was  to  be  n^adrata. 
made.     The  space  between  this  furrow  and  the  actual  wall,  as  after- 
wards a  similar  space  within  the  wall,  was  called  the  Pomoerium^  Pomoe- 
and  was  to  be  kept  sacred  from  building  or  cultivation,  and  marked  rium. 
the  limits  to  which    the  auspicia  of  the  city  magistrates  extended. 
Within    this    circuit   were   three    "  temples "    or    sacred    enclosures, 
dedicated  to  Jupiter,  Juno,  and  Minerva,  and  in  the  centre  a  vault  or 
inuftdusj    into   which   a   clod   of  his    native  earth    was    cast   by  the 
founder,  with  other  emblems  of  the  necessaries  of  life  ;  and  in  which, 
according  to  some,  was  stored  what  was  sufficient  for  the  immediate 
needs    of  the    community.       Romulus  also  was   the  author  of   the 
earliest  extensions  of  the  new  city  by  the   inclusion   of  those   six  SepHmon- 
minor  ridges,  with  inferior  fortifications  joined  on  to  the  chief  wall  ^*^'«- 
of  the  Palatine,  which  first  gave  it  the  name  of  the  city  of  seven  hills, 
the  Septimontium.2 

Now  the  settlers  whom  Romulus  brought  with  him  from  The 
Lavinium  and  Alba  were  not  sufficient  to  people  his  new  town,  asylum. 
He  therefore  appointed  a  place  on  the  neighbouring  height  of  the 
Capitolium  (then  called  the  Mons  Tarpeius),  between  its  two  ridges, 
which  afterwards  was  known  as  inter  duos  lucus,  to  which  all  who 
had  reason  to  be  dissatisfied  in  their  native  towns,  or  were  forced 
to  flee  for  fear  of  the  laws  or  their  domestic  enemies,  might  find 
a  safe  asylum.  So  men  became  abundant  in  Rome  ;  but  there 
were  not  enough  women  whom  they  might  marry,  and  there- 
fore  there    was   danger   that  the   inhabitants   might  again   dwindle 

^  The  traditional  dates  are  given  in  the  regal  period,  but  they  are  of  course 
without  any  good  authority.  ^  See  chap.  iv.  p.  25. 


32  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap. 

The  Sabine  away.  After  consulting  the  hundred  patres  whom  he  had  selected 
women.  ^s  a  council  or  senate,  Romulus  sent  messengers  to  the  neighbouring 
Latin  towns  asking  that  Rome  should  be  admitted  to  the  League,  at 
least  so  far  as  to  give  his  citizens  the  power  of  making  legal 
marriages  with  them.  But  his  messengers  were  treated  with  con- 
tempt, and  the  request  refused.  Thereupon  he  sent  a  proclamation 
to  the  various  towns  of  a  great  festival  to  be  held  at  Rome  in 
honour  of  Equestrian  Neptune. ^  The  festival  was  attended  by  a 
crowd  of  strangers  from  Antemnae,  Caenine,  Crustumerium,  and 
several  Sabine  towns,  accompanied  by  their  wives  and  daughters. 
While  the  games  were  attracting  the  attention  of  all,  suddenly  the 
Roman  youths,  at  a  concerted  signal,  rushed  among  the  spectators 
and  began  carrying  off  the  virgins  from  their  seats.  The  assembly 
broke  up  in  confusion,  and  the  fathers  of  the  virgins  fled,  loudly 
protesting  against  this  breach  of  the  laws  of  hospitality.  Their 
complaints  were  listened  to  in  the  various  Sabine  towns,  and  brought 
to  the  ears  of  the  Sabine  king,  Titus  Tatius.  But  though  Tatius 
was  prepared  to  avenge  his  subjects,  the  people  of  the  Latin  towns — 
Antemnae,  Caenine,  and  Crustumerium — would  not  wait  for  his  slow 
movements,  and  invaded  the  Roman  territory  on  their  own  account. 
The  first  were  signally  defeated  by  Romulus,  losing  their  king  and 
many  of  their  citizens.  The  second  fared  likewise,  but  on  the 
petition  of  Hersilia,  the  wife  of  Romulus,  were  spared  from  general 
slaughter  and  received  as  citizens  of  Rome.  The  people  of 
Crustumerium  were  still  more  easily  beaten,  and  their  lands  divided 
among  Roman  farmers. 

After  these  things  Titus  Tatius  entered  the  Roman  territory  at 
the  head  of  a  great  army.  He  captured  the  fort  on  the  Capitoline 
mount,  thanks  to  the  treason  of  Tarpeia,  the  daughter  of  its  com- 
mander, who  guided  the  enemy  into  the  fortress,  and  was  rewarded 
by  being  crushed  to  death  under  their  shields ;  for  she  had  bargained 
for  "what  they  carried  in  their  left  hands,"  meaning  thereby  the 
heavy  bracelets  and  jewelled  rings  which  it  was  the  Sabine  custom 
to  wear.  The  next  day  the  Sabines  descended  into  the  valley 
between  the  Capitoline  and  the  Palatine  and  gave  the  Romans 
battle.  At  first  the  Romans,  who  had  the  worse  position,  were 
routed,  and  Tullus  Hostilius,  who  fought  in  their  front  rank,  was 
killed.  But  as  the  broken  lines  were  retreating  towards  the  gate 
in  the  Palatine  wall,  Romulus  vowed  a  temple  to  Jupiter  Stator  if  he 
would  but  "  stay  "  the  panic  ;  and  then,  as  on  the  authority  of  the 
god,  he  called  loudly  to  the  Romans  to  stop.  They  rallied  just 
outside   the    city  gate   and  charged  down   upon   the   Sabines,    who, 

1  Or  in  honour  of  Consus,  god  of  counsel,  the  Cons ua Ha.  According  to 
others  Consus  is  only  another  name  for  Neptune. 


I 


THE  SABINES  IN  ROME 


33 


under  Mettius  Curtius,  were  close  upon  them.  The  Sabines  broke 
and  fled ;  and  though  they  once  again  rallied  and  renewed  the  battle, 
the  Romans  were  gaining  the  victory.  Then  the  Sabine  women, 
who  had  been  carried  off  by  the  Roman  youths  and  were  now 
Roman  matrons  and  mothers,  with  torn  garments  and  dishevelled 
hair,  rushed  between  the  ranks  of  the  combatants  and  implored 
those  who  were  now  their  husbands  and  the  fathers  of  their  children 
on  the  one  side,  and  their  own  fathers  and  brothers  on  the  other,  to 
cease  the  unnatural  conflict.  Their  prayers  prevailed.  Not  only 
was  the  battle  stopped,  but  the  two  hosts  agreed  to  be  united  in  one 
state,  ruled  jointly  by  Romulus  and  Tatius.  Upon  this  junction  of 
the  two  peoples  the  number  of  the  senators  was  raised  from  loo 
to  200  ;  the  three  cenhiriae  of  cavalry  were  doubled  in  numbers, 
so  that  they  now  contained  600  men  ;  and  when  the  people  were 
summoned  to  arms  they  were  enrolled  in  two  legions  instead  of 
one.  The  citizens  included  in  the  gentes  were  divided,  apparently  The 
for  military  purposes,  into  thirty  curiae  or  wardships, ^  founded  Kamnes, 
on  a  still  more  ancient  threefold  division  into  tribes — the  Ramnes,  ^'*"'  ^^^ 
Titii,  and  Luceres.  Of  these  the  first  two  were  connected  by 
the  Roman  writers  with  the  names  of  Romulus  and  Tatius,  and 
were  accordingly  believed  to  indicate  the  Roman  and  Sabine 
elements  among  the  people.  Of  the  third  they  could  give  no 
account  ;  but  Plutarch  connects  the  word  with  the  lucus  or  asylum 
on  the  Capitoline,  in  which  case  it  would  indicate  the  adventitious 
element  of  the  Roman  people  gathered  from  the  neighbouring  Latin 
towns.  The  truth  is  that  we  cannot  tell  what  the  origin  of  the  words 
is,  and  the  explanation  of  Mommsen,  that  they  represent  originally 
separate  communities  living  about  the  site  of  Rome,  is  only  one  more 
among  many  conjectures  which  cannot  be  proved.  We  can  only 
recognise  the  fact  that  some  threefold  division  of  the  populus  is  im- 
plied in  all  the  early  institutions — the  thirty  curiae,  the  three  centuries 
of  equites,  the  3000  men  of  the  legion,  the  six  Vestal  virgins,  the 
two  colleges  of  Salii  each  consisting  of  twelve,  and  others.  But  one 
permanent  trace  remained  of  a  mixture  of  Sabines  with  the  Romans. 
The  name  Quirites  survived  to  the  latest  times  as  an  appellation  of  Quirites. 
the  Roman  citizens  in  their  civil  capacity,  derived  from  the  Sabine 
qziiris,  "  a  spear."     The  king  or  chief  of  the  Sabines  had  been  wont 

^  According  to  Dio  (fr.  5)  the  tribes  like  the  curiae  were  divisions  grafted  on 
the  armed  host,  and  were  purely  military  :  Romulus  found  that  his  armed  levy- 
amounted  to  3000,  and  he  accordingly  divided  the  men  into  three  tribes,  each 
tribe  into  ten  curiae  or  "wards"  {(ppovTiaT-qpia,  curae).  Livy  (i.  13)  holds  that 
the  curiae  were  named  after  the  captured  women  ;  Varro  (Dionys.  ii.  47)  from 
ancient  leaders  and  other  sources  ;  Plutarch  [Rom.  20)  from  localities.  Seven 
only  of  the  thirty  names  are  known  to  us  and  are  not  decisive  on  the  point. 


34 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


to  address  his  subjects  as  Quirites  or  Qjuirinij  and  the  name,  which 
had  once  been  applicable  to  a  host  under  arms,  was  retained  at 
Rome  to  indicate  the  citizens  when  performing  civil  rather  than 
military  functions.^ 

The  joint  rule  of  Romulus  and  Tatius  did  not  last  long.  After 
a  few  years  Tatius  was  slain  at  Lavinium  ;  and  Romulus  reigned 
alone  over  what  was  now  a  mixed  population  of  Roman-Latins  and 
Sabines.  He  warred  with  the  people  of  Fidenae,  who  had  invaded 
the  ager  Romanus  ;  and  not  only  conquered  them  in  the  field,  but 
took  their  town,  in  which  he  placed  some  Roman  colonic  and  forced 
them  to  surrender  to  Rome  a  district  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Tiber 
called  Septempagi^  "  the  seven  villages."  This  roused  the  jealousy 
of  Veii,  a  flourishing  Etruscan  town,  about  fifteen  miles  from  Rome, 
long  since  allied  with  the  people  of  Fidenae,  who,  according  to  some, 
were  partly  Etruscans  and  partly  Latins.  The  Veientines  accord- 
ingly made  raids  upon  the  Roman  territory  \  and  so  the  Romans 
for  the  first  time  crossed  the  Tiber  in  arms,  chased  the  Veientines  to 
their  walls,  and  returned,  wasting  the  country  as  they  came.  The 
Veientines  sued  for  peace,  and  a  truce  for  loo  years  was  arranged. 
Thus  the  prowess  of  Rome  became  noised  abroad. 

But  it  was  not  only  for  his  achievements  in  war  that  he  was 
honoured.  He  was  the  author  of  wise  laws  and  useful  institutions. 
Thus  it  was  said  that  he  made  a  marriage  law  which  forbade 
the  wife  to  divorce  her  husband  ;  or  the  husband  to  divorce  his  wife 
save  for  three  causes  only — poisoning  her  children,  excessive  luxury, 
or  adultery.  He  ordained  that  a  father  should  have  complete 
power,  even  of  life  and  death,  over  his  son ;  but  forbade  the 
exposure  of  male  children  or  the  first  -  born  daughter ;  and  made 
severe  laws  against  murder  (^parricidiuui).  And  as,  besides  the 
members  of  the  original  gentes  who  had  settled  in  Rome  with  him, 
and  those  others  that  had  come  with  Titus  Tatius,  many  strangers 
had  been  attracted  to  the  city  and  its  territory  who  were  not  citizens, 
and  depended  for  protection  on  certain  of  the  full  citizens,  he  made 
laws  regulating  the  conduct  of  these  two  classes,  the  patroni  and 
clientes.  He  also  established  festivals  in  honour  of  the  gods  ;  and 
appointed  a  college  of  three  augurs  who  might  declare  their  will  to 
the  people.  He  also  defined  the  functions  of  the  king  and  the 
Senate,  and  of  the  magistrates  as  they  then  existed,  the  tribunus 
celerwn^  the  quaestores,  and  praefectus  urbi.  He  ordained  also  that 
every  ninth  day  there  should  be  a  market  {nufidinae)  held  in  the 
town  for  the  country  folk  to  sell  the  produce  of  their  farms  ;  and 
he  himself  administered  justice  on  a  raised  platform  {tribunal)  in 

^  The  Romans,  probably  without  reason,  connected  the  word  with  the  Sabine 
town  Cures. 


V  INSTITUTIONS  ASSIGNED  TO  ROMULUS  35 

the  market-place.  He  fortified  the  Capitol  and  the  Aventine  with  Fortifica- 
trench  and  palisade  for  the  security  of  the  flocks  and  herds  of  the  ^^°"-  ^f  ^^^ 
shepherd  people  who  dwelt  there ;  and  added  the  Quirinal  and  ^^J^^^/^""^ 
Caelian  hills  to  the  city,  on  the  former  of  which  he  settled  the 
Sabines  as  well  as  on  the  Capitoline,  while  the  Romans  dwelt 
chiefly  on  the  Palatine  and  Caelian.  He  built  temples  to  Jupiter 
Feretrius  and  Jupiter  Stator  ;  first  won  the  spolia  opivia;  and  first 
mounted  the  Capitol  in  triumph.  Thus  to  their  first  king  did  the 
Romans  attribute  the  beginning  of  many  things  known  in  later  times. 
Nor  to  such  a  hero  could  any  but  an  heroic  end  be  assigned.  The  Death  of 
people  loved  him  ;  but  there  were  certain  of  the  senators  who  were  Romulus. 
jealous  ;  and  some  say  that  he  was  assassinated  in  the  Senate-house 
by  those  who  hated  him  for  his  severe  justice,  and  that  the  murderers 
dismembered  his  body,  and  so  were  able  to  conceal  their  crime. 
But  others  say  that  on  a  certain  day,  when  he  was  addressing  his 
assembled  army,  a  sudden  darkness  fell  upon  the  earth,  though  the 
sky  was  clear  ;  a  mighty  storm  of  thunder  and  lightning  passed  over- 
head, and  when  it  cleared  away,  Romulus  could  nowhere  be  seen. 
But  as  the  citizens  were  mourning  for  their  lost  king,  a  certain  lulius 
Proculus  came  with  a  marvellous  tale.  Romulus  had  appeared  to 
him  from  heaven,  and  bidden  him  warn  his  people  that  they  should 
give  their  whole  minds  to  the  arts  of  war  ;  that  the  gods  willed  Rome 
to  be  the  capital  of  the  world  ;  and  that,  if  they  obeyed  him,  she 
would  be  irresistible  by  any  human  power.  So  it  came  to  be  believed 
that  Romulus  had  been  carried  to  heaven  in  the  chariot  of  his  father 
Mars,  and  he  was  worshipped  under  the  name  of  Quirinus,  "  the 
spear-god." 

II.    NUMA    POMPILIUS    {yi^-672) 

For  a  year  after  the  death  of  Romulus  no  king  was  appointed.  Interreges 
The  two  parts  of  the  city  could  not  agree  :  the  Romans  wished  for 
a  Roman  king,  the  Sabines  claimed  that,  as  they  had  submitted 
patiently  to  the  sway  of  Romulus,  so  now  it  was  but  fair  that  a 
Sabine  should  rule  for  a  time.  Meantime  the  government  was 
carried  on  by  interreges.  The  senators  were  divided  into  boards  of 
ten  men  {decuriae),  each  board  holding  office  for  fifty  days,  while 
each  of  them  in  turn  wore  the  royal  purple  and  was  attended  by 
twelve  lictors  for  five  days.i      But  the  people  could  not  brook  the 

^  Livy  i.  17 ;  Dionys.  ii.  57.  This  is  the  account  of  Dionysius  and 
apparently  of  Livy,  who.  however,  is  much  less  explicit.  In  subsequent 
references  to  interreges  we  hear  nothing  of  the  divisions  of  Senate  into  decuriae. 
The  Senate  appoints  an  interrex  for  five  days,  who  declares  the  election  of  his 
successor,  and  so  on,  until  the  necessary  election  of  king  or  consul  has  been  held 
(see  Dionys.  viii,  90  ;  Livyi.  32  ;  iii.  40  ;  iv.  7  ;  v.  31  ;  vi.  41  ;  vii.  17,  21  ;  viii.  23). 


36 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


rule  of  the  senators  and  clamoured  for  a  king.      The  Senate  yielded, 
and  promised  to  ratify  by  their  authority  a  worthy  election  by  the 
Curiae.       The  Curiae  in  return    permitted    the    Senate   to   choose. 
Election  of  Their  choice  fell  upon  Numa  Pompilius,  a  man  of  Cures,  renowned 
Numa.         for  his  wisdom  and  his  knowledge  of  divine  and  human  law.      He 
was  summoned  to  Rome,  and  consecrated  by  the  augur.      He  ruled 
well  and  wisely,  maintaining  peace  with  his  neighbours,  teaching  his 
people  by  what  ceremonies  to  appease  the  gods,  and  how  to  regulate 
His  insti-     their  lives  according  to  the  divine  will.      Thus  to  him  are  attributed 
tutions  and  the  custom  of  closing  the  door  of  Janus  in  peace,  and  opening  it  in 
laws.  \\vi\^  of  war  ;  the  appointment  of  the  separate  priests  for  the  worship 

of  Jove,  Mars,  and  Quirinus, — thejlatjiejt  Dialis^^Jlamen  Martis,Jlajncn 
Quirini;  the  foundation  of  the  college  of  five  pontifices,  and  the 
delivery  to  them  of  a  written  scheme  of  religious  services,  calendars, 
and  the  like  ;  the  appointment  of  four  Vestal  virgins,  and  of  the 
twelve  Salii  of  Mars  Gradivus.  He  taught  also  the  ceremonies  at 
funerals,  and  in  expiating  prodigies  ;  and,  above  all,  he  reformed 
their  mode  of  calculating  time,  for  he  divided  the  solar  year  into 
twelve  lunar  months,  with  an  intercalary  month  in  a  cycle  of  twenty 
years  ;  and  distinguished  between  holy  and  secular  days  {dies  nefasti 
diVidi  fasti).  He  is  said,  too,  to  have  organised  trade-guilds,  and  the 
consecration  of  Argci  or  local  chapels  may  refer  to  some  such 
division  of  the  citizens.  It  was  he,  too,  who  introduced  the  custom  of 
dividing  conquered  lands  among  the  citizens.  So  high  was  his  reputa- 
tation  for  holiness,  that  he  was  believed  to  hold  converse  with  the 
gods.  He  often  wandered  in  a  glade  sacred  to  the  Camenae,  where 
there  was  a  holy  cavern,  out  of  which  issued  a  stream  of  fresh  water. 
There  as  he  lingered,  taking  counsel  with  his  own  heart  and  with 
nature,  it  was  rumoured  that  he  met  the  nymph  Egeria,  who  loved 
him  and  taught  him  wisdom  more  than  human. 


III.    TULLUS    HOSTILIUS  {672-640) 

Numa's  death  was  followed  by  a  short  interregnum.  Then  the 
people,  with  the  sanction  of  the  Senate,  met  in  their  Curiae  and 
elected  Tullus  Hostilius,  grandson  of  that  Hostilius  who  had  fought 
against  the  Sabines  at  the  foot  of  the  Capitol.  To  him  no  peaceful 
institutions  are  attributed.  His  reign  was  one  of  war,  and  such 
religious  ceremonies  as  he  introduced  were  connected  with  the 
formal  proclamation  of  war.  His  great  achievement  was  the 
extension  of  the  Roman  territory  by  the  destruction  of  Alba  Longa, 
and  bringing  its  inhabitants  to  Rome.  This  was  the  result  of  a 
series  of  border  wars.  First,  we  are  told,  the  Albans  invaded  the 
Roman  territory  under  their  king  Cluilius.     When  Cluilius  was  killed 


] 


(     V  DESTRUCTION  OF  ALBA  LONGA  37 

the  Albans  were  forced  to  retire,  and  they  appointed  Mettius  Fufetius 
to  be  their  dictator.      The  Romans  then  invaded  the  Alban  territory ; 
but  on  the  suggestion  of  Mettius  it  was  agreed  that  the  victory  should 
be  decided  by  a  contest  between  three  brothers  on  the  Roman  side 
and  three  on  that  of  Alba,  the  Horatii  and  Curiatii.      This  combat 
took  place  in  the   presence  of  the  two  armies.     Two  of  the  three 
champions    on    either    side   were    killed ;    but   the   survivor  of  the  Horatii 
Curiatii  was  badly  wounded,  while  Horatius  was  still  unharmed.      He  ^^^  _ 
therefore   easily  killed   and  despoiled   the  third  opponent,  and  the     "''^^  "' 
victory   was   declared  to  be   on   the   side  of  Rome.       Mettius,    in 
accordance  with  the  agreement,   put  himself  and  his  army  at  the 
disposal  of  Tullus  Hostilius.      But  soon  there  was  a  new  war  with    War  with 
Fidenae.     The  people  of  Fidenae  had  submitted  to  Rome  in  the  days  Fidenae 
of  Romulus  ;  but  they  now  again  made  alliance  with  the  Veientines  and  ^"      ^"* 
broke  with  Rome.      Mettius  was  summoned  to  bring  an  Alban  army 
to  aid  the  Romans.      But  though  he  obeyed  and  advanced  across  the 
Anio,  yet  neither  he  nor  his  countrymen  were  zealous  in  the  cause  ; 
and  in  the  battle  against  the  combined  forces  of  Fidenae  and  Veil 
Mettius  wasted  time  in  manoeuvres  meant  to  avoid  active  participation 
in  the  struggle,  but  when  the   Romans  proved  victorious,  was  loud 
in  his  congratulations  to  Tullus.      His  double  dealing  was  terribly 
punished.     Two  quadrigae  were  placed  side  by  side,  and  to  each 
chariot    one    of   his    legs    was   fastened.       The   chariots   were  then 
driven  in  different  directions  ;  and  he  who  had  halted  between  two  Death  of 
opinions  was  torn  in  two   and   perished   miserably.       Then   Tullus  Mettius 
determined  to  destroy  Alba   and   bring   its    people   to    Rome ;    and     ^f^^^^^- 
when  this  was  done  the  number  of  people  at   Rome  was  once  more 
nearly  doubled.      The  Mons  Caelius   (already  included  by  Romulus 
in  the  city)  was  assigned  to  the  new  inhabitants  ;  the  Senate,^  the 
gentes,  the  equites,  and  the  legions  were  all  increased. 

The   next   war   was   with   the   Sabines,  between  whom  and  the    War  with 
Romans  mutual  causes  of  offence  had  arisen.      The  Romans  alleged  ^h.^^'^bmes. 
that  certain  of  their  citizens  had  been   carried  off  while  engaged  in 
peaceful  trade  near  the  temple  of  Feronia,  at  the  foot  of  Mount 
Soracte  ;  the  Sabines  that  their  exiles  had  taken  refuge  in  a  sacred 
grove  at  Rome  and  had  been  there  retained.  ^     Tullus  invaded  the 

^  To  accommodate  the  increased  number  of  senators  Hostilius  was  said  to 
have  built  a  new  Curia,  hence  called  to  the  latest  times  of  the  Republic  the  Curia 
Hostilia  (Livy  i.  30). 

■^  Neither  Livy  nor  Dionysius  is  clear  as  to  the  nature  of  the  offence. 
Dionysius  calls  them  "  exiles"  {(pv^abas).  Some  editors  wish  to  insert  the  word 
servos  in  Livy's  text.  That  would  give  a  more  intelligible  account  of  the  ground 
of  complaint,  but  would  not  agree  with  Dionysius.  It  is  perhaps  more  in  keeping 
with  the  usual  causes  of  quarrel  between  such  States  to  suppose  the  men  to  be 
political  refugees,  or  at  least  fugitives  from  justice. 


38  HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Sabine   territory,   and  won  a   battle  at   the   silva  malitiosa.      After 
a  reign  of  thirty-two  years,  marked  by  other  wars  and  by  a  great 
pestilence,  he  died  full  of  honour  and  fame.^ 
Provocatio.  One  other  story  is  told  of  him  which  it  is  important  to  remember, 

because  it  illustrates  a  right  of  the  citizens  of  Rome,  which,  if  it  did 
not  really  exist  at  this  time,  was  afterwards  looked  upon  as  of  the 
highest  value.  The  victorious  Horatius,  when  returning  to  Rome 
flushed  with  his  victory  over  the  Curiatii,  and  accompanied  by  the 
liveliest  expressions  of  joy  from  his  fellow-citizens,  was  met  by  his 
sister,  who  had  been  betrothed  to  one  of  the  slain  Curiatii.  She 
recognised  among  the  spoils  which  he  carried  a  cloak  which  she  had 
worked  for  her  affianced  husband,  and  amidst  the  general  joy  she 
alone  was  weeping  and  lamenting.  In  a  sudden  passion  of  resent- 
ment her  brother  slew  her.  Thereupon  the  king  summoned  a 
meeting  of  the  Curiae,  and  named  duoviri  to  condemn  Horatius  on 
a  charge  of  perduellio^  that  is,  as  a  public  enemy.  They  declared 
the  sentence  of  the  law  ;  and  the  king  in  accordance  with  it  ordered 
the  lictor  to  bind  his  hands,  that  he  might  undergo  the  legal  penalty 
of  scourging  and  hanging.  Then  Horatius,  with  the  permission  of 
the  king,  cried,  "  I  appeal "  {provoco).  This  appeal  was  judged  by 
the  people,  who  released  him  from  the  penalty,  on  the  performance 
of  certain  rites  of  purification  and  a  formal  penance.  Thus,  if  this 
story  is  founded  on  fact,  the  right  oi  provocatio — the  most  valued  of 
civil  rights — existed  at  Rome  under  the  kings,  though  it  was  gener- 
ally considered  to  rest  upon  the  lex  Valeria  (508)  and  the  leges 
Valerio-Horatianae  (447).  The  books  of  the  Pontifical  College, 
however,  contained  entries  attesting  its  existence  in  the  regal  period  ;  ^ 
and  this  is  in  harmony  with  the  fact  connected  with  nearly  all  legisla- 
tion. Laws  seldom  if  ever  create  an  entirely  novel  right ;  they 
usually  confirm  or  expand  one  which  has  already  existed  by  unwritten 
convention  or  tradition  ;  their  immediate  object  is  to  prevent  en- 
croachments upon  a  right  which  exists,  but  is  liable  to  be  invaded 
The  early  by  despotic  rulers.  Moreover,  the  story  as  we  have  it  shows  this 
^i^§^ ^f  right  in  an  embryonic  and  imperfect  stage.  In  the  first  place,  the 
frovocatio.  ^^"8"  ^^  represented  as  appointing  the  duoviri^  not  because  he  could 
not  have  proceeded  without  them,  but  because  he  wished  to  avoid 
odium.  In  the  next  place,  the  duoviri  do  not  try  the  accused.  His 
guilt  is  assumed,  and  they  only  have  to  declare  the  law.      Lastly,  he 

^  Yet  Plutarch  has  preserved  a  tradition  that  he  was  punished  for  his  contempt 
of  rehgion  by  the  loss  of  his  senses,  in  consequence  of  which  he  fell  into  grievous 
superstition,  quite  unlike  the  ordered  religion  of  Numa  (Plut.  Num.  22). 

2  Connected  with  duellum,  the  old  form  of  bellum  {cp.  Duelona  =  Bellona  : 
duonus  =  bonus)  ;  it  means  "levying  war  on  the  State." 

^  Cic.  de  Rep.  2,  §  54. 


1 


PROVOCATIO— THE  FETIALS  39 


Ancus 


can  only  appeal  to  the  people  by  permission  of  the  king.  The 
power  of  the  king  is  absolute,  but  he  may  choose,  either  to  avoid 
responsibility,  or  because  he  wishes  the  accused  to  escape  from  the 
law,  to  refer  the  case  to  the  people. 

IV.  Angus  Marcius  {640-616) 

On  the  death  of  Tullus   Hostilius  the  customary  interrex  being 
nominated  held  a  meeting  of  the  Curiae,  in  which  Ancus   Marcius,  establuhes 
son  of  the  daughter  of  Numa  Pompihus,  was  elected  king.      Because    ^^^,-^,-^^  ^y 
unlike   the  last   king,  he  showed   himself  anxious  that  the  laws  of  prodaim- 
religion,    which  his  grandfather  had  taught   the   people,   should  be  ing  war. 
observed,  and  took  care  that  the  public  sacra  should  be  inscribed 
on  an  album,  so  that  all  might  know  them,  he  was  believed  to  be 
unwarlike.      The  Latins,  therefore,  renewed  hostilities.     They  made 
a  raid  over  the  Roman  frontier,  and  refused  all  restitution.     But  king 
Ancus   Marcius  was  no   coward.       He  was   prepared   to   fight   the 
enemies  of  Rome,   but  even  in  war  was  careful  that  due  religious 
rites  should  be  observed.     A  legate  was  sent  to  formally  demand  the 
restitution  of  the  plunder,   and   to  proclaim  war  with  proper  cere- 
monies, if  the  booty  and  captives  were  not  restored  within  ten  days. 
When    the    legate    returned  announcing    the    enemy's    refusal,    the 
king  solemnly  put  the  question  to  the  senators,  who  one  by  one  with 
equal  solemnity  declared  that  war  might  be  waged  with  clean  hands 
and  a  clear  conscience.i     Then  the  fetial  took  a  spear,  with  an  iron 
head,  or  with  its  point  hardened  in  the  fire,  and  hurled  it  over  the 
frontier,  and  in  the  presence  of  not  less  than  three  youths  solemnly 
proclaimed  war.     The  war  was  fortunate  at  all  points  for  king  Ancus.    War  with 
Many  of  the  Latin  towns  were  stormed  ;  and  some,  such  as  Politonum,  ^^^  ^^''^'■ 
were  destroyed,  and  their  inhabitants  transferred  to  Rome  and  settled  m 
the  space  between  the  Palatine  and  Aventine.    Thus  the  power  of  Rome 
over  her  neighbours  was  increased  by  Ancus,  who  is  also  believed  to 
have  taken  an  important  step  for  securing  her  command  of  both  sides  ot 
the  Tiber  ;  for  he  founded  Ostia  and  connected  the  city  with  the  Jani- 
culum  by  means  of  the  "  Bridge  of  the  wooden  piles,"  \hepo?ts  subliaiis.  Pons  sub- 
the  construction  and  repair  of  which  were   accompanied  by  strict  ^^«"^- 
religious  rites.     No  iron  was  allowed  to  be  used  in  it,?  and  its  beams 

1  Puro  pioque  duello  quaerendas  censeo,  itaque  consentio  consciscoque. 

2  This  was  probably  connected  with  a  religious  tradition  derived  from  the  age  in 
which  bronze  was  the  only  metal  in  use,  before  the  discovery  of  iron.  Thus  the 
flamen  Dialis  might  not  be  shaved  or  have  his  hair  cut  with  an  iron  razor  or 
V.nxi^—aeneis  cultris  tondebatur.  The  rule  as  to  the  pons  sublicius  was  long  rnain- 
tained  (see  Dionys.  v.  24  ;  Varr.  L.  L.  v.  83  ;  Ovid.  Fast.  v.  622  ;  Pliny.  N.  H, 
36.  §  100). 


40 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


were  to  be  so  placed  as  to  be  easily  and  quickly  removable  in  the 
case  of  an  enemy's  approach.  That  from  very  early  times  Rome 
had  the  command  of  the  right  bank  of  the  Tiber  is  shown  by  the  fact 
that  the  lucus  Deae  Diae,  the  seat  of  the  very  ancient  Arval  Brother- 
hood, was  five  miles  from  Rome,  on  what  was  afterwards  called  the 
via  Portuensis.  The  bridge  was  therefore  not  merely  for  defensive 
purposes,  as  connecting  the  city  with  the  outlying  strong  post  on 
the  Janiculum,  but  was  a  necessary  means  of  communication  with 
a  district  already  part  of  Roman  territory.  Its  construction,  again, 
seems  to  indicate  that  an  intercourse  was  growing  up  between  Rome 
and  Etruria  of  a  more  peaceful  kind  than  that  with  her  southern 
neighbours.  Finally,  the  name  oi p07itifex  shows  that  its  construction 
and  maintenance  was  from  early  times  a  matter  of  importance  and 
even  sacred  obligation.  Besides  this  there  was  attributed  to  Ancus 
Marcius  an  extension  of  the  city  area,  protected  by  some  kind  of 
artificial  defence ;  for  this  appears  to  have  been  the  nature  of 
the  fossa  Quiritiwn,  the  exact  position  of  which  is  uncertain,  but 
which  perhaps  followed  the  line  of  part  of  the  subsequent  Servian 
wall,  from  the  porta  Capena  to  the  Tiber,  round  the  foot  of  the 
Aventine. 


V.  L.  Tarquinius  Priscus  {616-^78) 

When  Ancus  Marcius  had  reigned  twenty-four  years  he  died, 
leaving  young  sons  behind  him.  But  at  some  period  during  his  reign 
there  had  come  to  Rome  an  Etruscan  noble  or  Lucumo.  He  was 
said  to  be  the  son  of  Demaratus,  one  of  the  Bacchiadae  of  Corinth, 
who  had  migrated  first  to  Sparta,  and  then  to  Tarquinii,  after  having 
long  traded  with  the  Etruscans.  Discontented  with  the  inferior 
position  of  Tarquinii,  he  came  to  Rome  with  his  wife  Tanaquil,  in 
search  of  a  more  important  career.  When  he  reached  Janiculum,  an 
eagle  suddenly  swooped  down  and  carried  off  his  cap,  and  replaced 
it  with  loud  screams.  His  wife,  skilled  in  Etruscan  augury,  bade  her 
husband  look  for  the  highest  honours  in  their  new  country.  In 
Rome  he  purchased  a  house  and  dwelt  therein  in  wealth  and 
splendour.  His  title  of  Lucumo  was  corrupted  to  Lucius,  and  the 
Romans  called  him  also  Tarquinius  after  the  town  from  which  he 
came.  His  reputation  for  wealth  caused  him  to  become  known  to 
king  Ancus  ;  and  his  great  ability  and  zeal  soon  made  him  his 
trusted  friend  and  minister.  On  the  death  of  Ancus  he  induced  his 
sons  to  absent  themselves  from  Rome  on  a  hunting  expedition,  and 
in  their  absence  persuaded  the  Curiae  to  elect  himself  This  may 
be  only  a  perverted  account  of  a  transaction  less  pleasing  to  Roman 
pride  ;  and  the  fact  may  have  been  that  the  attainment  of  sovereignty 


V  THE  ETRUSCAN  DYNASTY  41 

at  Rome  by  an  influential  Etruscan  family  points  to  an  extension  of 
Etruscan  power,  which  at  this  time  was  almost  at  its  zenith.  This 
view  is  to  some  degree  supported  by  the  fact  that  nearly  the  first 
public  transaction  after  the  expulsion  of  the  Tarquins  was  a  treaty 
with  Carthage.  While  Rome  was  under  Etruscan  influence  no  such 
treaty  would  have  been  needed  ;  for  the  Etruscans  and  Carthaginians 
were  up  to  this  time  and  long  after  on  close  terms  of  friendship. 

Be  this  as  it  may,  it  seems  certain  that  a  Tarquin  reigned  at  The  wars 
Rome  ;  and  to  him  were  ascribed  various  achievements  in  war,  certain  ^f  -f^^^' 
civil  institutions,  and  the  commencement  at  least  of  some  great  public  ^"^'^^"•^• 
works.      Twice  he  fought  with  the  Sabines  ;  and  in  the  second  of 
these  wars   he  took   Collatia,  a  town  in   Latium,  but  inhabited   by 
Sabines,  and  added  it  and  its  territory  to  the  dominion  of  Rome.      By 
another  series  of  wars  he  gradually  reduced  nearly  all  the  towns  of 
the  Prisci  Latini  to  the  Roman  obedience. 

As  a  sign  of  the  growing  importance  of  Rome  he  planned,  and  His  great 
even  began,  a  great  temple  of  Jupiter  on  the  Capitoline,  to  be  buildings. 
the  central  place  of  worship  of  all  the  Roman  dominions.  He 
also  began  the  city  wall,  afterwards  completed  by  Servius  Tullius  ; 
laid  out  the  Circus  Maximus  for  the  races  and  games,  by  which  a 
great  central  city  not  only  provided  amusement  for  its  own  citizens, 
but  attracted  a  vast  concourse  of  visitors.  And,  lastly,  he  improved 
the  city  itself  by  the  construction  of  some  of  those  vast  cloacae  or 
sewers,  the  remains  of  which  still  testify  to  the  greatness  of  the 
resources  at  his  disposal.  ^ 

All  these  things  are  so  many  evidences  of  a  growth  of  the  city 
of  Rome ;   and  two  political  changes   attributed   to  him  point   the 
same    way.       In    the    first    place,    he    raised    the    number    of    the 
senators    to    300 ;     and    the   new   fathers,   being   selected   from   the 
gentes  that  had  been  at  one  time  or  another  added  to  the  roll  of 
the  original  gentes,  were  called /«/r.?j  7ninoruin gentium^  "fathers  of  Patres 
the    younger  houses  ; "   and,  in   the  second   place,  he  doubled  the  minorum 
number  of  the  knights.     The  story  goes  that  he  had  intended  to  do  S^^^^'^"^- 
this  by  doubling  the  number  of  the  centuries  ;  but  a  famous  augur, 
named  Attus  Naevius,  warned  him  that  it  was  unlawful  to  change 
what    Romulus   had    instituted  with   due    religious   rites.      Tarquin, 

^  The  Cloaca  Maxima,  as  it  is  called,  is  not  the  largest  of  which  remains  exist, 
'although  it  is  the  most  easily  seen.  Another  still  larger  opens  into  the  Tiber  about 
300  feet  higher  up.  As  the  city  increased  these  cloacae  were  extended  in  every 
direction,  and  served  not  only  to  carry  off  sewerage,  but  to  drain  the  surface 
water  of  the  valleys,  and  make  them  habitable.  Besides  the  passage  in  Livy 
(i.  55)  the  Cloaca  Maxima  is  described  by  Dionysius,  iii.  67  ;  PHny,  N.H.  33,  §§ 
104-109,  with  the  other  cloacae  ;  Aurelius  Vict.  v.  3,  8  ;  Strabo  v.  3.  The  reader 
will  find  interesting  descriptions  in  Professor  Middleton's  Remains  of  Ancient  Rome, 
i.  142  sq.  and  in  Lanciani's  Ancient  Rotne,  p.  53  sq. 


42 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


irritated  by  opposition,  tried  to  discredit  the  augur's  skill.  In  the 
presence  of  the  people  in  the  Forum  he  asked  him  whether  it  were 
possible  to  do  what  he  had  it  in  his  mind  to  do.  Attus  consulted  the 
omens  and  replied  that  it  was  possible.  "  Well,  then,"  said  the  king, 
"  I  wanted  to  know  whether  I  could  cut  this  whetstone  with  this 
razor."  "  You  can,"  said  Attus.  The  king  applied  the  razor  to  the 
whetstone,  and  to  his  own  astonishment  easily  cut  it  in  two.  Thus 
the  authority  of  Attus  was  confirmed,  and  the  king,  fearing  to 
double  the  number  of  the  equestrian  centuries  against  his  warning, 
and  yet  believing  it  necessary  that  the  number  of  knights  should  be 
increased,  doubled  the  number  of  men  in  each  century,  so  that 
instead  of  600  there  were  1200  men  arranged  in  three  centuries. ^ 
Posteriores  These  additional  knights  were  called  posteriores  equites^  "  later  or 
equites.  junior  knights "  ;  yet  in  course  of  time  they  were  reckoned  as 
separate  centuries,  and  the  equites  were  spoken  of  as  sex  suffragia. 


VI.   Servius  Tullius  {578-S34) 

Tarquinius  died  at  a  good  old  age,  or,  as  some  say,  was  murdered 
by  the  sons  of  Ancus,  who  had  all  along  resented  his  rule  as  injurious 
to  their  rights.  These  men  also  now  spoke  vehemently  against  the 
person  who  seemed  the  popular  favourite  for  the  succession.  This 
was  Servius  Tullius,  said  to  be  the  son  of  a  slave  or  captive  woman 
in  the  palace  of  Tarquinius,^  and  at  any  rate  of  obscure  origin.  He 
had  been  marked  out  for  a  great  future  by  a  miraculous  fire  which 
played  round  his  infant  head  as  he  slept  in  the  palace.  When  he 
grew  to  manhood  he  displayed  such  high  qualities  that  he  rapidly 
became  the  most  important  person  at  Court,  and  was  married  to  a 
daughter  of  Tarquinius.  In  their  jealous  anger  the  sons  of  Ancus 
resolved  to  prevent  his  succession.  They  suborned  two  shepherd 
youths  to  feign  to  be  quarrelling  near  the  king,  to  whom  they 
appealed  for  arbitration.  Both  began  speaking  at  once,  until  the 
lictor  bade  each  state  his  case  separately ;  and  whilst  the  king 
turned  to  one,  the  other  smote  him  with  an  axe.  In  the  midst  of 
the  excitement  Tanaquil  ordered  the  palace  gates  to  be  closed  and 
all  strangers  ejected.  After  trying  in  vain  to  cure  her  husband's 
wounds,  she  sent  for  Servius  Tullius,  and  begged  him  to  avenge  his 

1  Livy  (i.  36)  reckons  1800,  but  the  rest  of  his  narrative  implies  the  number  as 
given  in  the  text.  The  error,  how^ever  committed,  cannot  now  be  corrected.  We, 
may  observe  that  1200  gives  the  normal  number  of  300  for  each  of  the  four 
consular  legions. 

2  The  Emperor  Claudius  asserted  that  he  had  found  in  Etruscan  writers  that! 
Servius  Tullius  was  an  Etruscan  named  Mastarna,  who  came  to  Rome  with  the] 
remains  of  the  army  of  Caelius  Vivenna,  and  settled  on  the  Caelian  hill. 


V  THE  SERVIAN  CONSTITUTION  43 

murdered  father-in-law,  and  to  seize  the  kingdom.  She  even 
addressed  a  crowd  of  people  surrounding  the  palace,  assuring  them 
that  the  king  would  recover,  and  bidding  them  meanwhile  obey 
Servius  Tullius.  Thus  for  a  time  Tarquin's  death  was  kept  secret, 
until  Servius  Tullius,  having  secured  his  power,  allowed  the  truth  to 
be  made  public,  was  elected  king  by  the  Senate,  and  protected  by 
a  body-guard. 

His  reign  is  the  most  important  part  of  the  regal  period  in  regard 
to    the    Roman    Constitution.      For    to    him    has    been   universally 
attributed  not  only  the  completion  of  the  famous  agger,  extending  for  The  agger 
about  three-quarters  of  a  mile  from  the  Colline  gate,  and  the  town-  ^^^^^  ^^d. 
wall  which  enclosed  the  seven  hills,  and  remained,  with  its  pomoerium,    ^^"'  ^'^ 
the  legal  limit  of  the  city,  with  some  minor  enlargements,  until  the 
erection  of  the  wall  of  Aurelian  (about  A.D.  270),  but  also  a  new 
division  of  the  people,  which,  intended  apparently  for  purely  military 
purposes,  actually  resulted  in  a  constitutional  change  of  the  highest 
importance. 

As  our  whole  information  in  regard  to  this  comes  from  writers  Reforms  of 
who  lived  many  centuries  later,  we  naturally  find  that  they  judged  of  Servius 
its  intention  by  its  actual  effect.     To  them  it  appeared  as  a  measure      "  *"'^" 
of  reform  enlarging  popular  privileges,  as  indeed  it  proved  to  be  ; 
but  it  seems  certain  that  in  its  original  intention  it  was  an  extension 
of  duties  and  burdens  rather  than  of  privileges.      That  those  to  whom 
these  duties  and  burdens   were   extended  should  in  course  of  time 
claim  privileges  and  rights  also,  was  inevitable. 

We  must   remember  that,  as   far  back  as  we  can   at   all   trace   The 
Roman  history,  there  was  always  a  popuhcs  with  a  distinct  identity,  populus. 
and  accustomed  to  regard  three  things  as  properly  inherent  in  itself: 
(i)  The  election  of  a  king  and  of  military  officers;  (2)  the  passing 
of  laws  ;  (3)  the  decision  as  to  peace  and  war. 

With  a  king  possessing  absolute  power,  and  a  Senate  claiming 
that  its  auctoritas  must  first  be  obtained,  the  two  last  rights  were, 
perhaps,  seldom  exercised,  and  only  when  the  king  desired  to  have 
his  hands  strengthened  by  a  show  of  popular  support.  Still,  how- 
ever much  in  the  background,  they  existed  from  very  ancient  times. 

Now,  by  the  populus  seems  originally  to  have  been  meant  the 
fighting  force,  whether  actually  under  arms  or  ready  to  be  so.  It 
was  when  on  a  war  footing  that  the  people  would  be  consulted  on  a 
question  of  peace  or  war  ;  it  was  as  an  army  that  they  would  elect 
their  officers  ;  and  if  they  were  ever  required  to  pass  a  law,  no  other 
machinery  existed  for  obtaining  the  expression  of  their  will  but  that 
of  their  military  divisions. 

The  populus,  then,  consisted  of  those  who  were  liable  to  serve  in 
the  army — those  men,  that  is,  whose  names  were  included  in  the 


44  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap. 

thirty  Curiae.  These  were  the  members  of  the  original  gentes, 
whose  inclusion  in  the  Roman  name  was  earlier  than  any  memory  to 
the  contrary,  as  well  as  of  certain  gentes  and  families  which  had 
been  subsequently  admitted.  To  them,  apparently,  must  be  added 
men  of  humbler  means,  such  clients  and  dependents  as  had  become 
closely  connected  with  them.  It  was  this  body  alone  that  furnished 
soldiers  to  the  levies,  and  paid  the  war  tax  or  "  war  loan  "  {iribu- 
tu?n)  to  the  treasury. 

The  plcbs.  Round  them,  as   Rome  increased,  was  settled  an  ever-growing 

number  of  families  of  foreign  origin,  whom  interest  or  compulsion 
had  caused  to  reside  within  the  city  or  its  territory,  or  who,  being 
descended  from  freed  men  of  the  old  families  or  clients  of  extinct 
gentes,  retained  the  names  of  their  old  lords.  The  members  of  these 
families  had  no  civic  rights,  they  could  not  even  contract  a  legal 
marriage  with  a  citizen.  They  formed  the  multitude  {plebs)  who, 
while  actually  living  and  trading  in  Rome,  were  not  yet  Romans. 
But  as  they  had  no  privileges,  so  neither  had  they  the  same  burdens 
as  the  citizens  ;  they  probably  paid  some  fee  for  protection,  and 
were  hence  called  aerarii^  but  they  were  not  liable  to  the  tributiun^ 
nor  to  service  in  the  army.^ 

The  tribes.  The  Servian  reform  altered  this  state  of  things.      The  Roman 

army  had  originally  been  for  the  most  part  cavalry ;  and  the  names 
of  the  three  tribes,  Ramnes,  Titii,  and  Luceres  appear  to  have  sur- 
vived as  distinguishing  titles  of  three  centuries  of  horsemen.  But 
there  must  always  have  been  infantry  of  some  sort,  and  its  import- 
ance was  now  to  be  recognised,  and  it  was  to  be  drawn  from  all  free 
inhabitants  alike,  whose  property  reached  a  certain  standard.  To 
obtain  the  necessary  information  as  to  their  property  a  census  must 
be  taken,  and  in  order  to  take  a  census  the  whole  number  of  free 
men  living  in  Rome  and  the  ager  Romanus  was  divided  into  tribes, 
which  were  to  have  no  concern  with  the  origin  or  civil  status  of  the 
inhabitants,  but  were  to  be  entirely  local. ^  Four  of  them  were  city 
tribes — Palatina,  Suburana,  Collina,  Esquilina,  corresponding  to  the 
"  regions "  into  which  Servius  divided  the  city  ;  sixteen  were  rural 
tribes.  The  total  number  was  afterwards  gradually  raised,  as  new 
territory  was  added,  but  never  exceeded  thirty-five.  This  division 
made  it  easy  to  hold  a  census  of  property,  whether  in  land  or  in 
cattle, — which  implied  the  possession  of  land, — so  that  all  men  with 
a  settled  home  {assidui)  could  be  fairly  assessed  for  the  payment, 

^  This  theory  of  the  origin  of  the  plebs  is  one  of  many.  Two  others  are  ( i ) 
that  they  were  the  creation  of  Romulus  ;  (2)  that  they  were  the  inhabitants  of 
neighbouring  villages  subdued  and  annexed  to  Rome. 

2  The  tribes  necessarily  ceased  to  be  local  when  the  Italians  were  enfranchised, 
and  probably  had  nearly  ceased  to  be  so  locforc. 


V  THE  COMITIA  CENTURIATA  45 

which  now,  as  heretofore,  might  be  called  tributum^  "the  tribal  pay- 
ment." 1 

So  far  this  division,  including  all  owners  of  property,  had  nothing 
political  about  it,  conferred  no  right  and  implied  no  possession  of 
civitas.  There  were  still  patricii,  "men  with  ancestors,"  and 
plebeii,  "  men  of  the  multitude."  All  civil  rights  were  still  exclu- 
sively in  the  hands  of  the  former.  The  tribes,  it  is  true,  as  well  as 
each  viais  and  pagus,  had  some  sort  of  local  government  and  local 
religious  rites,-  but  as  far  as  Roman  civitas  was  concerned  the  old 
distinction  remained,  and  the  patricii  were  alone  full  citizens. 

The  other  part  of  the  reform  of  Servius  was  destined,  though  not   The 
apparently  introduced  with  that  intention,  to  bring  this  inequality  to  coinitia 

an  end.  centnriata. 

The  whole  of  the  people  included  in  the  tribes  was  again  divided 
into  193  centuriae  for  the  purpose  of  military  service;  and  these 
centuriae  were  arranged  in  classes  or  "  summonings,"  according  to  the 
amount  of  their  property,  and  the  members  of  the  centuries  were 
required  to  provide  themselves  with  a  particular  kind  of  armour, 
according  to  the  class  to  which  their  century  belonged, — a  measure 
to  which  we  have  a  striking  analogy  in  the  "  Assize  of  Arms  "  of  our 
own  Henry  11.^  First  of  all  came  18  centuries  of  equites,  developed 
from  the  original  three  equestrian  centuries,  partly  by  multiplying  the 
numbers  in  the  centuries,  partly  by  the  addition  of  new  centuries.* 
The  members  had  an  equus  publicus  and  an  allowance  from  the 
State  for  its  keep.  Next  come  80  centuries  (40  seniores,  i.e.  of 
men  over  forty -five  years  of  age,  40  juniores)  of  the  first  class, 
consisting  of  men  whose  property  exceeded  100,000  asses.  Next 
20  centuries  (10  seniores,  10  juniores)  of  the  second  class,  consisting 
of  those  whose  property  was  over  75,000  asses.  Then  20  centuries, 
similarly  divided,  of  the  third  class,  of  those  whose  property  was  over 

1  It  is  an  interesting  question  as  to  what  was  the  basis  on  which  this  valua- 
tion was  made.  Some  have  held  that  it  was  land  ;  others  that  it  was  cattle  (which 
would  imply  land).  Servius  was  believed  to  have  introduced  the  use  of  coined 
money,  and  the  earliest  coins  had  the  figure  of  an  ox,  a  sheep,  or  swine  impressed 
upon  them,  and  therefore  probably  represented  the  values  in  animals,  the  propor- 
tion being  i  ox  =  10  sheep  (Plutarch,  Popl.  xi.  ;   Q.  R.  41  ;  Varro,  L.  L.  v.  95). 

-  Vicus  was  a  subdivision  of  a  city  region  ;  fagi  are  villages  or  fortified  places 
with  the  land  round,  into  which  the  country  was  divided.  Their  magistrates 
were  called  magistri  or  prafecti  or  praepositi,  and  the  pagani  had  an  annual  cele- 
bration called  paganalia. 

^  Thus  the  men  in  the  first  class  were  to  have  the  galea,  clypeus,  lorica,  ocreae, 
hasta,  gladius.  The  second  class  a  scutum  and  the  rest  except  the  lorica.  The  third 
had  no  ocreae.  The  fourth  no  defensive  armour,  only  a  hasta  and  verutum.  The 
fifth  had  slings  and  stones  {fundi  lapidesqtie  missiles). 

^  Thus  the  six  seem  to  represent  the  sex  stiffragia,  or  the  three  centuries 
duplicated,  which,  though  in  name  still  three,  were  yet  counted  for  voting  pur- 
poses as  six. 


46 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


50,000  asses;  and  20  centuries,  also  divided  into  10  seniores  and 
10  juniores,  of  the  fourth  class,  of  those  whose  property  was  over 
25,000  asses.  Then  30  centuries  (15  seniores,  15  juniores)  of  the 
fifth  class,  consisting  of  those  whose  property  was  over  10,000  asses. 
All  whose  property  was  below  10,000  asses  were  included  in  a  single 
century,  were  called  proletarii,  and  were  not  liable  to  military  ser- 
vice. The  military  nature  of  this  division  is  shown  by  the  addition 
to  the  first  class  of  two  centuries  oi  fabri,  "  engineers,"  and  to  the  fifth 
class  of  two  centuries  of  cornicines,  "  horn  blowers,"  and  tubicineSy 
"  trumpeters  "  ;  and  by  the  regulation  which  excluded  men  over  sixty- 
one  years  of  age  from  the  centuries.^ 

The  whole  number  of  centuries  is  thus  193.  But  as  we  are  told 
that  at  the  first  census  held  under  this  arrangement  the  number  of 
citizens  of  military  age  was  found  to  be  80,000  (a  number  probably 
much  exceeding  the  truth),  it  is  evident  that  centuria  had  ceased  to 
have  anything  to  do  with  the  number  100.  Originally  a  centuria  of 
cavalry  no  doubt  meant  100  men,  but  it  had  come  to  mean  a 
"division"  without  regard  to  the  number  in  it,  just  as  "tribe" 
ceased  to  have  any  connexion  with  the  number  three. 

It  is  important  to  observe  that  whether  we  speak  of  the  Roman 


This  will  be  made  clearer  by  being  thus  tabulated  :- 


Equites     . 

. 

18  centuries. 

First  Class — 

40  centuries  of  seniores 

1 

40 

2  fabri 

juniores 

r  " 

Second  Class- 

- 

ic 

10          ,, 

seniores 
juniores 

[■20    ,, 

Third  Class- 

ic 

10          ,, 

seniores 
juniores 

-  20    ,, 

Fourth  Class- 

_ 

ic 

10          ,, 

seniores 
juniores 

J- 20    ,, 

Fifth  Class — 

IS 

seniores 

1 

IS 
2  comicines 

juniores 
and  tubicines 

V  ■• 

Capite  censi 

I    >> 

Property  valued  at  100,000  asses. 


75,oco 


50,000 


25,000 


12,500 


193 


Another  account  assigns  the  fabri  and  tubicines  to  classes  2  and  4.  The  value 
of  the  as,  as  has  been  remarked  above,  was  not  at  first  probably  reckoned  in 
actual  copper  weight  or  coins,  but  in  cattle,  an  ox  being  equal  to  100  asses. 


V  THE  COMITIA    CURIATA  47 

people  as  divided  into  tribes  or  into  centuries,  the  same  body  of  Distinction 
persons  is  meant.  But  in  the  latter  case  they  are  organised  as  a  l^^iween 
fighting  body  ;  and  while  service  in  the  army  is  still  looked  upon  to 
a  certain  degree  as  a  privilege  not  within  the  competence  of  some  of 
them,  yet,  as  far  as  such  service  is  a  burden,  it  has  now  been 
extended  from  the  old  and  more  contracted  body  included  in  the 
Curiae,  and  spread  over  a  larger  number.  The  amount  of  the 
change  was  somewhat  lessened  by  the  fact  that  the  Curiae,  the 
numbers  in  which  had  been  enlarged  by  the  admission  oi  n^sN  gentes^ 
included  many  clients  and  dependents  who,  in  strictness,  should  have 
been  classed  with  the  plebeians.  Still,  many  of  those  who  were  now 
included  in  the  centuries  had  been  little  better  than  resident  aliens, 
and  had  never  voted  in  the  Curiae ;  and  therefore,  as  the  numbers 
were  now  greater,  the  turn  for  military  service  would  come  less 
frequently  to  each  individual,  even  though  larger  summer  levies 
were  needed. 

Theoretically,  the  Curiae  were  still  the  sole  citizen  body  to  elect  Function 
the  king,  to  be  consulted  by  him,  and,  if  necessary,  to  pass  laws.   ^^^«^^^^  ^ 
So  much  was  this  the  case,  that  to  late  times  we  find  that  for  certain 
purposes  the  Comitia  curiata  had  to  be  summoned  as  alone  capable 
of  conferring  imperium  ^  upon  the  magistrates  elected  by  the  larger 
assembly.      Before   it — represented  in  later  times  by  thirty  lictors — 
the  formal  adoption  of  a  man  who  was  sui  juj'is  from  one  gens  into 
another  {arrogatid)  was  performed,   and  wills  were  made.      But  it 
rapidly  lost  all  legislative  or  electoral  power.     We  cannot  trace  the 
steps  by  which  it  was  superseded  by  the  assembly  of  the  people  in 
centuries,    Comitia  centuriata,  but  we   know   it  was   so   superseded, 
and  it  is  possible  to  form  a  plausible  theory  as  to  the  way  in  which 
this  took  place.     Naturally  the  men  who  were  to  serve  in  the  army 
would   be  the  men  to  elect   their  officers,  when  such  election  was 
allowed   by  the  king.       If  the   election    took   place,   there   was  no 
organisation  to  conduct  it  but  that  of  the  centuries.      The  Curiae  Elections 
had   held  their  meetings  in  the    Comitium  ;    but    the  centuries,  as  ^^  ^^f 
being  a  military  assembly  under  the  command  of  an  "  imperator,"   ^"^^*^f 
met  outside  the  city  in  the  Campus  Martius.      Here  then  the  people 
would  gradually  grow  into  the  habit  of  voting  in  centuries  for  their 
officers.      No  chronicler  has  ventured  to  relate  any  meeting  of  the 
centuries    during    the    regal    period    for    election    purposes,    much 
less  for  the  passing  of  laws.      The  absolutism  of  the  king  probably 

^  Imperium,  "the  right  of  command,"  was  a  part  of  the  kingly  office  which 
belonged  to  the  consuls  and  dictator.  By  a  constitutional  fiction  it  was  not 
supposed  to  be  conferred  on  them  by  their  election,  but  had  to  be  bestowed  by  a 
separate  vote  of  the  Comitia  curiata.  Thus  it  was  afterwards  bestowed  on  certain 
other  magistrates  and  pro-magistrates,  and  even  on  privati  in  case  of  need. 


48 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


made  the  latter  exceedingly  rare,  if  it  ever  took  place  at  all.  The 
first  time  we  hear  of  the  Comitia  centuriata  acting  as  an  elective 
body  is  when  it  elects  the  first  consuls  after  the  deposition  of  Tar- 
quinius.  Now,  supposing  this  to  be  an  historical  fact,  it  is  not 
likely  that  such  a  meeting  would  have  been  held  there  for  the  first 
time  ;  there  must  have  been  occasions  of  inferior  importance,  on 
which  the  manner  of  working  the  assembly  had  been  gradually 
learnt.  We  cannot  tell  for  certain  whether  such  a  meeting  did 
take  place  at  the  time  of  the  expulsion  of  the  kings  ;  but  we  know 
that  from  the  earliest  time  of  the  Republic,  of  which  we  have  any 
account,  the  people  elected  their  magistrates  voting  in  their  cen- 
turies, and  not  as  before  in  Curiae. 

Granting,  then,  that  the  Comitia  ce7itiiriata  has  become  the 
national  assembly,  we  must  observe  how  far  the  arrangement  was 
from  being  democratic.  In  the  first  place,  it  perhaps  disfranchised  the 
poorer  clients  who  had  been  used  to  vote  in  the  Curiae  ;  and  at  any 
rate  it  made  no  immediate  difference  in  the  mutual  position  of  the 
citizens  and  the  non-citizens,  who  now  began  to  be  called  patricians 
and  plebeians.  The  latter  voted  in  the  Comitia,  but  they  could  not 
form  a  legitimate  marriage  with  the  citizens,  or  hold  any  office  other 
than  military.  Nor,  again,  was  their  vote  in  the  Comitia  worth 
much.  The  final  decision  was  not  by  individual  votes,  but  by 
centuries.  Now  the  eighteen  centuries  of  knights,  together  with  the 
eighty  or  eighty-two  centuries  of  the  first  class,  formed  an  absolute 
majority  of  the  whole  193  centuries;  and  as  the  patricians  were 
still,  as  a  rule,  the  richest  men  in  Rome — at  any  rate  the  richest 
landowners — these  centuries  would  consist  chiefly  of  patricians,  who 
would  therefore,  if  they  wished,  carry  any  question  or  election  about 
which  they  were  anxious.  The  numbers  in  the  centuries  of  the  first 
class  must  also  have  been  comparatively  very  small ;  therefore  when 
the  assembly  began  to  meet  for  voting,  the  votes  of  a  minority 
would  overpower  those  of  the  bulk  of  the  people,  who  were  vastly 
superior  in  number.  ^ 

Still  though  this  arrangement,  when  it  came  to  be  used  for  civil 
purposes,  did  not  directly  favour  the  rights  of  the  plebeians,  who 
would  be  mostly  in  the  centuries  of  the  lower  classes,  it  led  to 
agitations  which  eventually  secured  a  full  equality  of  rights.  People 
subject  to  the  tributuin  and  military  service,  and  with  the  right  of 
electing  their  own  military  officers,  naturally  began  before  long  to 
question  the  justice  of  their  exclusion  from  other  rights  of  citizenship, 
the  right  of  intermarriage  with  patricians,  and  the  right  of  holding 

1  It  also  gave  a  great  advantage  to  older  as  against  younger  men.  There 
could  not  have  been  anything  like  as  many  seniores  as  jimiores ;  and  the  equites 
were  at  first  zWjuniores,  i.e.  under  forty-five  years  of  age. 


V  DEATH  OF  SERVIUS  TULLIUS  49 

office.  Many  of  their  own  body  were  wealthy  and  might  naturally 
look  to  form  such  marriages,  and  to  hold  such  offices.  Such  rich 
plebeians  were  indeed  a  minority,  and  their  grievance  might  have  been 
long  neglected.  But  when  the  multitude  found  themselves  pinched 
with  poverty,  while  the  policy  of  the  privileged  class  was  continually 
directed  to  secure  and  increase  their  own  wealth,  and  to  rivet  the 
chains  of  penury  upon  their  less  fortunate  brethren,  it  was  natural 
that  these  last  should  begin  to  look  for  a  remedy  of  their  evils  in  a 
fuller  share  of  political  rights.  Personal  suffering  will  do  what  a 
theoretical  grievance  may  long  fail  to  do. 

Whether  the  beginning  of  this  organisation  is  rightly  attributed 
to  a  king  called  Servius  Tullius  we  cannot  be  sure,  nor  whether  it 
was  indeed  the  single  conception  of  some  wise  ruler,  and  not  rather 
the  gradual  result  of  several  acts  of  reform.  But  we  may  accept 
the  fact  that  some  such  organisation  existed  in  the  early  days  of  the 
Republic,  and  that  on  it  later  changes  were  based. 

The  historians   have  little   more  to  tell  us   of  Servius   Tullius.    The  first 
He  held  his  first  census,  at  which  the  number  of  men  of  military  '^^nsus  of 
age,   however  exaggerated  in  our  accounts,   shows   Rome  to  have   /'T/-""^ 
already  become  one  of  the  most  powerful  states  in   Italy.      He  is 
said  to  have  dealt  wisely  with  the  other  Latin  cities,  whose  peoples 
he  persuaded  to  join  in  building  a  temple  of  Diana  at  Rome,  to  be  a   Temple  of 
common  place  of  worship  for  the  whole  confederacy,  of  which  Rome  -^^^^/^  -^-^  ^ 
would  thereby  be  acknowledged  the  head.      In   the  same  way  he  ^f^  ^^K 
tried  to  secure  the  future  allegiance  of  the  Sabines.      Thus  for  forty-  Latins. 
four   years    he    ruled   with   wisdom,    and    lived    in   peace   with    his 
neighbours. 

His  death  happened  in  this  wise.  Tarquinius  Priscus  had  left  Death  of 
two  sons  or  (as  some  say)  grandsons,  Lucius  and  Arruns,  who  were  Servius. 
married  to  two  daughters  of  king  Servius,  both  of  whom  were 
named  Tullia.  The  elder  of  these  women  was  bold,  ambitious,  and 
wicked  ;  the  younger  was  gentle  and  loving.  Lucius  and  his  brother 
Arruns  also  differed  in  disposition.  Lucius  was  haughty  and  ambi- 
tious, Arruns  quiet  and  gentle.  The  haughty  Lucius  was  married  to 
the  gentle  Tullia,  the  peaceful  Arruns  to  the  bold  Tullia.  This  last 
despised  and  hated  her  husband  for  his  unambitious  temper,  and 
looked  longingly  upon  the  bold  and  stirring  husband  of  her  gentle 
sister.  They  resolved  mutually  to  free  themselves  and  unite  their 
ambitions.  Arruns  and  the  gentle  Tullia  were  quickly  got  out  of 
the  way,  and  Lucius  married  the  haughty  Tullia.  Urged  on  by  his 
wife,  Lucius  formed  a  plot  against  the  life  of  his  father-in-law.  He 
collected  a  party  for  himself  in  the  Senate,  among  the  patres 
minorum  gentium  and  the  younger  men  in  the  State,  by  large 
promises  and  bribes.    At  length,  when  he  felt  himself  strong  enough, 

E 


50 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


he  came  surrounded  by  an  armed  band  into  the  Forum,  and,  ascend- 
ing the  royal  seat,  deHvered  a  speech,  denouncing  Servius  as  a 
slave's  son  and  usurper,  and  claiming  the  throne  as  his  by  right. 
Servius  was  sent  for,  and  appeared  in  the  Forum  while  Lucius  was 
still  speaking.  Then  there  was  a  fierce  struggle  between  the  partisans 
of  the  two;  and  Tarquin,  thinking  that  he  must  now  dare  all,  seized 
Servius,  and  hurled  the  old  man  down  the  steps  of  the  Curia,  and 
then  entered  the  building  to  hold  a  meeting  of  the  Senate.  Servius, 
bruised  and  bleeding,  was  staggering  towards  his  house,  when  he 
was  overtaken  by  some  emissaries  of  Tarquin  and  killed.  While 
this  was  going  on,  Tullia  arrived  at  the  Curia,  called  out  her 
husband,  and  was  the  first  to  salute  him  as  king.  He  bade  her 
return  home  from  a  scene  of  such  disorder  and  bloodshed.  As  she 
was  riding  back  in  her  car,  the  driver  checked  the  animals  at  the 
sight  of  the  dead  body  of  Servius  ;  but  his  fierce  mistress  smote 
him  with  her  hand,  bidding  him  drive  on — and  thus  her  chariot 
wheels  crushed  her  father's  corpse.  The  horror  of  the  people  at 
this  ruthless  act  was  commemorated  by  the  name  of  sceleratus  vicus^ 
ever  afterwards  borne  by  the  street  in  which  it  was  done. 

Thus    Servius   died,    and   Tarquin   the    Proud   became  king   at 
Rome. 


Evil  deeds 
of  Tar- 
quinius 
Superb  us. 


He  op- 
presses the 
Senate. 


His  foreign 
policy. 


VII.  Tarquinius  Superbus  {334-sog) 

As  Tarquinius  gained  his  power  by  violence  and  bloodshed,  so 
he  exercised  it  with  cruelty  and  oppression.  He  refused  the  rites 
of  burial  to  his  father-in-law,  and  put  to  death  some  leading  senators 
who  had  favoured  his  cause.  He  surrounded  himself  with  a  body- 
guard (as  indeed  Servius  had  done  at  first),  naturally  fearing  the 
enemies  that  such  measures  were  sure  to  create.  He  revoked  the 
good  laws  of  Servius  Tullius,  and  destroyed  the  tablets  on  which 
they  were  engraved.  He  held  trials  on  capital  causes  in  secret  and 
without  assessors,  in  which  he  could  fine,  banish,  or  put  to  death  his 
opponents.  He  depressed  the  Senate,  refused  to  fill  up  vacancies, 
and  seldom  consulted  it,  carrying  on  the  administration  of  domestic 
and  foreign  affairs  alike  on  his  own  authority.  These  are  the  usual 
allegations  made  against  the  Greek  fyran7ti,  and  against  certain  men 
who  seized  tyrannical  powers  in  later  times  at  Rome.  There  is 
nothing  improbable  in  them.  All  we  can  say  against  them  as 
historical  facts  is  that  there  are  no  authorities  to  support  them 
within  at  least  two  centuries  and  a  half. 

But  though  a  tyrant  at  home  he  made  Rome's  power  respected 
among  her  neighbours.  He  tried,  indeed,  a  conciliatory  policy  with 
the  Latins,  gave  his  daughter  in  marriage  to  Mamilius  of  Tusculum, 


THE  TYRANNY  51 


and  made  personal  treaties  of  hospitium  with  others.  But  to  all 
who  resisted  he  was  ruthless.  When  Turnus  Herdonius  of  Aricia 
denounced  his  pride  in.  a  congress  of  Latins  summoned  at  the  lucus 
Ferenttnae,  he  revenged  himself  by  contriving  his  death.  And  this 
led  the  way  to  a  more  definite  assertion  than  ever  of  Rome's  primacy 
among  the  Latin  states,  and  to  the  actual  enrolment  of  Latin  youths 
in  the  Roman  legions, — a  fact  which  was  believed  to  account  for  the 
two  centuries  in  the  maniple. 

Success  in  war  is  also  attributed  to  him.  He  was  the  first  He  wars 
Roman  king  to  fight  the  Volscians,  from  whom  he  wrested  Suessa  "^^^^^  {^^ 
Pometia.  It  was  from  the  spoils  there  taken  that  he  began  con- 
structing on  a  splendid  scale  the  temple  of  Jupiter  of  the  Capitol, 
which  had  been  projected  by  his  father.  He  next  attacked  Gabii, 
an  ancient  Latin  town  which  had  ofifended  him  by  harbouring  Roman 
exiles.  His  son  Sextus  feigned  to  fly  thither  for  fear  of  his  father, 
and  being  trusted  with  high  command,  found  means  to  admit  the 
Roman  troops. 

It  is  in  relation  to  this  enterprise  of  Sextus  that  a  story  was  The  story 
told,  which  Herodotus!  also  narrates  of  Thrasybulus,  the  tyrant  of  of  Sextus 
Miletus.     When  Sextus,  it  is  said,  had  gained  power  at  Gabii,  he  sent  ^^  ^«^"- 
to  ask  his  father  what  he  was  to  do  next.      Tarquinius  gave  no  verbal 
answer  ;  but  receiving  the  messenger  in  his  garden,  walked  up  and  down 
as  though  in  profound  meditation,  striking  of?  with  his  stick  the  heads 
of  the  tallest  poppies.     When  the  messenger  told  Sextus  how  his 
father  had  acted,  he  understood  that  he  meant  him  to  put  to  death 
the  leading  men  in  Gabii. 

Gabii  having  fallen,  Tarquin  made  peace  with  the  troublesome  His  works 
Aequians,  and  negociated  a  treaty  with  the  Etruscans.  After  this  he  ^'^  Rome. 
gave  his  whole  attention  to  his  public  works.  The  Capitoline  temple 
was  pushed  on,  the  Capitol  having  been  first  cleared  of  certain  minor 
sacred  buildings  or  shrines.  Only  it  was  said  that  the  statues  of  the 
god  Terminus  and  of  Juventus  could  by  no  means  be  removed,  and 
had  to  be  included  in  the  new  building.  Like  his  father,  too,  he  is 
said  to  have  built  cloacae.  The  largest  of  all,  the  Cloaca  Maxima, 
part  of  which  still  remains,  was  believed  in  particular  to  be  his  work, 
as  well  as  the  permanent  seats  ox  fori  in  the  circus. 

But  these  works  had  imposed  grievous  burdens  on  the  people.  Colonies  of 
and  he  found  it  necessary  to  appease  their  discontents.      Hence  it  is  Sigma  and 
said  that  for  the  first  time  since  the  reign  of  Romulus,  colonists  were 
sent  out  to  Signia,  near  the  frontiers  of  the   Hernici,  and  to  Circeii, 
on  a  promontory  in  the  territory  of  the  Volsci.      Signia,   placed  in 
a  commanding  position,  secured  the  communication  between  Rome 


Circeii. 


^  Herod,  v.  92,  §  6. 


52 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


and  the  friendly  Hernici,  and  its  colonisation  was  probably  prompted 
by  considerations  of  security,  as  much  as  by  the  motive  attributed  to 
Tarquin.  So  also  the  position  of  Circeii,  both  as  a  fortress  against 
the  Volscians,  and  as  an  excellent  situation  for  commerce,  was  no 
doubt  the  chief  motive  in  settling  a  colony  there. 

One  other  tale  is  told  of  Tarquin,  connected  with  a  fact  of  some 
importance  in  Roman  history.  An  old  woman,  a  foreigner  and  un- 
known, came  to  the  king  bringing  nine  books  which  she  asserted  to 
contain  divine  oracles,  and  offered  to  sell  them,  naming  a  large  sum. 
The  king  laughed  at  her  as  mad.  Thereupon  she  placed  a  brazier 
before  him,  and  having  burnt  three  of  the  nine,  asked  him  whether 
he  would  purchase  the  remaining  six  at  the  same  price.  Tarquin 
ridiculed  her  still  more.  Thereupon  she  burnt  three  more,  asking 
again  the  same  sum  for  the  remaining  three.  Struck  with  her 
pertinacity  Tarquin  finally  consented  to  give  the  whole  price  for  the 
three  books.  Thereupon  the  old  woman  departed  and  was  seen  no 
more.  The  account  of  this  event  is  given  differently  by  others  ;  but 
it  is  a  fact  that  certain  oracular  writings  were  preserved  in  the 
Capitol,  and  were  destroyed  in  the  time  of  Sulla,  when  the  Capitol 
was  burnt.  The  "  Sibylline  books,"  as  this  collection  was  called,  as 
having  been  obtained  from  the  Cumaean  Sibyl,  were  placed  under 
the  care  first  of  two,  then  of  ten,  and  lastly  of  fifteen  commissioners, 
whose  duty  it  was  to  consult  them  on  an  order  of  the  Senate.  When 
they  were  burnt  in  82,  others  were  collected  from  various  sources,  and 
frequently  revised  and  consulted  to  a  late  date  after  the  Christian 
era.  Many  such  collections  existed  in  Greece  ;  and  the  particular 
importance  of  this  one  lies  in  the  fact  that  from  it,  among  other 
sources,  was  derived  a  large  element  of  Greek  religion,  which 
became  inextricably  involved  with  the  old  Italian  cult.  Thus  it 
was  by  directions  drawn  from  it  that  the  worship  of  the  Magna  Mater, 
Aesculapius,  and  Apollo  was  introduced  or  extended  at  Rome, 
— deities  apparently  unknown  in  Italian  theology, — and  that  of 
other  gods  performed  according  to  the  Greek  rite  ;  while  legends  of 
Greek  divinities  were  associated  with  the  names  of  Italian  gods. 
Lastly,  it  is  not  impossible  that  the  legend  of  Aeneas  and  the  Trojan 
origin  of  the  Roman  people  was  derived  from  this  source.^ 

Such  are  the  actions  attributed  to  Tarquin  the  Proud.  The 
forced  labour  on  his  great  works,  his  revocation  or  neglect  of  the 
good  legislation    of   Servius,    would   perhaps    not    have   turned  the 


1  The  story  of  the  Sibyl  is  told  by  Dionysius,  iv.  62  ;  Pliny,  N.  H.  xiii.  88  ; 
Aulus  GeUius  i.  19.  According  to  Pausanias  her  name  was  Demo  (x.  12,  8). 
The  collection  of  Greek  verses  which  now  pass  under  this  name  are  of  various 
ages,  some  as  early  as  the  second  century  B.C.,  and  others  as  late  as  the  foxirth 
century  A.D. 


V  FALL  OF  THE  TARQUINS  S3 

nobles  against  him.  But  a  tyrant  was  always  especially  hostile  to 
and  hated  by  those  high  in  rank  and  wealth,  and  the  contempt  with 
which  he  is  represented  as  treating  the  Senate  would  account  for  the 
revolution  which  followed.  The  immediate  cause  of  his  fall,  and 
of  the  abolition  of  the  kingship  has  always  been  stated  thus. 

There  had  happened  an  alarming  prodigy.  A  serpent  descended  Embassy  to 
from  a  wooden  pillar  and  devoured  the  sacrifice  on  the  altar.  Such  Delphi. 
a  panic  ensued  that,  by  the  advice  of  the  Etruscan  soothsayers 
who  were  called  in,  an  embassy  was  despatched  to  Delphi.  The 
envoys  were  two  of  the  king's  sons,  and  Lucius  Junius  Brutus.  The 
Pythia  answered  that  he  of  them  who  first  kissed  his  mother  should 
hold  sway  in  Rome.  The  young  princes  failed  to  understand  the 
oracle  ;  but  Brutus,  who  had  up  to  that  time  feigned  dulness  to 
avoid  the  jealousy  of  Tarquin,  rightly  interpreted  it ;  and  on  landing 
again  in  Italy  pretended  to  stumble  and  fall,  and  thus  kissed  his 
mother-earth,  and  was  pointed  out  by  the  oracle  as  the  first  consul 
of  Rome. 

But  as  yet  no  one  understood  what  was  to  come.  Tarquin,  Siege  of 
like  other  tyrants,  finding  that  war  and  plunder  were  needed  to  keep  -4r^m. 
his  subjects  from  sedition,  attacked  on  some  slight  pretext  the 
wealthy  town  of  Ardea,  belonging  to  the  Rutulians.  It  resisted 
stoutly,  and  the  siege  dragged  on.  Now  it  chanced  that  as  the 
young  princes  Sextus  Tarquinius  and  Tarquinius  Collatinus  were 
sitting  with  their  friends  over  their  wine  in  the  camp,  the  conversa- 
tion turned  on  their  wives  at  home,  and  how  they  were  spending  their 
time  in  the  absence  of  their  lords.  Each  boasted  of  the  virtue  of 
his  own  wife  ;  and  it  was  agreed  that  they  should  go  secretly  to 
Rome  and  Collatia  and  see  for  themselves.  They  mounted  their 
horses  and  hurried  away.  The  wife  of  Sextus  at  Rome  was  found 
feasting  with  her  friends  ;  but  Lucretia,  the  wife  of  Collatinus,  was 
discovered  at  Collatia  sitting  amidst  her  handmaidens  weaving  late 
into  the  night  a  garment  for  her  husband.  All  agreed  that  the  chief 
praise  was  due  to  Lucretia.  But  Sextus  came  away  inflamed  with  an 
unholy  passion.  He  presently  found  some  excuse  for  going  to  Violation 
Collatia,  was  hospitably  received  and  entertained  by  Lucretia  as  a  of  Lucretia. 
relation  of  her  husband's,  and  in  the  night  forced  her  to  yield  to  his 
desires  by  a  terrible  threat.  He  declared  that  he  would  slay  her, 
and  then  killing  a  slave,  would  place  their  dead  bodies  together  on 
a  couch,  and  proclaim  that  he  had  killed  her  as  an  adulteress. 

Next  morning   Lucretia  sent  for  her  father  from  Rome  and  her  Conspiracy 
husband  from  Ardea  ;  she  confessed  to  them  what  had  been  done,  against 
and,  rejecting  their  offers  of  pardon  for  that  to  which  she  had  been   '^'^^'i^^"-- 
forced,  plunged  a  dagger  into  her  heart.     Brutus  had  accompanied 
Collatinus,  and  now,  throwing  aside  his  pretence  of  stupidity,  seized 


54  .HISTORY  OF  ROME 


the  bloody  dagger,  and  swore  that  none  of  the  accursed  race  of 
Tarquin  should  ever  reign  again  in  Rome.  The  oath  was  shared  by 
Collatinus  and  Lucretia's  father,  Spurius  Lucretius,  and  by  Publius 
Valerius,  who  had  accompanied  him.  The  dead  body  of  Lucretia 
was  displayed  in  the  Forum  of  CoUatia.  Amidst  the  lamentation  of 
the  crowd,  the  bravest  of  the  young  men  gathered  round  Brutus, 
and,  leaving  a  garrison  to  hold  Collatia,  hastened  to  Rome.  There 
their  tale  raised  a  like  storm  of  indignation.  A  crowd  collected  in 
the  Forum.  Brutus,  as  tribuniis  celermn^  sent  a  herald  to  summon 
an  assembly  ;  and  when  the  people  gathered  round  him  spoke  fiery 
words  of  the  shameful  deed  of  Sextus,  and  of  the  long  oppression  of 
the  commons,  ground  down  by  the  mechanical  labours  imposed  on 
them  by  Tarquin.  Finally,  he  proposed  that  the  king  and  all  his 
house  should  be  exiled  for  ever.  This  was  carried  by  acclamation, 
and  an  army  was  enrolled  to  attack  Tarquin  at  Ardea.  In  the  midst 
of  the  tumult  Tullia  left  her  palace  and  fled,  amidst  the  curses  of  the 
people,  who  invoked  against  her  the  furies  of  her  murdered  father. 
The  news  of  this  outbreak  soon  reached  Ardea,  and  Tarquin  with 
his  army  marched  towards  Rome.  Brutus,  with  the  new  levy,  had 
already  set  out,  leaving  the  city  in  the  charge  of  Lucretius,  2^%  praefectus 
tirbi;  but  he  intentionally  avoided  meeting  Tarquin,  and,  passing 
him  by  another  road,  reached  the  camp  at  Ardea,  where  he  was 
gladly  received.  Meanwhile  Tarquin  found  the  gates  of  Rome 
shut,  and  was  refused  admittance  ;  and  being  also  cut  off  from 
the  camp  at  Ardea,  gave  up  hope  of  regaining  his  power  for  the 
present,  and  with  two  of  his  sons  retired  to  Caere  in  Etruria  ;  while 
Sextus  went  to  Gabii,  of  which  he  had  become  king,  and  there,  not 
long  afterwards,  was  assassinated. 
Sro.  Thus  kings   ceased  to  rule  in  Rome  in  the  244th  year  of  the 

Ttvo^yearly  ^-^y  .  ^^^  instead  of  a  king  for  life,  the  people,  being  summoned  to 
Tn'placeof  their  Comitia,  elected  two  joint  kings  to  rule  for  a  year,  who  were 
one  king  called  perhaps  at  first  praetors,  but  afterwards  came  to  be  called 
for  life.  "  the  Colleagues  "  or  consuls.  The  first  were  Lucius  Junius  Brutus 
and  Lucius  Tarquinius  Collatinus. 

Legendary  Such  is  the  story  of  the  Seven  Kings  of  Rome,  as  we  have  it  in 

nature  of^     the  earliest  histories  we  possess.     The  reader  will  be  able  to  see 

reml  his-      ^^r  himself  that  in  many  ways  it  has  the  features  of  all  early  legends 

tory.  dealing  with  the  beginnings  of  great  states,  the  real  story  of  which 

has  been  lost,  or  so  embellished   by  pure  romance  as  to  make  it 

impossible  to  disentangle  the  true  from    the  false.      Some  of  the 

stories    were   perhaps   derived   from   ballads  ;    many   from   a  desii 

to  account   for   institutions,   buildings,   or   other   local   features  anc 

names  actually  existing  in  historical  times.      Some,  we  cannot  oftei 


V  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  LEGENDS  55 

tell  which,  were  real  traditions  of  actual  occurrences,  distorted  or 
added  to  as  such  traditions  usually  are ;  ornamented  with  tales 
built  by  skilful  story-tellers  on  a  slender  foundation  of  fact,  and  with 
those  miracles  of  divine  interposition  which  the  credulity  of  simple 
folk  made  easy  of  acceptance,  and  the  taste  of  a  later  and  more 
critical  age  was  yet  content  to  regard  with  indulgence. 

We  ought  to  know,  however,  how  far  we  are  from  having  any-  The  lack 
thing   like   contemporary  evidence    of  the   early   history  of  Rome,  of  con- 
Yet  one  word  of  warning  seems  necessary.     A  story  is  not  disproved  ^^^P^^^^ 
by  the  fact  that  the  relators  of  it  were  born  many  years  or  even 
centuries   after  the  alleged  events,  who  may  have  had  sources  of 
information   of  which  we   know  nothing.      It  is   only  shown  to   be 
unsupported  by  sufficient  evidence  to  demand  credit. 

It  seems  hard  to  believe,  again,  that  the  whole  histor>'  was,  as    Was  it 
some  think,  deliberately  invented  by  late  Greek  sophists  to  flatter  deliberately 
the  vanity  of  the  Romans.     For,  in  the  first  place,  when  the  story  ^^'^^"^^'^  ^ 
first  appeared  it  seems  doubtful  whether  Rome  was  yet  important 
enough  to  invite  such  flattery  from   Greeks ;    and,   in   the  second 
place,  though  mistakes,  and  even  deliberate  falsifications,  are  common 
enough  in  all  literature,  a  wholesale  and  impudent  invention  of  an 
entire  history  is  contrary  to  our  experience. 

Nor  can  contradictions  and  repetitions  be  held  by  themselves  to    What  are 
invalidate  a  body  of  tradition  indiscriminately.     They  are  the  almost  «^^  ^^»^- 
inevitable  result  of  a  story  being  handed  down  through  many  genera-  ^  /^^^ 
tions.      It  is  a  difficult  task  to  detect  the  undercurrent  of  truth  in 
the  midst  of  these  accretions,  but  we  must  not  hastily  conclude  that 
no  such  truth  exists.     Lastly,  supernatural  elements  in  a  story  are 
not  proofs  of  its  essential  falsity.      In  times  of  ignorance  men  were 
always  ready  to  account  for  everything  wonderful  or  strange,  every- 
thing which  they  did  not   understand,  by  alleging  the  direct  agency 
of  something  above  humanity.     What  happened  they  may  yet  tell 
truly,  though  they  may  be  quite  mistaken  as  to  the  cause.      It  is  not 
doubtful  that  the  Athenians  won  a  battle  at  Marathon,  yet  no  one 
believes,   as   they  did,  that    Hercules,   Theseus,   and   other  heroes 
rose  from  the  ground  to  help  the  Athenian  soldiers. 

The  reason  is  that  there  are  trustworthy  and  almost  contemporary  Lack  of 
records  of  this  event,  unaffected  by  and  independent  of  the  belief  in  contempor- 
ize miraculous  particulars.    And  this  is  the  difference  of  our  position  '^''-^  history. 
in  regard  to  early  Roman  history.      There  is  no  testimony  near  the 
time  at  all.     The  earliest  writers  who  tell  us  the  whole  tale  are  Titus 
Livius   (B.C.    59,  A.D.  17)  and   a   Greek  writer,   Dionysius  of  Hali- 
carnassus,  who  came  to  Rome  about  B.C.  29,  and  died  about  A.D.  19. 
Some  thirty  years  earlier  Cicero  wrote  a  book  about  the  Republic, 
which  only  survives   in   a  mutilated  form,  but  evidently  contained 


56  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap. 

a  story  very  like  Livy's  ;  and  Cicero's  contemporary,  Sallust, 
(B.C.  86-34),  gives  a  brief  sketch  of  the  origin  of  Rome  in 
his  history  of  Catiline,  which  shows  that  he  accepted,  with  more 
or  less  of  scepticism,  the  same  story.  But  of  course  these  authors 
drew  their  knowledge  and  opinions  from  earlier  writers.  Both  Livy 
and  Dionysius  often  refer  to  them,  and  these  references  enable  us  to 
Authorities  trace  the  existence  of  the  story  at  any  rate  for  a  few  hundred  years 
earlier  before  the  end  of  the  Republic.  The  most  important  of  these  writers 
than  Ltvy.  ^^.g  ^j^g  Roman  M.  Porcius  Cato  (B.C.  231-149),  who  compiled  an 
account  of  Roman  history  from  the  earliest  times,  for  which  he  seems 
to  have  taken  great  pains  in  studying  local  antiquities.  The  Greek 
Polybius  of  Megalopolis,  who  during  his  residence  in  Italy  (B.C.  167- 
151)  studied  the  Archives  and  such  ancient  inscriptions  as  he  could 
find,  besides  any  ancient  histories  that  existed,  and  compiled  an 
account  of  the  early  times  of  Rome.  But  though  a  considerable 
portion  of  his  Universal  History  still  remains,  the  part  treating  of 
the  early  history  of  Rome  has  almost  entirely  perished.  Q.  Fabius 
Pictor,  born  about  B.C.  245,  who  was  living,  and  a  member  of  the 
Senate  during  part  of  the  second  Punic  war  (B.C.  218-202),  wrote 
a  history  of  Rome,  probably  in  Greek,  from  which  Livy  took  many 
of  his  statements.  Still  earlier  a  Sicilian  Greek  named  Timaeus 
(about  B.C.  350-256)  had  in  his  History  also  told,  at  any  rate  in 
part,  the  story  of  Early  Rome.^ 

We  cannot,  therefore,  trace  this  story  In  written  history  earlier 
than  about  B.C.  320-300,  even  at  second  hand,  for  we  do  not  possess 
the  works  of  the  writers  just  mentioned  in  sufficient  completeness  to 
enable  us  to  judge  on  what  earlier  authorities  they  depended. 
The  evi-  But  besides  historical  books  these  writers  had  other  ways   of 

dence  of  satisfying  themselves  of  the  antiquity  of  the  story  they  were  telling, 
monuments  gm>jj  ^3  monuments,  inscriptions,  and  buildings.  Thus  Livy  learnt 
by^the  ^^^^  ^^  ^•^'  ^96  a  bronze  figure  of  a  wolf  suckling  the  twins  was  set 

historians,  up  in  Rome,  This  is  a  sufficient  proof  that  sixty  years  before 
The  she-  Pictor  wrote  the  story  was  current,  and  was  believed  by  at  least 
wolf  of  2()6.  some  people.  It  does  not,  however,  push  the  date  farther  back 
than  the  age  of  Timaeus.  Dionysius  makes  a  statement  which,  if 
The  Latin  true,  carries  us  into  much  more  remote  times.  He  says  that  there 
treaty.  existed  in  his  time  a  bronze  tablet  in  the  temple  of  Diana,  on  which 

was  inscribed  in  Greek  letters  the  terms  of  the  Latin  alliance  nego- 
tiated by  king  Servius  Tullius.  It  is  not,  indeed,  quite  certain 
from  his  words  that  he  ever  saw  it  himself;  but  that  the  Greek 
alphabet   should  be  used  in  such   a   document   is   far  from   unlikely. 

1  Plutarch,  who  lived  in  the  first  century  after  Christ,  says  that  in  his  Life  of 
Romulus  he  followed  Diodes  of  Peparethus.  But  we  do  not  know  the  age  of 
Diodes. 


V  AUTHORITIES  FOR  THE  EARLY  HISTORY  57 

The  later  period  of  the  kings  witnessed  in  all  probability  a  great 
extension  of  Etruscan  influence  in  Rome,  and  the  very  ancient 
Greek  alphabets  found  at  Caere  and  Formello  (near  Veii)  testify 
to  the  use  of  these  characters  in  Etruria ;  while  a  still  more 
ancient  inscription  in  Greek  letters  found  in  the  Latin  town  of 
Praeneste  only  a  few  years  ago  is  a  witness  to  its  use  in  Latium. 
Dionysius's  statement  is  quite  precise,  and  the  probability  is  that 
such  an  inscription  did  exist,  and  did  contain  some  ancient  treaty 
with  the  Latins,  but  its  adscription  to  Servius  Tullius  may  have  been 
only  an  instance  of  the  tendency  to  refer  all  monuments,  the  anti- 
quity of  which  was  beyond  certain  knowledge,  to  the  kings,  just  as 
at  Athens  all  or  most  of  the  ancient  tablets  of  laws  were  ascribed  to 
Solon.  1  The  next  most  ancient  monument  quoted  by  any  of  these  The  treaty 
historians  is  the  treaty  between  Rome  and  Carthage,  which  Polybius  ^'^^'^  <^^''" 
copied  and  translated,  assigning  it  to  the  first  year  of  the  Republic.  ^^^' 
If  it  is  really  of  that  time  it  confirms  one  point  in  our  story,  namely, 
that  at  the  end  of  the  regal  period  Rome  was  the  most  important 
state  in  Latium,  and  had  possessions  on  the  coast  at  least  as  far 
south  as  Circeii.  Such  ancient  inscriptions,  however,  when  they 
existed  were  very  difficult  to  decipher,  and  it  is  not  likely  that  Livy 
troubled  himself  much  with  them. 

Another  class   of  evidences  which  some  of  the  authorities  did  The  fasti 
consult  was  that  of  the  various  public  records.     The  chief  of  these  and  other 

were  \}s\^  Annates  Maximi,  a  concise  statement  of  the  chief  events  ^"^ 

'  .  .  records. 

of  each  year  drawn  up  by  the  Pontifex  Maximus,  and  exposed  each 

year   on  an  album   or  whited  board,   and  preserved  in   his  house. 

These  were  apparently  entered  in  a  book,  and  existed  up  to  the 

earliest  times  in  the  age  of  Cicero  and  Livy.      But  it  is  extremely 

doubtful  whether  the  parts  relating  to  the  first  centuries  of  Roman 

history  were  original,  and  not  rather  restorations,  formed  partly,  no 

doubt,  from   actual  fragments  remaining,  but  filled  up  on  what  the 

Pontifex  Maximus  of  the  day  thought  trustworthy  testimony.      Similar 

documents   were  the    Commentaries  of  the  pontiffs,   relating  to  the 

fasti  and  to  the  regulations  as  to  civil  business  or  religious  ritual. 

The  books  of  the  other  magistrates,  the  censors  and  praetors,  called 

libri  lintei,  must  of  course  have  been  of  later  date.     There  were  Lauda- 

also  waxen  busts  of  the  ancestors  of  the  great  families  preserved  in  ^^ones. 

their  houses,  with  names  and  brief  statements  attached  ;  laudationes^ 

^  In  i8i  it  was  reported  that  two  stone  coffins  were  found  on  the  Janiculum, 
one  inscribed  with  the  name  of  Numa,  the  other  containing  his  writings  in  Greek 
or  Latin.  The  writings  were  destroyed  as  harmful,  and  were  vaguely  rumoured 
to  be  books  of  Pythagorean  philosophy.  The  ground  of  their  destruction  by  the 
order  of  the  Senate  was  the  novelty  of  their  religious  doctrines  ;  and  Livy  seems 
to  regard  the  whole  matter  as  a  deliberate  fraud  (xl.  29). 


58 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Funeral 
monu- 
ments. 


Loss  of 
docutnents 
at  the  cap- 
ture of  the 
city  by  the 
Gauls  in 
390- 


The  value 
of  the 


or  funeral  orations,  pronounced  by  surviving  relatives  from  time  to 
time,  recounting  the  glories  of  the  family — which,  however,  were  of 
so  partial  a  character  as  often  to  falsify  history  ;  funeral  monuments  ; 
and  other  inscriptions.  Perhaps,  also,  there  were  ballads  or  songs  of 
unknown  antiquity  retailing  the  heroic  actions  of  the  past. 

No  monument  now  existing  is  older  than  the  third  century  B.C. 
How  much  farther  back  those  existing  in  Livy's  time  went  we  cannot 
tell.  We  know  that  Cato  was  fond  of  studying  them  to  help  him  in 
his  Origines^  as  we  know  that  Polybius  investigated  the  records  of 
the  Pontifices  and  other  Archives.  This  last  Livy  also  professes  to 
have  done.  But  how  far  did  those  then  existing  go  back  ?  He 
himself  tells  us  : — 

"  The  history  of  the  doings  of  the  Romans  from  the  foundation 
of  the  city  to  its  capture  [B.C.  390],  first  under  kings,  then  under 
consuls,  dictators,  decemvirs,  and  consular  tribunes,  their  foreign 
wars  and  domestic  broils,  I  have  described  in  my  first  five  books. 
The  facts  were  obscure,  dim  as  objects  seem  from  afar.  This  was 
the  result  of  their  antiquity.  But  also  in  those  times  written  records 
were  extremely  rare,  and  they  alone  can  be  trusted  to  preserve  faith- 
fully the  memory  of  events.  Besides,  even  such  records  as  were 
preserved  in  the  commentaries  of  the  pontiffs  and  other  monuments, 
public  or  private,  perished  at  the  burning  of  the  city." 

As  is  usually  the  case  in  great  disasters,  more  destruction  was 
perhaps  attributed  to  the  Gauls  than  they  really  accomplished,  and 
Livy  himself,  in  the  same  passage,  acknowledges  that  the  laws  of 
the  twelve  tables,  certain  treaties,  and  some  of  the  royal  laws 
remained  undestroyed,  and  were  collected  after  the  fire  ;  nor  does 
he  say  that  the  Annales  Maximi  were  lost,  and  he  afterwards  quotes 
the  libri  lintei  as  existing  before  this  date.  Still,  we  must  observe 
that  the  words  quoted  contain  a  confession  on  Livy's  part  that  he 
had  found  very  few  records  of  the  earlier  history  of  Rome,  which 
from  their  undoubted  antiquity  could  be  regarded  as  coeval  with  the 
events,  or  as  trustworthy  in  themselves. 

What,  then,  should  we  think  of  these  stories  ?     What  is  their 
value  ?     In  the  first  place,  they  contain  the  account  of  the  origin  of 
the  city  and  its  institutions,  with  which  the  Romans  themselves  were 
long  content.      And  if  this  account  is  to  be  regarded  as  founded  on 
things  existing,  rather  than  really  telling  us  how  they  came  about, 
yet  it  enables  us  to  understand  these  institutions  more  fully,  and  tc 
see  them   with  somewhat    the  same  eyes  with  which  the  ordinar] 
Roman  citizen  regarded  them.      In  the  second  place,  they  convey  j 
correct  view  in  the  main  of  the  actual   progress   made  by  the  cit] 
from  its  beginning,  first  to  internal  order  and  freedom,  and  then  t< 
independence    and    even    supremacy   among    its    neighbours.       Fo; 


V  HISTORICAL  MONUMENTS  59 

whether  the  history  of  the  kings  be  partly  true  or  wholly  false,  yet, 
by  the  time  that  Roman  history  begins  to  be  more  really  known  to 
us,  Rome  had  become  much  what  the  history  describes  her  as  grow- 
ing to, — a  city  with  a  constitution,  in  which  there  were  elements  of 
freedom  and  equality  imperfectly  developed,— a  city  with  a  small 
territory  struggling  for  mastery  among  surrounding  states,  possessing 
facilities  for  commerce  with  the  world  outside  Italy  of  which  she  was 
beginning  to  avail  herself,  commanding  both  sides  of  the  Tiber,  and 
having  already  secured  the  control  of  the  coast  from  Ostia  to  Circeii. 
She  is  beginning  to  feel  her  strength  and  the  greatness  of  her 
destiny,  "  mewing  her  mighty  youth,"  and  even  now  dealing  on 
equal  terms  with  the  great  Semitic  merchant  city  of  Carthage,  which 
had  been  long  the  chief  power  in  the  western  Mediterranean. 

Lastly,   the    city   still    retained    tangible   traces    of  its  previous  Actual 
history  in  buildings,  natural  objects,  and  memorials,  which  had  to  be  remains  oj 
accounted  for  in  some  way.      Thus  the  line  of  the  wall  of  the  Palatine  ^^^' 

city — Roma  quadrata — could  still  be  traced  even  in  the  time  of 
Tacitus.  There  was  also  on  the  Palatine  a  cave  said  to  be  that  of 
Cacus  {Scalae  Cact),  and  another,  the  Lupercal,  said  to  have  been 
dedicated  to  Pan  by  the  Arcadian  Evander.  There  was  the  Jicus 
Riiminalis^  under  which  the  she-wolf  suckled  Romulus  and  Remus, 
and  a  cottage — casa  Romuli — to  which  the  twins  were  taken  by 
Faustulus.  The  agger  between  the  Esquiline  and  the  Colline  gates, 
and  the  walls  of  Servius,  have  not  even  yet  wholly  disappeared,  and 
throughout  the  Republic  remained  almost  intact.  The  vault  of  the 
strong  prison  at  the  foot  of  the  Capitol  was  always  called  the  Tullia- 
num,  from  its  founder  Servius  Tullius.  The  Curia  Hostilia,  never 
wholly  destroyed  until  the  Clodian  riots  in  B.C.  53-52,  kept  ahve  the 
name  of  king  Tullus  Hostilius  ;  while  the  dwelling  of  the  Pontifex 
Maximus  attached  to  the  temple  of  Vesta  was  ever  called  the  Regia,^ 
as  having  been  the  palace  of  king  Numa ;  and  not  far  off  was  the 
Puteal,  under  which  the  whetstone  that  the  razor  of  Tarquin  dut  at 
the  word  of  Attus  Navius  was  believed  to  be  buried.  The  great 
cloaca  of  Tarquin  still  drained  the  Velabrum  ;  the  great  national 
temple  of  Jupiter  still  crowned  the  Capitol.  There  were  also  temples 
of  Jupiter,  Juno,  and  Minerva  on  the  Palatine ;  of  Diana  on  the 
Aventine ;  of  Jupiter  Stator  near  the  Palatine,  and  a  chapel  of 
Jupiter  Feretrius  on  the  Capitoline  ;  the  temple  of  Vesta  in  the 
Forum  ;  of  Fors  Fortuna  on  the  Janiculum ;  of  Quirinus  on  the 
Quirinal  ;  of  Fortuna  in  the  Forum  Boarium,  and  of  the  Mater 
Matuta  close  by.      These  and  more  were  indelible  records  of  a  near 

1  The  domus publica  in  which  the  Pontifex  Maximus  lived  was  properly  distinct 
from  the  Regia,  a  kind  of  chapter-house  or  office  of  the  Pontifex,  but  was  often 
called  by  that  name. 


6o  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap,  v 

past,  the  true  story  of  which  might  be  confused,  misrepresented,  or 
forgotten,  but  which  had  undoubtedly  existed.  Of  it  the  Romans 
beheved  that  they  possessed  an  account,  which,  if  not  Hterally  exact, 
was  yet  in  its  main  outlines  reasonable  and  worthy  to  be  regarded 
as  history 

Authorities. — The  story  of  the  kings  is  told  in  Livy's  first  book,  and  at 
greater  length  and  with  even  less  sign  of  doubt  or  criticism  by  Dionysius  of  Hali- 
carnassus  (i.-iv) ;  also  with  some  differences  of  detail  by  Zonaras  (vii.  3-1 1),  chiefly 
perhaps  from  Dio  Cassius)  ;  Eutropius  (i.  1-9)  ;  Plutarch's  Lives  of  Romulus  and 
Numa  ;  Cicero,  de  Republica,  and  others.  What  remains  of  the  Roman  writers 
of  history  before  the  Augustan  era  is  collected  by  H.  Peter  in  his  Historicorum 
Romanorum  Fragmenta.  For  the  earliest  Greek  writers  on  Roman  History  see 
Plin.  N.  H.  3,  §  57. 


CHAPTER    VI 

FROM    THE    EXPULSION    OF    THE    KINGS    TO    THE    WAR    WITH    VEII 

509-403 
COLONIES  CENSUS 

Norba  .  .  .      B.C.  492             B.C.  465  .         .      124,214 

Antium  .  .  .B.C.  467             B.C.  459  .          .      132,409 

Ardea  .  .  .B.C.  442 

Labicum  .  .  .      B.C.  418 

The  effect  of  the  Revolution  on  the  position  of  Rome  in  Latium — Attempts  of  the 
Tarquins  to  recover  their  property  and  royalty — Battle  with  the  Veientines 
and  people  of  Tarquinii  on  the  Naebian  meadow — Etruscan  invasion  under 
Porsena — Stories  of  Scaevola  and  Cloelia — Subjection  of  Rome  to  the  Etrus- 
cans— Defeat  of  Etruscans  before  Aricia — Isolation  of  Rome  in  Latium — The 
Latins  attack  Rome — Battle  of  the  lake  Regillus — Gradual  recovery  of  Roman 
power,  and  return  to  the  Latin  League  (492)  —  Wars  with  the  Sabines, 
Volscians,  Aequians,  Hernici — Effect  upon  the  Roman  character — Tales  of 
Coriolanus  and  Cincinnatus. 

i  The  supremacy  among  the  prisci  Latini,  secured  to  Rome  by  the  abihty  Rome  ex- 
!  of  her  later  sovereigns,  was  almost  entirely  lost  within  twelve  years  of  <^luded 
\  the  fall  of  the  kingship.      What  the  exact  nature  of  that  supremacy  J'^°^. 
I  was  we  do  not  know,  but  it  seems  probable  that,  while  leaving  each  League. 
I  community  free  as  far  as  external  relations  were  concerned,  it  secured 
I  for  Romans  and  the  citizens   of  the  towns  thus  united   the  private 
!  rights  which  are  the  most  valuable  features  of  a  common   nationality 

— the  right  of  intermarriage,  the  right  of  free  trading,  and  of  free 
!  settlement  or  residence.  This  arrangement  was  renewed  in  493- 
\  492,   after  some  years  of  interruption   and   some    sharp    struggles  ; 

but   it  was   certainly  broken   off  soon   after    the   expulsion   of  the 

Tarquins. 

The  consuls  first  elected  by  the  centuries  were  Lucius  Junius  s^g- 

Brutus  and  Lucius  Tarquinius  Collatinus.      But  it  was  felt  that  the   The  first 

presence  of  a  Tarquin,  however  hostile  to  the  rest  of  his  family,  was  ^°^^'^  ^' 


62 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


inconsistent  with  the  decree  which  imposed  perpetual  exile  upon  all 
of  the  name.  Collatinus,  therefore,  was  persuaded  to  abdicate,^  and 
Publius  Valerius  was  elected  in  his  stead.  The  first  difficulty  which 
the  consuls  had  to  meet  was  a  conspiracy  for  the  restoration  of  the 
Tarquins.  Though  the  twenty-four  years  of  the  tyranny  had  sufficed 
to  obliterate  from  the  minds  of  the  people  the  wise  rule  of  its  former 
kings,  even  this  tyranny  had,  as  always  happens,  partisans  of  its  own 
— some  who  from  gratitude  for  favours,  or  from  dislike  of  popular 
rights,  looked  back  with  regret  to  the  fallen  dynasty.  The  conspiracy 
came  to  a  head  when  emissaries  arrived  from  Tarquin,  professedly 
with  the  sole  object  of  asking  that  the  property  of  the  king  and  his 
family  should  be  restored.  The  treason,  however,  was  promptly 
discovered  and  sternly  punished.  Among  the  conspirators  detected 
were  two  of  the  sons  of  the  consul  Brutus  ;  and  with  feelings  of 
mingled  horror  and  admiration  the  people  saw  the  stern  father  not 
only  pronounce  the  condemnation  of  his  sons,  but  witness  with 
unmoved  face  their  punishment  and  execution.  It  was  a  scene  never 
likely  to  be  forgotten.  The  inflexible  sternness  of  Brutus  found  more 
than  one  parallel  in  later  Roman  history  ;  and,  whatever  may  be  the 
ground  on  which  the  truth  of  the  story  rests,  it  is  highly  characteristic 
of  Roman  sentiment,  which  regarded  duty  to  the  State  as  above  all 
others. 

The  property  of  the  Tarquins  was  then  divided  among  the  poorer 
citizens  ;  and  their  fields  in  the  bend  of  the  Tiber,  on  which  the 
corn  was  standing,  were  cleared  (the  corn  being  thrown  into  the 
Tiber),  consecrated  to  Mars,  and  reserved  for  a  public  drilling  and 
recreation  ground  under  the  name  of  the  Campus  Martins,  or  the 
Campus.  It  was  believed  that  this  great  weight  of  straw  thrown 
into  the  river  formed  the  nucleus  of  what  became  by  dint  of  alluvial 
deposit  the  Insula  Tiberina.^ 

But  the  Tarquins  did  not  acquiesce  peaceably  in  their  banish- 
ment and  the  confiscation  of  their  property.  It  was  easy  to  stir  up 
Rome's  ancient  enemy  Veil  against  her ;  and  with  Veii  is  said  to 
have  been  associated  the  native  town   of  the  Tarquins,   Tarquinii, 


^  According  to  Dionysius,  Collatinus  quarrelled  with  Brutus  on  the  questions 
(i)  of  giving  back  their  property  to  the  Tarquinii,  and  (2)  on  the  sparing  of  some 
of  the  conspirators  for  their  restoration.  Livy  seems  to  conceive  of  his  abdication 
as  taking  place  earlier. 

2  Livy  ii.  5  ;  Dionys.  v.  13  ;  Plut.  Poplic.  8.  None  of  these  vi^riters  seem  to 
have  any  doubt  of  the  fact.  Those  who  believe  it  argue  that,  had  the  insula  been 
fully  formed  before,  the  pons  sublicius  would  have  rested  on  it  as  a  natural  pier — 
as  Mommsen  says  it  did,  disagreeing  herein  with  most  antiquarians.  These  (iyots 
have  a  tendency  to  form  quickly,  and  it  is  possible  that  a  great  bulk  of  refuse 
would  gather  round  a  mud-bank  already  existing,  and  help  to  raise  it  rapidly  ; 
that  is  all  that  can  be  said. 


VI  ETRUSCAN  INVASION  63 

although  these  two  towns  appear  to  have  long  maintained  an 
unfriendly  rivalry  with  each  other.  The  invasion  was  met  by  the 
consuls  at  some  place  not  named  by  Livy,  but  called  by  Dionysius 
the  Naebian  meadow.  The  battle  was  indecisive  ;  but  legend  said 
that  from  the  neighbouring  grove/  "  the  Arsian  Wood,"  a  voice  was 
heard  to  proclaim  that  the  victory  was  with  the  Romans  because  the 
Etruscans  had  lost  one  man  more  than  they.  Before  the  battle  Death  of 
the  consul  Brutus  had  fallen  in  single  conflict  with  Arruns  Tarquinius,  Brutus. 
killing  his  adversary  at  the  same  time.  In  his  place  Spurius 
Lucretius  Tricipitinus  was  elected  {suffectus).\  but  he  only  lived 
a  few  days ;  and  on  his  death  M.  Horatius  Pulvillus  became 
consul.  2 

By    the     consul     Horatius    the     great     temple     of  Jupiter     on   The  temple 
the    Capitol,    designed    by    the    first     Tarquin    and    completed    by  of  Jupiter 
the  second,  was  at  length  dedicated ;  his  colleague  Valerius  being  ^.^^^^ 
still   outside  the  city  engaged   with   the   remains   of  the   Veientine 
war. 

Another  popular  story  illustrating  Roman  stoicism  was  told  of 
this  consecration.  The  friends  of  Valerius  were  annoyed  that 
Horatius,  the  junior  consul,  should  have  this  honour  to  himself. 
They  therefore  caused  it  to  be  announced  to  him  in  the  midst  of  the 
ceremony  that  his  son  had  died.  His  hand  was  on  the  temple  door- 
post, and  he  was  about  to  utter  the  solemn  prayer  of  consecration. 
He  did  not  remove  his  hand  or  turn  his  face  from  the  temple,  but 
bidding  the  messenger  take  an  order  back  for  his  son's  funeral,  he 
went  on  with  the  ceremony  unmoved. 

Thus  the  first  year  of  the  new  Republic  passed.     One  great  danger  The 
had  been  repelled  ;  and  a  solemn  national  ceremony  had  symbolised  Etruscans 
the  greatness  and  permanence  of  the  State.     But  a  still  worse  danger  ^'^^^^*'  ^^^ 
now  threatened  the  city.      Whatever  may  be  the  true   account   of 
Porsena's  motive  in  the  invasion  of  Latium,  whether  its  chief  object 
was  the  restitution  of  the  Tarquins,  or  whether  the  attack  upon  Rome 
was  only  an  incident  in  a  great  Etruscan  movement  upon  Central 
Italy,  or  whether  both  motives  were   combined,   there    can   be  no 
reasonable   doubt   that  the   Etruscans   did   reduce   the    Romans   to 
submit  to  humiliating  terms.      There  can  be  also  as  little  doubt  that 
Porsena  did  not  restore  the  Tarquins,  and  did  not  storm  or  dismantle 
the  city.      How  this  came  about ;  how  he  so  reduced  the  power  of 

'■  Dionysius  (i.  14)  calls  it  the  grave  of  the  hero  Horatius.  Plutarch  {Popl.  ix. ) 
the  "Apaiov  &\(tos. 

2  Livy  (i.  8)  says  that  some  authorities  omit  Lucretius,  and  make  Horatius 
follow  Brutus.  The  diversity  in  the  legends  is  farther  shown  by  the  fact  that 
Polybius  (iii.  22)  names  the  year  from  Brutus  and  Horatius,  who,  if  Livy  is 
right,  were  never  consuls  together. 


64 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


the  Romans  as  to  force  them  to  submit  to  such  terms,  and  yet  did 
not  restore  the  Tarquins  or  harm  the  city,  is  thus  explained  by  Livy 
and  Dionysius.^ 

It  was  in  the  third  consulship  of  Valerius  Publicola,  and  the 
second  of  M.  Horatius  Pulvillus,  that  the  king  of  the  great  Etruscan 
city  Clusium,  Lar  Porsena,  undertook  at  the  entreaty  of  the  Tarquins 
either  to  restore  them  to  their  kingdom  in  Rome,  or  to  force  the 
Romans  to  give  them  up  their  property.  In  the  previous  year  he 
had  vainly  sent  legates  with  these  demands  ;  now  he  would  enforce 
them  at  the  head  of  an  army.  Rome  was  already  weakened  by  the 
defection  of  some  of  her  Latin  allies.  Tusculum  was  ruled  by  Tarquin's 
son-in-law  Octavius  Mamilius,  and  would  support  him  ;  Cameria  and 
Antemnae  had  openly  renounced  their  league  with  Rome ;  and 
others  who  had  as  yet  taken  no  overt  step  were  already  in  secret 
communication  with  the  Tuscan.  The  coming  attack  was  not  un- 
known at  Rome.  The  country-folk  were  warned  to  bring  cattle, 
goods,  and  slaves  within  the  protection  of  the  city  or  of  the  forts  on 
neighbouring  heights ;  the  fortifications  on  the  Janiculum  were 
strengthened,  and  guards  were  posted  upon  it.  The  loyalty  of  the 
poorer  citizens  was  conciliated  by  promises  of  future  immunities 
from  taxation  ;  and  the  arrival  of  the  invader  was  awaited  with  con- 
fidence. 

But  Porsena  took  the  height  of  the  Janiculum  by  storm,  and  his 
men  were  following  close  upon  the  heels  of  the  flying  soldiers,  who 
were  rushing  over  the  po7is  sublicius  into  the  city.  It  seemed  as  if 
the  enemy  must  immediately  be  in  the  very  heart  of  the  town,  when 
the  gallantry  of  three  men  averted  this  supreme  disaster.  There 
was  but  one  bridge  ;  and  its  narrow  entrance  might  be  held 
by  a  few  resolute  men  against  a  host  long  enough  to  enable 
those  at  the  other  end  to  cut  through  the  beams,  and  render  the 
river  impassable,  Spurius  Lartius,  Titus  Herminius,  and  Publius 
Horatius,  called  Codes  from  the  loss  of  an  eye  in  battle,  volunteered 
for  this  forlorn  hope.  Amidst  showers  of  missiles  and  fierce  sword 
thrusts  the  three  heroes  held  their  ground  until,  the  Roman  soldiers 
having  crossed,  the  bridge  was  about  to  fall  under  the  axes  of  the 
workmen  on  the  southern  bank.  Then  just  in  time  Lartius  and 
Herminius  slowly  retreated  step  by  step  over  the  bridge.  But 
though  the  consuls  and  the  people  on  the  other  bank  shouted  to 
Horatius  to  do  the  same,  he  would  not  stir  until  he  heard  the  bridge 
go  down.      Then  he  sprang  into  the  river,  wounded  and  bleeding,  and 


1  Mommsen  holds  that  the  non-restoration  of  the  Tarquins  is  sufficient  proof 
that  Porsena  never  undertook  to  restore  them.  But  he  may  have  used  them  for 
his  purposes,  and  then,  as  the  historians  relate,  have  seen  fit  to  alter  his  plan 
when  he  found  himself  successful. 


VI  ROME  BESIEGED  BY  PORSENA  65 

swam  to  the  opposite  shore.^  Maimed  in  this  deed  of  gallantry, 
he  was  disqualified  for  the  consulship  ;  but  such  honours  as  were 
possible  were  heaped  upon  him.  In  the  midst  of  the  distress  caused 
by  the  siege  every  citizen  contributed  something  to  his  support,  a 
statue  was  raised  in  his  honour  in  the  Comitium,  and  as  much  land 
as  he  could  plough  round  in  a  day  with  a  yoke  of  oxen  was  assigned 
to  him. 

Thus  Rome  was  saved  from  storm  :  but  only,  as  it  seemed,  to  be  Distress  in 
reduced  by  hunger.  Porsena  entrenched  himself  on  the  Janiculum  ;  Kome. 
while  a  detachment  of  troops  under  the  Tarquins  managed  to  cross  the 
river  higher  up,  laid  waste  the  country  round,  and  prevented  supplies 
from  reaching  Rome  :  and  though  the  Roman  consuls  were  said  to 
have  had  sundry  minor  successes  in  sallies  against  these  plunder- 
ing parties,  the  city  was  getting  nearer  and  nearer  to  starvation. 
Appeals  sent  out  for  aid  to  various  Latin  towns  were  rejected  ;  and 
though  some  provisions  were  brought  in  from  the  sea  up  the  Tiber ; 
they  were  by  no  means  sufficient  for  the  great  population  of  Rome, 
raised  above  its  ordinary  numbers  by  crowds  of  alarmed  rustics. 

In  the  midst  of  the  distress,  when  Porsena  was  sending  in  his  Caius 
demands  as  though  to  a  people  unable  to  resist,  another  devoted  J^^ucius. 
act  of  daring  once  more  turned  the  tide.  A  young  man  named  Caius 
Mucins,  with  the  assent  of  the  Senate,  made  his  way  into  the 
Etruscan  camp,  in  the  garb  of  peace,  but  with  a  dagger  concealed 
in  the  folds  of  his  dress.  Seeing  a  man  transacting  business  on  a 
high  tribunal,  and  clad  in  purple,  he  supposed  him  to  be  Porsena,  and 
drawing  his  dagger  stabbed  him  to  the  heart.  The  man  thus  slain 
was  not,  however,  the  king,  but  his  secretary.  Mucius  was  at  once 
arrested  and  hurried  before  Porsena.  There  he  boldly  avowed  that 
his  intention  had  been  to  kill  the  king  himself;  but  he  promised, 
on  condition  of  being  spared  the  tortures  with  which  he  was 
threatened,  to  give  the  king  important  information.  The  assurance 
being  given,  he  told  Porsena  that  300  youths  in  Rome,  equally  bold 
and  equally  careless  of  their  lives  as  himself,  had  sworn  to  slay 
him  ;  that  the  lot  had  fallen  to  him  first,  but  that  the  king  must  lay 
his  account  with  a  similar  danger  day  and  night.  Another  version 
of  the  story  was   that,  when  the  king  ordered  fire  to  be  brought,  in 

^  Elaborate  details  were  given  by  Dionysius  of  the  wounds  of  Horatius. 
According  to  him  also  he  swims  across  without  losing  shield  or  any  of  his  armour, 
though  there  is  a  terrible  eddy  from  the  fallen  bridge,  which,  moreover,  is  not 
cut  down  spontaneously  on  the  part  of  the  consuls,  but  in  consequence  of  a 
message  from  him.  Livy  describes  him  as  being  shot  at  by  the  enemy  while 
swimming,  and  also  first  solemnly  commending  himself  to  "Father  Tiber." 
Polybius  (vi.  55)  knows  nothing  of  the  two  first  heroes,  and  say  that  Horatius 
perished  in  the  river.  He  gives  the  story  as  an  example  of  the  Roman  senti- 
ment to  the  State,  — which  is  the  point  of  view  in  which  it  is  of  value  to  us. 

F 


66 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


The  de- 
mands of 
Porsena. 


Cloelia. 


The  nature 
of  the  story. 


The  Tar- 
quins  not 
restored. 


order  to  compel  Mucius  by  torture  to  disclose  his  accomplices,  he 
thrust  his  right  hand  into  the  flame,  and  held  it  there  till  it  was 
consumed,  to  show  him  how  little  torture  would  be  able  to  bend  him. 

Convinced  by  Mucius  of  the  difficulty  and  danger  of  keeping  up 
the  siege,  Porsena  made  one  more  attempt  to  induce  the  Romans  to 
come  to  terms.  His  demands  now  were  that  they  should  restore  the 
Tarquins'  property,^  should  surrender  their  domains  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  Tiber,  and  give  hostages.  The  two  last  demands  were 
immediately  complied  with,  and  twenty  boys  and  girls  were  at 
once  sent.  But  while  negotiations  as  to  the  Tarquins'  property 
were  still  going  on,  the  maiden  Cloelia,  having  by  a  ruse 
got  out  of  sight  of  the  soldiers  assigned  to  guard  her,  accom- 
panied by  the  other  girls  who  were  hostages  with  her,  plunged  into 
the  Tiber  and  escaped  back  to  Rome.  The  people,  however,  kept 
faith,  and  sent  them  back  to  the  Etruscan  camp.  The  Tarquin 
princes,  in  wrath  at  the  supposed  influence  that  this  would  have 
upon  Porsena,  tried  to  intercept  and  slay  them  as  they  returned,  and 
almost  succeeded  in  so  doing.^  But  their  bad  faith,  and  the 
honourable  conduct  of  the  Romans  decided  Porsena  to  break  with 
the  Tarquins,  to  raise  the  siege,  to  restore  the  hostages, — Cloeha 
being  presented  over  and  above  with  a  horse  and  armour, — and  to 
give  back  the  Roman  prisoners  without  ransom.  He  led  his  men 
away  from  the  Janiculum,  making  a  free  present  of  his  camp 
apparatus  and  stores  to  the  people.  These  things  were  sold  by  the 
quaestors  ;  which  gave  rise  to  a  symbolic  expression  or  formula 
used  even  in  the  days  of  Livy,  in  selling  public  goods  by  auction. 
Such  an  auction  was  called  "  Sale  of  Porsena's  goods."  The  Senate 
in  gratitude  voted  him  a  throne  and  sceptre  of  ivory,  a  golden 
crown,  and  purple  robe. 

It  does  not  follow  because  we  have  good  reason  to  believe  that 
the  end  of  Porsena's  siege  was  not  as  Livy  and  others  represent  it, 
that  the  whole  of  the  heroic  incidents  in  this  story  are  incredible  in 
themselves.  They  are  not  without  a  certain  consistency  and  reason- 
ableness, and  they  did  not  appear  absurd  or  mythical  to  the  Romans 
of  a  later  date.  There  are,  however,  certain  facts  about  this 
Etruscan  invasion  which  seem  established.  First,  it  is  obvious  that 
in  coming  against  Rome  Porsena  either  did  not  intend  to  restore  the 


^  Livy  (ii.  13)  says  that  the  restoration  of  the  Tarquins  themselves  was 
demanded,  but  only  pro  forma.  Dionysius  says  only  the  restitution  of  their , 
property. 

2  According  to  Dionysius  the  hostages  were  only  saved  from  the  Tarquins  atj 
the  very  gate  of  the  camp  (v.  33)  ;   according  to  another  story  the  Tarquins  did] 
manage  to  intercept  them,  and  killed  all  but  the  daughter  of  Valerius  Poplicola, 
who  escaped  by  swimming  (Pliny  N.  H.  34,  §  29). 


VI  SUBMISSION  OF  THE  ROMANS  67 

Tarquins,  or  quickly  abandoned  the  intention  for  other  reasons  than 
the  want  of  power  to  enforce  it.      Secondly,  that  he  never  actually  The  city 
took  the  city.    The  distinction  drawn  by  Tacitus  between  the  cases  of  ^°^  ^^^^~ 
Porsena  and  the  Gauls,  in  the  one  case  speaking  of  the  city  as  dedila,  ^  ^  ^  ^"" 
in  the  other  as  capta,  shows  that  his  information,  whatever  it  was 
worth,  did  not  convey  the  idea  of  an  actual  capture.      Thirdly,  that 
Porsena  did  not  leave  Rome  on  the  generous  terms  described  in  the 
story.      Pliny  had  seen  the  treaty,  and  he  tells  us  that  in  it  was  a   The 
clause  forbidding  the    Romans   to   use  iron    except   for   agricultural  Romans 
purposes.!     That  is,  the  people  were  disarmed,  and  would  have  to  d^P'^^'"^'^  V 
be  dependent  on  a  superior  lord  for  defence,  and  would  be  prevented 
from  interfering  in  whatever  plans  of  aggrandisement  in  central  Italy 
the  Etruscans  might  entertain.     And  this  they  themselves  acknow-, 
ledged  by  their  gift  of  the  ivory  throne  and  sceptre,  the  crown  of 
gold  and  purple  robe  sent  to  Porsena.      Such  terms  would  only  have 
been  submitted  to  by  a  people  unable  to  resist. 

What  the  real  purpose  of  the  Etruscan  invasion  was  is  shown 
perhaps  by  the  sequel.  And  the  failure  of  that  purpose  involves 
a  natural  explanation  of  what  seems  a  certain  fact,  namely,  that  the 
Romans  only  abided  for  a  very  short  time  by  the  humiliating  terms 
of  the  treaty,  which  deprived  them  not  only  of  the  means  of  extending 
their  territory,  but  also  of  self-defence. 

When  Porsena  retired  from  the  Janiculum,  we  are  told,  he  left  so-jsod. 
his  son  Arruns  in  command  of  the  Etruscan  forces  to  continue  the  ^rruns  tn 
war  in  Latium.      His  first  act  was  to  attack  Aricia.      This  indicates  ^i^^J^j- 
the  object  of  the  invasion.     Aricia,  or  what  was  afterwards  the  Appian  Aricia. 
road,  was  the  first  stronghold  on  the  way  to  the  territory  of  the  Volsci, 
and  thence  to  Capua,  and  the  other  towns  in  Campania,  which  were 
dependent   on   the    Etruscans,      Hence   a   conquest   of  Latium   was 
important  to  them  as  securing   a  communication   by  land  between 
themselves   and   their   dependencies  in  central    Italy.       It  was  not, 
however,  only  to  the  Latin  communities  that  this  was  a  subject  for 
alarm.     The  Greek  states  throughout  Italy  had  been  oppressed  and 
harassed     by    the     Etruscan     corsairs.       As     the     Persians    to    the 
Asiatic   and   even   the    European    Greeks   about   this   time,    as   the 
Carthaginians  to  the  Greeks  of  Sicily,  so  to  the   Italian   Greeks  the 
Etruscans  were  oppressors  whose  enmity  had  been  often  experienced 
and  was  constantly  dreaded.      Accordingly  we  find  that  it  is  not  only 
the  Latm  and  Volscian  peoples  of  Tusculum  and  Antium  that  send  Relief  of 
help  to   Aricia ;   a    strong   force    came    also    from    the    Campanian  A.rtcia 
Cumae,  the  oldest  Greek  colony  in   Italy.      It  had  already  repelled  -^^^^^^ 
a  formidable  attack  of  a  mixed  force  of  Etruscans,  Umbrians,  and 


1  Tac.  Hist.  iii.  72  ;   Pliny  N.H.  34,  §  i39- 


68  HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Daunii.  In  this  war  a  young  knight  named  Aristodemus  had  so 
distinguished  himself  as  to  provoke  the  jealousy  of  the  oligarchical 
rulers  of  Cumae,  who  were  glad  to  send  him  on  the  hazardous  expedi- 
tion to  the  relief  of  Aricia,  and  did  their  best  to  secure  his  fall.^  He 
triumphed,  however,  over  all  difficulties.  The  Etruscan  chieftain  was 
slain  in  battle,  the  siege  of  Aricia  raised,  and  the  broken  remnants 
of  the  invading  force  compelled  to  take  refuge  in  Rome.  They  were 
so  kindly  treated  that  they  preferred  to  remain  there,  and  built 
houses  for  themselves  in  a  district  long  afterwards  marked  by  the 
name  of  the  Tuscus  vicus,  one  of  the  streets  leading  into  the  Forum 
between  the  Capitol  and  the  Palatine.^ 
The  Rom-  The  kindness  shown  to  these  Etruscans  was  rewarded  by  Porsena 

ans  recover  restoring  the  Roman   territory  on  the  right  bank  of  the   Tiber,  of 
the  right      which  they  had  been  deprived  in  the  previous  year.     At  any  rate  we 
^,   ^     ^    may  infer  that  the  failure  of  the  Etruscan  arms  at  Aricia  enabled 
the  Romans  before  long  not  only  to  secure  once  more  the  all-import- 
ant command  of  the  right  bank  of  the  river,  but  also  to  ignore  the 
terms  of  the  treaty  which  forbade  them  the  use  of  arms. 
From  We  know  hardly  any  particulars  of  the  twelve  years  in  which 

the  defeat      Rome   appears   to   have   gradually  recovered  from  her  fall,   and   to 
of  the  have  regained  her  old  position  of  superiority  in  the  Latin   League. 

invad  ^s       Perhaps  the  danger  which  had  lately  threatened  them  from  Etruria 
to  the  re-      taught  some  of  the  towns  to  regard  the  weakening  of  Rome  as  the 
entrance  of  loss  of  a  necessary  bulwark.      But  this  did  not  come  at  once  ;  it  was 
Rome  tnto    preceded  by  a  period  of  hostility  on  the  part  of  the  Latins,  accounted 
Leajue"^      for  in  our  authorities  in  the  first  place  by  the  ceaseless  activity  of 
Sos-493-       Tarquinius  and  his  family  till  his  death  in  496  ;  and,  in  the  second 
place,  by  the  view  which  the  Latins  took  of  the  position  of  Rome  in 
regard  to  the  Etruscans.      They  charged  the  Romans  with  having 
given  Porsena  a  free  passage  into  Latium,  and  with  having  harboured 
the    Etruscans    vanquished    at    Aricia.      It    does    not    indeed    seem 
improbable  that  for  a  time,  from  policy  or  under  compulsion,  Rome 
was  acting  in  close  alliance  with  the  still  formidable  Etruscan  power ; 
and  that  the  Latins,  who  had  lately,  by  prompt  combination  and  by 
summoning  help  from  Campania,   succeeded  in  repelling  a  serious 
Etruscan  invasion,  might  regard  Rome's  position  as  treasonable  and 
as  dangerous  to  their  common  interests.      At  any  rate  it  is  not  until 

1  The  career  of  Aristodemus  forms  an  episode  in  Dionysius  (viii.  a- 12)  very 
interesting  as  a  piece  of  the  history  of  an  Italian  Greek  town,  but  not  in  place 
here.  He  dates  the  assault  on  Cumae  as  Olymp.  64,  B.C.  524-520.  Just  at  this 
time  the  Persians  were  securing  Egypt  and  becoming  known  to  Carthage. 

2  It  seems  certain  that  the  Vicus  Tuscus  obtained  its  name  from  an  earlier 
settlement  of  Etruscans  in  Rome.  Tacitus  {A.  4,  69)  refers  it  to  the  followers  of 
Coelius  Vibenna  in  the  time  of  Tarquinius  Priscus,  but  owns  that  authorities  differ 
as  to  the  particular  king  under  whom  the  settlement  was  made. 


VI  WAR  WITH  THE  SABINES  69 

about  five  years  after  the  struggle  with  the  Latins  had  terminated  in 
the  admission  of  Rome  to  the  Latin  League,  that  we  find  her  engaged 
in  a  contest  with  an  Etruscan  power — her  old  enemy  Veii. 

But  before  the  hostility  of  the  Latins  had  come  to  the  point  of  War 
actual   war,   Rome  was   already  engaged   in   a   fierce   struggle   with  "^^^^^  ^^^ 
another    enemy.       As    early    as     505    the    Sabines    seem    to    have  ^^^^"^^' 
taken  advantage  of  the  weakness  of  Rome  to  attack  her  territory. 
For  the  next  three  years  there  was  constant  war  between  the  two 
peoples.      The  details  are  obscure  and  generally  perhaps  fabulous  ; 
but   it    seems    clear    that    by   some    means    Rome    did    manage    to 
strengthen  herself  in   the   direction    of  the    Sabine  hills.      Fidenae, 
important  as  commanding  a  bridge    over   the   Tiber,   was   held   for 
a  time  by  a   Roman   garrison  :   Crustumerium    and    Cameria  were 
taken,  and  the  powerful  town  of  Praeneste  was  induced  to  quit  the 
Latin  League,  which  now  excluded  Rome,  and  join  her  fortunes  with 
those  of  the  Republic.     The  heroes  of  these  wars  are  Publius  and  Publius 
Marcus  Valerius   Poplicola.       The    former    died    about    503,    after  and 
being  four  times  consul,  having  twice  triumphed,  yet  so  poor  that  ^^^^^^1 
he  was  buried  at  the  cost  of  the   State.      He  is  the  Washington  of     "^  ^'^"  '^' 
Rome  ;  and  every  virtue,  civil  and  military,  was  attributed  to  him. 
But  whatever  may  have  been  the  details  of  this  struggle,  it  is  clear 
that  Rome  resisted  the  attacks  of  the  Sabines,  and  on  the  whole  with 
success.     To  have  done  so  she  must  have  had  arms.      The  Sabine 
wars,  therefore,  mark  the  first  step  of  her  recovery  in  getting  rid  of 
the  humiliating  conditions  of  the  Etruscan  treaty. 

Another  sign  of  reviving  vigour  is  displayed  in  the  fact,  if  it  be  Immigra- 
a  fact,  that  at  this  period  a  powerful   chief  at  the  head  of  his  clan  i^on  of 
migrated    from    the    Sabine    town    Regillum    (of  uncertain    site)   to  ^^j^ 
Rome.     Atta  Clausus  and  his  clan  were  received  into  the  number  and  his 
of  patrician   gentes, — a   precedent,   perhaps   the   first,  for  the  right  family. 
afterwards   exercised  by  the  Senate  and  later  on  by  the   Emperor 
of  raising  families  to  the  Patriciate.      This  was  the  origin  of  the  great 
Claudian  gens  ;  while  the  property  granted  to  him  north  of  the  Anio 
gave  its  name  to  the  Claudian  tribe.      It  may  be  safely  concluded 
that  Atta  Clausus  would  not  have  migrated  to  a  city  hopelessly  weak 
or  at  the  feet  of  a  foreign  prince.  1 

But  this  revival  of  Roman  power  and  influence  was  a  work  of 
some  years,  and  not  the  result  of  any  great  and  sudden  blow.      The 
Sabine  war,   however,   is   said  to  have   been  ended  for  the  present 
by   a  great  battle  fought  near  Cures,   in  which  the  Roman  legions  Battle  of 
were  commanded  by  the  consul   Spurius   Cassius  Viscellinus  (502).   Cures,  S02. 
To  the  same  man  is  attributed  with  more  certainty  the  diplomacy 

^  A  less  credited  account  placed  the  migration  of  Atta  Clausus  in  the  time  of 
Romulus  and  Titus  Tatius  {Sueton.  Tib.  1). 


70 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


by  which  at  the  end  of  the  struggle  with  the  Latins  Rome  again 
became  a  member  of  the  League.^  For  though  the  Sabines  and 
the  towns  in  north-east  Latium,  which  were  half  Sabine  also,  were 
forced  for  a  time  to  suspend  their  hostility,  Rome  had  still  to  face 
the  attack  of  the  Latin  League  fostered  by  the  intrigues  of  the 
Tarquins,  supported  by  the  people  of  Aricia,  and  led  by  Mamilius  of 
Tusculum. 

When,  after  some  years  of  preparation,  the  cities  of  the  League 
took  up  arms,  the  Latin  host  encamped  near  the  lake  Regillus. 
This  has  been  plausibly  identified  with  a  small  volcanic  crater,  arti- 
ficially drained  in  the  seventeenth  century,  at  the  foot  of  the  hill  on 
which  the  modern  Frascati  stands.  There  the  famous  battle  was 
fought  in  which  the  Romans  won  a  glorious  victory  over  their 
enemies.  The  danger  had  appeared  so  formidable  that  the  consuls 
had  been  superseded  by  a  dictator,  Aulus  Postumius  Albus,  who, 
with  his  master  of  the  horse,  T.  Aebutius  Elva,  enrolled  the  legions 
and  commanded  them  in  the  field.  The  Latins  were  assisted  by  a 
corps  of  Roman  exiles  led  by  Sextus  Tarquinius,  or,  as  some  said, 
by  the  old  king  Tarquin  himself.^  In  the  battle,  as  usual  in  battles 
which  necessarily  consisted  in  actual  hand  to  hand  fighting,  the 
salient  incidents  remembered  in  tradition,  or  imagined  by  the 
chroniclers,  were  the  personal  encounters  between  the  leading  men 
on  each  side.  Thus  M.  Valerius,  enraged  at  the  sight  of  the  younger 
Tarquin,  dashes  at  him  ;  Tarquin  retreats,  and  Valerius,  becoming 
entangled  in  the  enemy's  Hne,  is  transfixed  by  a  spear.  Again,  later 
on,  T.  Herminius  recognises  the  Latin  leader  Mamilius,  drives  his 
spear  through  him,  and  is  himself  so  grievously  wounded,  whilst 
engaged  in  stripping  the  spoils  from  the  fallen  enemy,  that  he  is 
carried  back  to  the  camp  only  to  die.  The  battle,  according  to  both 
accounts  which  we  have  of  it,  was  decided  principally  by  the  picked 
horsemen  serving  as  the  dictator's  bodyguard,  who,  seeing  the 
infantry  waver,  sprang  from  their  horses  to  join  in  the  melee,  and 
only  mounted  them  again  to  follow  the  flying  Latins.  Such  incidents 
may  be  imaginary,  but  they  are  true  in  spirit.  As  in  the  battles  of 
the  Middle  Ages,  before  the  invention  of  gunpowder  and  arms  of 
precision,  the  personal  prowess  of  individuals  must  have  had  a 
decisive  influence  on  the  final  result  which  can  hardly  be  realised 

^  Livy  (ii.  33)  appears  to  have  seen  a  pillar  engraved  with  a  treaty,  in  which 
the  name  of  Spurius  Cassius  was  inscribed. 

2  Livy  (ii.  19),  quanqua7n  jam  aetate  et  viribus  erat  gravior.  Dionysius  says 
Sextus,  and  is  accordingly  accused  by  Ihne  of  inventing  a  new  Tarquin,  because 
he  found  that  the  old  man  must  be  past  ninety  by  this  time.  The  traditions 
followed  by  Dionysius' s  authorities  may  well  have  varied,  nor  does  it  seem  certain 
that  Sextus  was  yet  dead.  His  assassination  would  be  more  probable  after  the 
hopes  of  the  Tarquins  were  wrecked  (Livy  i.  60). 


VI  BATTLE  OF  THE  LAKE  REGILLUS  71 

by  those  conversant  with  modern  warfare ;  and  the  superiority  of  the 
mounted  soldier  to  the  foot  in  all  circumstances,  except  when  the 
phalanx  was  perfectly  unbroken,  must  have  been  almost  as  great  as 
that  of  the  ironclad  knight  over  the  peasant  with  pike  and  target. 
Finally,  though  doubtless  dust  obscured  much,  the  absence  of  smoke 
helped  to  make  such  deeds  of  gallantry  more  conspicuous. ^ 

In  the  midst  of  the  fight,  when  the  day  seemed  going  against  the  Castor  and 
Romans,  the  dictator  Aulus  vowed  a  temple  to  Castor,  which  he  Pollux. 
afterwards  began  in  the  Forum,  and  which  his  son  dedicated.  Its 
ruins  still  stand  on  the  south-western  side  of  the  Forum.  In  after 
times  the  tale  was  told  that  to  Postumius  and  his  stafif  on  the  field 
of  battle  two  strange  horsemen  had  appeared,  exceeding  beautiful, 
and  tall  above  the  stature  of  men,  who  rode  in  front  of  the  Roman 
cavalry  as  they  charged  ;  and  that  the  same  day  at  evening  two 
young  men  were  seen  in  the  Forum,  alike  in  age  and  height  and 
beauty,  with  all  the  marks  upon  them  of  having  come  fresh  from  the 
fight.  They  washed  the  foam  from  their  horses  in  the  spring  hard 
by  the  temple  of  Vesta  ;  and  when  men  crowded  round  them  to  ask 
for  news,  they  told  them  how  the  day  had  gone  and  that  the  Romans 
were  the  victors.  Then  they  departed  from  the  Forum,  and  were 
seen  of  no  man  again. 

The  ides  of  Quinctilis  (i  5th  July)  was  kept  as  a  festival  in  remem-    Theparadt 
brance  of  the  victory  ;  sacrifices  were  offered  at  the  temple  of  Castor  '^f  ^^^ 
built  by  Aulus  in  consequence  of  his  vow,  and  a  solemn  parade  was     "'^^ 
held  of  the  knights,  clad  in  purple  and  crowned  with  olive,  who  rode 
in  procession  from  the  temple  of  Mars  outside  the  wall  to  the  temple 
of  Castor  and  Pollux. 

This  celebration  of  the  day,  which  doubtless  gave  rise  to  the 
legend, — though  such  appearances  were  easily  believed  in  a  time  of 
excitement,   and  accordingly  are  constantly  heard  of  in  connexion 
with  great  battles  in  antiquity, — shows  at  least  that  the  Romans  had 
the  tradition  of  some  great  and  important  deliverance  which  the  battle 
of  the  lake  Regillus  secured  to  them.      It  is,  however,  an  isolated 
fact  in  the  struggle.      The  years  which  follow  embrace  no  great  or  Death  of 
decisive  event  ;  for  three  years  there  was  "  neither  war  nor  a  certain   ^^Z'-. 
peace,"   says    Livy.      But   the   death   of  Superbus   at   Cumae    (496)  |^"^"f"^ 
relieved  the  Romans  of  one  source  of  constant  uneasiness,  and  there    ,^^ 
were  signs  of  a  steady  growth.      Fresh  colonists  were  sent  to  Signia, 

^  Mommsen  (i.  349)  speaks  of  the  legend  of  the  victory  of  the  lake  Regillus 
as  "unusually  vivid  and  various  in  its  hues,"  and  seems  to  accept  it  as  a  real 
victory  of  Rome  over  the  rest  of  the  Latin  League.  Ihne  will  have  none  of  it. 
He  imagines  a  division  of  Latium  for  and  against  the  Etruscan  pretensions  :  the 
anti-Tuscan  party,  which  included  Rome,  were  successful,  and  Rome,  having 
thus  obtained  independence  by  the  help  of  the  Latins,  treated  with  the  League  as 
an  independent  nation. 


72 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


which  was  an  important  place  as  commanding  the  road  to  the  Her- 
nici ;  and  the  number  of  the  tribes  was  increased,  which  impHes  an 
increase  of  territory.  Such  fighting  as  took  place  was  no  longer  with 
the  Latini,  but  with  the  Volscians,  Aequians,  Aurunci,  and  Sabines. 

The  extension  of  the  power  of  the  Romans  at  the  end  of  the 
regal  period  had  brought  them  into  collision  with  the  Volscians,  and 


towns  on  the  Volscian  coast,  were  in  some  way  under  the  protection 
of  Rome.i  But  this  progress  was  not  always  maintained,  and  many 
vicissitudes  may  be  traced — Antium  now  being  free,  now  under  the 
Romans.  It  was  natural  that  the  Volscians  should  take  the  oppor- 
tunity of  Rome's  weakness  to  recover  their  control  over  these  places. 
They  had  threatened,  we  are  told,  an  attack  before  the  Latin  war, 
but  had  been  kept  in  check  by  a  movement  of  Roman  troops,  and 
had  been  compelled  to  give  hostages.  After  the  battle  of  the  lake 
Regillus  they  had  endeavoured  again  to  renew  their  attack  upon  the 
Roman  territory.  They  made  a  league  with  the  Hernici,  and  sent 
messengers  to  the  Latin  towns  to  instigate  them  once  more  to  take 
up  arms.  But  the  Latins  were  unwilling  to  move  after  their  late 
defeat,  and  even  arrested  the  Volscian  legates  and  handed  them 
over  to  the  consuls.  In  gratitude  for  this  6000  Latin  captives, 
then  confined  at  Rome,  were  restored  without  ransom,  and  the 
question  of  renewing  the  League  with  the  Latin  towns  was  referred 
to  the  consuls  of  the  next  year.  Whatever  may  be  the  exact  facts 
of  these  transactions,  thus  much  again  seems  clear,  that  in  this  period 
Rome  was  once  more  taking  her  place  in  the  Latin  League,  and 
coming  to  be  regarded,  not  as  an  enemy,  but  as  the  champion  of  the 
Latins.  In  the  struggles  periodically  recurring  in  the  following 
years  the  Latins  act  as  the  faithful  outposts  of  Rome,  and  warn  the 
consuls  of  threatened  invasions.  There  is  no  sign  of  their  jealousy 
being  roused  by  additions  made  from  time  to  time  to  the  Roman 
territory,  or  of  their  seeking  to  take  any  advantage  when  the  Romans 
were  engaged  with  the  Sabines  on  the  north-east,  or  with  the  Aurunci 
on  the  south.  And  when,  by  the  diplomacy  of  Spurius  Cassius,  now 
consul  for  the  second  time,  Rome  once  more  became  formally  a 
member  of  the  Latin  League,  the  treaty  seems  to  have  been  a  recog- 
nition of  a  state  of  things  already  practically  existing.  This  is  the 
first  step  indeed  in  Rome's  advancement  from  which  there  was  no  real 
recoil.  The  League  towns,  with  which  were  joined  the  Hernici  in 
486,  soon  found  themselves  practically  subjects  of  Rome,  nor  was 
any  serious  attempt  made  to  change  this  until  the  war  of  340. 

From   the   time  of  the  renewal  of  the   Romano -Latin    League 

^  See  the  treaty  with  Carthage  (Polyb.  iii.  22).      The  early  date  of  this  treaty, 
denied  by  Mommsen,  who  places  it  after  348,  is  generally  admitted. 


VI  ROME  AND  THE  LATIN  LEAGUE  73 

(493)  to  nearly  the  end  of  the  century  (403)  there  is  a  constant    iVars  with 
recurrence  of  warfare  with  the  Volscians,  varied  by  similar  struggles    Volscians, 
with  Sabines  and  Aequians.      They  seldom  rose  above  the  dignity  ^^^^"^^^> 
of  border  raids,   though   there  was  often  much  spoil,  and   several  '^^equians 
triumphs  were  celebrated.    At  times  the  enemy  ventured  to  approach  ^gj.^oj. 
the  city  itself,  and  the  citizens  were  called  to  arms  when  ^'  the  smoke 
from  burning  homesteads  and  the  flight  of  the  rustics  "  gave  warning 
that  the  Volscian,  Aequian,  or  Sabine  host  was  on  the  march.     On 
one  occasion  (460)  the  Capitol  itself  was  seized  by  a  Sabine  named 
Appius   Herdonius.     Rowing  down  the  Tiber  under  cover  of  dark-  Appius 
ness,  with  some  4000  followers,  composed  of  exiles  and  slaves,  he  herdonius 
landed  at  the  foot  of  the  Capitol  where  there  was  no  defending  wall,  ^r^l^-/ i^ 
and  succeeded  in  occupying  the  summit  and  the  temple  of  Jupiter. 
It  does  not  appear  that  he  was  acting  for  the  Sabines.      It  was  the 
adventure  of  a  lawless  chieftain  and  his  followers,  and  there  was  no 
force  at  hand  to  co-operate  with  him.      He  relied  on  notorious  dis- 
sensions then  dividing  patrician  and  plebeian  in  the  agitation  for  a 
written  constitution,  and  accordingly  proclaimed  equality  for  plebeians 
and   liberty  for   slaves.      It   seems    scarcely    credible  that,   with   an 
audacious  enemy  occupying  the  very   Capitol,  the  Tribunes  should 
have  instigated  the  plebeians  to  refrain  from  fighting  ;  and  it  is  at 
least  as  probable,  as  suggested  by  Livy,  that  the  patricians  feared  to 
arm  the  urban  proletariat,  and  wished  to  have  the  credit  for  them- 
selves and  their  clients.       In  answer  to   Herdonius's  proclamation, 
however,  no  important  defection  took  place,  even  among  the  slaves, 
and  the  adventurers  were  quickly  captured  and  destroyed,   though 
with  some  hard  fighting,  in  which  the  consul  Valerius  fell. 

The   struggle   with  the    Aequians    appears    to    have    constantly  The 
centred  round  Mount  Algidus,  one  of  the  Alban  heights  frequently  Aequians. 
occupied    by    them    as    a    base    of  operations  against   the   Roman 
territory ;    and  the    battles   which    stand   out  conspicuously  amidst   Two  battles 
the    monotony    of  the    constantly    recurring    details    of    the    war-  of  Mount 
fare  are  two  fought  there,  the  first  in  458,  when  Cincinnatus  con-      |,^  "^' 
quered    Cloelius    Gracchus ;  the    second    in    428,    when    Postumius 
Tibertus   was  victorious   over   a   combined  force   of  Aequians    and 
Volscians. 

With  the  Volscians  the  fighting,  though  not  confined  to  one  The  Vol- 
place,  often  came  to  a  head  at  Antium.  That  town,  long  an  object 
of  contention,  appears  to  have  been  under  the  protection  of  the 
Romans  at  the  end  of  the  regal  period.  In  the  weakness  which 
followed  the  fall  of  the  Tarquins  it  had  regained  its  independence, 
or  had  been  forcibly  anr^exed  again  by  the  Volscians.  It  is  said  to 
have  been  taken  and  colonised  by  the  Romans  in  468,  but  the 
colonists  were  not  numerous  enough  to  counteract  the  inclinations  of 


sctans. 
Antium. 


74 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


the  Volscian  inhabitants  left  in  it,  and  in  459  it  revolted.  From 
that  time  it  is  the  scene  of  constant  fighting. 

To  these  difficulties  must  be  added  that  of  pestilence.  Eight 
visitations  are  recorded  as  occurring  in  this  century  (500-400),  and 
four  of  them  within  a  space  of  twenty  years,  452,  435,  432,  431. 
In  the  first  of  these  Dionysius  asserts  that  nearly  all  the  slaves  and 
half  the  free  population  perished.  Yet  Rome,  united  with  the  Latin 
towns,  was  steadily  growing.  Velitrae  had  been  colonised  before, 
and  was  strengthened  with  fresh  colonists  in  492.  In  the  same 
year  Norba,  commanding  the  Pomptine  district,  was  colonised ; 
Ardea  in  439,  Labicum  in  416  ;  and  Circeii  must  have  been  recovered 
in  this  period,  if  not  for  the  first  time  colonised.  The  census  is  only 
given  in  465  and  459,  but  the  numbers  show  a  satisfactory  increase. 

To  these  wars  belong  the  famous  tales  of  Coriolanus  and  Cincin- 
natus,  preserved,  perhaps,  and  adorned  with  romantic  details  in 
family  traditions,  but  reflecting  the  spirit  which  the  Roman  believed 
to  have  animated  the  age. 

In  the  early  wars  with  the  Volscians  the  Romans  were  besieging 
Corioli,  a  town  not  far  from  Antium,  which  the  Volscians  had 
wrested  from  the  Latins.  One  day  a  sudden  advance  from  Antium 
was  made  upon  the  besiegers  by  the  Volscians,  and  at  the  same  time 
a  sally  by  the  besieged  garrison  in  Corioli.  It  chanced  that  a  young 
noble  named  Caius  Marcius  was  on  duty  in  the  Roman  outposts 
near  this  town.  He  not  only  succeeded  in  repulsing  the  sally,  but 
forced  his  way  through  the  gates  with  the  flying  garrison,  set  fire 
to  the  buildings  near  the  walls,  and  took  it.  The  cry  of  the 
captured  city  animated  the  Romans  outside,  so  that  they  conquered 
the  Volscians  who  came  from  Antium  to  relieve  it.  Thus  Caius 
Marcius  gained  great  glory,  and  was  ever  afterwards  called  Corio- 
lanus. But  he  was  a  stern  aristocrat,  hating  the  privileges  which 
the  people,  by  the  help  of  their  tribunes,  were  beginning  to  get 
for  themselves  ;  and  when  there  was  a  dearth  at  Rome,  and  the 
Senate  purchased  corn  from  Sicily  and  would  have  sold  it  to  the 
people  at  a  small  price,  Caius  Marcius  opposed  this  relief,  and 
declared  that  the  plebs  by  their  seditions  had  caused  the  dearth,  and 
should  be  allowed  to  suffer  for  it.  He  was  almost  slain  as  he  left  the 
Senate  House  ;  and  the  Fathers  were  so  alarmed  at  the  popular  fury 
that  they  were  obliged  to  allow  Marcius  to  be  impeached  before  the 
people.  He  would  not  appear,  but  went  into  exile  among  the 
Volscians,  threatening  vengeance  against  his  country.  The  Volscians 
received  him  gladly,  and  their  chief,  Attius  Tullius,  entertained  him 
as  his  guest.  Presently,  by  the  machinations  of  Attius  Tullius,  war 
was  once  more  begun  against  Rome,  and  Coriolanus,  with  Tullius, 
led  the  Volscian  army.      Everywhere  he  was  successful ;  town  after 


VI  LEGENDS  OF  CORIOLANUS  AND  CINCINNATUS  75 

town  fell  into  his  hands,  till  at  length  he  pitched  his  camp  five  miles 
from  the  city.  The  frightened  Senate  sent  legates  to  treat  of  peace. 
They  were  sent  back  with  a  stern  message,  ordering  the  Romans  to 
make  full  restitution  of  all  that  they  had  taken  from  the  Volscians. 
When  other  legates  were  sent  they  were  refused  admittance  into  the 
camp.  The  sacerdotes  with  the  emblems  of  their  holy  office  were  in 
like  manner  repulsed.  Then  the  matrons  begged  his  mother  Veturia 
and  his  wife  Volumnia,  with  her  two  young  sons,  to  go  to  the  Volscian 
camp  and  entreat  the  fierce  Caius  Marcius  to  spare  the  city.  At 
first,  seeing  only  a  crowd  of  women,  he  remained  obdurate  to  their 
tears  and  cries  for  mercy :  but  when  he  distinguished  his  mother, 
he  leapt  from  his  seat  and  would  have  embraced  her ;  but  she 
repelled  him  so  long  as  he  was  minded  to  enslave  his  country. 
While  he  stood  hesitating  his  wife  and  children  embraced  his  knees, 
and  overcome  by  their  importunity  he  led  the  Volscian  army  away 
and  returned  to  Antium,  where  some  say  that  he  was  slain  by  the 
Volscians  as  a  traitor,  and  others  that  he  lived  to  a  great  age, 
declaring  that  only  an  old  man  knew  the  misery  of  exile. 

Again  in  458  the  Aequians  under  Gracchus  were  engaged  in  one  Legend 
of  their  periodical  raids.  As  often  before,  they  occupied  a  camp  of  Cincin- 
on  Mount  Algidus,  and  the  consul  Lucius  Minucius  was  sent  against  ««^«-y- 
them.  But  Minucius  proved  himself  timid  and  incompetent.  The 
enemy  nearly  succeeded  in  blockading  him  in  his  camp,  and 
there  was  danger  of  the  Roman  army  being  starved  into  surrender. 
Before  the  investment  was  quite  complete  some  horsemen  broke  out 
and  made  their  way  to  Rome.  A  war  was  going  on  at  the  same 
time  with  the  Sabines,  but  the  Senate  recalled  the  other  consul  from 
the  Sabine  war  and  forced  him  to  name  a  dictator.  With  the 
approval  of  all  he  named  L.  Quintius  Cincinnatus.  The  officers  sent 
to  tell  him  of  his  appointment  found  him  working  on  his  small  farm 
across  the  Tiber,  some  said  digging  a  trench,  others  guiding  the 
plough.  When  he  heard  the  news  he  called  to  his  wife  to  bring  his 
toga  from  the  cottage,  and,  wiping  off  the  sweat  and  soil  from  his 
face,  was  taken  on  board  a  vessel  up  the  Tiber,  and  entered  the  city 
preceded  by  his  lictors  and  escorted  by  a  great  crowd  of  people. 
Next  day  he  ordered  all  business  to  be  suspended,  all  shops  shut, 
and  all  men  of  military  age  to  assemble  on  the  Campus  Martins 
with  provisions  for  five  days,  while  those  who  were  too  old  for 
service  should  busy  themselves  in  preparing  food  for  his  camp.  By 
midnight  he  had  reached  the  Aequian  lines.  Each  of  his  soldiers 
carried  one  or  more  stakes,^  which  they  drove  into  the  ground  when 
they  arrived,  and  before  daybreak  the   Aequians   found   themselves 

^  This  was  long  a  custom  with  Roman  soldiers  (see  Polyb.  xviii.  18). 


76 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


surrounded  by  a  palisade,  and  shut  in  between  two  armies.  Forced 
to  surrender,  their  Hves  were  spared,  but  they  were  compelled  to 
submit  to  the  disgrace  of  "passing  under  the  yoke."  Two  spears 
were  fixed  upright  in  the  ground  and  a  third  laid  across  them.  The 
defeated  army,  stripped  of  all  arms,  marched  under  this  as  a  symbol 
of  their  submission.  Their  camp  was  given  up  to  the  Romans  with 
all  it  contained,  and  Quintius  returned  laden  with  booty  to  celebrate 
his  triumph.  On  the  sixteenth  day  from  that  on  which  he  had  been 
named  dictator  he  abdicated  his  office,  having  in  that  time  saved  a 
Roman  army,  gained  immense  spoils,  and  won  great  glory  for  the 
Roman  name. 
Effect  of  This  constant  warfare  had  a  lasting  effect  on  Roman  character 

the  century  ^^d  the  political  constitution.  The  frequent  need  of  levies  gave  the 
plebs  opportunities  of  extorting  one  right  after  another  from  the 
privileged  classes.  Civil  rights  were  not  valued  where  all  power 
was  in  the  hands  of  a  single  king.  But  with  the  new  state  of  things 
the  vote  became  important,  and  as  the  burden  of  military  service 
and  tribute  fell  on  all  in  various  degrees,  the  other  privileges  were 
sure  to  be  demanded  also.  When  the  next  great  struggle  with  Veii 
was  ended  important  steps  had  been  taken  towards  civil  equality. 


of  wars 
on  the 
Romans. 


Authorities. — We  still  depend  almost  entirely  on  Livy  {ii.-iv.);  Diony- 
sius,  V.  -xi. ,  is  continuous  to  B.  c.  459  ;  but  of  the  remaining  books  there  are 
only  fragments  remaining.  Plutarch,  Poplicola  and  C.  Marcius  Coriolanus  (the 
story  of  Coriolanus  is  told  also  by  Appian,  Res  Ital.  fr.  v.)  Zonaras  vii.  12-19  ; 
Florus  i.  9  ;  Aurelius  Victor,  de  Viris  Illnst.  10-19  \  Eutropius  i.  9-19  ; 
Orosius  ii.  13. 


CHAPTER    VII 

ROME    AND    VEII 
482-395 

Enmity  of  Veii  and  Rome — State  of  Etruria  in  fifth  century  B.C. — General  move- 
ment against  Hellenism — The  Fabii — Farther  movements  of  Veientines  and 
Sabines — Fidenae  and  Veii — A.  Cornelius  Cossus  and  the  spolia  opima — The 
Etruscan  League  refuse  help  to  Veii — Twenty  years'  truce  (425) — Samnites 
drive  the  Etruscans  from  Campania — Last  war  with  Veii,  its  siege  and  fall 
(405-396) — The  effect  of  the  long  siege — The  Alban  lake — M.  Furius  Camillus 
— Stories  connected  with  the  fall  of  Veii — Fall  of  Melpum — Capture  of  Falerii, 
Volsinii,  and  Sutrium. 

The  enmity  between  Rome  and  Veii  was  of  long  standing.      Six  Long- 

wars  are  recorded  in  the  regal  period,  and  that  which  ended  with  standing 

the  fall  of  Veii  was  the   fourteenth.      This    ever-recurring   hostility  ^^^^^y 

needs  probably  no  explanation  beyond  the  fact  that  the  interests  of  ^^l^^nd 

the  two  towns  were  opposed  to  each  other  and  their  territories  con-   veii. 

tiguous.      A  few  hours'  brisk  walking  would  bring  a  man  from  the 

gates  of  Rome  to  those  of  Veii ;  and  when  Rome  obtained  territory 

on  the  right  bank  of  the  Tiber,  some  of  it  at  any  rate  must  have 

been  at  the  expense  of  Veii.       Thus  when   Porsena  deprived  the 

Romans  of  their  lands  on  the  right  bank,  he  is  said  to  have  given 

them  to  the  Veientines  ;  when  he  restored  them  to  Rome  he  had  to 

take  them  from  Veii.      Putting  aside  all  question  as  to  the  personality 

of  Porsena,  the  transaction  represents  what  must  almost  necessarily 

have  happened.      It  must  always  have  been  a  question  between  the 

two  States  as  to  which  of  them  had  the  command  of  the  right  bank 

of  the  river  in  the  neighbourhood  of  what  was  afterwards  the  Milvian 

bridge.     The  successful  claim  of  the  one  must  have  been  the  loss  of 

the  other. 

This  sufficiently  explains  their  constant  quarrels.      Nor  is  it  sur-  The 
prising  that  the  Veientines  should  so  long  have  held  their  own   in  strength 
the  dispute.      A   city,  not  less   in   magnitude  or  weaker  in  position  '^ 


78 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


than  Rome  itself,  Veii,  as  an  outpost  of  the  Etruscan  League  in  the 
direction  of  Latium,  would  also  be  able  to  count  on  the  support  of 
the  rest  of  Etruria  in  maintaining  the  contest.  It  was  when  that 
support  failed  her,  and  she  was  left  to  fight  Rome  almost  single- 
handed,  that  she  at  length  succumbed  to  the  growing  power  of  her 
great  neighbour.  The  history  of  her  fall,  therefore,  must  be  looked 
at  in  some  degree  in  connexion  with  the  general  history  of  Etruria. 

We  have  already  seen  that  the  Etruscans  had  established  settle- 
ments in  Campania,  originally,  doubtless,  as  commercial  centres. 
Their  supremacy  at  sea  had  long  made  them  an  object  of  fear  and 
hatred  to  the  Greek  towns  of  Italy  ;  and  they  were  constantly  in 
league  with  the  Carthaginians,  those  other  mortal  foes  of  the  Greeks. 
We  have  seen  that  they  had  joined  in  an  unsuccessful  attack  upon 
Cumae  (524),  and  had  made  a  great  attempt  to  secure  a  free  road 
through  Latium  to  their  possessions  in  central  Italy  (507-506).  The 
resistance  which  they  experienced  in  these  two  cases  finds  parallels 
in  other  parts  of  Italy.  In  494  we  hear  of  Anaxilas,  tyrant  of 
Rhegium,  erecting  a  fort  on  the  Scyllaean  rock  to  repel  them  ;  and 
in  474  Hiero  of  Syracuse,  in  answer  to  an  appeal  for  help,  sent  ships 
to  Cumae  and  inflicted  a  severe  defeat  upon  the  Etruscan  fleet  near 
that  town.  "  They  humbled  the  Tuscans,"  says  Diodorus  ;  and  from 
that  time  forth  they  seem  rather  to  act  on  the  defensive  than  to 
venture  upon  attacking  the  Italian  towns.^ 

But  it  is  impossible  to  disregard  the  fact  that  these  transactions 
synchronise  closely  with  the  struggle  that  was  going  on  between  the 
Persians  and  Greeks  in  the  East  and  the  Carthaginians  and  Greeks 
in  Sicily.  On  the  very  day,  it  is  said,  on  which  the  Persian  invasion 
was  crushed  at  Salamis,  Hiero  repelled  a  similar  attack  of  Cartha- 
ginians upon  Sicily  (480)  ;  and  there  is  good  reason  for  believing 
that  the  Carthaginians  were  acting  in  concert  with  the  Persians. 
The  Etruscan  fleet  which  threatened  Cumae  in  that  year,  and  was 
destroyed  in  the  next,  seems  to  have  been  also  taking  its  part  in  a 
great  movement  for  the  destruction  of  Hellenism  and  subjugation  of 
Greece  and  Italy.  Rome,  barring  the  way  between  Etruria  and  the 
South,  was  one  obstacle  to  be  removed.  It  may  therefore  fairly  be 
regarded  as  an  indication  that  Veii  was  taking  part  in  the  same 
movement  when,  after  a  quiescence  of  some  twenty-five  years,  her 
soldiers  once  more  entered  Roman  territory  (482).  We  are  told 
that,  in  the  almost  annual  raids  that  followed,  the  Veientines  were 
supported  by  auxiliaries  from  all  Etruria,  with  the  object  of  taking 
advantage  of  the  internal  quarrels  in  Rome  to  destroy  her. 

In  the  battle  of  482,  as  in  the  succeeding  campaign,  the  names 


^  See  p.  13. 


VII  THE  LEGEND  OF  THE  FABII  79 

of  various  members  of  the  Fabian  gens  are  prominent.     The  Fasti   The  FabU. 
for  seven  years  in  succession  (485-479)  show  a  Fabius  as  one  of  the 
consuls  ;  and  the  family  seems  to  have  regarded  the  Veientine  war 
as  its  special  province.      Hence  the  famous  story  of  the   fall   of  the 
306  members  of  the  gens. 

Kaeso  Fabius  Vibulanus  was  consul  for  the  third  time  in  479.  jcaeso 
He  came,  it  is  said,  into  the  Senate-House  and  proposed  that,  instead  Fabius 
of  sending  the  usual  army  against  the  Veientines,  he,  at  the  head  of  Vibulanus. 
his  gens,  should  undertake  the  Veientine  war.  The  offer  was  gladly 
accepted,  and  amidst  the  praises  and  prayers  of  the  people  Kaeso, 
in  full  military  array,  led  his  clansmen  out  of  Rome  by  the  Porta 
Carmentalis^  the  right  arch  of  which  was  ever  afterwards  regarded 
as  ill-omened  for  the  commencement  of  a  journey.  Livy  and  Ovid 
seem  to  confine  the  numbers  who  thus  sallied  forth  to  the  306 
members  of  the  Fabian  gens,  but  other  versions  of  the  tale  represent 
them  as  being  accompanied  by  clients  and  dependents,  amounting  in 
all  to  about  4000.  It  is  indeed  unlikely  that  men  of  their  rank  and 
wide  connexions  would  fail  to  be  followed  by  clients  and  slaves. 
Their  object  was  to  occupy  some  permanent  post  in  the  Veientine 
lands,  from  which  to  prevent  inroads  upon  the  Roman  territory,  and 
to  watch  for  opportunities  of  inflicting  injury  upon  Veii. 

The  greatness  and  magnificence  of  the  town  of  Veii  are  attested 
by  ancient  writers,  and  have  been   confirmed  by  the  few  scattered  Expedition 
remains   on  the  site,  which,  as  far  as   they  go,  indicate   a  town   at  of  the 
least  as  large  as  Athens.      It  stood  about   fifteen  miles  from   Rome  ^^'^"'  479- 
in  the  fork  of  two  streams,  which,  uniting  on  the  south-east  of  the 
town,  form  the  river  called  Cremera,  the  modern  La  Vulca.      When 
the  Fabii  reached  the  valley  of  the  Cremera  they  pitched  their  camp 
on   a   steep    hill,    and    fortified   it    by   a    double   trench   and   many   They 
towers.      This  post  they  held  through  the  winter,  repelling  all  attacks  f^J'^^fy 
of  the  Veientines,  and  repeatedly  plundering  their  territory.      Next  ^^  ^  j^^^ 
year  the  Veientine  army  was  defeated  by  the  consul  L.  Aemilius  at  in  the 
a    place    on    what   was   afterwards   the   Flaminian   road,   called  ad  Veientine 
Rubra   Saxa,    and   were   compelled   to    sue    for    peace.      For    some  i^*'^^^ou- 
reason,  of  which  we  are  not  informed,  the  people  of  Veii  did  not 
accept  the  terms  offered  by  the  Romans,  and  resolved  to  try  once 
more  to  dislodge  the  Fabii.      The  struggle  went  on  through  another 
winter,    and    after  numerous    less    important    engagements   they   at   The  Fabii 
length  succeeded  by  stratagem.      Choosing  a  plain   so  surrounded  fallwto 
by  covert  as  to  admit  of  an  ambush  for  a  large  force,  they  turned 
cattle   out   to    feed   apparently  unwatched.       The    Fabii    descended 
into  the  plain   and  began  driving  off  the  cattle.     Then  the  Veien- 
tines rose  from  their  ambush  and  slew  them  to  a  man.     The  one 
boy  who    survived    of    the    whole    clan    was    destined    to    be    the 


an 
ambush, 
477- 


8o 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


The  ex- 
planation 
of  the  story. 


The 

Veienfines 
occupy  the 
laniculum, 
476. 


They  ally 
themselves 
with  the 
Sabines, 


475-43S. 
A  period  of 
peace  with 
Veii. 


ancestor  of  the  famous  Fabius  Cunctator,  who  broke  the  power  of 
Hannibal.^ 

Such  a  tradition  is  not  likely  to  have  arisen  without  some  founda- 
tion in  fact.  It  probably  represents  a  great  disaster  sustained  by  a 
Roman  force  about  this  time,  in  which  the  Fabii  were  largely  repre- 
sented. ^  But  that  the  whole  Fabian  gens  should  thus  have  all 
perished  in  a  single  day  involves  the  all  but  impossible  circumstance 
that  every  Fabius  but  one  was  of  military  age,  only  one  of  the  306 
having  a  son  below  that  age ;  while  in  fact  we  find  a  Fabius  in  the  list 
of  consuls  for  467  and  464,  ten  and  thirteen  years  after  the  alleged 
occurrence. 

Inspirited  by  this  success  the  Veientines  made  more  determined 
attacks  upon  Roman  territory,  even  occupying  laniculum  and 
threatening  Rome  with  a  siege  (476),  until,  after  various  minor 
engagements,  the  consul  Spurius  Servilius  stormed  their  camp  on 
laniculum.  He  was  reinforced  by  his  colleague  Aulus  Virginius,  just 
when  he  seemed  about  to  suffer  a  signal  defeat,  and  the  two  together 
cut  to  pieces  the  army  of  the  invader. 

The  Veientines  now  sought  alliance  with  the  Sabines.  A  Sabine 
army  crossed  the  Tiber,  and  lay  encamped  under  the  walls  of  Veii. 
The  Romans  sent  a  force  under  the  consul  Publius  Valerius,  which 
made  a  vigorous  assault  upon  the  Sabines.  The  Veientines  sallied 
forth  to  their  relief,  but  after  a  stubborn  fight  the  camp  was  taken 
and  the  Sabines  dispersed  (475)- 

For  thirty-seven  years  from  this  time  we  have  no  Veientine 
inroads  recorded.  It  was  a  period  of  constant  civil  strife  in  Rome, 
with  frequent  intervals  of  wars  with  the  Volscian  and  Aequian  ;  and 
yet  Veii,  Rome's  implacable  foe,  seems  not  to  have  troubled  her. 
The  reason  is  probably  to  be  found  in  the  difficulties  of  the  Etruscans. 
They  were  suffering  from  determined  attacks  in  more  than  one 
direction.  Their  fleet  was  annihilated  at  Cumae  in  474  ;  in  458  a 
Syracusan  fleet,  first  under  Phayllus  and  then  under  Apellas,  was 
plundering  their  settlements  in  Aethalia  {Elba)  and  Corsica  ;  ^  the 
Gauls  were  threatening  on  the  north  ;  and  Veii  was  therefore  not 
only  called  upon  to  contribute  to  the  national  defence,  but  could  look 
for  little  help  from  the  rest  of  Etruria. 

The  immediate  occasion  of  the  next  war  was  a  sudden  revolt  of 
Fidenae  (438).     This  town  had  in  very  early  times  been  partially 


^  Another  version  of  the  story  attributed  the  destruction  of  the  Fabii  to  an  I 
ambush  set  along  the  road  to  Rome,  whither  they  had  gone  to  offer  a  family 
sacrifice. 

2  This  seems  the  view  of  Diodorus  Siculus,  xi.  53.  Niebuhr  and  MommsenI 
regard  it  as  a  kind  of  "  secession  "  of  the  Fabii  for  political  motives. 

2  Diodorus  xi.  88. 


FIDENAE  AND  VEII  8i 


occupied    by    Roman    coloni,^    but    from    time    immemorial    it  had  438-43J. 
been  closely  connected  with  Veii.      At  this  period  the  earlier  element  J^^yo^i  <^f 
of  the  population  apparently  found  itself  strong  enough  to  revert  to  J^^^^^ 
the  traditional  policy  of  the  city.      A  league  was   made  with  Lar  league  with 
Tolumnius,  king  of  Veii :  and  when  four  Roman  commissioners  were    Veii. 
sent   to   demand   an   explanation,    they   were   put   to   death    by  the 
Fidenates,  at  the  instigation  of  Tolumnius. ^     Though  Tolumnius  tried    ^(^^  ^«^ 
to  disclaim  this  breach  of  international  law,  the  Romans  at  once  pro-  ^^^.^'^ 
claimed   war   both   with   Veii   and  Fidenae  ;    and  in  the  next  year  Romans. 
(437)  a  battle  was  fought  which  appears  to  have  been  unfavourable 
to  the  Roman  arms.     A  dictator,  Mamercus  Aemilius,  was  named ; 
veteran  centurions  were  called  out ;  and  the  enemy  were  gradually 
manoeuvred  out  of  the   Roman  territory,   and  forced  to  take  up  a 
position  on  the  line  of  hills  between  the   Anio  and  Fidenae,  until 
auxiliaries  arrived  from  Falerii.      Encouraged  by  this  reinforcement 
they  ventured  to  descend  into  the  plain,  but  were  driven  back  into 
their  camp  with  great  slaughter.       King  Tolumnius  was  slain  and 
spoiled  by  A.  Cornelius  Cossus,  who  thus  won  the  spolia  opiina — the  Cornelitis 
second  instance  recorded  in  Roman  history.      The  sight  of  the  head  Cossus 
of  their  king  on  the  victor's  spear  began  the  rout  of  the  Veientines,   ^Tr^     ^ 
Avhich  the  Roman  dictator   turned  into  a  disastrous  flight.      Many  opima. 
of  the  Fidenates  saved  themselves  by  retreating  to  the  hills  ;   but 
Cossus  crossed  the  Tiber  with  some  cavalry,  and  brought  back  large 
spoil   from   the   Veientine   territory.       On   his    return  to  Rome  the 
dictator   celebrated   a  triumph  :    but   all   eyes  were   turned,  not  on 
him,  but  on  Cossus  carrying  the  spoils  of  Tolumnius  (437).^ 

But  neither  Veii  nor  Fidenae  was  long  cowed  by  this  disaster. 

^  Before  the  system  of  sending  colonies  to  towns  in  Italy  (see  p.  164)  was  fully 
established,  it  was  the  custom  in  case  of  conquered  towns  to  confiscate  part  of 
their  territory  and  settle  thereon  Roman  farmers  (coloni)  with  a  certain  allotment 
of  the  land. 

^  Their  names  were  C.  Fulcinius,  Cloelius  TuUus,  Sp.  Ancius,  L.  Roscius. 
Their  statues  were  placed  on  the  Rostra  and  were  extant  in  Cicero's  time  (Livy 
iv.  17  ;   Cic.  Phil.  iv.  9  ;   Pliny  A^.  H.  xxxv.  11), 

^  Livy  (iv.  20)  has  a  curious  discussion  on  this  subject.  It  was  the  rule,  he 
says,  that  the  spolia  opima  could  only  be  gained  by  a  leader  who  slew  and  stripped 
the  leader  of  the  enemy  [quae  dux  duci  detraxit)  ;  therefore  there  was  a  question 
whether  Cossus — whom  he  calls  a  military  tribune — could  gain  them.  When 
Augustus  inspected  the  temple  of  Jupiter  Feretrius  with  a  view  to  its  restoration, 
he  found  the  cuirass  of  Tolumnius  with  an  inscription  mentioning  Cossus  as 
consul.  But  the  libri  lintei  placed  the  consulship  of  Cossus  nine  years  later,  at 
which  date  there  was  no  mention  in  the  Fasti  of  a  Veientine  war.  Livy  declines  to 
solve  the  difficulty,  but  points  out  that  a  Cossus  was  consular  tribune  in  434  ; 
consul  in  428  ;  master  of  the  horse,  again  to  Mamercus,  in  426  ;  and  seems  to 
leave  us  to  choose  our  year.  In  this  last  year  (426)  Diodorus  (xii.  80)  mentions 
an  indecisive  battle  with  the  Fidenates,  which  would  not  answer  to  the  battle 
mentioned  in  the  text. 


82 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


435- 

Fidenae 

taken. 


The 

Etruscan 
cities  refuse 
to  aid  Veii, 
434-429- 


Fresh 
movements 
in  428-42J. 


423-403. 
Decadence 
of  Etruria. 


Two  years  later  (435)  we  find  their  combined  army  again  invading 
Roman  territory  nearly  up  to  the  Colline  gate.  Again  a  dictator 
was  nominated  (Q.  Servilius),  who  raised  an  army  and  forced  the 
enemy  to  retreat.  Fidenae  itself  was  besieged  ;  and  at  length,  like 
Veii  afterwards,  taken  by  means  of  a  mine  or  tunnel,  by  which  the 
Roman  soldiers  got  upon  the  rock  of  the  citadel.  Yet  Fidenae  does 
not  appear  to  have  been  treated  with  harshness.  New  coloni  indeed 
were  settled  there,  but  enough  of  the  original  inhabitants  remained 
to  give  trouble  again  before  long. 

The  success  of  Rome  caused  alarm  throughout  Etruria.  The 
Faliscans  had  refused  to  take  part  in  the  last  invasion  ;  but  they  still 
feared  the  vengeance  of  the  Republic  for  their  share  in  the  previous 
war,  and  now  joined  the  Veientines  in  a  mission  to  the  other  towns 
of  Etruria,  to  organise  national  succour  for  Veii.  The  Romans, 
alarmed  at  the  prospect  of  an  attack  from  united  Etruria,  again 
named  a  dictator.  But  they  were  soon  reassured  by  news  brought 
by  merchants  that  the  Etruscan  congress  at  the  temple  of  Voltumna  ^ 
had  refused  to  assist  Veii. 

For  a  few  years,  therefore,  the  Veientines  were  quiescent.  But 
in  428  they  again  made  raids  on  the  Roman  territory,  in  which 
certain  of  the  Fidenates  were  accused  of  participating.  No  battle 
of  any  consequence,  however,  took  place ;  and,  after  some  minor 
encounters  near  Momentum  and  Fidenae,  a  truce  was  arranged. 
But  the  Veientines  broke  it,  and  war,  proclaimed  in  426,  was  begun 
in  the  following  year.  A  defeat  sustained  by  the  Romans  at  the 
beginning  of  the  campaign  of  425  caused  once  more  the  nomination 
of  a  dictator.  The  Veientine  army  was  surrounded  and  destroyed. 
Fidenae  was  again  captured,  the  city  plundered,  and  many  of  the 
inhabitants,  instead  of  being  left  as  before  to  foment  new  rebellions, 
sold  into  slavery :  and,  though  the  town  does  not  seem  to  have  been 
destroyed,  it  was  never  of  any  influence  again.  The  Veientines  had 
lost  more  than  an  army  :  they  had  lost  their  base  of  operations 
against  Latium,  and  had  to  accept  a  truce  of  twenty  years. 

These  years  were  eventful  ones  in  the  constitutional  history  of 
the  Romans,  and  were  not  marked  by  any  external  wars  of  importance. 
But  while  they  brought  new  strength  and  better  social  and  political 
conditions  to  Rome,  they  witnessed  internal  strife  at  Veii,  and  deca- 
dence throughout  Etruria.  Not  only  were  her  maritime  settlements 
harried   by  Syracusans,  and  her  northern  communities  threatened] 


^  The  position  of  the  Fanum  Voltumnae  is  not  known  ;  but  it  seems  to  have 
certainly  been  in  northern  Etruria,   perhaps  near  Tarquinii  (Dennis,  Cities  at 
Cemeteries  of  Etruria,  ii.    33).     The   merchants  would  have  been  at  the  fai 
which  seems  to  have  accompanied  the  meeting  of  the  congress,  like  that  at  tl: 
lucus  Feroniae  and  other  places. 


VII  THE  LAST  WAR  WITH  VEH  83 

by  Gauls,   but  a  new  enemy  had  appeared.      We  do  not  know  at   The 
what  age  the  Samnites  arrived  in   Italy.      But  this  powerful  branch  Sammtes 
of  the  Sabellian  stock  1  had  long  occupied  the  central  district  touch-  ^f^^^^ans  ^ 
ing  on  the  shore  of  the  Adriatic  between  the  rivers  Atarnus  and  inEtruria. 
Frento,  and  was  now  pushing  down  from  the  mountainous  district 
of  the  centre  into  the  fruitful  plains  to  the  west,    supplanting  the 
Etruscans  in  their  ancient  settlements  in  Campania.      In  423  they 
took  Capua,  then  called  Volternum ;    and  before  long  became  the 
dominant  race  in  that   district.       Thus   the    Etruscans   were   being 
assailed  on  all  sides.      It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  in  the  last 
contest  with  Rome,  the  Veientines  found  themselves  left  for  the  most 
part  to  fight  alone. 

The  immediate  cause  of  this  final  war  is  not  very  plain.     The  The  causes 
twenty  years'    truce    was    expiring,    and  the    Romans   accused  the  of  the  last 
Veientines  of  predatory  acts  in  their  territory  ;  and,  finally,  of  a  con-  "^^^^ 
tumacious  answer  to  ambassadors  sent  to  demand  restitution.      We  aqcIjoS. 
may  assume  that  the  pretext  for  war  was  of  this  nature.      But  doubt- 
less the  growing  strength  of  the  Roman  arms,  trained  in  the  frequent 
struggles  with  the  Volscian  and  the  Aequian,  from  which  the  Republic 
had   on  the  whole  emerged  with  extended  territory  and  widening 
reputation,  inspired  the  people  with  the  courage  and  determination 
for  a  more  continuous  effort.     And  when  to  this  were  added  distraction 
and   decadence  in  Etruria,  the  Romans  may  naturally  have  thought 
that  the  time  was  come  to  strike  a  decisive  blow  at  the  existence  of 
their  inveterate  enemy. 

War  was   declared   in   405,   and  in  the  next  year  the  siege  was   The  siege  of 

begun.       The   fact   of   Veii   thus   acting   entirely   on   the   defensive    Veti  begun, 

instead  of  making,  as  of  old,  incursions  into  the  Roman  territory,  is  a  ^^^' 

proof  of  the  change  in  the  relative  power  of  the  two  which  the  last 

twenty  years  had  brought  about.      At  first  the  siege  was  carried  on   The  siege 

languidly  :  there  was  a  war  at  the  same  time  with  the  Volscians,  and  ^^^^  carried 

the   attention    of  the    Romans   was    divided.       But,    the    Volscians  ^^.  ^^ 

.'  vigour  at 

defeated,  they  were  able  from  the  second  year  of  the  siege  (403)  to  con-  jifst. 

centrate  their  whole  force  upon  the  doomed  city. 

Still  the  siege  dragged  on  without  much  hope  ;  and  though  the  The  people 

Etruscan  League  had  refused  assistance,  partly  because  a  revolution  of  Falerii, 

in  Veii  itself  had  established  a  king  unacceptable  to  the  other  cities,   ^^P^^' 

yet  the  apparent  ill  success   of  the   Roman   arms,  and  perhaps  the  quinii  send 

fear  of  being  themselves   the   next   object   of  attack,   induced   the  some  help 

people  of  Falerii,   Capena,   and  Tarquinii  to  make  some  not  very  io  Veii, 

effective   efforts  to  relieve  the  beleaguered   town   (402-401);    and  ♦>*5'7' 

later  still  the  League  in  its  annual  meeting,  though  still  declining 

^  See  p.  12,  note. 


84 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


The 

Romans 
retaliate  on 
Falerii  and 
Capena, 
397-39^- 


formal  help,  authorised  the  raising  of  volunteers  from  the  cities  in 
Etruria. 

The  Romans  were  now  obliged  to  extend  their  operations  to  the 
territories  of  Falerii  and  Capena,  in  order  to  prevent  farther  relief 
being  sent  to  Veii ;  and  in  doing  this  suffered  some  severe  losses. 
At  the  same  time  renewed  trouble  with  the  Volscians  compelled  them 
to  retake  Anxur,  which  had  fallen  shortly  before  the  siege  of 
Veii,  but  had  since  revolted  or  been  recaptured  by  the  Volscians. 
These  various  distractions  may  well  account  both  for  the  long 
resistance  of  Veii,  and  the  general  slackness  in  maintaining  the 
blockade  and  in  the  discipline  of  the  Roman  camp. 

Nor  was  its  continuance  without  more  enduring  effects  on  the 
Roman  state.  The  first  step  towards  creating  a  military  class,  and 
changing  the  citizen,  who  armed  for  the  summer  excursion  to  protect 
his  homestead,  into  the  professional  soldier,  had  been  taken  when 
during  the  siege  of  Anxur,  in  406,  pay  for  the  men  serving  in  the 
ranks  had  been  decreed.  But  it  was  yet  a  farther  step  when,  during 
the  siege  of  Veii,  the  Roman  soldier  for  the  first  time  spent  the 
winter  in  camp  instead  of  returning  to  his  farm  or  business.  Men 
who  had  been  for  several  years  absent  from  their  ordinary  homes 
and  occupations  would  never  return  to  them  quite  the  same  in  spirit 
or  in  habits,  and  there  must  soon  have  been  some  who  began  to  look 
to  the  army,  not  as  the  occasional  sphere  of  a  citizen's  duty,  but  as 
the  calling  of  the  greater  part  of  their  life. 

Again,  the  long  continuance  in  camp  of  a  large  army  drawing  pay 
must  have  increased  the  burden  of  the  tributurn;  for  during  the  siege 
of  Veii  the  cavalry  also  began  to  receive  pay  beyond  the  ordinary 
allowance  for  the  public  horse.  Heavy  taxation  is  a  sure  prelude  to 
civil  discontent ;  and  it  was  natural  therefore  that  the  plebeians,  who 
felt  its  weight,  should  press  for  a  larger  share  in  the  government. 
Accordingly  we  find  that  now  they  at  length  succeed  in  securing  one 
or  more  places  among  the  consular  tribunes  for  men  of  their  order 
to  which  they  had  all  along  been  eligible.  It  was  inevitable  indeed 
that  a  long  war,  with  frequent  variations  of  success  and  failure, 
should  test  the  hold  of  the  patriciate  upon  the  chief  administration 
of  affairs.  Three  hundred  years  later  the  nobles  failed  under  such 
a  test  in  the  lugurthine  war.  But  as  yet  corruption  had  not 
seriously  weakened  them.  They  were  roused  to  fresh  exertions : 
they  selected  their  best  and  most  distinguished  men  for  the  service 
of  the  State  :  and  at  length  the  undertaking  was  accomplished  by  one 
of  their  most  haughty  and  unpopular  champions,  Marcus  Furius 
Camillus. 

Lastly,  the  long  continuance  of  the  siege  gave  rise,  as  is  the  case 
almost  throughout  Roman  history,  to  frequent  reports  of  prodigies. 


THE  ALBAN  LAKE  85 


The  most  remarkable  was  the  sudden  rise  in  the  level  of  the  Alban  The  rise  in 
lake,  threatening  a  dangerous  inundation  in  the  Campagna,  where  the  Alban 
many  Romans  had  farms  (398).  Flood  and  pestilence,  with  both  of  '^  ^'  39  ■ 
which  the  Romans  were  only  too  familiar,  were  regarded  as  direct  signs 
of  divine  displeasure.  In  this  case  the  rise  of  water  seemed  more 
alarming  because  there  had  been  no  unusual  rainfall  to  account  for 
it.  Yet  Livy  reports  the  previous  year  to  have  been  marked  by  a 
great  frost  and  heavy  snow  :  there  was,  therefore,  a  simple  explanation 
of  the  phenomenon,  which  would  have  satisfied  a  less  superstitious 
age.  But  a  report  reached  Rome  that  an  old  Etruscan  augur  had 
been  heard  to  say  that  "  The  Romans  would  never  take  Veii  till  an 
outlet  had  been  made  for  the  waters  of  the  Alban  lake."  The  old 
man  was  captured  and  brought  to  Rome,  where  he  declared  that  it 
was  written  in  the  Etruscan  books  that  "  the  gods  would  not  depart 
from  Veii  until,  the  Alban  lake  being  swollen,  its  waters  were 
drained  off  by  the  Romans."  It  was  thereupon  resolved  in  the 
Senate  to  consult  the  oracle  at  Delphi.  The  answer  of  the  Pythia 
confirmed  the  Etruscan,  and  with  rather  more  directness  than  usual 
ordered  the  Romans  to  drain  the  Alban  lake,  and  promised  success 
against  their  enemy  when  they  had  done  it. 

It  is  useless,  in  view  of  the  habits  of  antiquity  in  regard  to  such   Theanswer 
things,  to  object  to  the  story  that  the  Alban  lake  had  nothing  to  do  of  the 
with   Veii.      The    Pythia  was   asked  for  advice  as  to  a  threatened     -^ 
flood,  and  very  sensibly  answered  "  drain  the  lake."     The  contingent 
promise  of  success  in  war  was  as  usual  founded  on  information  which 
the  priests  at  Delphi  always  took  care  to  possess,  and  was  sufficiently 
vague  to  save  the  credit  of  the  oracle,  whatever  might  happen  at  Veii. 

But  in  fact  it  is  not  improbable  that  the  work  done  at  the  Alban  The  outlet 
lake  had  an  effect  on  the  Roman  success.  Whether  in  obedience  to  ^£ 
the  oracle  or  no,  the  great  work  was  accomplished,  which  seems  cer-  ^^^^ 
tainly  to  belong  to  this  age.  The  emissarium  of  the  lake  is  a  subter- 
ranean channel,  bored  through  the  tufa  rock,  1509  yards  long,  varying 
in  height  from  five  to  ten  feet,  in  breadth  averaging  from  three  to  four 
feet,  and  giving  a  fall  for  the  water  of  about  sixteen  feet.  It  conducts  the 
water  of  the  lake  into  a  small  stream  about  a  mile  from  Albano,  which 
flows  into  the  Tiber.  It  is  a  work  of  astonishing  engineering  skill 
for  this  age,  though  the  great  cloacae  show  that  there  were  already 
among  the  Romans  men  capable  of  dealing  with  subterranean  struc- 
tures on  a  large  scale  ;  and  already  Fidenae  was  said  to  have  been 
taken  by  means  of  a  tunnel  or  mine.  But  this  work  at  the  Alban 
lake  is  far  above  anything  yet  done.  It  involved  not  only  the  long 
boring  through  the  rock,  but  the  cutting  of  great  perpendicular  shafts 
for  the  admission  of  air  {spiracula\  traces  of  which  can  still  be  seen. 
No  doubt  much  experience  of  tunnelling  had  been  gained  in  mining 


86 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Capture  of 
Veil,  B.C. 
395- 


M.  Furius 
Camillus 
takes  com- 
mand at 
Veil. 


for  metals  ;  and  this  method  of  capturing  towns  was  well  known  in 
Greece,  and  was  afterwards  frequently  employed  by  the  Romans.  ^ 
Still,  if  the  Alban  emissariujii  is  of  this  age,  as  there  seems  every 
reason  to  believe,  we  may  say  either  that  the  experience  gained  in 
making  it  may  have  helped  the  sappers  at  Veii,  or  that  its  construc- 
tion at  least  shows  that  there  were  men  at  Rome  capable  of  making 
the  tunnel  described. 

Veii  at  any  rate  was  certainly  taken  ;  and  the  story  of  its  capture, 
handed  down  and  believed  by  the  Romans,  was  this,^ 

In  the  tenth  year  of  the  siege, — the  work  at  the  Alban  lake 
having  been  completed, — the  Romans  resolved  on  a  supreme  effort 
to  end  it.  There  was  grave  reason  to  believe  that  affairs  in 
the  camp  were  going  on  ill :  discipline  was  relaxed ;  men  skir- 
mished at  will,  or  held  converse  with  the  enemy ;  and  it  was  clear 
that  some  man  of  authority  and  firmness  must  be  sent  to  take 
command.  Therefore  M.  Furius  Camillus  was  made  dictator,  and 
he  took  P.  Cornelius  as  his  master  of  the  horse  and  went  to  the 
camp  before  Veii.  He  had  already  ravaged  the  territory  of  Falerii 
(400),  and  as  consular  tribune  taken  and  sacked  Capena :  and, 
though  he  seems  to  have  been  unpopular  with  the  plebs,  he  had  great 
qualities  as  a  leader.  No  sooner  did  he  take  the  command  than  a 
change  came  over  the  Roman  army.  There  was  a  new  spirit  in  the 
men.  Discipline  was  enforced  with  rigour  ;  those  who  had  fled  in 
the  presence  of  the  enemy  were  visited  with  military  punishment ; 
new  soldiers  were  enrolled,  and  auxiliaries  obtained  from  the  Latins 
and  Hernicans.  Having  defeated  the  forces  of  Capena  and  Falerii, 
who  were  still  watching  for  an  opportunity  of  relieving  Veii,  he 
strengthened  the  lines  by  the  erection  of  new  towers  at  less  distance 
from  each  other,  and  strictly  prohibited  unauthorised  skirmishing 
between  them  and  the  city  walls.  But  above  all  he  pressed  on  the 
working  of  a  great  mine  or  tunnel  which  was  to  open  a  way  on  to  the 


1  Aeneas  Tacticus,  xxxvii.  ;  Polyb.  xxi.  28. 

2  To  regard  Livy's  story  as  historical  up  to  397,  and  then  to  attribute  the 
rest  to  a  "  poem,"  is  at  any  rate  an  arbitrary  assumption.  Nothing  can  be  more 
rationalistic  than  Livy's  account  ;  he  disavows  behef  in  the  dramatic  story  of 
the  sudden  interruption  of  the  Alban  sacrifice,  and  of  the  voice  from  Juno's  statue. 
Nothing  else  is  impossible  or  unlikely  in  the  narrative.  The  influence  of  a  good 
disciplinarian  and  active  man  in  the  disordered  camp,  the  added  energy  which 
just  sufficed  to  accomplish  a  work  which  had  been  long  preparing,  are  natural 
circumstances.  The  emissarium  in  the  Alban  lake  is  a  stubborn  fact  which 
cannot  be  attributed  to  a  "  Furian  poem"  or  be  assigned  with  better  reason  to 
another  age  than  to  this.  Appeals  to  oracles,  irrational  to  us,  were  not  so  to  a 
Roman  ;  and  the  Pythia  frequently  mentions  subjects  in  her  answer  which  were 
either  not  asked,  or  seemed  totally  disconnected.  Finally,  there  is  precisely  the 
same  reason,  neither  more  nor  less,  to  believe  Livy  in  this  story  as  in  all  the  early 
history. 


VII  THE  FALL  OF  VEII  87 

citadel.  Six  relays  of  sappers  digging  for  six  hours  each  carried  on 
the  work  day  and  night,  until  the  surface  was  reached  near  the 
temple  of  Juno.  Then  Camillus,  having  first  vowed  a  tenth  of  the 
spoil  to  Apollo  of  Delphi,  ordered  an  assault  to  be  made  on  several 
parts  of  the  wall  at  once,  that  the  besieged  garrison  might  all  be 
drawn  away  from  the  citadel ;  while  he  led  a  picked  company  of 
men  through  the  tunnel,  who,  springing  through  the  orifice,  charged 
down  upon  the  defenders,  set  fire  to  some  of  the  houses,  and  burst 
opQn  the  city  gates,  through  which  the  Roman  army  entered.  Veil 
was  at  last  taken,  and  a  scene  of  wild  disorder  and  carnage  followed, 
until  Camillus  proclaimed  that  the  unarmed  should  be  spared.  The 
inhabitants  surrendered,  and  the  soldiers  were  allowed  to  help  them- 
selves to  the  spoil.  Next  day  the  captive  Veientines  were  sold  by 
auction  and  their  price  paid  into  the  treasury.  Thus  the  long 
struggle  with  Veii,  almost  coeval  with  the  rise  of  the  city  of  Rome, 
was  once  and  for  all  laid  to  rest. 

The  city  itself  does  not  appear  to  have  been  destroyed  ;  and  its  ^-^^  Pf[*^ 
size  and  the  excellence  of  its  position  were  so  conspicuous,  that  both  '^  ^"" 
before  and  after  the  capture  of  Rome  by  the  Gauls  serious  pro- 
positions were  mooted  for  transferring  the  chief  seat  of  the  Roman 
people  to  it.  These  propositions,  however,  having  been  defeated,  it 
gradually  dwindled  away  :  and  its  materials  were  so  constantly  carted 
off  for  other  buildings,  that  in  the  time  of  Augustus  it  was  utterly 
desolate,  and  within  a  century  after  the  Christian  era,  its  very  site 
was  a  matter  of  dispute. 

Two  tales  connected  with  the  fall  of  Veii  were  told  by  some,  both 
of  them  regarded  by  Livy  as  fabulous. 

When  the   Roman  soldiers,  it  was  said,  came  to  the  mouth  of  The  inter- 
their  tunnel,  they  could  hear  just  above  them  an  haruspex,  attending  ^"/^f^ 
a  sacrifice  which  was  being  offered  by  the  Veientine  king,  declare         -^ 
that  the  victory  would  be  his  who  should  complete  the  sacrifice  by 
duly  cutting  the  entrails.      At  the  word  the  Roman  soldiers  started 
out  of  the  earth,  seized  the  entrails,  and  carried  them  to  the  dictator, 
who  at  once  performed  the  ceremonial  act,  and  was  thus  pointed  out 
by  Heaven  as  the  victor. 

Again,  it  was  said,  when  It  had  been  determined  to  remove  the  The  statue 
statue  of  Juno  to  Rome,  certain  young  men  clothed  in  white,  and  rfjuno. 
with  bodies  duly  purified,  entered  her  temple  at  Veii.  For  a  while 
they  hesitated  in  awe  of  the  divine  figure  ;  until  one  of  them  in  jest 
or  earnest  ventured  to  say,  "  Wilt  thou  go  to  Rome,  Juno  ? "  Then 
a  voice  was  heard  to  say  distinctly  "  I  will."  And  when  they  came  to 
move  the  statue,  behold  it  seemed  light  and  easy  to  bear,  as  though 
the  goddess  herself  were  marching  along  with  them.  So  they  bore 
her  to  Rome,  and  a  temple  was  built  for  her  by  Camillus  on  the 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP.   VII 


Camillus. 


Aventine.  Thus  did  legend  set  forth  the  ancient  faith  that  the  gods 
themselves  deserted  a  captured  city  and  clave  to  the  victorious  cause.^ 
Triumphof  Camillus  was  allowed  a  triumph,  and  celebrated  his  victory  by 
dedicating  a  temple  of  Juno  and  the  Mater  Matuta.  The  tenth  of 
the  spoil  vowed  to  Apollo  was  obtained  by  allowing  those  who  had 
it,  and  who  wished  to  relieve  themselves  from  the  religious  obligation, 
to  estimate  their  own  share  and  contribute  a  tenth.  A  gold  bowl 
was  then  made  and  sent  off  to  Delphi,  was  captured  by  pirates  of 
the  Lipari  Islands,  but  piously  restored  by  them  to  the  god. 

The  immediate  result  to  Rome  of  the  fall  of  Veii  was  a  rapid 
extension  of  her  influence  in  Etruria.  On  the  same  day,  according 
to  a  good  tradition,  the  Gauls  took  the  great  Etruscan  town  of 
Melpum  :  ^  and  this  perhaps  gave  Rome  still  greater  opportunities  of 
gaining  a  hold  in  Etruria,  either  as  conqueror  or  protector.  In  393 
Falerii,  the  next  most  powerful  town  of  southern  Etruria,  yielded  to 
the  arms  of  Camillus.  It  was  said  that  its  surrender  was  made  in 
admiration  of  his  good  faith.  For  when  a  certain  schoolmaster,  in 
charge  of  the  sons  of  Faliscan  nobles,  brought  his  pupils  to  Camillus 
as  hostages,  he  ordered  the  traitor's  hands  to  be  tied  behind  him,  and 
giving  the  boys  rods,  bade  them  drive  him  back  to  the  town.  Yet  we 
may  be  sure  that  the  Faliscans  would  not  have  submitted  to  a  large 
war-indemnity  had  they  thought  themselves  able  to  resist. 

Early  in  390  Volsinii  was  also  subdued,  whose  people  had  the 
year  before  invaded  Roman  territory ;  and  finally  the  capture  of 
Sutrium  made  the  Romans  masters  of  all  Etruria  south  of  the  Ciminian 
forest,  and  her  influence  in  the  country  was  shown,  fatally  to  herself, 
in  the  appeal  for  help  from  Clusium  against  the  Gauls. 


Results  of 
the  fall  of 
Veii. 

The  Gauls 
take  Mel- 
pum. 

Falerii. 


^  When  Lucan  wrote  victrix  causa  diis placuit,  he  was  enunciating  a  very  old 
belief,  more  perhaps  Greek  than  Roman.  Thus  the  goddess  Athene  was  believed 
to  have  deserted  the  Acropolis  when  the  Persian  was  coming  (Herod,  viii.  41)  ; 
Aeschylus  told  the  same  tale  of  Thebes  {S.  c.  Th.  207)  ;  Vergil  imitated  him  in 
regard  to  Troy  [Aen.  ii.  351)  ;  and  later  on  Tacitus  tells  us  how,  on  the  firing  of 
the  Temple  of  Jerusalem,  audita  major  humana  vox  Excedere  Deos  ;  simul 
ingens  motus  excedentium  {H.  v.  13).  The  reason,  says  Euripides,  is,  that  in  a 
desolate  city  the  gods  do  not  get  their  due  of  sacrifice  [Troad.  23). 

2  Its  situation  is  unknown,  the  neighbourhood  of  Milan  is  the  most  general 
conjecture. 


Authorities. — The  fall  of  the  Fabii  is  described  by  Livy  (ii.  48-50) 
Dionysius  (ix.  19-22)  ;  Diodorus  (xi.  53).  The  subsequent  dealings  with  Veii 
are  also  found  in  Livy  (iii.-iv. )  and  in  Dionysius  (ix.  36).  The  siege  and  fall  in  Livy 
iv.  61-V.  1-23  ;  Dionysius  xii.  fr.  8-21  ;  Plutarch,  Life  of  Camillus  ;  Florus  i.  12; 
Eutropius  i.  19;  Zonaras  vii.  20-21.  A  few  details  of  little  importance  in  Appian,, 
Res  It  a  I.  fr.  vi  -viii. 


CHAPTER    VIII 

CONSTITUTIONAL    HISTORY    FROM    509    TO    390 

The  early  Republican  government  founded  on  that  of  the  kings — Consuls, 
quaestors,  and  people — Effect  of  Servian  reforms — Disabilities  of  the  plebs — ■ 
Roman  civitas — Laws  and  Patria  Potestas — Perduellio  and  quaestiones — 
Provocatio — Other  laws  of  Poplicola — The  ownership  of  land — Law  of  debt — 
The  nexi — Appius  Claudius  refuses  relief  to  the  nexi — Secession  to  the  Sacred 
Mount — Tribunes  of  the  plebs  appointed  :  their  powers,  duties,  number,  and 
manner  of  election — Aediles  and  their  duties — Agrarian  law  of  Spurius  Cassius  : 
his  impeachment  and  death  (485) — Lex  Publilia  Voleronis  {471) — Proposal 
by  Terentilius  to  limit  and  define  the  power  of  the  consuls — The  embassy  to 
Greece  (453) — The  first  decemvirate  (451) — The  ten  tables — The  second 
decemvirate  (450) — Change  in  policy  of  Appius  Claudius — The  two  new  tables — 
Murder  of  Sicinius  and  story  of  Virginia — Decemvirs  deposed  and  consuls  and 
tribunes  elected — Valerio-Horatian  laws — Their  effects — The  laws  of  the  twelve 
tables  —  The  lex  Canuleia  (445)  —  Tribuni  militares  consulari  potestate  — 
Appointment  of  censors — Increase  of  poverty — Murder  of  Spurius  Maelius 
(439) — The  four  quaestorships  open  to  plebeians  (421) — Exile  of  Camillus — 
The  tribunes  in  the  Senate — The  Gallic  invasion — Summary  of  laws. 

The  abolition    of  royalty  did  not  at  first  change  the  principles  on   ^-^^  ^^«- 
which  the  government  was  administered.      But  what  had  been  done  "[ff^  ^°^' 
by  one  man  elected  for  life  was  now  to  be  done  by  two  elected  for  a  tors") 
year.     The  two  yearly  magistrates,  at  first  apparently  called  praetors, 1  take  the 
but    afterwards    consuls,    occupied    the    place    and    performed    the  place  of 
functions,  civil  and  religious,  of  the  king,  except  special  sacred  rites  ^^^  ^^^^' 
for  which  a  "  king  "  was  held  to  be  imperatively  required,  and  which 
were  therefore  delegated  to  a  rex  sacroruin.     As  the  king  had  been 
irremovable  for  life,  so  were  they  for  a  year.      Like  him  they  were 
supreme  judges,  commanders-in-chief  of  the  army,  representatives  of 

1  The  name  given  to  the  headquarters  in  a  Roman  camp,  praetorium,  among 
other  things,  confirms  this.  Zonaras  (vii.  19)  says  that  the  name  constil  was  not 
used  until  after  the  decemvirate  (449),  and  Livy  (iii.  55)  seems  to  agree  with  him. 
Still  all  Greek  and  Roman  writers,  from  the  habit  of  their  own  time,  agree  in 
speaking  of  them  as  ^tco-toi.  and  "consuls,"  and  it  will  be  most  convenient  to 
follow  their  example. 


fe 


90 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


The 
quaestors. 


The  people 


Effect  of 
Servian 
reforms. 


the  State  before  foreign  governments.  Like  him  they  were  assisted 
by  a  council  of  "  fathers,"  whom  they  alone  summoned,  and  whose 
advice  they  were  not  bound  to  take.  As  a  symbol  of  this  supreme  but 
divided  power  each  was  preceded  in  turn  by  twelve  lictors  with  fasces 
and  axes,  and  each  sat  in  the  curule  chair. 

The  only  other  regular  officials  were  the  quaestors  or  quaesitores. 
Originally  charged  with  the  duty  of  tracking  crime  (or  perhaps  only 
murder)  and  bringing  the  offenders  to  justice,  they  were  soon  after 
the  expulsion  of  the  kings,  if  not  before,  farther  charged  with  the 
care  of  the  State  finances  and  treasury,  and  gradually  lost  their 
judicial  functions. 

The  people,  thus  governed,  were  divided  broadly  into  two  bodies. 
First,  those  who  belonged  to  the  gentes,  of  which  there  were  about  fifty, 
and  their  clients,^  who,  without  being  actually  members  of  the  gentes, 
were  closely  connected  with  them  {^gentilicii  though  not  ge7itiles\ 
and  seem  to  have  voted  in  the  thirty  curiae  into  which  the  gentes 
were  divided.  Secondly,  those  who  had  settled  in  Rome  for  any 
reason  without  being  members  of  the  gentes,  who  were  reckoned  as 
denizens  {incolae)  and  not  full  citizens.  These  men  formed  the  plebs 
or  multitude,  were  not  counted  in  the  curiae,  and  originally  were  not 
liable  to  the  tribtctum  or  military  service. 

The  Servian  reforms  had  included  both  these  classes  in  a  two- 
fold division  :  one  local  into  tribes, ^  the  other  military  into  1 93 
centuries.  From  that  time  all,  except  the  one  century  below  the 
fifth  class  possessing  property  of  less  value  than  12,500  asses,  were 
obliged  to  pay  the  trzbutum^  and  to  serve  in  the  army,  and  to  supply 
themselves  with  arms  according  to  the  class  to  which  their  century 
belonged.      All  alike,  even  the  one  century  of  capita  ce?tst,  were  in- 

^  Whatever  may  be  the  origin  of  the  clients — a  subject  of  great  difficulty — we 
may  note  certain  facts  :  (i)  The  clients  were  not  the  same  as  the  plebeians,  and 
are  constantly  represented  as  acting  with  their  patrons  against  them.  (2)  A  client 
{k\tl)€lv  "to  hear")  owed  certain  duties  of  respect  and  practical  service,  both  in 
war  and  money,  to  his  patronus,  and  the  patronus  in  his  turn  owed  his  client  pro- 
tection, especially  as  his  representative  in  a  court  of  justice,  and  this  obligation 
was  a  most  solemn  and  religious  one.  (3)  That  though  the  institution  was  com- 
mon in  Greek  states,  the  Roman  clientela  differed  from  others  in  being  hereditary. 
(4)  Though  the  clients  were  not  "  plebeii "  yet  there  must  have  been  a  tendency  to 
recruit  their  numbers  from  the  plebeians,  and  for  them  to  become  merged  again 
in  plebeians  on  the  extinction  of  gentes. 

2  The  four  city  tribes  are  universally  attributed  to   the   "Servian"    reform.! 
Whether  the    "rustic  tribes"  were  also  formed   at   the   same   time,   and  after/ 
wards  fell  into  abeyance  owing  to  a  loss  of  territory,  is  a  vexed  question.      AJ 
any  rate  at  the  beginning  of  the  Republic  the   seventeen  rustic  tribes  existedj 
called  by  the  names  of  certain  of  the  patrician  gentes.      These  twenty-one  tribe 
(the  four  city  tribes  always  remaining  unchanged)  were  raised  to  twenty-five  \i 
387  ;  to  twenty-seven  in  358  ;  to  twenty-nine  in  332  ;  to  thirty-five  in  241.     Afte 
this  their  number  was  never  increased,  and  they  later  on  ceased  to  be  local. 


VIII  DISABILITIES  OF  THE  PLEBEIANS  91 

eluded  in  the  tribes,  that  a  census  might  be  taken  of  their  numbers 
and   property.     By  these  means  the  whole  of  the   inhabitants  had 
been  welded  together,  and  may  all  be  called  citizens  {cives),  though  Cives. 
not  with  equal  rights. 

The  military  division  into  centuries  presently  became  a  civil  one   The  civil 
also,  by  means  of  which  all  voted  in  elections  and  on  laws  ;  and  the  disabilities 
tribal  division  still  later  resulted  in  making  the  influence  of  the  mass  ?^^^^!^-^„j 
of  citizens  a  reality.      But  for  a  long  while  anything  like  equality  was 
prevented  in  several  ways  : 

First,  the  number   of   centuries  assigned  to   the   highest   class.    The 
which  consisted  of  the  few  wealthy,  practically  left  the  decision  on  "^^^li^y 
all  questions  to  them  ;  and  therefore  not  only  did  the  plebeians,  who  ^^^g^^^iHa 
were  generally  the  less  wealthy,  not  really  attain  substantial  power 
in  the  comttia  centuriata^  but  the  gentilicii  probably  had  less  than 
they  had  formerly  exercised  in  the  coinitia  curiata. 

Secondly,  the  coinitia  curiata^  in  which  plebeians  had  no  share.    The 
still  claimed  and  exercised  the  right  of  conferring  imperium.  impenum. 

Thirdly,  though  all  the  people  voted  for  magistrates,  plebeians   The  con- 
were  excluded  from   the  consulship,  on   the   religious   ground   that  •^"'■^^^/• 
patricians  alone  could  take  the  auspices. 

Fourthly,  the  patricians  claimed  that  they  alone  could  contract  No 
religious  marriage  {conubiujn),  and  therefore  alone  could  have  children  conubium. 
possessed  of  full  civil  rights  {cives  optima  jure).  The  marriage  of 
plebeians,  a  union  with  women  that  they  might  be  mothers  {matri- 
mo7iiu7n),  did  not  produce  such  children.  Therefore  there  could  be 
no  legal  marriage  between  patrician  and  plebeian,  the  one  party  to 
it  being  incapable  of  fulfilling  the  conditions. 

Thus  we  have  a  body  of  citizens  with  certain  common  rights  and 
common  burdens,  but  marked  off  as  to  other  rights  by  two  distinctions, 
one  between  rich  and  poor  in  practice,  and  another  in  theory  and 
practice  alike  between  patrician  and  plebeian.     That  is,  the  Roman   The  full 
civitas^  to  use  a  later  definition,    was  composed  of  two   classes  of  rights  of 
rights  {jura):  (i)  public — the  right   of  voting  {jus  suffragii),  the  ^°^^^"- 
right  of  holding  office  {jus  honoruvi)^  the  right  of  appeal  against  a 
magistrate  {jus  provocatioiiis)  ;   (2)  private — the  right  of  trading  {jus 
comi7iercii\  the  right  of  contracting  a  full  and  religious  marriage  {jus 
contibii).      Of  these  the  plebeians  possessed  \\\&  jus  st(ffragii,  though, 
I  if  poor,  their  vote  went  for  very  little,  the  jus  provocationis,  and  the 
j  jus  connnercii.,  but  not  the  jus  hoizorum  or  jus  conubii. 

The  early  constitutional  history  of  Rome  is  the  history  of  the  amal-  Patrician 
gamation  of  these  two  orders  till  the  distinction  became  unimportant,   and ple- 
and,  in  so  far  as  it  still  existed,  was  practically  in  favour  of  the  lower    ^.^^'^'  ^^ 
I  order.      But  the  struggles  which  led  to  this  were  continually  involved  poor. 
I  with  the  inevitable  and  more  lasting  struggle  between  rich  and  poor. 


92  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap. 

The  two  react  upon  each  other,  are  sometimes  mistaken  for  each 
other,  and  each  lends  to  the  other  its  pecuHar  bitterness. 
Up  to  4^1  Among  an  industrial  people  the  struggle  for  a  share  in  the  privi- 

isaouimt  ^  ^^8"^^  °^  office,  and  especially  unpaid  office,  as  the  Roman  honor  was, 
the  %ws  of  is  not  the  first  which  engages  attention.  Personal  hardships,  exces- 
debt,  sive  charges  on  the  fruits  of  labour,  personal  tyranny  on  the  part  of 

those  who  for  any  reason  have  a  hold  upon  them — these  are  the 
grievances  which  it  is  the  first  instinct  of  a  people  to  remove ;  it  is 
only  when  they  see  that  they  are  caused  or  maintained  by  inequality 
of  civil  rights  that  they  begin  to  strike  for  their  removal.  Accordingly, 
up  to  471  we  find  that  the  struggles  of  the  plebeians  are  not  for 
privilege,  but  for  protection  against  harsh  government,  especially 
against  the  consequences  of  poverty  and  debt. 
Leges  Whether  there  was  any  written  code  of  law  in  existence  at  the 

regiae.  ^^^  ^^  ^^^  regal  period  is  a  question  of  great  difficulty.      Livy  speaks 

of  some  royal  laws  extant  in  his  time ;  and  a  collection  of  them 
was  made  by  a  certain  Sextus  Papirius,  believed  to  have  lived  in  the 
time  of  Tarquinius  Superbus.^  But  none  have  come  down  to  us  on 
good  authority.  It  seems  likely  that  the  king  administered  justice 
rather  according  to  customs  {inores)  than  by  written  laws.  Much 
of  what  we  should  look  for  in  a  criminal  and  even  in  a  civil  code  was 
rendered  unnecessary  by  the  complete  power,  extending  to  enslave- 
ment or  death,  possessed  by  the  paterfamilias  over  all  members  of 
his  family,  including  wife,  natural  or  adopted  children,  grandchildren, 
and  wives  of  sons — a  system  saved  from  great  abuse  by  the  obliga- 
tion to  decide  on  each  case  in  a  "council"  of  relations.  Local 
government  in  \\\&  pagi  or  country  districts  also  seems  to  have  existed 
early,  and  trade  disputes  were  often  settled  by  arbitration.  Crimes 
against  the  State  were  judged  by  the  king  or  those  appointed  by 
him  for  the  occasion.  They  may  be  summed  up  in  the  term 
perduellio  or  act  of  "  hostility,"  by  which  may  be  indicated  almost 
any  act  likely  to  damage  the  community.  Under  the  Republic 
such  crimes  were  at  first  judged  by  the  comitia^  but  presently  by 
committees  {quaestiones)  of  the  sovereign  people  appointed  for  the 
particular  case.^  Against  hardship  from  judicial  decisions  or  edicts 
of  a  magistrate  individuals  were  protected  by  the  right  of  appealing 
{provocatio)  to  the  comitia  from  his  sentence.  Hence  the  consul, 
except  when  in  command  of  the  army  out  of  Rome,  ceased  to  decide 
capital  charges  or  inflict  summary  punishment.  That  was  only  done 
after  trial  by  the  whole  people  as  represented  by  such  committees. 
We  have  seen  that  this  right  of  appeal  appears  to  have  existed 

^  Pomponius  §  2.     Livy  vi.  i. 

2  No  standing  committee  assigned  to  a  special  class  of  crimes  was  established 
till  149  by  the  lex  Calpurnia  de  repetundis. 


Patria 
potestas. 


VIII  THE  TENURE  OF  LAND  93 

in   an   imperfect   form  under  the  kings.       The    earliest  legislation 
attributed    to    Republican  times  was  the  lex   Valeria^  proposed  by  Lex  Val- 
Valerius  Poplicola,  which  secured  this  right  against  the  sentence  of  ^''^'^>  509- 
the    consul ;   though   another  law  of  the  same  Valerius  appears  to  ^°  ' 
have  excepted  those  who  attempted  to  obtain  kingly  power.      The 
Valerian  law  was  re-enacted  with  heavier  penalties  on  more  than 
one  occasion,^  extended   to  citizens   outside  the   mile   radius   from 
Rome  (to  which  it  was  originally  confined),   and   eventually  saved 
Roman    citizens    altogether    from    the    penalty    of    flogging    before 
execution.      These  laws,  however,  did  not  prevent  the  infliction  of 
death,  without  appeal,   by  the  commander  of  an  army,  though  the 
third  lex  Porcia  (184)  forbade  the  scourging  of  citizen-soldiers  with 
the  cat  or  rods  {verbera  or  virgae). 

Next  to  personal  security  the  most  important  thing  to  a  nation  Land- 
of  farmers  was  the  tenure  of  land.  A  law  of  Poplicola  had  secured  o^^ners. 
free  markets  by  the  abolition  of  market  dues  {portorid)  for  citizens. 
But  this  would  not  be  sufficient  without  equitable  arrangements  as 
to  the  ownership  of  the  land  itself.  Whether  it  is  true  or  not  that  at 
first  all  land  was  held  in  common  by  a  gens,  it  seems  certain  that 
at  the  beginning  of  the  Republic  private  ownership  existed.  The 
State,  however,  retained  certain  lands  in  its  own  power,  which  were 
increased  from  time  to  time  by  territories  of  conquered  cities.  This 
land  was  treated  in  one  of  three  ways.  It  was  either  granted  in 
allotments  to  needy  citizens,  or  was  let  on  lease  to  possessores,  or 
was  retained  as  common  pasture.  In  the  last  two  cases  it  was 
called  ager  piiblicus.  Various  grievances  arose  regarding  both 
classes  of  land.  Allotments  averaged  seven  jugera  (about  4|  acres), 
and  were  barely  sufficient  to  maintain  a  family.  Consequently  loss 
or  misfortune  frequently  compelled  the  sale  of  such  farms,  which 
had  a  tendency  to  accumulate  in  fewer  hands,  while  the  numbers  of 
the  landless  and  discontented  increased.  Again,  the  rich  man 
frequently  treated  the  portion  of  the  ager  publicus  leased  from  the 
State  as  his  freehold,  inalienable  and  incapable  of  redivision  ;  or, 
in  the  parts  kept  as  public  pasture,  fed  more  sheep  and  oxen  than 
he  was  entitled  to  do.  The  poorer  plebeian,  therefore,  always  strove 
to  have  conquered  lands  divided,  and  not  kept  as  ager  publicus j 
while  the  landless  men,  who  got  allotments  at  a  distance,  were 
inclined  to  regard  their  migration  as  an  almost  equal  grievance.  If 
ithe  rich  men,  they  argued,  had  not  monopolised  the  public  pastures 

H^^  The  Valerio-Horatian  laws  (449)  ordained  that  any  one  who  procured  the 
refection  of  a  magistrate  sine  provocatione  should  be  outlawed.      There  were  on 

this  subject  also  a  lex  Valeria  B.C.  300  (Livy  x.  9) ;  two  leges  Porcine  before  B.C. 
I  184.      None  of  them,  according  to  Cicero  [de  Rep.  ii.  §  54),  added  anything  to 

the  substance  of  the  law,  only  to  the  penalties  attaching  to  a  violation  of  it. 


94 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Debt. 


^95.    Coss. 
Appius 
Claudius, 
P.  Servi- 
lius.      The 


Great  ex- 
citement in 
the  city. 


with  their  herds,  and  treated  the  lands  which  they  leased  at  a 
nominal  rental  as  their  own,  there  would  have  been  enough  land  at 
home  to  divide  among  those  who  had  been  ruined  while  serving 
their  country  in  arms. 

But  though  it  was  bad  enough  to  be  landless,  it  was  far  worse  to 
be  a  prisoner  and  a  slave,  and  the  Roman  law  of  debt  made  many 
men  both.  The  principle  on  which  this  law  or  custom  proceeded 
was  that  a  thing  pledged  as  security  passed  completely  into  the 
power  of  the  mortgagee.  Thus,  when  the  debtor's  property  was 
exhausted,  his  person  was  absolutely  in  the  hands  of  his  creditor. 
He  was  not  yet  a  slave,  but  he  was  nexus.,  and  custom — afterwards, 
no  doubt,  embodied  in  the  laws  of  the  twelve  tables — authorised  his 
creditor  to  load  him  with  chains,  and,  after  a  certain  period,  to  sell 
him  as  a  slave.  It  does  not  appear  that  the  sale  of  a  defaulting 
debtor  was  more  shocking  to  the  sentiment  of  the  day  than  was  im- 
prisonment (often  lifelong)  for  debt  in  recent  times  among  ourselves  ; 
and  the  ancient  writers  aver  that  the  more  brutal  practice,  recognised 
by  the  law  of  the  twelve  tables,  of  several  creditors  dividing  a 
debtor's  body,  was  never  actually  carried  out.  But  the  position  of 
a  ?iexzis,  neither  free  nor  slave,  seems  to  have  been  regarded  as  one 
of  peculiar  hardship  ;  and  at  any  rate  when  the  number  of  citizens  in 
that  position  was  large,  and  the  circumstances  reducing  them  to  it 
such  as  to  appeal  to  sympathy,  the  discontent  became  formidable. 

In  the  year  495  one  of  the  usual  levies  was  required  against  the 
Volscians.  The  Forum  was  filled  with  a  crowd  of  the  discontented 
plebeians,  when  suddenly  one  of  these  unhappy  nexi  appeared, 
clothed  in  rags,  emaciated  and  deadly  pale,  with  long  shaggy  hair 
and  untrimmed  beard.  He  was  recognised  as  one  who  had  served 
as  a  centurion  with  conspicuous  bravery,  and  he  now  pointed  to  the 
scars  of  the  wounds  received  in  the  wars,  and  the  marks  of  scourging 
inflicted  on  him  by  his  cruel  creditors.  He  had  a  pitiful  tale  to  tell. 
His  farm  had  been  ravaged  in  a  Sabine  raid ;  all  his  cattle  had 
been  driven  off  and  his  homestead  burnt ;  he  had  to  borrow  money 
to  pay  the  war-tax  {tributui7i) ;  the  debt  had  accumulated  with  usury  ; 
and  his  creditors  had  then  seized  his  person,  tortured  and  imprisoned 
him  in  an  ergastuliim.,  as  though  he  were  already  a  slave. 

Horror  and  pity  seized  the  people,  and  the  long  -  smouldering 
discontent  broke  into  a  blaze.  The  Forum  was  filled  with  ang 
shouts  ;  many  of  the  unfortunate  7iexi.,  forcibly  delivered,  thre 
themselves  upon  the  protection  of  the  citizens,  and  some  of  th 
senators  who  were  in  the  Forum  found  themselves  in  the  midst  of  a 
excited  crowd,  and  were  roughly  handled.  The  people  demanded 
that  a  meeting  of  the  Senate  should  be  summoned,  and  measures 
devised  for  relief.      Some  senators  answered  the  summons  of  the 


'5 

i 


VllI  THE  HARSH  LAWS  OF  DEBT  95 

consuls,  but  the  majority  were  afraid,  and  the  anger  of  the  people 
seemed  likely  to  end  in  open  violence.      But  in  the  midst  of  the 
tumult    news   came   that   the   Volscians   were  on  the  march.      The 
people  at  first  refused  to  enlist.     But  the  more  moderate  of  the  two 
consuls,  Servilius,  induced  them  to  do  their  duty  to  the  country  by 
an  edict,  which  was  regarded  as  a  security  for  the  present,  and  as 
holding  out  hope  for  the  future,      "  No  nexus  was  to  be  hindered  by  Edict  in 
his   creditor   from    giving   in   his   name   to   the   levy;    no   one   was  rehefofthe 
to  seize  or  sell  the  goods  of  a  debtor  while  he  was  serving  in  the  ^^^^' 
army,  or  to  confine  his  sons  or  grandsons  in  security  for  him."    Then 
the  people  gave  in  their  names  for  the  levy ;   the  Volscians  were 
repulsed,  as  well  as  the  Sabines  and  Aurunci. 

But  border  frays  are  soon  over,  and  the  soldiers  on  their  return  Repealed 
were  enraged  by  a  decision  of  the  consul  Appius,  which  placed  the  h  Appius. 
next  in  the  same  position  as  before.      The  power  of  the  creditor  over 
his  debtor  was  to  be  exactly  as  it  stood  prior  to  the  war.      Riots   Consequent 
attended  the  rescue  of  one  nexus  after  another  as  he  was  being  led  ^^ots. 
off  by  his  creditor  ;  the  city  was  full  of  rumours  and  clamour,  and 
when  Appius  tried  to  arrest  a  ringleader  of  the  crowd,  he  was  forced 
to  release  him  on  his  appeal  to  the  people. 

The  resistance   of  the  plebeians   became  still   more  formidable  494-  Coss. 
next  year,  because  better  organised.      Some  of  them  met  regularly  ^;  ^'^^S^- 
on  the  Aventine,  others  on  the  Esquiline  ;  and  the  patricians  saw  ^^  '  .  ' 
that  these  informal  co7tcilia  plebis  might  soon  arrogate  an  authority  Meetings  of 
superior  to  their  own.      But  when  the  consuls  tried  to  suppress  them  the  plebs. 
by  holding  a  levy  against  the  Volscians,  the  plebeian  youth  firmly 
refused  to  give  in  their  names.      An  attempt  to  arrest  one  of  them 
was  met  by  a  noisy  scene  of  violence,  and  finally  it  was  determined 
that  a  dictator  should  be  named  to  put  down  the  disturbance  and 
carry  on  the  war. 

Happily  not  Appius  Claudius,  who  was  hateful  to  the  plebeians,  M\  Val- 
but    Manius   Valerius   Volusus  (brother   of   Poplicola)  was    named,  ^^^^-^  ^<^^" 
whose  more  popular  sentiments  were  known  and  whose  character  ^J^/^j^^^ 
made  him  trusted.      He  induced  the  young  men  to  enlist  by  an  edict  The  Senate 
of  protection  to  debtors  similar  to  that  of  the  previous  year;  and,  refuse  relief 
when  the  army  returned  victorious  from  the  Volscian  war,  he  brought  ^^  ^^^  "'^^^^ 
a  motion  before  the  Senate  to  secure  milder  treatment  for  the  next. 
The  motion   was  rejected,  and  Valerius   abdicated  his   dictatorship 
rather  than  be  the  instrument  of  a  breach  of  faith.      "  You  will  some 
day  wish,"  he  said  to  the  Senate,  "that  the  plebeians  had  patrons 
like  me."      But  this  made  him  more  beloved,  and  enabled  him  to 
exercise  a  salutary  influence  in  the  quarrel. 

The  Senate  dared  not  disband  the  army  lest  the  demands  against 
which  they  were  resolved  should  again  cause  popular  tumults.      So 


96 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


The  armed- 
citizens 
retire  to 
the '  'Sacred 
Mount, ' ' 
493- 


Alarm  of 
the  sena- 
tors. 


Menenius 
Agrippa. 


Nature 
and  limits 
of  the  power 
of  tribunes. 


long  as  the  legions  were  subject  to  the  imperiu7n  of  the  consul,  they 
believed  that  they  had  a  firm  hold  upon  the  most  formidable  part  of 
the  population.  Under  the  pretext  therefore  of  a  fresh  danger  from 
the  Aequians  the  legions  were  again  ordered  out  under  the  consul. 

But  the  soldiers  were  also  citizens.  They  resolved  that  they 
would  no  longer  submit  to  injustice.  "  Let  us  kill  the  consul,"  was 
the  first  suggestion,  "  and  so  be  free  of  our  military  oath."  But  a 
crime  could  not  annul  a  religious  obligation  :  and  they  finally  conceived 
and  executed  a  measure,  which  has  ever  since  been  justly  celebrated 
as  the  most  glorious  of  revolutions,  because  unstained  by  bloodshed 
and  violence,  while  effectually  proving  to  the  oppressive  minority 
what  they  would  lose  by  persisting  in  an  unrighteous  policy.  On 
the  advice  of  one  Sicinius  the  armed  citizen -soldiers  marched  in 
good  order  beyond  the  Anio,  and  occupied  a  hill,  which  came  in 
after  times,  in  memory  of  this  event,  to  be  called  the  Sacred  Mount. 
They  took  nothing  with  them  but  what  was  necessary  to  support 
life  ;  but  they  fortified  the  usual  camp,  and  remained  quietly  there 
for  many  days,  neither  attacked  nor  attacking. 

This  famous  "  secession,"  therefore,  was  not  the  withdrawal  of 
an  unarmed  populace,  but  the  deliberate  abandonment  of  the  city 
by  the  flower  of  the  fighting  force,  which  Rome,  surrounded  by 
enemies,  could  not  afford  to  lose.  The  patres  were  naturally  alarmed, 
and  soon  determined  to  negotiate.  Menenius  Agrippa  was  sent,  and 
is  said  to  have  won  over  the  host  to  moderate  counsels  by  the  fable 
of  the  rebellion  of  the  members  against  the  belly,  which,  being 
starved,  was  avenged  by  the  decay  of  the  seditious  parts.  But 
we  may  safely  conclude  that  no  story,  however  ingenious,  would 
have  persuaded  the  seceders  to  return  without  solid  concessions. 
The  negotiations  ended  in  a  compromise.  The  plebeians  were  to 
have  officers  appointed  from  their  own  ranks,  whose  special  duty 
should  be  to  protect  citizens  against  the  harsh  sentences  of  the 
consuls.  As  the  officers  commanding  the  people  under  arms  were 
called  tribunes,  so  these  were  to  be  called  by  the  same  name.i 
Henceforth  there  would  be  two  kinds  of  tribunes,  the  tribuni  militiun^ 
elected  to  command  the  legions  on  service,  and  Tribuni  Plebis, 
elected  for  a  year  to  protect  the  people  not  under  arms.  Accordingly, 
their  authority  was  confined  to  a  mile  radius  round  the  pomoerium. 
That  is,  it  could  be  exercised  against  the  consul  when  acting  in  the 
city  or  holding  a  levy  in  the  Campus,  but  not  against  his  imperium 
when  in  command  of  an  army  outside.  How  far  it  availed  against 
the  imperium  of  a  dictator  was  a  moot  point.  But  this  was  of  I 
comparatively  little  importance ;  for  the  dictator  was  only  occasion- 


1  This  point  is  dwelt  on  by  Zonaras,  vii.  15. 


VIII  THE  TRIBUNES  OF  THE  PLEBS  97 

ally  appointed,  usually  for  some  special  civil  function,  which  being- 
performed  he  abdicated  immediately,  or  for  some  military  expedition 
which  took  him  at  once  out  of  Rome.  At  most  his  office  lasted  for 
only  six  months.  The  consuls,  on  the  other  hand,  were  judges  as 
well  as  military  commanders,  and  it  was  generally  against  hardships 
inflicted  by  them  in  that  capacity  that  the  tribunes  were  to  act. 
They  were  not  magistrates  in  the  ordinary  sense,  and  had  no  fixed 
sphere  of  duty  {provincia).  Their  power  was  negative ;  they  could 
stay  proceedings.  Their  veto  or  intercession  stopped  the  action  of  a 
magistrate,  and  gradually  various  other  public  business  ;  while  their 
right  of  summoning  and  addressing  the  plebs  [jus  agendi  cum  piebe)  in 
time  gave  them  an  important  legislative  position.  The  lex  Icilia  (492)  i^^x 
made  their  persons  sacred,  and  exposed  to  a  curse  any  one  obstructing  sacrata, 
them  or  offering  them  or  their  officers  violence.  In  case  of  dis-  49^- 
obedience  they  could  arrest  and  imprison  even  the  consul  himself,^ 
and  by  the  lex  Aternia  Tarpeia  (454)  could  inflict  a  fine.  They 
were  assisted  by  two  other  plebeian  magistrates,  appointed  at  the 
same  time,  called  Aediles,  who  transacted  legal  business  confined  to 
the  plebs,  and  had  charge  of  all  documents  connected  with  the 
plebeian  concilia.  As  their  primary  duty  was  to  give  aid  (auxiliwti) 
to  all  citizens  at  all  times,  whether  against  a  magisterial  decision,  or 
the  payment  of  tribute,  or  a  military  levy,  the  tribunes  were  bound 
to  keep  the  doors  of  their  houses  always  open,  and  not  to  be  more 
than  one  day  absent  from  Rome  except  during  ihtferiae  Latinae. 

There  is  some  variation  in  our  authorities  as  to  the  original  Number 
number  of  the  tribunes.  Livy  says  two  were  first  elected,  C.  of  tribunes. 
Licinius  and  L.  Albinus,  who  then  held  an  election  of  three  colleagues. 
Cicero  also  speaks  of  two  being  first  created,  but  Dionysius  says 
that  five  were  elected  at  once.  Diodorus,  again,  that  two  were  elected 
in  the  first  instance,  and  raised  to  four  in  47 1.^  Whatever  was  the 
original  number  it  seems  certain  that  there  were  soon  five,  and  after 
457  ten.  If  the  full  number  was  not  created  by  the  comitia^  those 
elected  had  to  fill  up  the  vacancies  by  co-optation  ;  and  in  438  a  law 
was  passed  compelling  the  president  at  the  election  to  go  on  with 
the  comitia  until  ten  were  elected.^ 

As  difficult  is  the  question  of  the  manner  of  their  election.      Here 

1  They  had,  that  is,  the  jus  prehensionis,  but  not  the  right  of  summoning 
{jus  vocationis),  which,  however,  was  sometimes  ignorantly  exercised  {Aul.  Cell. 
xiii.  12). 

2  Cicero,  de  Rep.  ii.  34  ;  Livy  ii.  58  ;   Dionys.  vi.  89  ;  Diodorus  xi.  68. 

^  Lex  Trebonia,  Livy  iii.  65  ut  qui  plebem  Romanam  tribunos  plebi  rogaret, 
is  usque  eo  rogaret,  dum  decern  tribunos  plebei  faceret.  They  entered  on  their 
functions  on  the  loth  of  December,  and  a  severe  punishment — even,  it  is  said, 
burning  alive — could  be  imposed  on  tribunes  abdicating  before  the  election  of 
their  successors. 

H 


98 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


apparently  was  the  part  of  the  compromise  in  favour  of  the  patricians. 
They  agreed  to  recognise  the  plebeians  as  a  constituent  body,  so  far 
as  to  allow  them  to  have  officers  of  their  own  ;  in  return  the  plebeians 
were  content  that  their  tribunes  should  be  elected  by  the  curiae^  in 
which,  though  the  clients  of  the  patrician  gentes  appear  to  have 
voted,  the  patricians  themselves  had  the  determining  voice.  Others 
have  thought  that  tribunes  were  from  the  first  elected  by  the 
plebeians,  though  voting  by  curiae  and  not  by  tribes.  But  these 
plebeian  comitia  or  concilia  curiata  are  wholly  unknown  in  connexion 
with  anything  else,  and  their  existence  is  denied  by  most  scholars.^ 

The  most  striking  effect  of  the  appointment  of  tribunes — setting 
aside  personal  hardships  which  they  may  have  prevented — was  the 
rapid  growth  of  plebeian  organisation.  The  informal  concilia  of  the 
plebs  became  more  and  more  important,  as  the  tribunes  exercised 
their  privilege  of  summoning  and  consulting  them,  and  eventually 
obtained  recognition  first  as  an  elective  and  then  as  a  legislative 
comitia. 

But  the  twenty-three  years  which  elapsed  before  the  next  advance 
of  the  plebeian  assembly  witnessed  also  a  recrudescence  of  the  old 
difficulty  as  to  poverty  and  the  possession  of  land.  In  the  year  486 
the  consul  Spurius  Cassius,  wise  negotiator  of  the  renewed  Latin 
League,  appears  to  have  seen  that  this  poverty  demanded  measures 
of  relief  In  the  previous  year  (487)  the  Hernici  had  been  conquered 
and  some  of  their  lands  had  become  the  property  of  the  Roman 
people.  Instead  of  treating  this  as  ager  publicus  to  be  let  out  at 
fixed  rentals,  which  would  put  it  into  the  hands  of  capitalists,  Spurius 
Cassius  proposed  to  divide  it  in  absolute  ownership  among  landless 
men,  Roman  and  Latin.  Livy  calls  this  the  first  agrarian  law  ever 
promulgated.  But  captured  lands  had  been  dealt  with  before  ;  what 
was  peculiar  about  this  law  was  that  for  the  first  time  it  proposed  to 
recognise  the  right  of  Latins  to  share  with  Romans  ;  and,  secondly, 
that  it  was  to  have  a  retrospective  effect,  for  it  contained  a  clause 
dealing  with  land  already  made  ager  publicus^  but  occupied  by 
private  owners.  This  land  it  proposed  to  let  out  at  fair  rents,  or  to 
add  it  to  what  was  now  to  be  divided  among  poor  plebeians.     It  was 


1  The  various  theories  on  this  subject  that  have  found  advocates  are  collected 
by  Willems,  Droit  public  Remain,  p.  280,  note  4.  Cicero,  pro  Cornelio,  fr.  23, 
says  distinctly  auspicato  postero  atino  tribuni  plebis  con^iiiis  curiatis  creati  sunt ; 
and  the  concilia  of  the  plebs  were  not  "auspicato."  Mommsen's  theory  of  the 
concilia  plebis  curiata  is  chiefly  supported  by  Dionysius  vi.  89,  vefiTjdels  6  dijimos 
elf  Ttts  t6t€  ovaas  (pparpias,  &s  €K€lvoi  koXovcti.  Kovpias.  On  the  other  hand  Livy  says 
that  the  bill  of  Publilius  Volero  in  471  "  took  away  from  the  patricians  the  power 
of  electing  by  means  of  their  clients  whom  they  chose  as  tribunes " — ^uae  patriciis 
omnem  potestatem  per  clientium  suffragia  creandi  quos  vellent  tribunes  auferrent 
(ii.  56),  a  description  which  could  only  apply  to  the  comitia  curiata. 


VIII  DEATH  OF  SPURIUS  CASSIUS  99 

this  which  made  the  patricians  hostile  to  the  measure;  while  the 
consul  Virginius  skilfully  used  the  clause  admitting  Latins  to  a  share 
to  excite  popular  prejudice  against  the  bill  and  its  author, 

Cassius  doubtless  inserted  this  clause  jn  pursuance  of  that  con-  Spurtus 
ciliatory  policy  towards  the  states  of  Latium,  which  had  contributed  so  '^f^^^^^ifl 
much  to  the  reconstitution  of  the  League.     But  it  was  enough  to  take  and  put  t 
the  bloom  off  the  gift  in  the  jealous  eyes  of  the  citizens  ;  and  Cassius,  death,  48^ 
therefore,  lost  much  of  the  support  for  which  he  might  have  looked, 
when  as  a  private  person,  in  the  year  after  his  consulship,  he  was 
charged   with    attempting    kingly  power,    condemned,    and    put    to 
death.i     Besides  his  agrarian  law  another  measure  proposed  by  him 
was  held  to  support  the  charge.      Gelo  of  Syracuse,  it  is  said,  had  The 
sent  a  present  of  corn  to  the  Roman  people — perhaps  as  a  recogni-  y-'^^^^'^ 
tion  of  their  hostility  to  the  common  Etruscan  enemy,  which  should  -^^^^ 
have  been  distributed  free  ;  and  Cassius  now  proposed  that  the  low 
price  paid  for  it  should  be  refunded.  ^ 

The  fate  of  Cassius  foreshadowed  that  of  Maelius  and  the  Patricias 
Gracchi,  and  of  others  who  ventured  to  make  a  stand  in  behalf  of  ^^"^/  > 
the  poor  and  helpless  against  class  privilege  and  selfishness.  But 
if  it  be  true  that  the  people  were  beguiled  into  a  base  desertion  of 
their  wise  champion,  they  were  rightly  punished  by  a  long  subjection 
to  the  patricians.  The  consulship  not  only  became  more  and  more 
an  exclusively  patrician  office,  but  seemed  gradually  becoming 
hereditary  in  the  Fabian  family.  The  tribunes  themselves  were  for 
the  most  part  tools  in  the  hands  of  the  patricians.  If  one  bolder 
than  the  rest,  as  Spurius  Licinius  in  481,  ventured  to  speak  of  the 
necessity  of  reviving  the  agrarian  proposals  of  Cassius,  he  was 
promptly  silenced  by  his  more  accommodating  colleagues.  In  475 
two  tribunes  had  indeed  successfully  prosecuted  T.  Menenius,  for 
he  was  already  discredited  by  having  sustained  a  defeat  on  the 
Cremera  ;  but  another  tribune,  A.  Genucius,  who  in  473  ventured 
to  bring  a  consular  to  trial,  was  murdered  in  his  bed. 

It  was  apparently  this  last  event  which  led  to  the  next  advance  Lex 
of  the  plebeians.      This  was  the  formal  recognition  by  the  lex  Pub-  P^^^^^^^^, 
lilia  Volerojiis  of  the  right  of  the  people  to  elect  tribunes  and  aediles 
by  voting  in  tribes  (471).      This  was  only  obtained  after  a  violent 
struggle,  in  which  Appius  Claudius  again  came  forward  as  the  most 

^  The  formal  name  of  the  crime  charged  -^2.1,  ferduellio  (see  p.  92  ;  Livy  ii. 
41).  A  tradition  followed  by  Cicero  {de  legg.  ii.  23)  represented  the  quaestors 
as  acting  the  part  of  accusers.  Others  represent  him  as  condemned  by  his  own 
father  in  virtue  of  the  patria  potestas. 

2  The  present  of  corn  had  been  made  in  the  famine  year  492.  Dionysius  (viii. 
70),  Plutarch  {Coriol.  xvi. )  and  Livy  (ii.  4)  speak  of  the  Siculum  frumentum. 
without  naming  the  king  ;  but  others  had  made  the  mistake  of  attributing  the 
gift  to  Dionysius  (Dionys.  vii.   i). 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


uncompromising  opponent  of  the  plebeian  demand.  The  senators, 
however,  wisely  gave  way,  and  the  law  was  sanctioned  by  their 
auctoritas  and  passed.  Thus  the  informal  concilia  plebis  became 
recognised  as  an  elective  body  —  coniitia  tribiita.  In  this  the 
patricians  had  a  right  indeed  to  vote,  but  their  comparatively  small 
numbers  would  have  given  them  little  weight  if  they  had,  and  for  a 
time  at  any  rate  they  abstained. ^  The  plebs  also  thus  obtained  the 
power  of  electing  tribunes  who  would  not  be  completely  under 
patrician  influence ;  and  the  tribunes  could  legally  invite  the  comitia 
to  pass  resolutions  (J)lebiscita),  which,  though  not  binding  on  the 
whole  populus,  had  yet  a  great  moral  weight  from  the  first,  and 
gradually  obtained  the  force  of  laws  binding  on  all.  Another 
advantage  of  thus  voting  in  tribes  was  that  it  did  not  require  the 
auspices  to  be  first  taken,  and  was  therefore  free  from  many  hin- 
drances, which  the  patricians — in  sole  possession  as  yet  of  the  sacer- 
dotal and  augural  colleges — could  offer  to  the  proceedings  of  the 
C07nitia  curiata  or  centu7'iata.'^ 

The  lex  Publilia  Voleronis  ^  in  ordaining  that  the  tribunes  should 
henceforth  be  elected  by  the  cojnitia  tribttta,  at  present  practically 
an  exclusively  plebeian  assembly,  may  have  only  given  legal  sanction 
to  an  existing  custom,  the  curiate  assembly  seldom  venturing  to 
disallow  the  informal  nomination  of  the  concilium  plebis.  But  the 
formal  acknowledgment  of  the  right  was  nevertheless  a  great  step. 
We  may  see  perhaps  the  fruit  of  it  in  the  greater  exertions  made  by 
the  tribunes  to  secure  an  equitable  arrangement  of  the  pubhc  land 
in  461,  when  the  plebeians  demanded  allotments  at  home  rather 
than  in  the  territory  of  the  newly-conquered  Antium  ;  in  the  attempt 
of  the  tribune  C.  Terentilius  in  462  to  limit  the  power  of  the  consuls 
by  definite  enactments  as  to  their  functions  ;  in  the  impeachment 
of  Caeso  Quintius  who  opposed  Terentilius  in  46 1  ;  in  the  carrying 
of  the  lex  Icilia  in  456  for  redividing  the  land  on  the  Aventine  for 
building,  involving  the  disturbance  of  many  who  had  encroached 
on  it ;  in  frequent  interferences  in  the  yearly  levies  ;  and  finally  in 
the  raising  the  numbers  of  the  tribunes  themselves  from  five  to  ten, 
which,  though   it   did  not   turn   out    in    practice  to    enhance    their 


^  The  comitia  tributa  as  an  elective  assembly  must  always  have  included 
patricians  who  were  like  the  rest  assessed  in  the  tribes.  But  when  this  assembly 
met  for  deliberative  purposes  it  was  at  first  only  the  old  concilium  plebis,  and 
from  it  the  patricians  were  excluded  (Livy  ii.  60). 

2  Dionysius  iv.  49.  But  in  later  times  the  auspices  seem  to  have  been  taken 
at  the  com,itia  tributa  (see  Cicero,  ad  Fam.  ix.  30). 

'  The  "law"  of  Volero  is  perhaps  properly  to  be  called  ?l plebiscituvt.  But 
3.  plebiscitum  had  not  yet  the  force  of  a  law,  and  it  must  in  some  way  have  been 
passed  by  the  whole  people.  Livy  (xxxix.  26)  says  of  Volero  that  he  tulit  AD 
POPULUM,  and  calls  it  a  lex  (ch.  57). 


VIII  PROPOSAL  FOR  A  WRITTEN   CODE  loi 

power,!  is  an  indication  of  increased  business  and  importance.  The 
condition  which  the  Senate  attempted  to  impose,  that  the  same 
men  should  not  be  re-elected  tribunes,  was  neglected  in  practice. 

But  the  proposal  of  Terentilius  to  limit  the  power  of  the  consuls  Events 
by  definite  written  enactments,  after  his  rogatio  had  been  fiercely  heading  to 
debated  for  ten  years,  was  now  to  be  carried  out  in  a  more  complete    ,  -^^^ 
manner.       The  impeachment  of  the  consuls  for  455   by  a  tribune  -uirate. 
and  an  aedile,  and  their  condemnation  and  fining  by  the  people — 
nominally  on  the  question  of  division  of  booty,  but  really,  it  seems, 
because  they  had  not  carried  out  the  law  for  dividing  the  land  on  the 
Aventine — led  to  the  acceptance  of  a  compromise  proposed  by  the 
tribunes,  that  a  commission  for  drafting  a  written  code  of  laws  should 
be  appointed.      For  the  plebeians  this  would  secure  that  the  power 
of  the  magistrates  should  not  be  used  against  them  illegally,  and  for 
the  patricians  it  held  out  the  hope  that  the  tribuneship  would  be 
unnecessary.     Hence  the  patricians  did  not  persist  in  their  resistance 
to  the   Terentilian   proposal  any  longer ;    and   the   plebeians   were 
content  for  a  time  to  abstain  from  electing  tribunes,  expecting  that 
their  protection  would,  for  the  short  time  of  the  suspension  of  the 
office,  be  supplied  by  the  action  of  some  of  the  new  board,  who  were 
meanwhile  to  supersede  all  the  regular  magistrates  ;  while  the  written 
laws    would    strengthen    the    hands    of    the    tribunes,    when   again 
appointed,  against  consular  tyranny. 

The  principle  of  confining  the  power  of  punishment  possessed  Laws  of 
by  the  consul  within  definite  Hmits  had  indeed  been  conceded  by  the  ^P-  Tar- 
lex  Tarpeia-Aternia^  which  limited  the  fine  which  he  could  impose  ^^^^  . 
to  two  cows  and  thirty  sheep  ;  ^  but  it  was  also  necessary  that  their  jHernius 
power  should  be  farther  limited  by  the  laws  in  virtue  of  which  the  ^j-^. 
whole  administration  was  carried  on.      It   was  now   resolved   that 
such  a  code  should  be  drawn  up  and  exposed  in  public  for  all  to  see 
,and  read. 

But  first  certain  commissioners  were  to  be  nominated  to  examine  453-452- 

and  copy  the  best  codes  in  existence  among  the  Greeks,  and  especi-  ^^^" 

ally  the  laws  of  Solon  at  Athens.     Accordingly  Sp.  Postumius  Albus, 

A.  Manlius,  and  Ser.  Sulpicius  set  out  for  Greece.     Athens  was  then 

at  the  height  of  her  prosperity,  and  Pericles  was  her  leading  states- 

I^Bman.       It    is    not    therefore    in    itself    improbable    that    her    fame 

^■bhould  have  attracted  those  in  search  of  model  legislation.      Still  it 

^^■tvould  have  been  a  more  obvious  thing  for  Romans  to  visit  the  Greek 

^^v       ^  Because  in  a  larger   number   opposite    interests  and  opinions    were   more 
^^likely  to  arise  ;  and  in  fact  we  find  the  college  of  tribunes  frequently  divided  and 

one  party  preventing  the  action  of  the  other.     It  was  this  that  made  such  a  power 

workable  at  all  (Zon.  vii.  15). 

-  Or,  as  some  have  it,  thirty  cows  and  two  sheep. 


i 


HISTORY  OF  HOME 


cities  of  Italy,  in  some  of  which  constitutions  had  been  drawn  up  by 
those  who  made  such  work  their  special  profession.  Probably  they 
did  visit  some  of  these  towns  ;  and  there  was  a  tradition  that  a 
certain  Hermodorus  of  Ephesus,  who  was  then  living  at  Rome, 
contributed  to  the  formation  of  the  code.^  Of  the  visit  to  Athens 
there  is  no  trace  in  Greek  writers  of  the  classical  time  ;  and  the  laws 
of  the  twelve  tables  are  not  known  to  us  with  sufficient  complete- 
ness to  enable  us  to  feel  sure  how  much,  if  anything,  was  taken 
from  those  of  Solon.  ^ 

The  demand  was  not  for  a  change  in  the  laws,  much  less  for 
anything  like  a  revolution,  but  that  the  secret,  jealously  guarded  for 
so  long,  of  what  the  laws  were,  and  what  was  the  right  method  of 
putting  them  in  motion,  should  be  the  common  property  of  all.  The 
secret  had  been  well  kept,  partly,  perhaps,  because  there  was  little 
to  keep.  As  in  the  case  of  our  own  early  history,  the  number  of 
written  laws  was  probably  small.  The  government  was  carried  on 
in  accordance  with  ancient  traditions  and  customs,  of  which  the 
knowledge  was  confined  to  a  few.  But  the  authority  of  the  magis- 
trate was  a  living  and  patent  fact,  from  which  all  might  suffer  at  any 
hour ;  and  now  that  the  people  had  become  conscious  of  their  cor- 
porate existence,  it  was  natural  that  they  should  claim  to  know  how 
far  this  authority  extended,  what  it  was  they  had  to  obey,  what 
regulated  the  transactions  and  obligations  of  the  market-place,  the 
relation  of  patron  and  cHent,  of  master  and  slave,  of  father  and  son. 

The  three  commissioners  returned  in  the  autumn  of  452,  and 
thereupon  the  decemvirs  were  appointed.  The  claim  of  plebeians  to 
places  on  the  board  appears  to  have  been  waived  on  the  condition 
that  the  Icilian  law  for  the  division  of  the  Aventine,  and  the  leges 
sacratae^  on  which  rested  the  inviolability  of  the  tribunes,  should  be 
left  untouched.  Among  the  ten  were  the  two  consuls-elect,  Appius 
Claudius  and  T.  Genucius,  who,  in  virtue  of  the  office  thus  suspended, 
were  looked  upon  as  holding  the  first  rank ;  the  three  commissioners 
who  had  been  sent  to  Greece  ;  and  five  other  patricians.  All  took 
turns  in  administering  justice,  and  each  had  the  twelve  lictors  and 
fasces  only  on  his  day,  the  rest  being  each  attended  by  a  single 
usher  {accensus). 

The  rule  of  these  decemvirs  for  their  year  is  admitted  to  have 
been  excellent.  Justice  was  fairly  administered,  and  the  rights  of 
the  citizens  duly  respected.  Within  a  few  months  ten  tables  of 
laws,  which  they  had  drafted,  were  exposed  for  public  criticism  and 

1  Pomponius,  ap.  Dig.  i,  2,  2,  §  4  ;  Strabo  xiv.  i,  25  ;  Pliny  N.  H.  xxxiv. 
II. 

-  A  regulation  as  to  lawful  sodalitates  is  said  by  Gains  (Z>.  47,  22,  4)  to  have 
been  taken  from  a  law  of  Solon.     It  is  generally  placed  in  the  eighth  table, p.  714. 


VIII  THE  SECOND  DECEMVIRATE  103 

emendation,    and    after    being    thus    improved  were  passed  by  the 
centuriate  assembly. 

What  followed  is  not  very  easy  to  understand.     The  code  was   The  second 
believed  to  be  as  yet  incomplete,  and  decemvirs  were  thought  neces-  decemvir- 
sary  again  for  the  following  year.      Perhaps  the  Senate  was  induced  ^^^'  ^•^^" 
to  consent  to  this  as  a  farther  postponement  of  the  evil  day  of  the 
re-establishment   of  the  tribunate  ;  while  the  plebeians,    conciliated 
by  the  moderation  of  the  first  decemvirs,  were  willing  to  consent  to 
a  farther  suspension  of  the  constitution  for  the  completion  of  a  busi- 
ness, advantageous    to    themselves,   asserted    to    be    still    in    some 
respects    defective.       Livy,    who    represents    Appius     Claudius    all 
through  as  exercising  the  chief  influence  among  his  colleagues,  now 
depicts  him  as  exerting  himself  to  secure  his  own  re-election,  with 
elaborate  display  of  popular  sentiments,  and  at  the  same  time  as  taking 
care  to  replace  the  aristocratic  members  of  the  old  board,  whom  he 
regarded  as  likely  to  stand  in  the  way  of  the  tyrannical  policy  which 
he  was  secretly  intending  to  pursue.     According  to  Livy's  view  of  Appius 
the  policy  of  Appius  this  is  not  unintelligible.      He  regards  him  as  Claudius. 
having  been  playing  a  part  all  along.      He  was  an   aristocrat,  who 
feigned  popular  views  to  secure  power  for  himself.      When  this  was 
once  obtained,  his  most  formidable   opponents  would   be   precisely 
the  strongest  aristocrats,  who,  opposed  to  popular  equality,  were  still 
more  jealous  of  the  personal  supremacy  of  one  man,  though  of  their 
own  order.      His  aim,  therefore,  was  to  have  colleagues  whose  posi- 
tion  was   not   high    enough   to  give  them  the  means  of  effectively 
opposing  him.      Three  of  them  were  plebeians,  and  none  men  of  the 
first  consideration. 

He  now  threw  off  the  mask.     The  people  were  astonished  to  see   Their 
that,  instead  of  each  member  of  the  board  in  his  turn  being  accom-  harsh  rule. 
panied  by  the  twelve  lictors,  all  appeared  in   the  Forum  with  these 
attendants,  whose  fasces  also  contained  the  axe,  symbol  of  power 
sine  provocatwne^  which   the  consuls  themselves   only  presumed  to 
adopt  when  outside  the  city.      It  soon  became  apparent  that  this  was 
no  idle  change.     Acts  of  severity  followed  in  quick  succession  ;  no 
man's  life,  no  woman's  honour,  was  safe.      Instead  of  an  authority 
rendered  less  oppressive  by  subdivision,  and  the  tribuneship  being 
replaced  by  the  mutual  check  of  the  colleagues  on  each  other,  the 
plebeians  found  themselves  under  ten  tyrants  instead  of  two.     The  Two  new 
decemvirs,  it  is  true,  justified  their  appointment  by  producing  two  ^^^^^^' 
additional  tables  of  laws,  afterwards  ratified  on  the  proposal  of  the 
consuls  of  449.^     But  when  the  time  came  for  the  elections  they 

^  It  has  been  assumed  that  the  last  two  tables  contained  oppressive  or  unjust 
laws,  but  there  is  no  sign  of  this.  They  are  ratified  immediately  after  the  abdica- 
tion of  the  decemvirs,   apparently  without  opposition.     Cicero's  remark  about 


104 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Alienation 
of  the 
patricians. 


Unsuccess- 
ful wars 
with 
Sabines 
and 

Aequians, 
449- 


Murder  of 
Sicinius. 


Virginia. 


showed  no  intention  of  abdicating  or  holding  the  comitia  for  the 
usual  magistrates  of  the  next  year.  This  was  tyranny,  and  the  feelings 
of  both  orders  were  equally  outraged.  The  decemvirs  had  already 
offended  the  patricians  by  neglecting  to  consult  the  Senate.  But  the 
senators  were  apparently  afraid  to  protest.  Most  of  them,  indeed, 
left  the  city  and  employed  themselves  on  their  country  properties  ; 
and  when,  in  the  early  part  of  449,  a  threatened  raid  of  the  Sabines 
and  Aequians  induced  the  decemvirs  to  summon  a  meeting,  scarcely 
enough  members  were  to  be  found  to  make  up  a  quorum.  The 
plebeians  murmured  loudly  that  the  senators  deserted  the  cause  of 
freedom  from  cowardice.  But  at  last,  when  a  fairly  full  meeting 
was  secured,  two  senators,  L.  Valerius  Potitus  and  M.  Horatius 
Barbatus,  giving  voice  to  the  popular  discontent,  ventured  to  attack 
the  conduct  of  the  decemvirs  in  strong  terms,  and  were  supported 
by  C.  Claudius,  uncle  of  Appius. 

The  Senate  seemed  on  the  point  of  voting  that  their  office  was 
vacant,  and  that  interreges  should  be  named  to  hold  the  consular 
elections.  For  the  present,  however,  the  necessity  of  a  levy  stayed 
farther  proceedings.  Two  armies  were  raised,  commanded  by  eight 
of  the  decemvirs,  while  Appius  and  Sp.  Oppius  remained  at  Rome. 
The  Roman  arms  were  not  successful,  and  this  in  itself  brought  fresh 
discredit  on  the  government.  But  two  instances  of  oppression 
are  said  to  have  brought  matters  to  a  climax. 

The  first  was  the  murder  of  the  centurion  Sicinius,  who  was 
serving  in  the  Sabine  war.  He  was  reported  to  have  used  seditious 
words  as  to  the  necessity  of  restoring  tribunes  ;  and  though  he  had 
been  long  famous  for  gallantry  in  the  wars,  he  was  murdered  by  his 
comrades  when  employed  in  choosing  a  camp,  and  every  one  believed 
that  it  was  done  at  the  instigation  of  the  decemvirs. 

The  second  was  the  famous  case  of  Virginia.  Her  father, 
Virginius,  was  serving  in  the  camp  at  Algidus,  and  Virginia  was  in 
the  care  of  friends  in  Rome.  While  walking  through  the  streets  she 
had  attracted  the  licentious  eyes  of  Appius,  so  the  story  goes,  and 
by  an  unjust  judicial  decision  he  adjudged  her  to  be  the  slave  of  one 
of  his  own  clients,  whom  he  instigated  to  claim  her  on  the  plea  that 
she  was  really  the  daughter  of  one  of  his  slaves,  and  had  been 
secretly  adopted  by  the  wife  of  Virginius.  It  is  not  altogether 
unaccountable,  as  has  been  alleged,  that  Appius,  who  was  acting  so 
tyrannically  in  many  other  ways,  should  prefer  to  act  in  this  case 
with    a   show    of  legality  rather   than   by  open   violence.      He   must 


them  seems  to  refer  solely  to  the  matter  of  conuhium.  In  regard  to  that  he 
speaks  the  sentiment  of  a  later  age  {de  Rep.  2,  §  63).  Though  the  plebeians  soon 
tried  to  get  rid  of  this  particular  enactment,  it  does  not  seem  to  have  been  new  in 
principle,  only  it  was  now  for  the  first  time  definitely  expressed. 


VIII  RESTORATION  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION  105 

have  known  of  the  growing  feehng  against  him,  and  would  not  rouse 
more  widespread  opposition,  or  give  his  enemies  more  hold  upon 
him  than  he  could  help.  It  is  a  favourite  device  of  tyrants,  and  not 
the  least  galling,  to  cover  their  oppressions  under  a  form  of  law.^ 

Virginius  was  hastily  summoned  from  the  camp  at  Algidus,  and   Virginius 
when  he   found   that,  in  spite  of  his  protests,  Appius  had  formally  kills  his 
assigned  Virginia  as  a  slave  to  his  client,  he  seized  a  knife  from  a    '^"•^  ^^' 
neighbouring  stall  and  stabbed  her  to  the  heart  to  save  her  from 
dishonour.      Then  the  popular  indignation  broke  into  fury.      Appius 
was   driven   from  the    Forum,    when  trying   to   effect   the  arrest   of 
Virginius    and   of    Lucius   Icilius,   the   betrothed  lover  of   Virginia, 
after    vainly    attempting    to    make    himself  heard.       The    agitation 
spread  from  the  city  to  the  two  camps.      The  armies  deposed  their  The  army 
decemviral  commanders,  elected  ten  military  tribunes,  and  marching  declares 
to    Rome,    occupied    the    Aventine.       Hence,    after    some    fruitless  ^S^^^^t  ^^^ 
negotiations  with  the  Senate,  which  Appius  was  still  able  to  summon, 
the  armed  plebs  repeated  their  former  manoeuvre  of  marching  out 
of  Rome  and  occupying  the   "  Sacred    Mount."     This  brought  an  Secession. 
immediate  concession.     L.  Valerius  and  M.  Horatius,  being  employed 
to  negotiate,  agreed  that  the  decemvirs  should  abdicate  and  tribunes 
be  appointed.      The  Pontifex  Maximus,  the  only  existing  magistrate, 
held  the  comitia^  and  the  election  of  ten  popular  tribunes  seems  at 
once  to  have  given  an  importance  to  the  resolutions  of  the  concilium 
plebis  which  it  never  lost.      We  have  seen  that  by  the  lex  Publilia 
(471)  the  conciliufjt  had  become  a  coviitia  for  electing  tribunes,  but 
it  has  not  hitherto  had  a  defined  position  as  a  legislative  assembly. 
Now  we  hear  of  its  passing  a  resolution  of  amnesty  for  all  those  A  plebi- 
who  had  taken  part  in  the  secession  (for  a  breach  of  the  military  ^^^^^^"'  V 

2  TldCfftTtZtV 

sacramentum  had  no  doubt  been  involved),  and  on  the  motion  of  a 
tribune,  M,  Duillius,  resolving  that  consuls  should  be  elected 
cmn  provocatione.  These  resolutions  {piebiscita\  though  no  constitu- 
tional rule  gave  them  the  force  of  a  law,  were  apparently  accepted  as 
binding. 

The  Senate  thereupon,  in  obedience  to  them,  named  interreges   Valeria- 
who  held  the  election  of  consuls.      L.  Valerius  and  M.  Horatius  were  ^^^^^^^^^ 
returned,  and  immediately  brought   in  a  series   of  laws  which  bear 

^  Dr.  Ihne  holds  that  Appius's  real  object,  as  shown  by  the  plebeian  element 
in  the  second  decern virate,  was  to  heal  the  breach  between  the  orders,  and  thus 
make  tribunes  unnecessary.  That  this  turned  the  strict  party  of  patricians 
against  him,  who  prevented  the  two  tables  being  passed,  as  containing  regulations 
they  disliked.  That  the  patricians  were  able  to  overthrow  him,  because  in  the 
second  year  he  was  in  an  unconstitutional  position.  That  the  secession  took 
place  after  the  abdication  of  Appius,  because  of  a  patrician  attempt  to  prevent 
tribunes  being  restored.  That  the  stories  of  Sicinius  and  Virginia  were  patrician 
inventions. 


H  106  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap. 

^B  their  name.     The  first  was  a  recognition  of  the  binding  nature  of 

^H  the  resokition  of  the  plebs  iut  qicod  tributim  plcbes  jussisset  populum 

^K  teneret).      The  second  condemned  to  instant  death   any  magistrate 

^B  returning    as   elected    a    magistrate    sine  provocatione.      The    third 

^H  devoted    to    a    curse    all  who  violated  the  plebeian    magistrates, — 

^B  tribunes,  aediles,  or  judges, — and  dedicated  their  property  to  Ceres. 

^K  Another  plebiscitum,  proposed  by  M.  Duillius,  ordered  that  any  one 

^B  depriving  the  plebs  of  tribunes,  or  "  creating  "  a  magistrate  without 

^H  provocation  should  be  put  to  death.     Appius  Claudius  was  impeached, 

HP  and  committed  suicide  in  prison. 

The  result  The  results,  then,  of  the  movements   of  the  years   471   to  449 

of  events  in  were,  that  the  plebeians  had  secured  the  election  of  their  tribunes 

47^-449'      by  themselves  ;    had    obtained    a  written    code    of   laws,    engraved 

on    bronze,   so    that  all  might    know  them ;     had  secured  that    the 

resolutions    of    the    plebeian    assembly  should    be    binding    on    the 

whole   populus.      It   is   not    certain  whether    some    confirmation    of 

the    plebiscita   by    the    auctoritas   patrum   was    required    to    make 

them   valid    after    this  ;     but    we    know    that    two    subsequent    laws 

were    passed     on     the     subject,     which    would     seem     to     imply 

that    the    effect    of    the    first    needed    something    to    complete    its 

object.  1 

The  work-         These  laws  do  not  seem  to  have  added  anything  directly  to  the  author- 

ing  and       ity  of  the  coniitia  tribuia.     Like  the  renewals  of  charters  by  successive 

importance  kings  in  our  own  history,  they  only  confirm  a  right  already  existing,  but 

of  the  new    y^^j^i^h  had  been,  or  was  in  danger  of  being,  infringed.      But  indirectly 

they  do  much.      They  took  from  the  senators  the  power  of  stopping 

the  passing  of  a  law  in  the  centuriate  assembly,  and  if  they  left  them 

still  the  formal  power  of  doing  so  to  plebiscita^  they  made  that  power 

1  The  three  leges  Puhliliae  {339)  supplied  what  was  wanting  up  to  a  certain 
point :  the  first  re-enacted  the  provision  ut  plebiscita  07nnes  Quirites  tenerent ; 
the  second  ordered  \he  auctoritas  of  the  fathers  (that  is,  a  resolution  of  the 
Senate)  to  be  given  beforehand  in  favour  of  laws  passed  in  the  centuriate 
assembly  ;  the  third  provided  for  the  delegation  of  certain  powers  of  the  consuls 
to  censors  at  such  time  as  the  plebeians  should  be  admitted  to  both  consul- 
ships. Livy,  viii.  12.,  see  p.  170.  For  the  difficult  subject  of  the  exact  effect 
of  this  series  of  laws,  the  reader  must  consult  larger  treatises — Mommsen's 
Romische  Forschungen,  i.  165  ;  Soltau's  Die  Giiltigkeit  der  Plebiscite ;  B.  Bor- 
geaud,  Histoire  du  PUbiscite.  Two  articles  maintaining  another  theory  are  con- 
tributed by  Mr.  Strachan-Davidson  to  the  English  Historical  Review,  April  1886, 
July  1890.  Mr.  Strachan-Davidson' s  theory,  as  I  understand  it,  is  this.  A 
plebiscitum  by  the  Valerio-Horatian  laws  went  through  three  processes  :  having 
been  passed  by  the  plebs,  the  consul  was  bound  to  bring  it  before  the  centuriata, 
before  which  he  must  have  an  auctoritas  patrum.  The  Publilian  law  abolished 
the  necessity  for  the  auctoritas  patrum,  and  forced  the  consul  to  bring  it  before  the 
centuriata  at  once.  The  Hortensian  law  made  this  unnecessary ;  directly  it 
passed  plebs  it  became  law.  This  may  be  so,  but  there  is  no  good  proof  of 
plebiscita  ever  going  before  the  ce?tturiata. 


Ill  THE  LAWS  OF  THE  TWELVE  TABLES  107 

omparatively  valueless.  For  the  auctoritas  of  the  Senate  was  now 
a  mere  formality  :  it  did  not  regard  the  substance  of  a  law,  it  gave 
Approval  in  advance — in  practice  something  like  the  royal  assent  to 
Bills  that  have  passed  both  Houses  in  the  English  Parliament. 
[Such  being  the  case,  the  Fathers  would  scarcely  venture  to  exercise 
im  antiquated  right  (one  too  which  probably  rested  on  no  law)  as 
tigainst  an  assembly  whose  decrees  had  been  more  than  once  declared 
to  be  of  equal  validity.  Long  afterwards  the  lex  Hortensia  (286) 
swept  away  all  impediments  to  the  authority  of  plebiscita^  whatever 
they  were,  and  from  that  period  the  legislative  powers  of  the  two 
cojnitia  were  concurrent. 

The  laws   of  the  twelve  tables,   however,   did   nothing  towards  It  did  not 
equalising  the  orders.      They  were  merely  a  codification  of  existing  touch  the 
laws   and  customs,  with   modifications   suggested  by  inspection   of  ^^^"^  ^°^  "^ 
Greek  laws,  or  by  proposals  of  the  decemvirs  and  others  while  they  and plebei- 
were  being  drafted.     Their  existence  had  a  conservative  effect  on  ans. 
Roman  jurisprudence,    and   helped   to   preserve   throughout    Roman 
history  a  oneness  of  spirit  in  the  laws  affecting  civil  rights,  which 
survived  much  political  change.      But  though   it   was  a  benefit  to 
every  one  to  have  definite  and  known  enactments  in  place  of  inde- 
finite customs  or  unwritten  laws,  there  was  nothing  in  them  specially 
favourable  to  popular  rights,   or  tending  to  the  relief  of  the  poor. 
On  the  contrary,  like  our  own  Magna  Charta,  they  bear  the  stamp  of 
the  property-holding  legislator,  whose  chief  object  is  to  enable  every 
man  to  hold  his  own  ;  and  who  looks  upon  the  validity  of  contract  as 
more  important  than  saving  individual  suffering. 

Thus  the  first  three  tables  dealt  with  forms  of  civil  process  and  Tables 
recovery  of  debt,  sanctioning  and  confirming  the  most  extreme  claim  ^-  "•  "^• 
of  creditor  over  debtor,   even   to  the  dividing   of  his  body  among 
several  creditors.      The  fourth  and  fifth  confirmed  the  most  absolute  iv.  v. 
patria  potestas — apparently  with  no  qualification  except  the  freedom 
of  the  son  after  the  third  sale  by  his  father — and  regulated  the  tutela 
of  women.     The  sixth  and  seventh  dealt  with  property  rights,  sale,  vi.  vii. 
encroachments,  easements,  rights  of  way,  and  the  like.     The  eighth  viii. 
dealt  with  what  lawyers  call  ''  torts  " — acts  of  an  individual  inflicting 
any  harm  on  another.      The  principle  is  that  of  compensation.     A 
broken  limb  may  be  avenged  by  retaliation  or  fixed  money  payment, 
according  as  the  sufferer  is  free  or  bond.     A  night  thief,  or  one  who 
defends  himself  with  a  weapon,  may  be  killed.      If  caught  in  the  act 
he  may  be  beaten  or  sold  as  a  slave  :  if  already  a  slave  may  be 
hurled  from  the  rock.      Convicted  thieves  pay  double  or  treble  the 
amount    stolen,    according    to    circumstances.^       Penalties,    varying 

^  The  distinction  between  the  punishment  of  a  thief  caught  in  the  act  and  one 
afterwards  convicted  rests,  according  to  Sir  H.  Maine,  on  the  principle  of  assimi- 


io8 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


from  infamy  to  death,  are  imposed  on  the  patron  injuring  his  clients, 
the  employer  of  incantations,   the   voluntary   homicide,    or  the  fre- 
quenter of  unlawful  assemblies,  though  clubs  which  have  no  illegal 
object  may  be  formed. 
Tables  The  ninth  forbade  privilegia — laws  passed  to  apply  to  a  single 

IX.  X.  ^2LSt  or  person  ;  ordained  that  no  citizen  be  tried  on  a  capital  charge 

except  before  the  coinitiaj  punished  capitally  a  judex  accepting  a 
bribe,  or  a  citizen  inciting  a  public  enemy  or  handing  over  a  fellow- 
citizen  to  him.  The  tenth  contained  sumptuary  laws  regulating 
funerals,  forbidding  burial  within  the  city,  or  burning  gold  (except  in 
stopping  of  teeth)  and  other  precious  things  on  funeral  pyres,  or 
lighting  such  pyres  near  houses. 
xi.  xii.  The  eleventh  and  twelfth,  as  far  as  we  know  them,  dealt  with  the 

Calendar,  public  sacrifices,  rights  of  masters  over  slaves  and  their 
responsibility  for  their  acts.  But  a  clause  in  the  eleventh  led  to  the 
next  agitation.  It  declared  that  a  patrician  and  plebeian  could  not 
contract  lawful  marriage  {conubium)  \  that  is,  the  offspring  of  such 
union  would  have  no  legal  father  in  whose  power  he  would  be,  and 
therefore  could  not  be  a  full  citizen.  It  is  not  certain,  though 
probable,  that  custom  had  already  impeded  these  marriages.^  But 
the  definite  enactment  would  be  sure  to  embitter  the  grievance,  which 
was  now  to  be  removed. 
Lex  Canu-  Early    in    445    C.   Canuleius,    a   tribune,   promulgated   a  bill   to 

leia,  44J.  remove  this  disability.  It  was  violently  opposed,  specially  on  the 
ground  that  patricians  alone  could  take  auspices,  and  that  if  such 
marriages  were  legalised,  it  would  be  impossible  to  tell  who  was  of 
pure  patrician  blood,  and  that  the  auspices  would  be  "  contami- 
nated." The  struggle  was  felt  on  both  sides  to  involve  farther 
issues.  Already  the  claim  of  the  plebeians  to  admission  to  the 
consulship  was  mooted,  and  the  more  violent  of  the  patricians 
maintained  that  if  the  tribunician  office  was  to  remain,  civil  life 
would  be  impossible  for  them.  The  majority  of  the  Senate,  how- 
ever, were  wiser.  The  rogatio  was  allowed  to  be  put  to  the  people 
and  carried  ;  while  the  decision  as  to  the  admission  of  the  plebeians 
to  the  consulship  was  postponed  for  the  present  by  a  compromise. 
It  was  agreed  that  for  the  next  year  instead  of  consuls  there  should 

lating  legal  punishment  to  what  a  man  would  naturally  inflict.  He  would  per- 
haps kill  a  thief  if  he  caught  him,  when  anger  cooled  he  would  let  him  off  more 
easily, 

^  Cicero  says  that  the  decemviri  inhumanissima  lege  sanxerunt  the  prohibition 
(^Rep.  ii.  27).  The  words  are  compatible  with  the  existence  of  a  similar  custom, 
which  is  assumed  in  the  dramatic  speeches  given  by  Livy  (iv.  2-6).  It  is  even 
likely  that  conubium  was  not  at  first  allowed  between  the  gentes  themselves  with- 
out special  process,  the  point  being  that  to  share  in  the  gentile  sacra  iv  man  must 
be  of  pure  blood. 


VIII  THE  LEX  CANULEIA  109 

be  Military  Tribunes  with  Consular  Power.     In  accordance  Tribuni 
with  military  precedent  these  would  be  elected  by  the    centuriate  militares 
assembly  without   distinction   of    orders.       Three  accordingly  were  ^f^/J^^^J^ 
created  for  444,  and  they  continued  to  be  appointed,  with  occasional  ^^^. 
intervals  of  consuls,  up  to  the  year  366.     Their  number  varied  in 
different  years   from  three  to  four  and  six  :  four  being  the  usual 
number  until   405,   after  which   six  was  the  regular  number, — the 
number    of    tribuni    in    a   legion.        The    first    three    elected,    Livy 
says,  were  all  patricians  ;  yet  this  is  disputed,  one  of  the  names  (L. 
Atilius)  probably  indicating  a  plebeian  gens.      If  it  is  so,  this  success 
of  the  plebeians  was  not  repeated  until  the  year  400. 

The  patricians  had  thus  managed  to  retain  the  doctrine  of  the  The  ques- 
necessity  of  patrician  birth  for  the  consulship.      It  is  even  alleged,  tionpost- 
though    on    hardly    sufficient    grounds,    that,    when    plebeians    did  ^^"^  ' 
succeed    in   being  elected   to  the  consular    tribuneship,   they    were 
practically  excluded  from  judicial  functions,  that  department  being 
left  to  their  patrician  colleagues.      Such  an  arrangement,  if  made, 
must  have   been  a  source  of  jealousy  and  discord,   and  would  not 
have    been    needed    until    400,    before   which   date   patricians   were 
exclusively    elected.      At    best    it    could    only    have    postponed    the 
question  ;  and  before  long  the  efforts  of  the  plebeians  were  centred, 
not  on  altering  their  position  as  consular  tribunes,  but  on  opening 
the  Consulship  itself 

At  the  same  time  the  patricians  secured  another  advantage.  Censors 
Certain  duties  attaching  to  the  consuls  were  not  performed  by  the  ^Ppo^nted, 
consular  tribunes,  especially  the  giving  out  of  contracts  for  public 
works  and  the  taking  of  the  census,  which  included  the  adjustment 
of  the  tributmn^  and  soon  also  involved  the  filling  up  the  roll  of  the 
senate,  the  knights,  and  the  other  ordines.  This  was  now  intrusted 
to  two  new  patrician  officers  called  censores  or  "  assessors."  They 
appear  at  first  to  have  been  appointed  for  the  whole  lustrum  (an 
arrangement  which  Appius  Claudius  Caecus  in  3 1 2  still  declared  to 
be  legal),  but  were  restricted  to  eighteen  months  by  the  lex  Aemilia 

in  435.^ 

In  the  midst  of  these  political  changes  the  question  of  poverty  Poverty. 
did  not  cease  to  cause  trouble.      We  hear  little  of  the  old  complaint 
of  the  debtors.      The  twelve  tables  had  not  relieved  them,  and  it  does 
not  appear,  as  before  remarked,  that  popular  sentiment  was  against 
the  surrender  of  the  person  of  a  defaulting  debtor.     The  former  com- 

^  Livy  iv.  24  ;  Mommsen  (i.  300)  appears  to  hold  that  the  censors  were  first 
appointed  in  435.  Livy  names  two  in  444,  but  no  others  till  435.  But  this 
irregularity  is  only  a  repetition  of  consular  irregularity  in  this  business,  or  at  any 
rate  of  Livy's  record  of  it,  who  only  twice  before,  since  the  expulsion  of  the  kings, 
J>ecords  a  census  (iii.  3,  23). 


I 


no 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Spurius 
Maelius, 
440-439- 


Cincin- 
natus 
named 
dictator. 

Death  of 
Maelius, 
439- 


A  lull  in 
the  contest, 
439-421- 


plaints  rested  on  the  fact  that  the  rich  had  taken  advantage  of  their 
position  to  wrest  the  law  in  particular  cases  to  the  disadvantage  and 
personal  hardship  of  the  nexi.  These  cases  were  prevented  now  by 
the  auxilhiin  of  the  tribunes.  But  tribunes  could  not  prevent  poverty  ; 
and  when  this  poverty  provoked  the  charity  of  a  rich  man,  he  usually 
risked  the  charge  at  the  hands  of  the  jealous  patricians  of  attempting 
to  set  himself  above  the  law. 

Thus  in  440  a  rich  eques,  named  Spurius  Maelius,  in  a  year  of 
famine  purchased  corn  from  Etruria,  which  he  distributed  at  a  low 
rate  among  the  poorer  citizens.  Immediately  the  cry  was  raised  that 
he  was  usurping  the  functions  of  the  praefectiis  annonae,  who  had 
been  appointed  to  superintend  the  supply  of  corn,  and  was  aiming 
at  royal  power.  Next  year  the  excitement  increased  ;  rumours  were 
afloat  that  nightly  gatherings  were  held  at  his  house,  and  arms 
collected  there  ;  that  the  tribunes  were  being  bribed,  and  a  revolution 
prepared.  The  alarm,  which  the  patrician  leaders  cunningly  kept 
alive,  had  enabled  them  to  secure  the  election  of  consuls  instead  of 
consular  tribunes  for  that  year,  and  now  also  enabled  them  to  insist 
on  the  nomination  of  a  dictator,  from  whose  authority  there  was  no 
appeal  to  the  people.  The  old  hero  of  the  Aequian  wars,  L,  Quintius 
Cincinnatus,  was  named  ;  and  he  appointed  C.  Servilius  Ahala  his 
master  of  the  horse.  Ahala  was  sent  to  summon  Sp.  Maelius  to  the 
judgment-seat  of  the  dictator.  Maelius  refused  to  follow  him,  and 
took  refuge  in  the  crowd  of  his  supporters ;  upon  which  Ahala  struck 
him  dead.  This  act  was  applauded  and  defended  by  the  dictator, 
on  the  ground  that  Maelius  had  been  legally  summoned,  and  in 
refusing  to  submit  to  a  legal  tribunal  was  attempting  kingly  power, 
which  by  the  law  of  Poplicola  was  punishable  by  instant  death.  It 
is  constantly  referred  to  by  Cicero  with  approval,  and  does  not  seemi 
to  have  excited  any  violent  sensation  at  the  time.  The  ungrateful 
people  were  pacified  by  the  distribution  of  Maelius's  store  of  corn  at  a 
low  price  ;  and  though  the  tribunes  from  time  to  time  attacked  the 
injustice  of  the  murder,  he  not  only  had  to  die  for  an  act  of  mercy,  as 
others  have  had  to  do,  but  had  to  leave  a  name  behind  him  stained 
by  a  groundless  charge,  invented  by  his  enemies,  who  could  not 
have  believed  it  themselves. 

Perhaps  the  patricians  fancied  that  he  was  aiming,  not  at  kingly 
power,  but  at  admission  to  the  consular  tribuneship.  At  any  rate 
when  he  had  been  got  rid  of,  no  attempt  was  made  to  prevent 
consular  tribunes  being  elected  for  the  next  year  :  and  no  farthei 
plebeian  claim  was  made  with  any  effect  for  some  time.  In  42! 
indeed,  the  tribunes  exerted  their  power  against  the  consuls,  ever 
threatening  to  imprison  them,  but  it  was  in  support  of  the  authorit) 
of  the  Senate  ^  in  424  we  find  them  declaiming  against  the  practica 


THE  SENATE  AND  THE  TRIBUNES 


exclusion  of  plebeians  from  the  consular  tribuneship  ;  and,  generally, 
they  seem  to  watch  with  care  the  conduct  of  the  patrician  magis- 
trates in   the  wars.      But   nothing  was  done   for  the  advancement  -Z^^- 

of  the  plebeian  order  until  421,  when  on  the  number  of  quaestors  Q^f^'^^^^- 
.     .  ,      ,  ,     1  -1  •  1  -11  1     ship  opened 

bemg  doubled,  two  to  serve  m  the  city,  and  two  with  the  consuls  to  plebeians 
abroad,  the  plebeians  claimed,  and  after  considerable  struggle  sue-  by  lex 
ceeded  in  securing,  that  the  office  should  be  open  to  them.     The  law  Papiria. 
appears  to  have  been  proposed  by  L.  Papirius  Mugillanus  as  interrex, 

Other  contests   which   marked    the  next   thirty   years  were   not  421-3^1. 
directly    political.       The    poorer    citizens    tried   on   more   than   one 
occasion  to  secure  that  conquered  land  should  be  divided  instead  of 
becoming  ager  publicus,  which  they  found  by  experience  was  mostly 
monopolised  in  the  interests  of  the  rich  ;  but  they  were  not  generally 
successful,  nor  always  satisfied  with  the  distribution  when  made.     On 
the    other   hand,    the    Senate    had    learnt    to    use    the    tribunician   The  Senate 
intercession  in  its  own  interests.      It  took  pains  to  secure  on  its  side  ^^.^  ^^^ 
a  majority  of  the  tribunician  college,  which  would  prevent  legislation    ^^  ^^^^' 
proposed  by  the  other  members.^     This  was  rendered  a  more  efifectual 
weapon  still  when,   about   395,  a  rule  was  introduced  whereby  the 
action  of  the  college  was  no  longer  determined  by  a  majority.      From  Single  veto. 
henceforth    one    tribune    could    veto    a    proceeding    though    it   was 
supported  by  all  the  others. 

This  right,  and  the   advantage  taken  of  it   by  the  Senate,  was   The 
conspicuously  illustrated  in  395,  when  after  the  capture  of  Veii,  the  proposed 
people  being  dissatisfied  with  a  division  of  certain  Volscian  lands,  J^^.?^^/^^ 
some  of  the  tribunes  wished  to  propose  a  law  transferring  a  part  of  jgs-jgs. 
the  inhabitants  of  Rome  to  Veii,  and  giving  that  town  equal  rights 
with  Rome.     The  patricians  held  that  this  measure  would  inevitably 
tend  to  perpetuate  a  division  of  interests  already  wide  enough,  and 
they  defeated  it  by  inducing  two  tribunes  to  forbid  the  rogatio.     The 
plebeians,  however,  looked  upon  this  as  a  violation  of  their  privileges. 
The  two  tribunes  were  impeached  and  fined  in  393,  and  the  law  was 
again  brought  before  the  assembly  of  the  tribes.      It  was  indeed 
rejected  by  a  narrow  majority ;  but  the  principle  was  vindicated  that 
the  Senate  should  not  interpose  their  authority  to  prevent  measures 
being  brought  before  the  tribes.     Nor  did  the  people  stop  there. 
Advantage  was  taken  of  a  dispute  as  to  the  distribution  of  the  Veien- 
tine  spoil  to  indict  the  victor  Camillus,  who  had  been  forward  in  Camillus 
resisting  the  punishment  of  the  two  tribunes.      L.  Appuleius,  one  of  S^^f  ^"•^^ 
the  tribunes  for  391,  accused  Camillus  and  demanded  a  heavy  fine.  ^^^  ^'  ^^^' 
He  anticipated  his  trial  by  going  into  exile,  and  in  his  absence  was 
condemned  to  a  fine  of  15,000  asses. 


I 


"  See  instance  in  Livy  iv.  49,  B.C.  415. 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Entrance 
of  tribunes 
into  the 
Senate. 


Progress 
interrupted 
by  the 
Gallic 


The  exercise,  therefore,  of  the  tribunician  powers  was  apparently 
steadily  increasing  in  frequency  and  effectiveness.  About  448  the 
tribunes  had  secured  the  right  of  appearing  in  the  Senate,  though  not 
of  speaking  or  voting,  A  bench  was  set  for  them  at  the  door  of  the 
house,  from  which  they  could  watch  the  proceedings.^  But  starting 
from  this  we  shall  find  that  they  gradually  claimed  and  obtained 
larger  powers, — the  right  of  preventing  magistrates  from  summoning 
the  Senate  or  proposing  in  it  new  laws  and  elections  ;  the  right  of 
preventing  a  senatus  consultuin  from  being  passed ;  and  finally  the 
right  of  summoning  it  themselves. 

This  was  a  later  development.  A  calamity  was  now  approaching 
which  made  a  break  in  Roman  progress,  both  internal  and  external. 
But  before  going  on  to  describe  the  burning  of  Rome  by  the  Gauls, 
it  will  be  convenient  to  sum  up  briefly  the  points  gained  in  the  gradual 
equalisation  of  the  orders. 


Summary.  By  the  lex  Valeria  (508)  all  citizens  alike  were  entitled  to  appeal 

against  the  sentence  of  the  consul  pronounced  in  the  city. 

In  493,  by  a  determined  though  bloodless  revolution,  the  plebeians 
obtained  the  appointment  of  certain  officers  (necessarily  plebeians), 
whose  duty  it  was  to  protect  them  from  harsh  administration. 

In  47 1,  by  the  lex  Publilia.,  the  plebeians  secured  that  these  officers 
(5  tribunes,  2  aediles — 10  after  457)  should  be  elected  in  their  own 
council,  now  called  comitia  tributa. 

In  451  the  plebeians  succeeded  (after  ten  years'  resistance  to  the 
Terentilian  rogation)  in  securing  that  the  laws  by  which  the  whole 
people  were  to  be  governed  should  be  written  out,  engraved,  and 
exposed  to  public  inspection  (x.  tabulae  451  ;  ii.  tabulae  449). 

In  449,  by  the  Valeria- H or atian  laws.,  the  plebeians  secured  that 
their  council,  which  as  comitia  tributa  already  elected  the  plebeian 
magistrates,  should  be  recognised  as  a  legislative  body  capable  of 
passing  orders  {plebiscita)  binding  upon  the  populus,  while  the 
senatus  consulta  were  committed  to  the  care  of  the  plebeian  aediles, 
to  be  preserved  in  the  temple  of  Ceres,  and  to  be  thus  saved  from 
possible  tampering  by  the  consuls  and  their  subordinates  the  quaestors. 

In  445,  by  the  lex  Canuleia^  the  plebeians  obtained  the  power  of 
contracting  full  and  lawful  marriage  with  patricians. 

In  444  the  patricians  were  forced  to  compromise  the  plebeian 
claim  of  admission  to  the  consulship  by  substituting  for  consuls 
"  military  tribunes  with  consular  power,"  among  whom,  on  the  analogy 
of  the  military  tribunes  in  the  legions,  plebeians  might  be  elected. 

In  421  the  number  of  quaestors  was  raised  from  two  to  four,  and' 

1  Valerius  Max.  ii.  2,  7. 


GRADUAL  PROGRESS  OF  THE  PLEBEIANS 


HI3 


the  right  conceded  to  the  plebeians  of  being  elected  to  any  number 
of  them,  although  they  did  not  succeed  in  carrying  any  election  till 
409,  when  three  out  of  four  were  plebeians. 

The  disabilities  still  remaining  were  that  the  plebeians  could  not 
be  consuls,  censors,  members  of  the  colleges  of  pontifices  or  augures, 
or  hold  certain  other  religious  offices.  The  gradual  removal  of  these 
disabilities  will  be  treated  of  in  a  future  chapter. 


Authorities. — The  most  continuous  narratives  are  those  of  Livy  ii,-v.  ; 
Dionysius  V. -xiii. ;  Zonaras  vii.  13-22.  We  have  also  fragments  of  Dio  Cassius, 
and  of  Cicero's  Treatise  on  the  Republic,  Lib.  ii.,  and  'PhxX.axch's  Lives  of  Pop lico la 
and  Camillus.  Most  valuable  of  all  perhaps  are  the  fragments  of  the  laws  of  the 
twelve  tables  preserved  chiefly  by  Aulus  Gellius  and  Gaius.  These  fragments  the 
student  will  find  collected  in  many  books — Donaldson's  Varj'oniam/s ;  Words- 
worth's Fragments  and  Specimens  of  Ancient  Latin  ;  Allen's  Early  Latin  ;  Bruns' 
Pontes  Juris  Romani  antiqui,  ed.  T.  Mommsen. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE    CAPTURE    OF    ROME    BY    THE    GAULS,    B.C.    390 

The  Gauls  in  Italy — The  Senones  and  Lingones  attack  Clusium — Roman 
envoys  at  Clusium  join  in  the  battle — The  Romans  refuse  satisfaction — 
Advance  of  Brennus  on  Rome — Battle  of  the  Allia  (midsummer  390) — Burn- 
ing of  Rome  and  defence  of  the  Capitol  by  Manlius — Camillus  at  Ardea — His 
recall  and  appointment  as  dictator — Saving  of  the  Capitol  by  the  geese — 
Exhaustion  of  the  Gauls  by  pestilence — They  overrun  the  Campagna — 
Recalled  home  by  an  invasion  of  the  Veneti — Camillus  said  to  have  attacked 
and  retaken  gold  and  standards — Effects  of  the  capture  on  Rome. 


Some  account  of  the  Celtic  invaders  of  northern  Italy  has  already 
been  given.  We  have  seen  that  they  had  long  ago  expelled  the 
Etruscans  from  the  valley  of  the  Padus,  and  confined  them  to  the 
region  south  of  the  Apennines.  The  rich  plains  of  northern  Italy 
had  attracted  tribe  after  tribe  of  these  barbarians  from  the  other  side 
of  the  Alps  or  from  the  high  Alpine  valleys.  Those  who  came  first 
lost  perhaps  some  of  their  warlike  and  migratory  habits  as  they  found 
fruitful  plains  to  settle  in,  and  sites  for  permanent  townships.  But 
as  they  had  seized  these  fair  lands  by  arms,  so  were  they  ever  pressed 
by  fresh  waves  of  immigration,  and  harassed  by  the  Ligures  on  the 
west  and  the  Veneti  on  the  east,  who,  whether  of  kindred  blood  or 
no,  were  earlier  comers  in  the  country,  and  ready  to  resist  any 
encroachment  on  their  soil. 

The  earliest  immigrants  had  settled  on  the  upper  parts  of  the 
Po  valley,  the  newcomers  going  farther  and  farther  to  the  east 
and  south.  The  latest  of  the  tribes  to  arrive  appears  to  have  been 
that  of  the  Senones,  who  occupied  a  district  on  the  shore  of  the 
Adriatic  between  the  two  streams,  the  Utens  and  the  Aesis.  It  is 
narrow  and  far  from  fertile,  for  the  mountains  here  come  down 
very  close  to  the  sea,  leaving  but  small  space  for  cultivation. 
Naturally  the  restless  Gaul,  who  would  not  bear  the  fatigue  and 
monotony  of  continuous  occupation  even  of  good  soil,  but  liked  to 
move  off  to  another  district  when  he  had  exhausted  one,  looked  out 


CHAP.  IX     THE  SENONES  AND  LINGONES  IN  ETRURIA  115 

for  wider  and  more  generous  lands.  Making  their  way  over  the 
mountains  into  the  valleys  of  the  upper  Tiber  and  the  Clanis,  the 
Senones,  joined  perhaps  by  the  neighbouring  Lingones,  were  seeking 
new  territories  in  Etruria.^ 

Marching  down  the  Clanis,   under  their  king  or   Brennus,   they   The 
came  upon  the  strong  town  of  Clusium,  situated  on  the  crest  of  an  Senones 
olive-crowned  eminence  at  the  southern  extremity  of  the  valley.      It  "'^i^^o^es 
was  necessary  to  capture  this  town,  if  they  were  to  have  liberty  to  attack 
settle  in  the  valley  or  beyond  it  as  they  chose.      But  the  Gauls  never  Clusium, 
bore  willingly  the  fatigue  of  a  siege.     The  people  of  Clusium  were  39^- 
able   to   maintain    themselves   within   their   walls,    and   to   send   out 
messages  asking  for  help.      It  is  a  striking  proof  of  the  growth  of 
the  Roman  reputation  since  the  fall  of  Veii,  that  it  was  to  Rome  that 
this  appeal  was  made,  though  nothing  in  the  past  history  of  the  two 
cities  warranted  an  expectation  of  help  from  this  ancient  enemy. 

But  though  the  Roman  government  sent  no  troops  to  the  relief  Ambassa- 
of  the  besieged  town,  they  took  the  opportunity  of  making  plain  the  ^^^^  ^^"^ 
fact  that  there  were  ties  between  the  two  states.      Three  ambassadors,  ■^J'J'^^   ^^^ 
all  members  of  the  great  Fabian  gens,  were  sent  to  warn  the  Gauls   Cauls  at 
"  not  to  attack  allies  and  friends  of  the    Roman   people,   who   had  Clusium. 
done  them  no  injury."      The  Gauls  answered  "that  they  were  willing 
to  treat  on  amicable  terms  :  that   what   they   wanted   was   land,   of 
which   the  people   of  Clusium  had    more    than    they  were   able  to 
cultivate,  while  they  themselves  were  straitened  for  room.      If  they 
refused,   let   the    Romans   stand  by  and  see   which  would   win   the 
field !  "     The   Roman  envoys,  without  deigning  to  answer  the  pro- 
posal, asked    haughtily,    "What  business   Gauls  had   in   Etruria?" 
"  Our  title,"  answered  the  Gauls,   "  is  in   our  swords.      Everything 
belongs  to  brave  men." 

The   battle  which  followed  was  not  decisive.      But   the    Roman    The  envoys 
envoys,  forgetful  of  the  law  of  nations,  took  part  in  it,  and  one  of  take  part  in 
them,  Q.  Fabius,  slew  and  spoiled  a  Gallic  chieftain.      The  leader  of  ^^^jf/^^' 
the  Gauls  at  once  sounded  the  recall,  and  suspending  hostilities  with  j^oj^^ns 
Clusium,  sent  an  embassy  to  Rome  demanding  the  surrender  of  the  refuse  re- 
three  Fabii.      Not  only  was  the  demand  refused,  but  all  three  were  paration. 
elected  among  the  six  consular  tribunes  for  the  next  year. 

It  is  not  easy  to  say  who  was  responsible  for  this  unjust  decision. 
Livy  represents  the  Fetials  as  deciding  that  the  men  ought  to  be 

^  There  is  a  story  told  by  Plutarch  and  Dionysius  that  the  attack  upon  Clusium 
was  instigated  by  Aruns,  a  native  of  Clusium,  whose  wife  had  been  dishonoured 
by  a  noble  youth  or  Lucumo.  Not  getting  redress  he  went  to  the  Senones  and 
induced  them  to  attack  his  native  city.  Another  version  of  the  story  attributed 
this  incident  to  the  first  passage  of  the  Gauls  into  Italy,  which  Livy  says  was  200 
years  earlier  (Plut.  Cam.  15  ;   Dionys.  xiii.  fr.  15  ;   Livy  v.  33). 


ii6  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap. 


and  yet  hesitating  to  surrender  them  from  a  class  feeling  in  favour  of 
men  of  rank.  To  save  themselves,  therefore,  from  the  odium  of  either 
decision,  they  referred  the  matter  to  the  people,  who  replied  by  elect- 
ing the  envoys  consular  tribunes.  But  as  this  decision  was  the  cause 
of  a  great  disaster  to  Rome,  no  doubt  each  party  in  the  State  would  be 
anxious  to  shift  the  blame  upon  the  other.  Livy's  account  seems  on 
the  whole  reasonable,  namely  that  the  Senate  vacillated.  Its  vacilla- 
tion however  must  be  held  partly  responsible  for  the  decision  of  the 
centuriate  assembly.  Q.  Fabius  was  indeed  subsequently  impeached 
by  a  tribune  ;  but  nothing  can  explain  away  or  quite  excuse  the  fact 
of  the  election.  That  at  any  rate  was  the  act  of  the  people.  If  they 
followed  the  lead  of  the  Senate,  so  much  the  worse  for  both.^ 

These  events  must  have  occurred  in  the  autumn  of  391  ;  for  the 
elections  come  after  the  Gallic  embassy.  The  Gauls  apparently 
waited  for  reinforcements,^  and  did  not  start  till  the  summer  of  the 
next  year.  They  then  poured  down  the  valley  of  the  Tiber  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  river,  in  great  force,  scouring  the  country  as  they 
came  with  a  widely  extended  line.  Where  they  passed,  the  citizens 
closed  their  gates  and  hurriedly  rushed  to  arms,  while  the  frightened 
rustics  fled  for  safety  to  towns  or  mountains.  Yet  though  they  doubt- 
less plundered  far  and  wide  to  supply  their  wants,  they  stayed  to 
attack  no  walled  town  ;  but  rushed  on  like  a  torrent,  shouting  "  To 
Rome  !  To  Rome  !  " 

Meanwhile  the  new  consular  tribunes  seemed  but  half  conscious 
of  their  danger.  Four  legions  were  indeed  enrolled,  and  were  joined 
by  Latin  allies  and  others  less  capable  of  service,  so  that  an  army 
of  nearly  40,000  men  was  encamped  about  eleven  miles  from 
Rome,  near  the  place  where  the  small  brook  called  the  Allia  fell 
into  the  Tiber.^  But  no  special  pains  had  been  taken  with  the 
levies  ;  no  dictator  had  been  named,  as  was  usual  in  times  of  peril ; 
no  great  care  was  shown  in  either  the  selection  or  the  fortifying  of 
the  camp  ;  and  finally  the  usual  ceremonies  in  taking  the  auspices  had 
been  neglected. 

^  Diodorus  (xiv.  113)  affirms  that  the  Senate  voted  for  the  surrender  of  the 
legate  (he  only  mentions  one),  but  that  his  father,  Q.  Fabius  Ambustus,  who 
was  consular  tribune,  appealed  to  the  people  and  carried  the  day.  This  does 
not  agree  with  either  Livy  or  the  Fasti. 

^  Diodorus  xiv.  114  irpocrXa^bjMevoL  irapa  tQjv  bixoeOvCov  dvvafiiv. 

3  Which  particular  brook  represents  the  ancient  Allia  is  not  certain.  Livy 
describes  it  carefully  :  "At  the  eleventh  milestone,  where  the  AUia  flowing  down 
from  the  mountains  of  Crustunierium  in  a  very  deep  channel  joins  the  Tiber 
close  below  the  road  "  (v,  37).  Two  streams  answer  more  or  less  to  this  de- 
scription, one  nameless  brook  crossing  the  road  a  mile  beyond  La  Macigliana ; 
another  the  Scolo  del  Casale,  three  miles  farther  on.  Neither  is  exactly  the  distance 
mentioned  by  Livy.     The  "  road  "  is  the  via  Salaria. 


I 


IX  DEFEAT  OF  THE  ROMANS  ON  THE  ALLIA  117 

The  left  of  the  Roman  army  rested  on  the  Tiber  ;  their  centre  Battle  of 
was  weak,  because  the  inferiority  of  their  numbers  made  an  unduly  ^^^  Alha, 
extended  line    necessary    to    prevent    being    outflanked.     They    en-  /[  ^^   "^' 
deavoured    to  make   their  right   strong  by   occupying   some    rising 
ground  with  reserves,  which   might   compensate  for  their  defect  in 
numbers.      But  the  Gallic  king  directed  his  main  force  against  this 
hill,  carried  it  by  an  impetuous  assault,  and  then  took  the  Roman 
line  on  the  flank  and  drove  their  left  into  the  river.      The  rout  was   The 
as  complete  as  it  seems  to  have  been  all  but  instantaneous.      So  little  Romans 
resistance  was  made  that  the  slaughter  does  not  appear  to  have  been  °^'^^^^' 
great.      The    men    stationed    on    the    left   escaped   across   the   river, 
and  such  loss  as  they  sustained  was  occasioned  by  the  crush  of  fugi- 
tives or  by   the   stream   more    than    by  the    swords    of  the   enemy. 
Large  numbers  made  their  way  to  Veii,  where  the  empty  town  was 
able    to   afford   them   a   refuge.      The    Roman    right    retreated  pre- 
cipitately to  Rome,  and  rushing  through  the  city,  without  stopping 
even  to  close  the  gates,  made  its  way  to  the  Capitol. 

The   Gauls  were   amazed  at  their  own   success.     It   seemed   so  The  Gauls 
sudden  as  to  be  unaccountable.     A  Roman  army  had  scattered  to  wait  for 
the  winds  almost  at  the  sound  of  their  shouting.     They  hesitated  to  ^"^^  '^'^y^' 
go  on,  thinking  that  there  must  be  some  ambush  preparing  for  them. 
It  is  thus  that  Livy  accounts  for  their  waiting  to  the  third  day  after 
the  battle  before  approaching  Rome.      But  it  is  also  probable  that 
the  division  of  the  spoil  of  the  Roman  camp,  and  the  riotous  feasting 
in  which  they  were  accustomed  to  indulge  after  a  victory,  may  partly 
be  responsible  for  the  delay.^ 

Meanwhile  the  two  days  gave  the  population  of  Rome  the  oppor-  Flight  of 
tunity  of  escape.      The  citizens  who  had  arms,  and  were  neither  too  the  fopula- 
young  nor  too  old  to  use  them,  entrenched  themselves  on  the  Capitol ;  ^^^"-  °' 
the  unarmed,  with  the  women  and  children,  poured  over  the   Sub- 
lician  bridge,  carrying  as  much  of  their  household  goods  as  they 
could,  and  made  their  way  to  neighbouring  towns — Caere,  Veii,  and 
others.      The  Vestal  Virgins  and  the  Flamen  Ouirinalis,  after  a  hasty   The 
conference,  selected  the  most  sacred  objects  of  their  worship  which    Vestals. 
they  could  carry  with  them  and  started  for  Caere,  after  burying  the 
rest  in  jars   {dolioli)  within  a  chapel  attached  to  the  flamen's  resi- 
dence.     The  story  is  told  that  as  these  holy  virgins  were  mounting 
Janiculum  on  foot,  a  certain  plebeian,  named  L.  Albinius,  who  was 
conveying  his  wife  and  children  on  a  waggon,  came  up  with  them. 
Even  in  that  hour  of  panic  he  reverenced  their  office  and  character, 
and,  causing  his  wife  and  children  to  dismount,  he  carried  them  and 
the  sacred  objects  which  they  bore  to  Caere. 


I 


1  Plut.  Cam.  20  ;  cp.  Polyb.  ii.  19. 


[8 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


When  the  Gauls  on  the  third  day  after  the  battle  of  the  Allia 
arrived  at  Rome,  they  were  astonished  to  find  the  gates  open  and 
the  streets  empty.  As  they  made  their  way  through  the  Forum,  and 
cast  their  eyes  from  side  to  side  upon  the  public  buildings  and 
temples  which  surrounded  it,  no  sign  of  resistance  or  even  of  habita- 
tion met  their  view.  Only  the  Capitol  towered  above  them,  strongly 
fortified  and  crowded  with  defenders.  Successive  accumulations  from 
surrounding  buildings,  as  well  as  deliberate  embankments  made  in 
imperial  times,  have  rendered  it  difficult  for  a  modern  visitor  to  the 
Capitol  to  understand  its  strength,  when  its  sides  were  abrupt  and 
steep,  and  no  easy  ascent  had  been  constructed  for  the  accommoda- 
tion of  peaceful  citizens.  At  this  period  it  presented  a  formidable 
obstacle  to  the  Gauls,  whose  strength  lay  in  sudden  and  rapid 
charges,  which  swept  all  before  them  in  the  open,  rather  than  in 
besieging  or  storming  fortifications. 

Leaving  a  detachment  to  guard  against  sallies  from  the  Capitol, 
the  Gauls  dispersed  to  plunder  the  deserted  town.  It  was  not,  how- 
ever, entirely  empty.  Certain  old  men,  many  of  whom  had  held 
high  office  and  celebrated  triumphs,  were  sitting  in  their  houses, 
clothed  in  the  robes  and  ensigns  of  their  rank,  waiting  for  the  end. 
They  were  too  old  to  be  useful  on  the  Capitol,  and  yet  had  disdained 
to  fly.  Some  even  said  that  by  a  solemn  formula,  dictated  by  M. 
Fabius,  the  Pontifex  Maximus,  they  had  devoted  themselves  to  death 
as  a  sacrifice  for  their  country.  At  first  the  Gauls  looked  at  them 
with  a  kind  of  reverential  curiosity  without  doing  them  any  violence. 
But  when  one,  hardier  or  more  curious  than  the  rest,  ventured  to 
stroke  the  beard  of  M.  Papirius,  the  old  man  in  wrath  smote  him  on 
the  head  with  his  ivory  staff.  The  barbarian,  in  a  flash  of  anger, 
slew  him  ;  and  this  was  a  signal  for  the  death  of  all  the  rest. 

When  their  first  lust  of  plunder  had  been  satiated,  the  object  of 
the  Gauls  was  to  provoke  the  garrison  of  the  Capitol  to  descend. 
They  tried  to  do  this  by  firing  different  parts  of  the  town,  or  slaughter- 
ing such  remnants  of  the  population  as  had  not  been  able  to  escape. 
But  though  it  was  a  heartrending  spectacle  for  the  garrison,  they 
remained  firm  to  their  purpose  of  holding  the  hill.  Whether  fear  or 
prudence  constrained  them,  it  was  doubtless  the  wisest  policy.  The 
Gauls  would  soon  weary  of  waiting,  and  even  of  their  work  of  destruc- 
tion, which  would  in  itself  naturally  entail  a  failure  of  provisions. 
Accordingly,  after  several  ineffectual  attempts  to  storm  the  Capitol, 
they  had  to  divide  their  forces  :  part  staying  to  keep  up  the  blockade, 
part  scattering  through  the  Campagna  in  search  of  food.  The  result 
of  this  was  that  they  lost  many  men,  cut  off  in  detail  by  the  Latins, 
who  were  obliged  to  arm  themselves  to  protect  their  lives  and  pro- 
perty.     The  exiled  Camillus,  for  instance,  who  was  living  at  Ardea, 


I 


THE  SIEGE  OF  THE  CAPITOL  119 


is  said  to  have  led  the   people  of  that  town  in  a  successful  night 
attack  upon  one  of  these  plundering-  parties,  and  to  have  cut  it  to 
pieces.      Meanwhile  the  Gauls  left  behind  in  Rome  showed  signs  of 
weariness.      The  blockade  was  so  ill  kept  that  C.  F'abius  Dorso  was   The  siege 
able  to  make  his  way  to  the  Quirinal,  perform  a  sacrifice  incumbent  of  the 
on  the   Fabian   gens,   and   return   without    being  molested   by   the  ^^P^*^^  ^^^ 
enemy.  ^ 

Moreover,  the  Roman  fugitives  had  gradually  collected  in  formid-  Romans 
able  numbers  at  Veil ;  had  sternly  suppressed  a  movement  among  ^^  ^^"• 
a  remnant  of  the  conquered  Etruscan  inhabitants  of  the  district,  who  ^^^' 
were  taking  advantage  of  the  disaster  of  Rome  to  plunder  her  terri- 
tory ;  and  were  looking  out  for  some  chance  of  striking  a  blow  at 
the  invaders.      Their  thoughts  naturally  turned  to  Camillus,  the  con-, 
queror  of  the  very  town  in  which  they  were  living.      It  was  deter- 
mined that  he  should  be  summoned  from  Ardea  as  dictator.     An 
active  youth,  named  Pontius  Cominius,  managed  to  make  his  way  to 
the  Capitol  by  the  river,  and  obtain  a  decree  of  the  Senate  for  the 
recall  of  Camillus  and  his  nomination  as  dictator.     Messengers  were  Camillus 
sent  to  summon  him  ;  and  he  consented  to  come  when  the  citizens  sent  for. 
at  Veil  had  passed  a  law  for  his  recall. 

Meanwhile  the  Gauls  were  getting  daily  in  a  worse  plight.     They   The  geese 
had  made  one  more  attempt  on  the  Capitol,  scaling  it  by  the  same  ^'^  ^^f 
path  as  the  Veientine,  or  some  other  messenger,  had  been  observed     ^^^  ^  * 
to  do,  and  were  on  the  point  of  making  their  way  in,  finding  the 
guards  asleep,  when  the  frightened  cackling  of  the  sacred  geese  of 
the  temple  of  Juno  roused  M.  Manlius,  who  hurled  the  leading  Gaul 
down  the  precipitous  path  by  a  blow  from  his  shield.      His  fall  threw 
the   advancing   file    into    some  confusion,   which   was  completed  by 
showers   of  javelins   poured   down   by  the   now  thoroughly -aroused 
garrison.     One  of  the  sentries,  whose  untimely  sleep  had  thus  all  but 
lost  Rome,   was  hurled  down  the  Tarpeian  rock  ;   the   Roman  dis- 
cipline being  thus  sternly  exercised  even  in  that  hour  of  danger. 

The  discouragement  caused  by  these  repeated  failures,  and  by 
the  losses  sustained  in  the  raids  in   Latium,  was  now  brought  to  a  Pestilence 
climax  by  famine  and  pestilence.      The  famine  was  the  natural  result  andfatnine 
of  a  marauding  army's   operations   in  a  foreign  country.      In  such  ^^'^^S  ihe 
expeditions  as  much  is  spoiled  and  destroyed  as  is  taken  for  use  ; 
while  cattle  are  driven  off  to  places  of  security  by  the  countrymen,  and 
corn  and  other  food  are  concealed.      These  causes  in  later  times  more 
than  once  reduced  Hannibal  almost  to  despair,  though  he  had  won 
greater  victories,  and  had  a  far  wider  district  to  draw  from.      More- 
over, as  the  battle  of  the  Allia  was  fought  on  the  i6th  of  July,  the 
Gauls  must  have  been  in  Rome  at  its  most  unhealthy  season,  during 
which  all  those  of  its  natives  who  could  afibrd  to  do  so  sought  purer 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


air.  We  have  seen  how  frequent  were  the  pestilences  at  Rome.^ 
It  was  likely,  therefore,  to  fare  much  worse  with  men  accustomed  to 
another  climate,  and  unused  to  long  residence  in  a  town  ;  exposed 
also  to  the  alternations  of  wild  debauchery,  when  the  plunder  of 
cattle,  corn,  and  wine  was  plentiful,  and  of  sharp  privation  when  that 
failed. 

The  retirement,  therefore,  of  the  invaders  requires  little  farther 
explanation.  It  was  their  way.  Sudden  and  violent  onslaughts, 
which  swept  all  before  them,  gave  place  to  sullen  discouragement  at 
anything  like  prolonged  opposition  and  difficulty.  News  was  brought 
them  also  that  the  Veneti  were  invading  their  territories.  This 
perhaps  applies  not  to  the  Senones  but  to  the  Lingones,  who  lived 
in  the  country  separated  by  the  Po  from  that  of  the  Veneti.  But  if 
they  found  the  Lingones  determined  on  a  return,  the  Senones  would 
not  probably  be  willing  to  stay  behind.  "  Accordingly,"  says  Polybius, 
"they  made  terms  with  the  Romans,  handed  back  the  city,  and 
returned  to  their  own  land." 

This,  perhaps,  is  all  of  which  we  can  be  sure.  Livy  says  that 
Q.  Sulpicius,  one  of  the  consular  tribunes,  negotiated  with  Bren- 
nus  a  payment  of  a  thousand  pounds  of  gold  ;  and  that  Brennus 
answered  his  objections  to  the  balance  brought  by  the  Gauls  by 
putting  his  sword  into  the  scale,  and  exclaiming  insolently,  "  Woe 
to  the  conquered  ! "  Before  the  base  bargain  was  completed  the 
dictator  Camillus  appeared.  He  ordered  the  gold  to  be  taken  away, 
answering  the  remonstrances  of  the  Gauls  by  declaring  that  all  public 
bargains  were  annulled  by  the  appointment  of  a  dictator.  He 
proudly  declared  that  Rome  must  be  saved  by  arms  and  not  by  gold  ; 
and  drawing  out  his  men  in  battle  array,  fought  with  and  conquered 
the  Gauls.  They  fled,  but  were  overtaken  by  him  eight  miles  from 
Rome,  again  defeated,  and  cut  to  pieces  to  a  man. 

Though  this  picturesque  story  of  the  sudden  intervention  of 
Camillus  is  repeated  in  several  of  our  authorities,  it  must  be  regarded 
as  almost  certainly  mythical.  It  would  be  impossible  without  a  pre- 
vious battle  and  victory  ;  and  it  seems  certain  that  whatever  sum  the 
Gauls  bargained  for,  they  obtained  and  carried  off"  with  them.  Some 
attack,  led  by  Camillus,  upon  the  rear  of  the  retreating  army  may  be 
the  foundation  on  which  this  story,  so  honourable  to  the  family  of 
Camillus,  was  founded. 

The  Gauls  were  gone.  They  had  swept  over  Rome  and  the 
Campagna  like  a  torrent,  leaving  behind  them  ruin  and  desolation. 
But  the  burning  of  a  city  cannot  destroy  a  people.  The  loss  of  life 
among  the  Romans  does  not  appear  to  have  been  great,  and  public 


Of  the  frequent  pestilences  in  Rome,  see  p.  74. 


I 


IX       RETIREMENT  OF  GAULS— RESTORATION  OF  CITY       121 

business  and  private  industry  could  at  once  be  resumed.  No  doubt  the 
farmers  had  suffered  severely,  and  the  poverty  of  the  weaker  of  them 
would  amount  in  many  cases  to  absolute  ruin.  Still  such  catastrophes 
are  seldom  complete.  Means  would  soon  be  found  to  rebuild  the 
homesteads,  to  sow  the  crops,  and  to  renew  the  herds  and  flocks  ; 
and  next  year  the  fields  would  hide  with  waving  corn  all  traces  of  the 
enemy's  presence.  Nor  can  we  suppose  the  city  to  have  been  utterly 
destroyed.  No  doubt  the  houses,  small  and  often  of  wood  and  thatch, 
would  to  a  great  extent  be  burnt ;  but  it  is  certain  that  many  of 
the  temples  and  public  buildings  still  remained,  either  whole  or  only 
partly  consumed  by  fire  ;  the  Gauls  also  would,  no  doubt,  have  pre- 
served some  houses  for  their  own  accommodation  ;  and  the  utter 
demolition  of  a  great  city  is  a  task  which  they  would  not  have  had 
the  patience  thoroughly  to  perform.  Just  ninety  years  before  Athens 
had  suffered  a  similar  disaster  at  the  hands  of  the  Persians,  yet  she 
had  now  long  been  famous  throughout  the  world  for  the  splendour 
and  beauty  of  her  temples  and  works  of  art.  Rome,  too,  would  soon 
rise  from  her  ashes,  revived  in  greater  magnificence  by  the  energy 
and  liberality  of  her  sons. 

Even  the  State  documents  and  other  perishable  objects,  which  Loss  of 
Livy  thinks  were  destroyed  by  the  Gallic  conflagration,  must  in  many  public 
cases  have  escaped.      Some  of  them  were  on  the  Capitol,  which  was  ^^'^^  ^' 
not  burnt  at  all ;  some  had  been  removed  or  buried  by  the  Flamen 
and  the  Vestals  ;  others  were  in  temples  which  did  not  at  any  rate 
wholly  perish.      It  was  an  obvious  thing  in  after  years  to  describe 
to  the  Gallic  fire  the  loss  of  everything  which  the  carelessness  or 
violences  of  succeeding  generations  had  perhaps  caused  to  disappear. 

The  work  of  restoration  began  with  the  temples,  and  an  altar  Restora- 
was  dedicated  to  Aius  Locutius  at  the  bottom  of  the  Sacred  Way,  to  ^^°"-     ^^^ 
expiate   the  neglect   of  a  divine  voice  which   was   believed  to  have 
announced  the  coming  of  the  Gauls. ^     But  the  ruinous  state  of  the    VeU 
city  caused  a  renewal  of  the  proposal  to  transfer  the  seat  of  govern-  defeated. 
ment  to  Veii.      It   is  diflicult  to  see  why  the  tribunes  should  have 
promoted  this  as  a  popular  measure,  unless  the  plebeians  hoped  that 

^  Livy  also  says  that  the  money  taken  from  the  Gauls,  which  had  originally 
been  contributed  by  the  women,  was  declared  sacred  and  placed  in  the  temple  of 
Jupiter,  and  we  hear  afterwards  of  this  money  as  being  believed  to  have  been 
embezzled  by  the  patricians.  But  it  seems  almost  certain  that  the  Gauls  never 
lost  the  ransom  which  they  received  ;  and  as,  by  Livy's  own  account,  the  women 
were  not  on  the  Capitol  but  at  Veii  and  other  towns,  it  is  inconsistent  with  the 
rest  of  the  account  that  Camillas  should  have  allowed  their  contributions  to  be 
sent.  Again,  Livy  states  that  in  consequence  of  this  public  service  the  Senate 
decreed  that  henceforth  a  laudatio  should  be  delivered  over  women  at  their 
funeral  as  over  men,  but  Cicero  {de  Orat.  ii.  §  44)  says  that  the  first  woman  so 
honoured  was  the  mother  of  Catulus,  about  B.C.  100. 


proposal  to 
ligrate  to 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP.  IX 


No  im- 
mediate 
political 
change, 
389- 


a  removal  from  Rome  might  be  an  opportunity  of  breaking  free  from 
patrician  privileges,  inextricably  interwoven  with  local  traditions  and 
rites,  and  starting  fresh  with  institutions  more  consonant  with  ideas 
which  had  been  growing  up  during  the  last  century.  At  any  rate 
the  patricians,  headed  by  Camillus,  successfully  resisted  the  pro- 
posal, and  the  work  of  restoring  houses  at  Rome  was  begun. 
Unfortunately,  no  general  plan  was  followed.  The  citizens  seem  to 
have  carried  on  the  rebuilding  according  to  individual  caprice  ;  and 
therefore  the  new  streets  were  irregular  and  ill-planned,  while  the 
old  sewers,  originally  constructed  down  the  line  of  the  streets,  were 
now  often  built  over  by  private  houses,  which  must  have  proved 
unhealthy  for  the  inhabitants,  and  have  increased  the  difficulty  of 
cleansing  and  repairing  the  sewers  themselves. 

Otherwise,  this  year  of  disaster  made  no  positive  change  in  the 
State.  The  old  constitution  simply  resumed  operation ;  consular 
tribunes  were  duly  elected  for  389,  and  the  contests  of  patrician  and 
plebeian  were  taken  up  again,  intensified  perhaps  by  the  greater 
poverty  to  which  many  must  have  been  reduced  by  their  losses  dur- 
ing the  Gallic  occupation.  Her  old  enemies  in  Etruria  and  Latium, 
indeed,  took  advantage  of  her  v/eakness  to  renew  their  attacks  upon 
Rome  and  her  territory  ;  but,  though  she  suffered,  she  survived  these 
assaults  as  she  had  survived  the  victory  of  the  Gauls  ;  and,  before 
the  Gauls  were  able  to  renew  their  invasion,  had  won  for  herself  a 
broader  territory  and  an  almost  undisputed  supremacy  in  Latium. 


Authorities. — Livy  v.  34-55  ;  Dionysius  xiii.  7-13  ;  Diodorus  xiv.  113-115  ; 
Dio  Cassius,  fr.  25  ;  Appian,  Res  Gall.  3  ;  Eutropius  i.  19  ;  Plutarch,  Camillus  ; 
Polybius  ii.  18  ;  Orosius  ii.  19  ;  Zonaras  vii.  23. 


1 


CHAPTER    X 


TO    THE    DISSOLUTION    OF    THE    LATIN    LEAGUE 


NEW  TRIBES 


Satricum 

Sutrium 

Nepete 

Setia     . 

Antium 

Cales  . 

Fregellae 


B.C.  385 
B.C.  383 

B.C.  383 
B.C.  382 
B.C.  338 
B.C.  334 
B.C.  328 


Stellatina 

Tromentina 

Sabatina 

Arniensis 

Pomptina 

Publilia 

Maecia 

Scaptia 


B.C.  387 


B.C.  358 


B.C.  332 


Hostilities  break  out  against  Rome  after  the  departure  of  the  Gauls — Camillus 
conquers  the  Etruscans,  Volscians,  and  Aequians  (389) — Fresh  war  with 
Volscians  and  Etruscans ;  capture  of  Sutrium  and  Nepete  (386) — The 
Volscians  joined  by  some  of  the  Latini  and  Hernici  ;  colony  sent  to  Satricum 
(385) — Pestilence — Rebellions  at  Lanuvium,  Circeii,  Velitrae,  Praeneste  (383- 
382) — War  with  Volscians  and  rebellion  at  Tusculum  (381) — Cincinnatus 
conquers  the  rebellious  Praenestines  (380) — A  Roman  disaster  in  Volscian 
territory  (379) — Conquest  of  Volscians  and  Latins  (378-377) — The  Gauls 
(367-282) — The  first  Samnite  war  (343-342) — The  Latin  rebeUion — T.  Man- 
lius  Torquatus  (340-339) — Dissolution  of  the  Latin  League,  and  last  struggles 
of  the  Latin  towns  (338-336). 


The  humiliation   which    Rome   had  suffered  at   the   hands  of  the    Wars  with 
Gauls   was   quickly  followed   by  attacks   from  her  enemies.      The  Etruscam, 
Etruscans  at  the  Fanuin  Voltumnae^  the  regular  place  of  meeting  of  ^^^^'^^"■^^ 
the  League,  determined  to  drive  the  Romans  from  southern  Etruria,  380-377. ' 
and  at  once  seized  upon  Sutrium,  the  first  strong  town  south  of  the 
Ciminian  forest,  which  the  Romans  had  secured  shortly  before  the 
coming  of  the  Gauls.      The  Volscians  advanced  as  far  as  Lanuvium, 
less  than  twenty  miles  from  Rome.      The  Aequians  were  encamped 
at  Bola,  not   far  from  Praeneste.      By  a   series   of  rapid  movements 
Camillus,  who  had  been  named  dictator,  gained  a  victory  over  all 
three  enemies  in  succession. 

But   they  were  far  from   being   finally  crushed.      For   the   next 
thirteen  years  there  was  almost  continuous  war,  and  the  Volscians 


24 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


A  new 
colony  at 
Satricum 
attacked  by 
the  Vol- 
scians,  381. 


Rebellion 
at  Prae- 
neste. 

The 

Romans 
take  the 
offensive 
agaijtst  the 

Vblscians, 
379-377- 


again  and  again  advanced  into  old  Latium,  often  joined  by  forces  of 
the  Latins  and  Hernici.^  In  386  they  invaded  the  Pomptine  district, 
but  on  the  appearance  of  Camillus  retired  towards  Satricum  and 
Antium,  and  were  decisively  defeated  and  obliged  to  surrender 
Satricum.  Yet  they  repeated  the  attempt  in  the  following  year 
(385),  again  with  assistance  from  the  Latins,  among  vi^hom  were 
some  of  the  Roman  colonists  in  Circeii  and  Velitrae,  and  were  again 
defeated  by  the  dictator,  A.  Cornelius  Cossus. 

To  secure  the  frontier  a  colony  of  2000  Roman  citizens  was 
now  sent  out  to  Satricum,  each  with  an  allotment  of  two  and  a 
half  jugera  of  land.  But  during  383  and  382  a  series  of  rebellions 
in  Latium — at  Lanuvium,  Circeii,  Velitrae,  and  Praeneste — kept 
the  Romans  engaged,  and  induced  the  Volscians  to  renew  hostili- 
ties by  attacking  this  new  colony.  Once  more  they  were  defeated 
by  Camillus,  now  for  the  seventh  time  a  consular  tribune.  But 
so  widely  had  disloyalty  spread  in  Latium,  that  even  some  of 
the  citizens  of  Tusculum,  long  closely  connected  v^^ith  Rome,  were 
found  among  the  captives  from  the  Volscian  host,  and  brought  the 
fidelity  of  the  town  into  such  suspicion  that  Camillus  marched  an 
army  against  it.  A  speedy  submission,  however,  and  a  humble 
embassy  to  the  Senate  averted  any  actual  severity.  The  next  year 
(380)  the  Praenestines  were  also  defeated  by  T.  Ouintius  Cincin- 
natus  on  the  banks  of  the  Allia,  and  their  town  was  surrendered. 2 

From  this  time  the  character  of  the  war  changes.  The  Romans 
assumed  the  offensive,  and  instead  of  being  content  with  repelling 
Volscian  raids  upon  old  Latium,  marched  themselves  into  Volscian 
territory.  Their  first  experience  was  unfortunate.  Under  two  of 
the  consular  tribunes,  Publius  and  Caius  Manlius,  the  Roman  army 
was  caught  in  a  disadvantageous  situation,  and  nearly  lost  its  camp 
(379).  In  the  following  year,  however,  a  systematic  devastation 
was  carried  out  in  the  Volscian  lands,  and  in  377  a  combined 
force  of  Volscians  and  Latins,  which  had  advanced  as  far  as  Satri- 
cum, was  defeated  and  driven  back  upon  Antium.  The  people  of 
Antium,  tired  of  the  war,  now  surrendered  to  Rome.  But  their  Latin 
allies  were  not  disposed  to  submit  so  easily  :  they  burned   Satricum, 


^  The  alliance  with  the  Latins  (493)  and  with  the  Hernici  (486)  was  still  in 
force.  But  the  bands  of  the  Latin  League  seem  to  have  been  loose,  and  the 
various  towns  took  their  own  line  as  to  hostility  or  friendship  with  Rome.  The 
meeting-place  of  the  League  was  the  lucus  Ferentinae  (Livy  vii.  25)  ;  but  a  smaller 
league  of  eight  towns  joined  in  the  worship  of  Diana  at  the  Nemus  Aricinum 
(Cato  Orig.  ii.  21  ;  Jord. ) 

2.  Cincinnatus  is  said  to  have  removed  the  statue  of  Jupiter  Imperator  from 
Praeneste  to  Rome,  and  to  have  caused  to  be  inscribed  on  the  pedestal,  ' '  Jupiter 
and  all  the  gods  have  permitted  T.  Quintius  Cincinnatus,  dictator,  to  capture 
nine  towns"  (Livy  vi.  29). 


J 


X  RENEWED  GALLIC  INVASIONS  125 

and  attacked  Tusculum,  as  having  deserted  the  Latin  alliance.      The  Last  Latin 
Tusculans   fortified   themselves   in  their  citadel,  and   were   speedily  struggle, 
relieved  by  a  Roman  army.       The   Latins   suffered    such  a  defeat  ■377-37  • 
and  slaughter  that  they  submitted  to  enter  into  alliance  with  Rome, 
to  furnish  a  contingent  to  the  Roman  army,  and  seem  to  have  made 
no  serious  resistance  again  until  the  great  war  of  340. 

The  extension  of  the  Roman  territory  in  the  course  of  these  wars  Extension 
is  marked  by  the  formation  of  two  new  tribes,  the  Pomptina,  which  of  Roman 
would  include  the  Volscian  territory  round  Antium,  and  the  Publilia,    ^^I l^^ce 
also  on  Volscian  lands.     The  ten  years  of  comparative  peace,  which  y^^  ten 
followed  this  thirteen  years'  war,   were  occupied  at   Rome  by  the  years  {376- 
struggles  about  the   Licinian  rogations  ;  and  during  half  that  time,  J<^7)- 
owing  to  the  interruption  in  the  election  of  the  usual  curule  magis- 
trates, the  State  was  scarcely  in  a  position  to  act  with  vigour. 

The  peace  was  broken  by  a  renewed  invasion  of  the  Gauls,  who  Gallic 
for  twenty-three  years  had  been  prevented  by  internal  dissensions  ^^^'  3^7- 
from  returning  to  the  attack,  thus  leaving  the  Romans  time  to 
establish  their  supremacy  in  Latium.  In  367  the  city  was  alarmed 
by  hearing  that  they  were  on  the  march  again  towards  Rome,  and 
were  encamped  upon  the  Anio.  For  the  fifth  time  M.  Furius 
Camillus  was  named  dictator,  and  once  more  returned  victorious. 
There  does  not  appear  to  have  been  a  pitched  battle,  for  the  Romans 
had  no  time  to  summon  allies  or  collect  a  sufficient  force.  But  by 
seizing  the  strong  positions  near  the  camp  of  the  Gauls,  who  had 
crossed  the  Anio  and  were  near  Alba,  and  cutting  off  their  stragglers 
and  foraging  parties,  he  forced  them  once  more  to  retire. ^ 

It  was  the  veteran's  last  great  public  service.  He  died  two  years  Death  of 
later,  after  having  been  seven  times  consul  or  consular  tribune,  Cojmllus. 
and  five  times  dictator.  He  had  fought  with  and  conquered  nearly 
all  the  enemies  of  Rome — Veientines,  Volscians,  Aequians,  and 
Gauls.  Great  in  peace  as  in  war,  he  had  not  allowed  the  condemna- 
tion of  the  people,  however  unrighteous  it  might  appear  to  him,  to 
destroy  his  loyalty  or  embitter  his  feelings.  And  when  the  neces- 
sities of  his  countrymen  recalled  him  from  a  dignified  retreat,  during 
which  he  had  already  done  them  good  service,  he  had  not  abused  the 
commanding  influence  thus  gained  by  persisting  in  an  obstinate 
opposition   to  the  reforms  which  the  people  demanded.      He  had 

^  Livy,  indeed,  speaks  of  a  battle,  and  of  a  great  slaughter  of  the  Gauls,  who 
dispersed  in  every  direction,  some  even  finding  their  way  to  the  extreme  south  of 
Italy  (vi.  42),  Plutarch's  account  seems  more  reconcilable  with  a  series  of  skir- 
mishes [Cam.  41).  Both  w^riters  seem  to  have  had  to  pick  their  way  among  dis- 
cordant authorities.  Polybius  (ii.  18)  says  that  there  was  no  battle,  because  the 
Romans  had  not  time  to  collect  their  allies.  But  he  places  the  first  renewed 
invasion,  after  390,  six  years  earlier  than  Livy  does,  and  tells  us  nothing  of  the 
retreat. 


126 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Sixtyyears 
cessation 
from  Gallic 
•wars    to 
281. 


Wars  in 
Etruria, 
35S-35I' 


known  when  to  yield  as  he  had  known  how  to  resist,  and  his  last 
civil  action  had  been  to  heal  a  quarrel  between  the  Senate  and  the 
people,  and  to  vow  a  temple  to  Concord. 

The  next  invasion  of  the  Gauls  was  in  361,  when,  in  a  fierce 
battle  at  the  bridge  over  the  Anio,  Titus  Manlius  conquered  a  huge 
Gaul  in  single  combat,  and  stripping  from  him  the  gold  bracelet 
{torques)  with  which  he  was  adorned  gained  for  himself  and  his 
descendants  the  cognomen  of  Torquatus.  The  Gauls  retreated  into 
Campania,  having  been  helped  by  the  Tiburtines,  whom  the  next 
year,  therefore,  the  Romans  prepared  to  punish.  But  the  Gauls 
returning  from  Campania,  and  being  overthrown  in  a  great  battle 
near  the  Colline  Gate,  retired  to  Tibur ;  from  which  for  a  year 
and  a  half  they  maintained  a  war  of  skirmishes  and  surprises  with- 
out any  great  battle,  though  both  they  and  the  Tiburtines  suffered 
more  than  one  disaster.  At  length  in  358  C.  Sulpicius  was  named 
dictator.  His  policy,  like  that  of  the  famous  Cunctator  of  after  days, 
was  one  of  delay.  Time,  he  thought,  must  bring  greater  and  greater 
difficulties  to  an  ill-disciplined  host  in  a  foreign  country,  and  to  an 
alliance  sure  to  prove  irksome  to  the  city  entertaining  these  uncivilised 
guests.  His  soldiers,  however,  headed  by  a  centurion  of  the  first 
rank,  clamoured  to  be  led  against  the  enemy ;  and  the  battle  was 
finally  brought  about  by  an  accidental  encounter  between  a  small 
number  of  Roman  soldiers  and  some  plundering  Gauls.  Sulpicius 
thus  gained  a  great  victory  and  a  splendid  triumph  almost  in  spite 
of  himself. 

After  ten  years  the  Gauls  came  again  (349),  and  descending 
from  the  Alban  hills,  harried  the  plains  and  coasts  of  Latium.  L. 
Furius  Camillus,  a  son  of  the  famous  conqueror  of  Veii,  was  sole 
consul  that  summer,  his  colleague,  Appius  Claudius,  having  died. 
He  maintained  the  honour  of  his  name  by  a  victory  over  the  in- 
vaders which  scattered  them  into  all  parts  of  Italy.  It  was  in  this 
battle  that  the  story  is  told  of  M.  Valerius  and  his  single  contest 
with  a  Gaul,  in  which  he  was  assisted  by  a  crow  that  perched 
on  his  helmet  and  assailed  with  beak  and  claw  the  face  of  the 
barbarian. 

Then  followed  a  long  interval  of  freedom  from  Gallic  inroads, 
and  shortly  after  the  end  of  the  first  Samnite  and  Latin  wars 
(about  336)  the  power  of  Rome  seemed  so  formidable  that  the 
Gauls  sought  and  obtained  a  treaty ;  and,  with  the  exception  of 
one  brief  raid,  remained  quiet  till  the  time  of  the  third  Samnite 
war. 

Besides  suppressing  minor  outbreaks  among  the  Hernici  (362 
and  358),  at  Tibur  (361  and  355),  and  at  Privernum  and  Velitrae 
(358),  the  Romans  were  meanwhile  struggling  to  secure  their  supre 


X  ETRUSCAN  AND  SAMNITE  WARS  127 

inacy    in    Etruria   with   varied   fortunes.      Thus    in    358    the   consul  Mutual 
Fabius  was  defeated  at  Tarquinii,  and  the  people  of  the  town  were  cruelties. 
so  furious  that  they  butchered  over  300  Roman  prisoners  on  pre- 
tence of  a  sacrifice  to  their  gods, — a  murder  avenged  by  equal  cruelty 
four  years  afterwards,  when,  in  addition  to  vast  numbers  killed  in 
battle,  580    Tarquinian  prisoners  were   executed    in   the    Forum   at 
Rome.     This  occurred  in  the  course  of  a  more  than  usually  serious 
rising   of   the    Etruscan    League,    beginning    in    356.      C.    Marcius 
Rutilus  was  named  dictator,  the  first  plebeian  who  had  ever  held 
that  office,   and  found  the  Etruscan  forces   close  to  the  saltworks 
{Salinae)  on  the  right  bank  of  the  mouth  of  the  Tiber.      Marcius 
harassed  the  enemy  by  sending  troops  across   in  boats  to   cut   off 
foraging  parties  and  stragglers,  and  at  length  surprised  their  camp, 
secured  8000  prisoners,  and  was  allowed  a  triumph.      But  in   353 
there  was  again  a  rising  in  southern   Etruria,  and  Titus  Manlius 
Torquatus  was  nominated  dictator  to  suppress  it.      The  chief  object 
of  his  attack  was  Caere,  which,  though  recognised  as  a  "  friend  of 
the  Roman  people,"  was  now  suspected  of  giving  secret  aid  to  the 
invaders     from    Tarquinii,    and    harbouring     their    plunder.       The 
Caerites,    however,    submitted,    and    were    compelled    to    make    a  The 
hundred   years'   truce,    and   submit   to   a   curtailed    citizenship    sine  Caerite 
suffragio^  with  the  loss  of  half  their  territory,  which  became  the  pro-  J^'^^^^^^^' 
perty  of  the  Roman  people.^     An  expedition  against  Falerii  in  the 
same  year  returned  without  striking  a  blow,  and  was  followed  in  3  5  i 
by  a  forty  years'  truce  with  Tarquinii  and  Falerii. 

For  a  time  Rome  had  peace  in  the  North,  except  for  the  peri-   The  Sam- 
odical  recurrence  of  Gallic  raids.      But  she  was  now  to   be  pitted  ^^^^  ^^^ 
against  a  more  formidable  enemy.    The  three  Samnite  wars,  between  z^atinwars. 
343  and  290,  taxed  the  strength  of  the  city  to  the  utmost.      Like 
the  Gallic  wars  they  served  as  an  admirable  training  for  the  coming 
struggle  with  Pyrrhus,  and  in  a  greater  degree  than  the  Gallic  wars 
led  to  an  unforeseen,  unsought,  yet  inevitable  extension  of  Roman 
power  both   in   central   Italy  and  Etruria.      Between  the  first  and 
second  of  these  wars  came  the  last  great  rising  of  the  Latins,  which 
ended  in  the  dissolution  of  the  Latin  League  and  the  practical  absorp- 
tion of  Latium. 

The  Samnites  were  a  hardy  mountain  race  inhabiting  the  centre  The 
of  Italy.     Branches  of  them  had  spread  to  Lucania  and  even  farther  Samnites. 
south,   and    those   who   remained    in    Samnium    proper    continually 
aimed  at  exchanging  their  bleak  highlands  for  the  more  fertile  plains 

^  This  is  a  detail  omitted  by  Livy,  but  recorded  by  Dio  Cass.  fr.  33.  It  is 
the  first  instance  of  a  town  being  thus  endowed  with  imperfect  citizenship,  whence 
the  Caerite  franchise  became  a  common  term  for  disfranchisement  (Hor.  Ep.  i, 
6,  62,  Caerite  cera  digni). 


128 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


on  either  coast.  Thus  the  Hirpini,  and  even  the  Frentani,  were 
perhaps  offshoots  of  this  race  ;  and  about  423  some  of  them  forced 
their  way  into  Campania,  and  supplanted  the  Etruscans,  who  for 
some  time  had  been  hving  among  the  native  Oscans,  and  had  built 
cities  and  established  trading  centres  there.  The  new  Samnite  con- 
querors seized  Capua,  stormed  the  Greek  colony  of  Cumae,  and 
reduced  a  number  of  other  Campanian  tribes  and  towns  to  submis- 
sion. They  did  not,  however,  uproot  or  destroy  the  Oscan  people, 
but  amalgamated  with  them,  and  the  two  together  became  Campani^ 


Minturnae 


4enana  I 


Cu„,a  KVP'-'-'K-^fC^l^'Z-A  \^  I     - 


CAMPANIA 

ROMAN     MILES 

5 '2 

ENGLISH     MILES 

-1 [£ 


r>^'^-^>'  'vy 


C -^  'JW9,//rc/i  +  /(>i///7    P, 


-^ 


East  of  14   Greenwich 


IVaUter  &  Boutall  sc. 


much  as  Norman  and  Saxon  became  English,  and  with  this  farther 
similarity,  that  while  the  common  people  in  the  towns  were  mostly 
of  Oscan  origin,  the  nobility  were  of  Samnite  stock.  They  formed 
a  loose  confederacy  of  states,  the  chief  of  which  was  Capua  and 
the  small  towns  round  it,  but  a  confederacy  which  appears  to  have 
had  no  provision  for  combined  action  or  counsel.  The  climate 
was  soft  and  enervating ;  the  plains  rich ;  the  shore,  deeply  in- 
dented with  bays  and  facing  south-west,  lovely  and  tempting.  No 
wonder  that  the  mountaineers  strove  for  it,  and  that  under  these 
influences  they  became  as  unwarlike  and   luxurious  as  the   people 


i 


X  THE  FIRST  WAR  WITH  THE  SAMNITES  129 

among  whom  they  lived.  It  was  a  contest  between  these  Osco- 
Samnites,  now  called  Campani,  and  the  Samnites  of  Samnium  proper, 
which  first  brought  the  Romans  (who  by  the  capture  of  Sora  on  the 
Liris,  in  344,  were  in  possession  of  the  last  stronghold  towards  the 
Samnite  frontier)  into  collision  with  the  Samnites,  and  eventually  into 
possession  of  Campania. 

In  343  the  Samnites,  we  know  not  why,  were  attacking  Teanum,   The  Sam- 
a   town   of  the    Sidicini,  who  were  an  independent   tribe  that  had  '"^^-^  attack 
not  fallen  before  the  Samnite  invaders,  and  had  never  shared  (as  the  ^  f     .  . 
Ausones  and  some  others  had  not  done  either)  in  the  ties  which 
connected,  however  slightly,  the  rest  of  Campania.      But  being  now 
attacked  by  the  Samnite  mountaineers,  they  appealed  to  the  Cam- 
panian  League  for  help.      The  Campanians  made  a  feeble  attempt 
to  assist  them,  and  only  succeeded  in  drawing  upon  themselves  the 
arms  of  their  kinsfolk.     The  Samnites  seized  the  heights  of  Tifata    , 
which  overlook  Capua,  and  drove  the  defeated  Campanians  to  take  ^t^^i^  ^^ 
refuge  within  the  walls.      In  their  despair  they  sent  an  embassy  to  Rome. 
Rome  to  beg  for  help. 

The  Romans  were  formally  on  terms  of  friendship  with  the  First 
Samnites,  who  in  354  had  voluntarily  asked  for  an  alliance.  The  Samnite 
Senate  therefore  hesitated  on  the  ground  that  their  honour  was  '^'^^'  ^'^■^' 
engaged.  Whether  such  scruples  were  feigned  or  not,  they  secured 
more  advantageous  terms.  The  Campanian  envoys  offered  to  give 
up  their  country  to  the  Romans  per  deditionem^  which  implied  a 
complete  surrender  of  their  city  and  its  territory  to  be  dealt  with 
as  they  chose.  1  It  did  not  follow  that  the  Romans  would  exercise 
the  right :  but  it  did  follow  that  any  one  else  who  attacked  the 
country  would  have  to  reckon  with  them.  Free  intercourse  with 
Campania  was  most  important  to  Rome,  for  from  its  rich  plains 
much  of  the  corn  supply  was  obtained.  The  Senate  therefore  adopted 
the  plea  of  keeping  faith  with  a  people  who  had  surrendered  to  them 
to  counterbalance  the  obligation  of  maintaining  their  treaty  with  the 
Samnites.  Legates  were  sent  with  a  conciliatory  request  to  the 
Samnites  to  spare  men  who  had  surrendered  to  Rome.  A  haughty 
answer  was  returned,  and  in  the  hearing  of  the  legates  the  military 
commanders  were  ordered  to  continue  the  invasion  of  Campania. 

The  Senate  at  once  decided  on  war.  The  consul,  M.  Valerius 
Corvus,  was  sent  to  Campania  ;  the  other  consul,  Aulus  Cornelius, 
to   Samnium.     Valerius  advanced  along  the  coast  road  to    Mount 

1  ' '  Those  who  thus  surrender  themselves  to  the  Roman  authority  surrender 
all  territory  and  the  cities  in  it,  together  with  all  men  and  women  in  all  such 
territory  or  cities,  likewise  rivers,  harbours,  temples,  and  tombs,  so  that  the 
Romans  should  become  actual  lords  of  all  these,  and  those  who  surrender  should 
remain  lords  of  nothing  whatever  "  (Polyb.  xxxvi.  4). 

K 


130 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Victories 
of  Mount 
Gaurtis, 
Suessula, 
and  Sati- 
cula,  J4J. 


Advan- 
tages 
gained 
by  the 
successes. 


342.  Coss. 
C.  Marcius 
Rutilus,  Q. 
Servilius. 
Mutiny  of 
Roman 
soldiers. 


Measures 
of  relief. 


Gaurus,  just  above  Puteoli ;  Cornelius  to  Saticula,  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  upper  Volturnus,  from  which  he  might  descend  upon  Capua, 
or  operate  in  the  interior  of  Samnium.  The  war  was  short  and 
sharp.  Three  battles  decided  that  the  supremacy  in  Campania  was 
to  belong  to  the  Romans  and  not  to  the  Samnites.  Valerius  won  a 
hard-fought  battle  near  Mount  Gaurus^  and  another  at  Suessula,  at 
which  place  the  defeated  Samnites  had  rallied ;  while  Cornelius, 
after  getting  into  considerable  danger  in  the  mountains  near  Saticula., 
from  which  he  was  saved  chiefly  by  the  heroism  of  a  military  tribune, 
Publius  Decius,  succeeded  in  finally  inflicting  a  defeat  upon  the  enemy. 

The  brilliant  success  of  the  Roman  arms  had  an  immediate  effect 
upon  their  foreign  relations.  The  Carthaginians  sent  a  congratu- 
latory embassy  and  a  gold  crown  ;  and  the  Latins  put  aside  their 
design  of  a  revolt  from  Rome,  and  turned  their  arms  against  the 
Peligni.  But  the  solid  advantage  gained  was  the  control  of  Cam- 
pania, into  which  Roman  garrisons  were  sent  to  occupy  Capua  and 
Suessula,  and  perhaps  other  towns,  in  order  to  secure  the  country 
from  Samnite  raids. 

The  allurements  of  this  beautiful  and  rich  district  proved  too 
strong  for  the  virtue  of  the  Roman  soldiers.  They  contrasted  the 
rich  lands  round  Capua  with  their  own  poor  allotments  at  home,  too 
often  burdened  with  debt ;  and  when  the  consul  for  the  next  year, 
C.  Marcius,  arrived  at  Capua,  he  found  the  Roman  troops  ready  to 
mutiny  and  seize  the  lands  and  wealth  of  the  Capuans.  He  endea- 
voured to  cure  this  by  giving  leave  of  absence  to  the  most  turbulent 
of  the  soldiers,  on  the  pretext  of  their  having  wintered  abroad.  But 
discovering  his  object,  the  remaining  soldiers  determined  to  strike 
a  blow  before  they  became  too  weak.  They  forced  a  certain  T. 
Ouinctius,  who,  after  serving  with  distinction  and  receiving  a  severe 
wound,  was  living  in  retirement  at  Tusculum,  to  take  the  lead  of  a 
force  of  malcontents  collected  near  Anxur,  and  advanced  within 
eight  miles  of  Rome.  Here  they  encountered  M.  Valerius  Corvus, 
who  had  been  named  dictator  to  suppress  the  mutiny.  He 
conciliated  the  men  by  promising  to  get  their  grievances  redressed, 
and  returned  to  Rome  to  give  effect  to  his  promise. 

What  these  grievances  were  is  shown  by  the  measures  of  relief 
They  prove  that  service  in  the  army  was  now  valuable,  and  nc 
longer  a  mere  burden.  The  new  laws  provided  that  no  one,  under 
a  curse,  should  erase  the  name  of  a  soldier  without  his  consent  from 
the  roll  when  it  had  once  been  entered  ;  that  no  one  should  hold 
the  rank  of  centurion  after  holding  that  of  tribune — the  grievance 
being  that  certain  persons  monopolised  these  positions,  profitable 
from  the  extra  shares  in  the  distribution  of  booty.  And,  lastly,  that 
the  disparity  between  the  pay  of  the  infantry  and  cavalry  should  be 


X  QUARREL  WITH  THE  LATINS  131 

decreased  by  a  lower  rate  of  pay  being  given  to  the  latter.  This 
too  seems  to  have  rested  on  the  practical  ground  that  the  share 
of  booty  was  proportioned  to  amount  of  pay.  But  it  is  also  a 
distinctly  democratic  demand  in  the  direction  of  equality,  and  must 
be  taken  in  connexion  with  the  other  movements  of  the  period,  the 
opening  of  offices  to  plebeians,  and  the  laws  against  usury  and 
accumulation  of  offices. 

The  details  of  the  war,  as  given  by  Livy,  are  not  very  clear  in  Practical 
themselves,  though  recounted  with  some  minuteness,  and  for  the  most  '''^^"■^t  of 
part  cannot  be  accepted  as  history.     It  is  not  doubtful,  however,  that        '^'^^' 
after  it  Roman  instead  of  Samnite  influence  prevailed  in  Campania. 
Peace  was  concluded  in  341. 

But  circumstances  now  involved  the  Romans  in  a  war  destined  Latin  war, 
to  consolidate  the  larger  Latium  as  a  part  of  Rome.     It  began  with  -340-338. 
a  union  of  Latins  and  Campanians  to  carry  on  the  war  against  the 
Samnites,  which  the  Romans  had  abandoned  by  making  peace  with 
the  common  enemy  in   341.     The  Samnites  complained,  and  the 
Senate  forbade  the  Campanians,  ^s  subjects  of  Rome,  to  make  war 
upon  the  Samnites  ;  but  professed  to  have  no  claim,  by  the  terms 
of  their  treaty  with  them,  to  lay  a  similar  injunction  on  the  Latins. 
The  Latins,  who  had  already  in  349  refused  to  furnish  soldiers  to   The  Latins 
the  Roman  army,  regarded  this  as  a  sign  of  weakness,  and  now  demand  in- 
decided  in  secret  consultation  to  recover  a  complete  independence,  '^^P^^^'^^^'^^ 

•  O'K  cofyiv Ictc 

or  to  demand  as  an  alternative  to  share  in  all  the  advantages  gained  citizenship. 
by  Rome  in  recent  wars.  As  a  first  step  two  Latin  praetors,  L. 
Annius  of  Setia  and  L.  Numicius  of  Circeii,  being  summoned  to  Rome 
to  receive  the  orders  of  the  Senate,  demanded  that  one  consul  and 
half  the  Senate  should  be  Latins,  and  that  the  whole  should  be  one 
Republic.  This  demand  was  rejected  with  indignation,  and  Annius 
retired,  proclaiming  that  the  Latins  renounced  all  reverence  for  "a 
Roman  Jupiter."  It  was  noted  with  a  kind  of  exultation  that  instant 
punishment,  as  it  were,  vindicated  the  majesty  of  the  god  :  for  while 
leaving  the  temple  where  the  Senate  had  met  Annius  stumbled  and 
fell  down  the  steps,  and  was  taken  up  stunned  and  insensible. 

The  war  lasted  three  years.     The  two  consuls,  Titus  Manlius  and  340.     T. 
P.  Decius,  led  their  armies,  supported  by  auxiliaries  from  Samnium,  Manlius 
to  Capua,  where  the  Latins  and  Campanians  were  united.     To  this   rjj^^p  " 
campaign  two  famous  stories  belong.      The  first  is  the  execution  of  Decius 
Titus  Manlius,  son  of  the  consul,  for  leaving  the  ranks  contrary  to  Mus. 
orders,  to  fight  the  Tusculan  Geminius,  who  challenged  the  Roman 
knights  to  send  a  champion  against  him.      Manlius  conquered  and 
killed  Geminius,  and  carried  the  spoils  to  his  father.       The  stern 
answer,  condemning  his   victorious   son  to  death  for  a   breach   of  imperia 
military  discipline,  rendered  the  Manliana  imperia  a   proverb   of  Manliana. 


[32 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Devotion 
of  Decius 
Mus. 


Battle  of 
Veseris, 
340. 


Battle  of 
Trifanum. 


Ssg.    Cosr. 
T.  Aemi- 
lius  Matn- 
ercinus,  Q. 
Publilius 
Philo. 

Latins  con- 
centrate in 
Pedum. 


338.    Coss. 
L.  Furius 
Camillus, 
C.  Mae- 
nius. 


terrible  import  for  ever.^  The  other  is  the  story  of  the  devotion  of 
Publius  Decius  Mus.  He  and  his  colleague  dreamed  the  same 
dream.  A  man  of  superhuman  size  and  dignity  warned  them  that 
on  one  side  the  leader,  on  the  other  the  army  itself,  must  perish. 
They  offered  sacrifice,  and  the  entrails  pointed  out  Decius  as  the 
man.  Thereupon  in  solemn  form  he  devoted  himself  to  the  "  Manes 
and  to  Earth,"  and,  mounting  his  horse,  rode  into  the  midst  of  the 
enemy  and  was  killed.  A  similar  story  is  told  of  his  son  in  295, 
and  even,  it  appears,  of  his  grandson. ^ 

The  battle  took  place  close  to  Mount  Vesuvius  on  the  road  lead- 
ing down  to  Veseris,  a  small  town  near  Nola.^  The  Latins  were 
defeated  decisively  and  scattered  in  various  parts  of  Campania, 
eventually  mustering  again  at  Vescia,  a  town  of  the  Ausones  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Liris.  There  they  managed  to  attract  fresh  levies 
from  other  Latin  and  Volscian  towns,  by  concealing  the  result 
of  the  battle  of  Veseris.  The  consul  Manlius  Torquatus  followed 
and  took  up  his  position  at  Trifanum,  on  the  road  between  Sinuessa 
and  Minturnae.  The  Latin  army,  little  better  than  a  raw  militia, 
was  again  decisively  beaten,  and  this  second  defeat  was  followed  by 
the  formal  submission  of  both  the  Latins  and  Campanians, 

But  though  thus  defeated  the  Latins  were  not  reconciled.  The 
offending  States  were  heavily  mulcted  of  land,  which  was  divided 
out  among  Roman  citizens,  and  the  indignation  thus  caused  found 
vent  next  year  in  another  revolt,  which  centred  round  Pedum, 
one  of  the  original  thirty  Latin  towns.  The  consul  Titus  Aemilius 
advanced  to  attack  it,  while  from  Tibur,  Praeneste,  Velitrae, 
Lavinium,  and  Antium  forces  gathered  to  defend  it.  But  Aemilius, 
though  gaining  some  petty  victories,  did  not  attempt  to  take  Pedum. 
He  wasted  his  time  in  a  fruitless  journey  to  Rome  to  demand  a 
triumph,  and  finally  avoided  farther  responsibility  by  naming  his 
colleague  Publilius  dictator.  The  Senate  forced  the  consuls  of  the 
next  year  to  greater  activity.  Maenius  conquered  a  combined  army 
of  Aricia,  Lavinium,  Velitrae,  and  Antium  on  the  Astura ;  and 
Camillus  defeated  an  army  from  Tibur  and  Praeneste  which  tried  to 


^  This  same  Manlius  was  the  hero  of  a  famous  story  of  filial  duty.  His 
father,  L.  Manlius,  had  despised  him  and  kept  him  in  retirement  in  the  country. 
But  when  the  tribune  Pomponius  (362)  gave  notice  of  a  prosecution  against  the 
elder  Manlius  for  tyrannical  conduct,  the  son  hurried  to  Rome,  entered  the  bed- 
chamber of  Pomponius,  and,  drawing  a  dagger  which  he  had  concealed  about*' 
his  person,  threatened  him  with  instant  death  unless  he  withdrew  the  prosecution*  , 
(Livy  vii.  5  ;  Appian,  Samn.  2).  2  Cicero,    Tusc.  i.  §  89, 

^  It  was  long  doubted  whether  Veseris  was  the  name  of  a  town  or  a  stream. 
The  discovery  of  some  Oscan  coins  with  the  legends  Fevaep  andi  fensernum  seems  to 
have  settled  the  question  in  favour  of  a  town  (Imhoof-  Blumer,  Numismat. 
Zeitsch.  1886). 


1 


X  DISSOLUTION  OF  THE  LATIN  LEAGUE  133 

relieve  Pedum.  The  storming  of  Pedum  was  followed  by  the  reduc- 
tion of  the  rebellious  cities  of  Latium.  Garrisons  were  put  in  them 
and  the  consuls  earned  a  triumph  as  having  finished  the  war. 

The  Latin  League  ceased  to  exist  as  a  political  body,  though  still  End  of  the 
joining  in  the  worship  of  Jupiter  Latiaris.       Rome  was  sovereign,  ^^^^'^ 
and   made   what   terms   she  chose   with   each    separate    town.       A  -,S.     ' 
senatus   consuUuin    defined    the    status   of  each.       As   a  rule   they  Senatus 
retained   local   government,   but,   as    regards    Rome,   had  only  the  consultum 
"  Caerite  "  citizenship,  that  is,  they  had  commercium  and  conubiuin  ^^.  ^^j^' 
with  Rome,  but  could  not  vote  or  hold  office.  ^     Moreover  they  were  ^^"Z  /Jf 
isolated :  no  marriage   or   commerce  with  each  other,  no  common 
meeting  was  allowed ;  their  only  market  would  be  Rome  or  more 
distant  places.      The  result  was  a  swift  decay  of  the  towns  ;  while 
Roman  citizens,  settled  in  the  country  with  full  citizen  rights,  found 
their  advantage  in  the  restricted  markets  which  ruined  the  towns, 
and  thus  Romanised  the  country. 

This  was  the  general  rule  :  but  certain  towns  received  special 
favour  or  punishment.  Thus  full  citizenship  was  given  to  Lanuvium, 
Aricia,  Momentum,  and  Pedum,  and  their  citizens  coming  to  Rome 
could  exercise  all  the  rights  of  Roman  citizens.  Tusculum  had  long 
had  this  position,  which  was  now  confirmed,  the  punishment  for  the 
part  taken  in  the  wars  being  confined  to  individuals.  On  the  other 
hand  the  walls  of  Velitrae  were  demolished,  her  senators  removed  in 
a  body  beyond  the  Tiber,  and  forced  under  a  heavy  fine  to  remain 
there,  while  their  lands  were  divided  among  Roman  farmers.  Tibur 
and  Praeneste,  for  having  favoured  the  Gauls,  were  mulcted  of  terri- 
tory, but  were  allowed  to  remain  free,  with  the  single  obligation  of 
furnishing  their  quota  of  troops  to  the  Roman  army.^ 

The  Campanians  were  dealt  with  in  the  same  spirit.      Some  of  Settlement 
the  towns,  such  as  Fundi  and  Formiae,  were  allowed  the   "Latin"  of  Ca7n- 
right ;  while  at  Capua,  Cumae,  and  Suessula  this  was  confined  to  the  ^^^^^' 
"  Knights," — the  upper  or  noble  class  descended  from  the  Samnite 
conquerors, — a  measure  which  served  to  accentuate  the  distinction 
between  them  and  the  Campanian  Oscans  forming  the  lower  class. 

Thus  the  wider  Latium  became  Roman  :  and  just  as  the  distinction  Larger 
between  patrician  and  plebeian  was  being  finally  abolished  by  the  leges  Latium. 
Publiliae  (340),  a  new  distinction  was  coming  into  existence  between 
full  and  imperfect  citizens,  which  was  to  lead  also  to  political  agita- 

^  Hence  Latinitas  was  used  to  express  imperfect  citizenship  long  after  it  had 
ceased  to  apply  to  Latium. 

2  This  obligation  would  apply  to  all  the  towns,  and  from  another  point  of 
view  the  measure  may  be  regarded  as  the  inclusion  of  all  these  towns  in  a  military 
league.  But  as  it  was  scarcely  voluntary  on  their  part,  it  may  also  be  regarded  as 
an  obligation  imposed  by  a  sovereign  state. 


134 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP.  X 


New 
Tribes. 


Samnifes. 


First 
acting  in 
Rome, 
363-362. 


tion  in  the  future.  For  the  present  the  increase  of  purely  Roman 
territory  was  shown  by  the  addition  of  two  new  tribes  (Maecia  and 
Scaptia)  ;  and  the  final  destruction  of  Antium  as  an  independent  naval 
power  by  the  adornment  of  the  pillars  of  the  speaker's  platform  in 
the  comitium  with  the  beaks  of  its  captured  ships.  Some  few  towns 
indeed  still  offered  spasmodic  resistance.  Cales  was  captured  in 
334,  Fundi  submitted  in  330,  Privernum  was  taken  in  329  ;  and 
when  fresh  colonies  were  settled  at  Cales,  Anxur,  and  Fregellae 
(339-336)  Roman  supremacy  was  complete  throughout  Latium — 
which  now  included  the  Hernici,  Volsci,  Ausones,  and  Sidicini,— and 
in  Campania  as  far  as  Suessula  and  Atella. 

The  Samnites,  openly  at  peace  with  Rome,  were  directing  their 
attention  southwards  :  and  the  movements  of  these  mountaineers, 
leading  to  fresh  appeals  for  Roman  help,  brought  Rome  step  by  step 
to  supremacy  throughout  Italy. 

This  period  had  been  marked  by  several  pestilences.  And  two 
years  of  more  than  usually  severe  visitations  suggested  various  modes 
of  appeasing  the  gods.  Among  others,  the  games  were  celebrated 
with  more  than  usual  elaborateness  ;  and  for  the  first  time  include 
plays  or  interludes,  acted  by  artists  brought  from  Etruria,  a  novel 
experiment  in  Rome,  and  one  never  sincerely  liked.  It  gave  birth, 
however,  to  a  considerable  Roman  literature,  which  has  all  perished, 
and  to  an  imitation  of  Greek  dramas,  some  of  which  has  survived. 


Authorities, — Livy  vi,-viii.  ;  Dionysius  xiv.  12-xvi.  1-14  (fragments). 
Zonaras  vii.  24-26;  Eutropius  ii.  1-4;  Plutarch  Camillus ;  Polybius  ii.  18-21 
for  the  Gallic  invasions. 


CHAPTER  XI 


THE   SECOND    SAMNITE   WAR 


326-304 


COLONIES 

NEW  TRIBES 

Luceria  in  Apulia     .     B.C. 

314 

Ufentina  "j 

Falerina   J"       "                 '^ 

Suessa  of  the  Aurunci    B.  c. 

313 

Pontiae   .         .         .B.C. 

313" 

Interamna  Lirinas    .      B.C. 

312  1 

Volscian. 

Casinum           .         .B.C. 

312  1 

Sora        .          .          .B.C. 

303  J 

Alba  Fucentia  (Aequians 

and  Marsians)      .      B.C. 

303 

Magna  Graecia — Invitation  from  Tarentum  to  Archidamus  (338)  and  Alexander 
(333) — Alexander's  treaty  with  Rome — Palaepolis  garrisoned  by  Samnites — 
War  declared  with  Samnites  (326) — Treaty  with  Neapolis — Confederacy  in 
south  Italy — The  Caudine  Forks — The  Senate  refuse  the  terms  of  Pontius 
(321) — Revolt  of  Volscian  towns — Capture  of  Luceria,  victories  in  Apulia 
and  Lucania,  revolt  and  recovery  of  Sora  (320-314) — Destruction  of  Ausones 
and  colonising  of  Luceria  (314-313) — Victory  over  Samnites  at  Cinna  (313) — 
Development  of  Roman  power  in  Italy,  and  growth  of  navy  (313-312) — 
Etruscan  war  and  battle  at  the  Vadimonian  lake  (311-309) — Wars  with 
Samnites  and  Hernjci  (308-306) — Peace  with  Samnites  (304). 

While    they   were   enjoying   a   peace    of  eleven   years   (338-327),  Magna 
only    broken   by   one    outbreak    among    the    Sidicini,    events    were  Graecia 
occurring  in  southern  Italy  destined  there  too  to  bring  the  Romans  ^^^^f'^^^  h 
on  the  scene.     The  Greek  towns  which  fringed  its  shores,  though  t^ii^J^ 
often  quarrelling  with  each  other,  had  yet  been  formed  into  a  loose 
confederacy  for  mutual  protection  under  the  presidency  of  Tarentum, 
and  their  delegates   met   at   Heraclea,  a  Tarentine  colony.       Such 
combination  as  existed  had  been  made  necessary  by  the  attacks  of 
the  common  enemies  of  them  all,  the  Lucani,  Bruttii,  and  Messapii,i 
while   the    Samnite  highlanders   were   ever  on   the   watch  to   take 


Diodorus  xiv.  loi  ;   xvi.  15. 


136 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP.  XI 


Help  asked 
by  the 
Tarentines 
(/)  from 
Archi- 
ll amus  of 
Sparta, 
Sj8,  and 
{2)  from 
Alexa?ider, 
king  of  the 
Molossi, 
333- 


Death  of 
Alexander, 
332  or  331. 


advantage  of  these  hostilities  to  enrich  themselves  from  the  lands  of 
Greek  and  Italian  alike. 

Tarentum,  as  head  of  the   Greek   League,   looked  out  for  help 
first  from  the  mother  state  of  Sparta  :    and  in  338  Archidamus,  a 
king  of  Sparta,  had  come  in  answer  to  such  a  call  and  had  fallen  in 
battle.i     And  now  in  ■},'^2>  Alexander,  king  of  the  Molossi,  uncle  and 
brother-in-law  of  Alexander  the  Great,^  willingly  responded  to  a  similar 
invitation.    He  landed  near  Posidonium,  which  had  been  the  object  of 
special  attack  to  the  Lucanians,  and  at  first  was  everywhere  successful. 
He  won  battles  over  the  Bruttii,  Messapii,   and   Lucani,   and  took 
several  towns.      But  the  Tarentines,  at  whose  request  he  had  come, 
were  presently  alarmed  at  his  designs.      He  had  a  dream  of  establish- 
ing a  great  Western  Empire  to  include  Italy,  Sicily,  and  Africa,  like 
that  which  his  mighty  nephew  and  namesake  was  forming  in  the 
East ;  whereas  the  Tarentines  wished  for  supremacy,  not  to  be  humble 
clients  in  a  great  empire.      Accordingly  they  soon  drew  back,  and 
Alexander  retaliated  by  making   terms   with   Metapontum  and   the 
Peucetii,  and  erecting  a  new  Hellenic  confederacy,  the  delegates  of 
which  should  meet,   not  at  the  Tarentine  Heraclea,  but  at  Thurii. 
The  death,  therefore,   of  the  champion  whom  they  had  themselves 
invited  must  have  been  welcome  to  the  Tarentines.      It  was  not, 
however,  brought  about  by  them,  but  by  their  enemies  the  Lucani. 
Alexander   had    tried    to    break    the    resistance    of  this   nation   by 
transporting    300    of    their    leading    families    to    Epirus ;    and    by 
bestowing  special  honour  on  those  of  them  who  had  been  banished 
by  their  countrymen  for  espousing  his  cause.      Two  hundred  Lucan- 
ians formed  his  body-guard.     But  though  thus  near  the  person  of 
the  king,   they  did  not  forget  their  country,    and   were   ready  to 
purchase    restoration    to    it    by    betraying    their    new    lord.       The 
opportunity  soon  came.      Alexander  was  occupying  some  hills   at 
Pandosia,    near   Consentia   on    the    river    Crathis,    from    which    he 
sent  out  foragers.      Here  he  found  himself  surrounded  by  the  enemy, 
who  cut  off  his  plundering  parties  ;  and  on  one  occasion,  when  two 
of  these  parties  had  been   surprised,  he  sallied  out  to  their  relief, 
and  attacked  the  Lucanian  force  with  great  gallantry,  killing  their 


^  Archidamus  III.,  after  taking  a  somewhat  doubtful  part  in  the  "Sacred  war," 
seems  to  have  been  glad  to  find  work  in  Italy  to  escape  a  contest  with  Philip 
of  Macedon.  The  battle  in  which  he  fell  was  near  Manduria,  twenty-four  miles 
east  of  Tarentum,  and  is  said  to  have  been  fought  on  the  same  day  and  hour 
as  the  battle  of  Chaeroneia  (August  338)  (Plutarch,  Agis  3 ;  Pausanias  iii. 
10,    5  ;    Diodor.    xvi.    63  ;   Theopompus  ap.    Athenaeum   xii.    536 ;    Strabo  vi. 

3.  3)- 

^  Alexander  was  brother  of  Olympias,  the  mother  of  Alexander  the  Great. 
He  married  his  own  niece  Cleopatra,  daughter  of  Philip  II.  and  Olympias 
(Livy  vjii,  17,  24  ;  Justin  xij,  2  ;   Strabo  vi.  3,  4). 


138 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


commander  with  his  own  hand.  But  as  he  was  emerging  from  a 
swollen  stream,  across  which  he  had  forced  his  horse,  one  of  his 
Lucanian  body-guards  ran  him  through  with  his  spear. 

Though  the  Romans  were  not  directly  concerned  with  Alex- 
ander's career  in  south  Italy,  yet  it  seems  that  he  had  found  it 
necessary  for  the  success  of  his  plans  to  be  on  good  terms  with 
them,  and  had  formed,  or  at  least  proposed,  a  treaty  with  the 
Republic ;  whose  growing  importance  in  the  affairs  of  south  Italy 
was  shown  again  soon  afterwards  by  an  appeal  to  the  Senate  from 
the  Lucanians  for  help  against  the  Samnites,  who  a  year  and  a  half 
before  had  been  assisting  them  against  Alexander,  but  had  since 
been  plundering  the  territories  of  their  former  allies. 

But  the  immediate  cause  of  the  inevitable  rupture  between  the 
Romans  and  Samnites  was  the  Greek  town  of  Palaepolis,  the  name 
by  which  the  Cumaean  colony,  called  it  seems  originally  Parthenope, 
had  come  to  be  known,  since  a  more  recent  settlement,  called 
Neapolis,  had  been  made  on  the  site  now  occupied  by  the  eastern 
part  of  Naples.  The  Palaepolitans  had  plundered  lands  of  Roman 
settlers  in  Campania  and  the  Falernian  district.  A  demand  from 
Rome  for  compensation  was  haughtily  refused,  and  war  was  declared 
against  them  (327).  The  two  consuls.  L.  Cornelius  Lentulus  and 
Q.  Publilius  Philo,  were  both  sent  out  with  their  respective  legions. 
PubliHus  was  to  go  direct  to  Palaepolis,  Cornelius  to  the  Samnite 
frontier.  Both  consuls  sent  home  disquieting  reports.  Publilius 
informed  the  Senate  that  2000  Campanians  and  4000  Samnites  had 
been  sent  to  garrison  Palaepolis,  almost  in  spite  of  the  Greek 
citizens.  Cornelius  reported  that  Samnium  was  preparing  for  war  : 
armies  were  being  enrolled,  and  the  fidelity  of  Privernum,  Fundi,  and 
Formiae  was  being  solicited. 

Legates  were  sent  to  remonstrate  with  the  Samnites.  They 
answered  by  alleging  injuries  received  by  themselves  :  "  The  Roman 
colony  of  Fregellae,"  they  said,  "  had  been  founded  in  Samnite 
territory ;  while  the  help  given  to  Palaepolis  came  only  from  private 
enterprise,  not  from  the  Samnite  government."  They  ended  by  a 
direct  challenge  to  war,  which  the  Romans  were  not  slow  to  take  up. 
Publilius  was  already  encamped  between  Palaepolis  and  Neapolis, 
and  now  commenced  a  regular  siege  of  the  former.  The  end  of  the 
year  approaching,  Publilius,  to  the  end  of  the  war,  and  Cornelius  for 
the  following  year,  were  continued  in  their  commands  as  pro- 
consuls ;  and  Cornelius  was  ordered  to  name  a  dictator  to  hold 
the  elections.  War  with  the  Samnites  was  formally  declared  by  the 
consuls  of  the  next  year. 

Palaepolis,  reduced  to  dreadful  straits  by  famine,  was  still 
holding  out.     The  starving  townsfolk  were  told,   indeed,  that  rein- 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  SECOND  SAMNITE  WAR  139 


forcements   were   coming  from   Tarentum  and  Samnium ;  but   this 

threatened  an  aggravation  of  their  misery  by  adding  fresh  mouths  to 

be  fed.     Two  citizens  therefore  resolved  to  save  the  lives  of  their 

countrymen  by  surrendering  the  town  to  the  Romans.      Their  names 

were  Charilaus  and  Nymphius.     While  Charilaus  made  his  way  to  Surrender 

the  camp  of  Publilius,  Nymphius  contrived  to  induce  the  Samnite  of  Palae- 

garrison  to  quit  the  town  and  descend  to  the  shore,  to  assist  him  to  ^^  ^^'  ■^ 

embark  upon  an  expedition  against  the  coasts  of  Latium.     While 

thus  engaged  they  heard  an  uproar  in  the  city,  and  discovered  that 

they  were  shut  out,  and  that  the  Romans  had  been  admitted.     They 

had  no  resource  but  to  make  their  way  to  their  homes  without  arms 

or   baggage.       Palaepolis    being    thus    surrendered,    the    people    of 

Neapolis  appear  to  have  acquiesced  and  obtained  good  terms.     The  Foedm 

treaty  by  which  they  became  a  civitas  foederata  was  so  favourable  in  ^^^poli- 

regard   to   the  burdens   it   imposed,  and  the  local  liberty  which  it 

secured,  that  when  in  89  all   Italian   states   were  offered   the   full 

civitas^  the  Neapolitans  long  preferred  their  old  status.     Palaepolis 

either  disappeared  altogether,  or  was  merged  in  Neapolis,  and  ceased 

to  be  of  importance. 

Meanwhile  the  Roman  arms,  under  P.  Cornelius,  had  had  some  Cornelius 

successes   in    Samnium.      Three   border    towns  1   and    considerable  in  Sam- 

plunder  were  taken.    Above  all,  the  Samnites  had  been  prevented  from  «^«»^.  327- 

making  a  diversion  in  favour  of  Palaepolis.     The  Romans  had  been  ^^ 

fully  alive  to  the  difficult  and  dangerous  nature  of  the  war.      In  326  a  Second 

solemn  lectistermum  was  held.     The  images  of  the  gods  were  exposed  Samnite 

on  couches,  with  a  banquet  placed  before  them,  and  throughout  the  city  ^^^'  3^^- 

prayers  were  offered  to  secure  their  favour.     Moreover  an  alliance  was  ^^^' 

made  both  with  the  Apulians  and  Lucanians,  who  had  so  often  suffered 

from  the  Samnite  raids.     But  the  jealousy  of  the  Tarentines  overthrew 

this  arrangement.      They  had  been  alarmed  and  irritated  by  the  fall  The  Taren- 

of  Palaepolis  ;  and  when  they  found  the  Apulians  and  Lucanians  in  tines  side 

alliance  with  Rome  they  feared  for  the  safety  of  the  Greek  confederacy,  "^^^^  ^^^ 

of  which  they  regarded  themselves  as  the  head.     They  determined  to     '^^^^  ^^' 

espouse  the  side  of  the  Samnites  against  the  power  they  now  thought 

the  more  dangerous  of  the  two.      In  pursuance  of  this  policy  they 

began    intriguing    to    detach    the    Lucanians    from    Rome.       Two 

Lucanian  youths  were  bribed  to  disfigure  themselves  with  blows,  and   The  Lu- 

in  this  state  to  present  themselves  before  a  popular  assembly,  de-  canians 

daring  that  they  had  been  cruelly  flogged  for  the  presumption  of  ^^^y  ^^^"f- 
•  1       -r.  rr^i  1  1  J   J-  -.1-    selves  with 

entenng  the  Roman  camp.      The  populace  clamoured  for  war  with  ^^^  Sam- 

Rome  ;  and,  though  an  open  declaration  was  avoided,  the  Lucanians  nites. 

made  a  formal  alliance  with  the  Samnites. 

The  first  year  of  the  war  therefore  saw  a  formidable  confederacy 

1  Allifae,  Callifae,  Rufrium — the  last  of  uncertain  site. 


140 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


The  Vestini 

subdued, 

325- 


formed  in  south  Italy,  rendered  still  more  alarming  by  the  adher- 
ence of  the  Vestini,  a  Sabellian  tribe  on  the  left  bank  of  the  river 
Aternus,  along  a  narrow  strip  of  the  Adriatic  shore.  They  were  not 
important  in  themselves,  but  if  the  kindred  tribes  of  Marsi,  Peligni, 
and  Marrucini  adopted  their  policy,  Rome  might  find  herself  attacked 
on  both  sides,  and  at  any  rate  debarred  from  the  coast  road  into 
Apulia.  One  campaign,  however  (325),  under  the  consul  D.  Junius 
Brutus,  reduced  the  Vestini  to  submission,  and  they  took  no  farther 
part  in  the  war. 

From  this  period  to  that  of  the  disaster  at  Caudium  (321)  it  is 
not  easy,  or  perhaps  possible,  to  discover  the  true  course  of  events. 
Livy  observes  at  the  end  of  his  eighth  book  that  the  questionable 
statements  contained  in  funeral  orations,  and  the  false  inscriptions 
upon  family  busts  {imagines)^  made  it  difficult  to  be  certain  in  assign- 
ing particular  achievements  to  particular  individuals.  Thus  the 
family  archives  of  the  Papirii  and  of  the  Fabii  seem  to  be  respon- 
sible for  the  stories  of  the  dictator  L.  Papirius  Cursor,  and  of  his 
master  of  the  horse,  Q.  Fabius  Maximus.  The  dictator,  it  is  said, 
was  obliged  to  leave  his  army  in  Samnium  and  return  to  Rome, 
owing  to  some  irregularity  in  the  auspices,  and  on  his  departure 
left  strict  orders  to  his  master  of  the  horse  not  to  engage  the 
enemy.  Fabius,  either  looking  upon  this  order  as  the  result  of 
jealousy,  or  unable  to  withstand  a  tempting  opportunity,  attacked  the 
Samnites,  and  inflicted  a  severe  defeat  upon  them.  On  his  return  to 
camp  the  dictator  called  a  meeting  of  the  soldiers  and  summoned 
Fabius  before  him.  He  was  about  to  order  his  instant  execution, 
when  the  soldiers  clamoured  so  loudly  for  his  pardon,  and  came  so 
near  to  a  mutiny,  that  Papirius  was  forced  to  postpone  the  carrying 
out  of  his  sentence  to  the  next  day.  Meanwhile  Fabius  escaped 
from  the  camp  and  fled  to  Rome.  The  angry  dictator  followed. 
Fabius  threw  himself  on  the  protection  of  the  tribunes,  and  appealed 
to  the  people.  Though  the  authority  of  a  dictator  was  above  all 
such  safeguards,  Papirius  was  assailed  by  the  intercession  of  senators, 
tribunes,  and  men  of  rank,  for  a  Fabius  was  sure  to  have  powerful 
friends.  He  at  length  consented  to  spare  his  life,  but  only  on  a  com- 
plete submission  and  renunciation  of  all  legal  remedies,  and  the 
abdication  of  his  mastership  of  the  horse.  Military  discipline  thus 
vindicated,  Papirius  returned  to  the  army.  The  men,  however,  were 
sulky  and  would  not  fight  with  vigour,  until  the  dictator,  by  assiduous 
attention,  mollified  their  anger.  Then  they  fought  bravely  and  won 
him  a  triumph.  The  Samnites  proposed  peace  ;  but  the  Romans 
declined  the  terms  they  offered,  and  only  consented  to  a  truce  for  a 
year. 

}5ut  though  the  authorities  which  Livy  followed  thus  gave  the 


ROMAN  DISASTERS  141 


pre-eminence  to  the  Roman  arms,  it  is  evident  that  they  had  not  sue-  The 
ceeded  in  impressing  others  with  the  behef  in  their  superiority  or  Apuhans 
ultimate  victory.      In  324  the  ApuHans,  whether  of  their  own  accord  ^^^^^^ 
or  under  pressure  from  the  Samnites,  left  the  Roman  alliance — in  alliance. 
either  case  showing  that  the  Romans  had  lost  hold.      In  the  same 
year  a  rebellion  at  Tusculum,  joined  by  Velitrae  and   Privernum, 
proved  that  those  once  powerful  states  thought  it  a  good  opportunity 
to  regain  their  freedom,  or  at  any  rate  to  get  better  terms.    The  State  civitas 
was  wise  enough  to  yield  to  the  demand,  if  such  was  made.     The  granted  to 
tribunician  bill  for  the  punishment  of  Tusculum  was  rejected  ;  and  Tusculum, 
not  only  was  full  citizenship  conceded,  but  L.  Fulvius,  who  had  been  ^^^' 
consul  at  Tusculum,  was  elected  consul  at  Rome  for  the  next  year 
(322).     Even  if  this  was  a  reward  for  having  been  of  the  Roman 
party,  it  was  still  a  measure  of  wise  conciliation. 

The  war  was  resumed  after  the  truce.  It  was  never  continuous,  322.  The 
and  what  Livy  calls  a  truce  may  have  been  an  interruption  of  active  ^^^  ^^"" 
operations  from  various  causes.  There  was  fighting,  however,  in 
322,  and  we  are  told  of  a  battle  so  fiercely  contested  that  the  two 
armies  remained  locked  for  five  hours  in  a  deadly  grapple,  neither 
giving  way  a  foot's  breadth,  or  finding  breath  to  shout.  At  last  the 
Roman  cavalry  defeated  the  Samnite  horse  as  they  were  plundering 
the  Roman  baggage,  and  thus  at  liberty  to  support  their  infantry 
they  secured  a  complete  victory.  It  is  said  that  after  this  battle  the 
Samnites  again  proposed  peace,  offering  to  give  up  Roman  prisoners 
and  the  heads  of  their  own  war  party.  The  chief  among  these  was 
Brutulus  Papius,  who,  rather  than  be  surrendered  to  the  Romans, 
put  an  end  to  his  life.  The  treaty,  however,  if  one  was  proposed  in 
this  year,  was  not  made.  The  only  result  of  the  campaign  was  the 
award  of  a  triumph  to  the  dictator,  A.  Cornelius  Arvina. 

The  next  year  (321)  was  to  witness  a  disaster  to  the  Roman  Surrender 
arms  which  was  never  forgotten.  In  the  summer  the  consul  of  a  Roman 
Postumius  was  encamped  near  Calatia  in  Samnium.i     T^i^  Samnite  ^P^y '^y"'^ 

T*  UVCtl  IdC 

imperator  for  the  year  was  Caius  Pontius,  who  was  encamped  near  Caudinae, 

Caudium,  on  the  road  afterwards  called  the   Appian  Way,  twenty-  j2z.    Coss. 
one  miles  from  Capua,  eleven    from  Beneventum.      By    means  of  TitusVetu- 

countrymen,  purposely  instructed,  Pontius  conveyed  to  the  consuls  ^^T p'f 

the  false  information  that  the  Samnites  had  quitted  their  camp  at  ^^'^j  jj 
Caudium  and  were  beleaguering  Luceria.      It  was  of  great  import- 
ance to  the  Romans  that  Luceria,  the  chief  town  of  Apulia,  should 

1  It  seems  likely  that  Livy  conceives  Postumius  to  be  at  Calatia  (or  Caiatia) 
in  Samnium,  not  at  Calatia  in  Campania.  Between  the  former  and  Caudium 
there  is  a  pass  which  answers  fairly  well  to  his  description,  but  not  between  Calatia 
in  Campania  and  Caudium  ;  yet  a  very  ancient  tradition  places  the  spot  between 
these  last  two,  as  in  the  maps  on  pp.  128  and  136. 


142 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


not    be    in    the   hands   of  the    Samnites.       The   consuls  therefore 

determined  to  march  thither  as  quickly  as  possible.      The  shortest 

route  was  to  strike  the  road  at  Caudium,  and  make  for  Beneventum, 

where  the  direct  road  to  Luceria  branched  off.     Between  their  position 

and  Caudium  they  would  have  to  pass  through  a  valley  closed  at 

either  end  by  a  difficult  gorge  :  but  believing  the  Samnite  army  to 

be  far  away,  they  determined  to  risk  it. 

TheRoman         When  the  Romans  had  passed  the  first    gorge    and   marched 

army  in       through   the  valley,  they  found  the  exit   blocked  by  a  rampart  of 

dine^so'rse     ^^^^    trees    and  other    obstacles.      Alarmed    at    this,     Postumius 

J2T.         '    ordered  a  retreat.     When  the  legions,  however,  regained  the  gorge 

by  which  they  had  entered,  they  found  that  too  blocked  by  similar 

obstacles  and  guarded  by  a  force  of  the  enemy.     They  knew  now 

that  they  were  entrapped  :  and  though  they  entrenched  a  camp  as 

usual,  they  saw  only  too  clearly  that  they  must  submit  to  any  terms 

which  Pontius  might  impose. 

Thus  Livy  represents  the  affair,  attributing  to  the  Romans  a 
mistake  in  strategy  but  no  reverse  in  the  field.  Yet  it  seems  from 
stray  notices  in  other  writers  that  there  was  some  kind  of  battle.  ^ 
It  took  place,  no  doubt,  on  ground  unfavourable  to  the  Romans  ; 
and  was  probably  neither  severe  nor  decisive.  The  fighting 
accordingly  was  forgotten,  which  the  surrender  of  an  army  was  not 
likely  to  be.  All  our  authorities  represent  this  surrender  as  the 
result  of  a  failure  of  provisions.  Pontius  doubted  for  some  time 
what  course  he  should  adopt  towards  the  enemy  now  in  his  hands. 
He  sent  for  his  aged  father  Herennius,  who  advised  him  either  to 
exterminate  them  or  to  let  them  all  depart  in  peace  and  honour. 
By  the  one  measure  he  would  effectually  cripple  the  Republic  for 
many  years  to  come :  by  the  latter  he  would  secure  its  friendship  by 
an  act  of  undeniable  generosity.  Pontius,  however,  decided  to 
make  a  treaty  at  once  with  the  consul.  He  must  have  known  that 
to  be  binding  such  an  agreement  required  to  be  confirmed  by  the 
people  ;  but  he  appears  to  have  thought  that  this  might  safely  be 
reckoned  upon,  if  the  consuls  and  military  tribunes  swore  to  the 
terms,  and  if  he  retained  the  600  Equites  of  the  legions  as  hostages. 
Tke  terms.  The  terms  agreed  to  were  :  That  the  Romans  should  withdraw 

from  Samnite  territory  ;  remove  the  colonies  of  Fregellae  and  Cales  ; 
and  make  a  peace  with  the  Samnites  on  the  basis  of  mutual 
independence. 


^  Cicero,  de  Sen.  §  41  Caudino praelio  ;  de  Off.  3,  §  109  cum  male  pugnatjim 
ad  Caudium  esset.  Eutrop.  ii.  4  Samnites  Romanos  ....  apud  Furculas 
Caudinas  angustiis  locorum  inclusos  ingenti  dedecore  vicerunt.  There  were  no 
contemporary  records  (Livy  viii.  40) ;  and  though  some  writers  may  have  thought 
it  worth  while  to  pass  it  over,  Livy  himself  does  not  usually  conceal  Roman  defeats. 


XI  SURRENDER  OF  THE  ROMAN  ARMY  143 

This  involved  the  abandonment  of  everything  for  which  Rome  jzi. 

had  been  fighting  ;  and  would  leave  the  road  into  Latium  open  to 

the   Samnites.      Such  terms  would  not  be  accepted  by  the  people 

except    after    overwhelming    disaster ;    and    the   loss   of  even    four 

legions  could  not  be  so  regarded.     Nor  did  Pontius,  by  allowing 

the  soldiers   to   depart   with  their   lives,  do  anything   to   conciliate 

Roman   feeling.     The   restoration   of   soldiers   who  had   laid  down 

their  arms   was   never  valued   at   Rome.      If  they  were   ransomed 

it  was  by  their  own  friends,  not  by  the  State.      Nor  could  Pontius 

reckon   on  the  men  themselves,  who  would  be  among  the  voters, 

showing  any  enthusiasm  for  him.      He  had  given  them  their  lives,   The 

but   in   circumstances   which   made   them   of  little   value.      For  he  Romans 

insisted  that  officers  and  men  alike  should  pass  "  under  the  yoke,"  -^f-^-^  under 

.  .  the  vohe 

without  arms,  and  to  take  nothing  home  with  them  but  the  clothes 

which  they  were  wearing. 

When    the    disgraced    army    and    its    officers,    assisted   by    the   The  Senate 
citizens    of  Capua,   got  back  to   Rome,   they    entered   the  city  by  refuse  the 
night,   avoiding   the   sight   of  all   men.       Postumius,   who   did    not  ^^''^•^• 
venture  to  act  as  consul,  was  forced  to  name  a  dictator  to  hold  the 
consular  elections  ;    and  the  new  consuls    appear  to  have  entered 
upon  their  offices  earlier  than   usual.      Postumius   himself  advised 
against  accepting  the  terms  to  which  he  had  sworn.      Rather  than 
this  he  urged  that  he  and  his  officers  should  be  sent  back  to  Pontius.   The  return 
Two  of  the  plebeian  tribunes  had,  it  seems,  been  sent  to  the  camp  to  of  Postum- 
join  in  making  the  agreement,  and  now  attempted  by  their  tribunician  ^^^  ^^  *}^ 
power  to   stop    this   measure.  ^      But  they  too   were    persuaded    to  J^^T  ^ 
abdicate,  and  shared  with  the  consuls  the  formal  surrender  to  the 
Samnite.      Accompanied    by   a   Roman    fetial    they   were   solemnly 
handed    over    to    Pontius  in   chains.       It   was   even    reported    that 
Postumius,  declaring  that  he  was  now  a  Samnite,  struck  the  fetial 
with  his  knee,  crying  that  he  had  thus  given  the  Romans  a  sufficient 
pretext  for  making  war. 

If  by  such  poor  subterfuges  the  Roman  officers  did  really  think  Pontius 
to  put  themselves  in  the  right,  Pontius  refused  to  allow  them  to  gain  declines  to 
this  technical  advantage.      He  declined  to  accept  the  surrender  of  ^^'^^^^^ 
the  officers  or  to  acknowledge  it  as  a  satisfaction  of  their  obligations  ; 
demanding  that,  as   the   Romans  had  not  accepted  the  treaty,  the 
whole  army  should  be  replaced  in  the  same  position. 

The   Roman   conduct   was   not   generous,   but  it  was  inevitable. 

1  This  seems  implied  by  Cicero  {de  Off.  3,  30)  ;  and  though  the  law  forbade 
the  absence  of  a  tribune  for  more  than  twenty-four  hours  from  the  city,  the  rule 
seems  to  have  been  relaxed  in  special  circumstances.  Niebuhr  suspected  that 
they  had  been  sent  with  a  legal  confirmation  of  \hefoedus  by  the  people,  which 
was  now  to  be  disowned. 


144 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Conduct 
of  the 
Romans. 


The  war 
from  J20 
to  314. 

Revolt  of 

Satricum. 

Loss  of 

Fregellae 

and 

Luceria. 

Energy  of 
the  Rom- 
ans. 


Siege  of 
Luceria, 
320. 


Pontius,  who  was  fully  aware  of  the  distinction  between  a  military 
convention  {sponsio)  and  a  treaty  {foediis)^  ought  in  common  pru- 
dence to  have  retained  the  legions  until  the  ratification  of  the  treaty. 
In  case  of  its  rejection  he  could  at  any  rate  have  deprived  the 
Republic  of  a  large  fighting  force.  The  army  having  been  once 
dispersed  it  was  difficult,  perhaps  impossible,  to  restore  it  to  the 
position  from  which  Pontius  had  allowed  it  to  depart.  Nor  was  it 
altogether  reasonable  to  expect  it.  By  assuming  that  the  treaty  would 
be  ratified,  and  allowing  the  men  to  go  on  that  understanding,  Pontius 
was  forcing  the  hand  of  the  Romans.  They  might  fairly  decline  to 
be  caught  in  the  trap  :  and  if  they  gave  up  the  officers  who  made 
the  treaty,  without  demanding  the  hostages  already  in  his  hands, 
they  had  some  reason  for  thinking  that  they  had  done  all  that  honour 
required.  He  had  had  his  triumph,  and  had  inflicted  on  the 
beaten  army  what  was  well  understood  throughout  Italy  to  be  the  last 
degradation  :  the  Romans  did  not  feel  bound  to  allow  him  to  carry 
off  also  all  the  advantages  of  the  war  in  return  for  sparing  the  lives 
of  men,  on  whom  he  had  inflicted  the  greatest  severity  in  his  power 
short  of  slavery  or  death. 

But  though  the  Samnites  had  thus  failed  to  get  the  advantages 
from  the  victory  at  the  Caudine  Forks  which  they  anticipated,  they 
were  evidently  regarded  as  having  the  best  of  the  struggle. 
Satricum,  on  the  borders  of  old  Latium,  which  forty  years  ago 
the  Romans  had  taken  from  its  Volscian  colonists,  now  declared 
its  adhesion  to  the  Samnites,  who  were  expected  to  advance  into 
Latium  (320).  Fregellae,  the  Roman  colony  which  had  been  the 
principal  pretext  for  war,  was  surprised  and  captured  by  a  Samnite 
army  ;  and  Luceria,  the  capital  of  Apulia,  fell  into  their  hands. 

Yet  before  long  the  energy  of  the  Romans  restored  the  balance. 
The  consul  Publilius  (320)  confronted  a  Samnite  force  at  Caudium  ; 
the  other  consul  L.  Papirius  Cursor  made  his  way  by  the  upper  coast 
road  to  Luceria,  where  the  Samnites  kept  the  600  Roman  hostages. 
He  was  supplied  with  necessaries  on  his  road  by  the  country  people, 
who,  though  they  had  no  great  love  for  the  Romans,  dreaded  the 
Samnite  raids.  Both  armies  are  credited  with  victories.  At  any 
rate  the  Samnite  force  at  Caudium  left  its  position,  followed  by 
Publilius,  and  went  to  the  relief  of  Luceria.  The  two  consuls 
effected  a  junction  near  that  town ;  but  the  siege  was  left  to 
Papirius,  while  Publilius  occupied  himself  in  securing  smaller  towns 
in  Apulia.  Details  are  quite  wanting ;  but  the  upshot  was  that 
Luceria  was  recovered  and  Papirius  allowed  a  triumph.^ 

^  But  so  defective  were  Livy's  authorities  that  he  could  not  decide  whether  it 
was  not  rather  Lucius  Cornelius  who  triumphed  as  dictator,  with  Papirius  as 
master  of  the  horse. 


XI  SIX  YEARS  OF  INDECISIVE  WAR  14S 

The  war  for  the  next  three  years  was  desultory  and  indecisive,  jig-316. 
But  whether  successful  or  the  reverse  in  Samnium,  Rome  was  con-   ^^^^  ^^^ 
solidating  her  Latin  territory.      Much  country  once  Volscian  was  in  '^^'*^■^• 
319  made  Roman,  its  inhabitants  being  enrolled  in  two  new  tribes, 
the  Ufentina  and  Falerina;  while  provision  was  made  for  peace  and  Patroni  in 
justice  between  the  Roman  settlers  and  the  old  inhabitants  of  Antium  Antium. 
by  yearly  officers  sent  from  Rome.      Meanwhile  the  chief  military  Success  in 
operations  were  in  Apulia  and  Lucania.     A  great  part  of  the  former  Apulia 
was  secured  to  the  Roman  allegiance,  and  a  footing  at  least  gained  ««^ 
in  the  latter.  Lucania. 

But  the  Samnites  were  more  successful  on  their  northern  frontier.  Revolt  of 
In  316  the  old  inhabitants  of  Sora,  on  the  upper  Liris,  overpowered  Sora, 
the  Roman  colonists,  and  declared  for  the  Samnites,  who  were  now  ^^^^^^  ^ 
advancing  dangerously  far  into  Latium.     In  3 1  5  the  dictator  Q.  Fabius     ^^^ 
was  recalled  from  Samnium  to  Sora.      On  his  way  he  was  met  by 
the  Samnite  army  in  the  pass  of  Lautulae,  between  Terracina  and 
Fundi;  was  defeated  with  considerable  loss,  including  Q.  Aulius,  his 
master  of  the  horse  ;  and  for  some  time  was  shut  up  in  his  camp.i 
He  managed  eventually  to  break  out  and  reach  Sora  ;  but  not  in  Sora  re- 
sufficient  force  to  storm  or  besiege  it.     That  was  reserved  for  the  covered, 
consuls  of  the  next  year  (314),  who  arrived  with  fresh  troops  to  take  •^^'f- 
command.     Sora  was  captured,  and  250  inhabitants  who  had  been  paeliliu's 
conspicuous  in  the  rebellion  were  sent  to  Rome  in  chains  and  executed  c.  Sul- 
in  the  Forum.     The  rest  were  spared,  and  a  garrison  was  placed  picius. 
in  the  town. 

The  Ausones  had  now  to  be  punished  for  their  defection  after  the  Destruc- 
defeat  of  Lautulae.      The  Samnites  were  not  there  to  support  them  ;  ^^'^^  ^f  the 
for  they  had  been  subsequently  defeated  by  Fabius,  or  for  some  other      ^^°^^^' 
reason  had  as  usual  not  followed  up  their  success.      Some  Ausonians 
also  themselves  favoured  the  Roman  supremacy,  and  were  ready  to 
betray  their  countrymen.      Their  subjection,  therefore,  proved  an  easy 
task.     Ausona,   Minturnae,  and  Vescia  were  taken,  and  the  people 
treated  with  such  severity  that  the  race  seemed  all  but  extinct. 

Meanwhile   Luceria    had    again    been    occupied    by  a    Samnite  Luceria 
garrison.       Its  recovery,  vital    to  Roman  influence  in   Apulia,  was  ^^^^^^^^^' 
however  effected  by   the   consuls ;    the    Samnite   garrison   and   the 
treasonable    party    among    the    Lucerini   were    put    to    the    sword ; 
and    2500    Roman    colonists    sent    out    to    occupy    it.       This    was 

^  Livy  (ix.  23)  represents  this  as  a  drawn  battle.  Not  so  Diodorus  (xix. 
72),  who  describes  a  general  rout  of  the  Roman  line.  The  commotion  which 
followed  in  Campania,  and  especially  among  the  Ausones,  shows  that  the  truth  is 
rather  with  Diodorus.  Still  as  Q.  Fabius  arrived  after  all  at  Sora,  he  could  not 
have  been  fatally  damaged  by  the  battle,  and  the  Samnites  failed  as  usual  to  use 
their  victory  with  effect. 

L 


[46 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Victory 
at  Cinna, 

3^4- 
Loss  and 
i-ecovery  of , 
Fregellae. 


Change  in 
the  state  of 
the  war, 
313- 


Roman 
power  in 
Campania. 

Colonies  at 
Suessa,  In- 
teramna, 
and 
Casinum. 

The  via 
Appia. 

Growth  of 

naval 

tower. 

Colony  at 

Ponza, 

3^4- 

Duoviri 

navales. 


followed  by  a  judicial  investigation  at  Capua  into  the  disaffection 
there  during  the  last  year.  Some  of  the  leaders  anticipated  their 
fate  by  suicide ;  the  rest  were  allowed  to  escape.  But  that  the 
movement  should  have  been  serious  is  a  measure  of  the  Roman 
difficulties  and  disasters. 

The  Samnites  were  still  threatening  Campania,  and  though  the 
consuls  now  gained  a  decisive  victory  over  them  at  Cinna, ^  and  were 
able  to  advance  into  the  heart  of  Samnium  and  attack  Bovianum 
(314),  they  were  still  able  to  surprise  the  citadel  of  Fregellae,  com- 
manding the  upper  road  into  Campania.  It  was  recovered  however 
shortly  afterwards  by  the  dictator  C.  Paetilius. 

Up  to  this  time  the  war  had  nearly  always  gone  on  close  to  the 
frontiers  of  Samnium  and  Campania  ;  and  the  chief  object  of  both 
sides  was  to  secure  the  command  of  Campania.  The  victory  at  Cinna 
(314)  proved  a  turning-point.  It  was  followed  by  no  negotiations 
for  peace.  The  Samnites  remained  unconquered,  and  often  inflicted 
isolated  defeats  on  the  Roman  armies  in  after  years.  But  though 
Rome  had  soon  another  war  on  her  hands  in  Etruria,  from  this  time 
the  policy  of  steadily  securing  by  permanent  settlements  all  that  she 
won  was  pursued  with  increased  regularity  ;  and  she  began  also  to 
develope  a  new  element  of  strength  by  the  use  of  ships  in  military 
expeditions. 

A  hold  upon  Campania  was  secured  by  the  occupation  of  Nola, 
Atina,  and  Calatia :  and  the  road  to  it  made  safer  by  a  colony 
at  Suessa  in  the  Falernian  district.  In  313  colonies  were  sent  to 
Interamna  Lirinas,  which  commanded  the  valley  of  the  Liris,  and 
to  Casinum,  which  commanded  the  valley  of  the  Volturnus.  Soon 
afterwards  (312-310)  Appius  Claudius  began  the  great  work  on 
the  road  between  Rome  and  Capua,  which  ever  after  went  by  his 
name.  Thus  Rome  had  secured  one  part  at  least  of  what  she  had 
been  fighting  for,  the  free  entrance  and  control  of  Campania. 

But  in  314  also  a  colony  was  sent  to  Pontiae  {Ponza\  an  island 
off  the  Latin  and  Campanian  coasts.  In  connexion  with  this  we 
find  a  sudden  interest  at  Rome  in  naval  matters.  In  338  all 
war  vessels  {naves  longae)  had  been  removed  from  Antium  to 
Ostia,  but  for  some  years  appear  to  have  been  neglected.  It  was 
not  until  3 1 2  that  duoviri  navales^  two  commissioners  for  the  outfit 
and  repair  of  ships,  were  appointed  for  the  first  time.  And  in  the 
next  year  (311)  we  also  for  the  first  time  hear  of  a  naval  expedition 
from  Rome.  The  ships,  under  Publius  Cornelius  as  "  praefect  of  the 
sea-coast,"  sailed  along  the  Campanian  shore,  and  a  descent  was  made, 
not  very  successfully,  near  Pompeii.      There  is  no  idea  of  fighting  at 

Diodorus  (xix.  76)  gives  the  name 


^  Livy  (ix.  27)  as  usual  mentions  no  name, 
Cinna,  but  its  situation  is  unknown. 


XI  THE  ETRUSCAN  WAR  I47 

sea  ;  but  it  adds  a  new  means  of  attack  when  troops  can  be  conveyed 
safely  from  point  to  point  of  an  enemy's  coast  in  ships.  For  this  it 
was  in  the  highest  degree  necessary  that  the  Romans  should  command 
the  Italian  waters  ;  and  it  was  to  secure  such  command  that  the 
colony  of  Pontiae  seems  to  have  been  formed. 

It  is  such  measures  which  explain  the  ultimate   success   of  the  Causes  of 
Romans.      The  Samnites  might  gain  single  battles  or  surprise  import-  i'^oman 
ant    strongholds  ;    but    they  did    not    follow   up  victories    or  retain  •^"'^^^■^■^• 
captures.      The  Romans,  on  the  other  hand,  by  these  settlements  of 
citizens  in  places  of  strategical  importance,  kept  a  resolute  hold  upon 
what  they  had  once  won,  and  at  the  same  time  spread  Roman  ideas, 
customs,  and  even  laws  through  wide  districts,  which  quickly  became 
Roman    in    feeling ;    while   the  plundering    raids    of  the    Samnites 
produced  only  hatred  and  hostility  among  the  farmers  whose  pro- 
perty they  destroyed. 

But  now  Rome  was  to  find  herself  engaged  in  a  double  war,  in  Etruscan 
the  north  as  well  as  in  the  south.     While  the  legions  were  employed  ^^''>  3^^- 
in  some  of  the  usual  desultory  operations  in  Samnium  during  the  j^^^^^  ' 
summer  of  3 1 1 ,  a  combined  army  of  the  chief  towns  in  Etruria,  north  Bubulcus 
of  the  Ciminian  forest,   suddenly  attacked  Sutrium,  which  was  the  ///.,  Q. 
frontier  town  of  Roman   Etruria,  and  in  close  alliance  with   Rome.   Aemilius 
The  consul  Aemilius  was  promptly  sent  to  its  relief.      But  he  found  j'^^  ^  ^ 
himself  outnumbered,  and,  though  by  the  gallantry  of  his  men  he 
appears  to  have  avoided  positive  defeat,  his  army  suffered  too  severely 
to  allow  of  anything  being  done  that  year,  or  of  Sutrium  being  re- 
lieved.     When  O.  Fabius,  the  consul  for  the  next  year  (310),  arrived  j^o. 
with  fresh  troops,  he   found  it   still   surrounded    by   Etruscans.      A   ^^•^•^-  Q- 
desperately-fought  skirmish,  rather  than  regular  battle,  confined  the  r^  l^^ ,    ' 


ctus 


besiegers  of  Sutrium  to  their  entrenchments  ;  and  Fabius  conceived  Rutilus. 
the  bold  design  of  effecting  a  diversion  by  crossing  the  Ciminian  hills,  Sutrium 
which  formed  the  frontier  of  Roman  Etruria.      They  were  covered  relieved. 
with  a  forest,   which    at  this   time   was   looked  upon   as   dangerous  ^^^''"^■^ 
even  for  peaceful  merchants.     Fabius  however,  sending  one  of  his  Saltus 
officers    forward    to    reconnoitre,    led    his    army   through    this   wild  Ciminius. 
district.       For   some   weeks  nothing  was  heard   of  him,  and  great 
alarm    was    felt    at    Rome,    presently    intensified    by    news    of   the 
defeat    of  the   other    consul    Marcius   in    Samnium.       The    Senate  Defeat  of 
determined  that  Papirius  Cursor  must  be  named  dictator.      Whether  Marcius 
Marcius  had  fallen  in  the  Samnite  battle  was  unknown  ;  but  news    ^  ^^^  . 
had  come  of  Fabius.       He  had  safely  passed  the  Ciminian  forest, 
and  was  enriching  his  army  with  the  spoil  of  the  fertile  plains  of 
central  Etruria.      A  message  therefore  could  be  sent  to  him  announ- 
cing the  will  of  the  Senate.      But  he  was  the   Fabius  whom,  as  his 
master  of  the  horse,  Papirius  had  once  wished  to  put  to  death.     Would 


CHAP.  XI  ETRURIANS  AND  UMBRIANS  UNITE  149 


he  be  induced  now  to  name  him  dictator  ?  Fabius  hesitated,  but 
patriotism  overcame  personal  feeling  ;  he  rose  in  the  night  (as  was 
usual)  and  named  Papirius.  He  himself  was  not  superseded  in  his 
command.  The  dictator  remained  in  office  without  consuls  through 
309,  and  went  to  Campania  to  take  over  the  army  from  Marcius  and 
drive  back  the  Samnites,  while  Fabius  continued  the  war  in  Etruria 
next  year  (309)  as  proconsul. 

The  Etrurians  had  collected  fresh  forces  at  the  Vadimonian  lake,  Battle  at 
and  there  Fabius  defeated  them  with   dreadful  slaughter,  and  took  *^^  Vadi- 
their  camp.     The  flower  of  their  youth  is  said  to  have  perished  ;  but  ^^^^^"^^^ 
though  the  slaughter  was  great,   some  of  the   survivors   rallied  at 
Perusia,    where  Fabius   again    defeated    them,   and    put   a    Roman 
garrison  in  the  town. 

His  brilliant  success  caused  him  to  be  re-elected  consul  for  the  308. 
next  year  (308)  ;  but  he  did  not  return  to  Etruria.      The  lot  assigned  F^^bius 
the  Samnite  war  to  him;   and  pushing  on  into  southern  Campania  ^^j^"^^- 
he  added  to  his  other  triumphs  the  capture  of  the  important  town  of  Alfatema. 
Nuceria  Alfaterna. 

His  colleague  P.  Decius,  whom  the  lot  sent  to  Etruria,  gained  some    Victory 
slight  advantages  over  the  Etruscans,  who  still  offered  a  fitful  resist-  ^'^^^    , 
ance.     But  when  all  seemed  quiet  in  Etruria,  a  new  danger  arose  ^^^  Etru- 
in  Umbria.     An  army  consisting  of  both  Etruscans  and  Umbrians  had  rians. 
collected  at  Mevania  in  Umbria,  and  were  reported  to  be  intending 
to  march  upon  Rome  itself      Decius  marched  swiftly  southward  to 
intercept   them ;    and    the   Senate  hastily   summoned    Fabius   from 
Campania.      Fabius  arrived  at  Mevania  before  his  colleague,   and 
once    more    engaged    and    routed    the    enemy.     All    danger    from 
Etruria  and  Umbria  was  for  the  present  at  an  end.      His  command  Battle  of 
was   again   continued    to   him   as  proconsul   in   307  ;    and  he   won  ^W<^^^ 
fresh    honours    in    the    Samnite    war,    especially    in    a    battle    near  '^^^' 
Allifae. 

But  the  retirement  of  Fabius  next  year  (306)  was  the  signal  for  Samnites 
renewed  exertions  on  the  part  of  the  Samnites.     They  crossed  the  ^'^^f  ^^'^" 
Volturnus,  stormed  Calatia  and  Sora,  and  put  the  Roman  garrisons  ^sora^\o6 
to   the   sword.      The   consul   P.   Cornelius   Arvina  was  sent  against 
them ;   and  while   he   attempted   the  difficult  task  of  getting  at  an 
enemy  who    had  already  occupied   all   the    roads    and  passes,   his 
colleague  O.  Marcius  was  engaged  in  the  easier  labour  of  subduing  Rebellion 
the  Hernici,  long  favoured  allies  of  Rome,  who  had  been  irritated  by  of  the 
what    they   thought  unjust   severity  towards   some   of  their   people  ^'?''«^«- 
found   in   the   Samnite  ranks  at   Allifae.     They  soon   submitted  to 
Marcius,  and  were  dealt  with  leniently.      The  three  towns  which  had 
not  joined  in  the  rebellion,  Alatrium,  Ferentinum,  and  Verula,  retained 
by  their  own  wish  their  old  status  of  foederatae  civitates  with  the 


so 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Great 
victory  of 
the  consuls 
P.  Cornel- 
ius Arvina 
and  Q. 
Marcius 
Tremulus 
over  the 
Samnites, 
306. 


305-^ 

Bovianum 

taken. 

Sara, 

Arpinu7n, 

and  Cen- 

sennia 

recovered. 

End  of  the 
second 
Samnite 
war,  304. 


Fruits  of 
the  war 
to  the 
Romans. 


special  privilege  of  mutual  commercium  and  conubiwnj  the  others 
were  forced  to  accept  the  Caerite  citizenship. 

Marcius  was  now  at  leisure  to  go  to  the  support  of  his  colleague 
P.  Cornelius.  If  we  are  to  believe  Livy,  the  Samnites  who  had  been 
baffling  Cornelius  by  cutting  off  his  supplies  and  chnging  to  their 
fastnesses,  without  accepting  his  repeated  offers  of  battle,  determined 
that  they  must  abandon  all  hope  if  they  did  not  prevent  the  junction 
of  the  two  armies.  They  therefore  advanced  to  attack  Marcius  on 
his  march.  Cornelius,  seeing  what  was  happening,  swiftly  sallied 
from  his  camp,  charged  the  Samnite  column  on  the  flank,  broke 
right  through  it,  and  took  the  camp  which  they  had  just  left. 
When  Marcius  therefore  came  upon  the  ground  he  found  the  enemy 
already  in  confusion.  The  sight  of  their  burning  camp,  now  in  the 
hands  of  Cornelius,  alarmed  them  still  more.  They  were  soon  in  full 
retreat,  pursued  by  the  soldiers  of  C.  Marcius,  who  are  asserted  to  have 
slain  more  than  30,000  of  the  enemy,  besides  taking  a  large  number 
of  prisoners.  But  the  exaggeration  of  this  account  is  proved  by 
the  fact  that  in  spite  of  such  a  decisive  victory  so  much  was  left 
for  the  consuls  of  the  next  year  to  do.  It  was  not  until  305  that 
Bovianum  was  taken,  that  Sora,  Arpinum,  and  Censennia  were  re- 
covered from  the  Samnites.  These  achievements  followed  a  more 
determined  raid  on  Samnium  itself  than  had  been  made  before,^ 
and  another  victory,  in  which  twenty-one  standards  of  the  enemy  fell 
into  the  hands  of  the  Romans,  along  with  the  Samnite  imperator 
Statius  Gellius.  Whatever  the  real  facts  of  the  campaigns  of  the 
years  306  and  305  may  be,  it  seems  certain  that  the  Samnites  now 
thought  it  time  to  ask  for  peace,  and  yet  were  able  to  demand  and 
obtain  honourable  terms.  The  old  treaty,  securing  mutual  independ- 
ence, was  renewed  ;  and  thus  after  twenty-four  years  a  varied  and 
indecisive  war  was  ended  for  a  while. 

Though  the  Romans  cannot  be  said  to  have  conquered  the 
Samnites,  yet  the  substantial  advantages  of  the  war  were  with  them. 
Their  enemy,  though  independent,  was  confined  to  his  natural  limits. 
They  had  secured  by  permanent  settlements,  and  by  the  great  Appian 
road,  the  way  into  Campania,  and  its  protection  along  the  Samnite 
frontier.  They  had  consolidated  their  own  immediate  territory,  and 
held  the  towns  on  the  debatable  mountain  land  between  Latium  and 
Samnium,  such  as  Sora  and  Fregellae,  thus  commanding  also  another 
road  into  Campania.  By  the  possession  of  Luceria  they  dominated 
Apulia  ;  and  by  that  of  Nuceria  Alfaterna  they  commanded  the  road 
into  Lucania.  Above  all  they  had  become  the  natural  arbitrators  in 
all  disputes  in  southern  Italy,  to  whom  the  ApuU  and  Lucani  would 


Diodor.  Sic.  xx.  80. 


XI  END  OF  THE  SECOND  SAMNITE  WAR  151 

look  for  protection  against  the  incursion  of  the  Samnite  mountaineers. 
In  the  course  of  the  same  period  the  arms  of  Rome  had  estabHshed 
her  supremacy  in  Etruria  and  had  spread  the  terror  of  her  name  in 
Umbria.  She  had  taken  a  long  step  towards  a  supremacy  in  all 
Italy.  It  mattered  comparatively  little  whether  the  Samnites  had  or 
had  not  from  time  to  time  defeated  her  legions  in  the  field  ;  with 
admirable  patience  and  persistency  the  Romans  sent  army  after  army 
each  year,  securing  now  one  point  and  now  another,  ready  to  take 
every  advantage  by  arms  or  diplomacy,  however  apparently  trivial, 
and  steadily  advancing  towards  the  attainment  of  their  end :  as  a 
rising  tide  which,  seeming  alternately  to  recede  and  advance,  con- 
tinues nevertheless  steadily  to  roll  its  waters  to  the  appointed  limit. 

The  Roman  consul  P.  Sempronius  had  made  the  peace  with  the 
Samnites,  not  by  the  authority  of  the  Senate  and  people,  but  at  the 
head  of  his  army.      When  he  had  satisfied  himself  that  all  was  quiet 
in  Samnium,  he  marched  along  with  his  colleague  P.  Sulpicius  against 
the  Aequi,  who  had  in  the  latter  years  of  the  war  sent  assistance  to   The  Aequ. 
the  Samnites.     They  were  offered  but  refused  the  Caerite  citizenship,  304- 
which  had  been  imposed  upon  the  Hernici  and  others,  amounting  in 
fact  to  the  position  of  subjects  of  the  Republic.      Their  refusal  brought 
upon   them   the   whole   weight   of  the   Roman   armies.     They  were 
beaten  in  the  field  and  their  whole  fighting  force  practically  exter- 
minated,   and    next    year    a    colony    6000    strong    was    settled    at  Colony  at 
Alba  Fucentia  to  keep  them  in  check  for  the  future.      Overawed  by  Alba 
this  severity  the  neighbouring  tribes — the  Marrucini,  Marsi,  Peligni,  ^^(^^'^^^^< 
and   Frentani — accepted   the  position   of  federate   states,  by  which 
each  retained  its  local  government,  but  had  no  right  to  any  connexion, 
M^arlike  or  peaceful,  with  any  other  states  without  the  authority  of 
Rome,  to  whom  also  each  owed  a  fixed   contribution  of  men   and 
money.      Thus    Samnium    had    on   its   north   also  a  ring   of   states 
subject  to  Rome  ;  and  Rome  had  full  command  of  the  road  along  the 
Adriatic  coast  into  Apulia. 

Authorities. — Livy  viii.  22-ix.  47  ;  Dionysius,  fragments  of  books  xv.  and 
xvi.  ;  Diodorus  Siculus  xiv.  101-102  ;  xvi.  15  ;  xix.  72,  76  ;  xx.  35,  80  ;  Appian, 
Samnit.  fr.  2-5;  Dio,  fr.  36;  Florus,  i.  11  ;  Frontinus  i.  2;  Zonaras  vii.  26; 
Eutropius  ii.  4  ;  Orosius  iii.  15.  Pliny  (.V.  H.  3,  §57)  refers  to  a  mission  sent  by 
Rome  to  Alexander  the  Great  (336-323),  but  we  know  neither  its  time  nor  its 
object,  if  it  really  took  place.  Livy,  however,  seems  to  indicate  that  his  victories 
were  known,  and  caused  alarm  at  Rome  (ix.  16-19). 


CHAPTER  XII 


ETRUSCAN    AND    THIRD    SAMNITE    WARS 


303-290 


COLONIES 

NEW  TRIBES 

Carseoli 

B.C. 

302 

Aniensis 

B.C.   299 

Mintumae 

B.C. 

296 

Terentina 

.        B.C.   299 

Sinuessa 

B.C. 

296 

Venusia 

B.C. 

291 

B.C.  293 
B.C.  289 

CENSUS 

262,322 
273,000 

Between  the  second  and  third  Samnite  wars  (303-298) — Complaint  of  the  Lucan- 
ians  and  the  beginning  of  the  third  Samnite  war  (298) — The  Samnites  league 
with  Etruscans  and  Gauls  (296) — Failures  of  Appius  Claudius  Caecus  (296) — 
Battle  of  Sentinum  (295) — Last  five  years  of  the  war  (294-290) — The  legiones 
linteatae — Battle  of  Aquilonia  (293) — Capture  and  execution  of  C.  Pontius 
(292) — Peace  with  the  Samnites  (290),  and  their  subsequent  attitude  towards 
Rome. 


Events 
between  the 
second  and 
third 
Samnite 
wars,  303- 

2^8. 


Settlement 
after  the 
war. 


The  peace  of  304  did  not  last  long.  But  for  about  six  years  there 
was  a  cessation  in  that  border  warfare  with  the  fierce  highlanders, 
which  had  grown  to  be  the  habitual  employment  of  large  numbers 
of  citizens.  Like  the  old  border  warfare  of  English  and  Scot,  it  had 
little  immediate  influence  on  the  course  of  life  in  the  city.  Its  effects 
were  felt  afterwards  in  the  training  which  the  Roman  soldiers  had 
gained,  and  in  the  new  responsibilities  which  the  State  had  been  led 
step  by  step  to  assume. 

The  first  measures  of  which  we  hear  after  the  last  war  are 
towards  extending  and  confirming  the  Roman  dominion.  The  colony 
at  Alba  Fucentia  to  check  the  Aequi  has  been  already  mentioned. 
To  Volscian  Sora  also,  on  the  Liris,  4000  new  colonists  were  sent  to 
replace  those  fallen  in  the  late  revolt.  To  the  Volscian  Arpinum  and 
to  Trebula  in  Campania  was  given  the  Roman  citizenship — the  former 
sine  siiffragio ;  while  Frusino,  as  a  punishment  for  help  to  the 
Hernici,  was  deprived  of  a  third  of  its  lands. 


CHAP.  XII       OUTBREAKS  IN  ETRURIA  AND  UMBRIA  153 

These  measures  were  quietly  submitted  to  by  all  those  concerned  A  "  tumul- 
except  by  some  of  the  Aequi  and  Marsi.     The  former  resisted  the  ^^^" 
colony  at  Alba, — a  resistance  often  imitated  in  after  times  by  those  ^^''^^l'    ^ 
who  suffered  loss  of  lands  for  the  benefit  of  coloni.     The  Roman  Marsi, 
government    never    treated    such    conduct    lightly ;  Gaius    Junius  S02. 
Bubulcus  was  named  dictator  and  sent  against  the  rebelHous  tribe, 
and    quickly   suppressed  the    disturbance :  and  a  similar    outbreak 
among  the  Marsi,  owing  to  the  formation  of  the  colony  of  Carseoli, 
was  also  put  down  in  the  next  year  (301). 

More  serious  alarm  was  caused  by  a  report  in  302  that  a  force  Movement 
was  collecting  at  Arretium  determined  to  strike  one  more  blow  for  inEtruria, 
Etruscan   liberty.     The   gravity  of  the   situation   is   shown   by  the  302-301. 
fact  that  from  the  middle  of  302  to  the  end  of  301   three  dictators 
were  named  in  succession,  no  consuls  being  elected  for  301.     The 
second  of  these  dictators,  M.   Valerius  Maximus,  after  suppressing  M.  Valer- 
the   Marsi,   led  his   army   into   Etruria.      But   having  to   return   to  ^"-^  Maxi- 
Rome  to  take  the  auspices  he  left  his  master  of  the  horse,  M.  Aemilius  dictator 
Paullus,  in  command,  who  sustained  the  loss  of  a  foraging  party  cut  joi. 
off  by  the  Etruscans.^     An  exaggerated  report  reached  Rome  and 
caused  great  alarm.     The  dictator  was  hurriedly  sent  back  to  the 
army,  where  his  presence  restored  discipline  and  confidence.      Find- 
ing the  soldiers  eager  to  wipe  out  their  disgrace,  he  advanced  into 
the  territory  of  Rusellae,  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Umbro.     There  he 
met    and   defeated    the    Etruscan    forces.     This    restored    order    in 
Etruria.      The    outbreak  had   been   apparently  almost    confined    to 
Arretium,  where  it  had  originated  in  a  popular  revolt  against  the 
powerful  family  of  the  Cilnii,  the  nobles  or  Lucumos  of  the  district, 
who  had  been  supporters  of  the  Roman  influence.     They  were  now 
restored  by  the  dictator,  and  from  them  sprung  in  after  times  Cilnius 
Maecenas,  the  minister  and  friend  of  Augustus.^ 

But  besides  the  disturbance  in  Etruria  there  had  been  also  an   Umbria. 
outbreak  in  Umbria ;  and  the  Romans  now  adopted  the  usual  course  Nequinum 
for  keeping  the  Umbrians  in  check.     After  a  lengthened  siege  the  i^tade  a 
town  of  Nequinum,  on  the  Nar,  in  the  south  of  Umbria,  was  taken,  ^-^j^^ 
the  inhabitants  destroyed  or  removed,  and  a   Latin  colony  settled  ^^^der  the 
there  under  the  name  of  Narnia  (299).    But  though  an  outward  peace  name  of 
was  secured,  there  were  still  elements  of  trouble.      Roman  supremacy  Narnia, 
in  Etruria  was  supported  by  Etruscan  nobles,  but  disliked  by  the  ^99* 
popular  party.       The   consequence   was   that   secret    meetings    and 

1  This  is  Livy's  account  (x.  3),  But  there  was  another  extant,  making 
Aemilius  master  of  the  horse  to  Q.  Fabius  Maximus,  which  Livy  believes  to  be 
a  mistake  arising  from  the  common  cognomen  Maximus.  The  second  dictator 
of  301,  according  to  the  Fasti,  was  also  a  Valerius, — M.  Valerius  Corvus. 

2  Hence  the  allusions  in  Horace  to  the  royal  descent  of  Maecenas :  atavis  edite 
regibus  {Od.  i.  i) ;   Tyrrhena  rcgum progenies  {Od.  iii.  29,  1). 


154 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


intrigues  caused  constant  uneasiness  at  Rome ;  and  especially  a 
report  that  the  leaders  of  the  popular  party  had  been  bargaining  for 
the  assistance  of  the  Gauls,  who  were  hovering  on  the  Etruscan  frontier. 
It  was  this  which  made  the  Romans  ready  to  form  a  new  alliance, 
as  they  did  at  this  time.  The  people  of  Picenum,  immediately  south 
of  the  Senones,  asked  and  obtained  a  treaty,  and  by  them  the  Romans 
were  presently  informed  that  the  Samnites  were  ready  to  rise,  and 
had  solicited  their  alliance. 

Six  years  of  peace  had  recruited  the  Samnite  forces.  They  were 
returning  to  their  old  habits  of  plunder,  and  it  was  evident  that  before 
long  they  would  be  again  in  collision  with  Rome.  The  Romans,  on 
their  side,  were  ready  to  strike  on  the  first  pretext,  and  the  opportunity 
soon  came.  Early  in  298  Lucanian  ambassadors  appeared,  com- 
plaining that  the  Samnites  had  invaded  their  country.  They  entreated 
the  Romans  to  forgive  past  defection,  and  offered  hostages  for  their 
good  faith.  There  was  no  hesitation  in  promising  help,  and  legates 
were  sent  to  bid  the  Samnites  quit  the  territories  of  the  "  allies  of 
Rome."  The  Samnites  refused  even  to  receive  the  fetials  ;  1  and  the 
Romans  at  once  prepared  for  war.  One  of  the  consuls,  L.  Cornelius 
Scipio  Barbatus,  went  to  Etruria ;  the  other,  Gnaeus  Fulvius,  to 
Samnium.  Scipio  fought  a  battle  at  Volaterrae  with  doubtful  result. 
Fulvius  penetrated  into  Samnium,  routed  the  enemy  near  Bovianum, 
and  even  took  the  town  itself,  and  Aufidena  on  the  Sagrus.  If  the 
inscription  on  the  tomb  of  Scipio  may  be  trusted,  Scipio  also  was  in 
Samnium  during  part  of  the  year,  and  took  two  towns — Taurasia  and 
Cisauna.2  The  first  year's  campaign  therefore  ended  favourably  for 
Rome,  and  Fulvius  was  allowed  a  triumph. 

1  So  Livy  says  (x.  12).  Dionysius  (xvi.  13)  describes  the  Samnites  as  re- 
ceiving the  ambassadors,  and  answering  very  naturally  that  the  alliance  of  Rome 
with  the  Lucanians  was  subsequent  to  their  own  treaty  with  Rome  :  that  they  had 
never  renounced  the  right  of  making  war  on  other  people,  and  therefore  were  not 
violating  their  treaty  by  attacking  the  Lucanians. 

2  The  inscription  is  in  Saturnian  verse  : 

Cornelius  Lucfus         Scfpio  Barbdtus 
Gnaivod  patr^  progndtus         fortis  vfr  sapidnsque 
quoius  formd  virtutei         pdrisumd  fuit 
cons61  cens6r  aedflis         quel  fuit  apud  vos 
TaurAsid  Cisauna         Samni6  c^pit 
Subigft  omn6  Loucdnam         6psiddsque  abdoucit 
It  is  unfortunate  that  this,  almost  the  first  original  historical  document  which 
we  possess,  should  leave  us  with  some  difficulties.      In  the  first  place,  the  form 
Cornelius  is  more  recent  than  Cornelia?  on  his  son's  tomb,  and  therefore  there  is  some 
cause  to  suspect  that  the  inscription  may  have  been  cut  some  years  after  his  death. 
In  the  next  place,  he  is  represented  as  winning  successes  in  Samnium,  although 
Livy  says  nothing  of  his  going  there.      The  assertion  in  the  last  line  that  ' '  he  sub- 
dued all  Lucania,  and  brought  away  hostages,"  may  be  the  family  view  of  the  fact 
that  in  his  consulship  the  Lucanians  did  give  hostages,  though  there  was   no  war. 


i 


XII  THE  ROMANS  IN  SAMNIUM  155 

The  war  thus  begun  differed  in  its  general  features  from  the  pre-  Different 
vious  war.     The  second  had  been,  for  the  most  part,  a  border  war :  "•ature  of 
fought  usually  on  the  frontiers,  now  of  Campania,  now  of  Latium,  l!J^^J^^ 
now  of  Apulia.      Its  object  had  been  to  decide  between  Samnite  and  ^^^^ 
Roman  supremacy  in  those  countries.      It  was  only  occasionally  and  second 
towards  the  end  of  the  war  that  the  Romans  penetrated  into  Sam-  Samnite 
nium  itself.      But  in  the  third  war  they  struck  at  once  at  the  heart  of  '^°'^' 
Samnium,  and  went  straight  to  Bovianum.     Only  once  do  we  read  of 
a  Samnite  raid  upon  Campania.      It  was  during  the  diversion  caused 
by  the  alliance  with  the  Etruscans  (296),  and  was  promptly  repelled. 

The  consuls  of  the  next  year  (297)  were  able,  owing  to  a  tem-  2g7.  Coss. 
porary  lull  in  Etruscan  disturbances,  to  devote  themselves  entirely  to  Q-  Radius 
the  Samnite  war.      Fabius  entered  by  the  upper  road  leading  through    r^^f/"^^^ 
Sora  ;  Decius  from  the  south  by  Sidicinum  and  the  valley  of  the  /y^  p^ 
Volturnus.      Fabius  appears  to  have  advanced  to  Bovianum,  which  Decius 
was  already  in  Roman  hands,  and  to  have  found  the  enemy  near  ^^^^  J^^- 
Trifanum,  separated  by  five  miles  of  deep  valley  from  Bovianum. 
They  hoped  to  attack  the  Romans  from  higher  ground  as  they  entered 
this  valley.      But  Fabius  fell  upon  them  unexpectedly,  and  defeated 
them  with  a  loss  of  over  3000  men  killed,  and  300  prisoners.      The 
other  consul,  Decius,  had  meanwhile  reached  Beneventum,  and  pre- 
vented some  Apulians  from  coming  to  support  the  Samnites.      Next  2^6.    The 
year  Decius  and  Fabius,  as  proconsuls,  failed  to  bring  the  enemy  to  S<^^^^^^ 
give  them  battle  again  ;  and  before  long  were  informed  by  scouts  ^J^Jy^^^a 
that  the  main  Samnite  army  had  abandoned  the  country,  and  marched 
to  the  north.      Thereupon  the  proconsuls,  leaving  the  open  country, 
busied  themselves  in  attacking  some  of  the  strong  towns. 

The  unexpected  movement  of  the  Samnite  army  was  in  accord-  Plan  of 
ance  with  a  plan  of  their  imperator,  Gellius  Egnatius.      He  had  con-  E^gnatius 
ceived  the  idea  that  Rome  might   best   be  struck  from  the  north.        % 
In  Etruria  he  would  find  ready  to  join  him  not  only  all  the  popular  confedera- 
party  of  the  Etruscans,  but  also  the  Umbrians,  and,  above  all,  the  Hon. 
Gauls.     With  such  a  coalition  threatening  her  from  the  north,  Rome 
would  be  compelled  to  withdraw  her  legions  from  Samnium,  or  to 
leave  such  weakened  forces  there  that  the  Samnites  at  home,  or  the 
popular  parties  in  Lucania  and  Apulia,  might  be  trusted  to  crush 
them. 

It  was  a  bold  policy,  well  conceived  and  gallantly  carried  out.    Why 
It    failed    because    a    permanent    combination    between    Umbrians  Egnatius 
or  Etrurians   and  their  natural  enemies  the  Gauls    was  impossible.  •/'"  ^  * 
And  Gellius  Egnatius  had  probably  also  overlooked  the  fact  that  the 
hostility  to  Rome  in  Etruria  was  confined  to  a  party,  while  she  could 
always  count  on  the  support  of  the  most  powerful  families.      At  first, 
however,  his  prospects  seemed  excellent.      His  camp  was  joined  by 


56 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Coss,  L. 
Volumnius 
Flamma 
ViolensII., 
Ap.  Claud- 
ius Caecus 
II.,  2g6. 
Victory  of 
Gauls  at 
Camer- 


Etruscan  volunteers  from  nearly  all  the  cities,  as  well  as  by  neigh- 
bouring Umbrians ;  while  Gallic  mercenaries  flocked  to  the  prospect 
of  pay  and  plunder. 

When  news  of  this  reached  Rome,  the  consul,  Appius  Claudius 
Caecus,  was  despatched  with  two  legions  and  troops  of  the  allies, 
amounting  to  12,000  men,  and  apparently  found  the  enemy  in 
Umbria.  But  he  effected  little  or  nothing,  and  indeed  sustained  a 
somewhat  severe  defeat  at  the  hands  of  the  Gauls  near  Camerinum.i 
And  though,  when  the  other  consul  L.  Volumnius  was  summoned 
from  Samnium  to  his  aid,  the  two  together  are  said  to  have  inflicted 
a  defeat  on  the  Etruscan  contingent  and  taken  their  camp,  it  is 
evident  that  the  results  of  the  campaign  of  296  were  unsatisfactory. 

There  was  great  alarm  at  Rome.  KjustiHu?n — that  is,  a  sus- 
pension of  ordinary  law  business — was  proclaimed  ;  a  fresh  levy  was 
held  in  which  youths  under  the  military  age,  and  men  over  it,  were 
enrolled,  as  though  the  city  itself  were  in  danger.  The  anxiety, 
indeed,  was  somewhat  dissipated  by  the  report  of  the  comparatively 
great  success  of  Volumnius  in  Samnium.  Before  going  to  the  sup- 
port of  Claudius,  he  had  suppressed  a  rising  in  Lucania.  On  join- 
ing Claudius  he  had  not  been  at  all  warmly  welcomed ;  for  Claudius 
asserted  that  he  had  not  sent  for  him,  and  did  not  need  him  ;  and  it 
was  only  in  consequence  of  the  remonstrances  of  Claudius's  officers 
that  Volumnius  remained  to  take  part  in  the  attack  on  the  Etruscans. 
He  then  returned  to  Samnium,  where  he  fell  in  with  a  Samnite  force, 
which,  taking  advantage  of  the  diversion  eff'ected  by  Gellius  Egnatius, 
had  made  a  raid  on  Campania.  He  defeated  them  with  great 
slaughter,  captured  their  leader,  Statius  Minatius,  and  recovered 
many  prisoners  and  much  booty. 

This  opportune  success  relieved  the  anxiety  which  was  being  felt 
at  Rome.  In  one  direction  at  any  rate  the  Roman  arms  were  still 
supreme.  And  it  was  determined  to  secure  the  power  of  the  Republic 
in   Campania   still  farther.      Two  new   colonies,  Minturnae   at   the 


pania  and  the  Falernian  territory,  were  decided  upon.  These,  as 
usual  with  maritime  colonies,  were  to  be  Roman  not  Latin — that  is 
to  say,  the  colonists  were  to  remain  Roman  citizens.  But  though 
those  who  joined  the  colony  would  thus  suffer  no  loss  of  civil  status, 
and  would  have  an  allotment  of  land,  it  was  found  difficult  to  induce 
men  to  give  in  their  names,  because  it  was,  in  fact,  going  to  what 
seemed  perpetual  military  service  or  frontier  duty. 

Yet  such  was  still  the  alarm  at  the  threatened  attack  of  Gaul  and 
Samnite,  in  combination  with  the  discontented  elements  in  Etruria 


Polyb.  ii.  19  ;   Livy  (x.  18)  rather  glosses  it  over. 


XII  THE  GAULS  AGAIN  IN  ETRURIA  157 

and  Umbria,  that  extraordinary  exertions  were  being  made  at  Rome,   zgs-    Coss. 
The  veteran  Q.  Fabius  Maximus  Rullianus  was  for  the  fifth  time  Q-  Fabius 
elected  consul,  and  had  at  his  own  request  as  a  colleague  P.  Decius  p^f^^^^ 
Mus,  who  had  already  won  victories  both  in  Samnium  and  Etruria  ;   ^ 
and  two  armies,   besides   the   two  usually  enrolled  by  the  consuls,  p.  Decius 
were  levied,  and  placed  under  the  command  of  the  propraetors  Cn.  Mus  IV. 
Fulvius  and  L.  Postumius.     L.  Volumnius  remained  in  Samnium  as 
proconsul ;  and  Appius,  the  unsuccessful  consul  of  the  previous  year, 
was  elected  praetor,  that  he  might  be  retained  at  Rome. 

The  rendezvous  of  the  coalition  armies  was  now  in  the  territory  Coalition 
of  Sentinum  in  Umbria  ;  but  the  Gauls  were  already  prepared  to  <^  Gauls, 
make  a  raid   into   Etruria,    and   attack  the   advanced  post   of  the      ^,  ^(^^s, 
Romans  at  Clusium.  niies. 

The  Senate  had  insisted  that  the  "  province  "  of  Etruria  should  Fadius  in 
be  assigned  to  Fabius  without  the  usual  drawing  of  lots  with  his  Etruria. 
colleague  ;  and  early  in  the  year  he  went  there  with  his  new  army, 
took  over  the  troops  of  Appius,  and  at  once  began  exercising  his 
men  by  a  series  of  marches  and  manoeuvres  until  he  had  arrived  at 
Clusium.  There  he  received  a  request  from  the  Senate  to  come  to 
Rome  to  consult  as  to  the  requirements  of  the  war,  if  he  could  do  so 
safely.  Appius  had  caused  alarm  at  home  by  his  report  of  the 
dangerous  state  of  affairs,  and  had  urged  that  both  consuls  should 
go  to  Etruria.  Fabius  left  L.  Cornelius  Scipio,  the  propraetor,  in 
charge,  and  went  to  Rome.  He  deprecated  the  necessity  of  rein- 
forcement, but  said  that,  if  the  Senate  and  people  thought  it  safer,  he 
was  content  that  another  army  should  come,  if  it  might  be  com- 
manded by  his  colleague  Decius  Mus,  or,  if  he  could  not  come,  by 
L.  Volumnius. 

The   result  was  that  both  consuls  started  for   Clusium  with   a  The 
second  consular  army.      On  their  way  they  were  met  by  the  news  of  Senones  cut 
a  disaster.      The  Senonian  Gauls  had  descended  upon  Clusium,  sur-  ^^  pieces  a 
rounded  the  propraetor  Scipio,  and  cut  a  Roman  legion  to  pieces.  ^^^^^ 
It  turned  out  that  the  report  was  exaggerated.      A  detachment  had 
been  cut  off,  but  Scipio  had  come  up  with  his  main  force  and  beaten 
the   enemy  back  ;  ^   and  when   the   consuls  arrived   the   Gauls  had 
recrossed   the   Apennines   to   Sentinum,    whither    the    consuls    now 
followed  them. 

Their  communications  with  Rome  were  kept  open  by  the  two  Position  of 
propraetors.      Fulvius  was  at  Falerii,  Postumius  close  to  the  city  in  i^e  Roman 
the  ager   Vaticanus.     The  former  was  now  ordered  to  advance  to  ^^^^^^• 
Clusium,  the  latter  to  Falerii,  and  both  of  them  to  lay  waste  the 
country  far  and  wide.     This  caused  the  Etruscans  who  were  with 

^  Polybius  (ii.  19)  seems  to  place  this  affair  at  Camerinum. 


158 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


the  Gauls  and  Samnites  to  withdraw  from  Sentinum,  and  hasten 
back  to  Etruria ;  and  all  the  Umbrians  in  the  coalition  camp  appear 
to  have  also  departed.  At  any  rate,  in  the  battle  that  followed  it 
was  almost  exclusively  with  Gauls  and  Samnites  that  the  Romans 
had  to  contend. 

For  two  days  the  armies  faced  each  other,  and  there  were 
skirmishes  and  counter-manoeuvrings  which  led  to  nothing  decisive. 
It  was  during  these  that  the  story  is  told  of  a  stag  pursued  by  a 
wolf  running  in  between  the  two  hosts.  The  Gauls  shot  the  stag, 
but  the  Romans  opened  their  lines  to  let  the  wolf  go  through,  for  it 
was  sacred  to  Mars,  their  founder's  father,  and  brought  promise 
of  victory,  while  the  Gauls  had  offended  Diana  by  slaying  her 
stag. 

When  at  last  the  battle  came,  Fabius  commanded  the  right  wing, 
facing  the  Samnites,  Decius  the  left,  facing  the  Gauls.  For  some 
time  the  Romans  were  hard  pressed  ;  and,  if  only  the  Etruscans  and 
Umbrians  had  been  there,  it  would  have  gone  ill  with  them.  The 
Samnites  proved  the  more  dangerous  enemy  of  the  two.  The  Gauls 
attacked  with  a  fury  that  nothing  seemed  capable  of  resisting — horse 
and  foot  and  chariot  swept  down  upon  the  foe  with  indescribable 
tumult  of  shouting  men,  trampling  hoofs,  and  rattling  wheels.  But 
though  the  storm  was  furious  it  was  brief.  The  first  shock  sustained, 
every  recurring  charge  was  fainter.  At  first,  however,  they  seemed 
to  be  carrying  all  before  them,  when  Decius  Mus,  mindful  of  his 
father's  heroism,  solemnly  "  devoted  "  himself  and  the  legions  of  the 
enemy  to  Earth  and  the  divine  Manes.  Having  uttered  the  due 
form  of  words,  he  put  spurs  to  his  horse  and  charged  into  the  densest 
masses  of  the  enemy  and  perished.  Livius,  the  pontifex  who  had 
dictated  the  form  of  "  devotion,"  and  to  whom  Decius  had  trans- 
ferred his  lictors,  loudly  proclaimed  that  "  the  consul's  death  was  in 
place  of  that  of  all  the  Romans,  while  the  Gauls  and  Samnites  were 
due  to  the  gods  below  ; "  and  the  Roman  soldiers,  always  keenly 
alive  to  religious  emotion,  were  fired  to  fresh  courage. 

Meanwhile  Fabius  had  at  length  turned  the  Samnite  line.  He 
had  patiently  remained  on  the  defensive  during  most  of  the  day,  and 
allowed  the  Samnites  to  tire  themselves  out  by  fruitless  attacks. 
When  he  thought  that  they  were  exhausted,  he  gave  the  signal  for 
his  cavalry  to  charge  their  flank  :  and  when  they  began  to  give  way, 
brought  up  his  reserves,  which  had  not  yet  been  engaged.  The 
routed  Samnites  rushed  past  the  Gauls  on  their  right  wing  and 
made  for  the  camp.  The  Gauls,  seeing  their  allies  in  retreat,  and 
being  themselves  wearied  with  long  fighting,  now  formed  into  a 
dense  mass  to  resist  the  double  attack  which  they  foresaw.  Fabius 
first  ordered  a  squadron  of  500  Campanian  cavalry  to  ride  round 


xir  EFFECTS  OF  THE  VICTORY  AT  SENTINUM  159 

and  charge  them  on  the  rear,   while   the  men  of  the  third  legion 
were  to  charge  in  front  when  they  saw  that  the  attack  of  the  cavalry- 
was  taking  effect.      He  himself — after  vowing  a  temple  to  Jupiter 
Victor — went  in  pursuit  of  the   Samnites  at  their  camp.      There  the 
struggle  was  renewed  ;  the  Samnite  imperator,  Gellius  Egnatius,  fell, 
and  the   Samnites  were  forced  within  their  camp,  which  was  finally- 
stormed  and  taken.      It  was  on  the  rear  of  the  Gallic  lines,  and  from  Failure 
it  the  Gauls  were  now  attacked,  and  the  day  was  won.    The  Romans  of  the 
lost  heavily  in  this  battle,  but  the  loss  of  the  enemy,  both  in  killed  ^'^'^^^^^on. 
and  prisoners,  was  much  greater  ;  and  above  all,  with  the  wrecking 
of  this   Samnite  army,  and  the  fall  of  Gellius  Egnatius,  the   great 
scheme  for  a  coalition  to  crush   Rome  from  the  north  fell  to  the 
ground  for  ever. 

About  the  same  time  Fulvius  had  been   severely  defeating  the  Successful 
people  of  Clusium  and  Perusia,  and  Volumnius  had  put  to  flight  a  operations 
Samnite  army  at  Tifernum  in  Samnium.     Some  minor  efforts  were  "    ,  ^sium 
indeed  made  by  the  Samnites  in  the  valley  of  the  Volturnus,  and  Tifernum, 
by  the  popular  party  at  Perusia.    But  the  former  were  again  defeated  ^pj-. 
in   the    Stellatian    plain    in   Campania    by   the    combined   forces    of 
Appius   Claudius  and  Volumnius,  and  the  latter  were  crushed  by 
Fabius. 

On  the  whole  this  was  a  year  memorable  for  the  success  of  the  Effect  of 
Roman   arms.       The   character  of  the   war  after    it   was   changed.   *^^^^ 
From  that  time  the  Samnites  had  to  fight  for  their  freedom  against     ^    ^^' 
Roman  armies  in  their  midst.      There  was  no  longer   any  hope  of 
carrying  the  war  into  Roman  territory. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  were  yearly  invasions  of  Samnium.  2g4-2gj. 
The  Samnites   were  not  yet   subdued,  and   still   made  gallant  and  ^^^^ y^'^^^ 
even  desperate  efforts  to  beat  back  their  foe.      In  294  they  all  but  ^     ^  ^^^' 
stormed  the  camp  of  the  consul  Regulus,  killing  his  quaestor,   L. 
Opimius  and  more  than  200  men.      The  Romans  in  alarm  sent  the  29^.   Coss. 
other  consul   Postumius,  and  the  two  together  had  some  successes,  'f*  ^^f"^' 
But   when   Postumius   left    his   colleague  for  Etruria,    Regulus  was  ^^ii^^  jj 
again  beaten  at  Luceria,  then  being  besieged  by  the  Samnites,  and  j/.  Atilius 
was  shut  up  in  his  camp.      Though  he  is  said  to  have  ultimately  Regulus. 
repulsed  the  enemy,  his  losses  were  greater  than  theirs,  and  his  only 
definite  success  was  the  cutting  off  of  a  body  of  Samnites  who  had 
been  plundering  Interamna. 

Postumius,  on  arriving  in  Etruria,  won  a  small  battle  against  the 
Volsinii.      But  Etruria  was  not  prepared  to  resist  any  longer.     The   Submission 
chief  towns — Volsinii,  Perusia,  and  Arretium — submitted  and  received  of  Etruria. 
a  truce  for  forty  years,  and  all  the  towns  were  content  to  pay  500,000 
asses  as  reparation  for  their  late  revolt.    The  Senate  naturally  objected 
to  Postumius  having  a  triumph  for  this  :  but  by  the  help  of  some  of 


i6o 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


293- 

Coss.  L. 
Papirius 
Cursor,  Sp. 
Carvilius. 


The  Sam- 
nite 
legiones 
linteatae. 


Samnite 
reverses. 


Battle  at 

Aquilotiia, 

293- 


the  tribunes,  and  by  using  his  own  authority  as  consul,  he  contrived 
to  get  one  in  spite  of  them.^ 

Thus  a  year  of  something  very  like  disaster  followed  the  glorious 
year  295.  The  balance  was  somewhat  restored  in  the  next  year 
(293)  by  the  consul  L.  Papirius,  son  of  that  Papirius  Cursor  who  gained 
glory  in  the  second  Samnite  war,  and  Spurius  Carvilius,  who  proved 
himself  a  worthy  colleague.  The  Samnites  made  a  special  effort 
this  year.  Their  levy  was  proclaimed  to  meet  at  Aquilonia,  about 
twenty  miles  south  of  Bovianum.^  Here  a  kind  of  order  of  chivalry 
was  instituted,  with  solemn  religious  rites,  after  an  ancient  form,  so 
the  priest  Ovius  Paccius  declared,  which  had  been  practised  by 
those  Samnites  who  long  ago  wrested  Capua  from  the  Etruscans. 
The  leading  men  of  military  age,  to  the  number  of  16,000,  were 
forced  to  take  a  solemn  oath  of  secrecy  as  to  the  rite  itself,  and  then 
to  invoke  the  most  dreadful  curses  upon  themselves,  their  family, 
and  race,  if  they  either  failed  to  obey  their  commander's  summons 
to  battle,  or  fled  from  the  field,  or  failed  to  kill  any  one  else  whom 
they  saw  attempting  to  fly.  They  wore  special  arms  and  a  lofty 
crest,  and  were  called  legiones  linteatae,  it  is  said,  from  the  awning 
covering  the  place  where  the  oath  was  taken. ^ 

If  these  solemn  preparations  were  really  made  they  were  not 
efficacious.  The  year  293  was  one  of  disaster  to  the  Samnites. 
The  consuls  again  entered  Samnium,  devastating  the  territory  of 
Atina  on  the  frontier,  and  storming  two  places  of  now  unknown 
position  —  Amiternum  and  Ausonia.  Carvilius  then  laid  siege  to 
Cominium,  Papirius  to  Aquilonia,  of  which  places  also  we  can  only 
say  that  they  appear  to  have  been  about  twenty  miles  from  each 
other,  and  about  the  same  distance  from  Bovianum. 

Papirius  agreed  to  attack  Aquilonia,  if  the  omens  allowed  it,  on 
the  same  day  as  Carvilius  assaulted  Cominium.  When  the  day 
came  the  sacred  chickens  would  not  feed  ;  but  the  pullaritis 
ventured  to  report  falsely  that  they  would.  He  was,  however,  him- 
self the  first  to  fall  in  the  battle,  and  therefore  Papirius  conceived 
the  gods  to  be  satisfied.  A  severe  defeat,  at  any  rate,  is  said  to  have 
been  inflicted  on  the  Samnites  :  the  legiones  linteatae  no  less  than 
the  others  fled  before  the  charge  of  the  cavalry  ;  the  Samnite  camp 
was  stormed,  and  the  outskirts  of  Aquilonia  itself  were  entered. 
Nightfall  prevented  the  Romans  from  venturing  to  go  farther.      But 


^  This  is  the  account  which  Livy  prefers,  but  as  usual  in  matters  in  them- 
selves obscure,  the  authorities  differed.  Some  say  that  Postumius  was  also  at 
Luceria,  and  was  even  wounded  there. 

2  The  site  of  Aquilonia  is  uncertain.  It  was,  it  seems,  in  the  territory  of  the 
Pentri,  almost  the  centre  of  Samnium. 

'  More  likely  from  their  white  linen  tunics,  cp.  Livy  ix.  40. 


LAST  SCENES  IN  THE  SAMNITE  WAR  i6i 


when  the  day  broke  they  found  that  the  enemy  had  evacuated  the 
place  and  gone  away,  leaving  large  numbers  of  dead  behind  them. 
On  the  same  day  Carvilius  also  took  Cominium,  killing  4000  men  Fall  of 
and  receiving  1 5,000  who  surrendered  at  discretion :  though  a  Comtmuvt. 
number  of  others  retreated  in  such  order  that  they  were  able  to 
inflict  some  loss  upon  the  cavalry  which  assailed  their  rear.  After 
this  the  consuls  proceeded  in  their  task  of  taking  cities  in  Samnium, 
one  after  the  other  :  sometimes  by  assault,  sometimes  only  after  a 
long  siege  ;  at  times  with  hardly  any  resistance,  at  others  with  con- 
siderable difficulty  and  loss. 

In  the  midst  of  the  rejoicing  at  Rome  caused  by  these  successful  New 
operations,  complaints  reached  the  Senate  from  loyal  cities  in  ^'^^°^^^  ^^ 
Etruria  that  they  were  suffering  from  the  attacks  of  those  states 
which  were  hostile  to  Rome.  The  Senate  promised  assistance, 
which  they  were  presently  induced  to  send  with  the  greater  despatch 
because  they  learnt  that  even  Falerii,  which  had  for  so  many  years 
been  faithful,  had  joined  the  mutineers.  The  two  consuls  in 
Samnium  were  ordered  to  draw  lots  which  of  them  should  go  to 
Etruria.  The  lot  fell  on  Carvilius  ;  and,  to  the  great  joy  of  his 
soldiers,  who  found  the  mountains  of  Samnium  very  trying  in  the 
winter,  he  marched  thither  at  once,  leaving  his  colleague  to  reduce 
Sepinum,  one  of  the  few  strong  towns  still  in  the  hands  of  the  Sam- 
nites.  In  Etruria  he  attacked  a  town  named  Troilius,  allowed  some 
of  the  aristocrats  to  depart  on  the  payment  of  a  heavy  ransom,  and 
reduced  the  rest  to  surrender.  The  capture  of  some  other  forts,  and 
the  slaughter  of  some  thousands  of  the  rebel  forces,  induced  the 
Faliscans  to  accept  a  year's  truce  and  pay  a  heavy  fine. 

The  year  293  had  been  one  of  great  glory  to  the  Roman  arms,   Coss.  Q. 
though   the  joy  at   these  successes   had   been   dashed  by  a  severe  'f^     "^ 
pestilence  both  in  city  and  country.     The  next  year  seems  to  have  Q^rses  D 
been   one   of  anxiety.       The  consul  Q.  Fabius,  son  of  the  veteran  Junius 
who  had  won  so  many  victories,  met  with  so  serious  a  disaster  that  Brutus 
it  was   resolved   to  recall   him.       His   father,   however,    intervened,  -^f^^^^-. 
offering  to  serve  on  his  son's  staff  as  his  legatus.     The  offer  was  ^^^  p^^_ 
accepted,  and  a  decisive  victory  gained  the  consul  a  triumph.       It  tius,  2^2. 
was  stained  by  a  cruel  act,  too  often  paralleled  in  Roman  history. 
The  imperator  of  the  Samnites,  Gains  Pontius,  was  taken  prisoner, 
forced    to    walk    in    the    consul's    procession    at    Rome,    and    then 
beheaded.      Whether  this  was  the  Pontius  of  the  Caudine  Forks  we 
do  not   know.      Livy  seldom  mentions   the   names  of  the  Samnite 
commanders,  and  on  this  point  we  have  only  a  bare  record  in  the 
epitome  of  his  lost  books. 

The  war  lingered  on  during  two  more  years,  but  in  a  languid 
fashion.     L.  Postumius,  the  consul  for  291,  found  so  little  for  his 

M 


l62 


HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap,  xii 


201  soldiers  to  do,  that  he  employed  2000  of  them  on  his  own  lands^  for 

Cos's.  L.  which  he  was  successfully  prosecuted  in  the  followmg  year.  He  is 
Posiumius  g^-^  however,  to  have  retaken  Cominium,— which  had  lapsed  back  to 
frT^r'  the  Samnites,— and  Venusia  in  Apulia  ;  the  latter  receiving  a  colony 
Junius'  in  291.  For  this,  once  more  against  the  wish  of  the  Senate,  he 
Brutus  obtained  a  triumph.  The  loss  of  Livy's  books,  however  prevents  us 
Bubulcus.  knowing  in  detail  how  the  war  was  brought  to  an  end.  The  last 
2C)o.  Coss.  blood  shed  seems  to  have  been  in  a  victory  gained  by  the  famous 
^-  ^'^''-  Curius  Dentatus.  The  Samnites  tried  to  bribe  him  with  gold,  and 
nelius^u/-  ^^^.^  emissaries  made  their  way  to  his  farm,  where  they  found  him 
"«";.;■  cooking  his  own  turnips.  He  contemptuously  declined  their  offers, 
Deniaius.  saying  that  he  did  not  count  it  a  great  thing  to  have  gold,  but  to  rule 
those  who  had  it.  After  this  victory,  wherever  it  was  gained,  the 
Peace.  Samnites  for  the  fourth  time  sought  and  obtained  a  treaty  of  peace  ; 

and,  after  celebrating  one  triumph  over  them,  Dentatus  is  said  to 
have  earned  a  second  by  suppressing  a  rising  of  the  Sabmes,  who 
were  granted  the  Latin  franchise. 
The  future         But  though  the  Samnites  were  defeated,  they  were  not  crushed  ; 
of  the  Sam-  ^or  was  their  implacable  enmity  to  Rome  abandoned.      They  came 
forward  again  and  again,  whenever  there  was  a  chance  of  striking  at 
Rome  or  for  their  own  independence  :  at  the  invasion  of  Pyrrhus 
(280)  ;  when  Hannibal  was  in  central  Italy  (216-209)  ;  in  the  Social 
war  (90)  ;  in  the  war  between  Sulla  and  Marius  (83).      It  was  the 
severities  of  Sulla  that  finally  reduced  them  to  insigmficance,  and 
their  country  to  pasture  land  thinly  scattered  with  villages,  save  for 
here  and  there  a  Roman  colony.     A  brave  mountain  folk  fighting 
for  independence  naturally  engages  sympathy  ;  but  we  must  remem- 
ber, on  the  other  hand,  that  they  were  dangerous  neighbours,  and 
that  the  triumph  of  Rome  meant  increased  peace  and  safety  for  the 
rich  countries  surrounding  them. 

Authorities. -Livy's  tenth  book  ends  with  the  year  293.  After  that  wt 
have  only  the  epitomes  of  his  Second  Decade.  Of  Dionysius  also  we  have  on^ 
fra-ments.  xvi.  13-xvii.  14  ;  as  also  of  Dio,  fr.  36,  though  Zonaras  vni.  i  give: 
he^'Tub  ance  of  more  of  Dio' s  narrative.  For  Curius  Dentatus.  see  Cicerc 
deSmll  §  99  ;  Valer.  Max.  iv.  3,  4-  In  hardly  any  part  of  Roman  history  ar 
our  authorities  so  scanty  and  unsatisfactory. 


mtes. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

CONSTITUTIONAL   HISTORY 

390-286 

The  period  (390-286)  full  of  wars,  and  not  marked  by  literary  production — Great 
growth  of  Rome  witnessed  by  increase  of  tribes,  numbers,  colonies  —  The 
struggles  between  patricians  and  plebeians — Proposed  relief  of  poverty  ;  M. 
Alanlius  (385) — Measures  against  usury  (378-297) — Abolition  oinexum  (326) 
— Licinian  rogations  proposed  (376)  :  their  purpose,  resistance  to  them, 
carried  (367)  —  The  praetor  —  Curule  aedile  —  Decemviri  sacrorum — The 
cojnitia  tributa  —  First  plebeian  censor  (351)  —  Leges  Publiliae  (339)  — 
First  plebeian  praetor  (336)  —  Censorship  of  Appius  Claudius  Caecus  (312- 
309)  —  His  innovations  and  their  aim  —  Cn,  Flavius  publishes  the  legal 
formulae  (305)  —  Lex  Ogulnia  (296)  —  Lex  Hortensia  (286)  —  The  new 
nobility  and  the  Senate — Stories  of  the  wife  of  Licinius  and  of  the  Chapel  of 
Castitas  Patricia — First  law  against  ambitus  (358) — Laws  against  usury — 
Sumptuary  laws. 

The  hundred  and  twenty  years  from  the  capture  of  Rome  by  the  sgo-270. 
Gauls  to  the  consohdation  of  Italy  from  the  Rubicon  to  Rhegium   '^^^  ^^^^'' 
are  among  the  most  important  in  Roman  history.      Unfortunately,  ^^^^^ 
from  293   Livy's  continuous  history  is  lost.      For  the  period  390  to 
293  he  professes  that  the  facts  are  clearer  and  more  certain,  but  it 
does  not  appear  that  his  authorities,  other  than  the  official  records  of 
the  Fasti  and  pontifical  books,  were  always  either  consistent  or  trust- 
worthy.     It  is  a  period  crowded  with  wars.      Rome  has  to  fight  the 
Volscian,  the  Gaul,  .  the  Etruscan,  the  rebellious  Latins,  the  Sam- 
nites, — a  new  and  dangerous  foe, — the  Lucani  and  Bruttii,  as  well  as 
the  Greek  communities  supported  by  Pyrrhus.      She  emerged  from 
these  struggles  victorious,  whatever  may  be  the  truth  of  particular 
triumphs  or  disasters  ;  and  became,  for  good  or  evil,  what  we  see  her 
to  have  been  in  the  second  century  before  Christ. 

There  is  little  intellectual  progress  to  record.      Roman  literature.  Absence  of 
properly  so  called,  had  not  begun.      The  earliest  writer  of  whom  we  literature, 
hear    was  Appius  Claudius  Caecus,   the  famous  censor,  who    died 
^bout  the  year  276.      He,  indeed,  is  credited  with  having  made  a 


I 


i64  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap. 

real  beginning  of  literature.  He  first,  as  far  as  we  know,  had  a 
speech  written  out  and  published,  composed  a  poem  on  the  model 
of  the  Greeks,  wrote,  or  caused  to  be  written,  a  treatise  on  law,  and 
is  even  credited  with  some  innovations  in  spelling,  as  the  use  of  R  for 
intervocalic  Z  or  S,  and  G  for  C.  He  was,  however,  two  generations 
ahead  of  his  age.  Setting  aside  his  works,  whatever  they  were,  all 
that  seems  to  have  existed  before  the  time  of  Naevius  (about  275- 
245)  and  Pictor  (about  220-200)  were  bare  statements  of  facts  in 
the  Fasti  or  other  official  records,  the  texts  of  laws  and  treaties,  and 
the  inscriptions  on  tombs,  or,  at  the  most,  rude  songs  composed  for 
rustic  festivals.  If  there  was  more  it  had  perished  before  the 
literary  age,  even  to  the  speeches  delivered  in  praise"  of  the 
departed,  if  any  such  existed  thus  early.  Dramatic  exhibitions,  the 
source  of  so  much  culture  among  the  Greeks,  were  unknown  in 
Rome  until  361  ;  and,  when  introduced  from  Etruria,  did  not  rise  to 
anything  which  could  be  called  a  play  for  more  than  a  hundred 
years.  It  was  not  until  the  Romans  were  brought  into  fuller 
contact  with  the  Greek  towns  of  south  Italy  and  Sicily,  that  the 
first  impulse  was  imparted  that  slowly  and  reluctantly  produced  a 
native  literature,  which  never  shook  off  this  first  influence,  or 
developed  in  ways  truly  independent  and  original. 
A  period  of  It  was  a  period,  however,  of  intense  life  and  continuous  growth. 
vigorous  The  increase  of  the  rural  tribes  from  seventeen  to  thirty-one  between 
growth.  287  and  241  marks  the  extension  of  the  urban  territory.  The 
census  returns  represent  the  number  of  citizens  capable  of  bearing 
arms  as  nearly  doubled  in  a  century  and  a  half  (459-295)  ^  ;  and  the 
number  of  colonies  sent  out  to  guard  the  coast,  to  secure  the 
allegiance  of  conquered  peoples,  or  prevent  invasion  by  hostile 
tribes,  testifies  to  the  growth  of  Roman  influence. ^ 

^  The  only  exceptions  to  the  expansion  in  the  census  returns,  as  given  by 
Livy,  are  in  the  years  275  and  240,  that  is,  at  the  end  of  the  war  with  Pyrrhus 
and  the  first  Punic  war.  It  is  not  quite  certain  that  the  drop  in  either  case  is  due 
to  losses  in  war  ;  for  the  men  actually  engaged  in  service  in  the  legions  were  not 
at  first  entered  on  the  census. 

2  The  colonies  on  the  coast  were  generally  "  Roman  "  colonies  :  that  is,  the 
colonists  retained  the  full  Roman  civitas.     Before  the  Punic  wars  the  ' '  Roman 
colonies  were  : — 

I.  Ostia  (regal  period). — Antium  (338);  Anxur  (329);  Casinum  (?)  (312); 
Minturnae  and  Sinuessa  in  Campania  (296)  ;  Sena  Gallica  in  Umbria,  and 
Castrum  Novum  in  Picenum  (circ.  283)  ;  Aesium  in  Umbria  (247)  ;  Alsium  in 
Etruria  (247)  ;  Fregenae  in  Etruria  (245). 

II.  The  Latin  colonies,  that  is,  in  which  the  colonists  enjoyed  only  the  im- 
perfect or  Latin  civitas,  were  : — 

A.  In  Latium  and  its  borders. — Signia,  Circeii,  Suessa  Pometia  (regal  period). 
Velitrae  (494)  ;  Norba  (492)  ;  Antium  (467)  ;  Ardea  (442)  ;  Satricum  (385)  ; 
Setia  (382)  ;  Fregellae  (328)  ;  Suessa  Auranca  (313)  ;  Pontiae  (313)  ;  Interamna 
Lirinas  (312);   Sora  (303);  Carseoli  (298);  Alba  Fucentia  (303). 


XIII  THE  NEW  NOBILITY  165 

This  vigorous  growth  is  accompanied  by  an  internal  history  full  A  nobility 
of  life  and  movement.  The  civil  and  social  struggles  of  the  first  of  wealth. 
century  of  the  Republic  were  continued  in  this,  and  bore  fruit  in 
changes  destined  to  be  far-reaching.  The  old  nobility  still  remained 
powerful,  but  with  the  admission  of  plebeians  to  the  higher  offices 
was  laid  the  foundation  of  a  new  nobility,  founded  on  the  magistracy 
and  therefore  on  wealth,  for  it  would  seldom  happen  that  any  but 
fairly  wealthy  men  would  aspire  to  office  or  be  elected  if  they  did. 
Whether  this  new  nobility  would  retain  the  virtues  of  the  old,  its 
faith  in  the  destiny  of  the  nation,  its  integrity,  and  its  subordination 
of  personal  gain  to  patriotism,  or  no,  was  a  question  which  the 
future  alone  could  decide.  Polybius  was  struck  by  two  things  in  the 
character  of  the  Romans,  as  he  knew  them,  in  the  second  century  — 
the  honesty  of  their  officials  in  dealing  with  public  money,  and  their 
personal  keenness  in  money  -  making.  He  afterwards  confines  the 
former  remark  to  the  period  before  their  foreign  conquests,  and  towards 
the  end  of  his  history  confesses  that  love  of  money  was  in  many  cases 
overpowering  public  virtue.^  But  the  mercantile  spirit  is  a  key  to 
much  of  the  history  of  this  period.  The  Romans  were  a  nation  of 
patriotic  soldiers  ;  but  they  were  also  farmers  and  merchants.  And 
while  they  exhibited  some  of  the  virtues  of  these  classes — courage, 
frugality,  and  respect  for  honourable  dealing — they  also  showed 
callousness  to  suffering  caused  in  the  pursuit  of  their  objects,  and  a 
covetousness  which  exacts  the  last  farthing  which  the  law  will  give. 
Hence  the  rich  fought  desperately  to  retain  everything  on  which 
they  had  laid  hand,  and  the  poor  were  forced  on  political  agitation 
to  secure  that  they  should  not  pine  in  the  midst  of  plenty. 

Poverty  had  been  increased  by  the  damage  done  to  farms  and  Measures 
homesteads  by  parties  of  Gauls,  who  wandered  in  search  of  pro-  for  the 
visions  while  their  comrades  beleaguered  the  Capitol.     Among  the  ^^^^^fof 
first  movements  after  their  departure,  therefore,  were  those  for  relief  ^^^^  y* 
of  distress.     The  first  (387),  for  a  fairer  division  of  the  ager  Pomp- 
tinus,    came   to    nothing.      Two    years    later  (385)  a  more  serious  Manliusin 
attempt  to  relieve  debtors  was  made  by  Marcus  Manlius,  the  hero  of  383. 
the  Capitol.      He  too  was  to  share  the  fate  of  Spurius  Cassius  and 
Spurius  Maelius,  with  whom  Cicero  classes  him,  as  he  shared  their 
love  of  the  people.      He  began  by  relieving  individual  cases  of  hard- 

B.  In  other  parts  of  Italy. — Sutrium  and  Nepete  (383),  Cosa  (273)  in 
Etruria  ;  Cales  (334)  in  Campania  ;  Saticula  (313),  Beneventum  (268),  Aesemia 
(263)  in  Samnium  ;  Narnia  (299),  Spoletium  (241)  in  Umbria ;  Venusia  in 
Apulia  (291)  ;  Paestum  in  Lucania  (273)  ;  Brundisium  in  Calabria  (244)  ; 
Hadria  (294),  Firmum  (264)  in  Picenum  ;   Ariminum  in  Cispadane  Gaul  (268). 

Antium  appears  in  both  lists,  having  been  changed  from  the  status  of  a  Latin 
to  that  of  a  Roman  colony  in  338. 

^  Polyb.  vi.  56  ;  xviii.  35  ;  xxxii.  13, 


^tm 


1 66 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Imprison- 
ment of 
Manlius, 
384- 


Death  of 
Manlius. 


Relief  of 
Debtors. 


ship.  He  saw  a  veteran  led  through  the  Forum  by  a  creditor,  and 
rescued  him  from  impending  slavery  by  paying  his  debt.  He  then 
sold  an  estate  in  the  Veientine  territory  and  devoted  the  proceeds  to 
the  relief  of  other  next.  He  became  a  popular  hero,  and  was  eagerly 
listened  to  as  he  denounced  the  senators  for  keeping  possession  of 
the  money  collected  for  the  payment  of  the  Gauls.  The  Senate  be- 
came alarmed  and  called  upon  A.  Cornelius,  who  had  been  named 
dictator  earlier  in  the  year  in  view  of  one  of  the  periodical  incursions 
of  the  Volscians  and  Aequians,  to  come  to  Rome. 

There  was  not  as  yet  anything  like  open  rebellion  ;  but  Manlius 
was  nevertheless  summoned  before  the  dictator  and  thrown  into 
prison.  The  populace  however  assumed  such  a  threatening  attitude 
at  this  treatment  of  their  champion,  that  the  Senate  thought  it  wiser 
to  set  him  at  liberty.  But  similar  scenes  occurred  in  the  following 
year  (384).  Manlius  harangued  the  people,  urging  them  to  resist 
tyrannical  powers  of  magistrates  and  legal  decisions  against  debtors. 
The  Senate  raised  the  usual  cry  that  Manlius  was  aiming  at  regal 
power.  Two  tribunes,  M.  Maenius  and  Q.  Publilius,  were  found  to 
give  practical  effect  to  a  senatorial  resolution  by  prosecuting  him. 
The  assembly  was  apparently  manipulated  in  the  interests  of  the 
patricians.  In  spite  of  his  eloquence  and  of  his  honours,  which 
included  two  mural  and  eight  civic  crowns,^  the  spoils  of  thirty 
enemies,  and  rewards  bestowed  by  forty  commanders, — Manlius  was 
declared  guilty  of  perdiiellio  and  hurled  from  the  Tarpeian  rock  by 
order  of  the  tribunes  :  and  a  law  was  passed  forbidding  any  patrician 
to  build  a  house  on  the  Capitoline  mount,  as  though  it  gave  a 
would-be  tyrant  an  opportunity  to  seize  the  Capitol :  and  an  order 
was  made  by  the  Council  of  the  gens  Ma7tlia  that  none  of  its  mem- 
bers should  henceforward  bear  the  praenomen  of  Marcus. 

Thus  once  more  the  patricians,  acting  with  the  richer  plebeians, 
crushed  a  social  reformer.  But  the  distress  of  the  indebted  farmers 
could  not  thus  be  set  aside.  In  378  the  usual  levy  was  prevented  by 
the  tribunes,  until  the  concession  was  wrung  from  the  Senate  that 
actual  military  service  in  any  year  should  excuse  the  payment  of  the 
tributum^  and  exempt  from  legal  process  for  debt.  But  the  quarrel 
of  debtor  and  creditor  is  eternal ;  and  the  disturbances  caused  by  it 
survived  the  Republic  itself.  Again  and  again,  as  in  343,  340,  297, 
it  breaks  out  and  various  remedies  are  tried  by  limiting  the  amount 
of  interest,  and  even  by  forbidding  it  altogether.^  But  such  regula- 
tions necessarily  proved  abortive  ;  and  the  relief  afforded  by  the 
Licinian  law  of  367  was  in  its  nature  temporary.     All  that  legislation 


^  Corona  muralis — a  crown  given  for  being  the  first  to  scale  an  enemy's  wall 
corona  civica — a  crown  given  for  saving  the  hfe  of  a  citizen. 


Livy  vii.  42  ;  Tacitus,  A 


7in.  VI.  22. 


XIII  RELIEF  OF  DEBTORS  167 

can  do  in  such  a  matter  is  to  prevent  what  is  essentially  a  social 
question  from  becoming  political,  by  securing  that  no  undue  advant- 
age given  to  one  part  of  the  State  over  another  shall  associate  in 
men's  minds  the  idea  of  personal  prosperity  with  that  of  political 
privilege.  The  plebeians  did  now  associate  these  ideas  ;  and  there- 
fore strove  for  political  equality  in  the  hope  that,  among  other  things, 
it  might  put  the  relations  of  rich  and  poor  on  a  more  equitable 
footing.  It  was  not  till  they  had  practically  attained  this  equality  by 
the  Licinian  and  other  laws,  that  they  carried  an  enactment  which 
did  more  than  anything  else  to  remove  the  hardship  inflicted  by  the 
law  of  debt.  This  was  the  abolition  of  nexuin  altogether  by  the  lex  Abolition 
Poetilia  (326).  Up  to  this  time,  at  the  expiration  of  thirty  days  after  ofnexum 
the  acknowledgment  of  a  debt  or  its  declaration  by  the  judge,  the  ^y  ^'^f . 
debtor  at  once  passed  into  the  hands  of  his  creditor.  He  was  not  '^^^^^^'^> 
yet  a  slave,  but  he  was  a  nexus.  His  creditor  could  load  him  with 
chains,  and  feed  him  on  the  lowest  amount  of  food  that  would  keep 
him  alive,  and  at  the  end  of  sixty  days,  in  the  course  of  which  he  had 
three  times  been  produced  before  the  praetor,  he  could  be  sold  into 
slavery.  This  process  was  abolished  by  the  lex  Poetilia^  and  though 
the  addictio,  or  assignment  to  slavery  of  a  debtor,  still  occurred  in 
certain  circumstances,  it  appears  to  have  henceforth  resulted  only 
from  a  failure  to  comply  with  the  formal  order  of  the  praetor  [judi- 
catimi)^  which  would  probably  be  made  on  a  review  of  the  whole 
circumstances,  or  at  any  rate  would  be  a  matter  of  time.  Meanwhile 
the  creditor  could  only  take  the  debtor's  goods  as  security,  not  his 
person.  This  of  course  did  not  remove  all  hardships,  or  touch  the 
deeper  causes  of  distress  ;  but  it  prevented  many  of  the  miseries  and 
scandals  caused  by  the  institution  of  the  nexum;  and  whatever  was 
the  exact  nature  of  the  relief,  it  was  not  secured  till  by  the  Licinian  and 
Publilian  laws  the  plebeians  had  obtained  a  full  share  in  civil  power. 

The  measures  of  the  tribunes  C.  Licinius  Stolo  and  L.  Sextius   The 
were  primarily  directed  to  the  relief  of  poverty.      But  they  differed  Licinian 
from  others  in  joining  to  a  proposal  for  the  immediate  diminution  of  ^iogations, 
the  burden  of  debt  a  measure  meant   to  effect  a  more  permanent  ^^  "^  '^' 
relief  by  a  fuller  participation  in  the  benefits  of  the  ager  piiblicus^ 
and  a  proposition  that  the  chief  disability  still  attaching  to  plebeians 
should  be  removed  by  their  admission  to  the  consulship. 

These  rogationes  1  were  originally  brought  in  by  the  two  tribunes 
in  376,  but  they  did  not  become  laws  until  after  ten  years  of  inces- 
sant struggle,  not  astonishing  if  we  consider  the  interests  attacked, 
and  the  rank  and  influence  of  those  affected. 

^  The  proposer  of  a  law  asked  [rogavit]  the  people  for  their  decision,  a  "bill" 
therefore  was  a  rogatio  before  it  was  passed. 


i68 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


The  fro- 
posed  legis- 
lation. 


Reduction 
of  debt. 


The  ager 
publiais. 


The  con- 
sulship. 


The  ten 
years  con- 
flict, 375- 
3(>7' 


The  propositions  were  ( i )  That  from  the  capital  sum  of  all  debts 
the  interest  already  paid  should  be  deducted,  and  the  balance  paid  in 
three  yearly  instalments  :  (2)  That  no  one  should  hold  more  than 
500  jugera  (about  300  acres)  of  the  ager  piiblicus.^  (3)  That  consuls 
should  in  future  be  appointed  instead  of  consular  tribunes,  and  that 
one  of  them  should  be  a  plebeian. 

Of  these  proposals  the  first,  for  the  reduction  of  debt,  was  in  fact 
a  measure  of  confiscation  to  meet  a  temporary  pressure  by  a  temporary 
cure.  It  is  difficult  to  justify  or  even  understand,  unless  we  suppose 
that  the  debts  were  not  incurred  as  mere  speculative  losses,  but  were 
charges  on  land  representing  expenditure  which  in  equity,  if  not  in 
law,  should  have  fallen  on  mortgagees,  now  practically  landlords,  rather 
than  on  indebted  freeholders  who  had  in  fact  sunk  to  the  position  of 
tenants. 

The  proposal  as  to  the  ager  publicus  2i\so  would  disturb  what  had 
come  to  be  regarded  as  a  right.  The  possessores  leased  the  land 
from  the  State  at  a  low  rent,  and  had  long  looked  on  it  as  inalienable 
property  on  which  there  was  a  small  charge.  The  law,  therefore, 
would  appear  to  them  an  unjust  confiscation,  and  would  be  resisted 
by  patricians  and  rich  plebeians  alike. 

The  admission  of  plebeians  to  the  consulship,  opposed  ostensibly 
on  the  religious  ground  that  plebeians  were  incapable  of  taking  the 
auspices,  also  touched  indirectly  on  the  financial  question.  For 
the  richer  plebeians  could  not  be  got  to  support  it  with  earnest- 
ness, if  it  involved  an  interference  in  their  occupation  of  public 
land. 

With  such  interests  opposed  to  them,  it  is  not  surprising  that 
Licinius  and  Sextus  had  to  fight  for  ten  years.  For  five  they  were 
continuously  elected  tribunes  (375-371),  and  prevented  the  creation 
of  curule  magistrates.  One  effect  of  this  would  be  to  stop  judgments 
against  debtors  ;  but  how  the  ordinary  administration  was  carried  on 
we  are  not  told.  The  Senate  and  quaestors  might  manage  the 
finances  and  police  ;  the  Pontifex  Maximus  would  preside  at  religious 
functions.  But  such  a  state  of  things  could  only  be  possible  in  a 
time  of  peace,  and  there  was  in  fact  no  need  of  a  levy  until  the  end 
of  this  time. 


1  This  is  the  only  regulation  as  to  the  ager  pub licus  mentioned  by  LivyJ 
Appian  [B.C.  i.  8)  also  adds  a  second  and  third  clause  forbidding  any  one  to 
feed  more  than  100  oxen  or  500  sheep  on  the  public  pasture,  and  ordering 
owners  to  employ  as  many  free  men  as  slaves  on  their  land.  But  it  seems  very 
unlikely  that  the  employment  of  slave  labour  had  become  so  common  at  this  period 
of  the  Republic.  Appian  perhaps  refers  regulations  of  the  Gracchan  law  of  131, 
which  was  founded  on  a  revival  of  the  Licinian  law,  to  the  earlier  legislation.  It  has 
even  been  held  that  Appian's  words  do  not  apply  to  the  Licinian  laws  at  all,  but 
to  some  later  legislation  of  which  we  know  nothing. 


xiii  THE  LICINIAN  ROGATIONS  169 

At  last  a  compromise  secured  the  passing  of  the  law.  The  relief  The  law 
of  debtors  and  the  reform  in  the  occupation  of  the  ager  publicus  were  P'^^^^"' 
accepted.  Some  effort  seems  to  have  been  made  at  first  to  enforce 
the  regulation  as  to  the  public  land,  and  Licinius  himself  was  fined 
for  evading  it  by  freeing  his  son  from  the  patria  potestas,  that  he 
might  hold  a  second  allotment  of  500  jugera.  Others  however  did 
the  same  with  impunity,  and  before  many  years  the  law  was  practically 
inoperative.  1 

It  was  in  the  clause  securing  one  consulship  for  the  plebeians  that  Theprae- 
the  compromise  was  effected.  Though  frequently  evaded  (as  in  355,  ^^^^"■^P- 
and  six  times  between  that  date  and  342)  the  law  remained  in  force, 
and  in  341  was  extended  to  allow  both  consuls  to  be  plebeians.^  But 
while  yielding  this,  the  patricians  secured  the  delegation  of  the 
judicial  functions  of  the  consul  to  a  new  magistrate  to  be  called  the 
praetor,  who  until  336  was  always  a  patrician.  He  was  considered  a 
colleague  of  the  consuls,  and  the  title  was  perhaps  the  earliest  used 
to  designate  the  chief  of  the  State.  The  derivation  of  the  word  and 
the  term  used  by  Greek  writers  to  translate  it  {arrpaT-qyoi)  point  to 
the  original  meaning  as  "head  of  the  army."  But  though,  when  the 
number  of  praetors  was  increased,  they  at  times  performed  military 
duties,  yet  a  later  regulation  confined  them  during  their  year  of 
office  to  the  administration  of  justice  ;  and  the  single  praetor  now 
appointed  had  primarily  none  but  judicial  functions. 

Shorn  of  this  important  sphere  of  action  the  consulship  could  be  The 
restored  without  offence.     The  consuls  still  enjoyed  the  highest  rank.  ^^^^^^^^ 
If  they  were   active  and   able   men,    they   did   much  by   initiating  ^^^^"  ^  ^^' 
laws,    publishing    edicts,    and    restraining    other    magistrates.       In 
times  of  civil   disturbance  they  had  the   chief  means  of  restoring 
order.      But  in  quiet  times,  and  within  the  walls,  they  were  almost 
confined  to   routine  duties  :   they  presided  in   the  Senate,  held  the 
comitia,  performed  certain  public  acts  of  worship.      Outside  the  walls 
however,  and  in  times  of  war,  they  were  still  supreme  :  held  levies, 
commanded  armies,   punished    rebellion.       If  they  failed,   or  were 
obviously  incompetent,  the  Senate  intervened,  and  by  forcing  one  of 
them  to  name  a   dictator,    secured  a  suitable  commander  for  the 
legions. 

Besides  the  praetorship,  the  patricians  in  return  for  their  con-  Curule 
cession  obtained  also  a  share  in  the  aedileship.      Two  curule  aediles  '^^'^^^^^^ip- 

1  Appian,  B.  C.  i.  8. 

2  The  same  law  prevented  accumulation  of  curule  offices  by  directing  that  a 
year  at  least  was  to  intervene  between  the  holding  of  two  curule  offices,  and  ten 
years  between  two  consulships  (Livy  vii.  42).  This  was  suspended  or  neglected 
on  several  occasions,  generally  for  special  reasons  ;  but  with  the  exception  of 
the  revolutionary  times  of  Marius  was  usually  respected  up  to  B.  c.  53. 


I70 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Decemviri 
sacrorum. 


Comitia 
tribjita, 
3^7- 


Trihini 
militum. 


Rufuli. 


Plebeian 
censor^ 

351- 

Leges  Pub- 
liliae,  jjg. 


A  uctoritas 
pat  rum. 


were  elected  from  the  patricians  to  superintend  the  pubhc  games, 
and  continued  to  be  elected  from  patricians  and  plebeians  alternately, 
all  distinction  between  the  two  sorts  of  aediles,  in  regard  to  their 
functions,  gradually  dying  out. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  plebeians  obtained  five  places  among  the 
decemviri  sacrorum^  who  took  the  place  of  the  duoviri  sacris  faciundis^ 
and  thus  got  a  share  in  the  custody  of  the  Sibylline  oracles,  to  which 
appeal  was  often  made  in  political  business. 

The  laws  embodying  these  mutual  concessions  were  passed  under 
the  presidency  of  the  veteran  M.  Furius  Camillus,  named  this  year 
dictator  for  the  fifth  time,  to  repel  a  Gallic  raid.  Henceforward  the 
plebeians  gained  admission  one  after  the  other  to  all  remaining 
positions  in  the  State,  and  the  comitia  tribnta  became  more  and  more 
clearly  recognised  as  a  sovereign  assembly,  to  which  legislation  was 
nearly  always  assigned  ;  while  the  centuriate  assembly  continued  to 
elect  the  higher  magistrates,  consuls,  praetors,  censors.  In  other 
words,  when  a  change  in  the  laws  was  to  be  made,  the  people  voted 
in  such  a  way  as  gave  the  chief  voice  to  numbers  ;  when  the  higher 
magistrates  were  to  be  elected,  the  people  voted  in  such  a  way  as  to 
give  the  preponderance  to  men  of  property.  The  aediles  and  quaestors 
and  tribunes  continued  to  be  elected  by  the  comitia  tribiita;  and  in 
361  the  rule  was  enforced  that  the  military  tribunes,  of  whom  there 
were  six  for  each  legion,  instead  of  being  nominated  by  the  dictator 
or  consul,  should  be  elected  by  the  same  assembly,  thereby  bringing 
the  army  also  more  under  the  immediate  control  of  the  people,  and 
decreasing  the  influence  of  the  consul.  The  practice  before  and 
after  this  date  appears  to  have  been  irregular,  some  military  tribunes 
having  been  elected,  others  named.  The  rule  was  repeated  in  311, 
and  as  late  as  105  a  law  of  Rutilius  Rufus  distinguished  the  two 
kinds  of  tribunes,  those  elected  and  those  nominated,  whence  the 
latter  got  the  name  of  Rtifuli.^ 

In  35  I  for  the  first  time  a  plebeian  was  elected  censor  :  and  in  339 
the  laws  named  from  the  dictator  Publilius  marked  another  step  in 
plebeian  advance.  They  (i)  confirmed  the  rule  that  the  piebiscita 
should  apply  to  all  citizens  alike  ;  (2)  ordered  that  when  a  law  was 
brought  before  the  comitia  ceitturiata  the  Senate  should  give  its 
formal  confirmation  of  it  before  the  voting  began,  not  after;  (3)  ordered 
that  one  censor  should  always  be  a  plebeian.  The  second  of  these 
laws  did  not  apparently  deprive  the  Senate  of  all  power  of  stopping 
legislation  in  the  comitia  ce?ituriata.  The  auctoritas  of  the  Senate 
was  still  necessary,  but  must  be  given  to  the  magistrate  proposing 

^  Livy  vii.  5  ;  ix.  30  ;  cf.  Festus,  s.v.  That  there  was  now  a  great  rush  of 
"new  men"  to  obtain  office  is  shown  by  the  lex  Poetilia  de  ambitu  (358), 
forbidding  canvassing  on  market  days. 


XIII  APPIUS  CLAUDIUS  CAECUS  171 


the  law  before  it  was  put  to  the  people, 
people  gave  a  vote  they  disliked,  step  in   afterwards   and   deprive 
the  law  of  validity.       It  could  prevent   a  proposal  being  brought 
before  the   centuriate   assembly,    it   could   not  suspend  its  enforce- 
ment   when    once    passed.       Finally  in    336    for    the  first    time   a  Plebeian 
plebeian  was  elected  praetor  in  spite  of  the  protest  of  the  consul  praetor, 
Sulpicius.  •  ^^  ' 

Thus  all  the  magistracies  were  thrown  open  to  the  plebeians.    The   The  sacer- 
patricians   still  retained  an  important  hold  on  administration  from  ^°^^^  ^"^ 
being  alone  eligible  to  the  sacred  colleges,  in  whose  custody  were  the  ^tillpatri- 
laws  regulating  the  details  of  civil  procedure,  the  arrangement  of  the  cian. 
calendar,  and  the  proper  distinction  between  days  on  which  business 
might  and   might   not   be  transacted.       The   abolition   of  this   one 
remaining  privilege  was  preceded  by  the  bold  innovations  introduced 
by  Appius  Claudius  Caecus  in  his  censorship. 

As  in  the  case  of  other  aristocrats  who  promoted  popular  measures.   The  cen- 
it  is  difficult  to  assign  a  motive  to  the  policy  of  Appius  with  any  sorship 
confidence.      He  was  no  enthusiast  for  the  rights  of  the  plebeians,  of  Appius 
for  he  afterwards  opposed  the  Ogulnian  law  which  admitted  them  to  ^^^^^j. 
the  sacred  colleges :  yet  he  systematically  disregarded  the  authority  J12-308. 
of  the  Senate,  and  endeavoured  to  lower  its  prestige  by  enrolling  men 
of  inferior  rank,  in  some  cases  even  the  sons  of  freedmen,  and  by 
neglecting  to  take  the  usual  senatorial  decree  for  the  issue  of  the  money 
required  for  his  two  great  works,i  the  road  to  Capua  {via  Appid)^  and 
the  water  which  he  brought  into  the  city  {aqua  Appia).      Moreover, 
he   obstinately  persisted   in   retaining  his   office    for  four  years   in 
order  to  complete  these   works,  maintaining  that  the  lex  Aemilia 
(430),   which    confined    the    censorship    to    eighteen    months,    only 
applied  to  the  censors  of  that  year.     But  the  most  important  of  his  His  inno- 
innovations  was  in  regard  to  the  urban  voters.     They  had  hitherto  nation  as  to 
been  included  in  four  urban  tribes,  and  therefore  only  counted  four  ^^^^^J^^^^ 
votes  as  against  twenty-seven  of  the  rural  tribes.     Appius  made  up 
the  list  of  the  tribes  in  such  a  way  that  the  people  of  the  city  were 
distributed  (perhaps  according  to  individual  choice)  among  all  the 
tribes.     The  city  vote,  therefore,  influenced  that  of  a  large  number 
of  the  tribes,  and  as  the  city  voters  were  on   the  spot,  while  the 
farmers   would    not    be   willing  to   come   in  large  numbers   to    the 
comitia,  except  on  special  occasions,  it  is  evident   that  this  measure 
tended  to   throw  power   into    the  hands   of   the  urban   population. 
But  why  did  Appius  wish  to  do  this  ?     The   answer  seems  to  be 

^  ' '  The  Senate  controls  also  what  is  by  far  the  largest  and  most  important 
expenditure,  that,  namely,  which  is  made  by  the  censors  every  lustrum  for  the 
repair  or  construction  of  public  buildings  ;  this  money  cannot  be  obtained  by  the 
censors  except  by  the  grant  of  the  Senate"  (Polyb.  vi.  13). 


172 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


His  aim- 
in  making 
the  change. 


The  policy 
revoked. 


The  gens 
Potitia. 


Cn.  Fla- 
vins pub- 
lishes the 
legal 
formulae 
and  the 
calendar, 
304- 


Lex  Ogul- 
nia,  2g6. 


that  his  aim  was  to  strengthen  the  power  of  the  magistrates  as  against 
the  Senate.  The  magistrates  were  to  be  supreme  :  and  the  only  way 
to  make  them  so  was  to  found  their  power  as  directly  as  possible  on 
the  popular  will,  and  the  popular  will  represented  by  the  urban 
inhabitants  could  be  acted  on  most  powerfully  by  the  magistrate.  It 
was,  in  fact,  incipient  Caesarism  of  the  sort  denounced  in  after  times 
by  Cicero,  which  "  did  nothing  through  the  Senate,  everything  direct 
with  the  people."  It  was  not,  rightly  viewed,  a  democratic  policy ; 
but  the  object  of  its  enmity  was  the  constitutional  oligarchy  of  which 
the  Senate  was  the  embodiment.  The  time,  however,  was  not  ripe 
for  such  a  change.  The  consuls  refused  to  summon  the  Senate  as 
enrolled  by  Appius,  and  employed  the  roll  of  his  predecessors  ;  and 
the  censors  for  304  upset  his  arrangement  of  the  tribes  by  once  more 
embodying  all  the  city  populace  in  the  four  urban  tribes. 

He  showed  his  free  spirit  in  regard  to  religious  matters  by  pro- 
moting the  transfer  of  the  worship  of  Hercules  at  the  ara  Maxima 
from  the  gens  Potitia  to  a  number  of  public  slaves  ;  to  which 
measure  popular  superstition  attributed  both  the  speedy  extinction 
of  the  gens,  and  the  loss  of  sight  which  befel  Appius  himself  at  a 
later  period  of  his  life.  He  also  deprived  the  guild  of  tibidnes, 
whose  services  were  required  at  sacrifices,  of  their  maintenance  in 
the  temple  of  Jupiter,  who  accordingly  struck  work,  and  migrated  to 
Tibur,  whence  they  were  brought  back  under  the  effects  of  wine 
drunk  at  a  banquet  given  them  by  the  Tiburtines.  More  important 
was  the  action  of  Gnaeus  Flavius,  the  son  of  a  freedman,  and  a  public 
clerk  or  scriba,  who  had  been  secretary  to  Appius,  and  under  his 
influence  still  farther  weakened  the  oligarchical  party  by  making 
public,  when  curule  aedile,  the  \^%2\  formulae  or  rules  of  pleading,  and 
the  methods  of  legal  practice  {actus  legitimi  and  actiones  legis)^  as  well 
as  posting  up  the  calendar  or  Fasti  in  the  Forum,  that  all  might 
know  what  legal  proceedings  were  valid  or  invalid  on  particular  days. 
These  things  had  been  kept  as  secrets  in  the  sacred  colleges,  or  were 
known  to  only  a  few  jurisconsults  besides,  and  their  revelation  was 
another  step  towards  broadening  the  basis  of  liberty.  Flavius,  as 
Cicero  says,  had  blinded  the  crows, — had  taken  from  these  sharp-eyed 
lawyers  their  monopoly  of  wisdom,  and  had  plundered  their  science. 
No  more  would  the  pontifices  be  able  to  protect  the  aristocratic 
wrong-doer  or  baffle  the  lowly  appellant  by  collusive  pleas  of  technical 
irregularity,  or  to  postpone  justice  on  the  ground  of  some  mysterious 
incompetency  attaching  to  the  day  selected. 

In  296  this  security  was  confirmed  by  the  admission  of  plebeians, 
to  the  sacred  colleges.  The  lex:  Ogulnia  increased  the  number  both] 
of  the  augures  and  pontifices  from  four  to  eight,  and  ordained' 
that  four    of   the   pontifices    and    five    of  the    augures    should   be 


xiii  FINAL  EQUALISATION  OF  THE  ORDERS  173 

plebeians.  The  importance  of  this  lay  in  the  fact  that  cases  of 
disputed  elections, — of  whether  there  was  a  vitiunt  in  an  election, — 
came  before  the  augures,  and  the  plebeians  believed  that  a  vitium 
was  declared  when  a  plebeian  was  elected.  ^ 

In  286,  when  the  people  had  for  the  last  time  "seceded"  to  the  Lex  Hor- 
Janiculum,  a  law  of  the  dictator  Hortensius  finally  put  an  end  to  all  ^^^^^^' 
important  distinctions  between   the  orders  by  making  the   comitia        ' 
tributa  an  absolutely  sovereign   assembly  for  legislative  purposes,  ^^^^^^g^ 
Re-enacting  that  the  plebiscita  should  be  binding  on  the  whole  people, 
it  added  that  for  the  binding  force  of  these  resolutions  the  audoritas 
of  the   Senate   should    not    be    required.       Henceforth,  although  a 
magistrate   often    brought   measures   before    the   comitia   tributa   in 
obedience  to  the  resolution  of  the  Senate,  such  a  senatorial  resolu- 
tion was    not  essential,  and  laws  could   be    proposed   and  passed 
without  it.2 

But  the  opening  of  all  the  higher  magistracies  to  the  plebeians .  The  new 
made  the  growth  of  a  new  nobility  of  wealth  inevitable.  The  offices  nobihty. 
were  unpaid  and  could  only  be  held  by  men  in  at  least  easy  circum- 
stances. As  the  standard  of  wealth  rose  with  the  extension  of  the 
city,  fewer  and  fewer  men  were  found  to  combine  great  public 
services  with  the  frugality  and  simplicity  of  a  Cincinnatus.  The  change 
was  reflected  in  the  Senate,  which,  without  legally  defined  powers, 
had  the  chief  administration  in  its  hands.  Th^  plebiscitujn  Ovinium  ^ 
(about  318-312)  had  transferred  the  duty  of  making  up  the  roll  of 
the  Senate  from  the  consuls,  or  consular  tribunes,  to  the  censors, 
and  had  directed  that  they  should  do  it  by  selecting  the  best  men  of 

^  See  the   case  of  the   dictator  M.    Claudius  Marcellus  in  327   (Livy  viii. 

23). 

2  How  the  lex  Hortensia  differed  from  the  lex  Publilia  is  a  difficult  question. 
Laelius  Felix  (Aulus  Gellius  xv.  37)  says  that  the  proposals  brought  before 
the  comitia  tributa  by  the  tribunes  were  not  binding  on  the  patricians  until  the 
law  of  Hortensius,  which  enacted  ut  eo  jiire  quod  plebs  statuisset  onifies  Quirites 
tenerentur.  Yet  the  lex  Publilia  (Livy  viii.  12)  also  contained  a  similar  clause. 
It  is  not  surprising  that  successive  laws  should  repeat  the  same  enactment,  just  as 
our  own  early  charters  do  ;  and  the  most  natural  explanation  of  the  remark  of 
Laelius  is,  that,  by  the  lex  Publilia  the  plebiscita  were  declared  binding  on  the 
whole  people,  but  that  it  was  still  considered  necessary  that  these  resolutions  of 
the  plebs  should  be  made  leges  by  going  through  the  ordinary  formalities,  i.e. 
by  being  authorised  by  the  Senate  and  passed  by  the  comitia  centuriata.  If  that 
were  not  done,  some  people  were  found  to  deny  their  validity  as  binding  patricians, 
the  very  protest  being  an  illustration  of  the  general  sentiment  the  other  way  ;  the 
lex  Hortensia  therefore  finally  and  distinctly  abolished  the  necessity  for  this 
process.   See  p.  106.      Gains,  Inst.  ii.  113. 

^  The  date  of  the  Ovinian  plebiscitum  is  nowhere  stated.  Willems  seems  to 
have  given  good  reason  for  placing  it  as  in  the  text  {Le  Sdnat  i.  153  sq."). 
Though  the  censors  ordinarily  made  up  the  roll  of  the  Senate,  on  certain  special 
occasions  a  dictator  was  named  for  the  purpose,  as  in  216  (Livy  xxiii.  3). 


174 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


the  several  orders.  It  soon  came  to  be  a  matter  of  course,  not  to  be 
departed  from  without  grave  reason  justifying  the  ignominia^  that  the 
ex-magistrates  of  curule  rank — consulares,  praetorii^  and  aedilicii^ — 
should  be  put  upon  the  roll.  These  offices  therefore  gave  a  life- 
membership  of  the  Senate  ;  and  when  they  were  filled  indifferently 
from  both  orders  of  the  State  and  by  popular  election,  it  followed 
that  the  Senate  consisted  chiefly  of  men  who  had  stood  the  test  of 
the  choice  of  the  people.  The  censors  indeed  filled  up  such 
vacancies  as  were  left  by  enrolling  men  who  had  obtained 
distinction  in  war ;  and  Appius  Claudius  Caecus,  as  we  have  seen, 
went  down  very  low  in  the  social  scale  to  find  members.  But,  put- 
ting aside  this  innovation,  which  was  soon  annulled,  such  men 
would  not  be  influential  members.  As  opposed  to  curule  senators 
they  would  be  called  pedarii^  who  voted  but  did  not  speak. ^  The 
bulk  of  the  Senate,  and  certainly  the  active  and  leading  men  in  it, 
would  be  those  who  once  at  least  had  stood  the  test  of  popular 
election  to  curule  office  ;  and  the  condition  of  success  in  such  an 
election  was  often  high  birth,  but  nearly  always  wealth  also.  These 
men  remained  members  for  life,  and  their  families  soon  came  to  be 
spoken  of  as  "senatorial,"  though  their  sons  had  no  hereditary 
claim  to  membership.  The  Senate  therefore  was  an  assembly  of 
ex-officials    and  rich  men,  who  formed  a   nobility  partly   of  birth. 


The  social 
distinction 
of  the 
orders  sur- 
vived the 
legal. 


had  experience  of  public  business  in  peace  or  war.  The  result  was 
a  body  whose  administration  for  more  than  two  centuries  deservedly 
earned  and  retained  the  respect  of  foreign  nations,  and  generally 
speaking  the  loyalty  of  its  fellow-citizens. 

The  distinction  between  the  orders  legally  annihilated  in  286 
survived  for  a  time  in  social  life.  Two  stories  have  been  preserved 
which  illustrate  the  form  which  this  may  have  taken.  Thus  the 
initiative  of  the  movement  which  resulted  in  the  Licinian  laws  is  at- 
tributed to  the  emulation  of  the  two  daughters  of  M.  Fabius  Ambustus. 
One  of  them  was  married  to  the  patrician  Servius  Sulpicius,  the  other 

^  According  to  Willems  they  were  called /^^arzV,  not,  as  Aulus  Gellius  says, 
because  they  voted  by  walking  across  the  Senate-house,  but  as  opposed  to  curules, 
who  occupied  special  seats.  A  series  of  laws  secured  to  the  aedilicii,  tribunicii, 
quaestorii  (who  had  not  held  curule  offices)  the  jus  dicendae  sententiae,  but  there 
appears  to  have  been  nothing  formally  to  prevent  them  doing  so  before  ;  only,  as 
the  presiding  magistrate  called  on  all  the  curule  members  before  them  {censorii, 
consulares,  and  praetorii),  they  had  not  in  practice  been  accustomed  to  speak. 
The  existing  aediles,  tribunes,  and  quaestors, — as  being  members  of  the  govern- 
ment,— spoke  on  matters  pertaining  to  their  respective  functions,  but  did  not  vote. 
All  these  ex-magistrates,  curule  or  non-curule,  remained  members  of  the  Senate  until 
the  next  lectio,  but  were  not  "senators"  until  placed  on  the  roll  by  the  censors. 
Such  as  were  placed,  on  the  roll  without  having  held  office,  if  there  were  such, 
seem  to  have  been  classed  with  the  pedarii. 


XIII  SOCIAL  DISTINCTIONS  SURVIVING  I7S 

to  the  plebeian  C.  Licinius  Stolo.  The  wife  of  the  plebeian  was  in  the  The  wife 
house  of  the  patrician,  who  at  the  time  waS  a  consular  tribune,  and  ofLtctmus 
was  startled  into  showing  signs  of  alarm  when  the  lictor  knocked 
loudly  at  the  door  to  summon  the  magistrate.  Laughed  at  by  her 
sister  for  her  want  of  acquaintance  with  ofiEicial  ways,  in  her  chagrin 
she  appealed  to  her  father,  who  promised  that  he  would  redress  the 
inequality  which  had  so  mortified  her. 

But  nearly  seventy  years  after  the  passing  of  the  Licinian  laws,  chapel  of 
when  one  distinction  after  another  had  been  abolished,  and  when  CasHtas 
two  generations  had  been  familiarised  with  the  idea  of  political  Patricia. 
equaHty,  the  patrician  ladies  showed  that  they  had  not  allowed  their 
social  ideas  to  keep  pace  with  the  times.  There  was  a  chapel 
dedicated  to  "  Patrician  Chastity,"  near  the  Forum  Boarium,  in  which 
the  matrons  were  accustomed  to  offer  a  yearly  sacrifice,  admission  being 
confined  to  those  whose  character  was  unimpeached  and  who  had 
been  married  to  only  one  husband.  In  the  year  296  the  wife  of  the 
plebeian  consul  Volumnius,  though  of  patrician  birth,  was  excluded 
on  the  ground  of  her  marriage  with  a  plebeian.  Indignant  at  the 
slight,  she  consecrated  a  chapel  adjoining  her  own  house  in  the  Vicus 
Longtis,  admission  to  which  was  made  to  depend  on  the  same  con- 
ditions as  that  to  the  older  shrine.  Such  acts  of  social  pride  how- 
ever, though  galling,  can  scarcely  be  regarded  as  of  importance  : 
they  were  but  the  froth  on  the  surface  recalling  the  storm  which  had 
raged  and  was  stilled. 

Authorities. — Up  to  293  Livy's  continuous  narrative  (v.-x,)  ;  from  that  date 
we  have  only  the  epitomes  of  lost  books  xi.  and  xii.  Of  Dionysius  also  (xiv. ) 
there  are  only  some  unimportant  fragments.  Plutarch  {Camillus  36,  39)  has 
some  account  of  Manlius  and  Licinius.  Of  the  latter  there  is  a  short  and  rather 
hostile  account  in  Zonaras  vii.  24  and  Aurelius  Victor  xx.  Appian  {B.  civ.  iv.  7-10) 
gives  an  instructive  account  of  the  ager publicus ;  Paterculus  (i.  14,  15)  a  list  of 
colonies.  For  the  censorship  of  Appius  Claudius  Caecus,  see  Livy  ix.  29,  30,  33, 
34,  40  ;  Diodorus  Sic.  xx,  36.  For  Gnaeus  Flavius  see  Livy  ix.  47  ;  Cicero  pro 
Mur.  §25  ;  ad  Att.  vii.  i  §  8  ;  ^^  Orat.  i.  186;  Phny  N.H.  xxxiii.  \t  \  Piso  in 
Aul.  Cell.  vii.  9. 


\ 


CHAPTER    XIV 


ROME    AND    TARENTUM 


COLONIES 
Hatria     .  .  .B.C.  289 

Castrum  Novum,  between 

B.C.  289-283 
Sena        .  .    about  B.C.  283 


B.C.  289 


273,000 


From  the  end  of  the  third  Samnite  war  to  the  invasion  of  Pyrrhus  (b.c.  290-280) — 
Wars  with  Senones  and  Boii  with  Etruscan  contingents — Defeat  of  the  Lucani 
and  Bruttii  in  the  territory  of  Thurii  —  Quarrel  with  Tarentum,  and  the 
invitation  to  Pyrrhus. 


Colonies  to 
secure  the 
east  coast 
of  Italy, 
289-283. 


War  with 
the  Sen- 
ones,  sSj. 
Coss.  P. 
Cornel- 
ius Dola- 
bella  Max- 
imus,  Cn. 
Domiiius 
Calvinus 
Maximus. 


Victory  of 

Cornelii/s 

Dolabella. 


The  years  immediately  following  the  third  Samnite  war  were  not 
marked  by  any  memorable  achievement.  Yet  Rome  went  on  steadily 
securing  her  position.  The  danger  which  had  menaced  her  from  the 
union  of  the  Samnites  and  Gauls,  along  with  the  disaffected  people 
in  Etruria  and  Umbria,  had  made  evident  the  importance  of  having 
the  control  of  the  east  coast.  Accordingly  a  colony  with  Latin  rights 
was  settled  at  Hatria  or  Hadria  on  the  southern  part  of  the  coast  of 
Picenum,  about  five  miles  inland,  and  a  short  time  afterwards  a 
colony  of  Roman  citizens  higher  up  the  coast  at  Castrum  Novum. 

With  the  exception  of  an  unimportant  revolt  at  Volsinii,  our 
scanty  remains  of  history  tell  of  no  farther  trouble  in  Etruria  until 
the  Senonian  Gauls  once  more  renewed  their  raids.  In  283  they 
even  besieged  Arretium,  and  succeeded  in  cutting  to  pieces  the 
Roman  legions,  with  the  praetor  L.  Caecilius,  sent  to  the  relief  of 
the  town.  M'.  Curius  Dentatus,  who  had  successfully  finished  the 
Samnite  war,  took  his  place,  and  sent  ambassadors  to  treat  with 
the  Gauls  for  the  restoration  of  prisoners.  But  the  Gallic  chief 
Britomaris  caused  the  ambassadors  to  be  barbarously  murdered,  in 
revenge,  he  said,  for  the  death  of  his  father  in  the  last  war.  This 
violation  of  the  law  of  nations  was  promptly  avenged.  The  consul 
Cornelius  Dolabella,  who  was  to  have  supported  Dentatus  in  Etruria, 
on  hearing  the  news,  turned  off  at  once  from  his  road,  and  marched 


CHAP.  XIV  THE  SENONIAN  GAULS  177 

straight  through  the    Sabine  lands  and  Picenum  into  the  territory 

of  the  Senones,  who   as   usual   had  gone  home   with   their  spoils. 

He    defeated    them    with    slaughter    which    almost    amounted    to 

annihilation.      The  survivors   were  expelled  from  the   district,   and 

the  women  and  children    sold  as  slaves.      The  country   was   then  Sena 

secured    by    sending   a    colony    of   Roman    citizens   to    the    coast  Gallica. 

of  the  Adriatic,  just   where  the  plains    of  the  Po  terminate,   which 

under  the  name  of  Sena  Gallica  became  afterwards  the  capital  of 

the  district. 

But  the  expulsion  of  the  Senones  made  their  neighbours   the   The  BoH 
Boii    alarmed    for    themselves.       They    quickly    summoned    their  enter  Etru- 
warriors,     swept    down    upon    Etruria,     and    calling    upon    those       '  ^ ,  . 
Etruscans   who  still  disliked  the  Roman  supremacy  to  join    them,  pieces  at 
marched  through  the  country  as  far  as  the  Vadimonian  lake.      There  the  Lacus 
they  were  met  by  the  consul  Cn.   Domitius,  and  overthrown  with    ^^^^\- 
such  slaughter  that  only  a  few  stragglers  escaped  to  carry  home  the  ^'^"' 
news  ;  their  Etruscan  allies  also  losing  half  their  men  in  the  battle. 
The    Boii,    however,    were    not    dismayed.       The    next    year    they  The  Boii 
entered  Etruria  again,  and  again  called  upon  the  Etruscans  for  aid  ;  <^gain  con- 
and  were  once  more  so  signally  defeated  that  they  humbled  themselves  ^^^^^  .^^ 
to  send  ambassadors   to   Rome  to   make  a  peace,  by   which   they  282. 
abided  for  nearly  fifty  years. 

But  while  thus  fighting  for  her  life   in    the   North,  Rome  once   Trouble  in 
more    found    herself  in    the  presence  of  serious   difficulties   in  the  Magna 
South.     The  Samnites  were  said  to   be  again  preparing   for  war  ;  '^^'^"^> 
the  Lucani  and  Bruttii  were  actually  attacking  the  town  of  Thurii, 
which  among  the  Greek  towns  of  south  Italy  was  the  most  closely 
united  in  friendship  with  Rome.      For  these  movements,  as  well  as 
in    part    for    the    recent    outbreaks    in    Gaul,    the   intrigues    of   the 
Tarentines  were  believed  to  be  responsible.     Thurii  had  been  put 
into    opposition    and    rivalry    with     Tarentum     by     the     Molossian 
Alexander,  and  the  Tarentines  had  now  their  opportunity  of  revenge. 

The    position    of    Tarentum    in    Italy    presents    some    striking  Tarentum 
analogies  to   that  of  Athens   during  the   Macedonian   period.       In  and  Athens 
Athens,  one  party,  while  aiming  at  a  supremacy  among  other  Greek  ^'^^P^^^^- 
states,  had  the  farther  object  of  forming  a  confederacy  to  resist  the 
great   and  united  Macedonian  power  ;  and,  to  do  this,  was  ready  to 
make  friends  with  her  ancient  and  bitter  enemy  Thebes,  and  even 
with  her  hereditary  foe  the  king  of  Persia.      The  other  party  wished  to 
secure  Athenian  prosperity  and  peace  by  co-operating  with  Macedonia. 
So  Tarentum,  regarding    herself  as  the  head  of  an  Hellenic  con-  Parties  in 
federacy,   of  which    the    natural  enemies  were  the   Lucanians  and  Tarentum. 
Apulians,  had  to  choose  between  making  friends  with  them,  and  so 
forming  a  united  front  against  the  encroaching  power  of  Rome,  or 

N 


party, 
284. 


178  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap. 

submitting  to  the  protectorate  of  Rome,  and  thus  securing  her- 
self ag-ainst  the  enemies  nearer  her  gates  :  and,  as  in  Athens,  there 
were  two  parties  supporting  the  first  and  the  second  poHcy  re- 
spectively. The  Romanising  party  consisted  for  the  most  part  of 
the  older  and  richer  citizens  ;  the  opposition  of  the  younger  and 
more  democratic. 
Weak  This   popular  party  was  now  in   the   ascendant,   and   its  policy 

policy  of  was  marked  by  singular  alternations  of  rashness  and  irresolution. 
the  popular  fj^g  Tarentines  had  been  the  ultimate  cause  of  the  second  Samnite 
war.  They  had  invited  the  Molossian  Alexander  to  their  aid,  had 
then  quarrelled  with  him,  and  stirred  up  against  him  all  the  Greek 
cities  which  they  could  influence  ;  and  when  among  other  acts  of 
retaliation,  he  had  made  terms  with  Rome,  they  had  instigated  those 
unlucky  raids  of  the  people  of  Palaepolis  upon  Roman  territory, 
which  brought  on  the  collision  between  the  Romans  and  the  Samnites 
who  aided  Palaepolis.  Yet,  with  the  exception  of  one  protest,  as 
pretentious  as  it  was  ineffectual,  which  the  Romans  treated  with 
deserved  contempt,^  they  had  done  nothing  to  help  the  Samnites  in 
their  long  struggle.  They  had  preserved  the  sort  of  neutrality 
which  is  really  offensive  to  both  sides,  striving  to  seize  the  oppor- 
tunity, when  the  two  powers  were  engaged  in  a  death  struggle  with 
each  other,  to  secure  their  own  ends  in  other  ways. 
They  invite  Nor  was  their  resort  to  foreign  powers  successful.  To  crush 
the  aid  of  ^^  Lucanians  and  Messapians,  while  Roman  and  Samnite  were 
foreigners,  f^gj^^-jj^g^  ^^y  continued  to  invite  foreign  princes  to  their  aid. 
Thus  after  Alexander's  death  they  called  in  (we  do  not  know 
with  what  result)  Agathocles  of  Syracuse,  who  had  been  supported 
by  mercenaries  from  both  Samnium  and  Etruria.  Later  on,  in 
302,  the  Spartan  Cleonymus  came  on  their  invitation  to  oppose 
the  Lucanians  and  Romans. ^  But  he  at  any  rate  did  no  good. 
Luxurious  and  dissolute,  after  treacherously  seizing  Metapontum, 
and  indulging  in  vain  schemes  of  Sicilian  conquest,  he  departed  to 
Corcyra,  contenting  himself  with  plundering  expeditions  on  the 
Italian  coasts,  among  others  at  the  mouth  of  the  Meduacus,  where 
the  inhabitants  of  Patavium  drove  him  off  with  considerable  loss. 
In  each  case  these  foreign  princes,  invited  by  Tarentum  for  her 
!  defence,  had  become  a  danger  or  a  difficulty  to  her. 

Two  The  wise  policy  for  Tarentum,  as  it  turned  out,  would  have  been 

possible         |.Q  have  secured  her  safety  among  her  hostile  neighbours  by  frankly 

po  iciesjor    ^y\^^  herself  with   Rome.      Failing  that,  her  only  resource  was  to 

have   united    all    the   peoples    of  southern    Italy,    Greek    and   native 

i  ^  Livy  ix.  14. 

(  2  /^     X.    2  ;     Diodor.    xx.     104,     105    irbXefxav    ^-^^ovres   irpbs  Aei'/fOfoi)?    Kal 


XIV  STATE  OF  PARTIES  IN  TARENTUM  179 

alike,  and  even  the  Samnites  themselves,  into  a  league  strong 
enough  to  hold  its  own  against  Rome.  But  there  was  little  chance 
at  Tarentum  of  a  Demosthenes,  or  even  an  Aeschines,  capable  of 
conceiving  or  carrying  out  either  the  one  policy  or  the  other. 

All  accounts  which  we  have  of  the  state  of  Tarentum  at  this  time  State  of 
present  some  of  the  worst  features  of  a  Greek  democracy  in  its  Tarentum, 
decline,  when  simplicity  of  life  and  intelligent  interest  in  affairs  have  ^  ^' 
been  replaced  by  idle  luxury  and  the  conceited  meddlesomeness  of 
the  incompetent.  There  were  energetic  and  active  citizens,  but  they 
did  not  find  a  scope  for  their  energies  amidst  the  decaying  Hellenism 
in  Italy.  They  went  abroad  to  serve  in  foreign  armies,  so  that 
"Tarentines"  became  the  well-known  designation  of  an  effective 
species  of  cavalry ;  or  they  were  away  with  the  still  numerous 
ships  of  war  or  commerce.  These  were  not  the  men  who  directed 
the  policy  of  the  State.  The  idle  citizens  spent  their  life  in  the 
baths  and  gymnasia  ;  or  in  sauntering  about  the  shady  walks  of 
the  city,  where  they  wrangled  over  politics,  or  discussed  those 
precepts  of  the  Pythagorean  philosophy  which  they  had  no  intention 
of  carrying  into  effect ;  or  in  attending  the  almost  daily  festivals  and 
banquets  which  filled  the  Tarentine  calendar.  The  great  fleets  had 
brought  immense  wealth  and  every  luxury  to  the  city ;  there  were 
plenty  of  slaves  to  do  the  hard  work  of  life  ;  and  that  free  citizens 
should  be  compelled  to  do  anything  contrary  to  their  inclinations 
was  to  make  them  no  better  than  slaves  themselves.  Yet  these 
were  the  men  whose  voices  settled  everything  in  the  sovereign 
assembly.  And  the  assembly  faithfully  reflected  their  character. 
A  jest,  a  vain  boast,  or  burst  of  empty  rhetoric,  sufficed  to  determine 
the  most  serious  business.  At  once  prone  to  panic,  and  reckless  in 
rushing  upon  danger,  they  provoked  a  powerful  people,  formed  or 
broke  an  alliance,  with  equal  rashness  and  frivolity.  Eager  to  catch 
at  any  means  which  would  secure  them  power  without  labour  or 
danger,  they  invited  one  ambitious  prince  after  another  to  their  aid, 
blindly  believing  that  he  would  consent  to  serve  their  aims  rather 
than  use  them  as  stepping-stones  for  his  own.  Such  were  the 
people  who  were  now  to  come  into  collision  with  the  steady  policy 
and  persistent  purpose  of  Rome.  The  result  was  not  doubtful.  But 
the  Romans  had  too  much  on  their  hands  from  285  to  280  to  wish 
to  provoke  a  contest,  although  they  knew  well  enough  that  Tarentum 
was  stirring  up  rebellion  against  them  in  southern  Italy.  We  shall 
find  them  therefore  unusually  slow  to  strike,  and  trying  by  diplomatic 
means  to  postpone  the  appeal  to  arms. 

It  was  perhaps  from  this, motive  that,  in  the  latter  part  of  the  Roman 
second   Samnite  war,  they  had   conceded  to   the  naval  jealousy  of  treaty  with 
Tarentum  a  treaty  whereby  they  bound  themselves  not  to  sail  with   Tarentvm. 


i8o 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


282. 
Coss.  C. 
Fabricius 
Luscinus, 
Q.  Ae7ni- 
lius  Papus. 
The 

Romans 
send  help 
to  Thzirii. 


Attack  on 
the  Roman 
ships  in  the 
harbour  of 
Tarentum. 


The 

Rotnans 
demand 
compensa- 
tion. 


warships  round  the  Lacinian  promontory  into  the  gulf  of  Tarentum.  1 
And  this  concession,  whenever  made,  was  destined  to  bring  about 
the  very  breach  which  it  was  intended  to  prevent. 

The  rising  of  the  Lucani  in  284  had  taken  the  form  of  an  attack 
upon  Thurii.  The  town  was  closely  besieged,  but  the  people 
managed  to  send  an  embassy  to  Rome  to  beg  for  help.  The 
Romans  were  ready  enough  to  exercise  a  protectorate  in  Magna 
Graecia ;  and  in  282  the  consul  C.  Fabricius  Luscinus  was 
despatched  to  the  relief  of  Thurii.  He  conquered  the  Lucani  in 
a  great  battle,  took  their  camp,  and  placed  a  Roman  garrison 
in  the  town.  This  was  offence  enough  in  the  eyes  of  the 
Tarentines,  who  regarded  themselves  as  the  natural  protectors  of 
Greek  towns,  and  the  appeal  to  Rome  as  treason  to  the  Hellenic 
cause.  But  this  was  not  all.  Besides  the  army  under  Fabricius, 
a  fleet  of  ten  ships  under  the  duovir  L.  Valerius  had  been 
despatched  also,  which  visited  the  Greek  towns  on  the  coast,  and 
eventually  appeared  in  the  harbour  of  Tarentum  itself. 

It  seems  scarcely  possible  to  believe  that  the  visit  of  these 
ships  was  purely  one  of  curiosity,  as  the  Romans  afterwards 
contended.  We  know  that  there  was  a  Romanising  party  within 
the  city ;  and  it  seems  natural  that  the  intention  was  to  lend 
support  to  it  against  the  more  democratic  and  patriotic  portion  of  the 
population.  At  any  rate  that  seems  to  have  been  the  interpretation 
immediately  adopted.  On  the  motion  of  one  Philochares,  who  is 
represented  as  a  man  of  vile  character,  a  fleet  at  once  put  to  sea. 
Four  of  the  Roman  ships  were  sunk,  and  one  was  taken  with  all 
hands,  L.  Valerius  himself  being  killed.  Moreover  a  force  was  sent 
by  land  to  Thurii,  to  punish  that  town  for  its  appeal  to  Rome. 
Some  of  the  leading  citizens  responsible  for  it  were  banished  and 
their  property  confiscated,  and  the  Roman  garrison  was  expelled. 

The  action  of  the  popular  party  of  Tarentum  may  perhaps  be 
justified  by  the  law  of  nations,  if  the  Roman  ships  were  in  the  harbour 
for  a  political  purpose,  and  if  the  treaty  was  still  in  force  ;  but  it 
inevitably  involved  a  war  with  Rome,  and  unless  the  Tarentines 
were  prepared  for  that,  it  was  in  the  highest  degree  unwise.  The 
Romans,  however,  were  still  too  deeply  involved  in  other  struggles 
to  be  willing  to  engage  in  a  new  one  at  once.  The  consul  Q. 
Aemilius  Papus  was  despatched  with  an  army  into  Samnium,  but  an 
embassy  only  was  sent  to  Tarentum,  headed  by  Lucius  Postumius, 

^  Our  only  authority  for  the  treaty  is  Appian  [Samn.  7).  He  calls  it  an 
"ancient  treaty"  (TraXami  avvd-qKal).  This  hardly  accords  with  the  theory 
generally  held,  which  places  it  in  304  or  303.  It  may  possibly,  as  indicated  in 
the  text,  have  been  made  when  the  revival  of  interest  in  naval  affairs  occurred  in 
Rome,  and  duoviri  navales  were  appointed,  i.e.  about  310;  but  it  may  also 
possibly  have  been  very  much  earlier. 


XIV  ROMAN  ENVOYS  AT  TARENTUM  i8i 

demanding  "  the  return  of  the  prisoners  taken  on  the  ship  ;  the 
restoration  and  indemnification  of  the  men  banished  from  Thurii ; 
and,  finally,  the  surrender  of  the  Tarentine  statesmen  responsible  for 
the  outrage  on  the  Roman  ships."  The  demands,  though  not  un- 
reasonable, were  such  as  Tarentum  could  not  grant  if  she  meant  to 
maintain  her  position  among  the  other  Greek  states  ;  and  yet  they 
were  such  that  their  rejection  must  necessarily  mean  war  with 
Rome. 

The  rejection  was  determined  upon,  and  made  more  offensive  by  Scene  in 
the   scene   in   the   assembly  when  it  was  confirmed.      The  Roman  the  theatre 
ambassadors   appeared   in   the   theatre,  clothed   in   their  senatorial  ^^^^ 
robes,   and    delivered    their  message.       But    the    volatile   Hellenes 
laughed   at   their  bad   Greek  and   their  purple -fringed   togas,  and 
burst  into  furious  exclamations  at  their  threatening  tone.      Finally 
when  a  certain  Philonides,  by  a  disgusting  act  of  contempt,  befouled 
the  toga  of  Postumius,  the  insult  was  greeted  by  clapping  of  hands, 
loud  laughter,  and  applauding  cries.     Postumius,  holding  up  the  be- 
spattered garment,  cried  sternly,  "  Laugh  on  !     You  will  weep  when 
this  toga  is  cleansed  with  blood." 

The  news  of  this  insult  was  reported  at  Rome  by  the  returning  281. 

ambassadors  shortly  after  the  entrance  upon  office  of  the  consuls  of  Coss.  L. 

the  next  year.      War  was  at  once  decided  upon  ;  but  the  time  for  ^^^^^^^^ 
1       •       •        •  Ml  r  ■,-  •  A      1  1    T      A        -I-        Barbula, 

begmnmg  it  was  still  a  matter  of  discussion.     At  length  L.  Aemilius  q  Marcius 

Barbula,  who  had  been  destined  for  Samnium,  was  ordered  to  go  Philippus. 
to  Tarentum  instead.      He  was  not,  however,  to  commence  warlike 
operations  at  once  ;  but  was  to  offer  an  ultimatum.      Let  the  Taren-  Roman 
tines  accede  to  the  demands  of  the  ambassadors  and  peace  might  ^ilti- 
be  made.     The  sight  of  the  Roman  legions  in  their  territory  had  a  ^^^"'^• 
sobering  effect   on   the   Tarentines.       They  hesitated   and    seemed 
inclined  to  give  in.     But  the  popular  party  had  one  last  card  to  play. 
Whilst  Aemilius   Barbula  was  still  waiting  for  a  reply  to  his  ulti- 
matum, they  succeeded  in  carrying  a  resolution  to  invite  the  help  of  invitation 
Pyrrhus,  king  of  Epirus,  whom  they  had  themselves  once  aided  by  toPyrrhus. 
a  fleet.      When  Aemilius  learnt  that  messengers  had  been  sent  to 
Pyrrhus,  he  at  once  began  plundering  the  country  round  the  Roman 
camp.      The   Tarentines   sent  out  some  troops  and  made  a  faint 
attempt  to  stop  his  ravages,  but  appear  not  to  have  been  able  to  face 
the  Roman  legions. 

The  Romanising  party  in  the  town  for  the  moment  got  the  upper  Pyrrhus 
hand  in  the  assembly ;  and  Agis,  the  leading  member  of  it,  was  ivillcome. 
selected  dictator.      He  would  probably  soon  have  made  terms  with 
Aepiilius  :    but  he  had  not   been   many  days   in   office   when  news 
arrived  that  Pyrrhus  had  accepted  the  invitation  of  the  Tarentines, 
and  promised  to  come  shortly  to  their  aid.      The  promise  was  con- 


i82  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap,  xiv 

veyed  by  his  favourite  friend  and  minister  Cineas,  and  produced  an 
immediate   revulsion   of  feeling.      Negotiations   with  Aemilius  were 
broken  off,  Agis  deposed,  and  one  of  the  members  of  the  deputation 
to  Pyrrhus  elected  in  his  stead. 
Arrival  of  Before  long,  as  an  earnest  of  the  good  faith  of  the  king,  some 

Milo  from  troops  arrived  under  Milo,  who  occupied  the  citadel,  and  undertook 
pirus.  ^^  guard  the  town  walls.  The  Tarentines,  deUghted  to  be  saved  all 
trouble,  willingly  supplied  these  men  with  provisions  and  pay. 
Aemilius,  who  was  not  in  sufficient  force  to  attack  the  town,  and  did 
not  wish  to  winter  in  the  country,  retired  northwards  through  Apulia, 
the  Tarentines  making  an  unsuccessful  attempt  to  intercept  his 
march.  He  was  considered  worthy  of  a  triumph  over  the  Tarentines 
and  Salentini,  as  well  as  for  his  successes  in  Samnium. 
Arrival  of  Before  the  next  spring  (280)  Pyrrhus  arrived  in  person,  and  the 

Pyrrhus,  Tarentines  soon  found  that  all  was  not  to  be  so  easy  and  delightful 
as  they  expected,  and  that  King  Stork  had  come  indeed.  They  had 
an  opportunity  of  appreciating  the  pantomime  of  Meton,  who,  after 
vainly  speaking  against  the  invitation  to  Pyrrhus,  when  the  vote  was 
passed,  appeared  in  the  assembly  crowned  with  flowers  and  accom- 
panied by  music  and  all  the  signs  of  revelry,  and  explained  that  it 
was  well  to  enjoy  themselves  at  once,  for  when  Pyrrhus  came  theyi 
would  all  be  slaves.  j 

Hopes  in  But  at  first  all  was  confidence  and  jubilation.      The  invincible 

Pyrrhus.  Yyxx\ms  would  hurl  back  the  legions  of  the  haughty  Republic  of  the 
Tiber,  that  ventured  to  dictate  to  free  Greeks,  and  maybe  would 
himself  dictate  his  terms  on  the  Capitol. 

The  AUTHORITIES  are  mostly  fragmentary.      For  the  GaUic  wars  the  best 
Polybius  ii.    19  ;    cf   Eutropius  ii.  6  ;    Livy,  Ep.  xi.  -xii.     For  the  south  Italiar 
affairs  Dio,  fr.  37-39  ;  Appian,  Samn.  7  ;  Dionysius  Hal.  xvii.  7  ;  Valerius  Max 
i.  8,  6  ;  Pausanias  i.  xi.-xii.  ;  Diodorus  Siculus  xx.  104,  105  ;  Zonaras  viii.  2. 


CHAPTER    XV 


PYRRHUS 

COLONIES 

CENSUS 

Posidonia  (Paestum)  in  Lucania 

B.C.  273 

B.C. 

280     .       278,222 

Cosa  in  Etruria 

B.C.  273 

B.C. 

275     .       271,224 

Ariminum  in  the  ager  Gallicus  . 

B.C.  268 

B.C. 

265      .       292,224 

Beneventum  in  Samnium  . 

B.C.  268 

Fiimum  in  Picenum 

B.C.   264 

Aesernia  in  Samnium 

B.C.   263 

Early  life  of  Pyrrhus — He  comes  to  Tarentum — Message  to  the  Roman  consul 
— Battles  of  Pandosia  (Heraclea),  Asculum  (280-279)— State  of  Sicily — 
Pyrrhus  goes  to  Syracuse — Attacks  the  Mamertines  and  Carthaginians  :  takes 
Agrigentum,  Panormus,  Hercte,  and  other  towns — Besieges  Lilybaeum  un- 
successfully—Recalled to  Italy  (278-275)  —  Battle  of  Beneventum  (275) — 
Pyrrhus  retires  to  Tarentum  and  returns  to  Epirus  (274) — The  Romans  take 
Tarentum  and  Rhegium  :  subdue  Lucania,  Bruttium,  and  Calabria,  and  the 
Picentines,  and  become  supreme  in  Italy  (274-265). 

^K  MORE  than  usual  interest  attaches  to  the  prince  who  now  came  Early 
to  Italy  in  answer  to  the  appeal  of  the  Tarentines.     He  was  not  only  a  career  of 
gallant  soldier  distinguished  for  personal  prowess  in  the  field.      He  Py^^^us 
was  also  a  skilled  tactician,  had  written  a  treatise  on  the  military  art,      °^g 
and  had  introduced  great  improvements  in  the  method  of  encamp- 
ment.     He  had  enlarged  his  own  kingdom  of  Epirus,  and  for  a  time 
had  shared  that  of  Macedonia  with  a  rival.      A    certain  generosity 
and  humanity  distinguished  him.  favourably  among  the  princes  and 
generals  of  his  time,  and  left  feelings  of  liking  and  respect  even  among 
his   enemies.      He  was  long  remembered   in  Rome  as  a  noble  foe 
against  whom  no  rancour  could  be  felt,  and  of  whom  no  memory  of 
bitterness   remained.       From   his   earliest    years   a   certain   halo   of 
romance  surrounded  him.      His  father  Aeacides  lost  his  life  in  battle 
with   the    Macedonian   Cassander  in   313;   and   the   little    Pyrrhus, 
about  five   years  old,  was  saved  from  his  father's  enemies,  and  the 
partisans   of  his  uncle  Alcetas,   by  faithful  slaves  and  nurses,  who 


i84  HISTORY  OF  ROME 


conveyed  him  to  the  house  of  Glaucias,  king  of  the  Illyrians. 
When  Glaucias  hesitated  to  entertain  the  child,  for  whose  life 
Cassander  would  gladly  have  paid  a  large  sum,  the  little  fellow 
crept  along  the  ground  to  the  king,  and  pulling  himself  up  by  his 
robe  stood  at  his  knees  looking  up  into  his  face.  Glaucias  could  not 
resist  the  appeal :  gave  the  child  to  his  wife  to  bring  up ;  refused  to 
surrender  him  ;  and,  when  he  was  still  a  boy  of  about  twelve,  restored 
him  to  his  kingdom  (306).  From  that  time  to  his  death  in  272  he 
was  nominally  king  of  Epirus,  a  title  which  his  father's  cousin 
Alexander  had  first  adopted  from  the  humbler  one  of  king  of  the 
Molossi.  But  he  did  not  reign  all  that  time.  When  he  was 
about  seventeen  he  was  driven  out  by  his  enemies,  and  fled  first 
to  Demetrius  Poliorcetes,  in  whose  company  he  fought  at  the 
battle  of  Ipsus  (301),  and  afterwards  to  Egypt,  where  Ptolemy 
entertained  him  nobly,  and  gave  him  his  stepdaughter  as  a  wife. 
Returning  to  Epirus  about  296  he  reigned  for  a  short  time  ini 
conjunction  with  his  second  cousin  Neoptolemus.  His  life  having! 
been  attempted  by  Neoptolemus,  he  caused  him  to  be  put  to 
death,  and  thenceforth  reigned  alone.^  He  added  Corcyra  and, 
the  territory  on  the  Ambracian  gulf  to  his  dominions,  and  trans- ■ 
ferred  the  seat  of  government  from  the  old  capital  Passaron  to 
Ambracia.  From  287  for  about  two  years  he  shared  the  kingdom  of 
Macedonia  with  Lysimachus,  but  had  been  then  compelled  to 
relinquish  his  hold  upon  it  and  confine  himself  to  his  ancestral 
kingdom  of  Epirus. 
Pyrrhus  is  When  the  invitation  from  Tarentum  came  to  him,  he  was  there- 

tnvited  to     fgj-g  fgj.  ^^  \\m^  not  engaged  in  any  great  undertakings  outside  his 
^-^'  "^  ^'    own  kingdom.      He  was  about  thirty-eight  years  old,  still  vigorous 
and   eager  for  distinction,  still   ambitious   of  conquest.       Like  his 
predecessor  Alexander  he  readily  caught  at  the  chance  of  gaining 

^  The  following  table  will  show  Pyrrhus' s  connexion  with  the  persons  here 
mentioned  :— 


Alcetas  I.,  king  of  the  Molossi 
ob.  after  B.C.  373 

I 


Neoptolemus  I.  Thrasj'bas  (or  Arrhybas  or  Arymbas). 

ob.  360.  I 

I 


Alexander  Olympias  Alcetas  II.  Aeacides  =  Phtheia 

ob.  in  Italy  abt.  331  mother  of  Alexander  disinherited  by  his  ob.  313      | 

first  called  himself  king  the  Great.  father,  but  succeeded  1  l  1 

of  Epirus.  his  brother  in  B.C.  313  |  | 

I  ob.  307.  Pyrrhus    Troias     Deidamei 

Neoptolemus  II.  b.  318,  ob.  272. 

(reigned  jointly  with 
Pyrrhus  for  a  short 
time,  296). 


XV  ARRIVAL  OF  PYRRHUS  185 

distinction  in  the  West  ;  of  conquering  Italy,  Sicily,  and  Africa,  and 

so  realising  Alexander's   dream   of  a  great   Western   Empire  ;  and 

returning  perhaps  with  all  its  vast  resources  at  his  back  to  once  more 

establish  his  power  in   Macedonia.      The  Tarentines    had  formerly 

helped  him  when  he  was  struggling  with  Agathocles  in   Corcyra  ; 

and    their  invitation    was    now  backed    by  other   Greek    states    in 

Italy  also. 

He  was  so  eager  that   he   had   not   the  patience  to  await   the  pyrrhus 

usual   season   for  sailing,   but   started  before   the  winter  was   over,  arrives  at 

Consequently  he  was  caught  in  a  great  storm,  which  scattered  his   Tarentum 

ships  and  drove  him  ashore  on   the   coasts   of  the  Messapii.      He  ^^^J 

made  his  way  however  on  foot  to  Tarentum  with  such  of  his  forces,   ^^^^  p 

including  two  elephants,  as  had  reached  land  with  him,   and  there    Valerius 

the   greater   part   of  the    expedition    eventually  rejoined    him.      He  Laevinus, 

immediately  began  training  the  inhabitants  for  the  serious  business   ^^t-^^^- 
-  .   ,      ,        ,      ,       ,         .     ,   °    ,        ^^       .         ,     ,  .        ,       ,  nncanius. 

which  they  had  taken  m  hand.     He  closed  the  gymnasia,  the  theatre, 

and  the  covered  walks,  diminished  the  number  of  festivals  and  banquets, 

and  compelled  the  citizens  of  military  age  to  give  in  their  names  for 

service  and  submit  to  drill  and  discipline.      But  though  there  was 

already  a  military  class  in  Tarentum,  which  did  some  service  in  the 

ensuing  years,  Pyrrhus  did  not  find  the  inhabitants  answer  cheerfully 

to  his   call.      There  were   loud   complaints    of   the    conduct    of  the 

garrison  which  he  had  sent  in  advance  ;  and  now  that  the  king  called 

upon  the  citizens  to  serve,  as  many  as  could  slipped  away  from  the 

townj  and  those  who  could  not  do  so,   or  were  forced  by  him   to 

remain,  grumbled  at  the  contributions  demanded  of  them,  and  at  the 

billeting  of  soldiers    in   their   houses.      The    promised    contingents 

from  the  other  towns  had  not  come  in,  and  the  Tarentines  had  not 

yet  made  up  their  minds  that  they  must  themselves  fight,  as  well  as  the 

prince  who  had  come  to  save  them  the  trouble,  when  news  arrived 

that  the  Roman  consul  Valerius  Laevinus  was  on  his  march  towards   The 

Tarentum,  wasting  the  country  of  the  Lucani  as  he  came.      Pyrrhus  Romans 

got  rid  of  some  of  the  leaders  of  the  discontented  party  by  sending  "^^^'^ 

them  under  various  pretexts  to  Epirus,  or  by  discrediting  them  in  the  ^^^^^^"^ 

eyes  of  the  people  ;  but  he  never  entirely  silenced  the  opposition,  towards 

nor  prevented  some  from  putting  themselves  under   the   protection   Tarentum. 

of  the  Romans. 

The  news  of  the  king's  arrival  had  meanwhile  been  the  signal 

for  active  preparations   at    Rome.      Legions   were   enrolled,    money 

collected,   and    guards    placed    in    all    towns   where    disloyalty   was 

suspected.      Some  leading  citizens  at  Praeneste  were  even  compelled 

to  come  to   Rome,  and  were  there  kept  in  ward.      As  soon   as  his  Laevinus 

army  was  ready  Laevinus  started  on  his  march.      He  was  anxious  ^^  ^«- 

to  fight  as  far  as  possible  from   Rome  ;    and  at  the   same  time  to  '^'^^^^- 


1 86  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap. 

prevent  the  Lucanians  from  furnishing  contingents  to  the  army  of 
Pyrrhus.  He  therefore  marched  far  to  the  south  of  the  direct  road 
to  Tarentum,  and  entered  Lucania,  wasting  the  country  as  he 
advanced,  preventing  aid  being  sent  to  Tarentum,  and  securing 
his  retreat  by  a  strongly-fortified  position  on  his  rear.  When  he 
had  reached  the  bank  of  the  Siris  he  was  met  by  a  despatch  from 
Pyrrhus,  in  which  he  declared  that  he  meditated  no  attack  upon 
Rome,  but  was  acting  solely  as  protector  of  Tarentum  :  "  Hearing 
that  Laevinus  was  marching  against  Tarentum  with  an  army,  he 
bade  him  dismiss  his  troops  and  come  to  Tarentum  with  a  small 
company.  He  would  arbitrate  between  the  two  states."  Laevinus 
answered  that,  before  acting  as  arbitrator  between  the  Romans  and 
Tarentines,  he  must  account  to  the  Romans  for  having  himself  crossed 
to  Italy  :  and  having  caught  some  spies  of  the  king  near  his  camp,  he 
ordered  them  to  be  shown  the  army  in  all  its  strength  and  to  take 
back  a  report  to  their  master. 

Pyrrhus  still  hesitated.  The  allies  had  not  come  in,  for  Laevinus 
in  Lucania  was  generally  able  to  prevent  them  ;  while  his  colleague 
Coruncanius  was  quelling  all  disaffection  in  Etruria  and  conquering 
the  Volsinienses.  The  king  hoped  that  delay  would  be  more  fatal 
to  Laevinus  than  to  himself ;  for  while  the  Romans  were  in  a  country 
in  great  part  hostile,  where  supplies  must  in  time  fall  short,  he  had 
a  large  town  on  the  sea  to  depend  on  and  plenty  of  ships  to  bring 
provisions.  Laevinus  was  of  the  same  opinion,  and  was  therefore 
eager  to  engage.  Pyrrhus,  in  spite  of  his  desire  to  postpone  the 
encounter,  could  not  do  so.  If  he  shrank  from  meeting  the  Romans 
in  the  field,  his  prestige  among  the  Italiots  would  quickly  disappear  ; 
they  would  in  all  directions  make  their  peace  with  Rome,  and  be 
less  ready  than  ever  to  join  him.  He  therefore  led  out  his  army 
to  the  Siris,  making  his  headquarters  between  Pandosia  and 
Heraclea.  Across  the  stream  he  could  see  the  Roman  camp : 
their  guards  carefully  posted,  or  the  men  drawn  up  in  battle  array. 
"  This  order  of  the  Barbarians,"  he  said,  "  is  far  from  barbarous  : 
what  they  can  do  we  shall  soon  know."  He  wished  to  wait  for  the 
allies.  But  the  Roman  commander  forced  on  a  battle.  Sending 
his  cavalry  higher  up  the  stream  that  they  might  cross  it  and  get 
on  the  rear  of  the  enemy,  he  tried  to  force  a  passage  with  his  infantry 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  his  camp,  in  face  of  the  pickets  of  the  enemy. 
This  movement  failed  at  first :  but  when  the  Roman  cavalry  had 
succeeded  in  coming  in  contact  with  the  Greeks,  Laevinus  took 
advantage  of  the  confusion,  and  successfully  accomplished  the 
passage  of  the  stream.  The  two  armies  being  thus  at  close  quarters 
a  furious  struggle  ensued,  which  lasted  many  hours  and  was  long 
undecided,    each    host    in    turn    giving    way    and    then    recovering 


BATTLE  OF  HERACLEA  187 

its  ground.  Pyrrhus  himself  had  a  horse  killed  under  him.  One 
of  his  officers  named  Megacles,  who  was  disguised  in  the  royal 
armour,  was  killed,  and  his  helmet  and  cloak  borne  off  in  triumph 
to  the  Roman  general  to  prove  the  death  of  the  king, — a  triumph 
soon  dashed  when  Pyrrhus  himself  with  bared  head  rode  to  the  front. 
The  day  was  finally  won  for  the  Greeks  by  a  charge  of  elephants,  The 
of  which  Pyrrhus  had  brought  twenty  with  him.^  The  novel  appear-  ^jf^^f^ll 
ance  of  these  huge  beasts,  the  towers  on  their  backs  filled  with  armed  ^^^^^yy 
men,  and  their  loud  trumpeting,  frightened  the  men,  and  still  more  280. 
the  horses,  who  threw  their  riders  and  galloped  madly  away.  The 
elephants  trampled  to  death  some  of  the  fallen,  and  the  Thessalian 
cavalry  dashed  in  pursuit  of  the  flying  legionaries.  Elephants  how- 
ever seldom  did  harm  to  the  enemy  only.  One  of  them  being 
wounded  grew  wild  and  made  the  others  unmanageable  ;  and  in  the 
confusion  thus  caused  the  main  body  of  the  Romans  escaped  across 
the  Siris.  The  losses  on  both  sides  were  heavy.  As  usual  different 
totals  were  named  :  but  the  story  was  told  that  Pyrrhus  replied  to 
those  who  congratulated  him,  "One  more  victory  like  this,  and  I 
shall  be  ruined."  And  again,  that  the  valour  of  the  Roman  soldiers 
and  the  sight  of  their  dead  bodies,  fallen  on  their  own  ground,  and 
with  their  wounds  all  in  front,  so  impressed  him  that  he  exclaimed, 
"  Had  I  been  king  of  the  Romans  I  should  have  conquered  the 
world!" 

The  immediate  effect  of  the  victory  was  to  establish  the  prestige  Effects  of 
of  Pyrrhus  in   Italy,   and   to  attract   numerous   adhesions   from   the  ^^^  battle. 
Lucanians   and   Samnites.       He   treated  these  tardy  recruits  gener- 
ously, lightly  rebuking  their  delay,  but  giving  them  a  share  in  the 
spoils  ;  being  in  fact  pleased  to  have  beaten  a  Roman  army  without 
them. 

Laevinus  retreated  upon  Capua,  where  he  was  reinforced  by 
fresh  troops  from  Rome,  while  his  colleague  Coruncanius  was  sum- 
moned from  Etruria,  and  Gnaeus  Domitius  Calvinus  was  named 
dictator  to  command  the  troops  levied  to  protect  the  city,  now  in 
a  state  of  considerable  alarm.  For  not  only  had  the  victory  of  Mutiny  at 
Pyrrhus  encouraged  the  Lucanians  and  Samnites  to  rebel,  but  a  ^"-^i^^"^- 
garrison  of  the  Romans,  consisting  of  4000  Campanian  allies  under 
Decius  Jubellius,  placed  in  Rhegium  the  year  before  by  Fabricius  at 
the  request  of  the  people  of  Rhegium  themselves,  had  mutinied. 
Under  the  pretext  of  discovering  treasonable  correspondence  with 
Pyrrhus,  they  expelled  or  put  to  death  some  of  the  leading  citizens, 
and  seized  on  the  city  and  its  territory  for  their  own.      They  made 

^  Hence  the  name  of  bos  lucana  ' '  Lucanian  cow "  for  an  elephant.  The 
Romans  having  first  seen  them  in  this  battle  in  Lucania  (Lucr.  v.  1302  ;  Varro 
L.  L.  7139  ;   PHny  N.  H.  viii.  16). 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Pyrrhus 
fails  to  take 
Capua  and 
Neapolis. 
Mission  of 
Cineas  to 
Rome,  280. 


terms  with  the  Mamertines  of  Messene  ;  and  for  the  rest  of  the  war 
Rhegium  was  lost  to  the  Romans  :  for  these  men,  though  not  joining 
Pyrrhus,  could  look  for  nothing  but  condign  punishment  if  the 
Romans  were  successful. 

Pyrrhus  tried  in  vain  to  seize  Capua  before  Valerius  reached  it. 
Baffled  there  he  moved  upon  Neapolis.  Failing  to  take  that  town 
also,  he  meditated  making  his  way  through  the  territories  of  the 
Volscians,  Hernici,  and  Aequi  to  Etruria  and  attacking  Rome 
from  the  north.  But  before  trying  this  he  sent  Cineas  to  Rome  to 
offer  terms.  They  were  those  of  a  conqueror.  The  Greek  cities 
were  to  be  free,  and  all  that  had  been  taken  from  the  Lucanians, 
Samnites,  Daunians,  and  Bruttians  was  to  be  restored,  in  return  for 
which  Pyrrhus  would  give  back  Roman  prisoners  without  ransom. 
Cineas  took  with  him  to  Rome  rich  presents  for  the  leading  men  and 
their  wives.  According  to  one  account  they  were  unanimously  declined : 
according  to  another  he  was  warmly  received  in  Roman  society,  and 
secured  many  adherents  before  he  ventured  to  solicit  an  audience 
of  the  Senate.  So  great  was  the  difficulty  of  the  situation  felt  to  be, 
that  a  large  number  of  the  fathers  seemed  inclined  to  yield  to  his 
demands,  or  at  any  rate  to  allow  Pyrrhus  to  come  to  Rome  in  person 
to  urge  them.  But  Appius  Claudius,  now  old  and  blind,  hearing 
of  this  wavering  in  the  Senate,  caused  himself  to  be  carried  into  the 
Senate-house,  surrounded  by  his  sons  and  sons-in-law,  and  delivered 
an  impassioned  speech, — the  earliest  Roman  oration  preserved  in 
writing  that  existed  in  Cicero's  time.  "  He  had  never  before,"  he 
said,  "  been  glad  of  his  blindness  :  but  now  he  could  wish  that  he 
had  been  deaf  also,  that  he  might  not  hear  their  decrees  which 
would  destroy  the  glory  of  Rome.  They  had  been  used  to  boast  that, 
if  Alexander  had  come  to  Italy,  his  fame  for  invincibility  would  have 
been  at  an  end  :  yet  they  were  going  to  yield  to  a  mean  Epirot,  the 
hanger-on  of  one  of  Alexander's  field  officers,  who  was  in  Italy 
because  he  could  not  maintain  himself  in  Greece,  and  whose  power 
had  not  sufficed  to  retain  even  a  portion  of  Macedonia.  If  Pyrrhus, 
so  far  from  being  punished,  were  actually  rewarded  for  his  pre- 
sumption, they  would  not  have  freed  themselves  of  him,  they  would 
only  have  brought  upon  themselves  the  Tarentines  and  Samnites,  who 
would  justly  despise  them."  The  old  man's  indignant  eloquence  had 
its  due  effect  :  Cineas  was  dismissed  with  the  answer  that,  if  Pyrrhus 
desired  peace,  he  must  quit  Italy  ;  if  he  stayed,  the  Romans  would 
continue  the  war,  though  he  should  defeat  a  thousand  such  as 
Laevinus.i 


1  Cineas's  mission  is  thus  placed  by  Plutarch  and  Appian.      Zonaras  places  it 
after  the  return  of  Pyrrhus  to  Tarentum    and  the  visit   of  Fabricius  and  his 


I 


XV  PYRRHUS  IN  LATIUM  AND  CAMPANIA  189 

Diplomacy  having  failed,  Pyrrhus  determined  to  advance  upon  Pyrrhns 
Rome.     As  he  marched  through  the  country  however  he  found  him-  advances 
self  continually  among  enemies.      No  one  joined  him  :  and  though  he  V^^^^-^ 
took  Fregellae  and  Anagnia,  and  even,  as  it  is  stated,  advanced  as  280. 
far  as  Praeneste,  only  twenty-three  miles  from  Rome,  he  found  no 
signs  of  yielding.      Laevinus  was  dogging  his  footsteps  behind  :  the 
dictator  Domitius  was  prepared  for  him  in  Rome  :  and  he  now  learnt 
that  the  consul  Coruncanius  had  by  his  conquest  of  the  Volsinienses, 
and  other  measures,  secured  the  loyalty  of  the  Etruscans.     He  turned 
back  to  Campania,  still  followed  by  Laevinus,  who  would  not  give 
him  battle,  but  harassed  his  rear.      "  The  Roman  legions  grow  like 
slain  hydras,"  he  exclaimed  ;  and  after  vainly  trying  to  strike  terror 
in  the  enemy  by  various  military  demonstrations,  he  put  his  troops 
into  winter  quarters  and  retired  to  Tarentum. 

He  was  visited  there  by  ambassadors  headed   by  C.  Fabricius  Mission  of 
Luscinus.     The  king  received  them  with  great  ceremony,  and  enter-  fabricius 
tained  them  royally,  paying  special  honour  to  Fabricius.      He  expected  ^^^ 
that  they  had  come  to  signify  the  acceptance  of  the  terms  which  he  280-27^. 
had  offered  by  Cineas.     When  he  found,  to  his  disappointment,  that 
they  had  only  come  to  negotiate  a  return  of  Roman  prisoners,  he 
doubted  what  course  to  take.      Some  of  his  officers  advised  him  to  offer 
no  more  terms  and  give  back  no  prisoners.      Cineas  like  a  true  Greek 
of  the  Macedonian  period  (he  had  been  a  hearer  of  Demosthenes) 
advised  conciliation  and,  above  all,  bribery.      This  plan  Pyrrhus  now- 
adopted  :  he  offered  splendid  presents  to  the  ambassadors,   if  they 
would  undertake  to  advise  acceptance  of  his  terms  at  Rome.      But 
whether  he  met  with  any  success  or  no  in  the  case  of  the  other  two, 
Q.  Aemilius  Papus  and  P.  Cornelius   Dolabella,  he  found  Fabricius 
deaf  to  all  his  offers.      "  If  I  am  base,"  said  Fabricius,  according  to  Stories  of 
the  famous   story,   "  how  can    I    be  worth  a  bribe  ?  if  honest,  how  Fabricius. 
can  you  expect  me  to  take  one  ?  "      Baffled  by  his  integrity  Pyrrhus 
tried  to  work  on  his  fears.      Next  day  while  they  were  conversing, 
he  ordered  an  elephant  to  be  placed  behind  a  curtain.      At  a  signal 
from  the  king  the  curtain  was  let  down,  and  the  animal  raised  his 
trunk  over  the  head  of  Fabricius  and  trumpeted.     The  Roman,  with- 
out flinching,  said  quietly,  "  The  beast  cannot  move  me  to-day  more 
than  your  gold  yesterday."      But  though  Pyrrhus  could  not  get  his 
way,  he   still  from  policy,  or  from  goodwill  to   Fabricius,   tried   to 
conciliate  the  Romans  by  his  kind  treatment  of  his  prisoners.     Accord- 
ing to  some  he  allowed  them  to  return  to  Rome  on  their  parole  to 

colleagues  to  him  there.  Plutarch,  however,  differs  from  Appian  in  his  account 
of  the  terms  offered  by  Cineas.  According  to  Plutarch  he  demanded  freedom 
for  the  Greek  towns,  and  offered  in  that  case  to  assist  Rome  against  the  other 
Italians. 


[90 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


279- 
Coss.  P. 
Sulpicius 
Saverrio, 
P.  Decius 
Mus. 

The 
consuls 
advance  to 
Asculum. 


Victory  of 
Pyrrhus  at 
Asculum, 
279- 


attend  the  Saturnalia,  according  to  others  he  released  them  altogethei 
without  ransom. 

Whatever  may  be  the  details  of  these  transactions,  it  became 
clear  before  the  spring  that  the  war  was  to  go  on.  The  Romans  had 
shown  no  signs  of  panic.  They  had  not  relaxed  the  severity  of  theii 
customs  towards  returned  prisoners,  however  released,  who  were 
reduced  in  rank,  told  off  to  distant  garrison  duty,  and  treated 
as  men  under  a  cloud.  The  Republic  had  no  lack  of  soldiers, 
With  the  spring  the  consuls  started  for  Apulia.  They  marched 
to  Malventum  (Beneventum),  and  there  left  the  main  road  leading 
to  Tarentum,  and  took  that  which  branched  off  to  Canusium. 
About  thirty  miles  short  of  that  town,  they  came  upon  the  army 
of  Pyrrhus,  encamped  near  Asculum.  He  had  been  engaged  in 
securing  the  submission  of  Apulian  towns,  and  was  now  in  position 
on  the  south  bank  of  a  considerable  stream.  For  many  days  the 
armies  faced  each  other  on  either  side  of  it ;  and,  while  they 
were  thus  stationed,  the  story  was  afterwards  told  that  a  rumour 
reached  Pyrrhus  that  Decius,  in  imitation  of  his  father  and  grand- 
father, meant  to  "devote"  himself  and  the  enemy's  legions  to  the 
infernal  gods  ;  and  that  Pyrrhus  sent  him  word  that  he  had  given 
orders  that  he  should  not  be  killed,  but  that,  if  he  took  him  prisoner, 
he  would  put  him  to  death  with  torture  :  and  again,  that  the  Romans 
offered  to  leave  it  to  Pyrrhus  to  decide  which  army  should  cross  the 
stream  to  meet  the  other,  saying  that,  if  he  would  come  to  them,  they 
would  retire  to  allow  his  army  to  cross  unopposed.  Such  tales,  what- 
ever may  be  their  origin,  do  not  help  us  to  understand  the  battle 
which  followed.  It  seems  that  in  it  the  Romans  occupied  a  position 
at  the  foot  of  the  hills,  in  which  was  a  high  valley  watered  by  a 
stream,  now  called  the  Carapella,  and  that  this  high  ground  saved  them 
from  destruction.  To  resist  the  elephants,  they  had  prepared  waggons 
with  spikes  fixed  on  them,  and  filled  with  javelin  throwers.  But 
Pyrrhus  baffled  this  precaution  by  directing  his  elephants  to  another 
part  of  the  field,  and  so  turned  to  flight  what  seemed  at  first  the 
victorious  Roman  line.  The  loss  on  both  sides,  stated  at  6000 
Romans  and  3505  Greeks,^  shows  that  the  fighting  was  long  and 
obstinate  ;  but  the  Romans  were  saved  by  a  diversion  effected  by 
some  Apulians,  who  took  the  opportunity  of  looting  the  camp  of 
Pyrrhus.  In  the  confusion  thus  caused  the  Romans  seem  to  have 
rallied  sufficiently  to  fight  their  way  back  to  safe  quarters.  Pyrrhus 
himself  and  many  of  his  staff  were  wounded  ;  and  shortly  afterwards 
he  retired  to  Tarentum  for  medical  treatment  and  proper  food. 


1  These  numbers  are  given  by  Plutarch  on  the  authority  of  Hieronymus  of 
Cardia,  a  contemporary  writer,  and  of  some  registers  of  king  Pyrrhus  himself ; 
they  may  be  therefore  regarded  as  approximately  correct. 


XV  PYRRHUS  INVITED  TO  SICILY  191 

Though    the   Romans,   therefore,    had   undoubtedly  sustained   a  Effects 
defeat  in  the  field,  it  was  one  of  those  defeats  which  left  the  victors  of  the 
almost  as   badly  off  as  if  they  had  been   the  losers.      The  Roman  ^^^A^^^ 
army  was  safely  entrenched,  and   could  not   be  attacked  ;  the  king 
had    lost    heavily,    was    encumbered   with   wounded   men,   and   was 
wounded  himself     And  though  the  Romans  had  suffered  too  severely 
to  attempt  any  forward  movement,  the  victory  to  Pyrrhus  was  sterile, 
and  nothing  more  was  done  by  him  during  that  season. 

The  Roman  army  wintered  in  Apulia,  and  the  new  consuls,  C.   2^8. 
Fabricius  and  Q.  Aemilius,  came  early  the  next  year  to  take  over  the  Coss.  C. 
command.      Pyrrhus  had  sent  home  for  fresh  supplies  of  men  and   ,^  ^f""J 
money,  expectmg  to  have  to  renew  the  war  m  the  sprmg.      But  when  //^  q^ 
he  heard  that  Fabricius,  for  whom  he  entertained  a  high  respect,  was  Aemilius 
one  of  the  consuls  for  the  year,  he  seems  to  have  hoped  for  some  less  Papus  II. 
warlike  settlement.      This  hope  was  raised  still  higher  by  an  act  of 
Fabricius  himself      One  of  the  most  trusted  servants  of  the  king, 
taking  advantage  of  negotiations  between  Tarentum  and  the  Roman 
camp,  visited  Fabricius,  and  offered  to  assassinate  Pyrrhus.      Dis- 
daining to  conquer  by  such  means,  Fabricius  communicated  the  fact 
to  Pyrrhus,  whose  generous  nature  was  so  moved  that  he  is  said  to 
have  at  once  released  his  Roman  prisoners  without  ransom,  and  to 
have  tried  once  more,  by  sending  Cineas  to  Rome,  to  come  to  terms 
with  the  Republic.     The  Senate  however  proved  inexorable.     Their 
answer  was  still  that  Pyrrhus  must  leave  Italy  ;  and  meanwhile  the 
Roman  armies  did  not  cease  to  attack  all  such  towns  as  were  in 
alliance  with  him. 

Embarrassed  by  the  increasing  discontent  of  the  very  people  to  Invitation 
whose  help  he  had  come,  and  by  the  growing  conviction  that  he  could  ^^  Pyrrhus 
not  permanently  secure  a  hold  on  Italy,  in  face  of  the  opposition  oi  ^^^"! 
Rome,  Pyrrhus  was  ready  to  catch  at  any  opportunity  of  retiring  from  summer 
an   impossible    position.      That  opportunity  was  offered  him  by  an  278. 
invitation  from  Syracuse  and  other  Sicilian  towns  to  cross  to  Sicily 
and  deliver  them  from  the  incompetent  rule  of  their  tyrants,  from  the 
attacks  of  the   Mamertines  of  Messene,  and  from  the  encroachments 
of  the  Carthaginians. 

Sicily,  like  southern  Italy,  was  fringed  by  Greek  colonies,  which  State  of 

had  been  founded  at  various  periods  from  about  B.C.  735.     When  Sicily  to 

the  Greeks  came  to  the  island  they  found  there  already  certain  native  ^^f^^mtng 
„.         .  ,^.,.,-  /-  ,  -  ..  r  of  Pyrrhus. 

Sicani  and  Siculi,  the  former  said  to  have  been   immigrants  from 

Iberia,  the  latter  from  Italy.    These  tribes  mostly  held  the  central  parts, 

while  at  various  spots  on  the  coast,  chiefly  on  the  west,  Phoenicians 

from  Tyre  had  fixed  trading  centres,   which  were  being  gradually 

taken  up  and  occupied  by  the  great  Phoenician  city  of  Carthage.     As 

the  Greek  cities  slowly  increased  in  number  and  power,  the  Cartha- 


.1^ 


[92 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


The 

Cartha- 
ginians. 


Defeat  of 
Hamilcar 
by  Gelo, 
480. 


Hannibal 
destroys 
Greek  cities 
in  Sicily, 
410-40^. 

Rule  of 
Dionysius 
the  elder, 
405-3^7- 


Himilcd  s 

victories, 

397- 


Treaty  of 
383.     The 
Carthagin- 
ian pale 
bounded  on 
the  east  by 
the  river 
Halycus. 


ginians  retired  more  and  more  to  the  west  of  the  island,  but  were 
always  aiming  at  the  recovery  of  their  lost  ground.  The  same  habil 
of  constant  quarrelling,  which  proved  so  ruinous  to  the  cities  ol 
Greece,  followed  the  Greeks  to  their  Sicilian  homes.  Yet  they  were 
compelled  to  combine  to  some  extent,  in  order  to  resist  these  constani 
encroachments  of  Carthage  ;  and  this  resistance  was  organised  b) 
the  rulers  of  Syracuse,  the  greatest  and  most  powerful  of  the  Greel; 
towns,  and  depended  upon  her  for  its  effectiveness. 

In  480  a  great  Carthaginian  army,  under  Hamilcar,  was  conquerec 
by  Gelo  of  Syracuse,  and  the  Carthaginian  possessions  in  Sicily  were 
confined  to  the  towns  of  Motye,  Panormus,  and  Soloeis,  the  original 
Phoenician  settlements.  In  410  the  Carthaginians  came  again,  this 
time  on  the  invitation  of  the  Sikel  city  Egesta,  which  complained  ol 
the  oppression  of  Selinus.  In  answer  to  this  invitation,  a  fleet  and 
army  were  sent  under  Hannibal,  grandson  of  Hamilcar,  which  in  thai 
year,  and  in  the  third  year  after  (407),  inflicted  ruinous  damage  upor 
nearly  all  the  Greek  towns  on  the  south  coast — Selinus,  Agrigentum. 
Gela,  and  Camerina.  The  Syracusans  had  reason  to  fear  that  the) 
would  be  the  next  victims.  Dionysius  who,  in  the  midst  of  the 
alarm  and  commotion  had  made  himself  tyrant  (405),  was  the  one 
man  who  seemed  capable  of  saving  his  country.  But  after  all  il 
was  not  he,  but  a  pestilence,  which  compelled  the  Carthaginian  armies 
to  leave  Syracuse  untaken,  and  return  to  Africa.  Between  405  anc 
397  Dionysius  carried  the  war  into  the  enemy's  own  dominions, 
attacking  and  taking  many  of  the  Carthaginian  settlements  in  the 
west  ;  until,  in  397,  another  great  Carthaginian  army,  under  Himilco, 
descended  upon  the  island,  recovered  Motye  and  Eryx,  took  Messene, 
and  threatened  Syracuse  itself  Once  more  Syracuse  was  saved  b) 
a  pestilence.  The  enemy  were  so  reduced  that  they  were  obligee 
to  purchase  even  leave  to  retire  by  the  sacrifice  of  their  mercenar) 
troops. 

But  during  the  next  fourteen  years  they  often  returned,  anc 
Dionysius  during  that  time  was  occupied  with  little  else  than  the 
repeated  struggle  to  drive  them  from  the  island.  Finally,  in  383, 
an  end  was  put  to  the  struggle  by  a  treaty,  whereby  the  Carthaginians 
were  left  in  possession  of  all  west  of  the  river  Halycus.  Dionysius 
during  the  rest  of  his  reign  extended  the  power  of  Syracuse,  and 
interfered  in  many  directions  with  the  Greeks  in  Sicily  and  Italy. 
But  in  the  reign  of  his  son  (367-344),  which  was  interrupted  by  twc 
periods  of  deposition  (by  Dion  356-353,  and  by  Callippus  353-352), 
the  Carthaginians  again  began  to  appear  east  of  the  Halycus,  and 
even  succeeded  in  taking  the  whole  of  Syracuse,  except  the  island  oi 
Ortygia  (345).  From  this  they  were  driven  by  the  Corinthian  hero, 
Timoleon,  who  came  to  Sicily  with  the  real  purpose,  which  was  onl> 


XV  CARTHAGINIANS  IN  SICILY  193 

the  pretext  of  Pyrrhus,  of  putting  down  the  tyranny  and  checking  the   Timoleon 
Carthaginians   (345-343).       Timoleon    followed   up   his   success   at  i^  Sicily, 
Syracuse  by  deposing  the  tyrants  of  Leontini  and  other  towns  ;  and  345-33^- 
then,  invading  the  Carthaginian  district,  he  crushed  a  huge  Cartha-  Defeat  of 
ginian  army  on  the  banks  of  the  Crimisus,  probably  near  Segesta,  in  Cartha- 
340.      This  victory  secured  the  Greek  towns  liberty  and  peace  for  S^^^^J^^ 
many  years.    Syracuse  was  now  once  more  a  Republic,  and  Timoleon,   Crimism 
honoured  and  beloved,  lived  there  as  a  private  citizen  till  his  death  j^o. 
in  336. 

The  reign  of  Agathocles,  who,  some  years  afterwards  (317),  rose  Agathocles, 
from  the  humble  trade  of  a  potter  to  be  tyrant  of  Syracuse,  was  one  317-298. 
long  struggle  with  the  Carthaginians,  who  blockaded  him  by  sea  and 
land.      By  a  bold  stroke  he  broke  through  the  blockade,  and  invaded  Ag<^jhocles 
the    Carthaginian   territory   in   Africa,    where   he  had  such    success  jjo-jo7.  ' 
that  hardly  any  city,  except   Utica,  remained  faithful  to   Carthage 
(310-307). 

But  in  the  period  which  followed  his  death  (289)  not  only  did  At  the 
the  Carthaginians  begin  once  more  steadily  to  encroach  on  the  Greek  ^^^^^'^  °f 
side  of  the  island,  but  the  greatest  disorder  prevailed  among  the  ^^f^/^^/.. 
Greek  states  themselves.      Most  of  them  fell  again  under  the  power  ti^es  seize 
of  incompetent  tyrants  ;  and  some  of  Agathocles'  own  mercenaries  Messene, 
from  Campania,  who  called  themselves  Mamertines  (sons  of  Mamers  ^Sg. 
or  Mars),  instead  of  returning  to  their  native  land,  seized  on  the  city  ^^"'^^^    ■ 
of  Messene,  expelled  or  killed  the  chief  inhabitants,  and  possessed  Sicily. 
themselves  of  their  lands  and  houses,  their  women  and  children.     An 
important  city  was  thus  de-hellenised,  while  many  of  the  other  Greek 
tyrants  admitted  Carthaginian  garrisons  into  their  cities,  and  the  free 
Greeks  were  confined  almost  to  the  south-east  corner  of  the  island. 
Syracuse  itself,  nominally  free,  had  been  held  by  one  military  adven- 
turer after  another,  was  torn  by  internal  factions,  and  was  powerless 
to  resist  the  invading  arms  of  Carthage,  whose  fleet  before  long  was 
riding  in  her  harbour. 

It  was  in  these  circumstances  that  a  party  in  Syracuse  sought  the  Pyrrhus 
assistance  of  the  first  soldier  of  the  age,  who  had  married  Lanassa,  ^^^y\^^^  ^^ 
a  daughter  of  their  late  sovereign  Agathocles.  Pyrrhus  was  to  come 
for  the  threefold  purpose  of  restoring  order  throughout  Sicily  by 
putting  down  the  tyrants,  of  punishing  the  Mamertines,  and  of  driv- 
ing back  the  Carthaginians.  His  affairs  in  Italy  were  in  such  a 
position  that  he  gladly  accepted  the  task. 

The  Carthaginians  had  expected  or  feared  that  this  would  be  the   The  Car- 
case,  and  had  early  in  this  year  sent  ships  to  the  Tiber  conveying  ihaginians 
ambassadors,  with  a  proposition  for  a  defensive  alliance  with  Rome,  ^^  ^  '^ 
offering  "  to  give  aid  to  the  Romans  by  sea,  if  need  arose,  though  Rome  for 
the  crews  of  the  ships  should  not  be  obliged  to  serve  on  land."      In  mutual  aid 

f^  at  sea. 


m 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Pyrrhw; 
starts  for 
Sicily,  late 
summer  of 
278. 


Pyrrhiis  at 

Syracuse, 

278-277. 


Pyrrhus 
(/)  con- 
guers  the 
Mamer- 
tines,  (2) 
attacks  the 
Carthagiji- 
ian  toxvns, 
277. 


case  of  war,  "the  Carthaginians  should  supply  ships,  and  each 
nation  its  own  men  and  their  pay."  The  offer  was  accepted,  and 
accordingly  the  Carthaginian  fleet  was  ordered  to  intercept  Pyrrhus 
on  his  voyage  from  Tarentum  to  Syracuse. 

It  did  not  however  succeed.  Leaving  Milo  in  command  at 
Tarentum  in  the  late  summer  of  278,  Pyrrhus  coasted  down  the 
Italian  shore,  touched  at  Locri,  which  was  in  the  hands  of  a  garrison 
of  his  own,  and  thence  sailed  straight  to  Sicily.  At  first  all  went 
well.  When  he  arrived  at  Tauromenium  (Naxos),  the  ruler  of  that 
town,  Tyndarion,  made  an  alliance  with  him,  and  supplied  him  with 
soldiers.  At  Catana,  where  he  disembarked  his  land  forces,  he 
was  received  with  an  ovation,  and  presented  with  crowns  of  gold  ; 
and  when  his  fleet  approached  the  harbour  of  Syracuse  the  Cartha- 
ginians did  not  venture  to  oppose  him.  Perhaps  they  had  not 
expected  him  so  soon  ;  for  their  squadron  was  not  in  its  full  force, 
thirty  of  their  ships  having  been  despatched  for  supplies.  He 
therefore  entered  the  harbour  and  landed  at  Syracuse  in  perfect 
security. 

He  found  a  miserable  state  of  division  prevailing  there.  The 
part  of  the  town  which  stood  on  the  island  Ortygia  was  held  by  one 
officer,  named  Thoenon  ;  while  Sosistrates  of  Agrigentum,  with  more 
than  10,000  soldiers,  occupied  the  rest;  and  Carthaginian  ships 
were  in  the  harbour.  The  coming  of  Pyrrhus  restored  some  unity. 
Thoenon  first  quietly  surrendered  Ortygia  to  him  :  and  Sosistrates 
voluntarily,  or  under  pressure  from  the  citizens,  made  terms  with 
him  also.  The  king  succeeded  in  reconciling  for  a  time  these  two 
men  and  their  followings,  and  the  whole  of  their  resources  were 
placed  at  his  disposal. 

He  had  now  a  large  army,  vast  supplies  of  war  material,  and  a 
fleet  of  more  than  200  vessels.  Leontini  and  many  other  Greek 
cities  signified  their  adhesion.  The  goal  of  his  ambition  seemed 
within  his  reach  :  lord  of  Epirus  and  Sicily,  he  might  next  attempt 
Africa,  and  return  with  irresistible  force  to  drive  the  Romans  from 
southern  Italy.  But  first  the  Mamertines  had  to  be  suppressed,  and 
the  Carthaginians  driven  off  Before  the  end  of  the  next  year  (277) 
he  had  a  series  of  successes  :  he  cut  off  the  plundering  parties  of  the 
Mamertines,  conquered  their  main  army  in  the  field,  and  captured 
several  of  their  outlying  forts.  He  then  turned  his  arms  against 
the  Carthaginians.  The  great  city  of  Agrigentum,  with  its  thirty 
dependent  townships,  was  handed  over  to  him  by  Sosistrates,  and  its 
Carthaginian  garrison  was  expelled.  But  he  determined  to  be  satis- 
fied with  nothing  less  than  the  entire  evacuation  of  the  island  by  the 
Carthaginians.  With  an  army  swollen  by  a  contingent  of  8000  from 
Agrigentum,  and  accompanied  by  a  great  siege-train  from  Syracuse, 


XV  PYRRHUS  TAKES  TOWNS  IN  SICILY  195 

he  took  Eryx  by  assault,  displaying  the  most  conspicuous  gallantry 
in  the  action,  inflicted  a  crushing  loss  upon  the  Carthaginian  garri- 
son, and  placed  one  of  his  own  in  it.      Thence  he  went  to  Hercte, 
which  he  seized  ;   stormed  Panormus  ;  and  overran  and  conquered 
nearly  the  whole  of  the  Carthaginian  territory.     One  place  alone  held 
out.       When   the   Carthaginians  had  been   driven   from   Motye  by 
Dionysius,  they  had  fortified  themselves  at  Lilybaeum,  which  had  Lilybaeum, 
grown  to  be  an  important  town,  protected  by  a  high  wall  and  a  deep  277. 
ditch  on  the  land  side,  and  by  lagoons  towards  the  sea  through  which 
it  was  difiicult  to  steer.     Some  thirty-five  years  later  it  proved  strong 
enough  to  resist  the  utmost  exertions  of  several  Roman  armies,  and 
now  it  defied  all  the  engines  of  Pyrrhus,  and  all  the  gallantry  of  his 
soldiers.      His  failure,  and  the  time  wasted  upon  it,  proved  the  ruin 
of  his   position   in   Sicily.       On   his   return   to   Syracuse  he   found  Pyrrhus 
everything  going  wrong,  and  Thoenon  and  Sosistrates  both  plotting  ^^^^^ ,    . 
against  him.      Sosistrates,   finding  himself  suspected,  escaped  ;  but  i^  Sicily, 
Thoenon  he  put  to  death.     Yet  it  was  not  only  in  Syracuse  that  277-276. 
there  was  a  feeling  of  discontent.      In  the  Greek  cities  throughout 
Sicily  murmurs  were  heard  that  he  had  become  a  mere  tyrant ;  that 
he  granted  property  to  his  friends  ;  put  his  inferior  officers  in  every 
post  of  profit ;  and  that  his  courtiers,  appointed  to  act  as  judges, 
looked  to  nothing  but  gain.      He  could  not  therefore  safely  carry  out 
his  design  of  imitating  Agathocles  in  crossing  to  Africa  and  attacking 
Carthage  at  home,  with  the  certainty  that,  as  soon  as  he  was  out  of 
Sicily,  the  divisions  between  the  Greek  towns  would  break  out  again, 
and  give   an   opening  for  Carthaginian   aggression.       Already   the 
Carthaginians,   taking  advantage  of  his  growing  unpopularity,  were 
renewing  their  attacks  from  Lilybaeum.      He  might,  in  case  of  failure 
in  Africa,  find  himself  cut  off  from  return  to  Europe. 

The  result  of  the  difficulties  thickening  round  him,  in  the  latter  Pyrrhus 
part  of  276,  was  that  he  resolved  to  listen  to  a  request,  which  reached  ^^^^^^^  ^^ 
him  from  Samnium  and  Tarentum,  to  come  back  to  their  aid  in  view      '^  ■^'    '  ' 
of  the  alarming  successes  of  the  Romans.     "  What  a  fighting  ground 
for  Roman  and  Carthaginian  am   I  leaving,"  he  exclaimed,  as  his 
ship  left  the  shore  of  Sicily. 

While  Pyrrhus  was  thus  spending  between  two  and  three  years   The 
in  his  fruitless  Sicilian  expedition,  the  Romans  had  not  been  idle.  ^^^^"^ 
Pyrrhus    had    left    orders   with   his   lieutenant   Milo   to   act  on  the  ^j'taiy\j8- 
defensive,  and  not  risk  a  battle.      Fabricius  and  Aemilius  however  276. ' 
did  not  think  of  attacking  Tarentum.     That  might  be  safely  left  to 
the  future.     As  soon  as  they  were  informed  of  the  king's  departure, 
they  descended  upon  the  cities  of  Lucania  and  Bruttium,  which  had 
allied  themselves  with  him,  and  by  their  successes  earned  the  right 
to  enter  Rome  in  triumph  in  December. 


I 


196 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


217- 

Coss.  p. 

Cornelius 

RufinusII. 

C.  Junius 

Brutus 

Bubulcus 

II. 


2j6. 

Q.  Fabius 
Maximus 
11. ,  C. 
Genucius 
Clepsina. 
Pyrrhus 
returns  to 
Italy. 


275- 

Coss.  M . 
Curius 
Dentatus, 
L.  Cor- 
nelius 
Lentulus. 


Un- 
willingness 
of  the 
Romans  to 
enlist. 


The  consuls  of  the  next  year  were  sent  to  punish  the  Samnites 
for  their  warlike  preparations,  and  for  the  assistance  given  to  Pyrrhus. 
But  the  Roman  arms  met  with  some  disaster.  The  Samnites 
retreated  into  the  mountains,  and  Cornelius  and  Junius  in  following 
them  got  entangled  in  the  difficulties  of  the  ground,  and  lost  heavily 
by  the  attacks  of  the  enemy,  who  were  better  acquainted  with  the 
country.  They  were  obliged  to  retire  as  best  they  could  to  the  south, 
and  separated  with  mutual  recriminations.  Cornelius  then  employed 
himself  in  laying  waste  the  plains  of  Samnium  ;  while  Junius  entered 
Lucania  and  gained  sufficient  successes  over  the  Lucanians  and 
Bruttians  to  earn  his  triumph.-^ 

These  expeditions  were  continued  in  the  next  year  by  the  consuls 
Q.  Fabius  and  Gaius  Genucius.  The  details  are  lost ;  but  triumphs 
over  Samnites,  Lucanians,  and  Bruttians  are  again  recorded,  and 
the  general  success  of  the  Roman  arms  is  attested  by  the  urgent 
messages  that  were  sent  over  to  Pyrrhus. 

His  return  checked  the  tide  of  success.  The  Romans  could  no 
longer  expect  to  go  from  point  to  point  almost  without  resistance, 
winning  one  town  after  another  by  force  or  fear.  They  must  now 
look  to  being  met  by  the  Epirote  troops  from  Tarentum,  led  by  the 
famous  soldier-king  who  had  twice  worsted  them  in  the  field.  Pyrrhus 
indeed  had  not  returned  without  suffering  loss  and  damage.  The 
Carthaginian  fleet  had  pursued  him  and  destroyed  some  of  his  ships  : 
the  Mamertines  had  sent  a  contingent  across  to  Rhegium,  which 
repulsed  his  attack  on  that  town  :  and  though  he  succeeded  in  again 
occupying  Locri,  which  the  Romans  had  retaken  in  his  absence, 
and  expelling  the  Roman  garrison,  yet  more  of  his  ships  were 
wrecked  when  they  left  Locri  for  Tarentum — a  misfortune  which 
the  pious  attributed  to  his  having  plundered  the  temple  of  Demeter 
there,  and  carried  off  its  wealth.  Still  he  himself  and  most  of  his 
army  arrived  safely  by  land :  and  these  forces,  joined  to  those 
waiting  for  him  at  Tarentum,  enabled  him  to  start  almost  at  once 
to  the  relief  of  the  Samnites,  whom  repeated  reverses  had  so 
dismayed  that  he  found  them,  after  all,  far  from  eager  to  join  his 
standard. 

Meanwhile  at  Rome  the  hardships  of  the  war  in  the  mountainous 
district  of  Samnium,  or  the  terror  of  the  name  of  Pyrrhus,  made  the 
service  so  much  an  object  of  dislike  that  the  new  consuls  found  a 
difficulty  in  raising  their  legions.  Instead  of  a  rush  of  volunteers 
making  the  exercise  of  the  consul's  authority  unnecessary,  all  hung 
back,  and  tried  to  avoid  giving  in  their  names.     It  was  not  until  the 

^  Zonaras  (viii.  6)  says  that  Junius  remained  in  Samnium,  and  Cornelius  went 
against  the  Lucani  ;  but  the  Fasti  record  the  triumph  of  Junius  de  Lucaneis  et 
Brutteis.     The  success  of  neither  appears  to  have  been  very  marked. 


XV  PYRRHUS  DEFEATED  IN  ITALY  197 

consul  Dentatus,  having  directed  the  names  of  a  tribe  to  be  called  over, 
ordered  the  property  of  one  of  its  members  who  did  not  answer,  and 
eventually  the  man  himself,  to  be  sold,  that  the  reluctance  was  over- 
come. When  at  last  the  legions  were  ready,  Dentatus  marched 
along  the  Appian  Way  to  Malventum,  while  his  colleague  L.  Cornelius 
went  southward  into  Lucania.  Dentatus  entrenched  himself  strongly 
near  Malventum  ;  and  before  long  Pyrrhus  marching  from  Tarentum, 
along  what  was  afterwards  an  extension  of  the  Appian  Way,  found  his 
enemy  there,  and  himself  fortified  a  camp  not  far  off.  The  accounts  Battle  of 
which  we  possess  of  the  battle  which  ensued  are  very  meagre.  At  Malventum 
Heraclea  Pyrrhus  had  owed  his  victory  greatly  to  his  elephants  ;  at  j  e^^ven- 
Malventum  the  elephants  seem  to  have  contributed  to  his  defeat.  A 
young  animal,  being  wounded,  rushed  among  the  rest  seeking  its 
mother,  and  threw  them  all  into  confusion,  so  that  they  became  more 
dangerous  to  their  own  side  than  to  the  enemy,  Dentatus  too  had 
learnt  that  the  terrible  phalanx,  that  is,  men  massed  sixteen  deep, 
was  useless  on  bad  or  uneven  ground,  and  so  took  care  to  occupy 
a  position  of  that  sort.^  The  victory  at  Heraclea,  again,  had  been 
gained  by  the  king's  own  troops,  with  small  admixture  of  Italians. 
At  Malventum,  as  at  Asculum,  his  army  was  more  mixed,  being 
arranged  in  alternate  companies  of  Epirots  and  Italians,  and  may 
thus  have  proved  less  effective  for  united  movements. 2  One 
account  seems  to  infer  that  Pyrrhus  attempted  a  night  surprise, 
but  missing  his  way  was  overtaken  by  daylight,  and  was  therefore 
observed  by  the  Romans  at  a  distance  in  time  for  them  to  make 
their  preparations.  Whatever  the  details  of  the  battle,  the  result  Defeat  of 
was  not  doubtful.  The  king  was  utterly  defeated,  his  camp  taken,  Pyrrhus. 
— from  which  the  Romans  are  said  to  have  taken  hints  in  the 
formation  of  their  own, — and  most  of  his  elephants  captured  and 
brought  to  Rome  to  adorn  the  consul's  triumph.  Pyrrhus  himself 
fled  with  a  few  horsemen  to  Tarentum  :  whence,  after  a  short  stay, 
he  crossed  back  to  Epirus,  to  fall  two  years  later  by  a  tile  thrown 
by  a  woman's  hand  in  Argos,  whither  he  had  again  gone  to  fight 
the  battles  of  others. 

To  the  Romans  the  results  of  the  victory  at  Malventum  were   The 
highly  important.      The  prestige  of  Pyrrhus  was  destroyed  ;  when  he  Romans 
returned  to  Tarentum  he  was  only  able  to  retain  what  remained  of  "^"^.f^ 
loyalty  there  by  falsely  reporting  that  Antigonus  Gonatas,  king  of  jfaiy, 
Macedonia,  had  made  an  alliance  with  him  and  had  promised  to  send 
him  reinforcements.     Without  fear  of  interruption  from  Tarentum, 
therefore,  the  Romans  were  able  to  go  on  with  their  task  of  steadily 
reducing  the  Greek  towns,  as  well  as  the  Italian  nations,  to  obedience. 

^  Frontinus  ii.  2,  i.  2  Polyb.  xviii.  28. 


198 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Embassy  of 
Ptolemy 
Phila- 
delphus  to 
Rome,  2']4- 
273- 


In  the  next  two  years  (274-273)  the  Samnites,  the  Lucanians,  and  the 
Bruttians  were  subdued  in  a  series  of  expeditions,  which  perhaps 
witnessed  some  disasters  as  well  as  successes.  But  the  general 
result  was  a  more  and  more  complete  hold  of  the  Republic  upon 
southern  Italy.  The  Greek  towns  were  made  subject  on  terms  as  to 
contributions  of  men  and  money  differing  according  to  circumstances ;  ^ 
while  a  Latin  colony  was  established  at  Paestum  to  secure  a  hold  upon 
Lucania,  and  another  sent  northwards  to  Cosa  in  Etruria,-  which 
commanded  an  important  harbour  (273). 

Moreover,  the  victory  over  Pyrrhus  attracted  the  attention  of  an 
important  sovereign.  King  Ptolemy  Philadelphus,  who  had  succeeded 
to  the  throne  of  Egypt  the  year  before,  sent  an  embassy  at  the  end 
of  274  to  Rome,  desiring  friendship,  and  loaded  with  gifts  the  Roman 
envoys  who  early  next  year  repaired  to  Egypt  bearing  the  consent 
of  the  Senate.  It  was  the  first  acknowledgment  of  Rome  as  an  im- 
portant power  in  the  Mediterranean,  if  we  except  the  treaties  with 
Carthage  ;  and  Egypt  was  destined  to  be  of  great  service  to  the  State 
in  the  future,  both  as  the  richest  corn  district  in  the  world,  and  as 
having,  like  Marseilles,  which  also  had  been  long  inclined  to  friendship 
with  Rome,  a  quarrel  with  Carthage  in  the  disputed  possession  of 
Cyrene. 

The  superiority  of  Rome  in  the  South  was  now  farther  secured  by 
the  capture  of  Tarentum  and  Rhegium. 

Pyrrhus  left  Tarentum  early  in  274  under  the  care  of  Milo,  with 
a  garrison  of  Epirots.  But  Milo  soon  became  exceedingly  unpopular, 
and  the  Romanising  faction  led  by  Nicon  rose  against  him,  besieged 
him  in  the  citadel,  and  sought  help  both  from  Rome  and  Carthage. 
The  Carthaginians  sent  a  fleet  into  the  harbour,  and  the  Roman 
consul  L.  Papirius  advanced  by  land.  Livy  appears  to  hold  that  the 
action  of  the  Carthaginians  was  a  breach  of  their  treaty  with  Rome. 
But  they  might  fairly  assert  that,  on  the  contrary,  they  were  aiding 
the  Romans  by  sea  in  accordance  v/ith  the  treaty ;  nor  do  they 
seem  to  have  made  any  claim  to  a  footing  on  land  when  the  town 
was  in  the  hands  of  the  Romans.  Livy's  view  is  that  of  a  later  date, 
when  it  became  necessary  to  rake  up  every  cause  of  quarrel  with 
Carthage.  3 

Milo  held  out  for  a  time  in  the  citadel,  but  finding  himself 
blockaded  both  by  sea  and  land,  he  determined  to  surrender,  and 
preferring  to  do  so  to  the  Roman  Papirius,  was  allowed  to  depart  with 


^  Thus  we  find  Locri,  for  instance,  which  was  specially  favoured,  claiming 
exemption  from  military  service  (Polyb.  xii.  5). 

2  This  seems  the  more  likely  ;  some  however  take  this  to  be  Cosa  near  Thurii 
in  Lucania. 


Livy  Ep.  xiv. ;  cf.  Dio  Cass.  fr.  43. 


XV  CAPTURE  OF  MUTINEERS  AT  RHEGIUM  199 

men  and  baggage.  The  Carthaginians  sailed  away,  leaving  the  town 
in  the  hands  of  the  Romans,  which  was  compelled  to  give  up  arms 
and  ships,  pull  down  its  walls,  and  submit  to  tribute. 

Rhegium    still    remained   to   be   dealt  with.       Not  only  was   it  Capture 
intolerable  that  a  town  commanding  the  shortest  passage  to  Sicily  of  the 
should  be   in   the  hands  of  a  hostile  population  ;    but  the   Roman  ^  "^  ■        x 
government  was  bound  to  justify  itself  before  its  allies,  and  to  show  Cam- 
that,  if  they  accepted  a  Roman  garrison,  they  would  be  secured  against  panians  at 
similar  acts  of  treachery.      Decius  Jubellius  and  his  men  had  been  Rhegium, 
holding  the  town  and  its  territory  as  conquerors   since  280.      They  ^2^'  ^ 
had  even  expelled  a  Roman  garrison  from  Croton,  and  had  made  Quintius 
an  alliance  with  the  Mamertines,  1000  of  whom  had  come  over  to  Claudius, 
their  assistance  when  Pyrrhus  returned  to  Italy.      But  on  the  consul's  L.Genucius 
approach  these  Mamertines,  whose  object  in  coming  to  Italy  was  to      ^P^^'^^- 
harass  Pyrrhus,  and  who  had  no  wish  to  incur  the  enmity  of  Rome,  made 
terms  with  him  and  sailed  back  to  Messene.      Still,  Genucius  found 
that  he  had  a  long  and  difficult  task  before  him  :  the  Campanian 
soldiers  resisted  desperately,   knowing  that    they  had  nothing  but 
punishment   to   expect ;    and   Genucius   would   have   been   in   great 
straits  for  provisions,   had  not  Hiero,  who  since  Pyrrhus  left  Sicily 
had  made  himself  ruler  of  Syracuse,  sent  supplies  of  corn  to  the 
besieging  army,   thereby  initiating   a   policy  which,  with   one  brief 
interval,  he  maintained  throughout  his  life, — of  looking  to  friendship 
with  Rome  as  his  best  protection  against  Carthaginian  and  Mamertine 
alike.      Both  in  the  siege  and  the  storm  of  the  town  large  numbers 
of  the  garrison  fell  fighting  desperately ;  but  at  length  the  300  who 
survived  surrendered,  and  were  taken  by  the  consul  to  Rome,  where 
they  were  flogged  and  beheaded  in  the  Forum.     The  old  inhabitants 
of  the  town  were  restored,  which  with  its  territory  remained  free, 
retaining  longer  than   almost   any   other   Greek   town   in    Italy   its 
original  Hellenism. 

Thus  Rome  had  become  supreme  from  the  north  of  Etruria  to  Consolida- 
Rhegium.     A  local  outbreak  in  Samnium,  under  an  escaped  Samnite  tion  of  the 
hostage  named  Lollius,  in  269,  was  the  only  movement  made  by  the  ^^'^"■^ 
Samnites  after  their  final  suppression  by  Carvilius  in   272.      The 
pacification  of  the  Bruttii  by  Papirius  (272)  had  been  finally  secured 
by  the  fall  of  Rhegium  (271),  while  the  fall  of  Tarentum  had  been 
preceded   by  the   submission   of  the    Apulians.       In    Bruttium   the 
Romans  acquired  a  vast  tract  of  forest  called  Sila,  containing  an  in- 
exhaustible supply  of  timber  for  building  ships  or  houses,  which  in 
after  years  would  supplement  the  still  finer  timber  of  Latium,  and 
which  supplied  the  markets  with  abundant  and  valuable  resin  from 
its  pines, 

Samnium  was  now  farther  secured  by  a  colony  at  Malventum, 


200 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


(^6j). 


henceforth  called  Beneventum  (268),  and  later  on  by  another  at 
Aesernia  (263).  In  268  also  the  Picentes  were  finally  subdued 
and  their  allegiance  secured  by  a  colony  at  Ariminum  (268),  while 
some  of  them  were  now,  or  four  years  later,  when  a  colony  was 
sent  to  Firmum  (264),  removed  to  the  south-east  corner  of 
Campania. 

These  settlements  on  the  east  coast  caused  perhaps  the  Illyrians 
of  Apollonia  to  propose  a  treaty  with  Rome,  as  they  did  about  this 
time.  And  this,  in  its  turn,  seems  to  have  suggested  to  the  Romans 
the  necessity  of  securing  Calabria,  and  especially  the  town  of 
Brundisium,  with  its  excellent  harbour,  the  best  starting  -  place 
for  the  Greek  coast.  In  267  therefore  they  turned  their  arms 
against  the  Sallentini,  to  whom  the  town  belonged.  They  were  con- 
quered by  the  consul  M.  Atilius  ;  and  though  Brundisium  appears 
not  to  have  been  made  a  colony  till  244,  yet  a  certain  number  of 
Roman  settlers  were  sent  at  once,  to  secure  the  freedom  of  the 
port. 

The  conquests  of  the  last  ten  years  had  also  brought  great  wealth 
to  Rome,  and  now  for  the  first  time  a  silver  coinage  was  used  there. 
The  silver  sestertius  (2  J  asses)  and  the  denarius  (10  asses)  were  called 
nu7n7m,  from  the  word  voiios,  used  to  indicate  coins  of  about  the  same 
value  in  Sicily  and  the  Greek  cities  in  Italy.  This  influx  of  wealth 
was  not  long  in  taking  effect  on  the  public  virtue  of  certain  Roman 
magistrates.  Curius  Dentatus  had  rejected  Samnite  gold,  and 
Fabricius  had  turned  with  scorn  from  the  rich  presents  of  Pyrrhus, 
though  a  poor  man.  But  when  in  275  P.  Cornelius  Rufinus, 
who  had  been  dictator  and  twice  consul,  was  struck  off"  the  roll 
by  the  censor  Fabricius  for  breaking  the  law  by  owning  ten  pounds 
of  silver  plate,  his  real  offence  was  believed  to  have  been  the 
appropriation  of  some  of  the  spoil  of  the  conquered  cities. 

Such  derelictions  of  duty  had  been  rare.  The  aristocracy  had 
as  yet  shown  a  truly  patriotic  spirit  and  a  singleness  of  aim  in  the 
presence  of  the  foreigner.  The  Senate  had  seemed  to  Cineas  "  an 
assembly  of  kings."  But  a  sterner  test  was  about  to  be  applied  to 
the  virtue  and  high  spirit  of  the  Roman  nobles.  We  are  now 
approaching  the  time  when  the  struggle  for  supremacy  outside  Italy 
with  the  great  commercial  people  of  Carthage  is  to  strain  to  the 
uttermost  the  strength  and  courage  of  all  classes  at  Rome,  but  above 
all  of  the  wealthy  and  the  highborn.  From  that  struggle,  which  led  her 
on  step  by  step  to  a  world-wide  dominion,  she  emerged  victorious,  as 
she  had  done  from  former  struggles  nearer  home  ;  but  she  emerged 
with  such  changes  in  the  character  of  her  ruling  classes,  and  of  the 
masses  of  her  people,  that  to  the  clear-sighted  the  elements  of  decay 
were  visible  in  the  very  hour  of  her  greatness.      We  will  pause  for 


XV        CONQUEST  OF  SOUTH  ITALY  AND  ITS  RESULTS        201 

a  time  to  study  the  constitution  of  the  state  on  the  eve  of  this  great 
contest,  and  learn  something  of  the  magistrates  who  were  to  direct 
its  fortunes,  and  of  the  army  which  was  to  secure  its  victory. 

The  chief  Authorities  are  Livy,  Ep.  xii.-xv.  ;  Plutarch's  Life  of  Pyrrhus ; 
Zonaras  viii.  2-6;  Justinus  xvi.  2-3,  xviii.  2-23;  Pausanias  i.  chs.  11,  12;  Eutropius 
ii.  6-8;  the  fragments  of  Dionysius  Halicarn.  xvii.  15-18,  xviii.  xix. ;  Appian, 
Samn.  9-12  ;  Dio  Cassius,  fr.  40-48.  Some  details  are  gathered  from  Polyaenus 
vi.  6  ;  Frontinus  ii.  2,  i,  iv.  i,  14,  and  the  affair  of  Rhegium  is  narrated  by 
Polybius  i.  7.  But  in  hardly  any  period  of  Roman  history  are  the  authorities  so 
incomplete  and  fragmentary  as  from  B.C.  275  to  265. 

Note  on  the  Settlement  of  South  Italy. — Besides  the  colonies, 
in  which  the  rule  was  that  a  third  of  the  land  was  taken  for  the  coloni,  Rome 
secured  the  country  by  a  system  of  civitates  foederatae,  states  joining  the 
Roman  alliance  on  terms  varying  according  to  the  foedus.  The  most  favour- 
able was  like  that  of  Naples,  which  retained  all  sovereign  rights  on  the  one 
condition  of  supplying  a  fixed  number  of  auxiliaries,  ships,  and  sailors. 
Military  service  was,  doubtless,  always  one  condition  (see  p.  278),  but  the 
nature  of  it  differed  in  different  places.  This  system  had  already  been 
followed  in  Latium,  Umbria,  and  Etruria.  Naples  had  occupied  this  position 
since  326,  and  other  towns  were  added  in  Campania,  Nola,  Nuceria,  Teanum 
Sidicinum ;  in  Lucania,  Velia,  Heraclea,  Thurii ;  in  Bruttium,  Rhegium, 
Locri,  Petelia  ;  in  Central  Italy  the  tribes  of  Picentes,  Marrucini,  Marsi, 
Peligni,  Fj-entani.  The  "  Latin  "  colonies  were  of  the  nature  of  civitates 
foederaiae,  being  attached  to  Rome  on  certain  fixed  terms,  and  in  the  army 
their  citizens  served  among  the  socii. 


CHAPTER   XVI 

THE    ROMAN    MAGISTRATES    AND    ARMY 

The  limitations  of  consular  powers,  and  their  devolution  on  other  curule  magis- 
trates, censors,  and  praetors — The  aediles,  quaestors,  praefectus  urbis,  and 
sacred  colleges — The  legion,  its  enrolment,  numbers,  officers,  discipline,  en- 
campment, and  disposition  in  the  field. 

The  populus  Romaniis  consisted  of  those  who  possessed  the  full 
civil  rights  included  in  the  word  civitas?-  At  the  end  of  the  third 
century  B.C.  this  comprised  all  men  born  of  free  parents,  who  were 
themselves  citizens,  whether  living  in  the  city  or  in  the  enlarged 
ager  Romanus,  or  in  those  colonies  by  joining  which  a  citizen 
suffered  no  loss  of  civil  rights  or  dimi7iutio  capitis;  and  again,  of 
those  who  by  emancipation  had  ceased  to  be  slaves,  or  who  for 
some  special  reason  had  been  invested  with  citizenship.  The  name 
had  once  been  much  less  comprehensive,  and  many  of  those  who 
now  came  under  it  at  one  time  had  not  done  so. 

To  this  populus  Ro7nanus^  whatever  that  name  included,  be- 
longed in  theory,  and  partly  in  practice,  all  powers  of  government. 
It  made,  unmade,  or  altered  laws ;  regulated  the  conduct  of  its 
members  ;  judged  in  cases  of  dispute  or  in  accusations  of  crime  ; 
punished  or  rewarded  those  who  wronged  or  served  the  State ; 
declared  war,  made  peace,  negotiated  treaties ;  joined  in  the  worship 
of  the  gods. 

But  a  people  cannot  act  without  some  one  to  summon  it  to 
meet ;  or,  when  it  has  met  and  declared  its  will,  without  some  one 
to  see  that  this  will  is  carried  out ;  or,  when  it  wishes  to  make  war 
or  peace,  without  some  one  to  enrol  and  lead  its  armies,  and  to 
make  terms  with  its  enemies  ;  or,  when  it  wishes  to  worship  the 
gods  as  a  nation,  without  some  one  to  direct  and  perform  the  proper 
ceremonies. 

The   citizens   therefore   elected   a   man   whom   they   called   rex^ 

^  See  pp.  90,  91. 


CHAP.  XVI  MAGISTRATES — THE  CONSULS  203 

"  ruler  "  or  "  king,"  to  do  these  things  for  them.  They  elected  him 
for  life,  and  he  soon  assumed  all  these  functions  as  his  right,  and 
was  able  to  treat  the  people  not  as  his  employers  but  as  his  subjects. 
He  was  assisted  indeed  by  a  council  of  elders  or  "Senate"  ;  but  he 
himself  nominated  the  Senate,  summoned  it  at  his  own  will,  consulted 
it  on  what  he  chose,  and  was  not  bound  to  take  its  advice.  If  we 
can  at  all  trust  the  early  story  of  Rome,  some  of  the  kings  were  more 
liberal  than  others,  and  not  only  took  pains  to  consult  the  people 
and  the  Senate,  but  made  elaborate  arrangements  for  giving  the 
people  the  opportunity  of  expressing  their  views,  and  for  strengthen- 
ing the  Senate.  But  about  509,  when  a  king  was  reigning  who 
carried  the  more  tyrannical  theory  higher  than  any,  the  people  put 
an  end  to  the  institution  of  a  life-king  altogether.  They  expelled  the  Abolition 
existing  king,  and  determined  henceforth,  instead  of  electing  a  king  of  kingship. 
for  life,  to  elect  two  magistrates  for  a  year.  The  kingship  was  put 
in  commission,  as  we  might  express  it,  with  the  farther  limitation 
that  the  joint  kings  ruled  only  for  a  year.  It  is  not  certain  what 
they  called  these  magistrates  at  first,  but  before  very  long  they  were 
called  consuls  or  colleagues,  and  in  after  times  the  Romans  spoke  of 
them  as  consuls  from  the  first.  ^ 

The  Consuls  then  held  for  a  year  all  the  authority  which  the  The  con- 
king  had  held  for  life.  They  alone  summoned  the  people  to  meet  suh.  Their 
in  their  comitta,  whether  to  elect  new  magistrates,  or  to  pass  laws,  or  pow^^^  i" 
to  determine  peace  and  war,  or  to  try  judicial  cases.  They  alone  ^^^^^• 
nominated,  summoned,  and  consulted  the  Senate,  and  were  free,  as 
the  king  had  been,  to  take  its  advice  or  not  as  they  chose.  They 
controlled  the  exchequer.  They  were  the  supreme  judges  in  all 
disputes  or  in  cases  of  criminal  offences,  unless  they  chose  to  refer 
the  matter,  as  the  kings  had  sometimes  done,  to  the  comitia.  They 
could  exact  obedience  from  all  citizens  to  their  edicts ;  could 
summon  any  one  of  them  to  appear  ivocatio\  could  arrest  him 
(prehensio)  and  throw  him  into  prison,  banish  him,  impose  a  fine 
upon  him,  order  him  to  be  flogged,  or  even  put  to  death.  They 
had  also  the  power  to  order  the  citizens  to  enrol  themselves  in 
the  army,  and  to  submit  to  discipline  and  march  out  to  war.  They 
selected  the  tribuni  of  the  legions ;  they  punished  or  rewarded  the 
soldiers.  All  these  powers  made  up  what  was  called  their  imperitim 
or  right  of  commanding  ;  and  if  any  one  resisted  them,  they  could 
punish  him  as  they  chose,  even  by  death.  They  were  preceded  by 
twelve  lictors  or  "  binders,"  who  as  a  symbol  of  these  powers  carried 
bundles  of  rods  {fasces),  with  which  were  bound  axes,  the  instru- 
ments of  punishment. 

1  See  p.  89. 


204 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Now  such  a  despotic  power  was  never  really  exercised  by  the 
consuls  over  Roman  citizens,  except  when  they  were  at  the  head  of 
the  army  on  a  campaign,  and  even  in  this  case  it  was  in  some 
respects  gradually  modified.  In  the  city  itself  it  was  almost  from  the 
first  restrained  in  various  ways  ;  and,  as  time  went  on,  was  so  much 
reduced,  that  though  the  consulship  remained  the  highest  and  most 
dignified  office  in  the  State,  and  though  the  consuls  had  still  great 
influence  both  in  legislation  and  in  the  executive,  they  actually 
performed  few  but  formal  functions  in  Rome  itself,  except  in  times 
of  popular  tumult  or  civil  war. 

The  causes  which  tended  to  reduce  the  power  of  the  consuls 
were  of  two  kinds — those  which  acted  in  restriction  of  all  magisterial 
power  as  such,  and  those  which  actually  relieved  the  consulship  of 
some  of  its  functions  by  delegating  them  to  other  officers. 

Of  the  former  kind,  the  first  was  the  fact  that  there  were  two 
consuls  and  not  one.  The  principle  of  colleagueship  eventually 
prevailed  in  all  Roman  magistracies.  It  acted  as  a  restraining 
force  on  the  consulship  from  the  first.  Each  of  the  colleagues  was 
equally  supreme  and  could  prohibit  the  acts  of  the  other,  though  not 
render  them  invalid  when  done.  In  the  city  each  discharged  for  a 
month  at  a  time  the  actual  administrative  functions  ;  the  consul  of 
the  month  being  preceded  by  the  twelve  lictors  with  fasces,  the 
other  either  going  without  his  lictors  or  being  followed  by  them 
without  fasces.  This  mutual  power  of  obstruction  forced  them  often 
to  compromises,  and  made  it  possible  for  the  people  generally  to 
bring  influence  to  bear  upon  them. 

The  next  modifying  influence  was  the  limitation  of  the  office  to 
a  year.  While  in  office  the  consuls  could  not  be  impeached  or 
deposed, — though  at  times  such  pressure  was  put  upon  them  that 
they  were  obhged  to  abdicate, — but  at  the  end  of  their  year  of  office 
they  became  private  citizens,  and  could  be  brought  to  such  an 
account  for  their  illegal  or  oppressive  acts  as  could  only  be  exacted 
from  a  life-king  by  a  revolution.  Nor  could  they  secure  themselves 
against  this  by  immediate  re-election.  From  the  first  such  re-election 
was  rare,  and  after  341  was  illegal  until  the  tenth  year,  although 
extraordinary  circumstances  were  still  held  to  justify  it. 

The  third  limitation  was  the  growth  of  a  body  of  laws  defining 
rights,  and  therefore  restricting  arbitrary  acts  of  magistrates.  The 
most  decisive  of  all  these  were  the  laws  concerning  the  right  of  appeal 
{provocatio),  beginning  with  the  lex  Valeria  at  the  very  commence- 
ment of  the  Republic.  By  these  laws  ^  no  magistrate  could  inflict 
on  a  citizen  loss  of  life  or  citizenship,  corporal  punishment,  or  even 


1  See  p.  93. 


XVI  CHECKS  ON  THE  CONSULAR  POWER  205 

a  fine  beyond  the  value  of  thirty  oxen  and  two  sheep  (3020  asses) 
without  allowing  him  an  appeal  to  the  people.  This  at  once  cut  off 
from  the  consuls  one  great  branch  of  their  functions  and  of  their 
influence ;  for  when  such  sentences  could  not  be  enforced  they  ceased 
to  be  passed,  and  cases  which  involved  such  punishments  were 
referred  to  the  Comitia  at  once.  The  consuls  ceased  therefore  to 
be  judges  in  criminal  cases. 

As  a  sign  of  this  curtailed  power  it  early  became  the  custom  The  im- 
within  the  city  for  the  axes  to  be  omitted  from  the  fasces  of  the  P^rium  tn 
consul's  lictors,  and,  when  he  came  into  the  Forum,  for  the  lictors  to  ^  ^-^  " 
lower  the  fasces  themselves  as  an  acknowledgment  of  the  superiority 
of  the  people.  Also,  though  the  consul  was  elected  by  the  comitia 
centuriata^  it  was  always  held  that  iinperiimi  could  only  be  conferred 
by  the  comitia  curiata.  This  became  a  mere  form,  and  was  never 
withheld,  but  the  form  was  always  maintained  ;  and  in  later  times 
it  became  the  custom  not  to  confer  the  imperiujn  until  two  months 
after  the  consul  had  entered  on  office.  But  even  when  it  was  con- 
ferred it  was,  though  existing,  in  abeyance  while  the  consul  was  in 
the  city.  There  grew  up  a  distinction  between  his  potestas  as  a  civil 
magistrate  elected  by  the  people,  and  his  imperium,  which  he 
obtained  by  a  different  process,  and  which  by  custom  he  did  not 
exercise  to  its  full  extent  in  the  city.  Still  it  is  not  accurate  to  say 
that  the  imperium  did  not  exist ;  there  was  an  imperium  domi  as 
well  as  i?nperium  militiaej  and  though  the  former  was  restrained  in 
various  ways  and  to  a  great  extent  was  rendered  nugatory  by  the 
law  of  provocation  it  was  not  abolished  by  any  definite  enactment. 
Nor  was  the  exercise  of  full  imperium  at  home,  as  it  existed  in  the 
army,  ever  abolished  by  law.  Like  so  many  things  in  Rome,  it 
became  virtually  abolished  by  custom,  and  only  revived  in  extreme 
cases. 

Still  there  was  a  large  class  of  cases  in  which  the  magisterial 
power  might  be  oppressively  used,  and  salutary  laws  evaded. 

Against  such  oppressions  the  citizens  were  protected  by  the  {4)  '^^^ 
Tribunes.  These  magistrates  were  a  peculiar  feature  in  the  Roman  ^^ibunes. 
commonwealth,  not  exactly  analogous  to  any  institutions  elsewhere 
of  which  we  have  knowledge.  They  differed  from  the  other  magis- 
trates in  this,  that  they  had  powers  but  no  functions  ;  there  was  no 
department  of  state  which  was  their  special  "  province."  They  had, 
however,  the  general  duty  of  protecting  plebeians,  and  afterwards  all 
citizens,  from  injustice,  and,  in  order  to  enable  them  to  do  this,  they 
had  the  power  of  stopping  all  proceedings  on  the  part  of  magistrates ; 
this  was  called  intercession  which  differed  from  the  prohibitio  exercised 
by  one  consul  against  his  colleague  in  this,  that  it  made  all  those 
proceedings,  against  which  they  thus  interposed  their  veto,  absolutely 


206 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


invalid.  Their  power  was  farther  strengthened  by  the  fact  that  their 
persons  were  sacred  and  inviolable,  protected  by  a  law  called  lex 
sacrata,  because  a  breach  of  it  made  the  offender  cursed  or  excom- 
municated {sacer).  Any  one  who  injured  their  persons  or  interfered 
with  the  exercise  of  their  office  would  fall  under  this  law,  and  they 
had  the  power  of  arresting  and  imprisoning  any  one,  even  the  consul 
himself,  who  disobeyed.  But  such  an  arrest  had  to  be  made  in  their 
presence  ;  they  had  no  right  to  summon  an  absent  citizen  ;  and  they 
were  therefore  escorted  not  by  lictors  but  by  viatores,  who  seem  to 
have  shared  in  their  inviolability.  It  is  evident  that  men  possessing 
such  powers  must  have  done  a  great  deal  to  circumscribe  those  of  the 
consul ;  that  their  power  must,  if  freely  exercised,  eventually  become 
almost  supreme  in  the  State.  They  did  become  very  powerful,  but 
there  were  in  their  case  also  some  circumstances  which  prevented 
them  from  becoming  quite  as  powerful  as  they  might  have  been. 

The  tribunes  were  first  elected  in  494.  Their  original  number 
is  doubtful ;  but  after  457  there  were  always  ten,  and  after  471  they 
were  elected  by  the  comitia  tributa^  and  only  those  who  belonged 
to  a  plebeian  gens,  either  by  birth  or  adoption,  were  eligible.  Their 
number  was  the  first  check  upon  them.  The  arrangement  as  to  the 
veto  was,  it  seems,  at  first  that  the  whole  collegium  had  to  concur  ; 
afterwards,  that  a  majority  must  do  so  ;  finally,  any  one  of  them 
could  veto  any  proceeding.  But  any  one  of  them  could  veto  the 
proceedings  of  the  others,  as  well  as  of  other  magistrates.  So  that 
compromises  had  frequently  to  be  made  between  the  demands  of  one 
party  in  the  State  backed  up  by  some  of  the  tribunes,  and  those  of 
the  other  party  backed  up  by  the  other  tribunes.  They  were  not  at 
first  members  of  the  Senate,  but  before  long  they  were  admitted  to 
sit  at  the  door  to  watch  the  proceedings,  and  finally  they  became 
members,  and  an  intercessio  of  a  tribune  prevented  a  valid  senatus 
consultion  being  passed.  Their  powers  did  not  extend  beyond  a 
mile  outside  the  pomoerium,  and  during  their  year  of  office  they 
were  not  allowed  to  be  absent  a  night  from  Rome,  and  were  obliged 
to  keep  their  houses  open,  that  they  might  at  any  time  be  appealed  to 
for  help.i 

Another  institution  which  limited  the  power  of  the  consuls  was 
the  Senate.  We  have  said  that  the  Senate  was  a  council  of  elders 
nominated  by  the  king  to  advise  him,  but  whose  advice  he  was  not 
bound  to  take.  So  it  was  with  the  consuls.  But  the  Senate  had 
this  great  advantage,  that  its  members  were  members  for  life.  It 
did  not,  therefore,  vary  quickly,  and  was  capable  of  a  continuous 
policy  ;  and  all  experience  teaches  us  that  a  permanent  body  inevit- 


1  See  pp.  97,  98. 
Aul.  G.  14,  8. 


For  their  admission  to  the  Senate  by  the  lex  Atinia,  see 


XVI  THE  POWERS  OF  THE  SENATE  207 

ably  gets  the  better  of  transient  officials.  Thus  it  came  about  that, 
although  there  was  no  law  definitely  stating  in  what  the  Senate  was 
to  be  supreme,  or  making  its  decrees  {senatus  consulta)  binding,  yet  it 
had  by  custom  gradually  absorbed  certain  functions  and  certain  de- 
partments of  government  which  for  a  long  time  no  one  thought  of 
questioning.  One  of  these  was  the  control  of  the  treasury  ;  it  came  Control 
to  be  acknowledged  that  the  quaestors  should  not  issue  money  from  of  the 
the  treasury  without  a  decree  of  the  Senate, — though  the  consuls  ^^^^•^"O'- 
still  retained  the  power  of  giving  such  an  order,  and  sometimes 
exercised  it.  But  as  soon  as  the  consul  was  out  of  Rome  the 
Senate  could  hamper  or  assist  him  by  refusing  or  voting  him 
supplies  ;  could  supersede  him  at  the  end  of  his  year  of  office,  or 
continue  him  in  command  as  proconsul.  It  also  assumed  the 
power  of  allowing  or  disallowing  triumphs, — a  power  which  again 
followed  from  the  control  of  the  purse,  for  these  shows  required 
grants  of  money.  The  power  of  the  purse  gave  it  also  a  control  over 
public  works,  for  the  money  required  for  them  could  only  be 
got  by  its  order.  Again,  as  Rome  extended  her  dominion  over  Trials  in 
Italy,  the  Senate  assumed  the  right  of  issuing  commissions  to  try  ^i<^ly- 
all  cases  of  treason  and  felony  in  the  Italian  towns,  which  practically 
gave  it  the  administrative  portion  of  the  government  in  Italy. 
Quarrels  also  between  allied  towns  were  settled  or  investigated  by 
commissioners  sent  by  the  Senate  ;  and  this  branch  of  government 
we  shall  see  still  in  its  hands  when  Rome  began  to  have  foreign 
provinces.  Ambassadors  from  other  states  came  to  the  Senate,  and 
from  it  received  their  answer  ;  and  though  the  right  of  the  people  to 
vote  on  peace  and  war  was  not  disputed,  the  matter  was  first  dis- 
cussed and  voted  on  in  the  Senate,  and  its  decree  was  generally 
accepted.  The  particular  sphere  of  action,  again,  which  each  Allotment 
of  the  consuls  was  to  take  was  decided  generally  by  lot,  but  at  of'pro- 
times  the  Senate  assumed  the  right  of  deciding  this  on  its  own 
authority.  It  is  to  be  kept  in  mind  that  these  powers  depended  on 
no  law,  and  could  at  any  time  be  overborne  by  a  law  ;  and  towards 
the  end  of  the  Republic  those  magistrates  who  wished  to  establish 
their  power  on  a  popular  footing,  and  accordingly  to  lower  that  of 
the  Senate,  were  in  the  habit  of  bringing  much  of  the  business  that 
was  usually  done  in  the  Senate  directly  before  the  Comitia.  So  that 
in  this  case  again,  though  the  "  auctoritas  "  of  the  Senate  curtailed 
very  materially  the  power  of  the  consul,  yet  it  could  not  push  this 
control  too  far,  for  the  consul  had  always  at  hand  the  weapon  of  an 
appeal  to  the  Comitia :  there  was  again,  therefore,  constant  need  of 
mutual  compromise. 

But  there  was  one  way  in  which  the  Senate  could  effectually 
overrule  the  consuls.      By  the  exercise  of  an  authority  which  again 


vtnces. 


208 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


rested  on  no  law,  but  on  immemorial  custom,  they  could  compel  one 
of  the  consuls  to  nominate  a  Dictator  {dicere  dictatoreiti). 

In  its  origin  the  Dictatorship  was  a  temporary  revival  of  the 
single  and  irresponsible  kingship,  when  circumstances  seemed  to 
require  the  rule  of  one  man — generally  on  account  of  some  imminent 
danger  in  war,  foreign  or  domestic,  but  not  unfrequently  for  the 
more  peaceful  purposes  of  holding  the  elections  when  the  consul 
could  not  be  present,  or  even  as  head  of  the  State  for  driving  in  a 
nail  in  the  temple  of  Jupiter  on  the  Ides  of  September,  when  pesti- 
lence or  other  misfortune  demanded  that  it  should  be  done  with 
unusual  solemnity.  The  consul,  who  was  obliged  to  be  in  the  ager 
Romanus — afterwards  held  to  include  all  Italy — having  risen  in  the 
dead  of  night  and  named  the  dictator,  he  was  invested  with  iinperium 
by  the  comitia  curiata,  and  immediately  became  supreme  over 
all  other  magistrates,  and  had  absolute  power  over  the  persons 
and  lives  of  all  citizens.  As  a  symbol  of  this  he  was  preceded 
by  twenty-four  lictors^  with  fasces  and  axes,  as  combining  the 
powers  of  both  consuls.  The  dictator  named  another  magis- 
trate called  the  master  of  the  horse  (as  he  himself  was  sometimes 
called  the  "master  of  the  people"),  who  represented  him  in  his 
absence,  but  was  as  completely  as  others  under  his  authority.  The 
other  magistrates  did  not  cease  to  perform  their  ordinary  functions, 
but  they  did  so  in  subordination  to  the  dictator  and  subject  to  his 
orders.  It  was  an  unsettled  question  whether  the  auxilium  of  the 
tribunes,  their  power,  that  is,  of  aiding  a  citizen  against  the  order  of 
a  magistrate,  was  valid  against  a  dictator.  There  seems  to  have 
been  a  notion  that  the  Tribune  still  in  some  degree  retained  this 
power :  but  on  the  only  occasions  recorded  by  Livy,  on  which  an 
attempt  to  exercise  it  was  made,  the  Tribune  did  not  venture  to  per- 
sist. ^  The  fact  seems  to  be  that  the  case  was  never  really  brought 
to  an  issue.  The  dictator's  tenure  of  office  was  limited  to  six 
months,  but  as  a  matter  of  fact  he  seldom  held  it  so  long.  In  the 
case  of  the  formal  dictatorships  for  holding  elections,  and  the  like,  he 
held  it  only  for  a  few  days,  did  not  generally  think  it  necessary  even 
to  name  a  master  of  the  horse,  and  abdicated  directly  the  purpose 
for  which  he  had  been  named  was  fulfilled.  In  the  case  of  war  he 
would  only  be  in  Rome  long  enough  to  perform  certain  religious 
functions  :  and  in  the  army,  to  which  the  power  of  the  Tribune  did 
not  extend,  he  would  not  have  an  imperium  essentially  more  exten- 
sive than  that  of  the  consuls  whom  he  superseded.      When  he  was 


^  Or  perhaps  only  twelve.      See  Mommsen,  H.  R.  iii.  349  note.  Cp.  p.  647. 

2  Livy  (vi.  16,  38)  seems  to  indicate  that  in  such  struggles  as  occurred  the 
dictators  got  the  better  of  the  tribunes.  But  that  the  legal  theory  was  the  other 
way  is  shown  by  Polybius  iii.  8  ;  Plutarch,  Fab.  9  ;  Anto?t.  9. 


XVI  DEVOLUTION  OF  CONSULAR  POWERS  209 

named  for  the  suppression  of  a  sedition  at  home,  or  for  safeguarding 

the  city  from  an   expected  invasion,  there  would  have   been   more 

likelihood  of  a  conflict  between  him  and  the  tribunes.      But  even 

then  a  time  of  popular  excitement  or  terror  was  not  favourable  for 

the  settlement  of  a  constitutional  question.      In  the  early  period  of 

the  Republic  the  appointment  of  a  dictator  was  frequent.^     From  Dictator 

about  300  one  is  rarely  named  except  for  formal  business,  electoral  rare  after 

or  religious  :  and  after  the  second  Punic  war  the  office  seems  to  3^°- 

have  remained  in  abeyance  until  the  unconstitutional  dictatorship  of 

Sulla.      Instead  of  it  a  custom  grew  up  of  investing  the  consuls  and 

praetors  with  dictatorial  powers,  in  case  of  dangerous  disturbances, 

by  a  senatorial  decree  that  the   "consuls,  praetors,  etc.,  should  see 

that  the  Republic  took  no  harm." 

But   besides   these   checks   on   the   consular  power,    regular   or  Devolution 
occasional,    it    was    also    diminished    by    devolution.      Many  of  its  of  powers. 
original  functions,  that  is,  devolved  on  other  magistrates,  the  censors, 
praetors,  and  aediles.     The  Censorship  arose  from  a  compromise  (/)  o?! 
in  443,  when  the  consulship  was  put  in  commission  by  the  appoint-  censors. 
ment   of  consular  tribunes    {tribuni   militares   consulari  potestate). 
The  censors  were  then,  or  soon  afterwards,  appointed  to  perform 
that  part  of  the  consular  office  which  was  concerned  with  the  lists 
of  the  Senate,  tribes,  and  other  orders,  and  to  perform  the  quin- 
quennial   purification    at    the   end   of  each   lustrum. ^     At   first   the 
length  of  their  tenure  appears  not  to  have  been  fixed  ;  but  the  powers 
which  these  functions  gave  them  proved  to  be  so  formidable,  or  the 
public  works  which  they  had  charge  of  so  costly,  that  a  limit  was 
found  necessary.      By  the  lex  Aemilia  (434)  this  was   defined   as 
eighteen    months.       Appius    Claudius     Caecus     indeed     (312-308) 
violated  this  rule  on  the  ground  that  the  law  referred  only  to  the 
existing  censors,  but  he  was  unable  to  persist  in  his  tenure  for  the 
whole  five  years,  and  his  example  was  not  imitated.      It  followed 
from  the  reason  of  the  institution  of  the  office  that  it  should  be  held 
by  patricians,  but  this  restriction  was  removed  in  350.      From  the  Functions 
first,  or  soon  after  the  first  establishment  of  the  office,  the  censors  of  the 
exercised   other  functions  besides  the  making  up  the  lists.      They 
inspected  public  buildings,  roads,  supplies  of  water,  and  the  like, 
and  gave  out  contracts  for  their  construction  or  repair,  for  which,  on 
an   order  from   the   Senate,  they  drew   upon   the   exchequer.     The 
censors  became  thus  very  influential,  being  concerned  with  nearly 
every  department  of  life  and   every  class   of  persons.      They  should 

^  In  309,  according  to  the  Fasti,  a  dictator  held  office  throughout  the  year 
and  without  election  of  consuls,  and  in  301  two  successive  dictators  did  the 
same,  but  this  was  exceptional  and  irregular.  Livy  confirms  the  Fasti  by  not 
jiaming  consuls  for  those  years. 

doing  this  they  were  said  condere  lustrum. 
P 


censors. 


HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap. 


have  been  above  and  apart  from  political  faction,  yet  they  could  and 
did  influence  politics  by  their  manner  of  filling  up  the  lists  of  the 
ordines  as  well  as  of  the  Senate,  while  we  have  seen  that  Appius 
Claudius  used  his  powers  for  a  political  and  almost  revolutionary 
purpose.  The  office  was  of  great  dignity  :  it  was  therefore  customary 
to  elect  only  those  who  had  been  consuls  (although  this  convention 
was  more  than  once  neglected),  and  by  the  lex  Rutilia  (265)  it  was 
ordered  that  no  one  should  be  twice  censor.  The  principle  of 
colleagueship  was  also  so  jealously  guarded  that  it  was  held,  that,  in 
case  of  the  death  of  one  censor,  the  other  was  bound  to  resign,  while, 
on  account  of  the  omen,  no  new  ones  were  created  in  that  lustrum. 
{2)  On  the  Another    part     of    the    consular    functions    devolved    upon    the 

praetor.  Praetor.  The  title  (  =  "leader")  was  an  old  one,  and  by  some 
has  been  supposed  to  have  been  that  originally  borne  by  the  consuls. 
But  the  praetorship  with  which  we  are  now  concerned  was  first 
established  in  367,  again  as  a  compromise,  at  the  restoration  of  the 
consular  office  after  the  admission  of  plebeians.  The  praetor  was 
to  be  a  colleague  of  the  consuls,  to  transact  the  judicial  business, 
which  up  to  that  time  had  been  performed  by  them.  He  was  next 
in  dignity  to  them,  and  presided  in  the  Senate  in  their  absence,  but 
he  could  not  legally  hold  the  consular  elections  or  name  a  dictator. 
His  business  lay  in  Rome,  but  in  emergencies  we  find  him  com- 
manding abroad,  as  in  the  Gallic  war  of  283.  Originally  confined 
to  patricians,  the  office  was  after  336  filled  indifferently  from  either 
order.  After  the  first  Punic  war  the  number  of  aliens  residing  in  Rome 
for  various  purposes  became  so  great,  that  a  second  praetor  was  ap- 
pointed, to  try  cases  between  citizens  and /^r^^r/;/z' (242).  He  was 
called  praetor  peregrinus.,  and  from  that  time  the  first  praetor  was 
called  praetor  urbanus.  The  whole  civil  business  was  in  their 
hands,  and  when  quaestiones  were  established  to  try  certain  charges 
of  public  crimes,  one  of  the  praetors  acted  in  person  or  by  deputy 
as  president  {judex  quaestionis)?-  On  entering  their  offices  they 
laid  down  the  legal  principles  by  which  they  meant  to  be  guided  in 
a  forinida^  generally  adopted  with  certain  variations  from  that  oJ 
their  predecessors,  whence  a  body  of  common  law  {jus  praetoriuni)  ^ 
arose,  recognised  in  all  courts,  whether  in  Rome  or  in  those  pro- 
vincial towns  to  which  a  praefectus  or  other  officer  was  sent  annually 
from  Rome  to  administer  law  as  the  praetor's  representative.     Til] 

1  When  the  quaestiones  perpetuac — i.e.  standing  courts  for  trying  particulai 
crimes — increased  in  number  so  much  as  to  exceed  the  powers  of  even  the 
increased  staff  of  praetors,  se.Y>^va.iQ  judices  quaestionum  were  appointed,  whethei 
by  the  praetor  or  by  the  comitia  centuriata  does  not  seem  clear. 

2  Or  jus  ho7iorarium — including  decisions  of  all  magistrates.  The  formula 
was  the  edictum  petpetuum.  That  part  of  the  edictum  which  remained  unchangec 
was  called  vett4s  or  tralaticium. 


PRAETORS  AND  QUAESTORS 


227  there  were  only  two  praetors,  but  in  that  year  two  more  were 
elected.  The  four  drew  lots  for  their  sphere  of  duty  {provincid)  ; 
two  stayed  in  Rome,  the  other  two  went  to  Sicily  (a  province  in 
241)  or  to  Sardinia  (a  province  in  238).  Gradually  more  were 
required  as  home  business  and  the  number  of  provinces  increased. 
From  199  there  were  six,  or  sometimes  six  and  four  alternately. 
After  144  all  six  stayed  in  Rome  for  their  year  of  office,  going  to 
various  provinces  afterwards  as  propraetors.  From  about  the  year 
80  there  were  eight  ;  JuHus  Caesar  (59-44)  raised  the  number  to 
twelve  and  then  to  sixteen,  of  whom  the  praetor  urbanus  and  praetor 
peregrmus,  and  a  certain  number  of  the  others,  had  to  stay  in  Rome, 
unless  by  special  exemption  of  the  Senate. 

Besides  these  magistrates  who  thus  exercised  between  them  the  Lower 
functions  of  the  one  king,  there  were  other  departments  of  adminis-  magis- 
tration  managed  by  yearly  magistrates  also,  who  had  no  part  of  the  ^^^*^^- 
unperium  shared  by  these  curule  magistrates,  and  were  regarded  as 
occupying  a  lower  rank  in  the  official  scale. 

The  oldest  of  these  was  the  Quaestorship.  We  hear  oiquaestores  The 
parricidii  under  the  kings,  and  quaestores  aerarii  very  soon  after  the  quaestors. 
establishment  of  the  Republic.  Whether  the  two  functions  were 
ever  united  in  one  person  seems  uncertain.  They  were  certainly 
separated  in  very  early  times.  The  duties  of  the  quaestores  parricidiz, 
"  trackers  of  murder,"  were  merged  in  other  judicial  offices  ;  but 
the  quaestors  of  the  treasury  {aerarii)  always  remained,  and  were 
increased  in  number  with  the  extension  of  the  business  and 
dominions  of  the  RepubHc.  At  first  there  appear  to  have  been 
two  in  charge  of  the  treasury,  from  which  they  made  payments 
on  the  order  of  the  Senate  or  the  consuls,  and  into  which  they 
received  the  taxes,  the  fines  inflicted  by  magistrates  or  people,  or 
the  wealth  brought  in  by  successful  generals.  After  447  they  were 
elected  at  the  comitia  tributa,  and  in  421  their  number  was  doubled, 
two  remaining  in  the  city  and  one  accompanying  each  of  the  con- 
sular armies.  At  the  same  time  plebeians  were  declared  eligible, 
though  no  plebeian  was  elected  till  409.  In  267  the  number 
was  again  doubled,  four  new  ones  being  apparently  appointed 
for  the  surveillance  of  the  port  of  Ostia  and  naval  purposes : 
and  as  public  business  increased  with  the  growth  of  the  Empire 
we  shall  find  their  numbers  increased  also.  The  quaestorship 
was  not  a  curule  office.  The  quaestors  did  not  wear  the  toga  prae- 
iexta,  or  sit  on  a  sella  curulis,  and  having  no  jurisdiction  over  the 
persons  of  the  citizens,  they  were  not  attended  by  lictors  or  viatores. 

Later  in  the  date   of  its   institution,  though  superior  in  dignity,   Aediles. 
was  the  Aedileship.     There  were  four  aediles,  who  all  seem  to  have 
shared  in  the  same  duties,  as  magistrates  in  petty  cases  and  com- 


I 


212 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Aediles 
curules. 


Praefectus 
urbi. 


Colleges  of 
poniifices 
and 
augures. 


missioners  of  police  {curatores  urbis\  as  superintendents  of  the  supply 
of  provisions  {curatores  annonae)^  as  managers  of  the  public  games 
{curatores  ludorum  solenntum).  But  the  history  of  the  office  is 
complicated  by  the  fact  that  in  name,  and  in  the  outward  marks  of 
dignity,  two  of  them  were  superior  to  the  other  two.  The  earliest 
were  the  plebeian  aediles,  first  appointed  in  494,  at  the  same  time 
as  the  tribunes,  to  assist  them  in  judicial  business,  and  to  keep  the 
decrees  of  the  comitia  tributa  and  later  of  the  Senate  also,  that  no 
patrician  might  tamper  with  them.i  From  472  up  to  the  end  of  the 
Republic  they  were  elected  by  the  comitia  tributa,  and  members  of 
the  patrician  gentes  were  ineligible.  But  at  the  next  compromise 
between  the  two  orders  (367),  when  the  praetorship  was  established, 
it  was  also  arranged  that  two  new  aediles  should  be  created,  who 
should  be  patricians  and  curule  magistrates.  Their  immediate 
purpose  was  the  presidency  of  the  ludi  Romania  to  which  were  after- 
wards added  the  Megalesia.  But  about  366  the  plebeians  were 
admitted  to  the  curule  aedileship  in  alternate  years,  and  shortly 
afterwards  indifferently  in  every  year.  So  that  eventually  there 
were  four  aediles,  two  of  whom  must  be  plebeians,  and  two  might 
be  either  plebeians  or  patricians.  But  apparently,  except  as  to 
the  games  which  were  assigned  to  the  two  sets  respectively,  their 
duties  gradually  became  assimilated.  The  advantage  which  the 
curule  aedileship  retained  was  that  up  to  the  time  of  Sulla  it  gave  an 
entrde  to  the  Senate,  and  was  regarded  as  the  first  step  in  the  cursus 
honorum^  the  scale  of  offices,  leading  to  the  praetorship  and  consulship. 

The  office  of  praefectus  urbi  was  also  very  ancient,  and  was 
believed  to  have  been  used  by  the  kings  for  the  safety  of  the  city 
during  their  absence  in  war.  But  as  the  custom  of  the  consuls  and 
praetor  remaining  in  the  city  during  their  year  of  office  became 
more  constant,  it  fell  into  desuetude,  except  as  an  honorary 
appointment  of  some  youth  of  high  birth  during  the  absence  of  the 
other  magistrates  at  the  Latin  games.  Under  the  Empire  the  title 
was  restored,  but  the  officer  so  called  had  more  distinct  and 
important  duties. 

No  account  of  the  checks  upon  the  magistrates  at  Rome, 
however,  can  be  complete  without  a  reference  to  the  functions  of 
the  sacred  colleges.  The  pontifices  and  augures  indeed  did  not  i 
generally  exercise  magisterial  powers,  and  the  control  of  the  Pontifex  H 
Maximus  over  the  Vestal  Virgins  rested  rather  on  the  patria 
potestas J  but  nevertheless  their  influence  on  the  course  of  affairs 
was    of    sufficient    importance    to    make    it    a    matter    of    urgency 

^  Both  aediles  and  tribuni  were  probably  names  belonging  to  officers  in  earlier 
times,  the  former  connected  with  the  temples  [aedes),  the  latter  with  the  three 


tribes.      But  their  offices  as  known  in  later  history  begin  now. 


XVI  THE  SACRED  COLLEGES  213 

for  the  plebeians  to  secure  entrance  into  them,  and  to  render 
membership  an  object  of  ambition  among  statesmen  of  the 
highest  rank.  This  influence  was  none  the  weaker  that  it  was 
indirect.  The  pontifices  had  a  general  superintendence  of  all  Pontifices. 
matters  concerning  the  State  religion.  But  they  also  had  charge 
of  the  Calendar  :  they  determined  which  days  were  fasti  and  nefasti, 
days  on  which  legal  business  might  or  might  not  be  transacted,  or 
when  it  was  necessary  to  intercalate  days  or  months.  They  could 
therefore  indirectly  affect  legal  business  and  constitutional  arrange- 
ments, often  to  the  help  or  annoyance  of  a  magistrate.  Their 
president,  the  pontifex  jnaximus^  was  to  the  people  in  their  religious 
capacity  what  the  king  had  been  in  the  civil.  He  could  take  the 
auspices,  summon  a  meeting,  publish  edicts.  And  though  the 
actual  exercise  of  his  power  was  in  practice  confined  to  the  priests 
and  vestals  (over  the  latter  of  whom  he  had  the  power  of  life  and 
death),  yet  in  the  case  of  the  failure  of  all  curule  magistrates  he 
held  comitia  for  elections.  So  again  the  augures.  No  assembly,  Augures. 
election,  meeting  of  Senate,  despatch  of  magistrate  to  a  province 
or  an  expedition,  in  fact  no  public  business,  was  transacted  without 
first  testing  the  will  of  the  gods.  The  proper  method  of  doing  this 
was  a  science  supposed  to  be  in  the  hands  of  the  college  of  augures, 
which  consequently  had  from  time  to  time  to  decide  on  the  validity 
of  elections  and  laws.  It  is  true  that  they  had  no  initiative  :  they 
could  only  pronounce  decisions  when  appealed  to  by  the  magistrates. 
But  cases  of  doubt  were  frequently  referred  to  them  :  and  their 
awards  seem  to  have  been  final. ^  Lastly,  up  to  the  end  of  the 
second  Punic  war,  the  college  of  twenty  fetials  exercised  considerable  Fetiah. 
influence  from  the  fact  that  they  were  judges  not  only  of  the  cere- 
monies in  proclaiming  war,  but  of  the  validity  of  treaty  obligations, 
and  of  the  amount  of  provocation  on  the  part  of  an  enemy  justify- 
ing war.2  Even  the  Decetnviri  sacris  faciundis^  from  having  the  Decemviri. 
custody  of  the  sibylline  oracles,  could  at  times  influence  the  course  of 
public  policy,  and  their  office  was  accordingly  one  of  those  which 

1  The  College  of  Pontifices  originally  consisted  of  four  pontifices  and  a 
Pontifex  Maximus.  From  300  to  80  there  were  eight  (four  of  whom  had 
to  be  plebeians)  and  a  Pontifex  Maximus.  Up  to  104  vacancies  were  filled  up  by 
co-optatio,  i.e.  by  election  by  existing  members.  After  104  (by  lex  Doniiiia) 
seventeen  of  the  thirty-five  tribes  selected  from  three  persons  already  nominated 
by  the  college,  which  then  co-opted  and  ordained  him  {inauguratio).  The 
College  of  Augures  up  to  300  consisted  of  four  augures  ;  after  that  (by  lex 
Ogulnia)  it  was  raised  to  nine,  by  the  addition  of  five  plebeian  augures,  and  so 
remained  till  80,  when  Sulla  raised  them  to  fifteen.  The  modes  of  election  were 
regulated  by  the  same  laws  as  that  to  the  Pontifical  College. 

^  After  the  time  of  Pyrrhus  the  old  ceremony  of  throwing  a  spear  into  the 
enemy's  lands  was  symbolically  represented  by  throwing  a  spear  against  the 
coliwma  bellica  before  the  temple  of  Bellona. 


k 


214 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Causes  of 
weakness 
in  the 
constitu- 
tion. 


the  patricians  tried  to  retain,  and  which  the  plebeians  successfully 
invaded.i 

Thus  by  a  system  of  checks  and  devolution  was  established  the 
constitution  which  Polybius  regarded  as  the  most  successful  attempt  to 
combine  the  three  principles  of  Monarchy,  Oligarchy,  and  Democracy. 
The  weak  point  in  it,  which  eventually  did  most  to  break  it  up,  was 
the  absence  of  any  central  power  of  compulsion.  It  depended  too 
much  on  custom,  and  on  the  loyalty  of  individuals  to  it.  Thus  the 
authority  of  the  Senate  rested  on  no  law,  and  even  the  limit  to  the 
tenure  of  office  by  the  magistrates  depended  on  the  voluntary 
obedience  of  the  magistrate  himself.  If  he  did  not  "  abdicate,"  the 
office  was  not  vacant,  and  there  was  no  known  power  to  make  him. 
If  he  disobeyed  the  Senate  he  would  be  crushed  so  long  as  public 
opinion  supported  the  Senate ;  but  when,  as  in  later  times,  he 
found  that  he  could  defy  it  by  resting  on  a  direct  appeal  to  the 
people,  or  by  supporting  himself  by  a  sufficiently  large  and  powerful 
party  of  adherents,  the  weakness  of  the  foundations  on  which  the 
power  of  the  Senate  rested  became  manifest. 


The  army.  From  the  earliest  times  we  find  the  principle  accepted  that  all 

citizens   were   liable  to   serve   in   the  army,  levied   from   season  to 
season  as  required.      But  as  each  man  furnished  his  own  arms,  and 
served  without  pay,  it  was  inevitable  that  such  service  should  as  a 
rule   be    confined   to  men   with   a   certain   amount  of  property,  the 
richest  of  all  serving  in  the  cavalry,  though  from  very  early  times 
with  an  allowance    for  the  purchase   and  keep  of  a  horse   {equus 
publicics).      Hence  in   a   certain   sense  to   serve  in  the  army  was  a 
privilege    as    well    as    a    burden  ;    and    the    "  reform "    of    Servius 
Tullius  was  the  extension  to  a  larger  number  of  citizens  of  a  privilege 
as  well  as  of  a  duty  :    and  when  shortly  before  the  siege  of  Veii 
Changed  by  (about  406)  the  system  of  giving  pay  {stipendium)  to  the  soldiers  was 
the  systejn     started,  it  was  possible  to  employ  in  the  service  even  those  citizens 
of  pay.  ^^Yio  were  rated  below  the  fifth  class,  the  cafite  ce?is^  down  to  those 

rated  at  only  400  asses,  and  even  these  were  enrolled  on 
emergencies.  Thus  the  army  was  at  first  a  citizen  militia  called 
out  for  the  season  when  required,  and  dispersed  when  the  necessity 
was  over.  But  in  the  Samnite  wars  and  the  war  with  Pyrrhus  we 
find  the  legions  at  times  going  into  winter  quarters,  and  serving 
continuously,  and  this  custom,  begun  at  the  siege  of  Veii,  gradually 
became  the  common  one.  Moreover  when  Rome  had  reduced 
many  states,  first  of  Latium  and  then  of  Italy,  to  the  position  of  | 
The  Socii.    subject  allies,  these  towns  had  to  supply  a  certain  number  of  men , 

^  Originally  two,  raised  to  ten  in   369,  of  whom  half  after  367  were  to  bej 
plebeians.      The  number  was  probably  raised  to  fifteen  in  98  by  Sulla. 


XVI  ENROLMENT  AND  ARMS  OF  THE  LEGIONS  215 

according  to   the   terms   of  their  alHance,  and  we  accordingly  find 
socii  regularly  serving  with  the  Roman  armies. 

The  men,  when  levied,  were  from  the  earliest  times  enrolled  in   The 
brigades  called  legions.     The  number  in  the  legions  probably  differed  legions. 
at  various  times,  and  was  seldom  exactly  what   it  professed   to  be. 
But  the  average  normal  strength  of  a  legion  may  be  taken  in  the  third 
century  to  have  been   3000  heavy-armed  infantry,   300  cavalry  of 
citizens,  and  1 200  light-armed  infantry.     The  number  of  the  socii  must  Numbers. 
have  differed  at  different  stages  of  Roman  supremacy ;  Polybius,  at 
the  time  of  the  Punic  wars,  reckons  the  infantry  of  allies  as  equal  to 
the  citizens  in  number,  and  the  cavalry  as  treble.     A  legion,  there- 
fore, at  that  period  may  with  socii  be  reckoned  roughly  as  a  body  of 
10,000  men. 

The  number  of  such  legions  enrolled  each  year  differed  according  Enrolment 
to  the  necessity  of  the  circumstances.      But  from  an  early  period  in  of  legions. 
the  Republic  two  legions  for  each  of  the  consuls  was  looked  upon  as 
normal.     The  Senate,  at  the  beginning  of  the  year,  settled  what  the 
levy  was  to  consist  of,  though,  of  course,  it  was  liable  to  be  supple- 
mented in  case  of  additional  dangers,  or  of  loss  in  the  field.     The 
consuls  then  proceeded  to  enrol  the  men.      Having  given  notice  of  a 
day  on  which  they  proposed  to  do  this,  all  citizens  of  the  five  classes 
between  the  ages  of  seventeen  and  forty-six,  who  had  not  already 
served  twenty  years  in  the  infantry  or  ten  in  the  cavalry,  were  bound 
to  appear  and  answer  to  their  names  when  the  lists  of  the  tribes 
were  read  over.     As  a  rule,  the  number  of  young  men  volunteering 
for  service  made  the  exercise  of  the  consular  powers  unnecessary ; 
but  at  times,  either  from  political  discontent   or  the  nature  of  the 
particular  service,  this  was  not  the  case  ;  and  then  the  consul  could, 
and  sometimes  did,  confiscate  the  property  of  those  who  failed  to 
answer,  or  even  sell  them  into  slavery,  unless  the  tribunes  interfered. 
The  first  thing  to  do  was  to  appoint  military  tribunes,  six  to  each   Tribuni 
legion.      From  361  this  was  done  partly  by  election  of  the  tribes,  militum. 
though  the  consuls  appear  at  times  to  have  named  some  of  them. 
These  military  tribunes  took  turns  in  selecting  suitable  names  until 
their  lists  were  full.      Then  the  military  oath  of  obedience  {sacra- 
mentuni)  was  administered  to  the  men,  one  repeating  the  formula, 
and  the  others  signifying  their  assent  to  it.     The  men  were  then  Hastati, 
divided,  according  to  wealth  and  age,  into  hastati,  principes,  triarii,   principes, 
and  rorarii :  and  a  day  and  place  were  named  at  which  they  were  ^''^^^"• 
bound  to  appear  armed  according  to  their  respective  ranks.      The 
poorest  were  assigned  to  the  rorarii  and  accensi,  later  called  velites,  Rorarii. 
who  had  to  equip  themselves  with  the  light  target  {par7fta\  sword, 
light  spear,  and  helmet  without  plume  (galea).    The  hastati,  principes, 
and  triarii  were  divided  according  to  age  and  service,  the  experienced 


2l6 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


veterans  being  in  the  last,  and  the  youngest  soldiers  in  the  first. 
The  defensive  arms  of  all  three  were  alike :  the  large  oblong  shield 
{scutum)^  coats  of  mail  or  breastplates  {loricae  or  pedoralia)^  brass 
helmet  and  greaves  {ocreae).  All  also  had  the  short  straight  sword, 
made  both  for  cut  and  thrust  {gladius)  :  but  the  hastati  and  principes 
had  besides  two  stout  javelins  or  pila  (some  finer  and  slighter  than 
others),  which  were  thrown  in  volleys  before  coming  to  close  quarters 
with  the  enemy.  Instead  of  these  the  triarii  had  the  long  lance  or 
pike  {hasta),  though  later  on  all  alike  had  the  pilum. 

Manipuli.  Each  of  the  three  orders  was  divided  into  ten  companies  {mani- 

puli))-  One  maniple  of  hastati,  one  of  principes,  and  one  of  triarii 
made  up  a  cohort :  there  were,  therefore,  ten  cohorts  in  a  legion. 
To  command  these  men,  there  were,  first,  the  six  military  tribunes  ; 
and,  secondly,  sixty  centurions,  two  to  each  maniple  ;  for  the  maniple 
was  subdivided  into  centuriae^  or,  as  they  were  sometimes  called, 
ordines^  each  of  which  was  commanded  by  one  of  the  centurions, 
who  were  thus  also  called  ordmum  ductores.  Each  centurion  also 
named  a  subaltern  or  optio. 

The  rorarii  were  distributed  in  equal  numbers  among  the  maniples 
of  the  heavy-armed,  but  afterwards  were  formed  into  a  separate  and 
distinct  corps  under  the  name  of  velites. 

The  cavalry  of  a  legion  were  divided  into  ten  squadrons  {tiirjnae) 
of  thirty  men,  each  commanded  by  a  decurio  and  optio.  Three 
decuriones  and  optio7ies  were  selected  in  each  squadron,  but  the  first 
selected  commanded  if  he  were  present,  the  second  taking  his  place 
in  his  absence,  and  the  third  in  the  absence  of  the  two  first.  The 
men  wore  helmet,  greaves,  and  lorica  or  corslet,  and  carried  a  shield 
and  lance  and  sword.  The  cavalry  of  the  allies  (900  for  each  legion) 
was  divided  into  three  alae  instead  of  turmae^  and  are  often  spoken  of 
as  alarii  equites. 

At  the  head  of  all  was  the  consul,  praetor,  or  some  magistrate 
with  consular  or  praetorial  powers,  assisted  by  a  staff  consisting  of  a 
quaestor  and  legati,  whose  numbers  differed  according  to  circum- 
stances.    These  with  the  tribunes  formed  his  conciliwn, 

Socii.  The  men  being  thus  organised  and  officered,  and  joined  by  the 

Socii — whose  levy  was  left  to  the  several  towns,  and  who  were  com- 
manded by  their  own  twelve  praefecti^  nominated  by  the  consul — 

The  camp,  they  at  once  formed  a  camp.  This  was  always  done  on  the  same 
principles  wherever  they  halted  even  for  a  night :  though,  of  course, 
a  camp  that  was  intended  only  for  temporary  stoppage  was  much 
less  elaborately  fortified.  One  for  two  legions  was  in  the  form  of  a 
square,   intersected,   according  to   a  regular  scheme,   with   "  roads " 

^   But  the  maniples  of  the  triarii  contained  only  half  the  number  of  men  con- 
tained by  those  of  the  hastati  and  principes. 


XVI  OFFICERS  AND  DISCIPLINE  217 

{viae)  between  the  tents,  and  between  the  officers'  quarters  {prae- 
toriuin)  and  those  of  the  men,  and  defended  by  an  earthwork  {agger) 
surmounted  by  a  stockade  of  stakes  {valli),  and  a  trench  {fossa),  the 
whole  structure  being  spoken  of  as  the  vallum.  The  principles  of 
its  arrangement  were  so  exact  and  so  well  known,  that  when  the 
advanced  guard  had  selected  and  marked  it  out,  the  rest  of  the  army 
could  march  straight  into  it,  each  man  knowing  where  his  quarters 
were  to  be,  and  what  portion  of  the  fortification  he  had  to  construct. 
The  form  and  construction  were  probably  in  their  main  features  of 
high  antiquity,  yet  the  Romans  are  said  to  have  taken  some  hints 
in  improving  their  castrametation  from  Pyrrhus  after  the  battle  of 
Beneventum,  as  also  they  introduced  improvements  in  the  arms 
of  the  cavalry  possibly  from  the  same  source. 

The  consul,  proconsul,  or  dictator,   when  in  the   command   of  The  com- 
the  army,  had  absolute  power  over  the  officers  and  soldiers  ;  there  mander-in- 
was  no  appeal,  and  no  tribune  to  save  a  soldier,  however  high  his  ^^^' 
rank,   from   the   sentence  of  the   commander-in-chief,  whether  the 
sentence  inflicted  flogging  or  even  death.  1     These  punishments  were  Military 
rigorously  inflicted  for  certain  military  offences,  such  as  cowardice  or  punish- 
desertion  of  a  post,  or  theft  in  the  camp,  or  neglect  of  duty  when  on  ^^^^i^- 
guard  ;  and  if  a  whole  corps  was  involved  in  the  same  offence,  the 
offenders  were  punished  by  decimatio,  every  tenth  man  being  selected 
by  lot  to  receive  the  punishment.      Some  crimes  not  punished  by 
sentence  of  death  from  the  commander-in-chief  were  visited,  under 
the  direction  of  a  military  tribune,  with  what  amounted  practically  to 
the  same.     This  was  called  the,  fustimrtum,  which  may  be  described 
as   "  running  the  gauntlet."     A  man  convicted  of  certain  offences, 
especially  neglect  on  guard,  was  touched  by  a  tribune  with  a  cudgel 
{fustis)  :  whereupon  all  the  soldiers  fell  upon  him  with  cudgels  and 
stones.      If  by  vigorous  exertions  he  escaped  from  the  camp  with  his 
life,  he  was  nevertheless  a  ruined  man.      He  could  not  return  home, 
and  no  one  would  venture  to  receive  him.      "  The  result,"  says  Poly- 
bius,  "  of  the  severity  and  inevitableness  of  this  punishment  is  that 
the  Roman  watches  are  faultlessly  kept."     The  tribune  could  also 
inflict  flogging,  or  money  fines,  on  the  soldiers  for  minor  offences. 
This  severity  of  discipline  was  tempered  by  the  rewards  offered  for  Military 
valour.      After  a  battle,  those  who  had  showed  conspicuous  bravery  rewards. 
were  publicly  praised  by  the  consul,  and  presented  with  prizes,  con- 
sisting of  arms  or  cups  or  horse-trappings,  according  to  his  position 
or  the  nature  of  his  feat.      The  first   to  mount  a  wall  which  was 
being  stormed  was  presented  with  a  mural  crown  ;  those  who  had 
saved  the  life  of  a  fellow-citizen  with  a  civic  crown  :  and  both  were 

^  Soon  after  the  time  of  the  Gracchi,  the  right  of  provocatio  for  a  citizen  even 
in  the  army  was  secured. 


Ik 


2i8  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap,  xvi 

farther  honoured  with  the  privilege  of  wearing  special  ornaments  at 
public  festivals,  and  of  decorating  their  houses  with  trophies. 
The  Acies.  The  method  of  marshalling  the  Roman  army  in  the  field  must, 

in  many  respects,  have  depended  on  circumstances  and  the  nature 
of  the  ground.  But  certain  principles  pervaded  the  arrangement 
with  whatever  modifications.  The  earlier  method  had  probably  been 
that  of  the  phalanx — that  is,  the  massing  together  of  the  men  to 
form  a  compact  body  many  deep.  But  this  practice  had  been  aban- 
doned probably  about  the  time  of  the  siege  of  Veii,  and  the  plan 
had  been  adopted  of  stationing  the  maniples  at  such  intervals  as  to 
give  each  maniple  room  for  separate  and  independent  manoeuvring. 
The  whole  force  was  thus  arrayed  in  three  open  lines,  probably  in 
the  form  called  the  quincunx — 


so  that  each  line  supported  the  other,  and  yet  left  intervals  for  the 
one  to  retire  through  the  other.  The  maniples  forming  the  first  line 
consisted  of  the  youngest  soldiers  (hastatt) ;  the  second  line  of  the  next 
oldest  soldiers  {principes).  These  two  lines  were,  in  the  period  begin- 
ning about  300,  armed  with  the  pilmtt  or  heavy  javelin,  yet  they  were 
called  antepilant,  because  at  some  previous  time  the  men  of  the  third 
line,  called  the  triarii^  appear  alone  to  have  carried  thepilum^  and  the 
name  remained  when  the  reason  for  it  had  disappeared.  The  third 
line,  the  triaru,  was  composed  of  the  veteran  soldiers,  who  were 
most  to  be  depended  upon  if  the  two  former  were  routed.  Each  line, 
if  one  legion  was  in  question,  consisted  of  ten  maniples,  the  light- 
armed  troops  being  distributed  among  the  heavy-armed  maniples.  The 
socii  were  usually  stationed  by  themselves  at  one  or  the  other  wing, 
and  were  drawn  up  probably  on  the  same  principles  as  the  legionaries, 
but  on  this  point  we  have  no  definite  information.  The  cavalry 
stationed  on  either  wing  were  principally  employed  to  cover  retreat- 
ing infantry,  or  to  harass  a  retreating  enemy ;  though  in  some 
battles  they  played  a  more  important  part  in  the  actual  combat.  In 
camp  the  men  of  the  cavalry  were  specially  employed  in  going 
the  rounds  at  night,  and  the  expeditions  in  search  of  supplies  fell 
mostly  to  their  share. 

Such  was,  in  general  terms,  the  organisation  of  the  army  with 
which  the  Romans  were  now  to  confront  Carthage,  and  begin  their 
career  of  conquest  outside  of  Italy. 


CHAPTER    XVII 

SICILY    AND    CARTHAGE 

Seeds  of  hostility  between  Rome  and  Carthage — Object  of  the  first  Punic  war  was 
Sicily — The  Phoenicians  and  Greeks  in  Sicily — The  Sicani,  Elymi,  and  Siceli 
confused  by  the  Romans  with  Greek  Siceliots — Character  of  Sicilian  Greeks — 
Power  of  Syracuse — Carthage,  its  foundation,  constitution,  and  the  character 
of  its  people — Their  possessions  in  Sicily — The  boundary  of  the  Halycus — 
Cause  of  the  Romans  coming  to  Sicily,  and  the  results  of  the  war  to  the  two 
peoples  contrasted  —  Romans  and  Carthaginians  compared  —  Judgment  of 
Polybius — The  city  and  harbours  of  Carthage. 

Pyrrhus  quitted  Italy  for  ever  in  274.      In  the  course  of  the  next  Beginnin<^ 
ten  years  Rome  had  subdued  Italy  from  the  north  of  Etruria  to  the  of  the 
south  of  Brutti'um.      She  was  now  for  the  first  time  to  embark  on  (^^mity  of 
conquests  outside  Italy,  and  to  measure  swords  with  the  great  com-  r^^^i^^ 
mercial  city  in  Africa,  with  whom  she  had  already  found  it  necessary  "^  " 

more  than  once  to  secure  by  treaty  a  basis  of  mutual  rights.  For  a 
time,  while  Pyrrhus  was  a  danger  to  both  alike,  Rome  and  Carthage 
had  agreed  to  support  each  other  by  armed  force.  But  even  then 
there  were  signs  of  jealousy  and  distrust  on  the  part  of  Rome,  and 
perhaps  of  a  desire  on  the  part  of  Carthage  to  gain  a  foothold  in 
Italy.  At  any  rate  the  friendship  was  short-hved  ;  and  before  long 
the  possession  of  Sicily  became,  as  Pyrrhus  foresaw,  the  object  of  a 
war  between  the  two  cities,  which  lasted  for  nearly  a  quarter  of  a 
century,  and  became  noteworthy  in  the  history  of  the  world  for  the 
enormous  resources  of  the  combatants,  for  the  extraordinary  exer- 
tions made  by  both  alike,  and  for  the  momentous  nature  of  its 
results. 

The  first  Punic  war  is  rightly  called  by  Polybius  a  war  for  the  The 
possession  of  Sicily.      Such,  indeed,  it  turned  out  to  be.      But  here,  possession 
as  elsewhere,  the  Romans  followed  rather  than  guided  their  destiny.  ^5^^^^ 
They  did  not  decide  upon  an  armed  interference  in  Sicily  with  a  sequences. 
distinct  idea  of  annexation.      The  immediate  advantage  in  wealth 
or  reputation  to  be  gained  by  a  war  was  a  motive  with  the  military 


220 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


class  ;  the  traders  hoped  to  recoup  themselves  for  losses  sustained  in 
recent  wars  by  finding  a  new  field  of  commerce  ;  and  statesmen,  who 
looked  farther  ahead,  saw  danger  to  Italy  if  Sicily  became  wholly 
Carthaginian.  Yet  the  original  idea  was  not  to  substitute  Roman 
for  Carthaginian  power  over  the  whole  island,  but  to  confine  the 
Carthaginians  to  their  side  of  it,  to  vindicate  the  freedom  of  the 
Greek  cities,  and  to  teach  them  to  look  to  Rome  for  protection.  It 
soon,  however,  became  evident  that  Sicily  itself  must  be  the  prize  of 
the  victor  in  the  struggle.  The  prize  fell  to  Rome  :  but  that  was  not 
all.     The  war  proved  to  be  but  the  first  step  in  a  series  of  inevit- 


<5>  C) 


0 

0 

SICILY 

ROMAN       MILES 
5  )0       20                40 

_eo 

ENGLISH 
5    10        20 

MILES 
40 

60 

^ ^1 

ft(c/iy/u,.s  Pr 


East  oi  14  Greenwich 


ll^alker  &■  BoiUall . 


The  inhabi- 
tants of 
Sicily, 
and  its 
position 
to7vards 
Italy. 


able  expansions  which  were  destined  to  extend  Roman  power 
and  civilisation  over  nearly  the  whole  of  southern  Europe.  For 
Sicily  itself  it  decided  the  important  question  whether  it  should 
belong  to  Africa  or  Europe,  to  men  of  Semitic  or  to  men  of  Aryan 
race. 

For  among  the  inhabitants  of  Sicily  at  this  time  two  elements 
were  still  striving  for  mastery,  as  they  had  been  striving  for  nearly 
300  years,  the  Phoenician  and  the  Greek,  the  Eastern  and 
the  Western  —  an  image,  and  perhaps  a  part  of  that  struggle 
which  had  been  fought  out  at  Marathon,  Salamis,  and  Plataea,  and 
on  the  coasts  and  islands  of  the  Aegean  sea. 


XVII  THE  INHABITANTS  OF  SICILY  221 

had  had  no  immediate  interest  for  Italy  or  Rome.  Sicily  had  not 
l)cen  closely  connected  with  Italian  history  ;  had  never  been  Italian, 
though  Italians  had  emigrated  to  it  ;  and  had  never  aspired  to  be 
the  mistress  of  Italy  or  submitted  to  be  its  slave.  There  were  Greeks 
in  Italy  and  Greeks  in  Sicily  :  but  though  Syracuse  strove  to  play 
in  Sicily  the  part  which  Athens  played  in  Greece,  it  was  only  now 
and  then  that  her  most  powerful  rulers,  such  as  Hiero  I.  or 
Dionysius,  undertook  to  interfere  in  Magna  Graecia,  and  even  to 
assume  the  protection  of  the  venerable  and  more  distant  Cumae. 
These  were  passing  exhibitions  of  power.  For  the  most  part  Sicily 
remained  Sicilian,  without  external  rule  or  connexions.  When  at 
length  it  was  united  to  Italy,  it  was  as  a  province  of  the  great  city 
on  the  Tiber. 

The  Greek  immigration  began  with  the  foundation  of  Naxos  about  The 
735  by  colonists  from  Chalcis  in  Euboea,  followed  in  the  next  year  Greeks. 
by  that  of  Syracuse  from  Corinth.  These  Greek  settlements  were 
augmented  at  frequent  intervals  by  others  from  Greece,  as  well  as 
by  cities  founded  by  those  already  existing,  till  by  500  the  coasts 
of  Sicily  were  fringed  by  Greek  communities.  But  these  Greeks, 
though  they  found  many  sites  on  the  coast  vacant  and  ready  for 
occupation,  did  not  come  to  an  uninhabited  island.  There  had  been 
at  least  three  immigrations  before  them.  The  Sicani,  an  Iberian  Sicani. 
tribe  from  Spain,  as  was  believed,  had  built  towns  on  heights  some- 
what remote  from  the  sea  for  fear  of  robbers  and  pirates.  Settling 
first  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Aetna,  they  had  been  frightened  by  its 
eruptions  to  the  western  part  of  the  island  ;  where  another  tribe  of 
unknown  origin,  the  Elymi,  were  already  occupying  certain  spots.  Elymi. 
Many  generations  afterwards  came  the  SiCELi,  an  Italian  tribe,  SicelL 
perhaps  from  Latium  itself.  After  long  wars  with  the  Sicani  they  at 
last  came  to  terms  with  them,  and  agreed  on  frontiers.  But  the 
Siceli  proved  the  most  prolific  or  the  most  permanent  ;  and  the 
island,  once  called  by  Greeks  Trinacria  from  its  three  promon- 
tories,!  and  perhaps  by  others  Sicania,  came  to  be  known  for  all 
time  as  Sicilia.  When  the  Greeks  arrived  they  occupied  all  the  most 
convenient  sites  on  the  coasts,  and  the  Siceli  and  other  barbarians, 
pressed  on  both  sides  by  Greek  and  Carthaginian,  retreated  for  the 
most  part  to  the  centre  of  the  island.  Thus  in  the  time  of 
Thucydides  the  distinction  between  these  tribes  and  the  Greek 
settlers  was  marked  by  the  names  Sicel  and  Siceliot  (S6/ceAo5  and 
2iKeA.twT7ys)  ;  but  though  the  two  remained  distinct  for  some  time, 
the  Sicels  did  not  succeed  in  maintaining  a  national  identity.  For 
a  brief  period,   under  the  leadership  of  Ducetius,  there  seemed  a 

^  For  the  doubt  as  to  the  origin  of  this  word,  see  E.  A.  Freeman,  History  of 
Sicily,  i.  p.  53. 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


The 

distinction 
between  the 
various 
inhabitants 
ignored 
by  the 
Romans. 


Greek 
colo?iies. 


chance  of  their  becoming  a  nation  ;  but  with  his  death  (440)  the 
chance  passed  away.  The  Sicel  towns,  mostly  in  the  centre  of  the 
island,  gradually  became  Hellenised  ;  and  by  the  Roman  the  old 
distinction  between  Sicel  and  Siceliot  was  almost  forgotten,  or  only 
remembered  as  a  matter  of  antiquarian  interest.  In  recounting  the 
dealings  of  Rome  with  Sicily,  Polybius,  living  between  the  second 
and  third  Punic  wars,  always  calls  the  people  Siceliots  (2iKeA.ia)Ta?)  ; 
though,  when  mentioning  the  immigration  from  Italy,  he  speaks  of 
Siceli.i  To  the  Roman  poets  Siculi  and  Sicani  afforded  a  convenient 
variety  in  naming  the  island  or  its  inhabitants  ;  but  to  Roman 
historians  all  alike  were  Siculi,  except  the  encroaching  Carthaginians, 
and  all  alike  were  regarded  as  Greek,  however  much  Sicel,  Sicanian, 
or  Elymian  blood  might  be  in  their  veins. 

The  proportion,  indeed,  of  cities  whose  inhabitants  were  almost 
exclusively  Greek  was  very  great.  In  the  century  and  a  half  which 
followed  the  foundation  of  the  first  Greek  colony  at  Naxos  (735) 
and  at  Syracuse  (734),  new  colonies  sent  from  them  or  from  other 
towns  in  Greece  had  fringed  three  sides  of  it  as  far  south  -  west 
as  Selinus,  and  as  far  north-west  as  Himera.^     Each  town  occupied 


1  xii.  5,  6. 

-  The  principal  Greek  towns  in  Sicily  may  be  arranged  as  follows,  in  reference 
to  their  origin  and  approximate  dates. 

I.  Chalcis  in  Euboea  {Ionian) 


Zankle  725  [Messene] 


Himera  648 
Thermae  408 


"1 
Mylae(7i6?) 


Naxos  735  [after  463  called  Tauromeniutn\ 


Catana  730         Leontini  730 


II.  Corinth  {Dorian) 

1 
Syracuse  734 

I 


I 
Acrae  664 


Casmenae  644  Camarina  599  Aetna  466  Tyndaris  395 

III.  Megara  (/^«/a«  and  Dorian  mixed) 

Thapsus,  removed  to  Megara  Hyblaea  726 
Selinus  628 
Heraclea  Minoa  510 


IV.  Rhodes  {Dorian) 

I 


(Lindus) 
Gela  692 
Agrigentum  582 


(Cnidus) 
.1 
Lipara  580 


J 


XVII  THE  PHOENICIANS  IN  EUROPE  223 

as  much  territory  surrounding  it,  and  attained  supremacy  over  as  its  earlier 
many  hamlets,  as  it  could.     Thus  Sicily  became  for  the  most  part  inhabitants 
Hellenic  :  the  earlier  inhabitants,  hemmed  in  from  the  sea  between  ■"'^"^«"^«- 
Phoenician  and  Greek,  submitted  or  were  gradually  Hellenised. 

The  one  non-Hellenic  power  of  importance  still  remaining  in  the  Sicilian 
island  was  that  of  Carthage.      A  brief  sketch  of  the  vicissitudes  of  ^I'eeks 
the  struggle  between  the  Sicilian  Greeks  and  the  Carthaginians  up  "■^"'  ^^^ 
to   the  time   of  the  departure   of  Pyrrhus    (275)  has  already  been  ^inians 
given.  1     When  he  left  the  island  the  Carthaginians  seem  quickly  to  after 
have  repossessed  themselves  of  all  the  country  lying  west  of  the  river  Pyrrhus. 
Halycus,  which  since  384  had  been  generally  acknowledged  as  the 
limit  of  the  Carthaginian  pale.      Even  east  of  this,  however,  their 
influence  was  now  extending.     Agrigentum  was  cleaving  to  them, 
and  they  were  threatening  the  independence  of  the  eastern  half  of 
the  island.      The  one  strong  state  which  stood   in  their  way  was 
Syracuse,    with    a   territory    including    the    towns    Acrae,    Helorus, 
Netum,   Megara,    Leontini,   and  Tauromenium.      On   the   death   of 
Agathocles    (289)    Syracuse    obtained    some    form    of    democratic  Syracuse 
government,    but    about    270   or  268    Hiero  had  used  his  success  ««^ 
in  war  to  secure   his  election  as  king  ;  and  it  was  he  who  pitted  ^^^^^  ^^■ 
Roman  against  Carthaginian  :   for  it  was   his   vigorous  attempt   to 
crush  the  marauding  mercenaries  who  had  seized  Messene  which 
caused    an   appeal   from  one   party  within   that  town   to   the   Car- 
thaginians   and    from    the    other    to    Rome.      Hiero,    indeed,    soon 
retired  from  the  contest,  and,  making  a  firm  friendship  with  Rome, 
watched  the  two  great  powers  fight  out  the  question  which  of  them 
was  to  be  supreme  in  Sicily. 

The  Phoenicians  are  said  to  have  come  originally  from  the  The 
shores  of  the  Persian  Gulf.  From  time  immemorial  however  they  Phoe- 
had  dwelt  in  the  north  of  Palestine,  and  Tyre  had  been  their  chief  «^^««^-^- 
town.  They  were  active  mariners  and  traders,  and  before  the  dawn 
of  certain  history  had  sent  out  their  adventurers  to  all  parts  of  the 
Mediterranean.  The  coasts  of  Asia  Minor,  Greece,  Africa,  and 
Spain  all  bore  traces  of  their  presence.  So  also  did  the  islands  as 
far  north  as  Thasos,  as  far  south  as  Crete  and  Rhodes,  and  as  far 
west  as  Sicily  and  Sardinia.  They  had  even  passed  the  Pillars  of 
Hercules,  and  perhaps  had  visited  the  Scilly  Isles  or  even  the 
greater  Island  of  Britain.  Wherever  there  were  metals  to  be  dug, 
or  goods  to  be  exchanged,  the  Phoenician  found  his  way,  and  left 
traces  of  his  presence  in  the  debris  of  excavated  mines,  or  in  the 
factories  which  had  in  many  cases  grown  to  be  towns.  Among 
these  none  was  richer  or  more  powerful  than  the  famous  city  on  the 
Gulf  of  Tunis.  It  was  situated  on  the  point  of  the  African  shore 
^  See  pp.  192-194. 


224  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap. 

where  there  is  an  almost  solitary  break  in  the  line  of  inaccessible 
cliff,  and  where  it  stretches  farthest  towards  Sicily.  Being  con- 
trasted with  an  older  settlement  called  Utica,  it  received  the  name 
of  the  New  Town  —  Karth-hadha,  Hellenised  into  Karchedon  and 
Latinised  into  Carthago. 

Both  the  time  and  the  manner  of  its  foundation  are  as  usual 
uncertain.  The  tradition  as  to  the  time  varied  between  the  date 
of  the  foundation  of  Rome  and  a  century  or  more  earlier.  Nearly 
all  our  authorities,  however,  agree  in  assigning  its  foundation  to  a 
band  of  fugitives  from  Tyre  led  by  Dido,  or  Elissa,  when  she 
escaped  for  her  life  from  her  jealous  brother  Pygmalion.  Landing 
on  the  coast  of  Africa  she  is  said  to  have  purchased  from  the  natives 
for  the  site  of  her  city  as  much  ground  as  could  be  covered  by  an 
ox  hide  (Pvpcra).  By  cutting  the  hide  into  thin  shreds  a  sufficient  area 
was  enclosed,  and  hence  the  new  citadel  was  called  Byrsa.  It  is  true 
that  Elissa  is  a  Semitic  word  for  a  goddess,  and  that  Byrsa  is  the 
corruption  of  another  word,  Bosrah,  which  means  a  "fortress." 
But  tradition  knows  nothing  of  such  rationalising  ;  and  the  legend, 
true  or  false,  has  at  any  rate  been  made  immortal  by  Vergil.  Per- 
haps the  real  truth  is  that  the  city  was  never  "  founded  "  at  all ;  but 
that  a  factory  or  emporium,  like  others  built  by  the  Phoenicians,  was 
set  up  on  the  site  of  the  future  city,  and  from  the  advantages  of  its 
position  gradually  attracted  trade  and  inhabitants.  Its  Phoenician 
origin  admits  of  no  doubt ;  and  the  Romans  showed  their  recognition 
of  the  fact  by  calling  its  inhabitants  Poem,  which,  with  its  adjective 
Fum'cus,  is  used  by  their  writers  along  with  Carthaginie7ises  to 
indicate  the  inhabitants  of  Phoenician  Carthage. 
Supremacy  We   do    not   know  the   steps   by  which   Carthage   attained   the 

of  Carthage  supremacy  in  Africa  which  we  find  her  possessing  at  the  time  of 
\t\igy.  her    earliest    connexion    with    Rome.       About    the    period    of    the 

Phoenician   beginning  of  the  Roman    Republic  she  ceased  to  pay  rent  to  the 
cities.  native  tribes  for  the  site  of  the  city  :  and  in  the  course  of  the  next 

(2)  Over       hundred  years  had  forced  all  the  Libyans  who  were  living  a  settled 
^-^f  life  in  the  country  to  become  her  subjects  ;  while  the  nomad  tribes, 

t  yans.  though  remaining  independent,  constantly  supplied  mercenaries  to 
her  armies.  She  had  moreover  established  her  supremacy  over 
other  and  older  Phoenician  settlements  in  Africa,  such  as  Tunes, 
Utica,  Hippo,  Leptis,  and  Hadrumetum.  The  nature  of  her  rule  over 
these  dependencies  seems  to  have  been  in  ordinary  times  neither 
better  nor  worse  than  that  of  other  great  mercantile  oligarchies. 
It  does  not  appear  that  an  invader  found  it  easy  to  raise  the  country 
against  the  Carthaginian  government  ;  and  even  after  the  first  war 
with  Rome,  during  which  their  subjects  had  been  exasperated  by 
increased  taxation  and  burdensome  requisitions,  it  was  not  until  the 


226 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Foreign 
dominions 
of  Car- 
thage. 


(/)  Sicily, 

(2)  Corsica 
and 
Sardinia, 

[3)  Spain. 


Cartha- 
ginians in 
Sicily. 
Phoeniciaji 
settle7nents 
at  Motye, 
Panormus, 
and  Soloeis. 

Lilybaeum. 


Advan- 
tages of 
the  Cartha- 
ginians 
over  the 
Greeks. 


mercenary  war  had  lasted  some  months  that  certain  of  the  towns 
were  induced  to  join  the  general  revolt. 

But  it  was  not  only  in  Libya  that  the  Carthaginians  exercised 
influence  or  rule.  Their  merchants  sought  outlets  for  their  traffic 
in  other  countries  ;  and  when  they  found  Phoenician  factories  already 
existing,  or  erected  new  ones  themselves,  settlers  from  Carthage 
were  attracted  and  towns  gradually  grew  into  permanent  import- 
ance. The  earliest  of  such  settlements  were  probably  those  in 
Sicily,  followed  about  500  to  480  by  others  in  Sardinia.  There 
were  also  numerous  trading  centres  established  in  Spain.  But 
whereas  at  the  opening  of  the  Roman  war  Sardinia  was  entirely 
under  the  rule  of  Carthage,  it  was  not  until  Sardinia  was  wrested 
from  her  by  the  Romans  that  systematic  efforts  were  made  to 
establish  Carthaginian  rule  in  Spain.  In  Sicily,  as  we  have  seen, 
the  Carthaginians  had  firmly  established  themselves.  Motye, 
Panormus,  and  Soloeis  had  been  occupied  by  Phoenicians  before 
them.  These  then  were  the  original  centres  of  Carthaginian 
settlement  in  Sicily  ;  and  the  splendid  harbour  of  Panormus  afforded 
shelter  to  their  largest  fleets.  It  was  not  until  Motye  was 
destroyed  by  Dionysius,  in  397,  that  the  remnants  of  its  Phoenician 
inhabitants  took  possession  of  the  site  of  Lilybaeum  and  there 
erected  fortifications  and  defences.  Between  that  date  and  the 
beginning  of  the  war  with  Rome  it  had  grown  to  be  the  strongest 
and  most  important  city  possessed  by  them.  It  was  the  most 
convenient  point  for  ships  coming  from  Africa :  it  stood  on  a 
peninsula  protected  on  the  land  side  by  a  huge  ditch  and  wall ; 
it  resisted  all  the  efforts  of  Pyrrhus  to  take  it ;  and  for  ten  years 
held  out  against  the  utmost  exertions  of  the  Roman  legions. 

Thus  holding  the  best  points  on  the  west  coast,  the  Carthaginians 
had  for  more  than  two  centuries  striven  for  mastery  over  the  whole 
island  with  the  Greek  settlers  who  had  established  themselves  in 
other  parts  of  it.  In  this  struggle  they  had  an  advantage  over  the 
Greeks  in  the  fact  that  they  were  not  merely  the  inhabitants  of  one 
Sicilian  town  or  district  contending  with  those  of  another :  they 
were  backed  by  a  great  and  powerful  mother  city  who  despatched 
and  paid  armies  and  fleets,  and  to  whom  the  loss  of  armies  as 
a  rule  meant  the  loss,  not  of  great  bodies  of  citizens,  but  of  so  much 
money.  The  Greeks  had  always  more  at  stake  than  the  Car- 
thaginians, and  less  power  of  immediate  recuperation  after  defeat.  A 
loss  of  a  battle  to  the  Greek  cities  frequently  meant  the  loss,  at  any 
rate  for  a  time,  of  liberty  :  it  often  meant  the  destruction  and 
desolation  of  more  than  one  city.  It  was  only  one  Greek  sovereign, 
Agathocles  of  Syracuse,  who  had  conceived  the  bold  idea  of 
carrying    the  war  up   to    the    gates   of   Carthage   herself.      To  the 


XVII      COMPARISON  OF  ROMANS  AND  CARTHAGINIANS       227 

Carthaginian  merchants  Sicily  was  a  possession  which  their  interests 
and  their  pride  alike  urged  them  to  do  their  utmost  to  retain  :  but 
to  them  the  loss  of  one  army  brought  no  widespread  mourning  or 
despair  ;  the  bulk  of  it  consisted  of  foreign  mercenaries  who  could  be 
replaced  by  others,  and  whose  survival  at  the  end  of  a  campaign  was 
a  matter  of  indifference,  if  not  of  positive  disadvantage,  to  the  home 
government.  As  long  as  their  wealth  held  out  and  their  fleets 
dominated  the  sea,  there  would  be  no  hope  of  finally  driving  the 
men  of  Carthage  from  Sicily. 

Thus    though    the    treaty    of   3S4    fixed    the    Halycus    as    the   The 
boundary    of     the     Carthaginians,     and     though    the    victory    of  Cartha- 
Timoleon  on  the  Crimisus  in  340  had  for  some  years  suppressed  all  'jj/y^^^^f/ 
attempts  on  their  part  to  encroach  beyond  it  ;  yet  before  another  of  ifie 
generation  had  passed  away  such  attempts  recur  again  and  again.  Halycus. 
Repelled  by  Agathocles  (317-298)  and  by  Pyrrhus  (278-275),  the 
ultimate  failure  of  the  latter  once  more  opened  a  way  to  them.     And 
when  the  question  of  Messene  brought  the  Roman  into  Sicily,  he 
found  them  not  only  safely  possessed  of  the  recognised  Carthaginian 
territory,  but  pushing  their  arms  and  influence  into  the  eastern  half 
of  the  island. 

The  struggle,  however,  was  not  merely  between  the  Romans  and  Romans 
the  Carthaginian  settlers  in  Sicily,  but  between  Rome  and  Carthage,  ^^^ 
each  city  using  its  utmost  efforts  and  straining  its  resources  to  the  ^f^ian's 
full.  The  reasons  therefore  of  the  final  result  of  that  struggle  must  compared. 
be  sought  in  the  position  and  character  of  the  two  peoples.  Of  the 
energy  and  public  virtues  of  the  Romans  we  have  perhaps  already 
got  a  sufficiently  clear  view  in  following  them  through  their  struggles 
with  their  near  neighbours  the  Latins,  Aequians,  and  Volscians, 
with  the  ancient  civilisation  of  Etruria,  the  intruding  barbarism  of 
the  Gaul,  the  dogged  resistance  of  the  mountaineers  of  Samnium, 
and  the  better  instructed  though  less  warlike  Greek  of  south  Italy. 
Of  the  Carthaginians  it  is  less  easy  to  gain  a  clear  or  well- 
founded  notion.  We  know  them  almost  entirely  from  their  enemies. 
Their  literature  perished  with  them.  The  conquering  Roman  in 
contempt  bestowed  the  contents  of  the  libraries  of  Carthage  on 
the  Numidian  princes,  and  nothing  survives  but  one  short  journal, 
in  a  Greek  version,  of  a  naval  explorer.  One  other  book  was 
preserved  and  translated  into  Latin,  Mago's  treatise  on  agriculture, 
and  was  long  used  as  an  authoritative  handbook.  That  too  has 
perished.  Even  the  ruins  of  the  town  are  gone,  as  well  as  those  of 
the  Roman  colony  and  of  the  mediaeval  city  which  at  long  intervals  of 
time  occupied  its  site.  Nature  herself  has  aided  the  work  of 
oblivion  in  altering  the  line  of  coast  and  changing  what  were  once 
open  bays  and  harbours  into  shallow  lagoons.      It  is  indeed  a  case 


I 


228 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Constiiu- 
Hon  of 
Carthase. 


The 
Suffetes. 


of  vae  victis  /  The  Carthaginians  grew  to  be  a  great  people,  spread 
their  power  abroad,  conquered  other  nations  and  gathered  wealth,  until, 
coming  in  contact  with  a  people  stronger  than  themselves,  they  fell 
irretrievably,  and  with  their  existence  as  a  people  lost  the  right  and 
power  of  making  themselves  heard  before  the  world.  Polybius, 
though  favourable  to  Rome,  had  an  admirable  idea  of  historical 
impartiality,  but  though  we  have  his  narrative  of  the  first  war  with 
Rome,  and  many  valuable  fragments  in  regard  to  the  other  two,  yet 
his  complete  account  of  the  constitution  of  Carthage  has  almost  all 
been  lost. 

He  tells  us  that  when  Rome  and  Carthage  came  into  collision 
the  constitution  of  Rome  was  at  its  zenith,  that  of  Carthage  in  its 
decline.  Constitutions,  according  to  him,  go  through  a  regular 
cycle,  beginning  with  kingship,  which,  degenerating  to  tyranny,  is 
replaced  by  aristocracy — the  rule  of  the  best  men.  This  is  corrupted 
into  oligarchy,  and  is  therefore  displaced  by  democracy.  This  in 
time,  corrupted  into  mob-rule,  leads  once  more  to  tyranny.  In  his 
view  Rome  was  at  the  stage  nearest  to  the  ideally  best  mixture  of 
absolutism,  oligarchy,  and  democracy  in  which  the  best  men  bear 
sway.  Carthage  was  at  the  stage  when  mob-rule  begins.  The 
degeneracy  is  marked  by  the  decline  in  the  power  of  the  Suffetes  ^ 
{Shophetiin,  "judges")  and  of  the  Gerusia  or  Senate,  and  by  the 
increased  interference  of  the  people  in  State  affairs.  He  cannot 
mean,  however,  that  a  formal  change  had  taken  place.  There  had 
always  been  an  assembly  or  ecclesia,  composed  of  all  full  citizens,  in 
which  ultimately  resided  the  supreme  power.  It  was  a  change  of 
custom  rather  than  of  law.  In  earlier  times  the  assembly  seems  not 
to  have  been  consulted  except  in  the  case  of  a  difference  of  opinion 
between  the  Suffetes  and  the  Senate.  It  is  in  this  respect  that  a 
change  may  perhaps  be  traced.  It  was  still  the  Suffetes  and  Senate 
who  received  the  Roman  envoys  in  219,  and  accepted  their  declara- 
tion of  war ;  but  it  was  apparently  the  general  assembly  which 
Hannibal  persuaded  to  accept  the  terms  offered  by  Scipio  after  the 
battle  of  Zama  in  202.2  xhe  change  was  a  natural  result  of  a  long 
period  of  varying  but  on  the  whole  unsuccessful  war,  when  it  would 
be  impossible  to  suppress  popular  excitement,  which  found  a  vent  at 
Carthage  in  formidable  riots,  and  would  have  to  be  appeased  by  a 
reference  of  the  measures  to  be  taken  to  the  popular  will.^  Another 
change  which  had  come  upon  the  government  of  Carthage  was  in 
the  direction  of  oligarchy  rather  than  democracy.  The  earliest 
arrangement  known  to  us  was  that  by  which  the  chief  power  resided  I 
with  the  Suffetes,  the  two  "kings"  elected  by  the  people.      They] 


1  Always  called  kings  (jSaciXets)  by  Greek  writers. 
2  Polyb.  iii.  20,  33  ;  xv.  19.  ^  Jb.  vi. 


31- 


XVII  CONSTITUTION  OF  CARTHAGE  229 

were  not  indeed  confined  to  the  members  of  a  particular  family,  nor 
elected  for  life.  But  they  might,  it  appears,  be  indefinitely  re-elected, 
and  while  in  office  dealt  with  foreign  states  as  kings ;  and  though 
controlled  at  home  in  some  degree  by  the  Sen  ate,  ^  were  supreme 
when  acting  as  generals  at  the  head  of  the  army.^  But  some  time 
before  Aristotle  wrote  (about  B.C.  330)  a  change  had  taken  place. 
Another  body  of  104  members,  often  spoken  of  as  "the  Hundred," 
had  come  into  existence,  elected  originally  by  boards  of  five  or 
Pentarchies.  These  Pentarchies  had,  it  seems,  been  originally  The 
elected  by  the  people ;  but  whether  "the  Hundred"  filled  up  vacancies  Hundred. 
themselves,  or  whether  popular  elections  were  corrupted  by  a  vast 
system  of  bribery,  it  seems  certain  that  by  some  means  membership 
of  "  the  Hundred  "  became  like  other  offices  the  exclusive  possession 
of  the  wealthy,  and  that  it  acquired  an  overwhelming  power  over 
every  other  office  in  the  State.  Like  the  Ephors  of  Sparta,  the  original 
function  of  the  Hundred  was  to  watch  and  control  the  magistrates 
rather  than  to  administer  the  government  itself  Especially  over 
the  generals  in  command  of  armies,  even  when  these  generals  were 
the  Suffistes,  their  hand  was  heavy.  It  is  probably  a  later  develop- 
ment of  this  body  that  is  meant  by  Livy  in  his  description  of  the  ordo 
judicum :  "  They  held  office,"  he  says,  "  for  life  ;  every  one's  pro- 
perty, reputation,  and  life  were  in  their  hands.  Offend  one  of  them, 
the  whole  order  were  your  enemies  ;  and  with  judges  thus  hostile  no 
accuser  was  needed."  It  was  apparently  the  rise  of  the  power  of 
this  body  that  changed  the  position  of  the  Suffetes.  They  ceased  to 
command  armies,  and  gradually  became  the  ornamental  rather  than 
the  real  head  of  the  State.  The  real  power  was  in  the  hands  of  the 
Hundred,  the  body  once  chosen  on  consideration  of  merit,  but  now 
closed  to  all  but  the  wealthy.  The  close  oligarchy  thus  formed  was 
tempered  by  the  occasional  interference  of  the  people.  But  such  The 
interference  was  not  that  of  a  body  trained  by  the  regular  perform-  eccksia. 
ance  of  civic  duties,  and  accustomed,  like  the  ecclesia  of  a  free 
Greek  state,  to  have  ordinary  business  brought  before  it.  It  was 
rather  the  occasional  outburst  of  discontent  at  an  incompetent  or 
unsuccessful  government.  On  the  side  of  the  governing  families, 
again,  there  was  constant  jealousy  of  successful  generals,  especially 
when,  as  in  the  case  of  the  great  family  of  Barca,  these  generals 
belonged  to  the  democratical  party  in  the  State.  This  jealousy 
perhaps  had  the  useful  effect  of  preventing  the  rise  of  a  tyranny ; 
but  it  acted  fatally  in  hampering  and  discouraging  able  generals, 
and  preventing  the  growth  of  a  feeling  of  civic  duty,  prepared  to 

^  The  number  of  the  Senate  is  not  known,  but  there  appears  to  have  been  a 
smaller  council  of  thirty,  which  practically  did  the  business  brought  nominally 
before  the  larger  body.  2  isocrates,  Nico.  24. 


230 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


The  em- 
ployment 
of  mer- 
ce?iaries. 


Mercen- 
aries 
compared 
%vith  citizen 
soldiers. 


Character- 
istics 
affecting 
the  result 
of  the 
struggle. 


sacrifice  wealth  or  comfort  for  the  service  or  the  protection  of  the 
State. 

This  tendency  was  increased  by  the  habit  of  employing  mer- 
cenary soldiers.  Some  of  the  citizens  devoted  themselves  to  military 
affairs,  and  the  generals  were  nearly  always  Carthaginians,  while  a 
larger  number  probably  served  on  board  ship ;  but  the  bulk  of  the 
armies  sent  abroad  were  hired  from  other  lands,  from  the  nomad 
Africans,  from  Campania,  Etruria,  or  Gaul.  The  advantages  of  a 
mercenary  army  are  obvious.  It  enables  a  state  to  carry  on  a 
foreign  war  without  serious  interruption  to  business  or  comfort ;  so 
long  as  victory  is  secured,  the  loss  of  life  involved  is  advantageous 
rather  than  the  reverse  to  the  government ;  the  cessation  of  hostili- 
ties does  not  flood  the  country  with  a  number  of  citizens  who  have 
lost  taste  or  capacity  for  ordinary  business  or  employments  ;  the 
men  return  to  their  own  lands  or  to  another  employer,  and  all  obli- 
gations towards  the  soldiers  end  with  discharge  of  the  wages  agreed 
upon.  Such  soldiers,  moreover,  were  not  liable  to  political  influences  ; 
their  one  object  was  to  earn  their  pay,  and  that  was  best  secured  by 
the  success  of  the  master  whom  they  served.  On  the  other  hand,  they 
had  no  feeling  of  loyalty  or  patriotism,  and  were  apt  to  be  dangerous 
to  their  employers  when  the  campaign  was  over,  if  any  dispute  arose 
as  to  the  amount  of  pay  or  bounty  to  which  they  felt  themselves 
entitled.  Moreover,  the  result  of  the  struggle  with  Rome  would 
seem  to  show  that  after  all  the  purchased  fidelity  of  foreign  mercen- 
aries was  in  the  long  run  no  sufificient  match  for  the  nobler  passion 
of  patriotism.  "The  Romans,"  says  Polybius,  "are  never  so  dan- 
gerous as  when  they  seem  reduced  to  desperation."  The  citizen 
levies  of  Rome  were  again  and  again  beaten  by  the  professional 
fighters  purchased  by  the  wealth  of  Carthage  ;  the  fleets  of  Rome 
were  again  and  again  destroyed  from  the  incompetency  of  her 
navigators  or  the  superiority  of  the  skilled  Phoenician  seamen  :  but 
when  one  army  perished  fresh  levies  of  citizens  were  ready  to  take 
its  place  ;  and  the  waves  had  scarcely  closed  over  one  hastily-built 
fleet  Avhen  the  indefatigable  Romans  were  felling  timber  and  training 
rowers  to  form  and  man  another. 

It  is  not  indeed  sufficient  in  estimating  the  causes  of  the  Roman 
success  to  look  merely  to  the  quality  of  the  forces  that  had  to  be 
encountered  in  the  field.  Behind  these  mercenary  armies  was  a 
nation  whose  activity  and  enterprise  accumulated  the  wealth  which 
supported  the  fleets  and  armies,  and  the  amount  of  whose  courage 
and  persistency  must  determine  both  the  length  and  effectiveness  of 
the  war.  When  driven  to  bay  indeed,  as  in  the  siege  of  their  city, 
the  Carthaginians  showed  in  actual  conflict  a  desperate  courage  and 
dogged    resolution   equalled    by   scarcely  any   people,   except    their 


XVII  THE  CITY  OF  CARTHAGE  231 

kinsfolk  at  Tyre.  These  qualities  were  not  without  their  influence 
in  protracting  the  long  struggle  with  Rome.  Plutarch,  who  is  prob- 
ably copying  hostile  authorities,  describes  them  as  "  resentful  and 
gloomy,  submissive  to  rulers,  harsh  to  subjects,  most  ignoble  in 
panics,  most  savage  in  wrath,  persistent  in  purpose,  without  taste  or 
feeling  for  the  lighter  arts  and  graces."  ^  But  though  their  treatment 
of  their  Libyan  subjects  seems  to  lend  a  colour  to  one  part  of  this 
indictment,  yet  neither  in  Sicily  nor  in  Spain  does  their  rule  appear 
to  have  been  uniformly  disliked,  and  the  wonderful  family  of  Barca 
— the  sons  of  thunder  or  Barak — is  a  sufficient  proof  that  they  could 
produce  men  endowed  with  the  highest  faculties  both  for  adminis- 
tration and  command. 

That  in  spite  of  great  wealth  and  luxury,  and  of  the  possession  Defects  of 
of  a  literature,  and  of  high  skill  in  building  and  engineering,  the  P^nic 
Carthaginians  had  little  or  no  genius  for  art  and  philosophy,  as  S^"^^^- 
understood  by  the  Greek,  seems  only  too  likely.  The  Roman  con- 
quered the  Greek  as  well  as  the  Carthaginian,  but  what  there  was 
in  the  Greek  better  than  in  the  Roman  survived  and  conquered  the 
conqueror.  When  Ambracia,  Tarentum,  or  Corinth  was  sacked, 
Rome  was  made  splendid  by  the  works  of  art  which  the  victor,  if  he 
did  not  understand,  at  least  saw  to  be  worth  preserving.  But  no 
model  of  beauty  or  grace,  no  work  of  sculptor  or  painter,  was  brought 
from  Carthage.  No  student  ransacked  the  libraries  of  Carthage,  and 
gave  their  contents  in  whatever  new  dress  to  Greek  or  Roman.  No 
great  teacher  or  reformer  in  thought  or  morals  claimed  Carthage  as  his 
home.  After  all  such  characteristics  have  been  taken  into  considera- 
tion, whether  of  polity  or  circumstance,  the  ultimate  reason  of  the 
Roman  success  is  best  expressed  by  Polybius,  in  the  memorable 
chapter  in  which  he  discusses  the  causes  which  eventually  gave  the 
Romans  the  victory  :  "  The  fact  is  that  Italians  as  a  nation  are  by 
nature  superior  to  Phoenicians  and  Libyans  both  in  strength  of  body 
and  courage  of  soul."  2  That  is  the  root  of  the  matter,  from  which 
all  else  is  a  natural  growth. 

The  city  of  Carthage  itself  must  at  the  period  of  the  beginning  The  city  of 
of  the  Roman  war  have  been  far  superior  to  its  rival.      It  was  said  Carthage 
to   contain    700,000   inhabitants   and    to    embrace    in    its    territory  ^"   .^ "! 
300  cities  in  Libya :  while  its  foreign  dominions  included,  besides 
nearly  two-thirds  of  Sicily,  the  Balearic  Isles,  Corsica  and  Sardinia, 
with  many  trading  settlements  in  Spain  south  of  a  line  joining  the 
Tagus  and  Ebro.      The  hill  on  which  was  built  its  citadel  or  Byrsa 
was  near  the  extremity  of  a  peninsula  connected  with  the  mainland 
by  an  isthmus  about  three  miles  broad.      To  the  south  was  the  lake 

^   Plut.  reip.  gei:  praecepta,  3.  2  polyb.  vi,  52. 


232  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap,  xvii 

of  Tunis,  cut  off  from  the  open  gulf  by  a  narrow  strip  of  land  called 
the  Taenia,  at  that  time  apparently  with  an  entrance  to  the  sea  wider 
than  the  present  Goletta,  and  forming  an  open  harbour  or  roadstead. 
Besides  this  there  were  two  artificial  harbours  or  docks.'  The  first 
was  an  oblong,  nearly  1400  feet  in  length,  surrounded  by  a  double 
wall,  with  a  narrow  entrance  from  the  gulf:  this  was  called  the 
"  Merchants'  Harbour "  ;  and  from  it  again  a  narrow  channel  led 
into  a  round  harbour  called  the  Cothon^  or  "drinking  cup"  (also 
surrounded  with  strong  walls),  in  the  middle  of  which  was  an  islet 
used  as  the  headquarters  of  the  chief  admiral,  and  joined  by  a  bridge 
to  the  road  leading  straight  to  the  Forum.  To  the  north  of  the 
town  was  a  deep  gulf,  now  also  by  the  formation  of  fresh  land 
become  a  salt  lake  {Salinae).  Between  the  Byrsa  and  the  open  sea 
on  the  east  ran  a  single  wall,  following  in  part  a  line  of  hills, 
which  in  many  places  required  little  strengthening.  Towards 
the  mainland  the  isthmus  was  defended,  but  apparently  not  at  its 
narrowest  point,  by  a  triple  line  of  fortifications,  the  outer 
wall  being  forty-five  feet  high,  with  towers  at  intervals  of  200  feet. 
The  spaces  between  the  walls  were  occupied  by  barracks,  magazines, 
stables  for  elephants,  and  all  the  munitions  of  war.  The  whole 
peninsula  thus  enclosed  was  about  thirty  miles  in  circuit,  includ- 
ing the  city  itself  and  its  great  suburb  called  Megara  or  Magaha. 
Thus  the  home  of  the  great  commercial  people,  who  were  now  to 
enter  upon  a  century  of  struggle  with  Rome,  at  first  for  supremacy 
in  the  western  Mediterranean  and  then  for  bare  life,  was  not  only  a 
great  city  but  a  vast  fortified  and  entrenched  camp,  stored  with  all 
the  necessaries  for  sustaining  a  siege  or  carrying  on  war,  and  pro- 
tected by  almost  impregnable  defences. 

Authorities. — The  history  of  the  Carthaginians  in  Sicily  mostly  rests  on 
Diodorus  Siculus  xx.  and  onward,  with  notices  in  Strabo  ii.  and  Plutarch's 
Timoleon  and  PyrrJms.  Our  knowledge  of  the  origin  and  constitution  of 
Carthage,  as  far  as  they  are  imperfectly  known,  depends  mainly  on  Polybius  i.  3, 
73.  75  I  vi.  43,  45,  51,  56  ;  xxvi.  4,  and  other  passages  :  on  scattered  passages 
in  Livy,  such  as  xxviii.  37  ;  xxx.  7  ;  xxxiii.  46  ;  his  formal  account  of  them  having 
been  in  the  lost  sixteenth  book,  of  which  the  epitome  preserves  nothing  on  this 
head.  The  most  continuous  narrative  is  that  of  Justin,  xviii.  3-7  ;  xix.  1-3,  and 
books  xxii.  and  xxiii.  An  important  notice  appears  in  Aristotle,  Pol.  ii.  11,  and 
some  particulars  are  given  in  Appian,  Pun.  i,  2  ;  and  more  details  as  to  situation 
and  general  history  by  Strabo  xvii.  3    14,  15,  and  other  passages. 


CHAPTER   XVIII 


THE    FIRST 

PUNIC   WAR 

264 

-242 

COLONIES 

TRIBES 

Aesernia  in  Samnium 

B.C.  263 

Velina    \ 
Quirina  J 

B.C. 

Aesium  in  Umbria     . 

B.C.  247 

241 

Alsium  in  Etruria 

B.C.  247 

PROVINCES 

Fregenae  in  Etruria    . 

B.C.   245 

Sicily 

B.C. 

241 

Brundisium  in  Calabria 

B.C.   244 

Corsica  and  Sardinia 

B.C. 

238 

Spoletium  in  Umbria 

B.C.    241 

CENSUS 

B.C.  265  .  .  292,224 
B.C.  252  .  .  297,797 
B.C.  245      .     .   251,222 

First  Punic  war — First  Period  (264-262) — Help  sent  to  Messana  at  the  request  of 
the  Mamertini— Claudius  enters  Messana — Battle  with  Hiero,  and  with  the 
Carthaginians — The  siege  of  Syracuse  (263) — The  consuls  lay  siege  to  Agri- 
gentum — Hiero  makes  alliance  with  Rome — Many  cities  in  Italy  join  the 
Romans  —  Fall  of  Agrigentum  (262).  Second  Period  (261-255)  —  The 
Romans  build  a  fleet — Loss  of  the  consul  Scipio — Victory  of  Duilius  at 
Mylae  (260) — Relief  of  Segesta,  siege  of  Hippana,  Mytistratum,  Camarina 
(259-258)  —  Naval  battle  off  Tyndaris  (257)  —  Battle  of  Ecnomus,  the 
Romans  land  in  Africa  :  after  successful  campaign  Regulus  is  left  for  the 
winter  at  Clupea  with  half  the  army  (256) — Defeat  and  capture  of  Regulus 
(255). 


From  the  long  struggle  with  the  Samnite  and  the  war  with  Pyrrhus   Causes 0/ 
the    Romans    emerged    masters   of    Italy   from    Cis-Alpine   Gaul  to  the  jealousy 
Rhegium.      They  had  suffered  much,  but  were  the  more  vigorous  :  f,^^' 
and  elate  with  their  triumph  they  were  eagerly  looking  out  for  oppor- 
tunities of  recruiting  their  forces   and   enlarging  their   field  of  com- 
mercial enterprise.      But   in   whichever  direction  they  turned  their 
eyes  for  such  purposes  they  were  confronted  by  the  power  of  Car- 
thage.     Her  supremacy  at  sea  was  as  yet  beyond  the  thought   of 
rivalry.     She  had  lodgment  in  Corsica,  was  supreme  in  Sardinia,  and 
held  Lipara  and  other  islands  in  the  Sardinian  and  Tyrrhenian  seas, 


234  HISTORY  OF  ROME 


thus  threatening  the  whole  western  coast  of  Italy.  Though  as  yet 
Rome  had  no  political  or  military  dealings  with  Spain,  yet  her 
merchants,  if  they  entered  it,  would  find  Phoenician  settlements  and 
Carthaginian  rivalry.  But  it  was  on  the  south  that  the  danger 
seemed  most  imminent.  Half  Sicily  was  already  Carthaginian, 
and  it  seemed  likely  that  the  eastern  portion  of  the  island,  whenever 
opportunity  served,  would  be  absorbed  by  the  same  encroaching 
power.  If  that  were  to  take  place,  if  Messana  was  held  by  a 
Carthaginian  garrison,  or  if  the  ships  of  Carthage  were  to  ride  at 
will  in  the  harbour  of  Syracuse,  there  would  be  little  doubt  that  the 
cities  of  southern  and  south-eastern  Italy  would  soon  have  to  fight 
for  their  freedom ;  and  at  any  rate  Roman  commerce  would  be 
hemmed  in  and  curtailed  on  every  side.  Jealousy  between  the  two 
peoples  was  inevitable.  It  was  well,  after  the  quarrel  had  begun,  to 
appeal  to  the  conduct  of  the  Carthaginians  at  Tarentum  in  272,1  or 
to  the  intrigues  of  Rome  with  Hiero  :  the  immediate  excuse  mattered 
little  ;  the  two  nations  were  bound  sooner  or  later  to  decide  which 
should  be  supreme  in  the  western  Mediterranean,  and  that  decision 
could  only  be  by  war. 
The  The  actual  excuse  for  hostilities  was  furnished  by  the  Mamertines. 

At  the  death  of  Agathocles,  tyrant  of  Syracuse,  in  289,  some  of  his 
Campanian  mercenaries  calling  themselves  by  this  name,  —  from 
Marmor,  the  Oscan  form  of  Mars, — seized  on  the  town  of  Messana. 
Having  been  hospitably  entertained  by  the  Messanians  they  got 
possession  of  the  citadel,  massacred  or  expelled  the  fullgrown 
citizens,  and  retained  the  women  and  children  for  their  own  use, 
dividing  the  territory  among  themselves.  This  lawless  occupation 
of  a  Greek  town,  and  the  cruel  murder  or  exile  of  Greek  citizens,  was 
bad  enough  ;  but  they  also  used  the  town  thus  taken  as  a  starting- 
place  from  which  to  plunder  the  country  and  attack  cities  as 
far  as  Gela  and  Camarina.  The  only  State  which  was  capable  of 
resisting  them  was  Syracuse.  Year  by  year  her  mercenary  troops 
were  employed  during  the  summer  in  waylaying  plundering 
parties  from  Messana  or  threatening  the  town  itself.  But  the 
intestine  disorders  which  generally  broke  out  as  soon  as  the  troops 
were  on  the  march  paralysed  the  effectiveness  of  the  Syracusan 
operations.  It  was  not  until  a  quarrel  between  the  citizens  and  the 
army  had  resulted  in  the  rise  to  power  of  the  bold  and  active  Hiero, 
that  attacks  were  made  upon  the  Mamertines  sufficiently  concentrated 
and  formidable  to  make  it  necessary  for  them  to  look  elsewhere  for 
help.  As  soon  as  he  had  obtained  supreme  power  in  the  State, 
and  had  got  rid  of  the  mercenary  army,  to  which  to  some  extent  he 


Mainer 
tines. 


^  See  p.  199. 


XVIII  KING  HIERO  AND  THE  MAMERTINES  235 

owed    his  own    advancement,    Hiero  drilled  levies  of  citizens,  that  Hiero 
he  might  no  longer  be  at  the  mercy  of  the  new  mercenaries  which  becomes 
he  had  hired,  and  in  two  or  three  years  felt  strong  enough  to  strike  ^^^^^  ^"■ 
an  effective  blow  at  the  Mamertines,  who  had  been  encouraged  by  abaiit  214. 
long  suspension  of  Syracusan  attacks  to  carry  on  their  plundering 
excursions  with  greater   confidence   than   usual.      On   the   plain    of  Victory 
Mylae  he  inflicted  a  severe  defeat  upon  them,  taking  many  important  of  Mylae, 
prisoners  and  shutting  the  rest  up  in  their  town,  which  was  only  ^^o-  Htero 
saved  from  capture   by    the    help    of  a    Carthaginian    force   under  king  of 
Hannibal,  of  whom,  however,  the  Mamertines  appear  to  have  got  Syracuse. 
rid  again  shortly  afterwards.      This  victory  secured  Hiero  the  title  of 
king ;  and  it  was  gained  about   the  same  time  that   the   Romans 
had  captured  the  mutinous  garrison  at  Rhegium.      Whilst  Rhegium 
was  in  the  hands  of  men  guilty  of  the  same  crime  as  the  Mamertines 
the  two  towns   had   been   in   league,  and  had  mutually  supported 
each  other  in  their  depredations.     This  was  now  at  an  end  ;  and 
the   Mamertines,   so  far  from  being  able  to  plunder  the  country  at 
will,  were  in  constant  fear  for  the  safety  of  their  town  and  their  own 
lives  before  the  ever-increasing  power  of  Hiero,     But  there  was  a  A  Cartha- 
conflict  of  opinion  among  them  as  to  the  source  from  which  help  g^^ian 
should  be  sought.      Some  were  for  inviting  a  Carthaginian  garrison,  "^^^^^^ 
others  for  applying  to  Rome.      The   Carthaginians,  however,  were 
the  nearest ;  and,  whilst  the  application  to  Rome  was  still  pending, 
Hanno  arrived  at  Messana,  and  having  effected  a  compromise  between  « 

Hiero  and  the  Mamertines,  occupied  the  acropolis  with  his  garrison. 

When  news  of  this  reached  Rome  (towards  the  end  of  265)  it  The 
brought  the  negotiation  with  the  Mamertine   embassy  to  a  crisis.  ^^^^^^^^ 
There  had  been  some  hesitation.      The  Senate,  it  is  said,  had  been  send  heH> 
embarrassed  by  a  conflict  of  feeling  :  on  the  one  hand  it  was  clearly  to  the 
necessary  to  check  the  spread  of  Carthaginian  influence  in  a  part  Mamer- 
of  Sicily  so  closely  connected  with   Italy  ;  on  the  other  it  seemed  ^^^^^'  ^^S- 
inconsistent  to  help  the  Mamertines  after  having  recently  punished 
with  inflexible  sternness   the  crime  committed  by  their  own  men  at 
Rhegium.     The  Senate  finally  resolved  to  leave  the  people  to  take 
the  responsibility  of  the  decision  upon  themselves.      It  may  well  be 
doubted,  however,   whether  it  was  the  moral  side  of  the  question 
which   caused  this   hesitation.       The  two   cases    were    not    strictly 
parallel.      The  treacherous  garrison  at  Rhegium  consisted  of  their 
own  soldiers,   the  deed  was  a  breach  of  the  military  oath  and  an 
act  of  mutiny,  which  deserved  military  punishment.      But  with  the 
right  or  the  wrong  of  the  action  of  the  Mamertines  the  Romans  had 
nothing  to   do.      It   was   at   that   time   no  business  of  the  Roman 
government  how  a  Greek  town  in   Sicily  was  inhabited  or  deprived 
of   its    inhabitants.       It    was   not    the  first    time   in    the   history    of 


236 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Reasons  for  Messana  itself  that  such  an  event  had  taken  place  ;  and  many  other 


hesitation. 


The  people 
decide  to 
help  the 
Mamer- 
tines. 


towns  in  Sicily  had  been  at  various  times  deprived  of  their  population 
and  repeopled  by  a  conqueror.  What  was  it  to  the  Roman  whether 
Greek  or  Campanian  dwelt  at  Messana  ?  Moreover,  right  or  wrong, 
the  Mamertines  had  now  been  there  twenty-four  years.  The  genera- 
tion of  the  original  robbers  was  doubtless  passing  away,  and  a  new 
generation  growing  up,  some  of  whom  were  children  at  the  time  of 
the  capture,  and  others  born  since  of  the  Greek  women  whom  the 
Mamertines  retained  as  captives  and  wives.  A  mixed  race  of 
inhabitants,  only  partly  responsible  for  the  crime,  now  held  the 
town,  with  whom  a  foreign  nation  might  have  dealings  without  grave 
discredit  in  an  age  in  which  such  violent  changes  were  not  un- 
common. It  seems  more  reasonable  to  suppose  that  the  hesitation 
of  the  Senate  was  caused  by  the  importance  of  the  step  they  were 
asked  to  take.  The  Romans  had  indeed  been  constantly  engaged 
in  struggles  leading  to  aggrandisement ;  but  these  acquisitions  of 
territory  had  as  yet,  with  the  exception  of  one  insignificant  island, 
been  all  within  the  shores  of  Italy.  They  were  now  for  the  first 
time  to  transport  an  army  across  the  sea  and  to  interfere  in  another 
land.  Moreover,  it  could  not  fail  to  be  clear  to  the  Senate  that,  on 
whatever  pretext  they  might  go  to  Sicily,  their  act  would  be  regarded 
as  an  hostile  one  by  Carthage  and  would  certainly  involve  war.  It 
is  true  that  in  the  commercial  treaty  of  306  the  Carthaginian  domain 
in  Sicily  was  clearly  distinguished.  But  Carthaginian  influence 
had  not  been  confined  to  definite  limits,  and  Carthaginian  armies 
had  often  appeared  east  of  the  Halycus  ;  interference  by  Rome  in 
any  part  of  Sicily  would  undoubtedly  be  resented  by  Carthage,  and 
especially  at  Messana,  for  just  before  the  occupation  of  the  town  by 
the  Mamertines  the  Messanians  had  joined  the  Carthaginian  alliance. 
Such  considerations  might  well  cause  the  Senate  to  hesitate.  But 
when  the  question  came  before  the  people  they  were  troubled  by  no 
scruples  and  few  fears.  Though  the  wars  with  the  Samnites  and  in 
Magna  Graecia  had  poured  great  wealth  into  Rome  and  enriched  the 
exchequer  as  well  as  individual  citizens,  the  farmers  had  suffered  much 
both  from  actual  damage  and  from  having  been  obliged  to  neglect 
their  farms  to  serve  in  the  army.  The  recent  introduction  of  silver 
coinage  had  turned  their  attention  to  commerce,  for  which  Sicily  was 
the  natural  sphere  ;  and  they  looked  upon  a  distant  war  as  likely  to 
bring  wealth  into  the  country  without  causing  them  damage,  while  the 
military  class  were  eager  for  fresh  opportunities  of  gaining  reputation 
and  plunder.  The  help  asked  for  by  the  Mamertines,  therefore,  was 
promptly  voted  ;  and  one  of  the  consuls  for  264,  Appius  Claudius 
Caudex — the  last  name,  it  is  said,  being  gained  by  the  attention  he 
had  paid  to  shipbuilding — was  appointed  to  lead  the  expedition. 


XVIII  THE  ROMANS  BORROW  SHIPS  237 

For  many  years  past  the  Romans  had  had  some  sort  of  a  navy,  264. 
and  as  far  back  as  3 1 1  two  commissioners  had  been  appointed  for  Coss. 
building  and  refitting  ships.      But  the  business  had  been  negligently   rTj^I- 
performed,  and  at  this  time  they  not  only  did  not  possess  any  warships  Caudex 
of  the  first  class,  but  had  not  even  a  sufBcient  supply  of  transports.  M.  Fulvius 
It  was  not  yet  in  contemplation  to  fight  the  Carthaginians  at  sea.  Flaccus. 
The  expedition  to  Sicily  would,  doubtless,  lead  to  a  struggle  with  "jfl^^^^f 
them,  but   it   would  be   settled  by  the  legions  on  land.      Still  the  collected^ 
troops  must  be  conveyed  thither,  and  when  coasting  down  the  shore 
of  Italy,  or  crossing  the  straits,  narrow  as  they  were,  the  vessels  were 
liable  to  be  attacked  and  destroyed  by  the  warships  of  Carthage. 
They  therefore  hired  or  borrowed  quinqueremes  and  triremes  from 
Tarentum,  Locri,  Elea,  and  Naples  to  supplement  and  convoy  such 
transports   as   they  possessed.       But  these   preparations   consumed 
some  time  ;  and  meanwhile   Hanno  and  his   Carthaginian  garrison 
were  in  occupation  of  Messana,  and  a  Carthaginian  fleet  was  protect- 
ing its  harbour.     To  counteract  this  Appius  Claudius  despatched  a 
small  squadron  of  ships  in  advance,  under  the  command  of  a  military 
tribune  Gains  Claudius,  to  Rhegium.      Gains  visited  the  town  more 
than  once  in  a  small  vessel  to  negotiate  with  the  Romanising  party, 
but  failed  to  obtain  the  expulsion  of  the  Carthaginian  garrison  ;   and 
when   he   attempted   to   force   his   way   into    the    harbour   with   his 
squadron,  he  was  caught  in  a  storm  in  which  several  of  his  ships  were 
driven  on  shore.      Not  discouraged  he  retired  to  Rhegium  and  set 
about  refitting  and  repairing  his  ships.      Hanno,  whose  cue  it  was  to 
assume  the  attitude  of  a  disinterested  third  party,  and  to  leave  to  the 
Romans  the  onus  of  beginning  a  war,  sent  back  the  stranded  ships, 
offered  to  restore  the  prisoners,  and  invited  Gains  Claudius  to  main- 
tain peace. 

Claudius  would  accept  nothing ;  and   Hanno  in  anger  boasted 
that  he  would  not  allow  the  Romans  so  much  as  to  wash  their  hands 
in  the  sea.      But  having  repaired  his  fleet,  and  studied  the  nature  of  Gains 
the  currents  in  the  straits,  Claudius  at  length  brought  his  ships  into  Claudius 
the  harbour  and  entered  the  town.     He  was  received  with  enthusiasm  j^^^^^^^^ 
by  the  Mamertines,  already  tired  of  their  Carthaginian  protectors. 
Hanno,  having   imprudently   consented    to  join    in    the  conference 
between  Claudius  and  the  Mamertine  leaders,  was  seized,  and  after 
a  short  confinement  was  allowed  to  leave  the  town  with  his  men. 
The  Carthaginians  put  Hanno  to  death  for  thus  losing  Messana,  and 
immediately  formed  an  alliance  with  Hiero  to  attack   the  town.     It 
was  not  necessarily  a  declaration  of  war  with  Rome,  and,  indeed, 
such  formal  declaration  does  not  seem  ever  to  have  been  made  ;  it 
was  the  Mamertines  whom  both  they  and  Hiero  were  to  attack  ;  it 
was  their  joint  interest  to  destroy  a  den  of  freebooters  and  robbers. 


238 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


The  constil 

Appius 

Claudius 

Caudex 

enters 

Mess  ana, 

264. 


Appius 
defeats 
Hiero, 


and  the 
Cartha- 
ginians. 


Nevertheless  from  this  time  forward  it  was  a  struggle  between  Rome 
and  Carthage  for  supremacy,  and  all  other  questions  became  of 
minor  importance.  The  Carthaginian  fleet  was  ordered  to  anchor 
at  Pelorus,  while  a  land  force  was  to  co-operate  with  Hiero,  who 
had  taken  up  a  position  on  the  "  Chalcidic  Mount,"  part  of  the 
range  of  hills  extending  to  Tauromenium. 

This  was  the  position  of  affairs  when  the  consul  Appius  arrived 
at  Rhegium  with  his  main  army  in  the  summer  of  264.  Though  the 
town  was  invested  on  one  side  by  the  Carthaginians  and  on  the 
other  by  Hiero,  he  boldly  crossed  the  strait  by  night  to  avoid  an 
encounter  with  the  Carthaginian  fleet,  and  threw  himself  and  his 
army  into  the  town.  The  protection  of  the  Roman  army  would  not 
have  availed  the  Mamertines  long  if  the  investment  had  continued, 
because  the  Carthaginian  command  of  the  sea  made  the  bringing 
in  of  provisions  hazardous,  if  not  impossible.  Appius,  therefore, 
resolved  to  get  rid  of  the  besieging  armies,  if  possible  by  negotiation, 
and,  if  that  failed,  by  force.  Hiero  had  on  former  occasions  shown 
an  inclination  to  be  friends  with  Rome,  and  the  treaty  with  Carthage 
was  still  nominally  in  force.  It  might  be  possible  to  induce  both  to 
retire  and  leave  the  town  under  the  care  of  the  Romans,  who  should 
be  answerable  for  the  future  peaceful  conduct  of  the  inhabitants. 
Both,  however,  rejected  the  advances.  The  Carthaginians  were 
resolved  to  prevent  the  Romans  from  getting  a  footing  in  Sicily. 
Hiero's  chief  aim  was  to  maintain  Syracusan  independence ;  it  was 
necessary  for  that  purpose  not  to  break  with  the  power  likely  in  the 
end  to  prevail,  and  at  present  that  power  seemed  to  be  Carthage. 

Appius  therefore  resolved  on  fighting.  On  the  morning  after  the 
failure  of  the  negotiation  he  led  out  his  troops  against  Hiero.  The 
engagement  was  long  and  obstinate,  and  some  historians  represent 
Hiero  as  victorious.  But  if  so,  Polybius  pertinently  asks,  why  did 
Hiero  abandon  his  camp  in  the  night  and  retire  to  Syracuse  ?  The 
fact,  indeed,  that  he  still  occupied  his  camp  in  the  evening  after  the 
battle  shows  that  his  defeat  was  not  ruinous  ;  but  it  was  sufficient  to 
convince  him  that  he  could  not  overcome  the  Romans  in  the  field. 
Elated  with  his  success  Appius  resolved  on  attacking  the  Cartha- 
ginians also.  Having  given  his  men  a  day's  rest  he  sallied  out  at 
sunrise.  He  was  again  successful  ;  he  drove  the  Carthaginians  from 
their  position,  and  the  survivors  sought  the  protection  of  the  nearest 
towns.  The  siege  of  Messana  being  thus  raised,  Appius  scoured  the 
country  between  it  and  Syracuse,  and  finally  sat  down  before  Syra- 
cuse itself  But  the  army  was  not  provisioned  for  a  long  siege,  and 
once  more  Syracuse  was  saved  by  the  unhealthiness  of  the  district 
round  it.  In  the  sallies  made  from  the  town  Hiero  appears  to  have 
been  as  often  successful  as  the  Romans,  the  consul  himself  on  one 


XVIII  THE  FRIENDSHIP  OF  HIERO  239 

occasion  all  but  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.      Before  break- 
ing up  his  camp,  however,  Appius  ascertained  that  Hiero  was  inclined 
to  make  terms.      Satisfied  with  that  he  led  off  his  army,  and,  leaving   Triumphs 
a  garrison  in   Messana,  returned  to   Rome,  which  he  was  allowed  to  of  Appius 
enter  in  triumph,  as  was  also  his  colleague  Fulvius  Flaccus,  who  had  "'pj^i^i^^ 
been  engaged  in  suppressing  a  rising  of  the  Volsinians.  Flaccus. 

Such  were  the  results  of  the  first  year  of  a  war  destined  to  last 
for  twenty-four.      They  were  considered  satisfactory  at  Rome,  and  it 
was  resolved  that  the  establishment  of  Roman  influence  in   Sicily 
should  be  pushed  with  even  greater  energy  in  the  next  campaign. 
Both  consuls  in  263  were  sent  to  Sicily,  each  with  the  regular  con-  263.  Coss. 
sular  army  of  two  legions.      The  arrival  of  this  formidable  force  at  M'. 
once  gave  rise  to  a  wide-spread  movement  among  the  Sicilian  cities.    Valerius 
Even  at  Segesta,  long  a  faithful  ally  of  Carthage,  the  citizens  mas-  ^^^^^^' 
sacred  the  Carthaginian  garrison  and  handed  over  the  town  to  the  otacilius 
consuls.      This  movement,  and  a  defeat  at  the  hands  of  the  consul  Crassus. 
Valerius,^  convinced  Hiero  that  the  Romans  were  destined  eventually  Movemefit 
to   be   the  victors.     He   therefore   determined   to   quit   his   alliance  ^.^  favour 
with  the  Carthaginians,   which  must  have   always  been  distasteful  of  Rotnan 
to  him,   and  made  offers  of  peace  and  friendship  to  the  Romans,  alliance. 
The   co-operation   of  Syracuse   was   of  great  importance  to   them,  Hiero 
especially  as  a  source  of  supplies  ;  the  offers  were  gladly  accepted,  makes 
and  Hiero  remained  the  active  and  faithful  friend  of  Rome  to  the  end  •^^^.^.?^ 
of  his  life.     With  great  skill  he  maintained  the  independence  and 
neutrality  of  his  kingdom  through  all  the  chances  and  changes  of 
the  war,  devoting  himself  to  internal  reforms,  and  to  attracting  the 
admiration  of  his  subjects  by  success  in  the  great  games  in  Greece. 

Alarmed    at    the   defection   of    Hiero,    and    feeling   certain    that  Great pre- 
the  Romans  would  not  long  be  content  with  merely  protecting  such  parations 
Greek  towns  as  joined  their  alliance,  the  Carthaginians  made  great  ^,     ^^' 
efforts  to  increase  their  forces  in  Sicily.     Fresh  recruits  were  enlisted 
from  the   Ligurians,   Celts,  and  Iberians  ;  and  Agrigentum,  as  the 
strongest  and  most  important  town  on  the  south  coast,  was  selected 
as   their  headquarters.      It  had  no  harbour  and  stood  some  three 
miles  back  from  the  coast,  but  it  was  convenient  for  operations  in 
the  central  districts,  and  into  it  they  collected  the  bulk  of  their  war 
material.     Thus  the  second  year  of  the  war  (263)  passed  without  any 
striking  event.      The  Carthaginians  were  collecting  their  forces  :  the 
Romans  were  securing  such  of  the  cities  as  voluntarily  joined  them. 

The  next    consuls    took  a    more    decided    line.     When    Lucius 
Postumius  and  Quintus    Mamilius    came   to    Sicily,   the  threatening 
nature  of  the  preparations  at  Agrigentum  could  no  longer  be  over- 
looked.     They  resolved  that  their  whole  energies  must  be  directed 
1  Mentioned  only  by  Pliny,  N.  H.  35,  §  22. 


240 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


262.    Coss. 
Lucius 
Postumius 
Megellus, 

Mamilius 
Vltulus. 


Fall  of 

Agri- 

gentum. 


to  its  capture.  Both  consular  armies  were  accordingly  concentrated 
within  a  mile  from  its  walls.  The  citadel  stood  on  a  steep  hill  about 
three  miles  from  the  shore,  while  the  town  and  its  temples  lay  to  the 
south-east,  lower  down  the  slope,  the  whole  being  enclosed  in  the 
fork  formed  by  the  union  of  the  rivers  Hypeas  and  Akragas.  At  the 
mouth  of  these  combined  streams  there  was  merely  a  piece  of  open 
beach,  with  no  good  haven  for  ships.  Help  therefore  could  not  be 
expected  from  the  sea.  But  the  commander  in  the  town,  Hannibal 
son  of  Cisco,  showed  great  spirit ;  inflicted  more  than  one  severe 
defeat  on  the  Roman  foraging  parties  ;  and  even  made  an  assault  on 
the  camp,  which  was  only  repulsed  with  considerable  loss.  The 
consuls  had  hitherto  been  in  one  camp  ;  they  now  separated  and 
fortified  two,  one  on  the  south  between  the  city  and  the  sea  near 
the  temple  of  Asklepios,  the  other  to  the  west  of  the  town  in 
the  direction  of  Heraclea,  from  which  succour  would  be  likely  to 
come  to  the  garrison.  Communication  between  the  camps  was 
maintained  by  a  line  of  pickets,  and  the  Romans  drew  their  supplies 
from  Herbessus,  a  small  town  in  the  neighbourhood,  to  which  corn 
and  cattle  were  sent  by  cities  allied  to  them.  For  five  months  the 
siege  went  on  without  important  incident ;  but  as  there  were  50,000 
persons  in  the  town  the  food  began  to  run  short.  Hannibal  had 
been  able  however  to  keep  up  communication  with  Carthage,  and  a 
fresh  army,  with  more  elephants,  was  sent  to  join  Hanno  at  Heraclea 
to  enable  him  to  relieve  Agrigentum.  Thus  reinforced  Hanno 
seized  Herbessus,  the  source  of  their  supplies,  reducing  the  Romans 
almost  to  the  position  of  a  besieged  garrison.  They  were  besides 
suffering  from  an  epidemic,  and  must  inevitably  have  raised  the 
siege  had  not  Hiero  contrived  to  throw  sufficient  supplies  into 
their  camp  to  enable  them  to  hold  out.  For  two  months  they 
sustained  nearly  daily  attacks  from  Hanno,  in  one  of  which  their 
cavalry  was  tempted  out  by  Numidian  skirmishers  and  suffered 
heavily.  But  though  the  Romans  were  in  great  difficulties,  the 
Agrigentines  were  in  still  worse,  and  Hannibal  kept  warning  Hanno 
by  signals  and  messages  that  his  men  were  deserting,  and  that  he 
could  not  hold  out  against  the  famine  much  longer.  Hanno  there- 
fore determined  to  risk  a  general  engagement.  The  Romans  were 
eager  to  accept  it ;  and,  after  a  severe  struggle,  broke  the  Cartha- 
ginian lines,  inflicted  a  terrible  slaughter  on  the  flying  enemy, 
and  captured  their  baggage  and  most  of  their  elephants.  But  the 
fatigue  of  the  battle,  or  the  carouse  after  the  victory,  caused  the 
watches  of  the  night  to  be  somewhat  negligently  kept  ;  and  Hannibal 
took  advantage  of  this  to  lead  out  his  garrison  across  the  Roman 
trenches.  At  daybreak  the  Romans  discovered  what  had  happened, 
and  indeed  were  for  a  time  engaged  with  Hannibal's  rear.      They 


XVIII  FALL  OF  AGRIGENTUM  241 

did  not  however  attempt  a  pursuit,  but  proceeded  to  occupy  and 
plunder  the  town,  from  which  25,000  prisoners  were  sold  into 
slavery. 

Thus  after  a  siege  of  seven  months,  during  which  the  Romans 
are  said  to  have  lost  30,000  men, — many  of  them  perhaps  Sicilian 
allies, — this   stronghold    of  the    Carthaginians   passed    into    Roman 
hands  in  the  winter  of  262-261.      Its  fall  marks  a  period  in  the  war  ;  Effect  of 
it  settled  the  question  of  superiority  on   land   in   favour  of  Rome,  the  fall  of 
The  Carthaginians,  in  spite  of  some  successes  in  detail,  never  had  ^f^^^^ 
a  real   chance    of  recovering   supremacy  in   Sicily   again.      Hence-  262. 
forward  their  hold  upon  the  island  is  rather  a  desperate  clinging  to 
certain  strong  points  on  the  western  coast :  while  the  Romans  from 
this  time   steadily   aimed  not   only  at  confining    the   influence   and 
arms  of  the  Carthaginians  to  their  own  territory,  but  at  driving  them 
out  of  the  island. 

But  the  events  of  the  next  year  (261),  though  not  on  the  whole  261  not 
unfavourable    to   the   Roman   arms,    showed   that   this   aim  was   in-  ?^^''  ^ 

.  pv  citiy 

capable  of  realisation  as   long  as   the   Carthaginians  were  masters  a-reat  event. 

of  the   sea.      It  was   comparatively  easy  to   win   or  force   to   their 

allegiance  the  inland  towns  ;  but  those  on  the  western  and  northern 

coasts  were  held  in  terror  by  the  Carthaginian  fleets,  and  could  not 

become  Roman  even  if  they  wished  it.     An  able  commander  named 

Hamilcar^  was  sent  to  supersede  Hanno,  and  was  active  in  sailing 

along  the  coasts  of  Sicily  and  even  making  descents  upon  Italy : 

and  in  spite  of  their  defeat  at  Agrigentum  the  Carthaginians  were 

now  besieging  the  Roman  garrison  at  Segesta  ;  while  a  detachment 

of  their    forces   was    sent    to   strengthen    Sardinia.       The    Romans  261-260. 

therefore  determined  to  build  a  fleet.  ^^^ 

It  was  a  resolution  of  singular  daring  in  the  circumstances.      The  j^^^Ya 
vast  superiority  of  the  modern  ironclad  makes  it  difficult  to  conceive  jieet. 
a  parallel   at    the    present    time ;  a    nearer  analogy  would    be    the 
English  or  Dutch  of  the  sixteenth  century  venturing  to  attack  the 
galleons    of  a    Spanish    Armada    with    vessels    collected    from    the 
merchants  of  their  own  land.     Though  the  Romans  possessed  some  Their  dis- 
merchant  marine,  and  had  even  employed   ships  of  war  at  times,  advantages 
they  do  not   seem  to   have  had  any  of  the  larger  kind,  the  qtmi-  ^^^A^[^^ 
queremes.^  which  the  Phoenician  builders  constructed  for  the  Cartha-  Cartha- 
ginian  navy.      The  ships  in  the  port  of  Tarentum  had  been  easily  ginians. 
destroyed    by  the    Tarentine    triremes,   and    naval    affairs    seem   to 
have  been  neglected  since  that  time  (281).      Thus,  when  they  first 
crossed  to   Sicily  they  had,  as  we  saw,  to  send  elsewhere  for  ships  ; 
and  now  that  it  became  necessary  to  build  a  fleet,  they  had  neither 


I 


Not  Hamilcar  Barcas,  the  father  of  Hannibal. 
R 


242 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


260. 

Coss.  Cn. 

Cornelius 

Scipio 

Asina, 

Gaius 

Duilius. 


The 
Roman 
fleet  is 
launched. 


shipbuilders  capable  of  constructing  quinqucremes  nor  sailors  cap- 
able of  rowing  and  managing  them.  The  case  of  the  Carthaginians 
was  very  different.  Like  their  ancestors  at  Tyre,  they  had  long 
been  renowned  for  the  number  and  size  of  their  ships,  the  skill 
of  their  rowers  and  pilots,  and  their  dexterity  in  practising  the 
manoeuvres  which  gave  the  trained  crew  the  superiority  over  the 
untrained.  Their  navy  was  the  source  of  their  power,  and  was  held 
in  proportionably  high  esteem.  It  was  not,  like  their  army,  served 
by  foreign  mercenaries.  They  might  at  times  hire  rowers  or  com- 
pel their  slaves  to  labour  at  the  oar,  but  the  bulk  of  the  crews  were 
composed  of  citizens  to  whom  seamanship  was  a  life-long  profession. 
Their  captains  and  pilots  were  no  amateurs  ;  long  practice  and 
experience  had  given  them  minute  knowledge  of  the  coast-line,  the 
harbours  of  refuge,  the  bays  and  headlands,  and  the  points  of  danger. 
They  had  studied  the  stars  and  the  signs  of  the  sky,  and  knew  when 
to  expect  foul  weather  and  when  it  was  prudent  to  trust  to  the  open 
sea.  Thus,  though  they  had  often  suffered  defeat  on  land,  no  one 
for  a  long  time  past  had  seriously  disputed  their  supremacy  at  sea. 
That  the  Romans,  entirely  without  these  advantages, — without  pro- 
fessional seamen,  and  without  even  the  practical  knowledge  of  the 
conditions  in  which  it  was  possible  to  sail, — should  hope  with  a  fleet 
of  hastily-built  ships  and  with  half-trained  crews  to  meet  and  check 
this  great  maritime  power,  must  have  seemed  almost  incredible 
presumption. 

All  through  the  winter  and  early  spring  the  preparations  went  on. 
The  ships  were  built  on  the  model  of  a  Punic  quinquereme  which 
had  been  stranded  on  the  Italian  shore  of  the  Straits  during  the  first 
year  of  the  war ;  and  such  of  the  citizens  as  were  to  be  employed  in 
the  service  were  trained  on  wooden  platforms  in  the  proper  move- 
ments of  rowing.  The  bulk  of  the  crews  however  were  obtained 
from  maritime  allies,  as  the  name  long  retained  by  their  sailors 
{socii  7tavalcs)  shows.  By  the  spring  of  260  the  great  undertaking 
was  accomplished ;  the  ships  were  launched  and  put  under  the 
command  of  one  of  the  consuls,  Gnaeus  Cornelius  Scipio,  while  the 
other  consul  Gaius  Duilius  went  to  Sicily  to  relieve  the  besieged 
garrison  of  Segesta.  After  a  brief  preliminary  practice  in  real  sea- 
rowing  they  started  for  Messana,  the  consul  himself  preceding  the 
main  body  by  a  few  days  with  a  squadron  of  seventeen  ships. 

The  first  encounter  with  the  enemy  was  disastrous.  When 
Scipio  arrived  at  Messana  he  was  met  by  an  offer  to  put  the  island 
of  Lipara  into  his  hands.  Conceiving  that  it  would  be  a  valuable 
place  for  stores  for  the  fleet,  he  sailed  thither  with  his  seventeen 
vessels.  But  he  had  not  taken  into  account  the  rapidity  of  the 
hostile   fleet.     Hannibal   was   at   Panormus,  and,  the   movement   of 


XVIII  THE  FIRST  ENCOUNTER  AT  SEA  243 

Cornelius  becoming  promptly  known  to  him,  he  despatched  Boodes 
with  twenty  ships  by  night  ;  and  when  day  broke  Scipio  found  him- 
self blockaded  in  the  harbour  of  Lipara.  The  crews  of  the  Roman  Scipio  is 
ships  ran  their  vessels  ashore  and  fled,  and  Scipio  was  obliged  to  fake7i 
surrender  himself  and  his  ships.  Hannibal  then  put  out  to  pf^^oner 
sea  with  fifty  ships  to  watch  for  the  approach  of  the  main  Roman  ^ .  ^P^^fa, 
fleet ;  but  falling  in  with  it  unexpectedly  as  it  rounded  a  promon- 
tory of  the  Italian  coast,^  he  lost  the  greater  part  of  his  ships 
and  barely  escaped  with  his  life.  The  Roman  fleet  therefore 
arrived  in  good  spirits  at  Messana  ;  but  were  there  greeted  with 
the  news  of  the  capture  of  their  commander,  and  the  loss  of  his 
seventeen  ships.  The  officers  at  once  sent  for  the  other  consul 
Gains  Duilius  from  Segesta,  and  meanwhile  made  active  prepara- 
tions for  fighting  the  Punic  fleet.  They  were  conscious  of  their 
inferiority  in  naval  tactics.  They  did  not  understand,  as  the  Cartha- 
ginians did,  how  to  manoeuvre  a  vessel  so  as  to  bring  her  beak  crash- 
ing into  an  enemy's  broadside  ;  how  to  dash  through  the  enemy's 
line,  and  turning  rapidly  to  charge  stem  or  side  ;  how  to  sweep 
away  his  oars  by  a  swift  rush  past,  or  practise  other  feats  which 
required  great  command  over  the  vessel  and  long  and  laborious  train- 
ing. They  therefore  determined  on  another  method  of  fighting, 
which,  however  rough  and  unscientific,  would  make  the  victory 
depend  on  the  fighting  men  on  deck,  of  whose  superiority  to  the  enemy 
they  felt  confident.  The  object  of  the  contrivance  was  to  enable 
these  men  to  board  an  enemy's  vessel  and  fight  as  though  on  land. 
To  effect  this  they  constructed  a  wooden  gangway  or  boarding  The  corvL 
bridge  on  each  vessel,  swinging  round  a  pole  fixed  in  the  prow. 
Its  extremity  was  elevated  by  a  rope  which  ran  through  a 
pulley  at  the  top  of  the  pole,  and  had  on  its  lower  side  a  sharp 
iron  spike.  The  machine  was  so  arranged  that  it  could  be  swung 
backwards  and  forwards  according  to  the  direction  of  the  enemy's 
ship.  The  plan  was  to  run  as  close  to  an  enemy  as  possible,  and  to 
swing  round  the  boarding-bridge  till  its  end  could  drop  upon  his 
deck.  The  two  ships  would  thus  be  grappled  together.  If  they 
were  close  alongside,  the  Roman  soldiers  would  leap  on  board ; 
or  if  the  spike  dropped  on  the  enemy's  prow  or  stern,  they  would 
board  by  means  of  the  gangway  two  abreast,  resting  their  shields 
on  the  railing  which  ran  along  each  side  of  the  gangway.  The 
machines  were  called  corvi  or  "  crows." 

By  the    time    that  these    preparations   were    completed    Duilius 
arrived.      Hearing  that   the   Carthaginian   fleet   was  plundering  the 

1  Polybius    (i.    21)    calls    it    "The    promontory  of   Italy,"    rh   ttjs    'ItoXItis 
d/cpwrijptoj',  i.e.  The  Skyllaean  promontory.     See  Diod.  Sic.  4,  47  ;    Dio  Cass. 

48.  47. 


244 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


coast  near  Mylae,  he  determined  to  sail  at  once  to  the  attack. 
Hannibal  was  ready  to  meet  him,  feeling  a  natural  confidence  in  the 
superior  skill  of  his  seamen  and  the  better  construction  of  his  ships. 
But  this  very  confidence  turned  out  to  the  advantage  of  the  Romans. 
On  board  a  huge  galley  with  seven  banks  of  oars,  which  had  once 
belonged  to  king  Pyrrhus,  and  followed  by  130  ships,  he  did  not 
condescend  to  have  recourse  to  any  manoeuvres.  His  ships  charged 
prow  to  prow  just  as  they  came  up  in  loose  order,  without  attempt- 
ing any  of  the  usual  oblique  movements.  The  Punic  captains  indeed 
were  puzzled  at  the  novel  appearance  of  the  "crows,"  but  felt  so  sure 
of  an  easy  victory  that  they  took  no  precautions  against  a  danger 
which  they  did  not  fully  understand.  But  as  they  steered  confi- 
dently upon  the  Roman  ships,  they  suddenly  found  their  vessels 
grappled  to  those  of  the  enemy,  and  the  Roman  soldiers  pouring 
over  the  ships'  sides.  Thirty  of  the  leading  vessels  were  thus 
captured  with  their  crews,  and  among  these  the  admiral's  seven- 
banked  galley,  though  he  himself  escaped  in  a  boat.  Thereupon 
the  other  Carthaginians  abandoned  the  direct  charge,  and,  trusting 
to  their  speed,  attempted  to  row  round  the  Roman  ships  and  charge 
them  on  stern  or  broadside.  But  the  "  crows,"  swinging  easily 
round,  proved  again  effective,  and  by  one  means  or  another  twenty 
more  Carthaginian  ships  were  taken  or  sunk,i  and  the  rest  fled  back 
to  Panormus,  from  which  place  Hannibal  took  the  remnants  of  his 
fleet  back  to  Carthage. 

The  immediate  effect  of  this  victory  was  to  enable  Duilius  to 
relieve  Segesta.  He  could  now  coast  along  the  island  and  land  his 
men  near  enough  to  reach  the  town  easily.  In  nine  days  he  forced 
the  Carthaginians  to  raise  the  siege ;  and  on  his  way  back  to  the 
fleet  carried  Macella  by  assault.^  The  Carthaginians  indeed  had 
one  stroke  of  good  fortune.  The  SiciHan  allies  of  the  Roman  army 
were  encamped  between  Thermae  and  Paropus, — having  it  seems 
had  some  quarrel  about  precedence  on  the  field, — and  the  vigilant 
Hamilcar  from  Panormus  surprised  and  killed  some  4000.  Still 
the  Carthaginians  in  Sicily  were  confined  more  closely  than  ever  to 
their  strong  places  on  the  west  and  north-west  coast  from  Panormus 


^  These  are  the  numbers  of  Polybius  (i.  23),  Those  given  in  the  transcripts 
of  the  surviving  columna  rostrata  are  a  restoration  from  Orosius  and  Eutropius, — 
thirty-one  taken  and  thirteen  sunk.  Polybius  says  nothing  of  sinking  vessels  as 
opposed  to  taking  them. 

2  The  site  of  Macella  is  uncertain,  but  its  capture  was  looked  upon  as  of 
sufficient  importance  to  be  put  upon  the  columna  rostrata  :  ".  .  .  Macelamqiie 
opidutn  pucnando  cepif."  The  fragment  of  Parian  marble  still  existing  at  Rome 
is  generally  admitted  to  be  a  restoration  of  the  Imperial  time.  Still,  as  Quintilian 
and  Pliny  both  regarded  it  as  antique,  the  inscription  itself  can  hardly  be  a  fanciful 
composition  of  an  antiquary.      It  is  very  likely  an  exact  copy  of  the  original. 


XVIII  REDUCTION  OF  CORSICA  245 

to  Lilybaeum  ;  while  the  result  to  the  Romans  was  more  far-reaching. 
By   the  victory  of  Mylae   Rome   had  become   a  naval   power,  and 
not  only  could  threaten   the   Carthaginian  position   in   Corsica  and 
Sardinia   and    other   islands,    but   might    even   invade   their   African 
home.     As  soon   as    they  heard   of  the    Roman   ship-building,    the 
Carthaginians    had    strengthened    their    force    in    Sardinia,    rightly 
thinking   that    the    Romans    would    begin    with    the    islands.      Thus 
we    find    that    next    year    only    one    consul    went    to    Sicily,    while  259.  Coss. 
the    other    consul    Lucius    Scipio    was    sent    to    Corsica.      He    took  ^-  f^^'- 
the  chief  town  Aleria,  expelled   the  Carthaginians,  and   forced   the  "^^f^f 
Corsicans    to    give    hostages.^     He    then    went    to    Sardinia    and  Q^ius' 
blockaded  the  mouth  of  a  harbour  in  which  Hannibal,  who  had  been  AquilHus 
sent  there  from   Carthage  after  his  defeat  at   Mylae,  was   lying  at  Florus. 
anchor.      He  inflicted  so  much  loss  on  the  Carthaginians  that  they 
mutinied  and  crucified  Hannibal.      Scipio  had  not    sufficient  force  to 
attempt   the   conquest    of  Sardinia ;  but  his    expedition    showed  the 
change  in  the  maritine  position  of  Rome  caused  by  the  victory  of 
Mylae.       It    is   no   wonder   therefore   that   Duilius  received  all  the 
honours  his  fellow-citizens  could  give.     His  was  the  first  naval  triumph 
ever  celebrated.     Appius  Claudius  had  perhaps  led  Carthaginians  in 
his    procession    to    the   Capitol ;    but    the    triumph    of   Duilius    was   The 
rendered  conspicuous  by  the  spoils  of  ships,  and — what  was  almost  triumph  of 
a  novelty  in  Rome — by  great  heaps  of  gold  and  silver  coins  (probably      "^  ^^^' 
Sicilian    niunmi\    valued  at   not   less   than   3,000,000  asses.     Two 
columns,  adorned  with  beaks  of  ships,  were  erected  in  his  honour, 
one  near  the  Circus  and  another  near  the  speaker's  platform  between 
the  Comitium  and  Forum  ;  and  he  was  allowed  throughout  his  life 
to    return    from  public    banquets    preceded    by    a    torchbearer    and 
a  piper. 

While  Scipio  was  attacking  Corsica  and  Sardinia,  his  colleague  2^9- 
Florus  was  in  Sicily.      But  it  seems  that  the  Roman  interests  in  that  ^^^^^^y- 
island  did  not  make  rapid  progress.      Hamilcar  was  an  active  and 
formidable    enemy,    and    while    Florus    found    the    strong    town    of 
Mytistratus  (of  uncertain  site)  so  difficult  to  take  that  he  remained 
all  the  winter   before    it,   Hamilcar  was   strengthening   Drepana,  to 
which  he  transferred  the  inhabitants  of  Eryx.       At  home  the  vast   Troubles 
increase    of  the   slaves,  owing  to  the    Sicilian  victories,  joined  to  a  i^  Rome. 
great  influx  of  south  Italian  shipbuilders,  had  caused  an  outbreak,  or 
the  fear  of  an  outbreak,  of  a  servile  insurrection.      The  year  259, 
therefore,  was  not  altogether  a  prosperous  one  for  Rome.      The  next 
consulship,  however,  was  more  active.      Mytistratus  Avas   taken  by 


I 


^  His  tomb  is  still  extant  ;  in  the  inscription  we  read  hec  cepit  Corsica  Aleria- 
urbe. 


246 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


2^8.    Coss. 

A.  Atilius 

Calatinus, 

Gains 

Sulpicius 

Paterculus. 

Heroism  of 
a  military 
tribune  at 
Camarina. 


Beginning 
of  opera- 
tions in 
Africa, 
258. 


257- 

Indecisive 
battle  off 
Tyndaris. 


2_§6.    Coss. 
L.  Manlius 
Vulso,  M. 
Atilius 
RegulusII. 
Immense 
fleets  pre- 
pared on 
cither  side. 


Atilius,  and  its  inhabitants  enslaved,  while  the  Carthaginian  garri- 
son escaped  by  night.  Hippana  (of  uncertain  site),  Camarina, 
and  Enna  also  fell ;  but  an  attack  on  the  island  of  Lipara  was 
repulsed.  These  and  similar  achievements  in  258  and  257  were 
not  accomplished  without  difficulty  and  loss.  At  Camarina 
especially,  the  Roman  army  nearly  met  with  a  great  disaster.  On 
their  march  they  fell  into  an  ambush,  and  must  have  been  cut  to 
pieces  but  for  the  heroism  of  a  military  tribune,  whose  name  is 
variously  given  as  Q.  Caedicius,  M.  Calpumius,  or  Laberius.  With 
300  men  he  marched  on  to  a  conspicuous  piece  of  rising  ground, 
and  diverted  the  attention  of  the  enemy.  Nearly  all  of  the  300 
were  cut  to  pieces,  as  they  knew  they  must  be,  but  the  consul 
Calatinus  was  able  to  lead  off  his  army.  The  heroic  tribune,  though 
covered  with  wounds,  appears  to  have  survived. 

A  new  departure  was  now  contemplated  at  Rome.  One  of  the 
consuls  for  258,  Gains  Sulpicius,  had  been  engaged  in  some  success- 
ful operations  in  Sardinia,  and  encouraged  by  them  had  sailed  for 
the  African  coast,  destroyed  part  of  a  fleet  sent  to  oppose  him,  and 
made  several  descents  upon  the  land,  but  had  finally  been  forced  by 
Hanno  to  retire.  Next  year  (257)  the  consul  Gaius  AtiHus  Regulus 
took  special  pains  with  the  navy,  and  in  an  engagement  off  Tyndaris, 
on  the  Sicilian  coast,  opposite  Lipara,  though  some  of  his  advanced 
ships  were  taken  or  sunk,  captured  ten  of  the  enemy's  ships  and  sunk 
eight.  Both  sides  had  suffered,  and  the  battle  may  be  considered 
drawn.  But  in  the  following  year  unusual  efforts  were  made  on 
both  sides.  The  Romans  were  resolved  to  transfer  the  war  to 
Africa,  the  Carthaginians  to  destroy  the  Roman  fleet  before  it  could 
reach  their  shores.  If  the  Roman  army  once  landed  in  Africa,  they 
knew  that  not  only  would  it  be  difficult  to  beat  in  itself,  but  that  it 
would  probably  be  joined  by  numbers  of  discontented  Libyans  and 
Numidians,  and  that  their  city  must  prepare  to  stand  a  siege. 
They  therefore  made  immense  preparations  for  a  battle  at  sea.  The 
Roman  fleet  was  greater  than  ever.  It  consisted  of  330  large 
vessels,  with  crews  of  300  men  each,  carrying  two  consular  armies 
amounting  to  39,600  men.  It  was  a  mixed  military  and  naval 
expedition,  for  as  yet  no  distinction  between  the  two  services 
existed.  This  was  specially  marked  on  the  present  occasion  by  the 
military  names  given  to  the  four  divisions  of  the  fleet.  They  were 
called  legions.,  the  last  being  also  spoken  of  as  tria?'it^  and  they  I 
were  accompanied  by  numerous  horse  transports,  that  the  Romanj 
army  might  land  in  Africa  with  all  its  usual  complement.  Thel 
Carthaginian  fleet  was  still  larger,  for  it  carried  150,000  men.  It| 
was  also  better  fitted  for  fighting  at  sea,  for  it  did  not  convey  ai 
army  with  all  its  heavy  accompaniments.      The  ships  had  only  theij 


BATTLE  OF  ECNOMUS 


247 


regular  equipment  of  fighting  men,  and  were  prepared  for  the  pur- 
pose of  a  naval  battle  alone. 

The  consuls  with  their  great  fleet  touched  at  various  points  in 
the  Sicilian  coasts,  made  necessary  arrangements  for  the  safety  of 
the  several  places  occupied  by  the  Roman  forces,  and  finally  came 
to  anchor  at  Ecnomus,  on  the  southern  shore.  From  that  point  Battle  of 
they  intended,  after  coasting  somewhat  farther  to  the  west,  to  Ecnomus, 
strike  aaoss  the  open  sea  to  the  Libyan  shore.  But  the  Cartha-  ^■^ 
ginian  fleet  had  mustered  at  Heracleia,  and  meant  to  bar  the  way. 
The  battle  which  followed,  generally  named  from  Ecnomus,  seems 
to  have  taken  place  somewhat  nearer  Heracleia.  Two  of  the  four 
divisions  of  the  Roman  fleet  were  arranged  in  divergent  columns  of 
single  ships,  each  ship  taking  up  its  position  in  the  rear  of  one  of 
the  two  sii-banked  vessels  of  the  consuls,  a  little  to  the  right  or  left 
of  the  ship  in  front  of  it.  They  formed,  therefore,  a  wedge,  at  the 
apex  of  wliich  were  the  two  consular  ships.  The  base  of  the  wedge 
was  formed  by  the  third  division  (towing  the  horse  transports)  in 
line.  Behind  this,  and  parallel  to  it,  was  the  fourth  division,  also  in 
line,  formiig  a  reserve. 


HamUcar  ^  ^  ^ 


>Keracleia  Minoa 


oAgrigentum 


V 


ooo  o  00 


Horse  transports 


Walker  (b-  BoiUall  sc. 


The  Caithaginians,  on  the  other  hand,  had  drawn  up  their  vessels 
in  a  Ion;  line,  so  extended  as  to  enable  them  to  take  advantage  of 
their  siperior  swiftness  to  outflank  the  enemy  and  charge  as  suited 
them.  This  was  Hanno's  task,  who  accordingly  had  on  the  right 
wing  tie  swiftest  vessels  armed  with  beaks  for  charging.  The 
centre  was  commanded  by  Hamilcar,  while  the  left  wing  at  right 
angles  to  the  line  kept  close  under  the  shore.  The  Roman  plan  was 
to  cha-ge  with  their  two  columns  through  the  centre  of  the  enemy's 
line,  vhich  was  weak,  and  to  trust  to  the  confusion  thus  caused  for 
the  tlird  and  fourth  divisions  to  make  their  way  through  also.      The 


248 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Three 

separate 

moveme7its. 


Defeat  of 
Hainilcar. 


The 

Romans 
win  the 
battle. 


fight,  however,  resolved  itself  into  three  separate  battles.  A 
manoeuvre  of  Hamilcar's  succeeded  in  separating  the  divisions  of 
the  Roman  fleet.  As  soon  as  the  Romans  charged  he  ordered  his 
ships  to  row  off  as  if  in  flight.  The  Roman  columns  followed  with 
exultation  :  and  when  they  seemed  sufficiently  separated  from  the 
third  and  fourth  divisions  he  signalled  to  his  ships  to  turn  and 
charge.  But  though  the  Carthaginians  were  the  better  sailors,  and 
could  manoeuvre  their  ships  much  more  skilfully  than  their  oppo- 
nents, yet  when  they  came  to  close  quarters  the  Roman  strength 
prevailed  ;  the  grappling  irons  were  again  used,  and  a  hand-to-hand 
fight  ensued,  in  which  the  Romans  soon  gained  the  victory.  This 
was  one  battle.  A  second  was  brought  about  by  Hanno  from  the 
Carthaginian  right,  who  took  advantage  of  the  struggle  in  :he  centre 
to  row  round  and  attack  the  fourth  or  reserve  division.  A  third  was 
caused  by  the  left  wing  of  the  Carthaginians,  which  had  been  posted 
along  the  shore,  manoeuvring  itself  into  line  opposite  the  Roman 
third  division,  which  was  encumbered  by  towing  the  horse-transports. 
The  men  let  go  or  cut  the  towing-cables,  and  the  transports  seem 
to  have  drifted  back  upon  the  fourth  division  and  adied  to  its 
embarrassment. 

The  first  begun  of  these  three  battles,  that  in  the  centie,  was  the 
first  over.  Hamilcar  was  overpowered  and  fled,  and  the  consuls  had 
leisure  to  come  to  the  rescue  of  the  ships  in  the  rear,  vhich  were 
suffering  in  the  other  two  battles  somewhat  severely.  Regulus  was 
the  first  to  get  free,  and  he  hastened  to  the  help  of  the  fourth  division 
which,  between  the  charges  of  Hanno's  ships  and  the  necessity  of 
assisting  the  abandoned  horse-transports,  were  in  coisiderable 
difficulty.  Finding  themselves  now  between  two  enemies  Hanno's 
ships  gave  way  and  retreated,  and  Regulus,  being  joined  b>  Manlius, 
then  went  to  the  relief  of  the  third  division,  which  had  been  driven 
towards  the  coast  by  the  Carthaginian  left,  though  they  had  not 
received  much  damage, — the  fear  of  the  "  crows  "  keeping  Ihe  Punic 
ships  from  charging  freely.  It  was  here  that  the  Ronans  had 
their  greatest  success,  for  they  captured  fifty  of  the  enemys  ships. 
The  three  battles  had  not  been  quite  simultaneous,  and  lad  been 
decided  in  different  ways,  but  the  general  result  was  clearly  ii  favour 
of  the  Romans.  They  had  lost  twenty-four  ships  sunk,  the  Cartha- 
ginians more  than  thirty.  Not  a  single  Roman  ship  had  beei  taken 
with  its  crew,  while  they  had  taken  sixty-four  of  the  Carthaginians. 
But  the  best  proof  of  their  victory  was  that  they  now  did  tiat  for 
which  they  had  fought.  After  putting  in  on  the  Sicilian  coist  for 
repairs  and  fresh  provisions,  in  a  few  days  they  put  to  sea  agah,  and 
steered  straight  to  the  promontory  of  Hermaeum,  which  terninates 
the  eastern  shore  of  the  gulf  of  Carthage. 


XVIII  REGULUS  IN  AFRICA  249 

The    full    effects    of  their    defeat   were  now   coming   upon   the   The 
Carthaginians.     The    enemy    was    in    their    country    and    must   be  Komans 
opposed  no  longer  with  ships,  in  which  they  might  still  feel  that  '^f^^J 
they  were  superior,  but  on  land  where  they  had  already  found  that  2k6. 
their  troops  were  generally  overmatched.      They  began  preparations 
at  once  for  the  defence  of  the  capital,  employing  the  remains  of  the 
armament  which  had  found  its  way  home  in  detachments  after  the 
battle   of   Ecnomus.      But   an   immediate    advance    upon    Carthage 
itself  was  not  the  design  of  the   Roman   commanders.      They  had 
first  to  secure  a  base  of  operations.     Coasting  along  the  peninsula 
from  Hermaeum  to  the  south-east,  they  laid  siege  to  Clupea,  which 
speedily    surrendered    and    was    occupied    by    a    Roman    garrison. 
Starting   from    Clupea    the    consuls    ravaged    the    country  towards 
Carthage,  carrying  off  an  immense  booty  of  cattle  and  slaves.     The 
Carthaginians    seemed    to    have    hoped   that    the  Roman    invasion 
was   a  mere   raid,  and   that,  if  they   kept   their  capital   secure,  the 
enemy  would  depart  at  the   approach  of  autumn.      But  when  they 
learnt  that  Regulus  was  to  remain  with  a  considerable  part  of  the  Regulus 
army  throughout  the  winter,  the  other  consul  taking  back  the  rest  <^^d,  P'^^^  of 
with  the  booty, — they  understood  that   a  real    occupation    of  the  yg^ain 
country  was    contemplated,    and    that    they  must    make    strenuous  during  the 
efforts  to  save  themselves.      Hasdrubal,  son  of  Hanno,  and  Bostarus  winter  in 
were  appointed  generals,  and  Hamilcar,  with  5000  infantry  and  500  Africa, 
horse,  was  sent  for  from  Heracleia,  and  associated  with  them  in  the  ^^  '^^^' 
command.      Through  the  autumn  and  winter  they  were  to  do  their 
best  to  prevent  the  plundering  of  the  country  and  the  advance  of 
Regulus  towards  the  capital.      But  in  this  task  they  met  with  very 
little  success.     They  were  frequently  defeated  in  skirmishes,  and  in 
endeavouring  to  force  him  to  raise  the  siege  of  a  town  called  Adys 
they  suffered  a  severe  reverse,  losing  their  camp  and  retreating  in 
great  confusion.      Polybius  attributes  their  general  ill  success  to  bad 
tactics.     Their  strength  lay  in  cavalry  and  elephants  ;  they  should 
therefore  have  been  careful  to  choose  plains  and  open  ground  for 
attacking  the  enemy,  but  they  timidly  clung  to  the  hills,  where  these 
parts  of  their  army  were  of  little  or  no  avail.      The  Romans,  there- 
fore, for  a  time  carried  all  before  them,  and  before  long  occupied  Regulus 
Tunes,  which   was   within   ten   miles   of  Carthage   itself,  making   it  occupies 
their  headquarters  for  plundering  the  country  up  to  the  very  walls  of  '^'"^^^^ 
the  capital. 

The  city  was  now  in  the  utmost  distress  and  terror.  The 
Roman  enemy  was  M^thin  sight ;  on  the  other  side  the  Carthaginians 
had  to  defend  themselves  against  an  attack  of  rebellious  Numidians  ; 
their  generals  were  being  beaten  in  the  field  ;  many  of  the  towns  in 
their  territory  were  openly  joining  the  Romans  ;  the  city  was  becom- 


250  HISTORY  OF  ROME 


peace 
255 


ing  crowded  with  terrified  countryfolk,  and  a  famine  seemed  * 
Fruitless  imminent.  In  these  circumstances  they  were  glad  to  listen  to  pro- 
negotia-  posals  from  Regulus  in  the  spring  of  255.  His  object  in  making 
^IITJ^^  them  was  to  prevent  the  credit  of  the  surrender  of  Carthage,  which 
he  now  considered  certain,  from  falling  to  his  successor  in  the  con- 
sulship. But  his  terms  were  of  the  utmost  severity.  The  Cartha- 
ginians were  to  evacuate  Sicily  and  Sardinia,  to  restore  Roman 
prisoners  without  ransom,  and  to  pay  a  ransom  for  their  own  ;  to 
pay  the  expenses  of  the  war  and  an  annual  tribute  ;  to  make  no 
alliance  without  the  consent  of  Rome  ;  to  keep  only  one  ship  of  war 
for  themselves,  but  to  maintain  fifty  triremes  at  the  service  of  Rome. 
The  Carthaginians  naturally  thought  that  nothing  worse  could  be 
imposed  if  their  city  was  taken,  and  determined  to  resist.  The 
event  justified  them,  and  gave  a  stern  rebuke  to  the  over-confidence 
of  Regulus,  who  presumed  so  far  on  his  good  fortune  as  to  believe 
that  a  great  city  like  Carthage  could  fall  after  a  few  months'  cam- 
paign to  what  was  after  all  but  a  weak  arm,y. 
Xanthippus  About  the  time  of  these  fruitless  negotiations  there  arrived  at 
of  Sparta.  Carthage,  among  other  Greek  mercenaries  hired  by  a  recruiting  agent, 
a  certain  Spartan  named  Xanthippus.  The  prestige  of  the  Spartan 
training  and  discipline  had  not  yet  died  out,  and  Xanthippus  was 
said  to  have  been  thoroughly  imbued  with  it,  and  to  have  had  large 
experience  in  actual  war.  His  criticisms  were  therefore  regarded 
with  respect ;  and  when  it  became  known  that  he  disapproved  of  the 
tactics  of  the  Punic  generals,  and  believed  that  the  enemy  might 
still  be  defeated  if  those  tactics  were  changed,  popular  feeling 
was  violently  excited  in  favour  of  entrusting  him  with  the  supreme 
command.  Summoned  before  the  magistrates  he  explained  that 
the  mistake  had  been  in  not  selecting  ground  proper  for  the  use  of 
cavalry  and  elephants.  It  is  not  likely  that  the  elementary  fact  of 
open  and  flat  country  being  required  for  cavalry  evolutions  was  a 
novelty.  But  either  from  terror  of  the  Roman  legions  or  from  not 
keeping  the  fact  firmly  before  their  minds,  the  generals  had  more 
than  once  made  a  mistake  in  selecting  the  ground  on  which  to  ofier 
battle,  or  had  allowed  themselves  to  be  outmanoeuvred  by  Regulus 
and  forced  to  take  up  a  position  unfavourable  to  themselves.  This 
would  be  enough  to  give  point  to  the  criticism  of  Xanthippus.  His 
influence  was  enhanced  by  the  skill  with  which  he  marshalled  the 
troops  and  directed  their  movements  as  soon  as  they  had  quitted  the 
town  ;  and  the  feelings  which  contribute  above  all  to  the  success  of 
an  army,  enthusiasm  and  confidence,  were  created.  The  Romans 
immediately  noticed  the  change  in  their  enemy's  tactics  and  the 
greater  skill  v/ith  which  their  ground  was  selected.  Yet,  though 
puzzled  and  somewhat  alarmed,  they  had  gained  so  many  victories 


XVIII  CAPTURE  OF  REGULUS  251 

over  the  Carthaginian  army  during  the  past  months  that  they  did 
not  hesitate  to  attack  it  even  now.  They  therefore  pitched  their 
camp  about  a  mile  from  the  enemy. 

In  the  battle  which  followed  the  total  numbers  engaged  on  each  Defeat  and 
side  were  not  widely  different.  But  in  cavalry  the  Carthaginians  <^apture  of 
were  vastly  superior  ;  they  had  4000  horsemen,  the  Romans  only  ^^^^  ^^' 
500.  Thus  outnumbered,  the  Roman  cavalry  failed  to  be  of  any 
use  to  the  infantry,  who  were  still  farther  weakened  by  not  being 
supported  as  usual  by  the  velites.  These  last  Regulus  posted  in 
front,  instead  of  on  the  wings,  in  order  if  possible  by  their  missiles 
to  frighten  the  elephants  which  Xanthippus  stationed  in  a  line  in 
front  of  his  phalanx.  Elephants,  as  we  have  seen  and  shall  have 
frequent  occasion  to  notice,  were  of  uncertain  advantage  to  an  army, 
and  apt  to  become  as  dangerous  to  their  friends  as  to  their  foes. 
On  this  occasion,  however,  they  appear  to  have  been  employed  with 
great  effect.  The  battle  began  with  a  charge  of  the  Numidian 
horse  on  both  wings,  before  which  the  scanty  Roman  cavalry  at  once 
broke  and  fled.  The  result  of  the  infantry  battle  was  less  uniform. 
The  left  wing  drove  the  Carthaginian  right  from  its  ground  and 
hurled  it  back  upon  its  entrenchment.  This  part  of  the  line  was 
outside  the  line  of  elephants,  and  the  troops  opposed  to  them  were 
the  mercenaries.  The  Roman  right  and  centre  were  not  so  fortunate. 
The  velites  in  their  front  were  thrown  into  confusion  by  a  furious 
charge  of  the  elephants.  The  heavy-armed  maniples  behind  them 
got  separated.  Some  coming  to  the  support  of  the  velites  charged 
through  the  line  of  elephants  only  to  find  themselves  confronted 
by  the  unbroken  phalanx  of  the  Carthaginian  centre  and  left.  The 
rest  were  obliged  to  face  right  and  left  to  resist  the  victorious 
Numidian  cavalry,  which  was  now  on  their  flanks.  Both  were 
utterly  shattered.  The  advanced  maniples  dashed  themselves  to 
pieces  on  the  Carthaginian  phalanx  ;  those  behind  were  broken  up 
and  cut  down  by  the  cavalry.  The  country  was  so  flat  that 
there  was  no  rising  ground  near  on  which  they  could  rally  and 
defend  themselves  from  the  horsemen  and  elephants.  The  right 
and  centre  were  thus  practically  destroyed.  Regulus  indeed,  with 
the  bulk  of  the  cavalry  managed  to  escape  from  the  field  ;  but  they 
were  pursued  and  made  prisoners.  Some  2000  of  the  left  wing, 
who  had  advanced  so  far  in  the  pursuit  of  the  Carthaginian  right 
as  to  be  clear  of  this  disastrous  overthrow,  made  good  their  retreat 
to  Clupea. 

The  army  of  invasion  was  thus  rendered  incapable  of  any  longer  The 
threatening   Carthage :  and  though  the   Romans   still   held   Clupea  Romans 
they  had  to  stand  a  siege  even  there.      It  proved  indeed  to  be  the  (^J'<^n(lonihe 
end  of  the  invasion,  for  the  Roman  government  presently  resolved  to 


252 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP.  XVIII 


After 

career  of 
Xanthip- 
pus. 


Punish- 
ment of  the 
Libyans. 


abandon  Clupea  also  :  and  this  failure  marks  an  era  in  the  war.  The 
activity  of  the  Carthaginians  in  Sicily  was  soon  afterwards  renewed  ; 
the  struggle  had  to  be  fought  out  there  and  on  the  sea,  and  was  never 
again  during  this  war  to  be  transferred  with  any  effect  to  Africa. 

The  conqueror  of  Regulus  did  not  long  remain  in  the  service  of 
Carthage.  Successful  mercenaries  were  often  objects  of  suspicion 
to  their  employers,  who  were  usually  anxious  to  be  rid  of  them  as 
soon  as  possible.  Generals  were  apt  to  make  large  promises  on  the 
field  which  the  home  government  were  unable  or  unwilling  to  fulfil ; 
and  an  armed  body  with  a  grievance  was  a  formidable  danger  to  a 
peaceful  population.  On  this  occasion  many  of  these  men  are  said  to 
have  been  enticed  on  board  ships,  the  captains  of  which  had  secret 
orders  to  abandon  them  if  possible  on  some  island  ;  while  Xanthippus 
himself  was  to  be  put  on  a  leaky  vessel  that  he  might  be  drowned. 
These  stories,  however,  look  like  the  invention  or  exaggeration  of 
the  enemy  ;  our  best  authority  represents  Xanthippus  as  retiring 
voluntarily  from  Carthage,  knowing  well  the  prejudices  likely  to  rise 
against  a  foreigner  whose  great  services  had  made  him  too  con- 
spicuous. Yet  Polybius  admits  that  even  in  his  time  other  stories 
were  current  as  to  the  cause  and  manner  of  his  departure.  We 
know  nothing  more  of  him 
from  the  Carthaginian 
Carthaginians  themselves. 

The  punishment  inflicted  on  those  Libyans  who  had  joined 
Regulus  was  severe.  The  tribute  of  the  towns  was  doubled  ;  the 
farmers  were  taxed  to  the  amount  of  half  the  annual  produce  of  their 
lands  ;  and  these  burdens  were  exacted  with  redoubled  harshness. 
But  this  policy  only  served  to  accentuate  the  fact  that  the  Punic 
people  were  living  among  a  subject  race,  with  which  they  had  never 
amalgamated,  and  produced  a  feeling  of  exasperation  among  the 
subjects  themselves  which  helped  to  produce  the  outbreak  at  the 
end  of  the  war  that  nearly  proved  fatal  to  Carthage. 


,  except  that  he  disappears   henceforth 
service,    to    the    relief  apparently    of  the 


» 


CHAPTER    XIX 

THE    FIRST    PUNIC    WAR Conti?tued 

255-242 

Third  Period  (255-251) — The  Romans  increase  their  fleet,  but  abandon  Clupea 
— The  fleet  is  lost  in  a  storm  {259) — A  fleet  is  again  built  and  Panormus  is 
taken  (254) — The  Roman  fleet  is  again  wrecked  (253) — The  Romans  abandon 
the  sea,  but  Himera,  Thermae,  and  Lipara  are  taken,  the  last  by  help  of  ships 
from  Hiero  (252) — Victory  of  Metellus  at  Panormus — Alleged  mission  of  M. 
Regains — The  Carthaginians  remove  the  people  of  Selinus  to  Lilybaeum 
(251).  Fourth  Period  (250-241) — The  Romans  again  build  a  fleet  and  invest 
Lilybaeum  (250) — Great  defeat  of  Claudius  at  Drepana — Wreck  of  a  large 
fleet  of  transports  carrying  provisions  to  the  camp  at  Lilybaeum — C.  Junius 
PuUus  seizes  Eryx  (249) — Siege  of  Lilybaeum  continued  (248) — Hamilcar 
Barcas  comes  to  Sicily,  and  occupies  Hercte  (247) — Hasdrubal  seizes  Eryx 
and  besieges  the  Romans  on  the  summit  of  the  mountain,  and  is  himself 
besieged  in  Eryx — Frequent  but  indecisive  engagements  at  Lilybaeum,  Eryx, 
and  Hercte  (246-243) — The  Romans  once  more  build  a  fleet  (243) — Great 
victory  of  Lutatius  at  the  Aegates  islands  (loth  March) — Peace  is  concluded, 
and  the  Carthaginians  evacuate  Sicily  (241). 

The  Carthaginians  followed  up  their  success  over  M.  Regulus  by  2^^-  ^oss. 

investing  the  remains  of  the  Roman  army  in  Clupea,  but  met  with  Servius 

such  determined  resistance,  that  they  were  still  before  the  town  when    ,f  ,^^5"^ 

T^  •  -1     1  ,  ^  •         •  -1     Nobilior. 

a.  report  came  that  the  Romans  intended  to  take  to  the  sea  again  with  yj/  Aemil- 

a  formidable  fleet,  and  to  renew  the  invasion  of  Africa.     All  their  ius 

forces  therefore  were  required  at  home  to  fit  out  and  man  a  fleet.  Pciullus. 

New  ships  were  rapidly  built,   old  ones  repaired,    and  before   the 

arrival  of  the  Romans  they  had  launched  200  vessels. 

The   Romans,   however,   far  from   entertaining  such   a   spirited   The 

policy,   had   determined   to   bring   off  their  men  and  abandon  the  Romans 

invasion    of  Africa    altogether.       They    had    indeed    been    making  ^^i^g  off 

vigorous  exertions.     The  fleet  that  had  conquered  at  Ecnomus  was  ^f  tjj^iy. 

got  ready  again  for  service  and  raised  by  the  addition  of  new  vessels  army  from 

to    the    number   of  250.        But  they  expected  that    the    defeat    of  Clupea. 

Regulus  would  bring  the  enemy  upon  Sicily  or  even    Italy   itself. 


254 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Victory 
off  Her- 
maeum , 
255- 


Wreck  of 
the  Ro7nan 
fleet  off 
Catnarina, 
July  2S5- 


The 

Cartha- 
ginians are 
encouraged 
to  new 
exertions 
in  Sicily. 


The  new  consuls  were  therefore  despatched  to  strengthen  the 
places  most  open  to  attack  on  the  Itahan  and  Sicihan  coasts,  and 
with  orders  to  sail  afterwards  to  Clupea  and  bring  off  the  survivors 
of  the  army  of  Regulus  and  their  ships.  On  its  way  the  fleet  was 
driven  by  stress  of  weather  upon  the  island  of  Cossyra  in  the  gulf 
of  Carthage.  Leaving  a  garrison  there  they  sailed  towards  the 
promontory  of  Hermaeum,  where  they  found  the  Carthaginian  fleet. 
Once  more  the  courage  and  number  of  the  Roman  soldiers  on  board 
prevailed  over  superior  skill.  After  a  severe  struggle  the  battle 
was  decided  by  the  Romans  in  Clupea  putting  out  to  sea  and  falling 
upon  the  Carthaginians  in  the  rear,  who  thus  attacked  in  two 
directions  lost  more  than  half  their  ships.  The  main  purpose  of 
the  expedition  was  now  easily  effected.  The  soldiers  at  Clupea  were 
taken  off  and  their  fourteen  vessels  safely  convoyed  to  Camarina. 
There  was  now  no  Punic  fleet  to  intercept  them,  and  indeed  it  seems 
hard  to  understand  why  the  Romans  should  have  abandoned  a  foot- 
ing in  Africa  which  they  might  easily  have  maintained.  Probably, 
if  the  victory  off  Hermaeum  had  been  known  at  Rome  in  time,  this 
seemingly  impolitic  movement  might  have  been  countermanded. 

But  presently  a  power  greater  than  that  of  Carthage  interposed. 
The  Romans  could  drive  their  ships  against  the  enemy  and  win  by 
sheer  force  ;  but  they  could  not  conquer  wind  and  wave  ;  nor  had 
they  the  knowledge  and  experience  of  the  Carthaginian  pilots  to 
serve  them  on  a  dangerous  coast  and  in  a  dangerous  season.  They 
were  duly  warned  :  but  the  warning  fell  on  deaf  ears.  The  southern 
coast  of  Sicily  is  remarkable  for  the  absence  of  good  harbours,  and 
Camarina,  at  which  the  Roman  fleet  had  touched,  was  no  exception. 
It  was  also  the  season  (about  the  end  of  July)  particularly  liable 
to  storms.  In  spite  of  every  warning  the  Roman  consuls,  elate  with 
their  success  on  the  African  shore,  determined  to  coast  along 
southern  Sicily  and  crown  their  achievements  by  taking  certain 
towns  which  still  held  by  Carthage.  They  were  caught  in  a  terrible 
storm,  in  which  284  out  of  the  364  vessels  were  lost.  The  coast  was 
strewn  for  miles  with  corpses  and  wreckage  ;  and  the  great  Roman 
fleet,  which  had  survived  two  hard-fought  battles,  was  practically 
annihilated  in  a  day. 

The  news  of  this  disaster  to  the  Roman  ships  naturally 
raised  the  spirits  of  the  Carthaginians.  The  year  before  they  had 
defeated  a  Roman  army ;  the  storm  had  now  left  them  again 
masters  of  the  sea.  Their  fleet  was  rapidly  got  afloat,  the 
Roman  garrison  was  expelled  from  Cossyra,  and  Hasdrubal  again 
landed  at  Lilybaeum  with  an  augmented  army  and  140  elephants. 
He  set  to  work  to  train  his  men,  and  had  high  hopes  of  striking 
a  decisive  blow  at  Roman  supremacy  in  Sicily.      But  the  Romans 


Coss.  Cn. 
Cornelius 


XIX  THE  ROMANS  TAKE  PANORMUS  255 

were  by  no  means  iDeaten  or  fatally  discouraged.  As  soon  as  they 
heard  of  the  loss  of  their  ships  they  began  building  enough  new  ones 
to  raise  the  number  of  their  fleet,  with  the  eighty  which  had  survived 
the  storm,  to  300. 

The     ships    were     got    ready    with    marvellous     rapidity,     and  2^4 
despatched  to  Sicily  under  the  command  of  the  consuls  of  the  next 
year  (254),  one  of  whom  was  the  Scipio  Asina  who  had  been  taken  ^^^-I'^^ 
prisoner  at  Lipara  in  260,  but  had  in  the  meantime  been  released  Asina  II., 
or  ransomed.  1     He  now  redeemed  his  previous  mismanagement  or  Aulus 
misfortune.      The  fleet  sailed  straight  to   Panormus,  which  with  its  ^^^j^^f 
magnificent  harbour  was  still  in  the  hands  of  the  Carthaginians.      The  jj      q^. 
lower  or  new  town  soon  yielded  to  the  battering-rams  which  were  tureof 
brought  to  bear  upon  it  from  two  directions  ;    and  though  the  old  Panormus. 
town,   which  stood  farther  from  the  sea,  made  a  longer  resistance, 
it  eventually  yielded.      Thus  the   Carthaginians  were  excluded  from 
one  of  the   finest   harbours    in    Sicily,    which   had  long   been  their 
starting-point  against  Italy  and  the  north  of  Sicily,   and  from  which 
they  could  wait  in  security  to  intercept  the  Roman  ships  coasting 
down  the    Italian  shore.       This   confined  them  still  more  closely  to 
their  positions  on  the  west  coast ;  but  for  the  present  the  loss  was 
lightened  by  the  rise  of  Lilybaeum,  a  more  convenient  place  of  arrival 
from  Africa  and  more  capable  of  defence.      Henceforth  therefore  we 
shall  find  it  to  be   the   policy  of  the    Carthaginians  to   strengthen 
Drepana  and  Lilybaeum  ;  and,  when  other  towns  became  indefensible, 
to  remove  their  inhabitants  to  one  or  the  other  of  these. 

The  capture  of  Panormus  marks  the  highest  point  in  the  good  2^3.   Coss. 
fortune   of  Rome   in   the   third   period    of  the   war.       It   hampered  '^^^ 
Hasdrubal  in  his  contemplated  raids  from  Lilybaeum  ;  and  though   CaxliT^C 
his  fleet  inflicted  some  damage  on  that  of  Rome,  it  could  not  pre-  Sempron- 
vent  the  consuls  of  the  next  year  from  sailing  to  Africa  and  making  iusBlaesus. 
descents  upon  the  coast.      No  great  success,  however,  was  gained  -Another 
by  them.      Their  ships  got  aground  in  the  Lesser  Syrtis,  and  though  ^  ^P^^^^  • 
they  were  floated  again,  they  were  caught  in  a  great  storm  on  their 
way  home  and  more  than  half  were  lost. 

Discouraged  from  farther  attempts  at  sea  the  Romans  resolved  2S2.  Coss. 
to  concentrate  their  efforts  upon  Sicily.  Accordingly  the  consuls  of  f-  ^^^^l- 
the   next    year   (252)    were    both    sent    thither   with    their    armies,   ^p  Se!^'i. 


^  The  Roman  government  again  and  again  refused  to  ransom  prisoners.  But 
they  were  sometimes  exchanged  and  sometimes  ransomed  by  their  friends.  That 
Scipio  should  not  have  incurred  disgrace  at  Rome,  and  should  even  have  been 
elected  consul  for  the  second  time,  lends  some  colour  to  the  assertion  of  some  of 
the  later  authorities  that  his  capture  had  been  the  consequence  of  some  breach  of 
faith  on  the  part  of  the  Carthaginian  admiral,  or  at  least  that  such  was  believed  at 
Rome  to  be  the  case. 


ius  Caepio. 


256 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Capture  of 

Thermae, 

Himera, 

and 

Lipara, 

252. 


231. 

L.  Caecil- 

ius 

Metellus, 

C.  Furius 

Pacilus. 


Victory  of 
the  Romans 
at  Panor- 


Triumphof 
Metellus. 


The 

Cartha- 
ginians 
propose 
terms  of 
peace. 


accompanied  by  sixty  ships  to  secure  supplies.  But  during  two 
years  (252-251)  little  of  importance  was  done.  Himera  and  Thermae 
indeed,  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  Panormus,  fell  into  the  hands  of 
the  Romans,  and  the  island  of  Lipara  was  taken  by  aid  of  ships 
borrowed  from  Hiero  —  achievements  considered  sufficient  to  gain 
the  consul  Aurelius  Cotta  a  triumph.  But  the  Carthaginians,  still 
confident  in  their  superiority  at  sea,  and  still  strongly  posted  at 
Drepana  and  Lilybaeum,  could  not  be  ejected,  while  the  terror  of 
their  elephants  kept  the  Roman  army  from  the  open  country.  The 
legions  clung  to  the  hills,  and  though  often  tempted  by  the  enemy  to 
give  battle,  always  refused. 

At  length,  towards  the  end  of  the  summer  of  251,  when  one  of 
the  consuls  had  as  usual  gone  to  Rome  to  hold  the  elections, 
Hasdrubal  determined  to  make  a  great  effort  to  draw  the  Romans 
from  Panormus.  He  marched  as  if  to  attack  that  town,  plundering 
the  country  as  he  went.  But  the  consul  Caecilius  Metellus  suffered 
him  to  destroy  and  burn  almost  up  to  the  walls  unopposed.  Panormus 
stands  between  two  streams  little  more  than  half  a  mile  apart.  When 
Hasdrubal  with  his  elephants  had  crossed  one  of  these  streams,  and 
was  in  this  narrow  strip  of  country,  Metellus  determined  that  his  time 
was  come.  He  posted  archers  on  the  walls,  and  javelin-throwers 
along  the  outer  edge  of  the  moat,  ordering  all  the  armourers  in  the 
town  to  pile  up  supplies  of  missiles  ready  for  use  outside  the  walls. 
Men  on  the  walls  were  of  course  out  of  reach  of  the  elephants,  while 
those  on  the  edge  of  the  moat  had  only  to  step  down  its  bank  to  be 
also  secure  from  them.  The  arrows  from  the  walls  and  the  javelins 
from  the  light  troops  outside  so  galled  and  irritated  the  beasts,  that 
they  turned  upon  their  own  troops  with  irresistible  fury,  broke  their 
ranks,  and  threw  the  whole  army  into  confusion.  As  soon  as  Metellus 
saw  this,  he  led  out  his  infantry  by  a  gate  opposite  to  the  left  wing 
of  the  enemy.  His  troops  were  fresh  and  charged  an  enemy  already 
disordered  ;  and  the  Carthaginians  were  soon  in  headlong  flight, 
leaving  a  large  number  of  their  men  on  the  field.  Ten  of  the 
elephants  were  captured  on  the  spot,  and  the  rest  shortly  afterwards. 
Metellus's  triumph  was  one  of  the  most  splendid  ever  yet  witnessed 
at  Rome,  and  was  adorned  by  thirteen  high  Carthaginian  officers 
and  120  elephants. 

The  repulse  of  the  attack  upon  Panormus  left  the  Romans 
undisputed  masters  of  Sicily,  except  on  the  narrow  strip  of  shore 
between  Drepana  and  Lilybaeum.  So  serious  did  their  position 
seem  to  the  Carthaginians,  that  they  made  proposals  for  peace.  It 
was  on  this  occasion  that  the  celebrated  mission  of  M.  Regulus  was 
believed  to  have  taken  place.  No  story  is  more  often  told  by  later 
writers,  and  yet  Polybius  mentions  neither  the  proposal  for  peace 


XIX        RETURN  OF  REGULUS  TO  CARTHAGE        257 

nor  the  mission  of  Regulus.  Modern  historians  seem  to  admit  the  Alleged 
former  and  reject  the  latter,  though  both  rest  on  the  same  authority,  mission  of 
The  story,  not  mentioned  by  any  writer  before  Cicero,  is  this.  When  '  ^^' 
the  ambassadors  came  from  Carthage  Regulus  was  sent  with  ^^^ ' 
them  under  an  oath  that,  if  he  did  not  obtain  the  peace  and  inter- 
change of  prisoners  from  the  Senate,  he  would  return  to  Carthage. 
When  he  arrived  at  Rome  he  refused,  as  being  no  longer  a  citizen, 
to  enter  the  city  or  to  visit  his  wife  and  children.  The  Senate  met 
outside  the  walls  ;  but  instead  of  pleading  the  cause  for  which  he  was 
sent,  he  urged  them  by  no  means  to  make  terms  or  to  exchange  the 
prisoners,  for  though  his  body  belonged  to  the  Carthaginians  by 
right  of  war,  his  spirit  was  still  Roman.  And  this  advice  he  gave 
although  he  knew  that  death  awaited  him  at  Carthage.  When  some 
wished  to  save  him  by  making  peace,  he  declared  that  he  had  taken 
a  slow  poison  and  must  perish  in  any  case.  Then  thrusting  aside 
clients,  wife,  and  child,  he  set  out  upon  his  return  to  Carthage.  There 
it  was  said  that  he  was  subjected  to  exquisite  tortures.  His  eyelids 
were  cut  off,  and  after  confinement  in  a  dark  dungeon  he  was 
suddenly  exposed  to  the  blinding  sun,  fastened  in  a  pillory  studded 
with  sharp  nails,  that  he  might  perish  slowly  from  agony  and  sleep- 
lessness. Therefore  at  Rome  two  noble  Carthaginian  captives  were 
given  into  the  hands  of  his  wife,  who  revenged  her  husband  on  them 
by  cruel  imprisonment  and  starvation  ;  till  one  died,  and  the  other, 
after  being  shut  up  for  several  days  with  the  corpse,  was  released  by 
the  order  of  the  magistrates. 

Such  was  the  story  which,  with  some  variation  of  detail,  has  been  Doubt  as  to 
recounted  by  numerous  writers.  If  we  are  to  reject  it  entirely,  we  ^'^^  Story. 
may  at  least  on  the  same  grounds  be  glad  to  be  rid  also  of  the  horrid 
revenge  wreaked  on  the  innocent  captives  by  the  wife  of  Regulus. 
True  or  false,  it  touched  the  imagination  of  the  Romans,  and  they 
loved  to  tell  of  the  country  gentleman,  unwillingly  detained  from  his 
farm  for  the  winter  campaign  in  Africa,  who  while  covered  with  a 
noble  shame  for  the  loss  of  freedom,  did  not  forget  the  love  of 
country  or  the  dignity  of  a  Roman  ;  and  the  ringing  verses  of  Horace 
will  keep  the  tale  alive  as  long  as  the  Latin  language  is  understood.  1 

^  fertur  pudicae  conjugis  osculum 
parvosque  natos  ut  capitis  minor 
a  se  removisse  et  virilem 

torvus  humi  posuisse  vol  turn, 
donee  labantes  consilio  patres 
firmaret  auctor  nunquam  alias  dato, 
interque  moerentes  amicos 
egregius  properaret  exul. 
atqui  sciebat  quae  sibi  barbarus 
tortor  pararet  ;  non  aliter  tamen 

S 


258  HISTORY  OF  ROME 


If  the  embassy,  however,  was  ever  sent  its  prayer  was  rejected.     The 

war  went  on,  but  from  this  period  the  interest  centres  round  Lilybaeum, 

For  eight  years  (250-242)  the   Romans  persisted  in  the  siege,  and 

though  the  chief  struggles  were  at  times  at  Eryx  and   Hercte,  the 

main  object  throughout  was  the  capture  of  Lilybaeum.      But  after  all 

it  was  never  taken  :   the  war  was  decided  at  sea,  and   Lilybaeum 

passed  to  the  victors  there. 

2S0-242.  This  FOURTH  PERIOD  of  the  war  begins'with  defeat  and  ends 

Last  period  with   victory  at   sea.      The   slow  progress  made  in   252    and  251 

of  the  war.    convinced  the  Romans  that  the  only  chance  of  ending  the  war  was 

to  become  masters  of  the  sea.     Accordingly  the  consuls  for  250,  one 

of  whom  was  the  brother  of  M.  Regulus,  were  placed  in  command  of 

200   ships.      Taking    the  consular  armies  on   board    they  at    once 

made  for  Lilybaeum,  which   they  invested  by  sea  and  land.     The 

town  was  exceedingly  strong  both  from  the   lagoons,  which  made 

navigation   difficult   at   the   entrance   of  its  harbour,   and  from  the 

vastness  of  its  artificial  defences  on  the  land  side.      It  had  in   276 

successfully  resisted  the  attack  of  Pyrrhus ;  it  had  lately  been  enlarged 

by  the  removal  to  it  of  the  citizens  of  Selinus ;  and  it  now  had  within 

its  walls  a  garrison  of  10,000  Carthaginian  soldiers  commanded  by 

Himilco.      The  consuls  pitched  separate  camps  under  its  walls  united 

2SO.  Coss.     by  a  stockade,  ditch,  and  wall,   and  immediately  began  operations. 

Gains  Every  contrivance  known  to  ancient  warfare — trenches,  mines,  mantle, 

Attlius         penthouse  and  battering-ram — was  put  in  practice.     The  assault  was 

lusll.  chiefly  directed  against  the  fortifications  at  the  south-western  corner 

L.  Manlius  of  the  city,  where  as  many  as  six  of  the  towers  were  before  long 

Vulso  II.      battered  down.    But  though  the  work  was  carried  on  with  extraordinary 

f  vA^Lt^/^^    energy  by  the  Romans,  it  was  met  with  equal  energy  and  courage  by 

Himilco,     As  soon  as  the  enemy  demolished  one  line  of  fortifications, 

he  found  himself  confronted  by  another  erected  nearer  to  the  city. 

The  Carthaginians  met  the  Roman  mines  by  countermines;  interrupted 

the  construction   of  batteries  by  frequent  sorties,  in  which  the  loss 

inflicted  was  often  as  great  as  in  a  pitched  battle  ;  and  again  and 

again   nearly  succeeded   in    burning  the    Roman   engines.       When 

imperilled  by  the  treason  of  some  of  the  officers  of  his  mercenaries, 

Himilco  suppressed  the  threatened  mutiny  and  desertion  by  the  aid 

of  a  Greek  officer  named  Alexion  ;  and,  in  spite  of  the  straits  to  which' 

both  garrison  and  people  were  reduced,  continued  to  hold  out  until 

dimovit  obstantes  propinquos 
et  populum  reditus  morantem, 
quam  si  clientum  longa  negolia 
dijudicata  lite  relinqueret, 
tendens  Venafranos  in  agros 

aut  Lacedaemonium  Tarentum. — Od.  iii.  5.  41  sqq. 


Lilybaeum 
begun. 


XIX  RUNNING  THE  BLOCKADE  AT  LILYBAEUM  259 

the   arrival    of  provisions  and  reinforcements  under  Hannibal,   son  Lilybaeum 

of  Hamilcar,  who  eluded  the  blockade,  and  entered  the  harbour  before  revictu- 

so  strono^  a  wind  that  the  Romans  did  not  venture  to  put  to  sea  to    „       ^  , 

,  .  A       •!•        1  •  ir      <-     1  •  XT-     -1  1      Hannibal. 

resist  hnn.      Availmg  himself  of  this  encouragement,  Himilco  made  ineffectual 

a  sortie  in  force.      It  failed  in  its  object  of  firing  the  Roman  engines  sortie  by 

and  destroying  the  siege  works  ;  for  the  Romans  defended  them  with  Himilco, 

desperate  courage,  and  on  the  whole  maintained  their  position  and  ^■5°' 

inflicted  greater  loss  than  they  sustained.      But  though  he  thus  missed 

his  stroke,  he  kept  up  the  defence  of  the  town,  while  Hannibal  again 

eluded  the   Roman  ships  and  sailed  away  to   Drepana,  which  now 

became  the  headquarters  of  the  Carthaginian  navy  in  Sicilian  waters. 

In  the  course  of  the  same  year  Lilybaeum  was  frequently  vie-  The 
tualled  by  privateers  who  ran  the  blockade.  The  example  was  set  Khodian. 
by  a  Rhodian  named  Hannibal,  who  offered  to  relieve  the  anxiety  of 
the  government  of  Carthage  by  entering  the  harbour  and  bringing 
back  news.  The  success  with  which  he  did  this  again  xmd  again  on 
board  his  own  private  trireme  not  only  induced  others  to  do  the  same, 
who  learnt  from  him  the  secret  of  the  way  to  enter  the  harbour,  but, 
what  was  of  still  greater  importance,  kept  up  communication  with  the 
home  government.  All  danger  of  assault  for  this  year,  however,  was 
removed  by  the  destruction  of  the  Roman  works  and  artillery.  A 
storm  of  wind  of  extraordinary  violence  hurled  down  wooden  towers,  of  the 
penthouses,  and  screens  :  and  the  besieged  took  advantage  of  the  ^rtilkrv 
confusion  to  make  an  attack.  They  succeeded  in  throwing  lighted 
torches  upon  the  woodwork,  and  the  fire  was  soon  blown  into  fury  by 
the  wind,  setting  full  in  the  faces  of  the  Romans  and  blinding  them 
with  heat  and  smoke,  while  it  blew  away  all  obstacles  from  the 
sallying  party,  and  enabled  them  to  take  easy  and  deliberate  aim 
with  javelins  and  arrows.  The  destruction  was  so  complete  that  the 
towers  and  carriages  of  the  battering-rams  were  burnt  to  the  ground, 
and  the  Romans  were  obliged  to  give  up  all  idea  of  assaulting  the 
town.  They  still  persisted,  however,  in  the  siege  and  blockade, 
strengthened  their  camps,  and  determined  if  possible  to  starve  out 
the  garrison. 

The  next  year  (249)  was  more  disastrous  to  the  Romans  than  24^. 
the  last.     Publius  Claudius,  one  of  the  new  consuls,  arrived  early  in  ^f^'  f^' 
the  summer  with  10,000  men  to  make  good  the  losses  in  camp  and  p^^cher  L 
fleet.      He  determined,  however,  to  strike  a  blow  elsewhere  than  at  Junius 
Lilybaeum,  where  nothing  was  ready  for  an  assault,  and  where  there  Pullus. 
seemed  no  prospect  of  anything  but  a  long  and  wearisome  siege  from 
which  little  credit  was   to   be   got.     The    Carthaginian  fleet   under 
Adherbal  was  in  the  harbour  of  Drepana, — a  long  inlet  of  the  sea 

h enclosed  by  the  sickle-shaped  peninsula  which  gave  it  its  name. 
Claudius  was  rash  and  impetuous,  and,  like  his  father,  the  famous 
[ 


26o 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


censor,  apparently  unsuccessful  in  war.  He  determined  to  attack  the 
Carthaginian  fleet,  and  explained  to  his  council  that  the  recent  losses 
of  the  Romans  would  be  likely  to  have  put  Adherbal  off  his  guard, 
and  that  therefore  a  sudden  attack  would  have  every  chance  of  success, 
if  made  before  Adherbal  learnt  that  the  Roman  army  and  fleet  had 
been  reinforced.  The  officers  cordially  approved.  The  ships  were 
quickly  manned,  and  the  flower  of  the  new  troops  selected  to  serve 
as  marines,  the  men  eagerly  volunteering  for  a  service  which  promised 
a  short  voyage  and  a  speedy  battle. 

Claudius  reckoned  on  surprising  Adherbal  in  the  harbour  where 
there  would  be  no  room  for  manoeuvring :  ship  would  crash  upon 
ship,  and  the  legionaries  would  settle  the  result.  He  did  not  wait 
therefore  to  train  the  new  crews,  or  to  fit  the  ships  with  "  crows  " ;  but 
starting  at  midnight  to  avoid  detection  by  the  enemy's  outlook 
vessels,  hoped  to  be  at  Drepana  before  Adherbal  knew  that  he  was 
coming.  He  had,  however,  miscalculated  the  time  required.  Day 
broke  while  he  was  still  some  distance  from  the  mouth  of  the  harbour. 
Adherbal  became  aware  of  his  approach,  got  his  men  on  board,  and 
his  ships  out  of  the  harbour  under  the  rocky  shore  of  the  peninsula. 
The  Romans  on  the  leading  ships  failed  to  observe  this,  and  rowed 
steadily  into  the  harbour.  But  when  Claudius  found  it  empty,  he 
understood  what  had  happened,  and  that  he  was  on  the  brink  of  being 
caught  in  a  trap.  The  enemy  were  only  waiting  until  the  whole 
Roman  fleet  were  inside  to  swoop  down  upon  the  entrance  of  the 
harbour  and  block  it  up.  He  at  once  gave  the  signal  for  his  ships 
to  return.  This  sudden  reversal,  however,  caused  great  confusion. 
The  ships  in  front,  in  trying  to  leave  the  harbour,  fouled  those  that 
were  still  entering,  often  breaking  their  oars,  and  throwing  their  rowers 
into  disorder.  Yet  by  strenuous  efforts  the  captains  at  length  got 
their  ships  out,  and  formed  them  in  line  along  the  coast  south  of  the 
harbour,  with  their  prows  toward  the  open  sea.  Claudius  himself, 
who  had  been  the  last  to  leave  the  harbour,  passed  down  the  line  and 
took  up  his  position  on  the  extreme  left.  But  while  these  difficult 
movements  were  in  progress,  Adherbal  had  got  his  ships  clear  of  the 
opposite  shore,  facing  the  Roman  ships  in  a  line  sufficiently  long 
to  outflank  the  Roman  left  and  prevent  it  from  escaping  to  Lilybaeum 
without  breaking  through  his  cordon.  The  chief  disadvantage  of  the 
Roman  position  was  that,  being  close  on  land,  they  could  not  retire  if 
attacked  ;  while  the  Carthaginian  ships,  having  the  open  sea  on  their 
sterns,  and  being  superior  in  speed  and  the  excellence  af  their  crews, 
could  retire,  swing  round,  and  charge  as  they  chose. 

In  a  short  time  the  Romans  were  in  distress  all  along  the  line. 
Many  of  their  ships  got  fast  in  the  shallows  or  were  completely 
stranded  ;  others  were  sunk  by  the  rapid  charges  of  the  Carthaginian 


XIX  DEFEAT  AND  RECALL  OF  APPIUS  CLAUDIUS  261 

ships,  which,  splendidly  handled  and  vigorously  rowed,  dashed  in 
and  out,  staving  in  the  sides  of  the  lumbering  and  helpless  Roman 
vessels,  and  easily  avoiding  their  ill-directed  attacks.  Seeing  all  was 
over,  Claudius  with  thirty  ships  took  to  flight.  By  keeping  close  in 
shore,  he  managed  to  reach  Lilybaeum  in  safety  ;  but  the  remaining 
ninety-three  were  captured,  most  of  them  with  their  crews,  though 
in  some  cases  the  men  ran  their  ships  ashore  and  escaped. 

Claudius  was  immediately  recalled,  and  was  ordered  to  name  a  Claudius 
dictator,  a  measure  which  had  not  been  resorted  to  for  nearly  thirty  recalled 
years.     Unabashed  by  his  disgrace  and  the  popular  feeling  against  him,  V^  •^"'''^^ 
he  showed  his  contempt  by  naming  a  freedman  called  M.  Claudius  dictator, 
Glicia.      Such  an  outrage  on  Roman  feeling  could  not  be  endured.   24^. 
Glicia  was  compelled  to  abdicate,  and  A.  Atilius  Calatinus  was  named. 
No  punishment  could  be  inflicted  on  Claudius  during  his  year  of  office, 
but  soon  after  it  came  to  an  end  he  appears  to  have  been  brought  to 
trial.      Polybius  says  that  he  was  heavily  fined  ;  later  writers  assert 
that  he  anticipated  condemnation  by  suicide.      He  was  certainly  dead 
before  245,  for  in  that  year  his  sister  Claudia  was  fined  for  exclaiming, 
when  annoyed  by  the  crowd  leaving  the  games,  "  Oh  that  my  brother 
were  alive  and  in  command  of  ships  ! "      His  defeat  was  attributed 
by  some  to  his   neglect  of  religion.      For  when  the  keeper  of  the 
sacred  chickens  reported  that  they  would  not  eat,  which  was  an  evil 
omen  for  his  expedition,  he  ordered  them  to  be  thrown  overboard, 
exclaiming  that   if  they   would   not   eat    they  should   drink.      Such 
stories    commonly   follow  an   unsuccessful  general.       Claudius's  real 
crime  was  failure  ;  but  to  that  failure  his  own  haste  and   neglect  of 
due  precautions,  and  the  presumption  of  pitting  raw  levies  against 
trained  seamen,  mainly  contributed. 

On  Claudius's  recall  the  other  consul  L.  Junius  Pullus  was  sent  The  fleet 
with  fresh  warships,  which,  when  joined  by  the  survivors  of  the  reinforced. 
battle  and  others  already  in  Sicilian  waters,  amounted  to  120, 
for  the  purpose  of  convoying  a  fleet  of  800  transports  carrying 
provisions  for  the  camp  at  Lilybaeum  :  so  far  were  the  Romans 
from  giving  signs  of  discouragement  or  of  an  intention  to  relin- 
quish the  war.  But  the  disasters  of  this  year  were  not  yet  complete. 
After  the  victory  at  Drepana  Adherbal  despatched  Carthalo  with 
thirty  ships  to  Lilybaeum.  Carthalo  succeeded  in  destroying 
or  towing  off  the  remains  of  the  Roman  fleet  stijl  stationed  there, 
while  from  within  the  town  Himilco  issued  forth  to  attack  the  troops 
as  they  were  trying  to  rescue  their  ships.  No  great  harm  was  done 
to  the  Roman  army,  but  Carthalo  coasted  round  to  Heracleia,  ready 
to  intercept  the  transports  which  were  bringing  it  provisions. 

Lucius  Junius  was  not  with  the  ships  which  first  came  into  view. 
He  was  still  at  Syracuse  awaiting  the  arrival  of  the  whole  flotilla, 


262 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


The 

Romaris 
abandon 
the  sea. 


L.  Junius 

occupies 

Eryx. 


and  had  sent  forward  a  detachment  under  the  command  of  the 
quaestors.  Learning  from  his  outlook  ships  that  they  were  approach- 
ing, Carthalo  joyfully  put  out  to  sea  from  Heracleia,  expecting  an 
easy  prey.  But  the  quaestors  had  also  been  warned  of  the  enemy's 
approach  by  light  vessels  sailing  in  advance  ;  and,  knowing  that  they 
were  not  fit  for  a  sea  fight,  made  for  a  roadstead  belonging  to  a 
small  town  subject  to  Rome,  and  beaching  their  ships,  fortified  a 
naval  camp,  defended  by  balistae  and  catapults  obtained  from  the 
town.  Carthalo  did  not  venture  to  anchor  his  ships,  or  land  at  a 
place  where  there  was  no  harbour,  for  he  knew  the  danger  of  storms 
on  the  south  coast  of  Sicily.  He  therefore  moved  his  fleet  into  the 
mouth  of  a  river  and  waited.  In  a  short  time  the  consul  himself 
approached  with  the  rest  of  the  fleet,  in  complete  ignorance  of  what 
had  happened.  He  had  only  just  rounded  Pachynus  when  Carthalo 
got  information  of  his  whereabouts  and  put  to  sea,  hoping  to  engage 
him  before  he  reached  the  place  where  the  first  ships  had  taken 
refuge.  Junius  did  not  venture  to  await  the  attack,  but  steered 
straight  upon  the  coast,  though  it  was  rocky  and  dangerous,  pre- 
ferring the  risk  of  shipwreck  to  the  certainty  of  falling  with  all  his 
men  and  stores  into  the  hands  of  Carthalo.  The  Carthaginian  was 
better  advised  than  to  attack  him  there.  It  was  getting  late  in  the 
year,  and  the  practised  Punic  pilots  saw  signs  which  they  knew  to 
portend  stormy  weather.  They  urged  Carthalo,  at  all  hazards,  to 
round  Pachynus,  and  take  harbourage  at  the  first  secure  place.  On 
the  east  coast  he  must  have  been  in  the  midst  of  enemies,  but  the 
storm  which  now  arose  made  such  considerations  of  minor  import- 
ance. The  chief  thing  was  to  be  clear  of  the  south  coast.  With  the 
utmost  exertion  and  difficulty,  the  Punic  fleet  was  got  safely  round 
Pachynus  :  but  the  storm  caught  the  two  Roman  fleets  in  full  force. 
They  were  simply  annihilated.  The  advanced  squadron  in  its  open 
roadstead,  or  drawn  a  little  way  upon  the  beach,  and  the  rear 
squadron  under  Junius,  were  alike  dashed  into  fragments.  So  com- 
plete was  the  destruction  that  not  one  of  the  wrecks  was  sufficiently 
whole  to  admit  of  repair.  The  loss  of  life  does  not  seem  to  have 
been  great,  for  a  large  number  of  the  men,  with  the  consul  him- 
self, were  on  shore  ;  but  the  ships  were  all  lost,  and  with  them  the 
supplies  meant  for  the  camp  at  Lilybaeum.  The  discouragement  at 
Rome  was  so  great,  that,  for  the  next  four  years,  the  government 
contented  itself  with  sending  supplies  across  the  Straits,  and  thence 
by  land  to  Lilybaeum,  and  once  more  abandoned  the  idea  of  fighting 
at  sea  altogether. 

Junius  did  not,  however,  give  up  all  hope  of  achieving  something 
which  might  atone  for  this  misfortune.  He  proceeded  to  the  camp 
at  Lilybaeum,  and  did  his  best  to  cheer  the  spirits  of  the  besiegers, 


XIX  FIGHTING  AT  LILYBAEUM  AND  ERYX  263 

thus  forced  again  to  wait  for  the  promised  supplies  from  Rome.  The 
supplies  came  at  length  ;  but  Junius  was  eager  to  do  something 
more.  Watching  his  opportunity,  he  led  part  of  his  army  to  the 
foot  of  Mount  Eryx,  some  miles  to  the  north  of  Drepana.  It  is  an  Mt.  Eryx, 
isolated  peak,  rising  2184  feet,  in  the  midst  of  a  low  undulating  ^49- 
plain,  which  gives  it  the  appearance  of«  a  still  greater  elevation,  and 
caused  it  to  be  wrongly  regarded  as,  next  to  Aetna,  the  highest  moun- 
tain in  Sicily.  On  its  summit  was  a  famous  temple  of  Venus  (per- 
haps originally  the  Phoenician  Melcarth),  and  just  below  the  summit 
was  a  town  also  called  Eryx,  which  had  been  captured  by  Pyrrhus, 
but  had  again  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  Carthaginians.  In  260 
Hamilcar  had  removed  the  greater  part  of  the  inhabitants  to  Drepana  ; 
but  it  was  still  partially  inhabited,  and  its  occupation  would  give  the 
Romans  a  good  base  of  operations  against  the  Carthaginian  troops 
in  Drepana.  He  seems  to  have  met  with  no  opposition.  Both 
temple  and  town  were  occupied  and  strongly  garrisoned,  and  a 
numerous  guard  was  also  posted  at  the  foot  of  the  steep  ascent  on 
the  road  from  Drepana. 

Thus  the  two  antagonists  were  apparently  at  a  deadlock.      The  248-242. 
Carthaginians  were  holding  Lilybaeum  and  Drepana,  and  presently   Constant 
the  impregnable  Hercte,  and  commanded  the  sea  :  the  Romans  were  J^Sf^l^"S  ^^ 
investing  Lilybaeum  and  were  securely  seated  on  Mount  Eryx  ;  and,  Eryx^and 
with  the  whole  island  east  of  these  places  under  their  power  or  allied  Hercte. 
with  them,  were  in  no  want  of  supplies.      But  they  could  not  take  Exhaustion 
Lilybaeum  or  Hercte,  or  move  from  Eryx  upon  Drepana.      For  six  ^f  ^f^'^  ^^ 
weary  years  a  kind  of  fencing  match  went  on  between  the  two  powers  ^^^^^^' 
at  these  three  points — Lilybaeum,  Eryx,  Hercte  :  every  day  had  its 
ambuscade,  skirmish,  sortie,  or  assault :  now  the  one  scored  a  suc- 
cess, now  the  other.      Polybius  compares  them  to  two  boxers,  equal 
in  courage  and  condition :   "  as  the  match  goes  on,  blow  after  blow 
is   interchanged  without   intermission.       But   to   anticipate  or   keep 
account  of  every  feint  or  stroke  is  impossible  alike  for  combatants 
and   spectators."      The   Romans   showed   an   extraordinary   dogged 
persistence  ;  but  the  Carthaginians  maintained  the  combat  with  no 
less  courage  and  perseverance.      The  Carthaginians  were  the  richer 
people,  but  they  had  a  twofold  expenditure  to  meet  in  a  fleet  and  Exhaus- 
a  mercenary  army.      The   Romans  for  four  years    did   not  support  ^^^^  </ 
a  fleet ;  and  their  citizen  army,  though  expensive,  must  have  been  J^"'^"^^^- 
less  so  than  that  of  Carthage.      Yet  their  financial  difficulties  also 
were  growing  formidable  ;  and  the  war,  which  had  been  voted  six- 
teen years  ago  with  a  light  heart,  must  have  now  become  a  weary 
burden,  requiring  all  their  pride  and  courage  to  endure. 

The  year  247  witnessed  the   arrival  from  Carthage  of  a  really 
great  man.      Hamilcar  Barcas,  father  of  the  still  greater  Hannibal, — 


comes  to 
Sicily. 

Hamilcar 
eficanips  on 


264  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap. 

247.  who  was  born  in  this  year, — was  now  put  in  command  of  the  fleet. 

Hamilcar  After  making  some  descents  upon  the  coasts  of  southern  Italy  he 
Barcas  sailed  to  Panormus,  and  boldly  seized  the  great  limestone  rock  known 
as  Hercte  {Monte  Pelegrino\  which  forms  the  northern  boundary  of 
the  gulf;  and  though  too  far  from  the  town,  which  lies  about  three 
miles  to  the  east,  to  be  its  acropolis,  forms  a  most  important  outpost 
Hercte.  to  it.  Alike  towards  sea  and  land  it  rises  sheer,  and  can  only  be 
ascended  by  two  paths  from  the  interior  and  one  from  the  sea.  The 
easiest  is  that  on  the  south  towards  Panormus,  which  the  Romans 
seem  to  have  left  unguarded.  But  Hamilcar  possibly  used  the  steep 
and  difficult  path  from  the  bay  which  it  encloses,  now  called  the  bay 
of  Sta  Maria.  Its  top  is  flat,  and  of  considerable  extent,  not  too  high 
to  afford  valuable  pasture,  and  high  enough  (1950  feet  above  the 
sea)  to  make  it  exceedingly  healthy.  The  bay  of  Sta  Maria  sup- 
plied a  small  but  secure  harbour,  not  approached  from  the  land 
except  over  the  mountain  which  dominated  the  surrounding  country, 
and  was  eminently  suited  for  an  encampment  in  the  middle  of 
enemies.  Here  Hamilcar  entrenched  himself.  For  provisions  he 
would  have  to  depend  wholly  on  what  could  be  brought  by  sea, 
except  for  the  cattle  which  he  found  grazing  on  the  mountain  ;  for 
the  Romans  pitched  a  camp  near  the  entrance  to  the  southern  path, 
and  the  other  was  ill-suited  for  bringing  up  heavy  stores  even  if  they 
could  be  obtained  ;  and,  if  he  forced  his  way  down  the  southern 
path,  he  had  not  sufficient  force  to  maintain  himself  permanently  in 
what  would  be  a  completely  hostile  district.  Still  for  five  years  he 
held  the  mountain,  sending  out  plundering  expeditions  to  the  shores 
of  Italy  as  far  up  as  Cumae,  and  harassing  the  Roman  camp  by 
frequent  sorties  and  surprises.  It  was  a  bold  move,  conducted  with 
consummate  ability,  and  served  to  divide  the  Roman  forces  and 
compel  them  to  keep  a  large  garrison  at  Panormus.  But  though  he 
could  annoy,  he  could  not  hope  to  crush  them  ;  and  he  might,  per- 
haps, have  done  more  real  service  to  the  cause  by  helping  to  relieve 
Lilybaeum.  The  war,  in  fact,  now  depended  on  the  command  of 
the  sea.  If  that  were  lost,  Hercte  would  be  a  trap  or  a  prison. 
The  war  at  Meanwhile  a  furious  struggle  was  going  on  elsewhere.  When 
Eryx,  ti-ie  consul  Junius  in  248   seized  Eryx,  he  occupied  both  the  summit 

^47-^43'  Yvith  its  temple,  the  town  immediately  below  it,  and  the  foot  of  the 
path  leading  to  Drepana.  But  Hasdrubal,  who  commanded  at 
Drepana,  evaded  the  lower  guard,  and,  mounting  by  another  path, 
contrived  to  seize  the  town.  The  Romans  retired  to  the  summit, 
to  which  supplies  could  be  brought  from  the  other  side  ;  while  the 
Carthaginians  found  themselves  between  two  bodies  of  enemies,  those 
on  the  summit  and  those  on  the  lower  path.  The  track  by  which 
thev  had  ascended  communicated  with  the  sea,  and  was  still  under 


XIX  ANOTHER  ROMAN  FLEET  265 

their  control,  but  it  was  unfit  for  the  carriage  of  provisions,  and  they 
soon  found  themselves  reduced  to  great  straits.  But  the  same 
obstinacy  which  prolonged  the  struggle  at  Lilybaeum  and  Hercte 
was  displayed  by  both  sides  at  Eryx.  Ruse,  ambuscade,  and  pitched 
battle  were  tried  again  and  again  on  both  sides,  but  without  giving 
a  decisive  superiority  to  either.  No  loss  and  no  privation,  both 
of  which  fell  heavily  on  Roman  and  Carthaginian  in  turn,  proved 
sufficient  to  dislodge  either. 

At  length  it  became  evident  to  the  Roman  government  that,  if  243.   The 
they  were  to  finish  the  war,  they  must  again  strike  for  the  mastership  Romans 
of  the  sea.      But  the  war  as  a  whole  had  been  enormously  expensive.  ^^^^-^  f^ 
Fleet  after  fleet  had  been  built  and  lost  ;  armies  had  been  for  years  build  a 
permanently  maintained  in  Sicily.     The  treasury  was  empty,  and  there  fleet. 
was  no  means  of  building  more  ships.      In  this  crisis  private  muni- 
ficence loyally  supported  the   State.      Some  of  the   richest  citizens 
undertook  to  supply  a  quinquereme  each,  while  others  of  less  wealth 
clubbed  together  in  groups  of  two  or  three  to  furnish  one  between 
them,  the  money  thus   expended  to  be   regarded  as  a  loan  to  the 
State,  repayable  when  success  made  it  possible.      The  commercial 
spirit  was  strong  at  Rome  even  now,  but  in  this  crisis  of  its  fate 
patriotism  and  a  noble  confidence  in  the  destiny  of  the  city  were 
stronger  still. 

A  fleet  of  250  quinqueremes  was  ready  early  in  the  year  242.  242. 
They  were  built  on  an  improved  model  furnished  by  the  vessel  of  the  ^°^^-  ^^^^-^ 
Rhodian,   which   had   at   length  been   captured   at    Lilybaeum,   and  Catulus 
were  put  under  the  command  of  the  consul  Gains  Lutatius  Catulus.  a.  Posi'um- 
It  can  hardly  have  escaped  the  knowledge  of  the  Carthaginians  that  ius 
a  fleet  was  again  being  built  at  Rome  ;  but,  by  extraordinary  exer-  ^l^inus. 
tions,  the  vessels  were  ready  for  the  sea  much  earlier  in  the  year  than 
could   be   anticipated,  and   when    Lutatius  arrived  off  the   coast   of 
Sicily,  the  yearly  contingent  of  ships  had  not  yet  come  from  Carthage 
to  Lilybaeum  and  Drepana.      The  harbours  of  both  were  empty,  or 
only  contained  a  few  guardships.      He  was,  therefore,  able  to  occupy 
both  unopposed.      Keeping  a  good  lookout  for  the  fleet  which  must 
be   shortly  expected   from    Carthage,   he   employed   the   interval   in 
practising  his  crews,  and  in  throwing  up  earthworks  against  the  town 
of  Drepana.      The  Carthaginians  in  Eryx  therefore  found  their  one 
source  of  supply  insecure,  and  could  only  be  released  by  the  destruc- 
tion or  evasion  of  the  Roman  fleet.     The  garrison  of  Lilybaeum  was 
in   the  like   case.     Victory  at  sea  alone  could  save  the  one  or  the 
other.      Lutatius   himself  was  fully  alive  to  this,  and  took  as  much 
pains  to  keep  his  fleet  in  a  high  state  of  training  as  to  maintain  the 
siege  of  Drepana. 

The  news  of  the  early  arrival  of  Lutatius  naturally  caused  alarm 


266  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap. 

Alarm  at     at  Carthage.     The  usual  preparation  of  the  fleet  was  hastened,  the 
Carthage      ships  were  laden  with  provisions  for  the   besieged   garrisons,   and 
'^hu  r'ed        speedily  despatched  under  the  command  of  Hanno.     His  plan,  since 
despatch  of   ^^^  harbour  of  Lilybaeum  was  in  Roman  hands,  was  to  make  straight 
their  fleet,     for  Eryx,  and  not  to  engage  Lutatius  until  he  had  lightened  his  ships 
by  unloading  the  supplies.      To  do  this  he  must  evade  the  Roman 
fleet   at   Drepana,   which    Lutatius   was  resolved   to   prevent.      The 
Carthaginian  fleet  touched  at   Holy  Isle,  the  most  western  of  the 
Aegates.      Thence   Hanno  designed  to  make  straight  for  the  Sicilian 
Lutatius       coast  at  the  foot  of  Eryx.      Lutatius  divined  his  intention,  and  took 
moves  prompt  measures  to  frustrate  it,  and  force  him  to  fight  while  his  ships 

to  Aegusa.  ^^^^  ^^qj  heavily  loaded.  He  brought  his  fleet  to  Aegusa,  the  south- 
eastern island  of  the  Aegates,  from  which  he  would  be  able  to  throw 
himself  in  the  way,  whether  Hanno  made  for  Lilybaeum  or  Eryx. 
After  some  skirmishing  Lutatius,  who  had  been  wounded  at  Drepana, 
but  lay  on  a  couch  on  board,  determined  to  fight  the  next  morning. 
Battle  of  When  day  broke  on  the  i  oth  of  March  there  was  a  strong  breeze 

Aegusa,        blowing  on  the  stern  of  the  Carthaginian  vessels,  and  the  sea  was 
2d2  rough  and  boisterous.      It  would  be  difficult  for  the  Romans  in  the 

teeth  of  such  a  wind  to  charge  with  any  effect.  Yet  it  was  of  the 
first  importance  to  them  to  bring  on  the  engagement  at  once,  while 
the  enemy's  ships  were  still  too  heavily  burdened  to  admit  of  the 
manoeuvres  practised  with  such  effect  at  Drepana,  and  while  they 
were  far  from  the  support  of  their  land  forces  at  Eryx.  The  relative 
conditions  of  the  two  fleets  were  unlike  those  that  had  existed  at  the 
battle  of  Drepana,  The  early  start  of  the  Roman  fleet  had  caused 
that  of  Carthage  to  be  despatched  with  hurried  preparations.  The 
four  years'  abstention  from  naval  warfare  by  the  Romans  had  induced 
a  corresponding  slackness  in  naval  affairs  at  Carthage,  and  the  crews 
now  put  on  board  were  raw  and  inexperienced  ;  the  ships  were  heavy 
and  lumbering  from  the  freight  which  they  carried,  and  Hanno  was 
by  no  means  the  equal  of  Adherbal.  The  Romans,  on  the  other 
hand,  had  the  advantage  of  ships  of  improved  construction  ;  their 
crews  had  been  some  weeks  at  sea,  and  were  in  a  good  state  of 
training ;  the  marines  on  board  were  picked  men  from  the  legions  ; 
and  Lutatius  was  a  man  of  courage  and  prudence.  The  result,  there- 
fore, was  that  of  the  battle  of  Ecnomus  rather  than  of  Drepana. 
When  the  ships  came  to  close  quarters,  the  superiority  of  the  Romans 
was  soon  apparent ;  and,  though  the  Carthaginians  fought  desper- 
ately, they  were  beaten  all  along  the  line.  Seventy  of  their  ships 
were  taken  with  their  crews,  fifty  sunk ;  the  rest,  favoured  by  a 
sudden  change  of  wind,  escaped  to  Holy  Isle,  and  thence  home. 
Effect  of  The  effect  was  immediately  recognised  at  Carthage.      The  garri- 

the  battle.      <^q^^    at    Lilybaeum   and    Eryx    must   be   left    without    supplies,    for 


I 


THE  CARTHAGINIANS  LOSE  SICILY  267 


mans 
evacuate 
Sicily. 


Lutatius  would  be  able  to  intercept  them.      Drepana  apparently  had 
already  passed  into  Roman  hands,  and  the  only  hope  was  to  make 
peace.      Hamilcar,  though  safe  in   Hercte,  could  do  nothing  for  the 
generals  at  Eryx  and  Lilybaeum.      Still  he  was  as  yet  secure,  and 
the    Carthaginian   government    sent    a   hasty   message,    leaving   the 
decision  in  his  hands.      He  saw  that  the  only  thing  to  be  done  was  Hamilcar 
to  make  terms,  and  accordingly  opened  negotiations  with  Lutatius  at  ''nakes 
Lilybaeum.       Lutatius  knew  better  than   Hamilcar  that  peace  was    ^^^"-^^  ^4^- 
necessary  for  the  Romans  also.     This  did  not,  however,  prevent  him 
from  exacting  such  terms  as  he  thought  would  satisfy  the  people 
of  Rome.     In  addition  to  the  usual  demand  for  the  restitution  of 
prisoners  without  ransom,  and  for  a  war  indemnity  of  2200  Euboic 
talents  in  twenty  years,  the  Carthaginians  were  to  wholly  evacuate 
Sicily,  and  undertake  not  to  make  war  upon  the  king  of  Syracuse 
and  his  allies. 

The  terms  were  generally  approved  by  the  commissioners  sent  The  Car- 
from  Rome,  though  they  raised  the  amount  of  indemnity  to  3200  ^^'^S' 
talents  to  be  paid  in  ten  years,  and  added  to  the  evacuation  of  Sicily 
that  of  all  other  islands  between  it  and  Italy — meaning  the  Liparae. 
Corsica  had  been  already  lost.  Thus  the  result  of  the  twenty-four 
years'  war  to  Carthage  was  the  diminution  of  her  outlying  possessions  ; 
and,  what  was  far  more  serious,  the  loss  of  her  supremacy  at  sea. 
Spain  might  make  up  to  them  for  Sicily ;  but,  if  the  Roman  fleets 
held  the  sea,  they  could  have  no  security  of  traffic  even  there. 

The  Romans  had  gained  in  Sicily  an  invaluable  source  of  corn 
supply  ;  and  the  weakening  of  the  naval  power  of  their  rivals  not 
only  opened  the  sea  to  their  commerce,  but  rendered  the  southern 
and  western  shores  of  Italy  more  secure. 

For  Sicily  itself  the  gain  was  very  doubtful.  It  was  but  a  change  Effect  on 
of  masters  ;  and  the  extensive  movement  in  the  island  in  favour  of  •^^'^^d'- 
the  Carthaginians  at  the  beginning  of  the  second  Punic  war  seems 
to  show  that  the  Sicilians  had  not  found  the  change  wholly  for  the 
better.  The  island,  with  the  exception  of  the  kingdom  of  Hiero, 
was  henceforth  under  the  rule  of  a  praetor  sent  annually  from  Rome. 
It  was  the  first  country  outside  of  Italy  to  become  a  "  province,"  and  A  province. 
there  were  no  precedents  on  which  to  go.  Commissioners  were  sent 
from  Rome,  and  the  principle  of  the  settlement  made  by  them  was 
that  of  taking  over  Sicily  as  nearly  as  possible  in  the  state  in  which 
they  found  it,  substituting  Roman  for  Carthaginian  supremacy.  The 
states  in  it  were  to  retain  their  own  laws  and  local  institutions,  but 
were  to  pay  to  Rome  what  they  had  paid  to  Carthage  or  Syracuse, 
namely,  a  tenth  of  the  yearly  produce,  and  5  per  cent  on  exports 
and  imports.  An  appeal  would  lie  from  their  courts  to  that  of  the 
praetor,  and  they  were  forbidden  to  go  to  war  with  each  other,  or 


268  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap,  xix 

maintain  an  armed  force.  But  though  this  was  the  general  arrange- 
ment, certain  towns  which  had  been  distinguished  for  early  or  con- 
stant adhesion  to  the  Roman  cause  were  admitted  to  the  rank  of 
civitates  foederatae^  and  were  free  from  the  payment  of  the  tenths  or 
the  customs.  Their  one  obligation  was  the  supply  of  ships  and 
socii  navales,  as  at  Messana  or  Mamertina,  or  of  troops  to  serve  as 
allies  in  the  Roman  army,  as  at  Segesta,  Halicyae,  Centuripa,  Alaesa, 
and  Panormus. 

Thus  the  first  "  province "  was  formed  outside   Italy  ;  and  thus 
Rome  established  herself  as  a  naval  power  in  the  Mediterranean. 


Authorities. — The  earliest  and  best  is  Polybius  i.  7-63.  Born  about  forty 
years  after  the  end  of  the  war,  he  used  earlier  authorities,  such  as  Timaeus, 
Philinus,  and  Fabius  Pictor,  All  other  accounts  are  secondary,  derived  either  from 
Polybius  or  from  writers  later  than  Polybius.  They  are  :  the  Epitomes  of  the 
lost  books  of  Livy  xvi.-xix.  ;  Appian  (ist  cent. 'A.  D.)  Res  Pun.  3-5  ;  Res  Sic. 
1-2;  Florus  (2nd  cent.  A.  D.)  i.  2  ;  Diodorus  Siculus  (end  of  ist  cent.  A.D.) 
fragments  of  books  xxiii.  and  xxiv.  ;  Dio  Cassius  (2nd  cent.  A.D.)  fragments  43- 
46  ;  Eutropius  (3rd  cent.  A.D.)  ii.  18.  A  more  valuable  compilation  is  that  of 
Zonaras  (about  the  12th  cent.  A.D. )  because  he  used  the  part  of  the  complete  work 
of  Dio  Cassius  which  is  lost.  Something  is  also  to  be  gleaned  from  Orosius, 
Historia  adversus  Paganos,  iv.  7-ij:  (5th  cent.  A.D.) 


CHAPTER    XX 

BETWEEN    THE    FIRST    AND    SECOND    PUNIC    WARS 
241-218 

COLONIES  CENSUS 

Spoletium  in  Umbria        .      B.C.  241  B.C.  220  .  .  ,      270,213 

Cremona  \.  ^  Q^^^  .     B.C.  218  provinces 

^lace"ti^i  Sicily      .  .  .     B.C.  241 

Sardinia  and  Corsica     B.C.  231-225 

Progress  in  Italy  during  the  first  Punic  war — Six  days'  campaign  against  Falerii 
(241) — Mutiny  of  mercenaries  in  Carthage — The  "  truceless  war"  (241-238) 
— Sardinia  surrendered  to  Rome  (238) — Wars  with  Ligurians  and  Boii  (239- 
237) — Temple  of  Janus  closed  (235) — lUyrian  war  (229-228) — Embassies  to 
Aetohan  and  Achaean  Leagues  (228) — Agrarian  law  of  Gaius  Flaminius  (232) 
— Gallic  war  (225-221) — The  Via  Flaminia  (220). 

Though    the    chief   energies   of   Rome    had   been  devoted   to    the  Covjirm- 
struggle  for  Sicily,  the  consohdation  of  her   ItaHan  supremacy  had  ^^^<^^  of  the 
not  been  wholly  neglected.      In   the  first  year  of  the  war  (264)  a    ,  ^  y^'^   • 
colony  had  been  sent  to  Aesernia,  eighteen  miles  from  Bovianum,  on  /^^/^ 
the  Volturnus,  which  did  good  service  in  the  most  trying  period  of  during  the 
the  second  Punic  war.      Aesis  in  Umbria,  Alsium  and  Fregenae  in  fi^^^ . 
Etruria,  received  Roman  colonies  a  few  years  later  (247-245),  the     '"^^<^'^<^^- 
\  first  commanding  an  important  road  and  bridge  over  the  Aesis  into 
the  territory  once  held  by  the   Senonian  Gauls,  and  the  last  two 
securing  the  coast  immediately  north  of  the  Tiber's  mouth.     More 
important  still  was  the  colony  sent  to  Brundisium  in   244,  after  the 
place  had  been  in  the  possession  of  Rome  for  more  than  twenty  years. 
By   it   the   Romans   secured   a   basis  from  which  to   command  the 
Adriatic,  to  protect  their  merchants  from  piracy,  and  to  cross  to  the 
^  opposite    peninsula.       Lastly,    in    241,   southern    Umbria    was    still 
I  farther  strengthened  by  the   Latin  colony  of  Spoletium,  which  com- 
I';  manded  the  road  to  Ariminum,  and  proved  strong  enough  in  217  to 
resist  the  attack  of  Hannibal. 


270  HISTORY  OF  ROME 


The  war  The  hold  of  Rome  upon  Italy  had  not  been  interrupted  by  any 

with  outbreak  during  the  first  Punic  war.      The  last  spark  of  resistance 

2di^^Coss     '^  Etruria  had  been  stamped  out  at  Volsinii  in  265.      It  is  therefore 

A.Manlius  surprising  that  at  the  very  moment  of  victory  one  town  in  Etruria 

Torquatus    ventured  to  revolt.      Falerii  had  been  reduced  in  293,  and  for  now 

//.,  Q.         more  than  fifty  years  had  remained  in  quiet  submission.     What  real 

Catulus        ^^  fancied  wrongs  induced  the  Faliscans  to  renew  at  this  time  their 

old  hostility  we  do  not  know,  but  whatever  it  was  their  resistance 

was  short-lived.      In  six  days  the  consuls  earned  their  triumph,  and 

the  Faliscans  were  compelled  to  abandon  their  town  and  build  one  on 

lower  ground,  though  the  ancient  temple  of  Juno  was  allowed  to  remain. 

The  Meanwhile   Carthage   became   involved   in  a   struggle  with   her 

mercenary    mutinous  mercenaries,  which  led  to  a  widespread  revolt  of  her  Libyan 

^'artha<re      subjects.      It  lasted  for  over  three  years,  and  was  distinguished  by 

{241-238),    every  circumstance  of  horror,  threatening  the  city  itself  with  famine  and 

and  the        destruction.      As  soon  as  Hamilcar  Barcas  had  arranged  the  peace 

surrender     y^ix^x  Rome,  and  had  caused  the  Carthaginian  troops  at  Eryx  to  remove 

/  th^  ^^^"^  ^^  Lilybaeum  for  transport  to  Africa,  he  withdrew  his  own  army  and 

Romans.       A^^t  from  Hercte,  abdicated  his  command  in  Sicily,  and  left  the  task 

of  transporting  the  troops  to  Gesco.     To  avoid  danger  Gesco  shipped 

them  in  detachments,  that  they  might  receive  their  pay  and  be  got 

rid  of  in  detail.      But  the  exchequer  at  Carthage  was  low,  and  the 

government   deferred    a   settlement,   hoping    to    make  a  favourable 

bargain  with  the  whole  army.     An  idle  soldiery,  however,  fresh  from 

the  privations  of  a  campaign,  soon  became  intolerable  in  the  city. 

Outrages  were  of  daily  and  nightly  occurrence,  and  the  government 

at  length  removed  them  to  Sicca,  a  Numidian  town  on  the  Bagradas, 

with  a  temple  of  Astarte  or  Venus,  renowned  for  its  licentiousness. 

Here  the  soldiery  lived  without  restraint,  and  among  other  things 

employed  their  leisure  in  calculating,  always  to  their  own  advantage, 

the  amount   of  pay  due   to   them,  and   the  claims  founded  on  the 

promises  made  from  time  to  time  by  the  generals.      Though  a  mixed 

multitude  of  Iberians,  Celts,  Ligurians,   Balearici,  half-bred   Greeks, 

deserters,  and  slaves,  without  feelings  in  common  or  knowledge  of  i 

each  other's  language,  they  were  all  united  in  the  one  aim  of  getting 

as  much  as  they  could  from  the  government.     Their  attitude  soon 

became  so  menacing  that  the  Carthaginians  were  obliged  to  negotiate. 

Hanno  was  first  sent  to  them.      But  the  soldiers  felt  no  confidence  in 

him  ;  he  had  not  served  with  them  in   Sicily,  and  did  not  therefore, 

they  thought,  understand  their  claims.     They  determined  to  overawe 

the  government.     They  seized  Tunes,  and  from  that  vantage-ground 

daily  raised  their  demands.     At  length  Gesco  was   sent  to  Tunes 

with  money  to  settle  with  them.     But  it  was  too  late.    The  mutineers 

had  found  leaders  as  able  as  they  were  desperate  and  unscrupulous. 


XX  THE  MERCENARY  WAR  AT  CARTHAGE  271 

The  first  was  a  fugitive  slave  named  Spendius,  for  whom  surrender  Spendius 
to  his   Roman  master  would  mean  crucifixion  ;  the  second  a  Libyan  '^^^ 
named  Mathos.     Under  the  influence  of  these  men  the  wildest  state  '  ^  ''^^' 
of  disorder  began  to  prevail.     Any  one  who  ventured  to  act  or  speak 
contrary   to   their   sentiments   was    forthwith    killed.       Though    the 
different  nations  did  not  understand  each  other's  language  they  all 
became  acquainted  with  one  word,  "  throw  "  (/?aA.Ae),  and  as  soon  as 
that  cry  arose  the  obnoxious  officer  or  soldier  was  overwhelmed  by  a 
shower  of  stones.      Before  long  Gesco  offended  some  applicants  for 
pay  by  telling  them  roughly  that  they  had  better  apply  to  Spendius 
and  Mathos  for  it.      He  and  his  staff  were  seized,  their  baggage  and 
money  plundered,  and  themselves  put  under  close  guard. 

Spendius  and  Mathos,  thus  committed  to  open  mutiny,  now  set  Mutineers 
themselves  to  rouse  the  country  people.  Glad  of  an  opportunity  of  joined  by 
shaking  off  the  yoke  of  Carthage,  doubly  severe  since  their  league  Libyans, 
with  Regulus,  the  Libyans  joined  the  mutineers  in  every  direction.  ^^^' 
Two  towns,  Utica  and  Hippo  Zarytus,  remained  loyal,  and  were  accord- 
ingly at  once  besieged.  Cut  off  thus  from  the  country  supplies  which 
fed  the  city,  from  the  tribute  that  paid  soldiers,  and  with  their  hired 
army  in  arms  against  them,  the  Carthaginians  were  in  dreadful 
peril.  But  though  the  citizens  prepared  to  defend  their  homes  and 
their  lives  with  desperate  courage,  their  first  attempts  proved  entirely 
unsuccessful.  Hanno,  the  first  general  appointed,  did  not  succeed 
in  driving  the  mutineers  from  Tunes,  or  in  relieving  Utica,  or  in 
defeating  them  in  the  field.  He  was  therefore  deposed,  and  Hamilcar 
Barcas  placed  in  command.  Hamilcar  again  showed  great  qualities  ; 
he  not  only  twice  routed  Spendius  in  the  field,  but  by  wise  acts  of 
conciliation  attracted  many  of  the  defeated  troops  to  his  standards. 
Early  in  239  Spendius  and  Mathos  retaliated  by  the  torture  and 
murder  of  Gesco  and  his  staff,  determined  to  involve  their  men  in 
such  unpardonable  guilt  as  to  deprive  them  of  all  hope  except  in 
victory.  From  this  time  no  quarter  was  given  or  received,  no 
proposal  for  terms  or  for  the  release  of  prisoners  entertained ;  it 
became  a  "truceless  war"  (TroAe/xos  ao-TrovSos),  and  was  marked  by 
atrocities  on  both  sides.  The  mutineers  tortured  and  killed ;  Hamilcar 
exposed  his  prisoners  to  be  trampled  to  death  by  elephants.  It  was 
farther  protracted  by  disputes  between  Hamilcar  and  the  incompetent 
Hanno,  who  was  again  in  part  command,  and  at  last  even  loyal 
Hippo  and  Utica  joined  the  revolt. 

Spendius  and  Mathos,  thus  masters  of  the  whole  country,  threat-  End  of  the 
ened    Carthage    itself      It   was    saved  by  the  masterly   tactics   of  mutiny. 
Hamilcar,   who  had  now  a  competent  colleague  named    Hannibal, 
and  by  supplies  and  other  assistance  sent  by   Hiero  of  Syracuse. 
The  Romans  too,  after  the  settlement  of  a  diplomatic  quarrel  in  the 


272 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Fall  of 

Spendius 

and 

Mathos, 

238. 


The  revolt 
spreads  to 
Sardinia, 
240. 


The 

Romans 
intervene, 
238. 


previous  year,  had  shown  some  disposition  to  act  in  a  friendly  spirit. 
They  allowed  their  merchants  to  carry  goods  to  Carthage,  but  forbade 
the  exportation  of  provisions  to  the  mutineers.  Still  the  war  dragged 
on.  It  was  not  until  the  early  part  of  238  'that  Spendius  and  a 
Gallic  chief  named  Antaritus  found  themselves  obliged  to  sue  for 
peace  to  Hamilcar.  He  offered  to  grant  terms  on  condition  that  he 
might  have  the  choice  of  ten  men  to  keep  as  hostages.  Spendius 
assented,  whereupon  Hamilcar  quickly  replied:  "Then  I  choose  the 
emissaries  here' present."  They  were  at  once  arrested,  and  Hamilcar, 
considering  himself  free  from  honourable  obligations  to  men  of  such 
desperate  character,  immediately  proceeded  to  attack  the  rest, 
dismayed  at  the  loss  of  their  leader,  and  cut  them  to  pieces. 
Whatever  may  be  thought  of  the  morality  of  such  a  proceeding  it 
was  eminently  successful.  The  back  of  the  revolt  was  broken,  and 
it  only  remained  to  force  Mathos,  closely  besieged  in  Tunes,  to  a 
similar  surrender.  He  offered  a  desperate  resistance,  defeated  and 
killed  Hannibal,  but  was  himself  finally  defeated  and  captured  by 
Hamilcar.  Hippo  and  Utica  were  next  reduced  with  comparative 
ease  :  the  rest  of  Libya  submitted,  and  was  heavily  punished  by  an 
increase  of  tribute  and  other  severities. 

When  the  mutiny  had  been  going  on  for  about  a  year  in  Africa, 
the  mercenaries  serving  in  Sardinia  followed  the  example,  and  put 
their  general  Bostarus,  with  all  other  Carthaginians  they  could  lay 
hands  upon,  to  death.  An  army,  under  another  general  named  Hanno, 
was  sent  from  Carthage  to  quell  the  mutiny.  But  no  sooner  had 
he  arrived  in  Sardinia  than  his  men  crucified  him,  and  joined  the 
revolted  garrison.  They  then  proceeded  to  seize  the  other  towns 
in  the  island,  killing  or  expelling  all  Carthaginians  they  could  find. 
Thus  the  Carthaginians  had  lost  Sardinia,  and  were  too  much 
pressed  at  home  for  the  next  two  years  to  make  any  effort  for  its 
recovery.  But  though  the  mercenaries  had  taken  possession  of  the 
island  they  could  not  hold  it.  The  native  Sardinians  rose  against 
their  tyranny  and  forced  them  to  depart.  They  came  to  Italy,  and 
had  the  assurance  to  apply  for  help  to  Rome.  The  Romans  readily 
availed  themselves  of  an  excuse  for  taking  in  hand  the  pacification 
of  Sardinia  at  a  time  when  it  might  plausibly  be  asserted  that  the 
Carthaginians  had  ceased  to  be  in  possession.  The  mercenaries 
were  not  dealt  with,  but  an  expedition  to  Sardinia  was  at  once 
undertaken.  The  Carthaginians,  however,  had  now  (238)  triumphed 
over  the  revolt  at  home,  and  claiming  a  prior  right  to  settle  the 
island  began  preparations  for  sending  troops.  The  Romans  replied 
by  a  declaration  of  war  on  the  ground  that,  as  they  had  undertaken 
the  pacification  of  Sardinia,  these  preparations  were  directed  against 
themselves.      The  Carthaginians  were  in  no  position  to  dispute  the 


XX  TROUBLES  WITH  THE  GAULS  273 

claim,   and  were  glad  to  compromise  by  a  formal   renunciation   of 
Sardinia,  and  by  an  additional  payment  of  1200  talents. 

Sardinia  thus  became  a  Roman  possession,  but  did  not  by  any  Reduc- 
means   submit  at  onize  to  its  new  masters.      A  consular  army  was  iio^  of 
employed  there  nearly  every  year,   and   campaigns  are  mentioned,  '^^^"^'"^' 
followed  by  the  usual  triumphs  in   235   and  onwards,  the  rebellion 
being  set  down  to  Carthaginian  agents.      The  final  reduction  of  the 
island  was  ascribed  to  Manlius  Torquatus  in  235  :  but  both  consuls 
were   engaged   there   in    232  ;    and  though   in   227    two   additional 
praetors  were  appointed,  with  the  idea  that  one  should  govern  Sicily 
and  the  other  Sardinia,  still  the  consul  Gains  Atilius  was  sent  there 
with  his  army  in  225  ;   and  it  was  not  until  about  that  time   that 
Sardinia,  with  Corsica  annexed,  can  be  looked  upon  as  regularly 
reduced  to  the  form  of  a  province,  while  even  then  trouble  was  from 
time  to  time  experienced  from  the  wilder  tribes  in  the  centre. 

But  though  the  Roman  territory  was  now  in  peace,  there  was    Wars  in 
trouble  in  the  north  of  Italy.      The  Boii,  either  because  they  antici-  the  north 
pated  that  the  Romans  would  eventually  attack  and  displace  them,  ^^^  ^•^' 
as  they  had  done  to  the  Senones,  or  from  natural  restlessness,  began  Ligurians 
to  show   signs  of  a   movement   southward.      They  were  joined  by  and  Boii, 
certain  tribes  of  the  Ligurians,  who  perhaps  saw  danger  to  themselves  ^J^-^JS- 
in  the  occupation  of  Sardinia  and  Corsica,  and  the  growing  use  made 
by  the  Romans  of  the  port  of  Pisae.      One  of  the  consuls  for  238, 
Sempronius  Gracchus,  appears  to  have  gained  an  easy  victory  over 
the  Ligurians,  while  the  other  consul,   Publius  Valerius  Falto,  also 
defeated  the  Boii,  but  after  sustaining  some  reverse  himself      In  the 
next  year  (237)  L.  Cornelius   Lentulus   earned  a  triumph  over  the 
Ligurians,  but  his  colleague,   Q.   Fulvius  Flaccus,  appears  to  have 
had   ill   success   against   the    Boii,  who  went  so  far  as  to  send  an 
embassy  to  Rome  demanding  the  cession  of  Ariminum.      The  alarm  The  Boii 
was  increased  by  the  news  that  some  Gauls  from  beyond  the  Alps  ^^f^^'' 
had  been  induced  to  cross  into  the  territory  of  the  Boii  to  aid  them  ^^^-^^j.  2^6 
against  Rome,  but  was  quickly  dissipated  by  an  act  of  self-destruction 
■    on  the  part  of  the  Gauls  themselves.    The  Boii  suspected  the  motives 
of  their  own  chiefs  in  sending  for  the  Transalpini,  put  two  of  them 
to  death,  and  attacked  the  newcomers.      The  loss  mutually  sustained 
in  the  fight  was  sufficient  to  render  them  innoxious  for  several  years  :    Victory 
but  another  campaign  was    needed    in  233  against  the  Ligurians,  ^'"^^'^"■f 

I '■ho  were  conquered  by  Q.   Fabius  Maximus,   afterwards  the  cele-  ^fo. 
rated  Cunctator,  who  won  his  first  triumph  in  this  war. 
•     For  a  short  time  in  235  there  was  an  appearance  of  such  profound  The 
bace,  that  for  the  second  time  in  the  history  of  Rome  the  temple  of  ^^^y^^^"- 
.  ZVClf     22Q' 

anus  was  closed.      But  the  lull  in  the  troubles  from  Gaul  gave  the  ^^s' 

I     Romans  the  opportunity  of  bringing  to  a  successful  close  another 

I 


274 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


task  which  their  leading  position  in  Italy  entailed  upon  them.  From 
time  immemorial  the  Illyrian  pirates  had  infested  the  Adriatic,  and 
plundered  ships  sailing  between  Italy  and  the  opposite  coast.  The 
coast  of  Dalmatia  has  innumerable  indentations,  and  is  flanked  by  a 
vast  number  of  small  islands,  offering  every  facility  for  the  protection 
of  the  light  craft  used  in  these  lawless  expeditions.  Though  com- 
plaints had  reached  the  Romans  from  time  to  time,  they  had  no 
warships  to  use  against  pirates,  and  had  not  yet  conceived  the  idea 
of  extending  their  jurisdiction  so  far  east.  But  in  230  the  depreda- 
tions of  these  scourges  of  the  sea  had  been  brought  very  prominently 
under  their  notice.  Taking  advantage  of  a  quarrel  between  the 
Aetolians  and  the  people  of  Medion,  near  Mo?ite7iegro^  the  Illyrian 
king  Agron  had  possessed  himself  of  that  town ;  and,  though  he  died 
soon  afterwards,  his  widow  and  successor  Teuta,  delighted  with  the 
plunder  obtained,  had  allowed  her  subjects  to  ravage  the  coasts  of 
Elis  and  Messenia  and  to  seize  Phoenice,  a  town  standing  some  few 
miles  up  a  river  flowing  into  the  Adriatic  on  the  coast  of  Chaonia. 
An  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  Epirotes  to  rescue  Phoenice  failed, 
and  an  appeal  was  then  made  to  the  Achaean  and  Aetolian  Leagues. 
Thus  the  two  chief  powers  of  Greece  were  brought  into  the  conflict. 
Phoenice,  however,  was  not  saved  by  them,  but  by  an  insurrection  in 
the  dominions  of  Teuta  herself,  especially  in  the  island  of  Issa,  which 
forced  her  to  recall  her  troops. 

The  Romans  now  found  themselves  appealed  to  in  two  direc- 
tions. The  Illyrians,  while  blockading  the  mouth  of  the  river  on 
which  Phoenice  stood,  had  frequently  plundered  Italian  merchants 
in  the  Adriatic,  from  whom  many  complaints  reached  Rome ;  while 
from  Issa  came  an  offer  of  submission  to  the  Romans  if  they  would 
save  the  island  from  Teuta.  Commissioners,  Gaius  and  Lucius 
Coruncanius,  were  sent  to  remonstrate  with  the  queen.  They  found 
her  engaged  in  the  blockade  of  Issa,  and  in  a  high  state  of  exulta- 
tion at  the  amount  of  booty  brought  home  by  her  ships  from  the 
Greek  coast.  She  was  not  inclined,  therefore,  to  conciliation.  She 
promised  to  restrain  her  own  ships  and  officers  from  piracy,  but  dis- 
claimed all  power  of  preventing  private  subjects.  The  younger 
Coruncanius  exclaimed  with  some  warmth  that  *'  in  that  case  the 
Romans  would  undertake  to  improve  the  relations  between  the 
sovereign  and  the  people  of  Illyria."  Exasperated  by  this  reply, 
Teuta  is  said  to  have  secured  the  assassination  of  the  speaker  on 
his  way  home,  and  early  in  the  next  year  (229)  she  sent  another 
fleet  along  the  Greek  coast.  Though  it  failed  in  an  attack  upon 
Epidamnus,  it  laid  formal  siege  to  Corcyra,  which,  after  a  vain 
attempt  at  relief  by  the  Achaean  and  Aetolian  Leagues,  had  to  receive^ 
an  Illyrian  garrison  under  Demetrius  of  Pharos. 


I 


THE  ILLYRIAN  WAR  275 


Postumius 
AlbinusII. 
Gnaeus 


But  the  Romans  were  not  likely  to  allow  this  defiance  and  the  22^. 
murder  of  their  ambassador  to  pass  unnoticed.      Teuta,  indeed,  when  Coss.  L 
she  heard  of  preparations  being  made  at   Rome,  had  attempted  to 
avert  the  danger.      She  had  sent  Demetrius  with  promises  of  sub- 
mission, and  an  assurance  that  the  murder  of  Coruncanius  had  been  Pulvius 
the  deed  of  a  pirate,  for  which  she  was  not  responsible,  while  other  Centum- 
charges    referred    to    circumstances     which    had    happened    in    her  ^^^^'     ^^^ 
husband's  lifetime.      But  in  spite  of  this  pacific  message  the  expedi-  ^IJ^/^g^f 
tion  was  pushed  on,  and  the   Romans,  having  arrived  at   a  private  against 
understanding  with  Demetrius,  appeared  at  Corcyra  with  a  fleet  of  Teuta. 
200  ships  of  war  under  the  consul  Gnaeus  Fulvius,  whilst  the  other 
consul  Postumius  marched  to  Brundisium  ready  to  cross.      Corcyra 
was  already  in  the  hands  of  the  Illyrians,  but  the  traitor  Demetrius, 
who  had  fallen  out  of  favour  with  Teuta  and  feared  her  vengeance, 
connived  at  the  surrender  of  the  garrison.      The   Corcyreans  hailed 
the   Romans  as  deliverers,  and  were  admitted  to   their   "  friendship 
and  alliance,"     The  fleet,  with  Demetrius  on  board,  then  sailed  to 
Apollonia,   where    they  found    Aulus    Postumius  just   arrived  from 
Brundisium.     The  Illyrians  besieging  Epidamnus  fled,  and  Epidam- 
nus  also  became  an  "  ally  and  friend  "  of  Rome.     The  fleet  coasted 
along  parallel  with  the  army  until  it  arrived  at  Issa,  which  was  still 
blockaded.     At   its   approach  the   queen   fled   to   a  fortress    called 
Rhizon,  and  Issa  was  delivered.      Meanwhile  the  army  was  march- 
ing up  the  country,  subduing  some  tribes  and  receiving  the  voluntary 
surrender  of  others,  without  meeting  with  any  check  except  a  slight 
repulse  at  Nutria.      The   consul   Postumius   wintered   in   Illyria,  and 
early  in  the   spring  of  228    queen  Teuta    signified  her  submission. 
She  was  allowed  to  retain  a  small  portion  of  her  dominions,  but  the 
rest  was  handed  over  to  the  nominal  authority  of  her  young  stepson 
Pinnes,  really  to  the  care  of  Demetrius  of  Pharos  as  his  guardian. 
A  fixed  tribute  was  imposed,  and  it  was  agreed  that  no  Illyrian  ship 
of  war  should  sail  south  of  the  promontory  of  Lissus. 

The  subsequent  expeditions  to   Illyria  were  brought   about   by  Demetrius 
Demetrius,  who  proved  as  unfaithful  to  Rome  as  he  had  been  to  the  of  Pharos, 
queen.       He    endeavoured    to    establish    his     position    by    making  ^^  '^^^' 
alliances  with  the  king  of  Macedonia,  and  served  in  the  army  of 
Antigonus    Doson  in  the   expedition  against   Cleomenes  of  Sparta 
(224-222).      In  the  year  222  he  intrigued  with  the  Aetolian  League, 
and  went   on   a  piratical  expedition,   not   only  south   of  Lissus,  but 
round  the  coasts  of  Greece  and  the  islands  of  the  Aegean.      In  these 
movements  he  had  been  aided  by  the  Istri,  who  inhabited  the  tongue   The  Istri, 
of  land  at  the  head  of  the  Adriatic  still  called  Istria,  and  accordingly  221. 
in   221    the  consuls,   P.  Cornelius   Scipio  and  M.  Minucius  Rufus, 
were  sent  to  subdue  them.      In  219  the  consul  Lucius  Aemilius  was 


276 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


sent  to  Illyria  to  crush  Demetrius.  He  took  Pharos,  and  won  a 
triumph :  but  Demetrius  escaped  to  the  court  of  PhiHp  V.  of 
Macedonia,  with  whom  he  remained  for  some  years,  in  spite  of 
demands  made  by  Rome  for  his  surrender.  It  was  he  that  instigated 
some  of  PhiHp's  worst  deeds  in  his  deaHngs  with  Greece,  and  it  was 
on  his  advice  that  Philip  also  resolved  to  take  up  a  position  of 
hostility  to  Rome  :  and  accordingly  his  restoration  was  guaranteed  in 
the  treaty  between  Hannibal  and  Philip  in  21  5.  He  is  said  by  some 
to  have  subsequently  ventured  to  return  to  Illyria,  and  there  to  have 
been  captured  and  put  to  death  by  the  Romans  ;  but  Polybius  says 
that  he  perished  in  an  attack  upon  Messene,  which  must  have  been 
shortly  after  this  treaty. 

The  submission  of  Teuta  in  228  led  to  the  first  diplomatic  rela- 
tions between  Rome  and  Greece.  The  best  organised  governments 
at  that  time  in  Greece  were  the  Aetolian  League  in  north-west 
Greece  and  the  Achaean  League  in  Peloponnese.  Both  had  been 
asked  for  and  had  given  aid  against  the  Illyrians,  and  the  Roman 
consuls  recognised  their  position  by  sending  legates  to  acquaint  them 
formally  with  what  had  been  done  and  to  read  their  treaty  with 
Teuta.  The  legates  were  received  with  great  respect,  and  carried 
back  a  vote  of  thanks  from  both  bodies.  At  Corinth,  indeed,  where 
they  met  the  magistrates  of  the  Achaean  League,  they  were  treated 
with  special  honour,  being  even  admitted,  as  though  of  Hellenic 
descent,  to  share  in  the  Isthmian  games  ;  while  the  Athenians  pre- 
sented them  with  the  freedom  of  their  city,  and  allowed  them  to  be 
initiated  in  the  Eleusinian  mysteries.  It  was  the  first  circumstance 
that  made  the  Roman  power  practically  known  in  Greece,  and  it  was 
not  long  before  a  party  existed  there  which  looked  upon  Rome  as  a 
possible  champion  of  Greek  interests  against  Macedonia.  Among  the 
Romans,  on  whom  Greek  thought  and  Greek  customs  had  long  been 
making  themselves  felt,  it  brought  into  fashion  a  kind  of  chivalrous 
Philhellenism  which  they  never  quite  forgot,  even  when  they  became 
the  stern  masters  of  the  land  which  they  professed  to  liberate. 

Since  the  suicidal  quarrel  between  the  Boii  and  their  transalpine 
kinsfolk  in  236  there  had  been  no  actual  outbreak  on  the  part  of  the 
Gauls.  Still,  danger  was  always  expected  from  them,  and  various 
precautions  were  taken.  Thus,  after  the  expulsion  of  the  Senones 
from  their  territory  (283)  the  coast-line  had  been  secured  by  the 
colonies  of  Sena  (283)  and  Ariminum  (268).  The  colonists  of  these 
two  towns  had  of  course  had  grants  of  the  abandoned  land,  but  there 
was  still  much  unassigned  and  belonging  to  the  State.  One  of  the 
tribunes  for  232,  Gaius  Flaminius,  destined  to  perish  at  Thrasymene, 
brought  in  a  law  for  dividing  this  land  among  the  citizens.  We 
know  nothing  of  the  conditions  on  which  the  division  was  to  be 


XX  AGRARIAN  LAW  OF  FLAMINIUS  277 

made,   but  the  proposal   was    strenuously  resisted   by  the   nobility,    The 
headed  by   Q.    Fabius    Maximus,   and    was  passed   in    spite  of  the  Agrarian 
Senate    refusing    to    sanction    it.       Such    propositions    were    always  ^.  '^ 
resisted  by  the  conservative  nobles.      There  is  no  evidence  to  show  piaminhjs, 
that  the  opposition  arose  from  their  having  already  illegally  occupied  2j2. 
this  land  themselves.     Rather  it  seems  that   it  was  founded  on  the 
dislike  to  the  settlement  of  citizens  at  a  distance  from  Latium,  where 
they  would  be  comparatively  free  from  the  influence  of  the  nobility, 
as  tending  to  shift  the  centre  of  power  from  the  city  to  the  country, 
and    to   destroy  the   idea   of  a   strictly   urban   government.      When 
Polybius  judged  it  to  be  *'  the  first  step  in  the  demoralisation  of  the 
people,"  he  appears  to  regard  it  as  an  encouragement  to  an  idle  part 
of  the  citizens  to  look  for  wealth  from  sudden  windfalls  rather  than 
ordinary  labour.      His  judgment  may  have  been  coloured  by  associa- 
tion with  the  upper  classes  at  Rome,  but  there  probably  was  reason 
to  fear  any  measure  which  tended  to  draw  the  country  people  to  the 
city  for  the  sake  of  possible  bounties  whether  of  corn  or  land  :  and 
there  was  no  security,  if  the  land  fell  to  the  idle,  that  they  would  not 
quickly  sell  it  and  return  to  the  city  in  hopes  of  something  morc.i 

The    immediate    effect    of  the   measure   is   more    certain.      The  Effect  of  the 
Gauls  of  the  Po  valley  were  alarmed,  and  expected  that  similar  treat-  ^^^  ^f 
ment  would  be  applied  to  them  if  the  Roman  power  increased.      A      ^^^^"^•«" 
league,  therefore,  was  formed  between  the  Boii  and  Insubres  ;  and  a  Qauh 
tribe  of  free-lances  called   Gaesatae  were   invited  from  the   Rhone  2jr-22j. 
valley  to  join  in  attacking  Rome.     The  rumour  of  a  Gallic  invasion 
spread,  and  the  Romans  made  haste  to  prepare.      Their  attention 
had   been    lately   turned    elsewhere.      Hasdrubal,    the    successor    of 
Hamilcar  in  Spain  (229),  had  made  a  progress  which  roused   their 
alarm   and  jealousy.      The   founding   of  New    Carthage  (228)   was 
apparently  answered  on  the  part  of  Rome  by  an   alliance   with  the 
rich  city  of  Saguntum,  and  it  seemed  likely  that  before  long  the  two 
peoples  would  contend  for  Spain  as  they  had  for  Sicily.      But  when,    Treaty 
after  the  close  of  the  Illyrian  war,  the  danger  from  the  Gauls  became  "^^^^ 
more  threatening,  the  Romans  put  away  for  a  time  all  thought   of   •  %/^^.  ^ 
armed  mterference  m  Spam,  contented  themselves  with  makmg  a  treaty 
with  Hasdrubal  binding  the  Carthaginians  not  to  come  north  of  the 
Ebro  in  arms,  and  devoted  themselves  to  prepare  for  the  Gallic  war. 
It  is  even  recorded  that,  in  consequence  of  a  prophecy  that  Gauls  and 

^  For  the  agrarian  law  of  Flaminius,  see  Cic.  Acad.  ii.  5  invito  sen atu ;  de 
Invent,  ii.  17  invito  senatu  contra  voluntatem  omnium  optimatium  per  sedi- 
tionem  ad populum  legem  agrariam  tullt.  De  Sen.  §  ti  "resisted  by  Q.  Fabius," 
though  in  this  place  Cicero  assigns  it  to  the  second  consulship  of  Fabius,  i.e.  228. 
Valerius  Max.  (v.  4,  3)  has  a  story  of  the  father  of  Flaminius  having  induced 
his  son  to  leave  the  rostra  while  speaking  for  the  law.     Anyhow  it  was  passed. 


278 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Greeks  were  to  possess  the  city,  two  Greeks  and  two  Gauls  were  buried 
alive  within  the  walls  in  order  to  fulfil  the  terms  of  the  prediction. 

The  Boii  and  Insubres  had  taken  some  years  to  make  their  pre- 
parations. It  was  not  till  225  that  the  Gaesatae  had  been  brought 
into  the  valley  of  the  Po,  and  meanwhile  the  Romans  had  secured 
the  friendship  of  the  Veneti  and  Cenomani,  which  would  compel  the 
Boii  to  leave  a  considerable  force  to  protect  them  from  attacks  on 
their  rear  and  to  defend  their  territory.  The  consul  L.  Aemilius 
Papus  was  sent  to  Ariminum  to  block  the  coast  road  ;  one  of  the 
praetors  went  into  Etruria  with  an  army  of  Sabines  and  Etruscans  to 
guard  the  inland  road  which  led  through  Faesulae  and  Clusium  ; 
and  the  other  consul  Atilius  was  summoned  from  Sardinia.  That 
he  should  have  been  sent  there  at  such  a  time  seems  to  show  that 
after  all  the  actual  movement  of  the  Gauls  was  a  surprise.  Yet 
preparations  had  been  made  of  unusual  magnitude.  Stores  of 
provisions,  weapons,  and  other  war  material  had  been  collected 
in  Rome,  and  the  Italian  allies  were  volunteering  in  every 
direction  to  avert  the  common  danger.  There  were  soon  over 
170,000  men  actually  serving  in  the  field,  while  a  reserve  of  50,000 
foot  and  5000  horse  was  kept  at  Rome.  At  the  same  time  re- 
turning officers,  or  conquisitores^  were  sent  round  to  the  Italian 
communities  to  revise  the  lists  of  men  of  military  age,  who  re- 
ported an  available  force  of  220,000  foot  and  32,000  cavalry. 
The  roll  of  citizens  in  Rome  and  Campania  fit  for  service  showed  a 
total  of  I  50,000  foot  and  6000  cavalry,  besides  two  legions  actually 
serving  at  the  time  in  Sicily  and  Tarentum.  Supposing  these  all  to 
be  available,  as  they  would  be  against  a  Gallic  invasion,  Rome  found 
herself  able  to  draw  upon  a  force  of  over  600,000  infantry  and  70,000 
cavalry,  a  force  far  surpassed  in  modern  times,  but  which  had  then 
been  equalled  by  no  great  empire  since  that  of  the  Persian  kings.i 

^  Polybius  (ii.  24)  makes  up  the  list  thus  : — 

Two  consular  armies  of  two  legions  each 

(allies) 
Sabine  and  Etruscan  volunteers 
Umbrians  and  others         .       •  . 
Veneti  and  Cenomani 
Reserves  at  Rome  (citizens) 

(allies). 
Two  legions  at  Tarentum  and  Sicily 

Total  actually  serving 

Military  rolls  of  Italian  States  . 

, ,  , ,     of  Rome  and  Campania 

Grand  Total 


INFANTRY. 

CAVALRY. 

20,800 

1,200 

60,  000 

4,000 

50,000 

4,000 

20,000 

— 

20,000 

— 

20,000 

3,000 

30,000 

2,000 

8,400 

400 

229,200 

14,600 

250,000 

35,000 

150,000 

23,000 

629,200 

72,600 

«^B^Ba» 

a>— ^I^B 

XX  THE  GAULS  INVADE  ETRURIA  279 

The  Gauls  took  the  central  road  through  Etruria,  and  marched, 
as  their  fathers  had  done,  upon  Clusium.  Thither  the  praetor  with 
his  Sabine  and  Etruscan  militia  followed.  The  Gauls  won  the  first  ^^■^' 
battle  by  a  ruse.  During  the  night  they  left  their  camp  in  charge 
of  the  cavalry  an^i  retired  some  distance  along  the  road  towards 
Faesulae.  Finding  next  morning  that  the  cavalry  were  alone  the 
praetor  attacked.  The  enemy  retreated,  and  the  praetor's  army 
pursued,  but  suddenly  found  itself  in  the  presence  of  the  main  body 
of  the  Gauls.  After  a  fierce  battle,  in  which  they  lost  6000  men, 
the  survivors  of  the  praetor's  army  entrenched  themselves  on  some 
rising  ground,  and  were  there  besieged.  Never  good  at  such  opera- 
tions, the  Gauls  left  the  task  of  watching  the  refugees  to  a  squadron 
or  two  of  cavalry,  while  the  rest  feasted  and  slept. 

But  the  tidings  of  the  route  taken  by  the  enemy  had  reached  the 
consul  Aemilius  at  Ariminum.  He  had  started  in  pursuit,  and 
now  appeared  upon  the  scene  soon  after  the  defeat  of  the  praetor. 
The  beleaguered  troops  on  the  hill  saw  his  watch-fires,  and  contrived 
to  let  him  know  what  had  happened.  He  resolved  to  attack  next 
morning.  But  the  Gauls  had  no  mind  to  fight  a  regular  Roman 
army.  They  had  taken  a  great  booty,  and  on  the  advice  of  the  king 
of  the  Gaesatae,  determined  first  to  convey  this  safely  into  their  own 
territories,  and  to  return  and  fight,  if  they  must  fight,  disencumbered 
of  the  burden. 

They  could  not  retreat  along  the  same  road  by  which  they  came  Retreat  of 
without  fighting  Aemilius  ;  they  therefore  made  for  the  west  coast,  the  Gauls 
intending  to  march  along  the  Ligurian  Bay,  which  would  at  any  rate  '"' 

bring  the  Gaesatae  to  the  entrance  into  Transalpine  Gaul.  Aemilius, 
having  reinforced  his  army  by  the  men  whom  he  had  rescued,  started 
in  pursuit,  not  intending  to  fight  a  pitched  battle,  but  to  dog  the 
footsteps  of  the  Gauls,  harassing  them  at  every  opportunity,  and 
wresting  from  them  such  booty  as  he  could  lay  hands  upon.  The 
retreating  Gauls  reached  the  Etruscan  coast  near  Telamon  ;  but,  as 
they  marched  northward,  suddenly  found  themselves  face  to  face 
with  another  Roman  army. 

Summoned  from  Sardinia  Gains  Atilius  had  landed  at  Pisae  with   They  are 
his  troops,  and  was  marching  down  the  very  road  on  which  the  Gauls  ^^^  h  the 
were.       Falling   in   with   their   advanced    guard    he   took    the   men  ^^^^^'^ 
prisoners,  and  learnt  the  state  of  the  case.      He  put  himself  at  the  Atilius. 
head  of  his  cavalry,  and  hastened  down  the  road  to  seize  some  rising 
ground  by  which  he  knew  the  enemy  must  pass,  leaving  orders  with 

Polybius  adds  up  his  figjures  wrongly,  and  must  of  course  be  speaking  in  round 
numbers,  as  the  later  authorities  do,  Livy,  for  instance,  speaking  of  the  army  in 
foot  as  300,000.  Fabius  Pictor  reckons  800,000,  of  whom  448,200  foot  and 
26, 600  horse  were  Romans  and  Campanians. 


28o  HISTORY  OF  ROME 


the  Gauls 

22S. 


the  infantry  to  advance  in  fighting  order.      When  the  Gauls  saw  the 
Roman  cavalry  making  for  the  hill  they  at  first  imagined  that  the 
horse  of  Aemilius  had  outstripped  them  in  the  night,  for  they  knew 
Great  nothing  of  the  army  in  front.      They  sent  their  cavalry  and  some 

defeat  of^  X\^\.  infantry  forward  to  dispute  the  possession  of  the  hill,  and  pre- 
sently learnt  the  truth.  Aemilius  also  first  knew  of  the  approach  of 
the  army  of  Atilius  by  seeing  the  cavalry  fight  in  front.  For  some 
time  the  infantry  looked  on  while  the  cavalry  of  Atilius  and  the  Gauls 
contended  for  the  hill.  After  an  obstinate  fight,  in  which  Atilius 
fell,  the  Romans  prevailed,  and  nothing  now  prevented  the  infantry 
from  coming  into  collision.  The  Gauls  were  numerous  enough  to 
show  two  strong  fronts  in  opposite  directions,  and  presented  a  strange 
and  terrifying  spectacle.  The  Gaesatae  came  stripped  into  battle, 
though  ornamented  with  every  kind  of  barbaric  device.  Their  horns 
and  clarions  made  a  hideous  din  :  their  flanks  were  protected  by  a 
barricade  of  waggons  and  chariots.  Their  naked  bodies,  however, 
suffered  severely  from  the  volleys  of  pila,  and  their  retreat  caused 
some  confusion  ;  but  when  the  Romans  charged  the  Boii,  Insubres, 
and  Taurisci,  sword  in  hand,  these  tribes — better  protected  by  their 
leather  jerkins — offered  a  stout  resistance.  Here,  however,  the 
superiority  of  the  Roman  weapons  helped  to  decide  the  result.  The 
pointless  Gallic  swords  were  no  match  for  the  cut-and-thrust  blades 
of  the  Romans,  and  were  also  of  such  inferior  metal  that  they  easily 
bent  and  were  often  useless  after  the  first  stroke.  Forty  thousand 
Gauls  are  said  to  have  fallen  on  the  field;  10,000  were  taken 
prisoners  with  Concolitanus,  one  of  their  kings.  The  king  of  the 
Gaesatae,  Aneroestes,  escaped  with  a  few  followers,  but  only  to  end 
his  life  by  his  own  hand.  The  cavalry  for  the  most  part  got  aAvay. 
Invasion  of  This  success  determined  the  Romans  to  attempt  offensive  opera- 
Gaul,  224.  tions.  The  Boii  submitted  to  the  consuls  of  the  next  year  (224) 
without  a  struggle,  but  an  unusually  wet  season  prevented  farther 
223.  Coss.  operations.  The  consuls  of  the  next  year,  C.  Flaminius  and  P. 
Gains  Furius,  for  the  first  time  crossed  the  Po,  near  its  confluence  with  the 

Flatninius,  Addua.  They  were  opposed  by  the  Insubres,  and  lost  so  heavily, 
both  while  crossing  the  river  and  while  pitching  their  camp,  that  they 
were  obliged  to  make  terms  with  the  enemy  and  quit  their  territory. 
They  marched  eastward  down  the  left  bank  of  the  Ollius  until  they 
had  crossed  its  tributary,  the  Clusius,  into  the  territory  of  the  friendly 
Cenomani.  The  Insubres  found  that  the  enemy,  whom  they  had 
thus  allowed  to  escape  them,  were  securing  reinforcements  of  Ceno- 
mani to  attack  them  again.  They  therefore  made  a  grand  effort. 
The  golden  standards,  called  the  "  immovables,"  were  taken  down 
from  the  temple  of  their  goddess,  which  were  only  to  be  used  in  the 
last  resort,   and  a  great  host  was  collected  to  resist  the  returning 


P.  Furius 
Philus. 


J 


XX  CAPTURE  OF  MEDIOLANUM  281 

army.  Even  now,  by  imskilfulness  or  ill-fortune,  the  consuls  gave  Defeat  of 
the  enemy  battle  in  a  dangerous  position.  Distrusting  the  fidelity  of  the  In- 
their  Gallic  allies,  they  placed  them  on  the  opposite  bank  of  the  ^^^^^^> 
river  on  which  they  were  posted,  and  broke  down  the  bridge  between 
them.  The  Romans  thus  fought  with  a  river  on  their  rear  which 
they  could  not  pass,  and  were  forced  to  conquer  or  perish.  Flaminius 
declined  to  listen  to  an  announcement  of  unfavourable  auspices,  or 
even,  it  is  said,  to  open  a  despatch  from  the  Senate  forbidding  him  to 
fight,  and  gave  the  signal  for  battle.  Success  alone  saved  him  from 
impeachment  by  his  aristocratic  enemies.  Victory  was  attributed  in 
part  to  an  innovation  in  the  usual  Roman  tactics.  The  hastati  were 
armed  with  the  pike  instead  of  the  pilum,  and  charged  with  the  rest 
of  the  line.  The  Gauls  exhausted  themselves  in  striking  with  their 
swords  at  an  enemy  a  spear's  length  distant,  and  when  the  Romans 
threw  down  their  pikes  and  began  to  use  their  swords  resistance  was 
almost  at  an  end. 

The  Insubres  now  again  got  help  from  the  Gaesatae,  and  next  222.   Coss. 
year  the   consuls   once   more  invaded  them.       They  first  besieged  ^'^•.  ^"^' 
Acerrae  on  the  Addua,  while  the  Gauls  retaliated  by  investing  Clas-  ^^  f^^f 
tidium,  seven  miles  south  of  the  Po.     Claudius  went  with  the  cavalry  Calvus,  M. 
to  relieve  Clastidium,  defeated  the  Gauls,  and  won  the  spolia  opijna  Claudius 
by  killing  their  king  Viridomarus.     Acerrae  having  fallen,  the  Gauls  Marcellus. 
made  their  last  stand  at  Mediolanum.      Scipio  followed  them  there,  Fall  of 
but,  not  thinking  himself  strong  enough  to  take  the  town,  was  retiring  Y'^dio- 
towards  Acerrae.     The  Gauls  sallied  out  to  harass  his  rear  guard, 
which   turned  upon   them  with   such  fury  that   they   retreated,   and 
Scipio,  following  up  the  success,  carried  Mediolanum  itself.     This 
ended  the  war  for  the  present.      The  Insubrian  chiefs  hastened  to 
submit,   and  the  consuls  traversed   the   country  to  the  foot  of  the 
Alps. 

The  Gauls  were  not  now  expelled  from   their  territories,  but  the  Military 
Romans  at  once  began  to  secure  the  country  by  taking  hostages  and  colonies 
establishing  colonies  in  places  of  strategic  importance.    Thus  Cremona  ^^^  roads. 
and  Placentia  were  at  once  resolved  upon,  and  the  colonists  were 
being  settled  in  them  in  218,  when  the  news  of  Hannibal's  march 
encouraged    the    Boii    to   attack   them.       Bononia,   Parma,    Mutina, 
and  other  strong  towns,  afterwards  also  colonised,  were  secured  by 
Roman   garrisons.       Moreover,   one  of  the    three   great   roads    con- 
necting  Rome  with   the  north,  the  via  Flaminia,   was  now  (220) 
made  fit  for  the  passage  of  an  army  as  far  as  Ariminum,  under  the 
auspices  of  Gains  Flaminius  as  censor.       It  did  for   Rome  in  the 
north-east  what  the  via  Appia  did  in  the  south-west.     It  was  meant 
especially   to    keep   communication    open    between    Rome   and   the 
Gallic  territory  ;  and,  by  its  conception  and  construction,  formed  a 


282  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap,  xx 

noble  memorial  of  Flaminius,  whose  opposition  to  the  optimates  as 
tribune  in  232,  and  failure  at  Thrasymene  in  217,  have  helped  to 
leave  an  undeserved  impression  of  a  demagogiae  without  greatness 
as  a  statesman  or  ability  as  a  commander. 

Authorities. — For  the  mercenary  war  at  Carthage,  Polybius  i.  66-88  ;  for 
the  Illyrian  war,  ii.  2-12  ;  for  the  Gallic  wars,  ii.  14-35  I  Livy,  Ep.  xx.  ; 
Plutarch,  Marcellus  iii.-iv.  Some  farther  notices  are  to  be  found  in  Appian, 
Gall.  xi.  ;  Diodorus  fr.  of  book  xxv.  ;  Dio  Cassius  fr.  50  ;  Eutropius  iii.  2  ; 
Florus  ii.  3-5  ;  Zonaras  viii,  18  ;  Orosius  iv.  13.  The  best  of  all  is  Polybius, 
who,  especially  in  his  account  of  the  mercenary  war,  is  graphic  beyond  his  usual 
style. 


CHAPTER    XXI 

CHANGES    IN    ROME    BETWEEN    THE    FIRST    AND    SECOND 
PUNIC    WARS 

241-218 

Social  distinctions—  Apparent  change  in  character  and  influence  of  Senate  and 
the  aristocracy — Increase  in  number  of  slaves,  and  consequences  of  it — The 
Libertini  and  Peregrini — The  games  —  Gladiators  —  Funerals — Women  and 
divorce — New  nobles — Greek  influence  on  personal  habits,  and  on  literature — 
Livius  Andronicus — Cn.  Naevius — Absence  of  prose  writing. 

When  the  complete  equality  of  the  orders,  gradually  established  by  Survival 
a  series  of  laws,  had  been  consummated  by  the  election  in  253  of  a  of  social 
plebeian  as   Pontifex  Maximus,   there  were   yet   signs  that  socially     f-^  ^^^" 
the  distinction  had  not  disappeared.     We  have  already  noticed  the 
exclusion  of  a  plebeian  lady  from  the  chapel  of  Patrician   Chastity  ; 
and  the  fact  that  the  plebeian  aediles  thought  it  worth  while  to  punish 
the  petulance  of  Claudia,  is  a  proof  that  social   pride  on   the  one 
hand,  and  jealousy  on  the  other,  was  not  extinct.      Similar  sentiments  Opposition 
survived  in  the  Senate.      Though  it  could  not  eventually  stop  popular  of  the 
legislation,    it   clung  obstinately    to   its    old    position   of  obstructing  ^^^^'^*^- 
political  change  and  the  claims  of  the  lower  orders.      This  is  illus- 
trated by  the  opposition  to  the  proposal  of  Gaius  Flaminius  in  232 
to  divide  the  Gallic  land  instead  of  making  it  ager  publicusj  and  by 
the  Senate's  unfriendly  attitude  to  him   in   the   Gallic  campaign  of 
222,   when  a  party  in  the   house  tried   to  secure  his  recall  on  the 
grounds  of  a  vitium  in  his  election,   while   its  loss  of  influence  is 
shown  by  his  successful  defiance.      The  Senate,  indeed,  which  had  The 
impressed  the   envoy  of  Pyrrhus  as  an  "assembly  of  kings,"  and  Senates 
whose   influence   increased    during    the    second    Punic   war,    seems,  ^^fl'^^nce. 
nevertheless,  during  this  period,  to  show  signs  of  decadence.     Hence, 
perhaps,   the    unusual   severity  of  the   censors  of  252,   who    struck 
thirteen   names  off  the    roll ;  ^    while,   three   years  afterwards  (249), 

^  The  personal  character  of  the  nobles  generally  was  still  high.  The  im- 
peachment of  M.  Livius  Salinator  and  L.  Aemilius  Paulus,  consuls  for  219,  and 
the  condemnation  of  the  former  on  a  charge  of  peculatus,  grounded  on  alleged 


284 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


241-218. 

Increased 
number  of 
slaves. 


Effect  on 

country 

life. 


Claudius  ventured  to  beard   it  by  nominating  a  freedman  dictator, 
when  ordered  by  the  Senate  to  supersede  himself. 

A  striking  feature  in  the  social  condition  of  the  people  at  this  time 
was  the  increase  in  the  number  of  slaves.  This  was  chiefly  brought 
about  by  the  enormous  number  of  unfortunate  persons  reduced  to 
servitude  in  the  course  of  the  wars  in  Cisalpine  Gaul,  Magna  Graecia, 
and  Sicily,  25,000,  for  instance,  having  been  sold  at  one  blow  after 
the  fall  of  Agrigentum  in  262.  The  slave  market,  therefore,  must  have 
been  overstocked,  and  the  price  of  slaves  low.  This  accelerated  the 
tendency,  always  perhaps  existing,  to  leave  the  country  and  crowd 
into  the  city,  where  there  was  a  greater  opportunity  of  using  capital, 
of  obtaining  profitable  employment,  or  of  sharing  in  public  benefac- 
tions :  for  the  land  could  be  worked  to  greater  advantage  by  cheaply 
purchased  slaves,  who  were  not  taken  away  by  the  levies.  "When 
Regulus  was  in  Africa  (255)  one  story  represents  him  as  wishing  to 
be  recalled,  because  the  hired  servants  {merce7iarii)  on  his  farm  were 
cheating  him ;  but  when  Cato  wrote  on  farming  (about  1 80),  he 
assumes  that  all  the  work  is  done  by  slaves.  Free  or  cheap  distribu- 
tions of  corn,  indeed,  were  not  yet  so  frequent  as  to  tempt  the  poor 
or  the  thriftless  to  the  city  in  such  large  masses  as  in  after  times  : 
yet  they  did  occur.  Hiero,  on  his  visit  to  Rome  in  237,  brought 
with  him  a  large  cargo  of  corn  for  free  distribution  ;  and  the  assign- 
ment of  land  by  the  lex  Flaminia  (232)  must  have  substantially  bene- 
fited the  landless  urban  populace.  The  increase  in  the  number  of 
slaves  is  also  illustrated  by  the  fact  that  it  was  thought  worth  while, 
in  238,  to  forbid  the  purchase  of  them  from  the  Gauls,  lest  the 
revenue  thus  obtained  should  assist  preparations  against  Rome  ;  and, 
again,  by  the  growing  importance  of  the  liberfini,  the  necessary 
accompaniment  of  slavery.  For  some  time  emancipated  slaves  became 
citizens  on  the  same  terms  as  others  as  far  as  the  law  was  concerned, 
though  custom  excluded  them  from  office  and  other  advantages. 
The  State  took  no  cognisance  of  the  matter  beyond  formally  attest- 
ing, in  certain  cases,  the  act  of  emancipation.  But  in  257,  either 
with  a  view  to  check  emancipation,  or  because  the  numbers  of  such 
transactions  made  it  worth  while,  a  lex  Claudia  imposed  a  tax  of 
5  per  cent  on  the  selling  value  of  the  emancipated  slave,  which,  under 
the  name  of  aiirinn  vicessimarimn,  was  kept  as  a  reserve  in  an  inner 
chamber  of  the  treasury.  And,  whereas  on  emancipation  the  freed- 1 
men  had  been  accustomed  to  enrol  themselves  in  any  of  the  tribes, 
either  according  to  their  places  of  residence  or  that  of  their  emanci- 
pators, their  numbers  became  so  important  an  element  in  influencing! 
the  votes  that,  in  222,  a  law  ordained  that  they  should  be  enrolled] 

unfairness  in  dealing  with  the  Illyrian  booty,  is  almost  the  first  instance  recorded 
of  real  or  suspected  dishonesty  on  the  part  of  a  member  of  the  aristocratic  families. 


XXI  GROWTH  OF  THE  POPULATION  OF  ROME  285 

in  one  of  the  four  city   tribes,  thus   confining  their  influence  on  an  241-218. 
election  to  narrower  limits. 

But  the  libertini  were  not  the  only  additions  to  the  inhabitants  increase  in 
of  Rome.      The  appointment   of  a   second   praetor   {peregrinus)  in  peregrini 
244,  to  adjudicate  in  cases  arising  between  a  citizen  and  an  ahen,  ^f'^ 
is  a  farther  proof  of  the  growth  of  the  population  and  the  attractive-  ^^  ^^^'^■^" 
ness  of  Rome  as  a  place  of  business  or  residence.      The  number 
of  full  citizens  was  also  growing.     The  census   of  men  of  military 
age    shows  a  steady  increase  up  to  252  ;    between  that    and  245 
there  is  a  sudden  drop  of  over  46,000.      This  may  be  accounted  for 
partly  by  great  losses  in   Sicily,  and  by  the  greater  number  of  men 
actually  serving  in  the  army,  who  were  not  counted  in  the  census  ; 
and  partly  by  the  settlement  of  citizens  in  colonies  with  Latin  rights, 
in  joining  which  they  suffered  a  diminutio  capitis  and  ceased  to  be 
entered  on  the  Roman  lists.i     However  that  may  be,  the  next  census 
of  Roman  citizens  recorded  (220)  shows  a  recovery  of  20,000. 

And  as  Rome  was  thus  gradually  assuming  the  dimensions  worthy  Gladiators. 
of  the  capital  of  the  world,  so  those  tastes  and  pastim-es  were  coming 
into  use  which,  for  good  or  ill,  marked  the  Roman  character  in  after 
times.  The  games  in  the  circus  had  from  the  first  been  the  favourite 
amusement  of  the  people,  and  what  the  citizens  were  proud  to  display 
to  foreigners.  King  Hiero's  visit  in  237  had  been  professedly  for 
the  purpose  of  being  present  at  them,  and  there  was  no  surer  title 
to  higher  office  than  the  splendour  with  which  the  aediles  pro- 
vided them.  Accordingly,  the  popular  Gaius  Flaminius,  when 
censor  in  220,  besides  his  great  work  the  via  Flaminia^  also  con- 
structed a  new  circus  in  that  part  of  the  Campus  Martius  which 
was  nearest  the  Capitol,  and  was  already  called  prata  Flaminia. 
But  besides  these  games,  a  new  amusement  began  about  this  time, 
which  exercised  a  hardening  and  demoralising  effect  upon  the 
people.  In  263  for  the  first  time  an  exhibition  of  gladiators  was 
given  by  Decimus  Junius  Brutus  in  honour  of  his  departed  father. 
This  seems  to  have  set  the  fashion,  not  only  of  training  and  using 
slaves  from  the  North  for  this  purpose,  but  also  of  the  extravagant  Funerals. 
outlay  upon  funeral  ceremonies  generally,  in  spite  of  the  Twelve 
Tables,  against  which  occasional  protests  in  after  times  were  made, 
as  by  M.  Aemilius  Lepidus,  six  times  named  princeps  senatus,  who, 
in  154,  ordered  his  sons  on  his  death-bed  to  carry  his  body  out  to 
the  pyre  on  a  simple  bier  without  fine  linen  or  purple,  and  not  to 
spend  on  the  rest  of  his  funeral  more  than  ten  asses. 

In  some  other  ways  this  age  witnessed  a  departure  from  the 

^  The  counting  of  the  coloni  in  Campania,  in  225,  seems  to  have  been  a  special 
and  exceptional  measure  (Polyb.  ii.  24).  But  later  on  steps  were  taken  to  include 
those  on  service  in  the  census. 


286 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Women 
and 
divorce. 


New  nobles. 


2.41-218.  simpler  manner  of  an  earlier  time.  Women  were  profuse  in  ornaments 
of  gold  and  gay -coloured  dresses,  and  rode  in  covered  carriages, 
which,  it  was  thought  necessary  to  forbid  in  a  plebiscitum  proposed 
by  the  tribune  Q.  Claudius  in  228,  and  by  the  lex  Oppia  in  215  ; 
and  it  is  specially  noted  by  subsequent  writers  that  in  231  for  the 
first  time  a  wife  was  divorced.  Regulations  for  divorce  were  con- 
tained in  the  laws  of  the  Twelve  Tables,  which  implies  its  existence 
even  earlier  ;  but  Sp.  Carvilius  put  away  his  wife  on  the  ground  of 
barrenness,  not  of  immorality  ;  and  he  thereby  set  a  precedent  which 
was  before  long  eagerly  followed  with  results  disastrous  to  family  life. 
Another  innovation  of  less  importance  was  the  permanent  wearing 
of  decorations  won  in  military  service, — thus  marking  men  off  as  a 
kind  of  life-nobles.  We  have  seen  that  Duilius,  the  victor  of  Mylae 
(260),  retained  for  life  the  honour  of  the  torch -bearer  and  the 
piper;  but  in  231  we  hear  for  the  first  time  of  wearing  the  triumphal 
ornaments  at  the  public  games,  after  the  day  of  triumph,  by  Papirius 
Maso,  who  had  conquered  the  Corsicans  ;  while  M.  Valerius  Corvus, 
consul  in  263,  set  the  fashion  of  adopting  a  title  or  second  cognomen 
from  the  name  of  a  conquered  town  or  country,  calling  himself 
Messala  for  his  victory  over  Messana. 

Greek  In  such  things  generally  we  see  natural  development  of  Rom.an 

influence.  habits  without  appreciable  influence  from  without.  Of  the  time  when 
Hellenic  habits  and  thoughts  began  first  to  influence  the  Romans  it 
would  be  impossible  to  speak  with  precision.  It  probably  may  be 
traced  to  the  earliest  days,  and  to  the  very  rudiments  of  their 
civilisation  and  their  religious  habits.  Greek  had  apparently  before 
this  time  superseded  Etruscan  as  the  staple  subject  of  the  education 
of  the  young.  But  a  great  impulse  was  given  to  this  influence  by  the 
closer  contact  of  the  Romans  with  the  cities  of  Magna  Graecia  and 
Sicily  in  this  period.  This  influence  showed  itself  in  various  ways,  some 
of  them  trivial, — the  custom  of  shaving  the  beard,  for  instance,  being, 
it  is  said,  introduced  by  barbers  from  Sicily  in  300  ;  while  the  first 
physician  from  Greece,  Archagathus,  was  imported  from  Peloponnesus 
in  219,  and  was  eagerly  welcomed,  a  place  of  business  being 
purchased  for  him  at  the  public  cost,— perhaps  as  superseding  those 
charms,  incantations,  and  concoction  of  simples  which  seem  to  have 
characterised  the  medical  art  in  Latium,  and  still  to  have  been  practised 

Literature,  in  the  country  when  Cato  wrote. ^  But  a  more  important  and  more 
permanent  influence  was  that  exercised  by  the  Greeks  on  literature, 
and  first  of  all  upon  that  part  of  it  which  could  reach  even  uneducated 
people  through  the  theatre.  Acting,  we  have  seen,  had  been  intro- 
duced in  Rome  nearly  a  hundred  years  before  the   first  Punic  war 

^  Thus  medical  terms  were  generally  derived   from  Greek,    e.g.    liepatarius 
morbus  (Plaut.  Cure.  2,  i,  24). 


XXI  INFLUENCE  OF  GREEK  LITERATURE  287 

(361).      For  some  time  it  seems  to  have  consisted  principally  of  the  241-218. 
recitation  of  rude  songs  and  dances,  or  at  the  most  of  coarse  comic 
dialogue  between  the  dances,  with    some  allusions  to  topics  of  the 
day,   but  without   connected   plot    {fabula).       But    the  career  of   a 
Greek  captive   from   Tarentum  in  this  century  not  only  shows  that  Livius 
the  value  set  upon  education  was  rising,  but  led  the  way  for  an  amuse-  Andro- 
ment  more  refined  and  artistic.      Andronicus  was  brought  as  a  slave  ^^^'"■^' 
to  Rome  about  275,  and  being  afterwards  manumitted  by  his  owner, 
M.  Livius  Salinator,  whose  sons  he  taught,  was  thenceforth  called 
Livius  Andronicus,     He  was  able  to  make  a  livelihood  by  teaching, 
both  in  Latin  and  Greek,  and  for  the  use  of  his  pupils  translated  the 
Odyssey  into  Latin  Saturnians.^      He  wrote  also  hymns  to  be  sung 
at  festivals  or  at  times  of  public  rejoicings,  for  one  of  which  in  207 
he  was  rewarded  by  a  grant  of  residence  for  himself  and  other  poets. 
He  was  not  indeed  the  first  to  compose  in   Latin  on  Greek  models, 
for  Appius  Claudius  Caecus  had  done  so  before  ;  2  but  he  seems  to 
have  first  made  a  profession   of  writing,    which  partly  at  any  rate 
maintained  him  ;  and  if  the  translation  of  the  Odyssey  was  made  for   Trans- 
pupils,  it  indicates  a  considerable  advance  in  education.      But  besides  ^'^^^^-'^  ^ 
this,  Andronicus  was  an  actor,  and  as  an  actor  he  composed  his  own       y^^^y- 
parts.     He  is  said  to  have  taught  a  slave  to  recite  his  poem,  which 
then  for  the  first  time  contained  a  continuous  story,  while  he  accom- 
panied the  recitation  with  appropriate  gestures.      He  also  made  the 
next  step.      He  was  the  first  to  exhibit  translations  of  Greek  plays,  Greek 
principally  tragedies,  which  required  other  actors  than  himself,  whom  plays. 
he  had  to  train  and  teach.     The  first  was  exhibited  in  240  ;  and  his 
example  was  soon  followed  by  others.      Thus  the  scanty  old  literature 
of  Fescennine  verses,  religious  songs,  oracles,  magic  formulae,  and  rude 
miscellanies    called    Saturae,    if   it    was    not    superseded    in    popular 
favour,  had  at  any  rate  a  rival  literature  formed  on  a  better  model, 
which  attracted  the  most  refined  tastes  in  Rome,  and  gave  a  direction 
to  Latin  poetry  never  destined  to  be  materially  changed.     But  we  must  Difficulties 
not  think  of  it  as  immediately  successful.      Many  of  the  upper  classes  in  the  way 
objected  to  acting  as  undignified  and  frivolous,  and  to  Greek  literature  ^       "'^'^ 
as  an  innovation,  preferring  real   Latin  plays,  however  poor ;  while  ^^^^-^ 
the  common  people  cared  much  more  for  rope  dancers,  pugilists,  and  drama. 
gladiators.3       Still   an   audience   was    found,    and    Livius    was    soon 

^  A  few  lines  have  been  preserved,  e.g. — 

Virum  mihi,  Casmena  |  insect  versutum 
and 

ibi  mandns  sed^to  |  ddnicum  videbis 

me  carpentd  veh^ntem  |  en  domum  venisse. 

2  One  line  of  Appius  Claudius  is  preserved — 

Est  unus  qui'sque  faber  |  ipse  sua6  fortunae. 
^  Plautus,  Poen.  pr.  15  ;   Terence,  Hecyra,  pr.  2,  25  sq. 


288  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap,  xxi 

Cn.  followed  by  another  poet.      Cn.  Naevius  was  a  Latin,  though  living 

Naevius.      i^  Campania.     He  fought  in  the  first  Punic  war,  and  lived  till  near  the 

end  of  the  second.      Five  years  later  than  Andronicus  (235),  he  too 

began  to   exhibit    Latin   plays,  modelled  on,  or  translated  from,  the 

Greek.    As  Andronicus  was  a  Greek  by  birth,  Naevius  may  be  regarded 

(excepting  Appius  Claudius)  as  the  first  native  writer  of  Latin  whose 

works  can  claim  to  be  literature.      He  did  not  write  plays  only.      He 

composed  a  Saturnian  poem  in  seven  books  on  the  first  Punic  war ; 

and  also  Saturae,  in  which  he  commented  so  freely  upon  the  public 

characters  of  the  day  that  he  incurred  bitter  personal  enmities,  and 

ended  his  life  in  exile  at  Utica  (204).^ 

Absence  of  We  may  therefore  note  the  period  between  the  beginning  of  the 

early  Latin  ^^^^  Punic  war  and  the  second  as  that  of  a  new  departure  in  Roman 

4)yOSC  .  ...  ... 

lorititiss  literature  :  in  which  new  influences  were  acting,  new  fashions  begin- 
ning to  prevail,  and  much  that  was  afterwards  specially  characteristic 
took  its  rise.  We  have  not  yet  to  discuss  prose  writings.  A  speech 
of  Appius  Claudius  Caecus  delivered  in  the  Senate  on  the  question 
of  making  terms  with  Pyrrhus  was  extant  in  Cicero's  time,  and 
perhaps  others,  and  was  regarded  as  the  earliest  piece  of  Latin 
prose  in  existence.  Some  laudationes  or  other  family  records  may 
have  existed  even  earlier :  but  they  did  not  survive  to  the  literary 
age  ;  and  when  Fabius  Pictor,  who  lived  in  the  time  of  the  second 
Punic  war,  wished  to  write  a  history  of  Rome,  he  seems  naturally  to 
have  used  the  Greek  language,  much  as  an  English  writer  of  the 
thirteenth  or  fourteenth  centuries,  or  even  later,  would  almost  certainly 
have  used  Latin.  The  same  seems  also  true  of  another  writer  of 
history,  nearly  contemporary  with  Pictor,  L.  Cincius  Alimentus,  and 
of  P.  Cornelius  Scipio,  son  of  the  elder  Africanus.  A  laudatio  of 
Marcellus  by  his  son  (about  206)  survived  for  a  time ;  but  the 
earliest  writer  of  history  in  Latin,  beyond  the  bare  entries  in  the 
Ajinales  Maximt^  seems  to  have  been  Cato  the  censor. 

^  His  banishment  was  chiefly,  it  appears,  contrived  by  Metellus  and  his 
friends  ;  probably  the  Q.  Caecihus  Metellus  who  was  consul  in  206.  The  line 
particularly  offensive  to  him  has  been  preserved — 

fato  Metdlli  Romae  |  consules  fiunt, 
which  Metellus  or  some  partisan  answered  by  another  Saturnian— 
dabunt  malum  Metelli  |  Naevio  poetae. 


CHAPTER    XXII 

THE    SECOND    PUNIC    WAR 

Second  Punic  war — First  Period,  from  219  to  spring  of  217— Origin  of  the  war, 
Carthaginian  expansion  in  Spain,  Hamilcar,  238-229;  Hasdrubal,  229-221; 
Hannibal,  221-218 — Roman  treaty  with  Hasdrubal  confining  the  Carthaginian 
supremacy  in  Spain  to  the  country  south  of  the  Ebro  (228) — Founding  of  New 
Carthage  about  the  same  time — The  Romans  make  treaty  of  friendship  with 
the  semi-Greek  communities  of  Emporiae  and  Saguntum — Hannibal  becomes 
general  of  the  Carthaginian  forces  in  Africa  and  Spain  (221) — He  subdues  the 
Olcades  (221),  the  Vaccaei  (220) — The  Saguntines  in  alarm  appeal  to  Rome 
— Roman  commissioners  visit  Hannibal  in  the  winter  220,  ordering  him  to 
abstain  from  attacking  Saguntum,  or  from  crossing  the  Ebro — They  then  go 
to  Carthage — The  second  lUyrian  war  (219) — Hannibal  takes  Saguntum  after 
a  siege  of  seven  months  (219) — The  Romans  send  an  embassy  to  Carthage 
demanding  the  surrender  of  Hannibal,  and  on  the  refusal  of  the  Carthaginian 
Senate  Fabius  declares  war  (219-218) — Hannibal  starts  from  New  Carthage 
in  the  early  summer  of  218 — Subdues  Spain  north  of  the  Ebro,  and  puts  it 
under  the  care  of  Hanno  ;  crosses  the  Pyrenees  and  arrives  at  the  Rhone  while 
Scipio  is  still  only  at  Marseilles  (September,  218)  —  P.  Cornelius  Scipio 
finding  himself  too  late,  sends  on  his  brother  Gnaeus  to  Spain,  returns  him- 
self to  Italy  with  a  few  men,  and  takes  over  the  legions  of  the  praetors  and 
awaits  Hannibal  on  the  Po — Hannibal  crosses  the  Alps  and  descends  into 
the  basin  of  the  Po,  takes  Turin  and  defeats  Scipio's  cavalry  on  the  Ticinus — 
Scipio  (wounded)  retires  to  the  Trebia  near  Placentia,  south  of  the  Po — He 
is  joined  by  the  other  consul  Sempronius  Longus  from  Ariminum — Defeat  of 
Sempronius  on  the  Trebia — the  Romans  go  into  winter  quarters  at  Placentia 
and  Cremona — Meanwhile  Gnaeus  Scipio  defeats  and  captures  Hanno  in 
Spain,  and  secures  the  country  north  of  the  Ebro  (summer  of  218). 

The    first    Punic    war    arose  from    a    dispute    in   Sicily,   its    result  The  origin 
had  been  the  acquisition  of  the  greater  part  of  Sicily,  the  adjacent  ^"^  residt 
islands,   and    all    Sardinia    and  Corsica.       The    second    Punic   war  '^     ^, 
arose  from  a  dispute  in  Spain,  and  its  result   was    to    hand    over  punicwar, 
to  Rome  the  rest  of  Sicily  and  a  great  part  of  Spain.     The  immediate 
pretext  for  it  was  the  capture  of  a  town  in  alliance  with  Rome,  but  it 
had  been  rendered  inevitable  by  a  chain  of  events  which  more  and 
more  brought  the  interests  of  the  two  peoples  into  collision. 

And  as  the  causes  of  the  war  are  to  be  sought  in  events  prior  to 

u 


290 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


The 
remoter 
con- 
sequences of 
the  war. 


Their 
importance. 


The 

extension  of 
the  Cartha- 
ginian 
power  in 
Spain. 


Hamilcar 
Barcas  in 
Spain, 

2j8-22g. 

His 

hostility  to 
Rome. 


the  actual  pretext  for  it,  so  its  effects  were  extended  beyond  the 
immediate  results.  Hannibal's  plan  for  the  humiliation  of  Rome  was 
to  use  against  her  the  hostility  of  the  Gauls  in  Italy,  and  the  discontent 
which  he  believed  to  exist  among  the  Italian  allies.  But  he  also 
schemed  to  bring  an  enemy  upon  her  from  the  East,  and  was  soon  in 
communication  with  the  court  of  Macedonia.  The  conquest  of 
Illyricum  had  made  the  Roman  arms  a  source  of  alarm  to  Macedonia; 
and  the  expulsion  of  Demetrius  of  Pharos  (218)  had  placed  in  the 
court  of  the  young  king  Philip  V  a  crafty  and  unscrupulous  adviser, 
inspired  with  deadly  hatred  to  Rome,  Thus  Rome  was  brought  into 
conflict  with  Macedonia,  and  thence  obliged  to  interfere  in  Hellenic 
politics.  This  again  involved  her  in  a  quarrel  with  Antiochus,  which 
took  her  armies  and  her  ambassadors  into  Asia. 

The  war  therefore  is  the  best  known  and  most  famous  of  all  the 
Roman  wars,  and  deserves  to  be  so.  For  it  is  the  central  fact  of 
the  history  of  the  Roman  Republic,  from  which  radiate  those  gradual 
extensions  of  its  power  which  were  not  deliberately  sought,  but  were 
to  all  appearance  forced  upon  it  one  by  one, — each  step  forward 
being  the  inevitable  consequence  of  that  which  preceded  it. 

When  the  Carthaginians  had  at  length  quelled  the  terrible  mutiny 
of  their  mercenaries,  and  the  revolt  among  their  Libyan  subjects, 
they  looked  about  for  means  to  recoup  themselves  for  the  loss  of 
Sicily  and  Sardinia.  There  was  one  country,  in  which  they  already 
had  commercial  settlements,  that  might  be  made  more  profitable  than 
either.  Spain  could  be  reached  by  the  Straits  of  Gibraltar  without 
the  assistance  of  a  large  fleet  of  warships,  and  its  mineral  wealth 
offered  a  grand  field  of  enterprise.  However  much  or  little  truth 
there  may  be  in  accounts  by  Roman  writers  of  the  contests  between 
the  parties  of  Hanno  the  Great  and  the  family  of  Barcas,  it  is  clear 
that  the  services  of  Hamilcar  Barcas  in  Sicily  and  the  mercenary 
war  had  been  too  great  to  allow  of  his  enemies  ruining  or  thwarting 
him.  He  was  elected  general  of  the  armies  at  home  and  abroad, 
and  was  commissioned  or  allowed  to  secure  the  north  coast  of  Africa 
as  far  as  the  Pillars  of  Hercules,  and  to  cross  to  Spain  with  the 
object  of  extending  and  consolidating  the  Carthaginian  power  in  that 
country. 

But  whatever  may  have  been  the  view  of  the  people  of  Carthage, 
Hamilcar  himself  had  a  purpose  in  his  own  mind  beyond  the  mere 
acquisition  of  wealth  and  the  extension  of  empire.  He  had  regarded 
himself  as  unconquered  in  Sicily,  and  it  was  with  extreme  bitterness 
of  feeling  that  he  had  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  victory  of 
Lutatius  at  sea  had  made  a  peace  with  Rome  necessary  even  at  the 
price  of  the  evacuation  of  Sicily.  He  had  triumphantly  maintained 
himself  on  Hercte,  had  boldly  harassed  the  Italian  coasts,  and  had 


XXII  HAMILCAR  AND  HASDRUBAL  IN  SPAIN  291 

handed  over  his  troops  at  Lilybaeum  unstained  by  defeat  or  disaster. 
His  spirit  was  unbroken,  and  he  burned  to  be  revenged.  This  bitter- 
ness was  increased  to  intense  hatred  when  Rome  took  advantage 
of  the  weakness  of  Carthage  to  demand  the  cession  of  Sardinia. 
It  was  therefore  with  the  set  purpose  of  creating  a  power  in  Spain 
strong  enough  to  defy,  or  eventually  conquer  Rome,  that  he  set  sail 
for  Cadiz.  Long  afterwards  Hannibal  told  the  famous  story  of  the  Hannibal 
oath  exacted  from  him  by  his  father  on  this  occasion.  Hamilcar  was  ^'^^^^  ^^'^• 
engage"d  in  offering  sacrifice  to  the  supreme  god  of  Carthage  before 
embarking.  His  son  Hannibal,  then  nine  years  old,  was  standing 
by :  and  his  father  suddenly  drew  the  lad  aside  and  asked  him 
whether  he  would  like  to  accompany  him  to  Spain.  The  glad 
assent  was  given  with  boyish  enthusiasm  ;  whereupon  Hamilcar 
caused  him  to  lay  his  hand  upon  the  altar  and  swear  never  to  be 
friends  with  Rome.  With  this  purpose  ever  before  him  he  spent 
nine  years  (238-229)  of  ceaseless  exertion  and  almost  constant  com- 
bat in  Spain.  It  is  only  a  later  Roman  tradition  which  represents 
him  or  his  successors  as  aiming  at  the  establishment  of  a  Spanish 
kingdom  independent  of  Carthage,  or  of  acting  contrary  to  the 
feelings  of  the  majority  of  his  countrymen. 

We  know  hardly  any  details  of  his  achievements  in  Spain.  He  Hamilcar 
extended  the  Carthaginian  power  as  far  north  as  the  Saltus  campaign. 
Castulonensis  {^Sierra  Moreno),  and  appears  to  have  founded  Acte  ^^  P'^^^' 
Leuke,  near  the  modern  Alicante,  to  be  the  capital  of  Carthaginian 
Spain,  which  however  was  superseded  by  the  later  foundation  of  New 
Carthage  {Carthagend).  But  he  was  not  only  a  conqueror.  His 
army,  unlike  previous  Carthaginian  armies,  was  not  a  miscellaneous 
collection  of  soldiers  hired  from  Italy,  Gaul,  and  Greece  ;  but  con- 
sisted of  Libyans,  Numidians,  and  Spaniards  :  and  he  seems  to  have 
encouraged  the  two  former  to  amalgamate  with  the  natives,  to  marry 
their  daughters,  and  acquire  property  in  Spain.  He  himself  took 
pains  to  develop  the  natural  wealth  of  the  country,  and  to  intro- 
duce better  methods  of  mining  ;  while  by  attacking  the  strongholds 
in  the  interior  held  by  plundering  tribes  he  secured  the  safety  of  the 
more  peaceful  and  industrious  tribes  under  Carthaginian  protection. 
He  lost  his  life  in  one  of  these  expeditions,  and  by  an  act  of 
generous  self-sacrifice.  Finding  himself  outnumbered  and  over- 
powered he  secured  the  safe  escape  of  his  son  and  his  friends  by 
taking  the  enemy's  pursuit  upon  himself,  and  was  drowned  in  trying 
to  cross  a  river. 

His  son-in-law  and  successor  Hasdrubal  continued  his  work.  Hasdruba 
He  seems  indeed  to  have  been  more  inclined  than  Hamilcar  to  commandi 
depend  upon  the  arts  of  diplomacy  and  conciliation,  even  in  the  ^220-221' 
case  of  the  hated   Romans.      Yet   force  was  used  when   necessary. 


CHAP.  XXII  HANNIBAL  COMMANDS  IN  SPAIN  293 

and  his  young  brother-in-law  Hannibal,  now  his  second  in  command, 
was  generally  employed  for  that  purpose.  By  skill  or  arms  the 
Carthaginian  power  was  pushed  farther  north,  almost  up  to  the 
Ebro,  while  a  new  town  was  founded  in  a  better  position  than  Acte  Founding 
Leuke,  which  under  the  name  of  New  Carthage  ^  was  to  be  the  of  New 
capital  of  this  great  and  rich  dependency.  Its  foundation  excited  Carthage, 
some  prejudice  at  home ;  and  it  roused  the  jealousy  of  the  Romans, 
who  readily  listened  to  alarming  messages  from  the  allied  cities  of 
Emporiae  and  Saguntum,  warning  them  of  the  encroaching  policy 
of  Hasdrubal.  But  they  were  engaged  in  the  Illyrian  war,  and  were 
beginning  to  be  alarmed  at  movements  among  the  Boii.  They 
therefore  contented  themselves  with  exacting  a  treaty  or  under- 
taking from  Hasdrubal,  that  the  Carthaginian  armies  should  not  go 
north  of  the  Ebro.  Whether  Saguntum  was  mentioned  in  this 
arrangement  was  later  on  a  matter  of  dispute.  It  seems  almost 
certain  that  it  was  not.  The  Romans  rested  their  case  afterwards 
on  the  principle  that  a  town  in  alliance  with  Rome  could  not  be 
attacked  with  impunity,  whatever  might  be  the  status  of  the  surround- 
ing country.  For  the  present  Hasdrubal  was  left  without  farther 
interference,  and  during  his  eight  years  of  command  extended  the 
Carthaginian  influence  right  across  the  Peninsula,  and  fell  at  length 
by  the  hand  of  a  slave,  whose  master  had  been  put  to  death  by 
his  order. 

It  seems  probable,  in  spite  of  some  statements  to  the  contrary,  Hannibal 
that  Hannibal  had  been  in  Spain  continuously  since  his  arrival  with  ^^(^omes 
his  father  in  238.     At  the  death  of  Hasdrubal  he  was  in  his  twenty-  ^j^n^sTain'' 
seventh  year,  and  had  been  trained  in  all  the  accomplishments  of  221. 
a  camp  under  two  wise  and  able   commanders,  without  neglecting 
more    liberal    culture,    including    the    study   of    Greek.      Under    his 
brother-in-law  Hasdrubal  he  had   been   constantly  employed  when- 
ever the  use  of  armed  force  was  necessary,   and  had  proved  him- 
self to  possess  the  quahties  which  endear  a  commander  to  soldiers. 
He  shrank  from  no  fatigue  or  hardship  :  he  shared  the  labours  and 
privations  of  his  men  :  he  was  the  first  to  undertake  a  dangerous 
service  and  the  last  to  retreat  :  he  could  sleep  on  the  ground  with  no 
covering    but    his    cloak,    or    go   without    sleep   as  long    as    it   was 
necessary  :  he  was  an  excellent  horseman,  but  fought  and  marched 
on  foot  with  equal  cheerfulness,  whether  under  the  blazing  summer 
sun  or  through  the  frost  and  snow  of  winter.      As  a  commander  he 
was  as  careful  as  he  was  bold,  and  took  infinite  pains  to  acquaint 
himself  not  only  with  the  nature  of  a  country  into  which  he  was 

^  Hasdrubal  probably  called  it  simply  "Carthage,"  the  epithet  "New"  was 
added  by  others  to  distinguish  it  from  the  African  city.  "  Carthage  "  itself  means 
"  New  town."     Nova  Carthago,  therefore,  is  "  New  New-Town." 


294 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


going,  but  with  the  character  and  ability  of  the  commanders  he  was 
to  meet.  Whether  these  high  quaHties  were,  as  Livy  in  his  famous 
sketch  asserts,  counterbalanced  by  inhuman  crueUy  and  monstrous 
perfidy,  we  shall  have  occasion  to  see  hereafter.  Enough  that  he 
won  the  hearts  of  the  miscellaneous  army  which  he  led  in  Italy,  and 
in  all  his  triumphs  and  difficulties  never  lost  its  fidelity  or  affection. 

On  the  death  of  Hasdrubal  there  seems  to  have  been  a 
disposition  in  the  Senate  at  Carthage  to  regard  Hannibal's  youth 
as  unfitting  him  to  succeed  to  the  command,  or  perhaps  the  party 
of  Hanno  thought  it  a  good  opportunity  to  effect  his  recall.  But 
while  the  question  was  being  debated  at  Carthage,  the  army  in  Spain 
had  practically  settled  it :  and  when  news  came  that  the  soldiers 
had  elected  him,  the  people  insisted  on  confirming  the  action  of 
the  army. 

With  the  energy  and  genius,  as  well  as  the  youth  of  Napoleon, 
Hannibal  had  the  advantage  of  a  position  something  like  that  of 
a  Governor-General  in  India  before  the  days  of  rapid  steamers  and 
telegraphs.  He  was  of  course  subject  to  the  direction  of  the  home 
government,  but  those  directions  would  come  slowly,  and  often  too 
late  to  forbid  a  siege  or  prevent  a  campaign.  His  father  and 
brother-in-law  had  acted  with  a  free  hand,  satisfying  the  people  at 
home  by  sending  shiploads  of  booty,  and  by  pointing  to  the  exten- 
sion of  the  Carthaginian  power  as  the  justification  of  their  measures. 
Hannibal  was  not  likely  to  be  less  active  or  self-reliant.  He  in 
fact  immediately  set  about  fresh  enterprises.  The  summer  of  221 
was  spent  in  subduing  the  Olcades,  a  tribe  of  central  Spain  ;  and 
after  wintering  at  New  Carthage,  and  devoting  himself  to  the  training 
and  strengthening  his  army,  he  started  at  the  beginning  of  the  next 
season  for  the  territory  of  the  Vaccaei,  which  lay  farther  north  on 
the  upper  course  of  the  Ebro  and  the  Douro.  The  capture  of  their 
principal  town  Arbucala  cost  him  a  long  and  wearisome  siege  ;  and 
he  was  afterwards  obliged  by  an  attack  of  another  tribe,  the  Carpesii, 
to  retreat  south  of  the  line  of  the  Tagus.  Here,  however,  he  inflicted 
a  severe  defeat  upon  the  barbarians  as  they  tried  to  cross  the  river 
to  attack  him,  and  continued  his  return  march  to  New  Carthage  in 
safety. 

Meanwhile  the  Saguntines,  believing  that  their  turn  would  come 
next,  had  been  sending  messages  to  Rome  asking  for  help.  Though 
the  Romans  had  no  army  in  Spain,  and  no  real  footing  there  at  all, 
except  perhaps  at  the  port  of  Tarraco,  they  had  for  some  time  past 
been  in  alliance  with  Saguntum,  and  at  the  invitation  of  a  party 
among  its  citizens  had  acted  as  arbitrators  in  some  civil  disputes 
within  its  walls  ;  and  had  apparently  caused  the  execution  of  some 
of  the  leaders  of  the  anti-Roman  party.      This  was  enough  to  give 


XXII  HANNIBAL  AND  THE  ROMAN  ENVOYS  295 

Hannibal  the  pretext  he  desired.  He  had  hitherto  abstained  from 
interfering  in  Saguntum,  following  his  father's  policy  of  avoiding 
collision  with  Rome  until  he  was  strong  enough  to  brave  her.  But 
now  he  was  goaded  into  taking  active  measures. 

When  he  returned  into  winter  quarters  at  New  Carthage  towards  Roman 
the  end  of  220  he  was  met  by  some  Roman  commissioners,  sent  at  embassy  tc 
last  in  answer  to  appeals  from  Saguntum,  to  see  for  themselves  the  ^^^^^^^^^ 
state  of  affairs.  There  they  had  doubtless  listened  to  the  party  most  ^^^ 
opposed  to  the  Carthaginians,  and  had  come  on  charged  with  a  mes- 
sage from  the  Senate  couched  in  the  most  peremptory  terms.  "  He 
was  to  leave  Saguntum  alone,  and  not  to  venture  to  cross  the  Ebro." 
We  may  imagine  the  feelings  with  which  the  still  youthful  general, 
flushed  with  success,  and  with  the  memory  of  the  humiliations  of  his 
country,  and  his  father's  passion  for  revenge  burning  in  his  heart, 
saw  the  ambassadors  of  the  hated  enemy  in  his  camp,  and  listened 
to  their  imperious  words.  He  answered  them  with  a  fierce  outburst 
of  indignation.  He  charged  the  Romans  with  treacherously  using 
their  position  as  arbitrators  at  Saguntum  to  put  citizens  opposed  to 
them  to  death,  and  declared  that  the  Carthaginians  would  not  suffer 
such  oppression  in  a  Spanish  town.  Without  farther  answer  the 
Roman  legates  were  dismissed,  and  Hannibal  determined  at  once 
to  strike  at  Saguntum.  He,  however,  strengthened  himself  by  first 
obtaining  authority  from  home,  where  he  represented  that  the  Sagun- 
tines  were  oppressing  certain  tribes  under  the  protection  of  Carthage, 
and  that  the  Romans  were  intriguing  in  Saguntum  with  the  design  of 
ejecting  the  Carthaginians  from  Spain. 

The  Roman  commissioners  left  Hannibal  fully  convinced  that  war  Dilatori- 
was  inevitable,  and  sailed  to  Carthage  to  enter  a  protest.    But  though  ^^^^  of  thi 
this  was  known  to  the  Senate,  there  was  no  idea  in  the  minds  of  the     °^'^"' 
Roman  people  or  government  that  the  war  would  be  in  Italy.      They  ^^ent. 
assumed  that  it  would  be  in  Spain,  as  the  former  had  been  in  Sicily, 
until  they  should  be  able  to  transfer  it  to  Africa.     There  was,  there- 
fore, no  need  for  haste  ;  they  could  take  their  own  time,  and  mean- 
while would  secure  themselves  against  danger  arising  from  the  east 
while  their  attention  was  fixed  on  Spain.      And  such  a  danger  was  Second 
menacing  them  from  Illyricum.     Demetrius  of  Pharos,  who  had  some  IHyrian 
years  before  been  put  in  charge  of  the  country  as  guardian  of  the  young  "^j^^  ^f'^.  ' 
king,  had  acted  as  an  independent  sovereign  ;  and,  relying  on  the  of  Pharos 
difficulties  of  Rome  with  the  Gauls  and  Carthage,  had  broken  his  2/9. 
compact   by  sailing   with    warships   beyond    Lissus,    had    plundered 
the   coast   and   islands   of    Greece,    and   attacked   cities   which   had 
accepted  the  protection   of  Rome.     He  was  also  forming  intimate 
relations    with    the    king    of  Macedonia ;    and    though    as    yet    the 
Romans   had  had  no  reason   to  expect  Macedonian  hostility,   they 


296  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap. 

were  aware  that  Hannibal  hoped  to  secure  help  from  Philip  ;  nor 
could  the  position  of  the  Macedonian  king  towards  Greece  have  been 
unknown,  for  the  Romans  had  recently  formed  diplomatic  relations 
with  the  Aetolian  and  Achaean  Leagues.  That  they  should  have 
devoted  their  energies  to  the  comparatively  insignificant  war  with 
Demetrius,  rather  than  to  the  relief  of  Saguntum,  and  the  precau- 
tions necessary  to  check  Hannibal,  no  doubt  contributed  to  shake 
Roman  credit  in  Spain,  and  to  facilitate  Hannibal's  march.  The 
II  very  success  of  Aemilius  Paulus  in  capturing  Pharos,   and  driving 

luence  of  Demetrius  from  his  Illyrian  dominions,  helped  to  bring  on  the  hos- 
metrlus  tility  of  king  Philip,  of  which  they  were  afraid.  For  Demetrius  took 
^  ^^'  refuge  at  the  Macedonian  court,  and  there  exercised  a  sinister 
influence,  both  on  Philip's  conduct  to  Greece,  and  on  his  policy 
towards  Rome.  Still  the  time  was  not  wholly  wasted,  and  the  terror 
of  the  Roman  fleets  prevented  Philip  from  sending  ships  across  the 
Adriatic  to  the  coasts  of  Italy. 

Meanwhile  Hannibal  had  struck  the  blow  which  the  Roman 
embassy  of  220  had  been  designed  to  avert.  He  started  from  New 
Carthage  in  the  spring  of  2 1 9,  and  marched  straight  upon  Saguntum. 
The  capture  of  that  city  was  necessary  for  his  safety  in  the  design 
which  he  had  already  formed  of  anticipating  a  Roman  attack  by 
transferring  the  war  to  Italy  :  while  it  was  important  to  leave  no 
enemy  in  his  rear.  The  town  held  out  for  more  than  seven  months 
in  spite  of  a  siege  pressed  on  with  frantic  energy,  in  which  Hannibal 
displayed  the  highest  qualities  of  a  commander.  His  spirit  and 
cheerfulness  inspired  a  corresponding  enthusiasm  in  his  army  ;  and 
his  men  were  ashamed  to  show  slackness  or  timidity  when  they  saw 
their  general  working  like  a  common  soldier,  or  exposing  his  life  with 
unflinching  courage  to  the  weapons  of  the  enemy.  Still  expecting 
the  help  from  Rome  which  never  came  the  Saguntines  endured  the 
extremities  of  famine  ;  and  when  they  saw  that  their  city  must  fall, 
the  men,  after  burning  all  the  property  which  could  be  collected, 
perished  in  a  last  desperate  sally  or  by  their  own  hands  ;  while  the 
women  killed  their  children  and  threw  themselves  from  the  walls. 
Hannibal  obtained  a  booty  from  the  city  rich  enough  to  serve  his 
purposes.  The  money  supplied  him  with  means  for  the  projected 
Italian  expedition  ;  the  portable  property  was  shipped  to  Carthage, 
and  helped  to  silence  his  opponents  there  ;  the  captives  were  distri- 
buted among  his  soldiery,  and  their  services,  or  their  price,  enriched 
and  gratified  the  army.  He  then  retired  to  New  Carthage  for  the 
winter. 

The  news  of  the  fall  of  Saguntum  produced  a  great  sensation  at 
Rome.  With  the  indignation  of  the  citizens  there  must  have  been 
mixed  a  feeling  of  shame  at  their  own  supineness.     While  they  had 


XXII  DECLARATION  OF  WAR  297 

been  sending  missions  and  remonstrances,  Hannibal  had  acted,  and  Effect  of 
had  inflicted  a  severe  blow  on  Roman  prestige.      How  could  they  the  fall  of 
hope  to  gain  partisans  among  the  tribes  in  Spain  if  this  was  to  be  ^•^'^^^^ 
the  fate  of  their  friends  ?     And  if  an  allied  city  could  thus  be  besieged 
for  months  without  interference  from  Rome,  why  should  Hannibal 
hesitate  to   throw  aside   the   agreement   of  Hasdrubal,   and   march 
across  the  Ebro  ? 

There  could  be  no  doubt,  however,  as  to  what  was  to  be  done  Surrender 
now.      Legates,  with  Q.  Fabius  Maximus  at  their  head,  were  sent  to  of  Hanni- 
Carthage  to  demand  the  surrender  of  Hannibal,  the  members  of  the  ^^^^^^^ 
Senate,  and  other  chief  officers  with  him  ;  and,  in  case  of  refusal, 
to  declare  war.      The  Carthaginian  Senate  answered  the  demand  by 
elaborate  arguments,  proving  from  various  treaties  between  the  two 
peoples  that  the  Romans  were  the  aggressors.      They  rejected  the 
alleged  agreement  of  Hasdrubal  as  having  never  been  ratified  by  the 
people;  and  as  to  the  treaty  of  241,  in  which  it  had  been  agreed 
that  neither  should  attack  the  allies  of  the  other,  they  argued  that  it 
covered  only  the  case  of  allies  existing  at  the  time,  and  that  therefore 
the  Saguntines  were  not  protected  by  it.      But  it  was  in  vain  that  Declar- 
they  demonstrated  the  justice  of  their  position,  and  read  the  text  of  "■^^'^^  ^f 
treaties.      The  Romans  replied  that  such  arguments  might  have  had  ^jp^^J^ 
some  value  while  Saguntum  was  intact :  they  were  too  late  now  that  winter  of 
it  had  been  taken  and  plundered.      The  two  alternatives  were  again  2/9. 
stated,  and  a  reply  demanded.      The   Carthaginians  renewed  their 
arguments  at  even  greater  length.      The  Romans  listened  for  a  time 
without  speaking ;  at  length  Fabius  stood  up,  and,  pointing  to  the 
folds  of  his  toga,  said  that  in  them  he  carried  peace  and  war :  he 
would  produce  whichever  they  bade  him.      The  sufifete  replied  that 
he  might  produce  whichever  he  chose.      "  Then,"  said  he,  shaking 
out  the  folds,  "  I  give  you  war."     The  majority  of  the  Carthaginian 
Senate  cried  out  with  enthusiasm  that  they  accepted  it. 

There  was  no  doubt  on  either  side.      But  while  Hannibal  had  a  Hannibal's 

plan  of  amazing  boldness  which  he  had  spent  the  winter  in  maturing,  -^^^"^  '"^^' 

the  Romans  seem  to  have  had  at  first  little  or  no  idea  of  what  was 

to  come.     They  expected  to  meet  him  in  North  Spain,  and  to  be 

able,  at  the  same  time,  to  distract  his  attention  by  invading  Africa. 

The  envoys,  on  leaving  Carthage,  had  gone  to  test  the  feelings  of 

the  Spanish  tribes.      But  the  fall  of  Saguntum  was  naturally  pointed 

to  as   indicating  what   the   friends  of  Rome   had  to  expect,  and  a 

demand  that  they  should  refuse  Hannibal  a  passage  through  their 

country  was  received  with  disdain.      Still  no  suspicion  of  the  truth  Leisurely 

seems  to  have  occurred  to  the  Roman  grovernment.      The  usual  pre-  P'^fP^^' 

,         .     ,         _,  °  1        T^      ^  1-  ^    at  ions  at 

parations   were   not   hurried.      The    two  consuls,   P.    Cornelius   and  ^^,„^ 

Tiberius  Sempronius,  entered  upon  their  office  on  the  ides  of  March,  in  218. 


298 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAI 


Coss.  P. 
Cornelius 
Scipio,  Ti. 
Sempron- 
ius  Longus, 
218. 


The  Boil 

attack 

Placentia 

and 

Cremona. 


Hannibal' s 
prepar- 
ations, 
2ig-2i8. 


The  day 
for  the 
march  is 
arranged. 


and  enrolled  the  regular  consular  armies  of  two  legions  each 
Cornelius  was  ordered  to  proceed  to  Spain,  Sempronius  to  Afric 
with  a  fleet.  But  farther  delay  was  caused  by  alarming  news  fror 
the  basin  of  the  Po.  Three  commissioners,  one  of  whom  was  Gain 
Lutatius,  the  consul  of  220,  had  been  sent  to  allot  land  among  th 
settlers  in  the  new  colonies  of  Placentia  and  Cremona,  while  th 
praetor,  Gaius  Manlius,  was  stationed  with  troops  in  the  distric 
to  protect  them.  Encouraged,  doubtless,  by  their  knowledge  c 
Hannibal's  intended  invasion,  the  Boii,  disregarding  the  safety  c 
the  hostages  held  by  the  Romans,  suddenly  attacked  the  colonist; 
Unprepared  as  yet  to  resist  they  fled  to  Mutina,  which  was  occupie 
by  a  Roman  garrison.  1  Manlius  marched  to  the  relief  of  Mutiny 
but  fell  into  an  ambuscade,  and  lost  a  considerable  number  of  mer 
The  survivors  took  refuge  in  Tannetum,  eight  miles  from  Parma,  an 
were  there  besieged  by  the  Boii.  On  this  being  known  at  Rome  on 
of  the  legions  enrolled  by  Cornelius  was  despatched  to  Tann( 
tum,  under  one  of  the  new  praetors,  Gaius  Atilius.  Consequently 
Cornelius  had  to  enrol  a  new  legion,  and  his  departure  for  Spain  wa 
considerably  delayed  ;  it  must  have  been  past  midsummer  when  2 
length  he  embarked  his  troops  at  Pisae  and  sailed  for  Spain. 

Meanwhile  Hannibal  had  also  met  with  so  much  to  delay  hi 
expedition  that  a  few  days  earlier  Scipio,  who  touched  at  Marseille; 
would  have  frustrated  his  design  of  marching  to  the  Alps  withoi 
fighting  a  Roman  army,  and  beginning  the  campaign  in  the  midst  c 
friendly  tribes. 

At  the  end  of  the  previous  year  Hannibal  had  sent  his  Spanis 
troops  to  winter  in  their  several  cities,  with  orders  to  muster  in  th 
spring  at  New  Carthage.  During  the  winter  he  made  elaborat 
preparations  to  secure  the  safety  of  Carthage  as  well  as  Spain,  fo 
both  of  which  he  was  responsible.  With  a  view  of  securing  th 
fidelity  of  the  Spaniards,  he  made  an  interchange  between  the  tw 
armies,  sending  some  of  his  Spanish  troops  to  Carthage,  and  bringin 
some  of  the  Libyan  army  over  to  Spain. 

After  diligent  inquiries  as  to  the  route  into  Italy,  and  the  natur 
of  the  country  into  which  he  would  descend  from  the  Alps,  message 
were  sent  to  the  Gallic  tribes  on  both  sides  of  the  mountains  urgin; 
them  to  join  him  against  the  common  enemy.  Receiving  favourabl 
replies  from  the  Gauls,  and  assured  by  the  reception  of  the  Roma: 
embassy  at  Carthage  that  he  would  be  supported  at  home,  he  a 
length  communicated  his  design  to  his  officers.  It  was  received  wit 
approval,  although  the  difficulties  and  dangers  were  pointed  out  t 
him ;  but  when  he  took  the  army  into  his   confidence,  he  was  me 

^  Polybius   (iii.   40)  speaks  of  Mutina  as  a  Roman  colony  (d7rot/c/a),   but  : 
appears  to  have  been  made  a  colony  first  in  183  (Livy  xxxix.  55). 


XXII  HANNIBAL  STARTS  FOR  ITALY  299 

with  a  display  of  such  enthusiastic  devotion  that  he  at  once  named 
the  day  for  the  march. 

It  is  at  this  time,  we  are  told,  that  falling  asleep,  with  his  thoughts  Hannibal's 
full  of  his  great  adventure,  he  saw  a  youth  of  divine  aspect  who  told  ^f^^^"- 
him  that  he  was  sent  from  God  to  guide  him  into  Italy.  "  There- 
fore," said  he,  "  follow  me  and  turn  not  thine  eyes  aside."  Filled 
with  awe  he  followed  the  spectral  guide  for  a  time  without  looking 
round  ;  but  at  length,  compelled  by  irresistible  curiosity,  he  looked 
behind  and  saw  an  immense  dragon  following  him,  and  heard  the 
crash  of  the  woods  through  which  it  past,  and  rumblings  of  thunder 
in  the  heaven  above,  and  a  voice  proclaiming  the  "  devastation  of 
Italy,"  and  bidding  him  go  forward  nor  seek  to  pry  into  the  secrets 
of  fate. 

On  the  appointed  day,  leaving  his  brother  Hasdrubal  with  a  con-  Hannibal 
siderable  force  of  men  and  ships  in  command  of  southern  Spain,  ^^^^^^  ^^ 
Hannibal  started  from  New  Carthage  with  an  army  of  90,000  foot,  J 218^^ 
12,000  cavalry,  37  elephants,  and  a  long  train  of  ammunition  and 
provisions.  It  was  not  a  mere  march  to  the  Alps  that  was  thus 
begun.  The  district  north  of  the  Ebro  had  to  be  subdued,  and  when 
this  was  done  with  considerable  losses,  he  had  to  detach  10,000 
foot  and  4000  horse  under  the  command  of  Hanno,  to  protect  his 
heavy  baggage  which  he  left  behind  in  Spain,  and  to  hold  the 
country.  Much  precious  time  was  thus  lost,  and  the  summer  was 
wearing  away  when  he  at  length  crossed  the  Pyrenees  by  the  line  of 
the  modern  road  from  Rosas  to  Perpignan,  and  found  himself  in 
Gaul.  Though  his  army  was  now  much  diminished  in  numbers,  it 
was  in  a  high  state  of  training,  enthusiastically  confident  in  its  general, 
and  ready  to  "  go  anywhere  and  do  anything."  After  marching 
along  the  western  coast  of  the  Gulf  of  Lyons  he  turned  to  the  north- 
east and  struck  the  Rhone  somewhere  near  the  modern  town  of 
Orange,  about  seventy  miles  from  the  mouth,  and  immediately  began 
making  preparations  for  crossing  it. 

In   spite   of  all   delays  he  had   outmarched  Scipio.     When  the  Scipio  too 
latter  arrived  at  the  mouth  of  the  Rhone  he  ascertained  that  Hannibal  ^^^^  ^o  ^^^p 
was  crossing  the  Pyrenees,  and  therefore  disembarked  his  troops,  for     ^"^' 
he   felt   sure   that  the  march  through  the  intervening  tribes  would 
occupy  a  long  time,  and  give  him  opportunities   of  offering  battle. 
Suddenly  he  learnt  that  Hannibal  had  passed  him  and  had  reached 
the   Rhone.     Hardly   crediting  the   intelligence,   he  sent   out   some 
cavalry  with  Gallic  guides  to  reconnoitre.     They  rode   up  the   left 
bank  of  the  river  to  within  a  few  miles  of  the  Carthaginian  camp. 
There  they  fell  in  with  a  party  of  Gallic  and  Numidian  horse  sent 
out  by  Hannibal  for  a  similar  purpose.      They  drove  these  men  in 
with  considerable  slaughter,  rode  on  near  enough  to  the  Carthaginian 


300 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Scipio  s 
change  of 
plan, 
218. 


Hannibal' s 
march. 


Passage  of 
ike  Rhone. 


Camp  to  see  and  examine  it,  and  then  returned  at  full  speed  to  Scipio 
with  the  news,  Scipio  immediately  started  in  pursuit ;  but  it  was  too 
late.  When  he  arrived  at  the  passage  of  the  Rhone,  Hannibal  had 
been  gone  three  days,  and  the  direction  of  his  march,  as  well 
perhaps  as  information  obtained  from  natives,  must  have  shown 
Scipio  at  last  that  he  intended  to  descend  into  Italy  by  one  of  these 
passes  through  which  the  Gallic  hordes  had  so  often  come  before. 

Scipio  was  obliged  to  decide  promptly  what  to  do  in  these  altered 
circumstances,  and  the  plan  which  he  adopted  showed  both  spirit  and 
military  ability.  The  expedition  to  Spain  must  not  be  given  up,  but 
his  own  presence  in  Italy  was  necessary.  Marching  back  to  his  ships, 
therefore,  he  sent  his  brother  Gnaeus  with  most  of  them  and  the  bulk 
of  his  army  to  Spain,  while  he  himself,  with  a  small  part  of  his  forces, 
sailed  back  to  Pisae.  Thence  having  made  his  way  to  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  Placentia,  he  took  over  the  legions  of  the  praetors,  and 
crossed  the  Po  to  receive  Hannibal  on  his  descent,  still  with  imperfect 
information,  it  appears,  as  to  the  valley  by  which  he  would  come. 

From  the  Pyrenees  to  the  Rhone  Hannibal  had  not  met  with 
much  opposition  from  the  native  tribes.  Some  few,  indeed,  he  had 
been  obliged  to  terrify  or  force  into  allowing  him  to  pass,  but  many 
others  he  had  been  able  to  conciliate  by  bribes.  When  he  arrived, 
however,  at  the  point  of  the  river  at  which  his  guides  told  him  he 
could  cross,  he  saw  a  large  number  of  barbarians  collected  on  the 
other  side  prepared  to  hinder  his  passage.  He  was  in  considerable 
danger.  He  did  not  know  as  yet  how  far  off  Scipio  was,  and  if  he 
stayed  there  he  might  be  obliged  to  offer  him  battle  at  a  disadvan- 
tage ;  while  to  cross  the  river  in  the  small  boats  which  he  had  been 
able  to  purchase  from  the  friendly  tribes,  or  to  construct  others  with 
the  timber  they  had  allowed  him  to  cut,  in  the  face  of  a  numerous 
enemy,  seemed  extremely  venturesome.  He  halted  for  two  days 
uncertain  what  to  do.  On  the  third  night,  however,  he  sent  a 
detachment  under  Hanno,  son  of  Bomilcar,  with  some  native  guides 
about  ten  miles  higher  up  stream.  There  the  river  is  divided  by  an 
eyot,  and  the  men  found  sufficient  wood  to  enable  them  to  construct 
rough  rafts,  on  which  they  contrived  to  cross.  No  one  appeared  to 
stop  them,  and  seizing  on  a  position  which  seemed  secure  they  rested 
for  the  remainder  of  the  day,  and  at  nightfall  began  their  march  down- 
stream. 

Hannibal,  calculating  the  time  at  which  they  would  arrive,  had 
pushed  on  his  preparations  for  crossing  on  the  second  morning.  The 
larger  craft,  which  he  had  hired  or  purchased,  were  filled  with  the 
cavalry,  the  horses  being  forced  to  swim  at  the  sterns,  and  were 
ordered  to  cross  somewhat  higher  up,  that  they  might  in  some  degree 
break   the  force   of  the   current  for  the   small  canoes  used  by  the 


XXII  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  ALPS  301 

infantry.  The  barbarians,  seeing  these  preparations,  left  their  camp 
and  drew  up  along  the  bank  to  prevent  their  landing.  But  a  column 
of  smoke  rising  on  their  rear  showed  Hannibal  that  the  detachment  - 
sent  out  forty-eight  hours  previously  had  arrived.  He  at  once  gave 
the  signal,  and,  amidst  the  cheers  of  their  comrades,  the  first  flotilla 
pushed  out  into  the  stream.  The  cheers  were  answered  by  defiant 
yells  from  the  Gauls  ;  but  while  their  enemies  were  still  in  mid-stream 
the  barbarians  were  alarmed  by  flames  rising  from  their  camp. 
Many  of  them  rushed  back  to  save  their  tents,  while  those  who 
remained  offered  an  ineffectual  resistance  to  the  troops  of  Hannibal 
now  forming  on  the  bank.  The  whole  army  got  safely  across,  and 
the  detachment  of  Numidian  cavalry  was  despatched  on  the  recon- 
naissance which,  as  we  have  seen,  brought  them  into  collision  with 
the  cavalry  of  Scipio. 

On  the  left  bank  Hannibal  was  met  by  emissaries  of  the  Boii,  Legates 
who  urged  him  not  to  wait  to  fight  Scipio,  but  to  push  on  for  Italy,  -^^ff  *  ^ 
offering  to  be  his  guides  and  to  share  his  dangers.      Cheered  by  these 
assurances  he  encouraged  his  men  by  a  spirited  address,  and  having 
completed  the  transport  of  the  luggage,  despatched  his  infantry  next 
morning  on  their  journey,  while  he  himself  stayed  behind  with  the 
cavalry  to   superintend  the  passage  of  the  elephants.      This  was  a   The 
matter  of  considerable  difficulty,  for  the  animals  were  restive  at  the  elephants 
sight  of  water,  and  had  to  be  tempted  on  to  rafts  elaborately  con-  ^|'^^^  ^ 
cealed   by  a  covering   of  earth.     When  they  had  been  induced  to 
follow  a  female  elephant  on  to  these,  the  moorings  were  cut  and  they 
were  towed  over,  and  though  some  of  the  animals  became  frightened 
and  plunged  into  the  stream,  drowning  their  riders,  they  eventually 
all  reached  land. 

Four  days'  march  brought  the  army  to  the  junction  of  the  I  sere.   March 
The  country  in  the  fork  of  the  two  streams,  called  the  "  island,"  was  from  the 
inhabited  by  Allobroges,  among  whom  two  brothers  were  contending  P^^^^S^  ^f 
for  the  chieftainship.      The  elder  invited   Hannibal's  help  or  arbitra- 
tion, and  rewarded  it,  when  successfully  given,  by  liberal  supplies  for 
the  army, — an  army  that  had  now  been  more  than  four  months  on 
the   march.      He   also   supported  and  guided  them  during  the  ten 
days'  march  through  the  territory  of  the  Allobroges  up  to  the  foot  of 
the  pass.     There  he  left  them,  and  Hannibal  had  henceforth  to  trust 
the  guides  who  had  accompanied  him  throughout,  or,  if  these  failed, 
to  such  as  he  could  obtain  on  the  spot. 

It  is  not  possible  now  to  name  with  absolute  confidence  the  pass   The  passage 
by  which  Hannibal  entered  Italy.      Up  to  the  junction  of  the  Isere  of  the  Alps. 
and  the  Rhone  all  is  clear  ;  after  that  our  two  chief  authorities  differ, 
or  seem  to  differ,  in  their  accounts.      On  the  whole,  the  balance  of 
probability  seems  in  favour  of  the  theory  that   Hannibal  crossed  the 


302 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP 


2t8. 


Conflicts 
with  the 
natives. 


Is^re  and  continued  to  ascend  the  Rhone  to  a  point  somewhat  above 
Vienne,  and  thence  commenced  the  ascent  with  the  Mont  du  Chat, 
following  a  track  which  would  lead  him  over  the  Little  St.  Bernard 
into  the  Val  d'  Aosta.i  Up  to  the  beginning  of  his  ascent  he  had 
experienced  little  or  no  hindrance  from  the  natives ;  but  as  soon  as 
he  was  fairly  in  the  mountain  district  he  found  hostile  natives  or 
either  side  or  above  him  on  the  zigzag  path.  He  avoided  coming 
into  conflict  with  them  as  long  as  he  could.  They  retired  to  theii 
mountain  villages  in  the  evening,  and  Hannibal  took  care  to  occup) 
the  strong  points  in  front  during  the  night.  His  long  train  o: 
sumpter  beasts,  however,  was  easily  thrown  into  disorder  witt 
disastrous  effects.  Wounded  or  frightened  horses  galloped  back  oi 
plunged  over  the  precipices,  throwing  the  whole  line  into  confusion 
and  causing  other  animals,  helpless  with  their  burdens,  to  fall  fron 
the  narrow  path  ;  and  when  at  length  Hannibal  found  it  necessarj 
to  turn  back  to  his  heavy-armed  infantry  on  the  rear  and  lead  then 
to  attack  the  enemy,  the  movement,  joined  with  the  hurry  and  nois( 
of  the  contest,  caused  still  greater  dislocation  and  more  numerous 
losses.  Thus  for  two  days  they  struggled  on  amidst  grievous  suffer 
ings.  They  were  somewhat  relieved,  however,  by  the  capture  of  j 
fortified  village,  in  which  a  supply  of  corn  and  cattle  was  founc 
sufficient  for  a  few  days,  and  the  capture  of  which  inspired  som( 
terror  in  the  enemy.  After  a  day's  rest  they  resumed  their  marcl 
under  the  guidance  of  some  natives  who  had  submitted  and  givei 
hostages.  But  other  tribes  were  dogging  their  path,  and  from  ridge: 
above  them  were  rolling  down  great  boulders,  which  killed  horse: 
and  other  beasts  of  burden  and  threw  the  line  into  confusion.  Whei 
night  came  Hannibal  and  his  heavy-armed  infantry  were  separatee 
from  the  baggage  train,  which  was  still  struggling  on  in  front  in  j 


1  This  seems  the  route  intended  by  Polybius.  Livy  seems  to  have  conceive( 
him  to  have  turned  back  from  the  Isere  and  to  have  followed  the  course  of  th 
Durance,  which  would  have  led  him  over  the  Col  de  t Argentiere  or  Man 
Gentvre.  Polybius,  some  fifty  years  after  Hannibal's  march,  went  over  the  pas 
himself,  and  his  authority  would  therefore  be  far  higher  than  that  of  Livy,  wh( 
does  not  seem  to  have  had  any  personal  knowledge  of  the  region.  But  unfortu 
nately  Polybius  has  not  described  the  pass  in  a  manner  to  make  its  recog^itioi 
certain.  This  is  not  very  wonderful,  if  we  reflect  what  a  crossing  of  the  Alp 
must  have  been  before  mountain  roads  were  made,  and  without  maps  or  com 
pass.  Other  passes  that  have  found  supporters  are  the  Mont  Cents  and  the  Co 
du  Clapier.  One  thing  seems  clear  to  me,  which  has  not  been,  I  think,  dwelt  o: 
before,  that  Hannibal  did  not  cross  by  the  pass  he  had  intended,  and  that  con 
sequently  he  had  to  trust  to  guides  who  were  strangers  rather  than  to  those  h 
had  brought  with  him.  The  presence  of  Scipio  near  Marseilles  was  unexpected 
and  caused  him  to  go  farther  north,  and  his  actual  route  seems  to  have  bee 
suggested  by  the  AUobroges.  The  difficulties  also  were  evidently  greater  than  h 
had  expected. 


XXII  THE  PASSAGE  OF  THE  ALPS  303 

miserable  plight,  and  had  to  bivouac  under  a  "white"  or  "bare"   The  head  oj 
rock.      Next  day,  the  ninth  of  the  ascent,  he  rejoined  his  cavalry  and  the  pass 
baggage  and  the  head  of  the  pass  was  gained,  ^f^*^  f    °" 

There  they  rested  two  days,  a  rest  which  at  that  late  season  ^^^ 
must  have  been  both  gloomy  and  painful.  Yet  to  those  who 
remember  the  first  glimpse  of  some  sunnier  valley  on  the  Italian 
side  of  the  Alps,  it  will  not  be  difficult  to  understand  how  cheering 
even  the  smallest  indication  of  the  land  of  promise  must  have  been  First  view 
after  so  much  toil  and  suffering;  and  Hannibal  seized  the  oppor-  of  Italy. 
tunity  offered  by  the  distant  view  of  some  valley  or  plain  to  encourage 
his  men  by  pointing  to  it  as  the  rich  land  of  Italy,  and  as  the  way  to 
Rome.  There  seems  to  be  some  difficulty  in  identifying  any  spot 
where  such  a  view  could  have  been  obtained.  At  best  it  must  have 
been  but  an  illusion.  The  descent  was  to  prove  in  some  ways  even 
more  trying  than  the  ascent,  though  free  from  the  aggravation  of 
hostile  attacks,  which  ceased  from  this  time  ;  but  six  more  days  of 
difficulty  and  peril  were  to  be  passed  before  the  poor  remains  of 
the  fine  army,  which  nearly  five  months  ago  had  marched  out  of 
New  Carthage,  were  to  find  themselves  on  the  plains. 

During  the  rest  at  the  head  of  the  pass  the  camp  was  rejoined 
by  some  stragglers,  as  well  as  by  horses  and  beasts  of  burden  which 
had  followed  the  tracks  of  the  army,  and  the  third  day  the  descent 
began. 

It  was  accomplished  in  seven  days,  almost  at  the  beginning  of  The 
which  the  army  was  brought  to  a  standstill  by  finding  the  narrower  descent, 
track  recently  destroyed  for  nearly  a  furlong  by  avalanches  or  land-  ^    f?    f^ 
slips.    After  trying  in  vain  to  avoid  the  difficulty  by  making  a  detour,  ^^^_  ^/S. 
which  was  rendered  impossible  by  a  fresh  fall   of  snow  upon   the 
glacier,  he  was  obliged  to  pitch  a  camp  and  engineer  a  new  road. 
The   entire  army  was    set  to  work   in  relays,  and   after  working  a 
whole  day  they  had  made  a  track  practicable  for  the  horses  and  beasts 
of  burden,  which  were  sent  across  and  let  loose  to  find  what  food 
they  could.     But  the  elephants  had  to  wait  three  more  days  in  a 
state  of  starvation.     All,  however,  were  at  last  got  over,  and  on  the 
third  day  afterwards  they  reached  the  foot  of  the  Alps. 

His  object  was  gained,  but  at  great  cost.  Of  the  90,000  infantry  HannibaVs 
and  12,000  cavalry  with  which  he  left  New  Carthage,  he  had  arrived  bosses. 
at  the  Rhone  with  only  38,000  infantry  and  8000  cavalry,  the  rest 
having  been  lost  in  the  contests  with  the  natives  of  North  Spain, 
fallen  out  from  fatigue  and  sickness,  or  left  with  Hanno  to  maintain 
his  hold  upon  the  country.  But  even  of  those  who  reached  the 
Rhone  little  more  than  half  were  now  encamped  in  Italy,  and  they 
too  in  a  miserable  state  from  exposure  and  fatigue.  Hannibal,  if  we 
follow  Polybius,  reached  the  plains  by  the  Val  d'  Aosta,  in  which  the 


304  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap,  xxii 

robber  tribe  of  Salassi  lived.      He  does  not  seem  to  have  experienced 
any  trouble  from  them,  however,  except  from  occasional  thefts,  and 
he  was  enabled  to  pitch  a  camp  and  rest  his  men. 
218.  This   rest,   however,   did   not   last   long.      It   was   necessary  for 

Hannibal  Hannibal  to  be  among  friendly  tribes,  and  to  strike  terror  into  such 
conquers  ^g  ^gj.g  unfriendly  ;  and  the  Ligurian  Taurini,  whose  territory  was 
y,^  .  .  near  his  camp,  were  disposed  to  be  suspicious  of  him,  chiefly  perhaps 
and  takes  because  they  were  on  ill  terms  with  the  Insubres,  who  were  known 
Turin.  to  be  his  friends.  Hannibal  first  tried  to  conciliate  them,  but,  when 
that  failed,  he  attacked  their  chief  city  ;  took  it  in  three  days  ;  and 
put  to  the  sword  those  who  would  not  submit. 
Scipios  This  rapid  success  did  a  great  deal  to  determine  the  Gallic  tribes 

movements.  ^^  j^j^^  Hannibal :  but  Scipio  was  now  too  near  to  allow  the  movement 
to  extend  very  far  south  with  safety.  For,  equally  to  the  surprise  of 
both,  Hannibal  and  Scipio  were  now  almost  within  reach  of  each 
other,  both  having  been  more  rapid  than  they  anticipated.  The 
march  of  Hannibal  from  the  Rhone  to  the  Italian  foot  of  the  Alps 
had  occupied  thirty-nine  days,  and  not  less  than  ten  can  be  allowed 
for  the  rest  absolutely  required  for  his  army  and  the  subsequent 
capture  of  Turin.  And  this  was  by  no  means  an  excessive  time  to 
allow  for  Scipio's  movements.  He  had  marched  three  days'  journey 
up  the  Rhone,  and  had  been  three  days  behind  Hannibal.  Therefore 
by  the  time  he  could  return  to  the  coast,  despatch  his  brother  to 
Spain,  and  take  shipping  with  his  small  detachment,  at  least  eight 
days  of  Hannibal's  march  were  accomplished.  Then  the  voyage  back 
to  Pisae  1  had  been  unfavourable,  and  must  therefore  have  taken  five 
or  six  days,  and  his  journey  across  the  Apennines  to  the  Po  valley, 
there  being  as  yet  no  good  military  roads,  as  many  more.  Then  he 
had  to  wait  to  be  joined  by  the  praetor's  army  from  Mutina.  So 
that  we  cannot  suppose  that  he  had  long  crossed  the  Po  when 
Hannibal  arrived  among  the  Taurini. 
Alarm,  in  Hannibal's  presence  on  Italian  soil  caused  great  alarm  at  Rome, 

Rome.  anj  a,  message  was  despatched  to  Sicily  to  recall  the  consul  Sem- 

Sempron-      p^Qj^j^g  from  his  meditated  expedition  to  Africa.      On  his  arrival  at 
f^Q^  Messina  he  had  found  the  war  already  in  progress.     King  Hiero's 

Sicily.  ships  had  captured  some  Carthaginian  vessels  sent   to  harass   the 

coasts  of  Italy,  and  the  praetor  M.  Aemilius,  while  engaged  in  strength- 
ening Lilybaeum,  had  inflicted  a  defeat  upon  another  Carthaginian 
fleet.  Sempronius  had  proceeded  to  capture  Malta,  and  thence 
went  to  the  Lipara  Islands  in  search  of  the  enemy,  who,  however, 
had  crossed  to  Italy  and  were  threatening  Hipponium.  As  he  was 
preparing  to  pursue  them  he  received  the  message  of  recall.      He 

^  According  to  Polybius  (iii.  56).     Livy  (xxi.  32)  says  he  landed  at  Genua,  a 
better  place  for  his  march  to  the  valley  of  the  Po. 


3o6 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


left  his  legate  Sex.  Pomponius  with  twenty-five  warships  to  protect 
Hipponium,  and  at  once  sent  his  army  by  sea  to  Ariminum,  and 
followed  himself  after  taking  some  measures  for  the  safety  of  Sicily.  ^ 

Meanwhile  Scipio  had  crossed  the  Po,  and  was  on  the  east  of  its 
tributary,  the  Ticinus,  He  heard  of  Hannibal  near  Vercellae,  and 
determining  to  meet  him,  passed  the  Ticinus  by  a  bridge  of  boats 
and  marched  up  the  left  bank  of  the  Po.  Hannibal,  prepared  to 
give  him  battle,  was  also  marching  to  meet  him.  On  the  second  day 
each  was  informed  by  his  scouts  of  the  proximity  of  the  other.  On 
the  third  both  continued  the  advance,  with  cavalry  and  light-armed 
infantry  in  front.  But  though  Scipio's  army  marched  slowly,  Hanni- 
bal's cavalry  advanced  at  a  brisk  pace,  and  the  two  bodies  of  horse 
came  into  collision  too  quickly  to  allow  the  Roman  light -armed 
infantry  time  to  pour  in  their  volleys  of  javelins.  They  retired 
through  the  intervals  of  their  cavalry,  and  left  the  fighting  to  the 
horsemen.  The  combat,  however,  was  not  an  even  one.  The 
Numidians  outnumbered  and  outflanked  the  Gallic  horse  employed 
by  the  Romans  ;  and  though  there  was  a  sharp  struggle,  some  of  the 
men  dismounting  and  fighting  on  foot,  the  cavalry  of  the  Romans 
finally  fled,  while  the  victorious  Numidians  crushed  the  light-armed 
infantry,  which  had  not  had  time  to  get  away.  The  consul  himself, 
though  wounded,  was  conveyed  safely  back  to  the  camp  by  a  body 
of  cavalry  which  still  remained  unbroken.  His  life  was  saved  by  the 
gallantry  of  his  son,  afterwards  the  famous  Scipio  Africanus,  who, 
then  eighteen  years  old,  was  serving  his  first  campaign.  Seeing  his 
father  wounded,  and  with  only  two  or  three  horsemen  near,  he 
cheered  on  his  men  to  the  rescue,  and  when  they  hesitated  led  the 
way  himself,  dashing  into  the  midst  of  the  enemy  and  throwing 
himself  in  front  of  his  father.  His  squadron  was  ashamed  not  to 
follow  him,  and  he  had  the  satisfaction  of  dispersing  the  enemy  and 
bringing  his  father  off.^ 

It  was  after  all  but  a  cavalry  skirmish,  but  it  convinced  Scipio 
that  he  was  in  a  wrong  position.  The  enemy  was  strong  in  cavalry, 
and  a  flat  open  country  was  in  his  favour.      His  own  wound  made  it 


^  This  is  Livy's  account  (xxi.  51).  Polybius  asserts  that  the  men  were  sent 
by  land  under  oath  to  muster  at  Ariminum  on  a  fixed  day,  that  they  took  forty 
days  on  the  journey,  and  that  Sempronius  and  some  of  his  troops  went  to  Rome 
first  and  thence  to  Ariminum  (iii.  61,  68).  This  seems  highly  improbable  in 
itself,  and  certainly  would  have  made  Sempronius  too  late  in  arriving  at  the  camp 
of  Scipio  to  take  part  in  the  campaign,  unless  the  message  of  recall  was  sent  a 
considerable  time  before  Hannibal's  actual  arrival. 

2  Coelius  (Livy  xxi.  46)  ascribes  Scipio's  rescue  to  a  Ligurian  slave.  But 
Polybius  was  told  the  story  in  the  text  by  Laelius,  who  must  have  known.  Still 
a  Ligurian  may  also  have  done  something  to  protect  the  wounded  man  before  his 
son  came  up. 


XXII  THE  GAULS  JOIN  HANNIBAL  307 

impossible  to  undertake   a  forward  movement  with   effect,  and  he  Scipio 
determined  to  retire  beyond  the  Po,  and  wait  to  be  joined  by  his  retires  to 
colleague  from  Ariminum.      He  recrossed  the  Ticinus  and  the   Po,  ^^^^^^Z" 
breaking  down  the  bridge  over  the  latter  behind  him,  and  encamped  ^fig  p^^ 
on  the  left  bank  of  the  Trebia  near  its  junction  with  the  Po,  satisfied  21S. 
that  with  the  protection  of  Placentia,  which  was  a  few  miles  on  the 
other  side  of  the  Trebia,  he  could  choose  his  own  time  for  fighting 
again.      Hannibal  followed  as  far  as  the  Po,  but  finding  the  bridge 
already  broken  he  gave  up  any  idea  of  crossing  there,  though  he 
took  prisoners  a  detachment  of  600  men  who  had  been  left  behind 
by  Scipio  to  destroy  the  bridge.     He  then  ascended  the  north  bank  Hannibal 
of  the  river  in  search  of  a  crossing.      His  success   in  the  cavalry  crosses  the 
engagement  on  the  Ticinus  had  brought  in  numerous  adhesions  from  ^^' 
Gallic  tribes  ;  and  when  after  two  days'  march  he  came  to  a  point 
on  the  river  at  which  it  could  conveniently  be  bridged,  he  left  the 
task  of  getting  the  army  across  to  his  subordinates,  and  employed 
himself  in  receiving  the  ambassadors  of  these  tribes,  and  accepting 
the  provisions  and  troops  which  they  brought. 

Continuing  his  advance  down  the  southern  bank  he  drew  out  his  Scipio  will 
army  in  sight  of  Scipio's  fortified  camp  and  offered  battle.      Scipio,  not  fight. 
however,  did  not  stir,  and,   after  waiting  for  a  time,   Hannibal  drew 
off  and  fortified  a  camp  about  six  miles  to  the  west  of  the  Roman 
position.      But  a  new  move  soon  became  necessary.     The  Gauls  in   Treachery 
the  Roman  army  were  in  their  hearts  favourable  to  Hannibal,  and  a  of  the 
considerable  body  of  them,  amounting   to   2000  infantry  and   200      ^"       . 
cavalry,    suddenly   rose  in    the   dead   of  night,    killed   the    Romans  ^^^  Romati 
quartered  next  them,  and  marched  off  to  Hannibal's  camp.      About  army. 
the  same  time  the  Boii,  who  had  attacked  the  colonists  of  Placentia 
and  Cremona,  bringing  the  three  Roman  commissioners  whom  they 
had  taken,  came  to  Hannibal.     He  received  them  warmly,  but  would 
not  keep  their  prisoners,  pointing  out  that  they  would  need   them 
to  exchange  against  their  hostages. 

The  treason  of  the  Gallic  troops  seemed  to  Scipio  to  forebode  a  Scipio 
general  rising  of  the  Gauls  in  the  neighbourhood,  and  he  concluded  moves 
that  it  was  not  safe  to  remain  on  the  flat  ground  opposite  Placentia.  ^^^^^.  ^^^ 
He  therefore  broke  up  his  camp  and  marched  up  the  Trebia  until 
he  came   to   the   high   ground  forming   the   commencement  of  the 
Apennines,  from  which  that  stream  flows  northward  into  the   Po. 
Hannibal,  on  hearing  of  this  movement,  sent  his  Numidian  horse  to 
harass  their  line  of  march.     But  finding  the  Roman  camp  deserted, 
the  Numidians  stopped  to  plunder  and  burn   it,  and  this  gave  the 
Romans  time  to  get  over  the  Trebia,  though  even  so  their  extreme 
rear  suffered  considerably  as  it  was  crossing.     The  main    Cartha- 
ginian army  followed    and   Hannibal  pitched  his  camp  about  five 


3o8 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


miles   from    the   new   quarters   occupied   by    Scipio,    though   not,   it 


Seinpronius 
skirmishes 
with 
Hannibal. 


Scipio  was  now  defending  the  Hne  of  the  Trebia.  On  his  left 
were  the  high  slopes  of  the  Apennines,  on  his  right  the  fortress  of 
Placentia.  He  was  in  a  good  position,  and  though,  when  news 
reached  Rome  of  the  defeat  of  the  cavalry  on  the  Ticinus,  there  was 
a  strong  feeling  of  uneasiness,  yet  the  people  were  comforted  by  the 
belief  that  the  infantry  was  still  intact  and  safely  posted,  and  that 
the  junction  of  Sempronius  with  his  colleague  would  quickly  decide 
the  war. 

The  junction  was  effected  early  in  December,  apparently  without 
any  attempt  on  Hannibal's  part  to  prevent  it.  That  this  should 
have  been  so  seems  to  prove  conclusively  that  he  was  not  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Trebia  or  to  the  east  of  Scipio,  as  some  have  sup- 
posed. Perhaps  he  was  engaged  at  Clastidium,  for  just  about  this 
time  this  town  (the  modern  Casteggid)  fell  into  his  hands  by  the 
treason  of  its  commander  Dasius,  a  native  of  Brundisium,  It  was  a 
serious  loss  to  the  Romans,  for  it  contained  a  large  store  of  provi- 
sions, and  reduced  them  to  the  necessity  of  depending  for  supplies 
on  what  could  be  brought  up  the  Po  :  it  was  a  great  gain  to  Hanni- 
bal, not  only  as  providing  him  with  stores,  but  as  impressing  the 
Gauls  with  his  superiority,  and  as  commanding  the  westward  road. 

He  was  anxious  to  follow  up  his  success  by  inducing  Scipio  to 
give  him  battle.  But  delay  was  to  the  interests  of  Scipio.  His 
wound  was  not  yet  healed,  and  he  could  not  therefore  hope  to  take 
part  in  a  battle.  Moreover,  though  the  Gauls  readily  supplied 
Hannibal  with  all  that  he  wanted  at  present,  it  was  quite  certain 
that  they  would  soon  grow  tired  of  doing  so.  They  had  joined  him 
from  hatred  of  Rome  and  the  hope  of  plunder  \  they  would  soon 
abandon  him  if,  in  the  place  of  plunder,  they  found  themselves  sub- 
ject to  continual  requisitions.  There  were  not  wanting  signs  of 
Gallic  treachery  already.  A  tribe  living  in  the  angle  of  the  Trebia 
and  the  Po,  while  professing  goodwill  to  the  Carthaginians,  was 
discovered  to  be  corresponding  with  Scipio.  Hannibal  inflicted 
condign  punishment  on  them  by  ravaging  their  lands,  but  there 
was  litde  doubt  that  failure  or  even  delay  would  be  the  signal  for 
similar  treason  elsewhere. 

Meanwhile  the  terrified  natives  came  to  the  Roman  camp  for 
help,  and  their  request  gave  Sempronius  the  opportunity  he  was 
desiring.  He  sent  out  his  cavalry  with  looo  light-armed  infantry, 
who  crossed  the  Trebia  and  drove  off  the  Numidians  and  Gauls  ;  but 
when  the  Romans  pursued  they  were  driven  back  by  the  outposts  of 
the  Carthaginians,  and  in  their  turn  chased  up  to  their  camp 
Sempronius  sallied  out  with  the  rest  of  his  cavalry  and  light-armed 


xxir  BATTLE  OF  THE  TREBIA  309 

infantry,  brought  in  his  men  in  safety,  and  scattered  the  enemy.  Sempronius 
Hannibal  then  came  out  in  person  and  restored  the  order  of  his  -wishes  to 
cavalry,  but  would  not  continue  the  fight  on  that  day.  The  skir-  -^^  *' 
mishing  had  on  the  whole  been  favourable  to  the  Romans,  and 
Sempronius  was  so  much  elated  that  he  resolved  to  hazard  a  general 
engagement.  Scipio  was  still  opposed  to  it.  Recent  events  had 
confirmed  his  opinion  that  they  had  everything  to  gain,  Hannibal 
everything  to  lose,  by  delay.  He  probably  also  felt  no  great  con- 
fidence in  his  colleague,  who,  on  the  other  hand,  was  eager  to  fight. 
Sempronius  would  soon  have  to  go  to  Rome  to  hold  the  election  of 
the  new  consuls.  If  the  battle  were  postponed  to  the  spring  he 
would  most  likely  be  superseded  before  it  took  place,  but  by  fighting 
now,  while  Scipio  was  still  disabled,  he  would  have  all  the  credit 
of  the  victory.  Besides,  he  believed  that  he  would  succeed,  and 
knew  that  his  countrymen  at  home  expected  him  to  do  something. 
He  had  not  come  all  the  way  from  Sicily  to  sit  idle  whilst  Hannibal 
was  plundering  the  allies  or  consolidating  his  power  among  the 
Gauls. 

Hannibal  had  therefore  little  difficulty  in  provoking  a  battle.  Hannibal 
For  this  he  prepared  by  forming  an  ambuscade  in  the  bed  of  a  P^o^okes  a 
stream,  between  the  two  camps,  thickly  covered  with  brambles,  in 
which  he  concealed  1000  infantry  and  a  like  number  of  cavalry 
during  the  night.  At  daybreak  he  despatched  his  Numidian  horse 
to  ride  up  to  the  Roman  lines  and  provoke  the  consul  to  attack 
them,  while  the  rest  of  his  army  were  early  afoot  with  orders  to  get 
breakfast  and  prepare  themselves  for  action. 

Sempronius  fell  into  the  trap.      He  sent  out  his  cavalry  to  drive   The  battle 
off  the  Numidian  horse;  and  despatching  6000  light-armed  infantry  of  the 
in  advance,  he  got  his  whole  army  in  motion  at  once,  without  waiting  J'''^^^^' 
for  his  men  to  get  their  breakfast.      It  was  a  bleak  miserable  day  ;  ^t^^^ '^'' 
there  had  been  many  hours  of  cold  rain  mixed  with   sleet,  and  the 
Trebia  was  so  swollen  that  the  men  had  to  wade  through  it  with  the 
water  breast-high.      They  arrived,  therefore,  on  the  ground  hungry, 
wet,  and  cold,  to  meet  men  who  not  only  had  had  a  good  meal,  but 
had  oiled  their  bodies  and  put  on  their  armour  over  their  camp  fires. 
Moreover,  they  had  to   fight  on   ground   chosen  by  Hannibal,  and, 
though  they  did  not  know  it,  with  a  strong  body  of  the  enemy  lying 
concealed  in  their  rear.      In  these  circumstances  the  result  could  not 
be  doubtful.     That  the  disaster  was   not  greater  was  due  to   the 
courage  and  discipline  of  the  Roman  soldiers  themselves. 

Finding   that   his   cavalry   could    not   deal    effectively   with    the   The  Roman 
Numidian  horsemen,  trained  to  scatter  and  rapidly  reform,  and  that  cavalry 
it  was  disorganised  by  the  Balearic  slingers  and  the  terror  of  the  ''^^■"^^^^• 
horses  at  the  sight   of  the  elephants,  Sempronius   recalled   it  to   its 


3IO 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


regular  place  on  the  wings  of  the  infantry,  which  consisted  of  four 
legions — 16,000  citizens  and  20,000  allies. 

The  battle  was  begun  by  the  6000  light-armed,  who  had  been 
sent  out  early  at  the  first  appearance  of  the  Numidian  horse.  They 
were,  however,  tired,  and  had  expended  most  of  their  missiles 
already.  Their  attack,  therefore,  was  not  effective,  and  they  soon 
retired  behind  the  heavy-armed  infantry.  The  next  move  was  made 
by  the  Carthaginian  cavalry,  which  easily  drove  back  that  of  the 
Romans,  thus  leaving  the  flanks  of  their  infantry  exposed,  which 
were  immediately  attacked  by  the  Numidian  horsemen  and  light- 
armed  troops,  who  passed  by  their  own  lines  to  do  it. 

In  spite  of  these  disadvantages  the  main  body  of  the  Roman 
heavy-armed  made  an  obstinate  resistance.  Even  when  they  found 
themselves  attacked  in  the  rear  by  the  2000  men  from  the  ambus- 
cade, when  their  wings  were  driven  in  by  the  elephants,  the  cavalry, 
and  the  light-armed  of  the  enemy,  the  Roman  centre,  still  keeping 
close  order,  cut  its  way  through  the  Gauls  and  Libyans  opposed  to 
it,  and  seeing  that  it  was  hopeless  to  return  to  the  camp,  marched 
straight  to  their  old  quarters  on  the  Trebia  opposite  Placentia,  and, 
being  now  no  longer  harassed  by  the  enemy,  quietly  passed  the 
stream  and  entered  that  fortified  town.  Many  of  the  infantry  on  the 
wings  were  cut  to  pieces  whilst  trying  to  recross  the  Trebia,  but  a 
considerable  number,  with  the  greater  part  of  the  cavalry,  succeeded 
in  crossing,  and  entered  Placentia  with  the  10,000  of  the  centre. 
They  owed  their  safety  in  a  great  degree  to  the  violence  of  the  rain, 
which  prevented  an  effective  pursuit,  and  gave  the  wounded  Scipio 
also  time  to  lead  out  the  men  left  in  the  camp  and  rejoin  his 
colleague  at  Placentia. 

Sempronius,  indeed,  sent  home  a  report  that  "  the  storm  had 
prevented  a  victory."  But  facts  were  too  strong  for  him.  It  soon 
became  known  at  Rome  that  the  camp  had  fallen  into  the  enemy's 
hands,  that  the  army  was  shut  up  in  Placentia  and  Cremona,  that 
all  their  provisions  had  to  be  brought  up  the  Po,  and  that  finally  all 
the  Gallic  tribes  had  joined  Hannibal.  It  had  been  a  real  disaster, 
and  the  way  into  Etruria  was  open  to  Hannibal. 

The  winter,  which  was  a  severe  one,  prevented  any  more  opera- 
tions of  importance.  Sempronius,  indeed,  with  a  small  escort  of 
cavalry,  made  his  way  with  considerable  difficulty  and  danger 
to  Rome  to  hold  the  consular  elections,  and  returned  to  his 
army's  winter  quarters  at  Placentia  ;  but  he  was  only  able  to  barely 
protect  himself  from  various  harassing  attacks  of  Hannibal,  who, 
finding  it  impossible,  owing  to  the  weather,  to  pass  over  the 
Apennines,  devoted  himself  to  annoying  the  Roman  quarters  and 
securing  his  hold  over  the  Gauls.      That  their  fidelity  was  little  to  be 


I 


XXII  GNAEUS  SCIPIO  IN  SPAIN  311 

trusted,  and  would  soon  yield  to  the  burden  of  supporting  an  army, 
was  quickly  made  manifest.  So  much  did  he  fear  treachery,  that 
during  the  months  which  followed  the  battle  of  Trebia  he  is  said  to 
have  constantly  disguised  himself  by  the  use  of  false  hair,  that  he 
might  not  be  recognised  by  would-be  assassins. 

Thus  ended  the  first  year's  campaign.      It  had  been  on  the  whole  Result  of 
unfavourable  to  the  Romans,  but  not  fatally  so.      They  had  lost  two  first  year 
battles,  but  not  of  the  first  importance  or  very  decidedly.      They  still  J^^''' 
held  Placentia,  Cremona,  and  ivlutina  in  the  Po  valley,  from  which 
Hannibal's    attacks,   in    one    of   which    he    was    wounded,  had  not 
succeeded  in  expelling  them.      For  Hannibal  the  greatest  advantage 
gained  was  the  adhesion  of  the   Gauls   and   the   opportunity  offered 
him  of  conciliating  the   Italians  by  discriminating   between    Italian 
and    Roman    prisoners.       The    latter    were     subjected    to    rigorous 
imprisonment   and   scant   fare,  the   former   were   indulgently  treated 
from  the  first,  and  finally  dismissed  without  ransom,  and  bidden  to 
tell  their  friends  at  home  that  Hannibal  had  come  to  restore  freedom 
to  the  Italians  and  recover  the  lands  which  Rome  had  taken  from 
them. 

The  Romans  might  still  hope  to  prevent  Hannibal's  march  south,  Moderate 
but  the  idea  of  fighting  in  the  Po  valley  was  abandoned.      The  pre-  pfepar- 
parations  at  Rome,  when  the  true  state  of  the  case  became  known,  ^^^^^^  ^^ 
though  not  on  a  scale  denoting  panic,  were  yet  made  somewhat  earlier  218-217. 
and  more  carefully  than  usual,  and   were   directed  to   the   object  of 
blocking  Hannibal's  road.      Garrisons  were  strengthened  at  various 
points  in  Etruria,  magazines  collected  at   Ariminum   and  Arretium, 
and  a  request  was  sent  to  king  Hiero  for  assistance,  who  immediately 
despatched  500  Cretan  archers  and    1000  light-armed  mercenaries. 
For  the  rest  the  usual  arrangements  were  made  for  defending  Sicily, 
Sardinia,  and  Tarentum  ;  and  the  consuls  only  levied  sufficient  men 
to  fill  up  the  legions  of  the  previous  year,  which  were  to  be  kept  on 
foot.     A  fleet  of  sixty  triremes,  however,  was  ordered  to  be  made 
ready  for  service. 

Meanwhile    Hannibal's    success    in    North    Italy   was    somewhat  Gnaeus 
counterbalanced  by  events  in  Spain.       Gnaeus  Scipio,   as  we  have   Cornelius 
seen,  had  been  sent  there  with  the  fleet  of  his  brother  from  the  mouth  ^I^l^  ^"' 
of  the   Rhone.      He   sailed  direct  to  Emporiae,  and  thence  coasted  21S. 
southward  as  far  as  the  mouth  of  the  Ebro,  making  descents  upon 
the  shore,  besieging  towns   which   declined,   and   providing  for    the 
safety  of  those  which  offered,  submission.     He  then  landed  his  army, 
and   being   reinforced  by  a  considerable  number   of  native   troops, 
marched  inland,  taking  several   towns   on   the  way,  until  he  found 
Hanno  encamped  near  Cirsa,  a  town  apparently  to  the  west  of  the 
Sicoris  {Segre).      There  he  not  only  defeated  the  Carthaginian  army, 


312  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap,  xxii 

Victory  but  took  Hanno  himself  prisoner,  as  well  as  an  important  Spanish 
overHanno.  chieftain  named  Indibilis.  The  camp  also  fell  into  his  hands,  and 
with  it  the  heavy  baggage  of  Hannibal's  army,  which  he  had  left  in 
Hanno's  charge.  Hearing  of  what  had  happened,  Hasdrubal  sailed 
northwards.  He  found  the  Roman  fleet  at  the  mouth  of  the  Ebro 
carelessly  guarded,  while  the  crews  wandered  inland  in  search  of 
plunder.  He  cut  off  a  considerable  number  of  these  foraging  parties, 
and  then  retired  to  the  south  of  the  Ebro,  and  marched  back  to 
winter  quarters  in  New  Carthage,  strengthening  various  fortresses  on 
his  way.  Scipio,  after  vindicating  Roman  discipline  by  the  punish- 
ment of  those  whose  carelessness  had  caused  the  loss,  took  his  fleet 
and  men  into  winter  quarters  at  Tarraco,  where  the  division  of  the 
vast  booty  he  had  taken  rendered  his  army  eager  for  the  campaign 
of  the  next  year. 

Thus,  though  no  victory  of  first-rate  magnitude  had  been  won, 
Hannibal's  work  of  the  early  summer,  by  which  he  trusted  to  have 
left  an  entirely  friendly  Spain  on  his  rear,  was  undone  ;  and  he  was 
more  than  ever  left  dependent  on  success  in  Italy.  The  wisdom  of 
Publius  Scipio's  plan  of  defence,  when  he  found  himself  outstripped 
on  the  Rhone,  was  amply  vindicated. 

Authorities. — Polybius,  books  iii.-xv.  Livy  xxi.-xxx.  Of  the  books  of 
Polybius  iii.  to  v.  are  complete.  They  are  of  the  first  vahie.  He  took  pains  to 
study  original  sources  of  information  m  Rome  and  Italy,  to  examine  the  sites  of 
battles,  and  even  to  cross  the  Alpine  pass  used  by  Hannibal,  He  knew  also  the 
sons  of  many  of  those  actually  engaged  ;  and  had  before  him  the  writings  of  men 
contemporary  with  the  events,  such  as  Fabius  Pictor  and  Philinus  of  Agrigentuni 
— writing  from  opposite  points  of  view,  Silenus  (the  Greek  secretary  of  Hanni- 
bal), Sosilus  and  Chaereas,  Caelius  Antipater  who  had  been  a  prisoner  in  Hannibal's 
camp,  and  others.  Livy  often  uses  Polybius,  sometimes  translating  his  very 
words,  but  he  also  made  independent  use  of  these  same  authorities,  and  therefore 
frequently  gives  a  different  account  of  details.  When  the  two  are  irreconcilable, 
it  is  generally  safest  to  stand  by  Polybius,  who  must  have  had  better  means  of 
ascertaining  the  truth.  Livy's  narrative  becomes  of  the  highest  importance  to  us 
at  the  point  at  which  the  continuous  narrative  of  Polybius  is  lost,  i.e.  after  the  fall 
of  Syracuse  in  B.C.  212.  Our  possession  of  two  such  authorities  makes  that  of 
other  and  generally  later  writers  comparatively  unimportant,  except  so  far  as  they 
may  contain  extracts  from  earlier  writers,  such  are  Cornelius  Nepos,  Life  of 
Hannibal ;  Plutarch's  Lives  of  Fabius  uWaximus  and  Marcellus ;  Appian,  Bellum 
Hannibalicum,  Res  Punicae  (5-67),  Res  Ibericae  (4-38)  ;  Dio  Cassius,  fr.  57  ; 
Zonaras  viii.  21-ix.  14  ;  Diodorus  Siculus,  fr.  of  xxvi.-x.xvii.  ;   Eutropius  iii.  3-13. 


1 


I 


CHAPTER    XXIII 

THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR — Continued 

From  217  to  the  Battle  of  Cannae  (216) 

Flaminius  enters  upon  his  consulship  at  Ariminum  (217) — Hannibal  marches  into 
Etruria — His  sufferings  in  the  marshes  of  the  Arno — Battle  of  the  Thrasymene 
LAKE — Q.  Fabius  Maximus  Verrucosus  (Cunctator)  baffles  Hannibal,  who 
enters  Campania,  but  finds  it  unsuitable  for  winter  quarters — He  makes  his 
way  back  to  Apulia  by  a  stratagem,  and  encamps  near  Gerunium — Minucius 
made  equal  to  Fabius,  but  defeated  by  Hannibal — Preparations  in  the  winter 
of  217-216 — P.  Terentius  Varro — The  Battle  of  Cannae — Courage  and 
activity  of  Varro  after  the  battle — His  return  to  Rome. 

When    the    day    for    the    new  consuls    to    enter   upon    their   office  217.   Coss. 
arrived  (15th   March),   Servihus  was  at  Rome   and   performed   the  Gnetus 
usual  formal  duties  ;  but  his  colleae^ue  Flaminius  had  already  left  the   ,/^f  "'"'^ 
city.      He  had  bitter  enemies  in  the  Senate,  and  he  seems  to  have  Caius 
feared  that  some  pretext  of  evil  omens  or  informality  in  his  election  Flaminius. 
might  be  found  to  prevent  his  taking  over  the  command  which  had 
fallen  to  his  lot.      It  had  been  arranged  that  Servilius  was  to  command 
at  Ariminum,  and  Flaminius  at  Arretium.      But  the  legions  had  been 
brought    from     Placentia    and     Cremona     (perhaps     by    water)     to 
Ariminum  ;  and  thither   Flaminius  went  a  few  days  before  the  ides 
of  March,  determined,  in  spite  of  custom,  to  enter  on  his  consulship 
there.      The  Senate  sent  commissioners  to  order  his  return  ;  but  there 
was  no  law  compelling   him  to  do  so,  and  he  refused  to  obey.      He 
took  over  his   own   part   of  the   troops,  and  led  them  to  Arretium, 
whilst  his  colleague  Servilius  took  his  place  at  Ariminum.      It  was 
not  known  by  which  road  Hannibal  would  enter  Etruria ;  but  the  two 
chief  routes  were  thus  defended. 

As  soon  as  the  weather  became  open  Hannibal  started.      He  was  Hannibal 
in  haste  to  begin  his  march,  partly  because  his  Gallic  allies  could  not  enters 
be  trusted  unless  they  had  a  speedy  prospect  of  action  and  plunder,  ^i^^^^- 
and  partly  because  he  wished  to  find  Flaminius  unsupported  by  his 
colleague.      He  was  informed  of  his  arrival  at  Arretium,  and  he  had 


314 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


also  satisfied  himself  that  he  was  a  general  who  might  be  outwitted  and 
crushed.  He  abandoned  the  usual  road  over  the  Apennines,  which 
descends  the  valley  of  the  Macra  to  Luca,  partly  perhaps  to  avoid 
delay  from  attacks  of  the  garrison  there,  and  took  a  shorter  though 
more  difficult  route.  Descending  the  valley  of  the  Auser  {Serchid) 
he  reached  the  plain  of  the  Arno  with  comparative  ease.  But  from  that 
point  the  road  led  through  marshes  extending  between  the  Apennines 
and  Faesulae,  which  were  in  a  state  of  unusual  flood.  Four  days  and 
three  nights  his  army  struggled  through  sloughs  and  quagmires. 
There  was  no  ground  dry  enough  to  lie  down  upon  for  rest ;  nothing 
showed  above  the  water  but  the  bodies  of  beasts  of  burden  that  had 
slipped  in  the  slime  and  perished.  All  the  elephants  but  one  died  ; 
and  Hannibal  himself  lost  an  eye  from  violent  ophthalmia.  The 
Spanish  and  Libyan  troops  fared  best,  for  being  in  the  van  they  did 
not  find  the  ground  trampled  into  deep  mud  ;  but  the  Gauls  behind 
them  suffered  greatly,  and  would  perhaps  have  turned  back  if  the 
cavalry  on  their  rear  had  not  prevented  them.  Still  Hannibal,  who 
was  forced  by  his  sufferings  to  ride  on  the  one  surviving  elephant, 
had  gained  his  object.  He  had  come  upon  Flaminius  before  he  was 
expected  ;  and  now  marched  past  the  Roman  camp,  wasting  the 
country  far  and  wide,  feeling  sure  that  he  would  irritate  Flaminius  into 
following  him. 

He  had  not  misjudged  the  man.  The  sight  of  the  smoke  rising 
from  farm  and  villa  was  more  than  Flaminius  could  bear.  His  officers 
advised  against  fighting  an  enemy  strong  in  cavalry  on  such  ground, 
and  argued  that  he  should  at  least  wait  for  Servilius,  who  had  started 
from  Ariminum  on  the  news  of  Hannibal  being  in  Etruria.  "  What 
would  the  people  at  home  think,"  he  indignantly  asked,  "  if  I  remained 
encamped  in  the  rear  while  the  enemy  wasted  the  country  up  to  the 
walls  of  Rome  .'"'  He  promptly  gave  the  signal  for  starting,  with  the 
same  blind  confidence  as  had  crowded  his  camp  with  traders, — almost 
more  numerous  than  the  soldiers,  who  had  provided  themselves 
with  chains  and  fetters  for  the  prisoners  who  were  to  enrich  them  by 
sale  or  ransom. 

Hannibal  meanwhile  was  marching  southwards.  Leaving  the 
direct  road  which  led  by  Clusium  (afterwards  called  the  via  Cassia), 
he  turned  to  the  left  towards  Perusia,  with  Cortona  on  his  left  and 
the  Thrasymene  lake  on  his  right,  a  route  which  would  eventually  have 
brought  him  on  to  the  via  Flamitiia.  A  spur  of  the  mountains  of 
Cortona  {Monte  Gualandrd)  descends  to  a  point  on  the  north-west 
bank  of  the  lake,  leaving  only  a  marsh  and  a  narrow  path  between, 
and  separating  the  plain  of  Cortona  from  the  lake.  At  this  point  is 
the  modern  village  of  Borghetto,  and  from  it  the  mountains  form  an 
arch  coming  down  to  the  lake  again,  eight  miles  off,  at  the  village  of 


THE  THRASYMENE  LAKE 


315 


Passignano.  This  arch  is  intersected  about  half-way  to  Passignano  by 
an  eminence  covered  with  wood,  on  which  is  the  village  Tuoro, 
sloping  down  towards  the  lake.  Hannibal  at  once  saw  the  advantages 
offered  by  this  site  for  an  ambuscade. 

He  concealed  his  Balearic  slingers  on  the  eastern  slopes  of 
Gualandro,  and  sent  his  cavalry  and  other  Gauls  to  hide  themselves 
on  the  western  slopes,  so  that  their  extreme  right  was  almost  at  the 
entrance  of  the  pass.  He  with  his  main  army  took  post  on  the  hill 
of  Tuoro,  which  roughly  divided  the  plain. 

The  same  evening  Flaminius  arrived  at  the  shore  of  the  lake,  and 
encamped  there  for  the  night.      Nothing  was  seen  of  the  enemy  ;  and 


217. 

Hannibal 
concealed 
in  the 
valley  and 
hills  north 
of  the  lake. 
Flaminius 
follows  him 


next  morning,  without  making  reconnaissances,  he  proceeded  on  his 
march  towards  Perusia  by  the  shortest  road  along  the  shore  of  the 
lake.       When    his    line    debouched    into    the    plain,   Hannibal   was 
discovered  on  the  hill  of  Tuoro  on  their  left  front.      But  a  heavy  mist 
was  rising  from  the  lake,  which  interrupted  their  view,  and  prevented 
them   from    seeing   distinctly   even   those   of  the   enemy   who    were 
immediately  in   front  'of  them.      Hannibal  now  gave  the  signal  for 
attack  all  along  his  line,  which  could  be  seen  by  the  troops  on  the 
higher  ground  above  the  mist,  though  not  by  the  Romans  ;  who  thus 
found  themselves  attacked  on  all  sides  at  once.      Six  thousand  of  the   The 
vanguard   cut  their  way  through  towards    Passignano,   and   finding  Roman 
themselves  on  higher  ground,  halted  to  learn  the  fate  of  the  others.   ^J^y 
Suddenly  the  mist  lifted,  and  they  saw  a  terrible  sight.      The  main     "  ^'^•^^  ' 


3i6 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


body  of  the  army  on  sighting  Hannibal  had  turned  to  the  left  to 
receive  his  attack  ;  but  found  themselves  assaulted  not  only  in  front 
by  Hannibal,  but  on  the  flank  by  the  light-armed  troops  from  the 
eastern  slopes  of  Gualandro,  and  with  hardly  time  to  draw  their  swords 
or  get  ready  their  spears,  were  being  killed  or  driven  into  the  lake  ; 
while  the  rear  columns  were  caught  by  the  cavalry  actually  in  the 
defile  leading  from  Borghetto,  and  were  being  helplessly  cut  to 
pieces.  Some  of  these  last  tried  to  escape  by  swimming  in  the  lake, 
but  finding  the  distance  too  great,  returned  to  the  shallows,  and  there, 
after  vainly  begging  quarter  with  uplifted  hands,  were  despatched 
by  the  horsemen  riding  in  after  them,  or  in  some  cases  killed  them- 
selves or  begged  the  favour  of  the  fatal  stroke  from  their  friends.^ 
Flaminius  himself,  however  much  he  may  have  been  to  blame  for 
the  disaster,  exhibited  high  courage  and  heroism  in  this  hour  of 
despair.  He  exerted  himself  with  hand  and  voice  to  rally  his  men, 
and  encourage  them  to  extricate  themselves,  until  he  fell  fighting  at 
the  hands  of  a  company  of  Gauls. 

The  day  was  irretrievably  lost.  And  the  six  thousand,  closing 
their  ranks,  pushed  on  with  the  utmost  speed  they  knew  not  whither. 
At  last  they  found  themselves  in  a  village,  which  they  might  hope  to 
hold  for  a  time.  But  they  had  no  means  of  getting  supplies,  and  no 
hope  of  outstripping  the  enemy  ;  and  soon  after  the  battle,  being 
besieged  by  Hannibal's  Spanish  light-armed  troops  under  Maharbal, 
they  were  compelled  to  surrender  on  a  promise  of  their  lives,  a 
promise  which  Hannibal  fulfilled,  though  protesting  that  he  had  given 
no  authority  for  it.  Fifteen  thousand  in  all  fell  into  his  hands  ;  among 
whom  he  discriminated,  as  before,  between  Romans  and  Italians, 
keeping  the  former  in  close  custody,  but  liberating  the  latter  without 
ransom.  His  own  loss  had  been  comparatively  small,  although  the  fall 
of  I  500  Gauls  testified  to  a  desperate  resistance  at  one  part  of  the  field. 

The  Roman  army  was  annihilated.  The  consul  with  15,000 
men  lay  dead  on  the  field,  and  many  died  afterwards  of  their  wounds. 
Fifteen  thousand  were  prisoners.  Ten  thousand  more  had  in  various 
directions  effected  an  escape,  and  found  their  way  back  to  Rome  ; 
where  the  news  of  the  disaster  was  soon  too  well  authenticated  to  be 
concealed  by  the  government. 

It  was  better  to  face  the  truth.      Summoning  the  citizens  the 


^  The  site  of  the  battle  of  Thrasymene  is  much  disputed,  and  the  descriptions 
in  Livy  (xxii.  4-6)  and  Polybius  (iii.  82-84)  appear  to  point  to  different  places. 
The  site  as  described  in  the  text,  on  the  north  of  the  lake  between  Borghetto  and 
Passignano,  seems  to  suit  Livy  best  ;  while  from  Polybius  it  has  been  inferred, 
though  not  without  considerable  difficulties,  that  the  narrow  pass  was  that  between 
Passignano  and  Torricella,  and  the  chief  fighting  in  a  combe  between  Torricella 
and  Magione.     Some  even  place  the  battle  still  farther  to  the  east  of  Magione. 


i 


[I  HANNIBAL  MARCHES  SOUTH-  317 

praetor  briefly  announced,  "  We  have  been  beaten  in  a  great  battle." 
The  Senate  rose  to  the  occasion.  In  prolonged  sessions  they  dis- 
cussed the  measures  to  be  taken  and  the  means  of  defence.  But 
three  days  later  the  alarm  was  intensified  by  the  news  of  a  fresh  Fresh 
disaster.  Servilius,  hearing  at  Ariminum  that  Hannibal  had  entered  disaster. 
Etruria,  started  to  join  his  colleague.  But  the  case  was  pressing,  and, 
in  order  that  Flaminius  might  know  that  help  was  on  the  way,  he  sent 
4000  cavalry  under  Gains  Centenius  in  advance.  Informed  of  this 
Hannibal  despatched  Maharbal  with  cavalry  and  light-armed  troops  to 
intercept  Centenius,  and  the  whole  force  was  killed  or  taken  prisoners. 

Now  indeed   it   seemed  as  though   Hannibal  might   be  at  their  Q.  Fabius 
gates   before   many    days.       It  was   no  longer  safe   to   trust  to  the  Maximus 
ordinary  magistrates.      But  there  was  a  constitutional    difficulty   in  ^•^,/, 
appointing  a  dictator,  who  could  properly  only  be  named  by  a  consul,   ^i-j. 
Now  one  consul  was  dead,  and  with  the  other  it  seemed  impossible 
to  communicate.      But  the  extremity  was  held  to  justify  an  irregu- 
larity, and  Fabius  was  elected  dictator  by  the  centuries.^ 

The  battle  of  Thrasymene  would  seem  to  have  opened  the  way  Hannibal'i 
to   Rome   for   Hannibal ;    yet   he   did    not    take    it.       Quitting    the  ^(^f^^ 

Flaminian  road  he  turned  to  the  left  through  Umbria  to  Picenum,    r^^^^.    , 

.    ,     ,  .  °         ....  „     ,     .'    Umbria  to 

wastmg  the  country,  killmg  the  mhabitants,   and  drivmg  oft  their  ^^^  ^^^^ 

cattle,  until  by  the  time  he  arrived  on  the  coast  of  the  Adriatic  his  coast,  21J 

army  was  hampered  with  more  booty  than  it  could  drive  or  carry. 

He  marched  down  the  coast  to  Arpi,  on  the  borders  of  Apulia,   and 

there  refreshed  his  men  and  horses,  worn  out  by  the  winter  cold  and 

the  toils  of  the  campaign.      The  wealth  of  the  country  enabled  him 

to  get  them  into  condition  and  to  cure  an  attack  of  scurvy  which  was 

emaciating  both.      It  was  perhaps  this  which  had  decided  him  not 

to  advance   on   Rome.       But   a   prolonged   siege  would  in  any  case 

have   been    dangerous    with    an    army    largely    consisting   of  Gauls, 

always  impatient  of  such  operations,  and  when  he  had  not  yet  induced 

a   single  Italian    State  to  join.      Notwithstanding  his  victories  and 

the  terror  which  his  march  must  have  inspired,  his  great  design  of 

raising  Italy  against  Rome  seemed  as  far  from  accomplishment  as 

ever,  and  without  it  he  could  not  venture  to  attack  the  city. 

But  there  was  one  possible  ally  of  Hannibal  whose   secret  hos- 
tility to  Rome  was  confirmed  by  the  battle.     As  Philip  of  Macedonia 

^  That  Fabius  was  dictator  and  not  pro-dictator  seems  certain  from  Polybius, 
The  reading  pro-dictatorem  in  Livy  xxii.  8  is  probably  wrong.  Still  Livy  (xxii. 
31)  thought  the  annals  wrong  in  calling  Fabius  "dictator,"  and  there  may  have 
been  legal  purists  at  the  time  and  afterwards  who  spoke  of  him  as  a  pro  dictatore. 
The  question  was  raised  again  in  49,  when  Caesar  wished  to  be  able  to  hold  the 
consular  elections,  and  a  lex  was  needed  to  enable  the  praetor  to  name  him 
dictator  for  that  purpose  (Cic.  Att.  ix.  15  ;  Caes.  B.C.  ii.  20,  21). 


':''i'iiiii;"ri'i'iii!iiiiil 


I 


CHAP.  XXIII         Q.  FABIUS  MAXIMUS  CUNCTATOR  3^9 

was   watching  the   Nemaean  games  at  Argos  a  courier  put  a  letter  Philip  V 
into  his  hands.      The  king  showed  it  to  no  one  except  Demetrius  of  ^^^^^'^  "f 
Pharos,  the  bitter  enemy  of  Rome,  bidding  him  say  nothing  to  any  ^^^  ^ 
one.      It    contained    the   news   of   Thrasymene    and    of    Hannibal's  prepares  to 
possession  of    Italy.       Demetrius  urged  Philip  to  give  up  his  war  invade 
with  the  Aetolians  and  hasten  to  attack  Illyricum,  and  so  gain  a  basis  Jt^^ly- 
from  which  to  invade  Italy.      The  advice  chimed  in  with  the  king's 
secret  wishes.    A  council  was  summoned,  peace  with  Aetolia  proposed, 
and  shortly  afterwards  ratified  at  Naupactus,  and  Philip  started  for 
Illyricum.      There  he  was  brilliantly  successful,  and   Italy,  always 
in  his  thoughts  and  even,  in  his  dreams,  seemed  at  length  within 
reach. 

Meanwhile  at  Rome   Fabius  was  preparing  to  start  in  pursuit  of  Fabius 
Hannibal.     The  alarm  in  the  city  had  as  usual  turned  men's  thought  t^^es 
to  the  gods.     The  Sibylline  books  were  consulted,  a  "  sacred  spring  "  ^^T/j^f'^f^ 
vowed,  a  lectisternium  held  for  three  days,  sacrifices  performed  on  a  21^. 
vast  scale,  and  all  the  resources  of  superstition  brought  into  play. 
Fabius  then  enrolled  two  legions,  and  summoned  the  consul  to  meet 
him  by  the  Flaminian  road.      At  Ocriculum  he  took  over  the  army, 
sending  Servilius  to  command  a  fleet  at  Ostia  and  attack  a  Punic 
squadron,  which  was  cruising  on  the  coast  of  Etruria  and  had  captured 
some  Roman  transports  on  the  way  to  Spain.     He  himself  advanced  to 
Praeneste,  and  thence  by  cross  roads  came  upon  the  via  Latina,  by 
which  he  reached  Daunia  and  encamped  within  sight  of  Hannibal's 
quarters  at  Arpi,      Hannibal  at  once  offered  battle.      But  Fabius  had  Follows 
resolved  on  a  policy  to  which  he  obstinately  clung  in  spite  of  much  Cannibal, 
obloquy  for  many  years.      It  gained  him  the  name  of  Cu7tctator^  but  ^^f^^f^f 
was  rewarded  eventually  by  the  acknowledgment  of  his  having  been 
the  one  man  who  restored  the  fortunes  of  the  State.     This  was  to  hang 
about  Hannibal's  army,  in  camp  or  on  the  march,  watching  every 
opportunity  of  harassing  or  annoying  him,  but  rigorously  to  decline 
battle.      He  rightly  felt  that  Hannibal  had  all  to  lose  by  delay.     The 
Romans  had  immense   resources   from   which   to   draw :    Hannibal 
depended  entirely  upon  plunder,  which  must  become  less  and  less  pro- 
ductive every  month  he  stayed  in  Italy.      Like  all  narrow  and  rigorous 
plans,  it  might  be  pushed  too  far,  and  Fabius  could  never  reconcile 
himself  later  on  to  the  forward  policy  of  Scipio  :  but  for  the  present 
it   baffled   Hannibal.       Fabius    kept   his   men    in    camp,    and    con- 
tented himself  with  dogging  his   steps,  cutting  off  stragglers   and 
marauders,  and  habituating  his  troops  to  the  fatigues  and  discipline 
of  war. 

Daunia  being  exhausted,   Hannibal  crossed  the  Apennines  into  Samnlum. 
Samnium,  overran  the  territory  of  Beneventum,  and  took  the  rich 
town  of  Telesia.     Wherever  he  went  Fabius  followed,  one  or  two  days' 


320 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


march  behind,  making  careful  reconnaissances  and  keeping  on  safe 
ground.  Finding  that  Fabius  was  not  to  be  induced  to  fight, 
Hannibal  determined  to  advance  boldly  into  Campania.  Passing 
over  the  hills  by  Cales  he  encamped  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Volturnus,  and  sent  out  foraging  parties  in  all  directions.  Fabius 
followed,  still  resolved  to  avoid  battle.  But  such  a  resolution  was 
necessarily  a  most  irksome  one  to  his  army.  The  soldiers  skirted  the 
mountains  with  the  Carthaginians  in  view,  but  were  not  allowed  to 
descend  and  drive  the  plunderers  from  the  rich  Falernian  plains.  It 
was  the  more  exasperating  because  the  Roman  officers  themselves 
believed  Hannibal  to  be  in  a  trap,  and  were  as  eager  as  the  men  for 
battle.  The  discontent  found  a  mouthpiece  in  the  master  of  the 
horse,  Minucius,  who  had  all  along  wished  to  fight,  and  had  now  the 
feehngs  of  the  army  with  him.  Fabius,  however,  believed  that  he 
was  in  a  position  to  starve  Hannibal  out.  His  troops  at  Tarracina 
barred  the  Appian  Way  to  Rome ;  Casilinum  and  the  road  over 
Mount  Tifata  by  which  Hannibal  had  descended  were  guarded  ;  and 
while  the  Romans  could  draw  supplies  from  home,  from  Capua,  and 
from  Samnium,  Hannibal  would  be  forced  to  winter,  inadequately 
provisioned,  in  the  marshy  ground  between  the  mouths  of  the  Liris 
and  Volturnus.^  The  difficulty  was  to  get  back  as  he  came,  and  this 
he  accomplished  by  a  bold  manoeuvre. 

A  detachment  of  4000  men  held  the  gorge  between  Tifata  and  the 
Volturnus,  and  in  anticipation  of  Hannibal's  retrograde  movement 
Fabius  moved  his  main  army  to  within  a  short  distance  of  this 
position.  But  Hannibal,  taking  advantage  of  a  dark  night,  ordered 
a  herd  of  cattle  with  burning  torches  attached  to  their  horns  to  be 
driven  up  the  mountain.  Behind  them  were  some  light-armed  troops 
instructed  to  assist  in  driving  them  part  of  the  way,  and  then  to  pass 
them  at  the  double  and  make  for  the  ridge,  with  all  possible  noise 
and  commotion.  The  ruse  succeeded  in  drawing  the  4000  men  from 
the  gorge,  who  fell  in  with  some  of  the  enemy  and  skirmished  for 
a  time,  and  finally  ensconced  themselves  on  the  mountain  and 
waited  for  hght.  Meanwhile  Hannibal,  who  had  his  army  ready 
for  the  start,  marched  through  the  abandoned  gorge.  The  nocturnal 
alarm  had  not  induced  Fabius  to  leave  his  camp,  and  in  the  morning 
he  found  that  the  enemy  had  escaped  him. 

After  making  a  feint  of  advancing  towards  Rome  through 
Samnium,    Hannibal   turned    south-east   from    the    territory    of  the 


^  According  to  Livy,  Hannibal  had  got  into  a  situation  he  had  not  intended. 
He  had  aimed  at  reaching  Casinum  on  the  Latin  road  to  cut  oft"  troops  coming 
from  Rome  ;  but  his  guide,  misled  by  his  foreign  accent,  had  taken  him  past 
Casilinum  and  down  into  the  P'alernian  territory.  He  knew  at  once  that  it  was 
too  much  enclosed,  and  was  not  fit  for  winter  quarters. 


XXIII  HANNIBAL  AND  MINUCIUS  321) 

Peligni,  re-entered  Apulia,  and  seized  Geronium,  near  Larinum.     The  Hannibal 
inhabitants  resisted  but  were  taken  prisoners  or  put  to  the  sword,  returns  to 
and  the  buildings  reserved  for  the  army  and  stores.      It  was  in  the     ^"  ^^' 
course  of  this  march  that  he  is  said  to  have  tried  to  discredit  Fabius 
by  ordering  one  of  his  farms  to  be  spared  by  his  foragers.     Fabius, 
however,  frustrated  the  device  by  sending  his  son  home  to  sell  the 
farm  and  devote  the  price  to  the  ransom  of  prisoners.      Hannibal 
seems  to  have  meant  his  return  to   Apulia   to  be   the   end   of  the 
campaign  ;  but  Fabius  still  hung  on  the  skirts  of  the  neighbouring 
hills,  and  being  obliged   to  go  home   to  conduct   certain  sacrifices 
left  strict  orders  with  M.  Minucius,  encamped  near  Larinum,  to  follow 
the  same  tactics  and  not  give  Hannibal  battle. 

Minucius  had  other  thoughts.      The  strategy  of  Fabius,  always  M. 
unpopular,  had  been  farther  discredited  by  the  failure  to  intercept  Minucius 
Hannibal's  return  from  Campania ;  and  Minucius  now  began  to  look  ^-J^^^' 
out  for  the  opportunity  of  striking  a  blow.      For  a  few  days  he  still  command, 
kept  on  high  ground ;  but  when  he  found  that  Hannibal  had  taken  provokes 
Geronium  and  was  collecting  corn  from  the  country,  he  descended  to  Hannibal. 
the  foot  of  a  hill  (called  Galena)  three  or  four  miles  west  of  Geronium. 
Hannibal  gladly  went  to  meet  him,  and  pitched  a  camp  on  some 
rising  ground  within  sight,  sending  out  as  usual  about  a  third  of  his 
army  to  forage.     To  provoke  him  still  farther  he  caused  about  2000 
light-armed  troops   to  occupy  a  hill  between  the  two   camps.       At 
daybreak  Minucius  assaulted  and  carried  this  hill  and  transferred  his 
camp  to  it.     The  two  armies  remained  thus  close  for  some  days  with- 
out stirring.      But  the  collection  of  stores  for  the  winter  was  necessary 
for  Hannibal ;  and  he  was  compelled  to  divide  his  forces,  sending 
out  two-thirds  for  corn  and  fodder.      The  remainder  were  insufficient 
to  enable  him  to  accept  battle,  which   Minucius  took  care  to  offer  at 
the  hour  at  which  he  knew  the  foraging  parties  to  be  out.     Hannibal's 
apparent  timidity  filled  the  Roman  soldiers  with  such  confidence  that 
they  even  attempted  to  storm  the  camp,  and  only  desisted  on  the 
arrival  of  Hasdrubal  with  a  strong  detachment  recalled  from  the  fields. 
Meanwhile  a  portion  of  the  Roman  army  had  cut  off  some  isolated 
foraging  parties ;  and  altogether  Hannibal  found  the  position  untenable 
and  withdrew  to  Geronium  lest  it  too  should  be  attacked  in  his  absence. 

Exaggerated  accounts  of  these  movements  reached  Rome  and  Minucius 
caused  great  exultation.      Fabius's  policy  was  more  unpopular  than  ina.de 
ever  ;  Minucius  became  the  idol  of  the  hour.     A  vote  of  the  people  ^^^^^^<^^' 
was  even  obtained,  giving  him  equal  powers  with  Fabius,^  who  on 

^  It  was  altogether  an  unprecedented  measure.  To  have  two  dictators  was  an 
absurdity.  But  Polybius  (iii.  103,  104)  speaks  of  Minucius  as  a  "dictator,"  and 
this  is  confirmed  by  an  inscription,  CJ.L.  i,  1503  Hercolei  sacrom  M.  Minuci\us'\ 
C.  F.  dictator  vovit. 


322 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


rejoining  the  army,  therefore,  found  himself  unable  to  carry  out  his 
plans,  and  offered  Minucius  either  to  take  supreme  command  on 
alternate  days,  or  to  divide  the  legions  and  occupy  separate  camps. 
Minucius  chose  the  latter  alternative. 

Hannibal  took  advantage  of  this  by  again  seizing  a  hill  between 
their  camps  and  tempting  Minucius  out.  But  this  time  he  prepared 
an  ambuscade  ;  and  while  Minucius  was  intent  on  the  struggle  for 
the  hill,  in  which  Hannibal  himself  took  part  in  strong  force,  the  men 
in  ambush  suddenly  charged  the  flank  and  rear  of  the  Romans. 
Their  ranks  were  broken,  a  considerable  number  fell,  and  a  retreat 
began  which  threatened  to  become  a  flight,  accompanied  by  a  heavy 
loss  if  not  annihilation.  But  Fabius  had  been  watching  the  combat 
and  came  up  at  the  right  moment  with  his  fresh  forces,  and,  covering 
the  retreat  of  the  beaten  army,  forced  Hannibal  to  retire.  This 
caused  a  reaction  of  feeling,  and  with  universal  approval  Minucius 
resigned  his  powers  into  the  hands  of  Fabius,  reunited  the  camps, 
and  henceforth  followed  his  orders.  Nothing  farther  was  done  on 
either  side  that  season. 

Meanwhile  events  in  Spain  and  at  sea  had  been  more  favourable 
to  Rome.  Early  in  2 1 7  Cn.  Scipio  had  taken  twenty-five  of  the  forty 
vessels  with  which  Hasdrubal  had  come  to  the  mouth  of  the  Ebro. 
A  fresh  Carthaginian  fleet  of  seventy  vessels  had  touched  at  Sardinia 
and  Pisae  (near  which  they  seem  to  have  expected  to  find  Hannibal), 
but  had  been  chased  back  to  Africa  by  Servilius  with  a  fleet  of  125 
war  vessels.  Servilius  went  as  far  as  the  African  coast,  and  though 
he  seems  to  have  suffered  some  loss  while  attempting  a  descent  upon 
it,  he  exacted  a  contribution  from  the  island  Cercina,  off  the  Lesser 
Syrtis,  and  plundered  Cossyra  on  his  way  back  to  Lilybaeum.  These 
were  no  great  achievements,  but  the  presence  of  a  powerful  fleet 
prevented  any  despatch  of  reinforcements  from  Carthage  either  to 
Spain  or  Hannibal.  Twenty  ships  were  then  sent  to  Spain  under 
the  command  of  Publius  Scipio,  whose  impcriiim  had  been  extended. 
He  joined  his  brother,  and  for  the  first  time  a  Roman  army  advanced 
to  the  south  of  the  Ebro.  The  native  tribes  were  overawed,  and 
when  Scipio  arrived  at  Saguntum  the  treachery  of  Abilyx  gave  him 
an  opportunity  of  which  he  made  prompt  use.  The  governor  of 
Saguntum  had  in  charge  some  young  Spanish  hostages  entrusted  to 
him  by  Hannibal.  Abilyx,  though  he  had  the  reputation  of  being 
warmly  Carthaginian,  had  secretly  concluded  that  the  Romans  were 
the  more  likely  to  win,  and  now  offered  to  put  these  hostages  into 
Scipio's  hands.  He  deluded  the  governor  Bostar  by  pretending 
that  he  should  have  the  credit  of  restoring  them,  and  led  them 
straight  to  the  Roman  camp,  whence  they  were  despatched  to  their 
homes.      Thus  before  going  into  winter  quarters  the  Scipios  could 


XXIII  PREPARATIONS  FOR  ANOTHER  BATTLE  323 

feel  that  they  had  impressed  the  natives  in  favour  of  Rome,  both  by 
the  destruction  of  a  Punic  fleet  and  by  displaying  a  generous 
confidence  in  the  Spanish  chiefs. 

The  spirit  of  renewed  hope  at  Rome  was  shown  by  the  election  216.  Coss. 
of  Gaius  Terentius  Varro  to  the  consulship,  who  had  been  the  chief  ^^""  . 
supporter  of  the  measure  for  making  Minucius  equal  to  Fabius.      In    y^^^^  ^ 
spite  of  the  resistance  of  the  nobles,  he  alone  obtained  a  majority  of  Aemilius 
the  centuries,  and  had  to  hold  the  election  of  his  colleague  Paullus,  Paullus  Ii 
the  conqueror  in  the  Illyric  war  of  219.     Varro  is  said  to  have  been 
the  son  of  a  butcher,  and  to  have  assisted  his  father  in  a  menial 
capacity.     Whatever  may  be  the  truth,  he  had  gained  the  ear  of  the 
people,  who  believed  in  his  will  and  ability  to  meet  Hannibal.     To 
select  a  military  commander  by  popular  vote,  and  on  the  ground  of 
civil  ability,  is  indeed  hopelessly  absurd.      The  wonder  is  that  such 
men  so  often  succeeded,  not  that  they  often  failed.      In  regard  to 
Varro  the  popular  feeling  seems  to  have  had  some  solid  ground.    He 
lost  Cannae,  indeed,  but  he  showed  courage  and  ability  in  repairing 
the  disaster,  and  was  almost  constantly  employed  with  respectable 
success  afterwards.      Fabius  and  his  colleague  Minucius  laid  down 
their  office.     The  consuls  of  the  previous  year,  Servilius   Geminus 
and  Atilius  Regulus  (successor  to  the  slain   Flaminius),   had  their 
imperium  extended,  and  were  sent  to  the  army  in  Apulia ;  while  the 
new   consuls,    in   consultation  with    the   Senate,    were   employed   in 
enrolling  men  to  fill  up  the  gaps  in  the  old  legions  and  to  form  new 
ones.      For  it  was  determined  that  a  battle  must  be  fought.     The 
praetor,  Postumius,  was  sent  into  Gaul  to  effect  a  diversion,  with  the  Postumius 
hope  that  the  Gauls  serving  with  Hannibal  might  be  thereby  induced  ^^  Gaul. 
to  return  home.     The  fleet  was  recalled  from  Lilybaeum,  and  sup- 
plies sent  to   Spain.      Offers  of  aid  from  various  quarters  served  to   Offers  of 
farther  encourage  the  Romans.      From  Naples  and  Paestum  came  ^^'^' 
large  presents  of  gold  plate  ;  from  Hiero  a  golden  figure  of  victory, 
large   quantities    of  corn   and  barley,    with   promises   of  more,   and 
1000  archers  and  slingers.     The  gold  of  Naples  and  Paestum,  with 
the  exception  of  the  smallest  cup,  was  declined  with  warm  thanks  ; 
but  Hiero's  contributions  were  gratefully  accepted,  and  twenty-five 
quinqueremes  were  sent  to  reinforce  Titus  Otacilius  in  Sicily,  who 
was  authorised  to  cross  to  Africa  if  he  thought  it  expedient. 

The  proconsuls,  according  to  their  instructions,  had  maintained  Hannibal 
the  Fabian  policy  during  the  summer  months.     But  when  harvest  ^^^^^^ 
time  approached,  Hannibal  was  obliged  to  move  in  order  to  collect     "^"^'^^' 
supplies.      Breaking  up  his  camp  at  Geronium  he  seized  Cannae,  a 
small  town  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Aufidus,  about  eight  miles  from 
its  mouth.      It  had  been  damaged,  if  not  destroyed,  the  year  before  ; 
but  its  citadel  remained,  and  had  been  used  by  the  Romans  as  a 


324 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


It  is 

decided  to 
give 

Hannibal 
battle. 
The  consuls 
go  to  the 
seat  of  war, 
216. 


Different 
views  of 
Aemilitis 
and  Varro. 


A  skirmish 

encourages 

Varro. 


Two 

Roman 

camps. 


magazine.  Hannibal,  by  its  capture,  not  only  got  a  rich  supply,  but, 
as  he  intended,  made  the  proconsuls  eager  to  fight  before  he  got 
complete  command  of  the  district.  They  sent  frequent  messages  to 
Rome  for  instructions  ;  and,  after  anxious  deliberation,  the  Senate 
decided  that  they  should  give  Hannibal  battle,  but  should  wait  the 
arrival  of  the  consuls. 

Aemilius  and  Varro  were  ordered  to  make  all  despatch,  and 
to  join  the  proconsuls  with  their  armies,  thus  raising  the  force  to 
eight  legions,  amounting,  with  allies,  to  about  80,000  men.  The 
hopes  of  the  Senate  were  centred  in  Aemilius,  whose  military  career 
had  been  brilliant.  They  neither  liked  nor  trusted  Varro,  and  their 
sentiments  are  dramatically  represented  by  Livy  in  the  form  of  a  solemn 
warning  delivered  by  Fabius  to  Aemilius,  on  the  eve  of  his  departure,  to 
beware  of  his  colleague's  rashness  not  less  than  of  the  enemy's  forces, 
and  to  keep  resolutely  to  the  policy  which  he  himself  had  followed. 

There  seems  no  doubt,  however,  that  the  consuls  went  to  the 
seat  of  war  with  instructions  to  fight ;  and  Aemilius's  address  to  the 
soldiers,  on  his  joining  the  army,  assumed  that  a  battle  was  to  be 
sought  with  all  speed.  Still  they  would  have  to  exercise  discretion 
as  to  the  ground  on  which  to  fight ;  and  on  this  point  Aemilius  soon 
found  himself  at  variance  with  Varro.  When  after  two  days' 
march  they  came  in  sight  of  Hannibal's  position  at  Cannae,  Aemilius 
at  once  observed  that  the  country  was  too  flat  and  open  to  engage 
an  enemy  superior  in  cavalry.  They  must  first  try  to  draw  him  to 
ground  more  favourable  to  themselves.  Varro  thought  differently. 
He  knew  that  to  fight  was  what  was  expected  of  him  at  Rome.  He 
had  had  no  experience  of  actual  warfare,  and  perhaps  thought  that 
eight  Roman  legions  formed  so  overpowering  a  force  that  victory  was 
secure.  When  both  consuls  were  at  the  seat  of  war  it  was  customary 
for  them  to  take  the  chief  command  on  alternate  days.  The  day 
after  they  arrived  within  about  six  miles  of  Hannibal's  camp,  it  was 
Varro's  turn  to  command,  and  he  immediately  ordered  an  advance. 
Hannibal  hurled  his  light-armed  troops  and  cavalry  at  his  line,  and 
a  somewhat  severe  struggle  ensued,  only  ended  by  nightfall,  and,  on 
the  whole,  not  unfavourable  to  the  Romans. 

Next  day  Aemilius  could  no  longer  draw  off  his  army  as  he 
would  have  wished.  He  set  himself,  however,  to  secure  his  position 
as  far  as  he  could.  He  fortified  one  camp  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Aufidus,  in  which  he  placed  two-thirds  of  the  army,  while  the  remain- 
ing third  was  entrenched  in  a  smaller  camp  on  the  right  bank,  near 
the  ford,  less  than  two  miles  from  the  enemy.  His  object  was  to 
have  protection  for  his  own  foraging  parties,  and  a  means  of  attack- 
ing those  of  the  enemy,  while  this  smaller  camp  was  sufficiently 
within  reach  of  the  larger  to  secure  mutual  support. 


] 


XXIII  BATTLE  OF  CANNAE  325 

Hannibal  formed  a  camp  on  the  left  bank  of  the  river  also,  and  Hannibal 
gave  every  sign  of  wishing  for  a  battle.      In  fact,  a  battle  was  neces-  provokes 
sary  to  him.     As  long  as  the  present  position  continued,  he  could  ^  ^'^^^l^- 
neither  collect  supplies  nor  march  elsewhere  without  being  attacked. 
Aemilius,  however,  still  thought  the  place  unsafe.      He  felt  sure  that 
Hannibal  would  soon  be  obliged  to  shift  his  quarters,  and  could  be 
better  attacked  in  the  process,  or  on  other  ground.      But  next  day 
Varro  was   in  command,   and  resolved  to  fight.       On  the  previous 
evening  their  watering  parties  had  been  harassed  by  the  Numidian 
cavalry,  and  the  soldiers  were  as  eager  for  battle  as  the  consul,  and 
when  they  rose  in  the  morning  rejoiced  to  see  the  red  flag  flying 
over  his  tent. 

The  men  from  the  greater  camp  crossed  the  Aufidus,  and  were  Roman 
drawn  up  facing  south,  with  2000  Roman  cavalry  on  their  right,  ^^d^^- 
resting  on  the  river,  and  4000  allied  cavalry  on  the  left.  There 
were  70,000  infantry  on  the  ground,  10,000  being  left  to  guard 
the  camp.  The  heavy -armed  were  in  column,  with  less  space 
than  usual  between  the  maniples  ;  the  light-armed  were  slightly  in 
advance. 

On  Hannibal's  right  was  a  body  of  Balearic  slingers  and  light-  Hannibal 
armed  javelin-throwers  ;  on  his  left,  close  to  the  river,  and  facing  the  order. 
Roman  cavalry,  were  4000  Spanish  and  Gallic  horse  ;  on  his  right, 
facing  the  allied  cavalry,  6000  Numidian  light  horse.  His  line  was 
formed  of  his  heavy-armed  Africans  in  two  bodies  on  the  right  and 
left,  with  Spanish  and  Gallic  infantry  in  the  centre.  His  line  was 
about  the  same  length  as  that  of  the  Romans  ;  but  after  a  while  he 
moved  the  Spaniards  and  Gauls  forward,  and  so  graduated  the  posi- 
tion of  the  companies  to  the  right  and  left  of  them  that  the  whole 
presented  somewhat  the  appearance  of  a  crescent,  with  the  convex 
towards  the  enemy.  The  object  of  this  arrangement  was  that  the 
African  troops,  who  were  well  armed  with  Roman  weapons  taken  in 
previous  battles,  should  form  a  reserve,  while  the  worse  armed  and 
less  trustworthy  Gauls  and  Spaniards  should  receive  the  first  attack 
of  the  enemy. 

The  battle  was  begun  by  an  engagement  between  the  light-armed   The  battle 
troops  in  front  of  the  respective  lines,  and  was  for  some  time  unde-  </  Cannae 
cisive.      But  presently  the  4000  Spanish  and  Gallic  cavalry  on  the  ^"-^/^^S^^ 
left  joined  in  the  attack  upon  the  Roman  light-armed,  dismounting 
and  grappling  with  their  enemies,   who  were  utterly  routed.      The 
greater  part  fell  on  the  ground,  and  when  the  survivors  fled  towards 
the  river  the  cavalry  pursued,  cutting  them  down,  and  giving  no 
quarter.      The   Roman  heavy -armed  then  advanced  to   the  ground 
abandoned  by  the  light-armed,  and,  closing  their  ranks  and  reducing 
the  space  between  the  maniples,  charged  the  Carthaginian  centre  in 


CHAP.  XXIII         ANNIHILATION  OF  ROMAN  ARMY  327 

a  solid  wedge.  Their  immense  weight  told  at  once,  and  they  cut 
their  way  through  the  thin  line  of  Spanish  and  African  infantry.  But 
this  success  proved  fatal  to  them.  They  pursued  too  far,  and  the 
two  Carthaginian  wings  faced  to  left  and  right,  and  charged  their 
flanks.  Thus  surrounded  they  fought  gallantly  ;  but  their  line  was 
disordered,  and  each  maniple,  or  even  each  soldier,  fought  as,  and 
where,  he  best  could.  Aemilius  had  already  been  engaged  in  the 
disastrous  fight  with  the  cavalry.  He  now  rode  up  to  the  centre  and 
led  the  charge  in  person,  Hannibal  also  being  in  the  centre  of  his 
own  line.  For  some  time  the  struggle  went  on,  until  Hasdrubal, 
who  commanded  the  left  cavalry,  returned  from  chasing  the  light- 
armed,  and  after  assisting  the  Numidian  cavalry  to  drive  off  the 
cavalry  on  the  left  of  the  Roman  line,  returned  to  the  centre  and 
charged  the  legions  on  the  rear. 

Then  all  was  lost.     Aemilius  fell  in  the  thick  of  the  fight,  and  the  The 
consuls  of  the  previous  year,  Atilius  and  Servilius,  soon  shared  his  Romans 
fate.     The  bulk  of  the  soldiers  fighting  doggedly  to  the  last  were  ^^^'^^^^^^ 
gradually  reduced  by  continual  charges  on  every  side  to  a  disordered  Aemilius 
mass  of  fugitives,  most  of  whom  were  cut  off  in  detail,  though  some  killed. 
escaped  along  the  road  or  across  country  towards  Venusia.      The 
cavalry  had    dismounted   and   fought    on  foot ;  but   some   of  them 
managed  to  regain  their  horses  and  escape.     As  Cn.  Lentulus  was 
galloping  off  the  field  he  saw  Aemilius,  we  are  told,  sitting  on  a  rock, 
bleeding  from  numberless  wounds.      He  would  have  given  him  his 
horse  to  secure  his  escape.      The  consul  refused,  preferring  to  die 
with  his  men  ;  but  he  bade  Lentulus  hasten  to  Rome  to  warn  the 
Senate  to  strengthen  the  defences  of  the  city,  and  to  tell  Fabius  that 
he  had  not  forgotten  to  follow  his  advice.  1 

Terentius  Varro,  with  about  seventy  horsemen,  escaped  to  Venusia.    Varro 
But  the  Roman  army  was  annihilated..     Out  of  the  70,000  infantiy  escapes  to 
actually  engaged  on  the  field  little  more  than  3000  escaped  to  the   Venusia. 
neighbouring  towns,  though  almost  as  many  more  appear  to  have 
wandered  about  in  the  country,  and  eventually  rejoined  ;  while  on 
the  field  lay  piles  of  dead,  among  whom  was  one  of  the  consuls  for 
the  year,  the  two  consuls  of  the  previous  year,  beside  other  con- 
sulars,  the  quaestors  of  both  consuls,  twenty-nine  out  of  forty-eight 
military  tribunes,  numerous  ex-praetors  and   ex-aediles,  and  eighty 
senators.      Some  600  from  the  lesser  camp,  under  a  military  tribune, 
P.  Sempronius  Tuditanus,  closed  their  ranks  and  made  their  way  to 
the  larger  camp,  and,  being  joined  by  a  detachment  from  it,  fought 
their  way  to  Canusium.     The    10,000  guarding  the  greater  camp 
had  made  early  in  the  day  an  ineffectual  attempt  to  storm  the  Car- 

'  This  is  not  mentioned  by  Polybius,  and  is  hardly  consistent  with  his  narra- 
tive. 


328 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Spirited 
cotiduct  of 
Varro,  and 
of  Scipio 
and  others, 
216. 


thaginian  camp ;  they  were  now  surrounded  by  Hannibal's  victorious 
army,  and,  after  losing  2000  men,  were  compelled  to  surrender.  The 
number  of  the  prisoners  was  swollen  by  those  taken  on  the  field,  and 
by  about  2000  stragglers  brought  in  by  the  Numidian  cavalry,  which 
scoured  the  country  round. 

That  all  was  not  lost  was  greatly  due  to  the  fortitude  of  Varro, 
and  to  the  patriotism  of  four  military  tribunes — Fabius  Maximus, 
son  of  Cunctator,  Publicius  Bibulus,  P.  Cornelius  Scipio  [Africanus], 
Appius  Claudius  Pulcher.  These  four  young  nobles  had  made  their 
way  to  Canusium,  some  five  miles  from  the  field,  with  others,  among 
whom  counsels  of  despair  prevailed.  Rome  was  lost,  they  thought ; 
it  was  better  to  escape  over  sea  where  their  swords  might  find  them 
a  new  career.  L.  Caecilius  Metellus  actually  proposed  to  do  so. 
But  Scipio  and  the  other  three  came  to  the  place  in  which  they  were 
deliberating,  and  with  drawn  swords  forced  them  to  swear  that  they 
would  not  desert  their  countiy.  Meanwhile  Varro,  at  Venusia, 
twenty-eight  miles  from  Cannae,  had  been  exerting  himself  to  collect 
the  scattered  remains  of  his  army.  Before  long  he  mustered  between 
4000  and  5000  infantry  and  cavalry,  which  were  almost  daily  in- 
creased by  fresh  arrivals,  until  he  had  again  something  like  a  con- 
sular army.  The  refugees  at  Canusium  had  been  furnished  with 
necessaries  by  a  lady  named  Busa  ;  those  at  Venusia  were  supplied 
by  the  municipality  with  money,  clothes,  and  arms,  besides  receiving 
many  private  benefactions.  After  hearing  from  Scipio,  Varro  led  his 
men  to  Canusium  to  await  orders  from  home. 

The  Carthaginian  army  was  no  longer  threatening  them.  After 
making  arrangements  as  to  booty  and  captives  Hannibal  marched 
westward  into  Samnium  towards  Compsa,  in  the  territory  of  the 
Hirpini,  on  the  upper  course  of  the  Aufidus,  to  which  he  had  been 
invited  by  a  man  of  influence  named  Statius  Trebius.  There  seems 
to  have  been  a  feeling  among  his  army  that  he  might  advance  at  once 
against  Rome,  instead  of  attending  to  this  and  similar  invitations. 
Cato  recorded  that  Maharbal,  his  captain  of  the  horse,  assured  him 
that  if  he  would  only  send  him  on  at  once  with  the  cavalry  he  should 
"  on  the  fifth  day  feast  as  conqueror  on  the  Capitol."  The  question 
why  Hannibal  refrained  was  long  a  theme  for  declamation,  and  may 
perhaps  be  still  regarded  as  a  problem.  We  must  remember  that 
his  object  was  to  rouse  the  Italian  states,  and  attack  Rome  with  all 
Italy  at  his  back.  Would  it  be  wise,  before  securing  that  object, 
with  an  army  wearied  and  diminished  (for  he  had  lost  6000  men  in 
the  battle),  to  attack  a  strong  city,  still  rich  in  resources  and  filled 
with  a  warlike  and  desperate  people  ?  *'  You  know  how  to  win  a 
victory,  Hannibal" — Maharbal  is  represented  as  saying — "but  not 
how    to   use    it."      Perhaps   he  might    more    truly  have    said    that 


DISMAY  AT  ROME  329 


Hannibal  knew  the  limitations  of  his  powers,  and  what  he  could  and 
could  not  do.i 

The  rumour  of  disaster  reached  Rome  before  any  official  report,  Measures 
and  as  usual   even  exaggerated   the  blow,  heavy  as   it  was.     Both  of  defence 
consuls,  it  was  reported,  had  fallen  ;  their  armies  had  been  utterly  ^^  ^ome, 
destroyed.      Hannibal  was  master  of  Apulia,  of  Samnium,  of  nearly 
all  Italy.     The  city  was  without  an  army  or  a  general.     Hannibal 
himself  would  before  long  be  at  their  gates. 

The  praetors  summoned  the  Senate  to  discuss  the  defence  of 
Rome.  It  met  in  such  excitement,  and  amid  such  sounds  of 
mourning,  that  for  a  time  it  seemed  impossible  even  to  discuss  or 
suggest  a  plan.  At  length  Q.  Fabius  Maximus  proposed  that  some 
horsemen  should  be  sent  along  the  Appian  'and  Latin  Roads  to 
question  stragglers  and  to  discover  where  Hannibal  was  ;  that 
sentinels  be  posted  at  the  gates  to  bring  all  fugitives  to  the  praetors, 
and  to  prevent  a  flight  of  men  from  the  city, — to  convince  all  that  their 
one  hope  of  safety  was  to  defend  their  homes.  The  voice  of  decision 
is  always  acceptable  to  men  dismayed  and  puzzled.  Fabius's  proposal 
hushed  the  tumult.  The  magistrates  recovered  their  presence  of 
mind,  and  with  the  help  of  the  senators  forced  the  excited  crowds 
from  the  Forum.  Presently  a  horseman  entered  the  gates  with  a  Despatch 
despatch  from  Varro,  announcing  the  death  of  Aemilius  and  the  from 
destruction  of  his  army.  But  it  added  that  "  he  himself  was  at  ^^'-ffo. 
Canusium  gathering  the  wrecks  of  the  disaster,  and  had  already 
nearly  10,000  men,  though  grievously  disorganised.  Hannibal  was 
at  Cannae  still,  trafficking  for  prisoners  and  booty,  unlike  a  great 
conqueror  or  general." 

Another  outburst  of  grief  followed  the  announcement  of  the  list 
of  dead.  Not  a  single  matron  but  was  placed  in  mourning,  and 
thereby  prevented  from  joining  in  the  rites  of  Ceres  which  were 
celebrated  about  this  time  by  the  Roman  ladies.  ^  The  feeling  of 
terror  was  heightened  by  the  receipt  about  the  same  time  of  a 
message  from  Titus  Otacilius,  asking  for  more  ships  to  protect  the  Fresh 
kingdom  of  Hiero,  which  he  was  unable  to  do  because  a  second  disasters. 
Carthaginian    fleet    was    threatening    Sicily.       Reports    of   portents 

^  The  famous  story  of  Maharbal's  proposal  and  comment  is  not  noticed 
by  Polybius,  though  he  records  the  feehng  in  the  Carthaginian  army  in  favour  of 
attacking  Rome.  Livy  (xxii.  51)  is  said  to  have  taken  it  from  Caelius,  who  copied 
it  from  Cato  (Gell.  x.  24,  6).  The  later  authorities  tell  it  with  variations.  Florus 
(i.  22,  19),  Valerius  Max.  (ix.  5),  Zonaras  (ix.  i)  agree  with  Livy.  Plutarch 
{Fab.  17)  gives  the  advice  to  "  his  friends  "  and  the  comment  to  "  Barcas. "  Silius 
Itahcus  (x.  375)  makes  Mago  the  spokesman. 

2  The  Ludi  Cereales  were  on  the  ides  of  April.  The  battle  of  Cannae  seems 
certainly  to  have  been  fought  in  August.  These  later  cerealia  seem  to  have  been 
mysteries  celebrated,  like  those  of  the  Bona  Dea,  by  women  alone. 


330 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP.  XXIII 


High 
Spirit  of 
the  Senate, 
216. 


Varro 
returns  to 
Ro7ne  and 
is  well 
received. 


spread  from  mouth  to  mouth,  and,  to  crown  all,  two  Vestal  Virgins 
were  convicted  of  unchastity.  One  of  them  forestalled  her  fate  by- 
suicide  ;  the  other  underwent  the  cruel  punishment  of  living  burial, 
while  her  lover  was  beaten  to  death  in  the  Forum.  The  Sibylline 
books  were  consulted,  Fabius  Pictor  sent  to  Delphi,  and,  without 
waiting  for  the  answer  of  the  oracle,  two  men  and  women,  Gaul 
and  Greek,  are  said,  as  before,  to  have  been  buried  alive  in  the 
Forum  Boarium. 

..-  But  the  Senate  took  other  and  more  reasonable  steps.  Marcellus, 
commanding  the  fleet  at  Ostia,  was  ordered  to  relieve  Varro.  Sending 
1500  marines  for  the  defence  of  Rome,  and  despatching  the  legion 
belonging  to  the  fleet  to  Sidicinum  on  the  Latin  Road,  he  handed 
over  the  command  of  the  ships  to  M.  Furius,  and  hastened  to  lead 
his  men  in  the  direction  of  Canusium.  On  the  order  of  the  Senate 
M.  Junius  Pera  was  named  dictator,  who,  with  Ti.  Sempronius  as 
master  of  the  horse,  proclaimed  a  general  levy.  Youths  below  the 
military  age  were  enrolled,  and  8000  slaves  freed  at  the  public 
expense  on  condition  of  serving  in  the  army.  By  these  means  four 
legions,  with  1000  cavalry,  were  made  up,  and  the  usual  complement 
demanded  from  the  Italian  towns. 

The  unbroken  spirit  of  the  Senate  was  farther  shown  by  the 
stern  answer  to  the  prayer  of  the  prisoners  taken  at  Cannae  that 
they  might  be  ransomed.  Though  besieged  by  the  mournful  relatives 
and  friends  of  the  prisoners,  the  Fathers  refused  to  depart  from  the 
ancient  rule  which  left  the  Roman  soldier  no  hope  but  to  conquer  or 
jdi^  One  of  the  envoys,  who  had  given  their  oath  to  return,  had 
made  some  excuse  for  going  back  to  Hannibal's  camp,  and,  pretending 
to  have  thus  fulfilled  his  promise,  endeavoured  to  remain  behind  at 
Rome,  but  was  detected  and  sent  back  in  chains  to  Hannibal. 

Nor  was  this  the  only  sign  that  the  people  and  Senate  were  not  " 
utterly  carried  away  by  panic.  A  despatch  was  sent  to  Varro, 
ordering  his  return  to  Rome  as  soon  as  was  consistent  with  the  good 
of  the  State.  When  he  did  return  the  people  gave  a  generous  proof 
that  neither  anger  nor  terror  had  blinded  them  to  the  value  of  his 
services  since  the  battle.  He  was  met  by  a  procession  of  all  classes, 
as  he  might  have  been  if  his  fasces  had  been  wreathed  with  the 
laurel  of  victory,  and  he  was  publicly  thanked  because  he  had  not 
despaired  of  the  Republic.  A  people  calm  enough  to  be  just  in  the 
midst  of  such  disasters  is  not  conquered.  A  general  whose  popularity 
survived  Cannae  cannoflTave'been  a  mere  empty  demagogue. 


v^A 


t 


Authorities. — See  p.  312. 


i 


CHAPTER   XXIV 

SECOND    PERIOD — FROM    CANNAE    TO    METAURUS,   2l6-207 

Hannibal,  after  Cannae,  is  joined  by  Italian  towns — Enters  Campania,  recoils 
from  Naples,  but  is  joined  by  Capua — Movements  of  Marcellus — The  Castra 
Claudiana.  Spain  —  Defeat  of  Hasdrubal  and  diversion  of  Carthaginian 
reinforcements  from  Italy  (216)  —  Hannibal  winters  in  Capua  {216-215)  — 
Takes  Casilinum  (215)  —  Fall  of  Postumius.  Sicily  —  Death  of  Hiero  — 
Hieronymus  joins  Carthage — Revolution  at  Syracuse  and  death  of  Hieronymus 
(215) — Hippocrates  and  Epicydes  at  Syracuse  defy  the  Romans — Marcellus 
in  Sicily — Siege  of  Syracuse  (214-212) — The  inventions  of  Archimedes — 
Hanno  at  Agrigentum  (212).  Italy  (214-207) — Hannibal  in  Campania — 
Goes  to  Tarentum  (214)  —  Fabius  takes  Arpi  —  Hannibal  takes  Tarentum 
(212)  —  Livius  holds  the  citadel  (212-210)  —  Siege  of  Capua  —  Hannibal's 
march  on  Rome  —  Fall  of  Capua  and  settlement  of  Campania  (211)  —  Fall 
of  Cn.  Fulvius  at  Herdonia — Three  days'  fighting  in  Lucania — Marcellus 
confined  to  Venusia  (210) — Fabius  recovers  Tarentum  (209) — Fall  of  Mar- 
cellus (208) — Defeat  of  Hasdrubal  on  the  Metaurus  (207). 

Unsurpassed  as  a  commander  and  strategist  in  camp  or  field  Effects  of 
Hannibal  never,  except  at  Saguntum,  won  a  great  success  against  ^^^  battle 
v^alled  towns.  It  is  likely,  therefore,  that  he  was  right  in  rejecting  ^  a^^Z^^' 
the  suggestion  of  an  advance  upon  Rome.  His  troops  would  follow 
him  anywhere  and  fight  any  one,  but  his  veterans  from  Africa  were 
reduced  in  number,  and  neither  Spaniards  nor  Gauls  would  have 
endured  the  fatigues  of  a  great  siege.  Meanwhile  the  results  of 
Cannae  answered  his  expectations.  Revolt  from  Rome  spread  through 
the  Italian  towns,  and  he  soon  might  hope  that  the  Republic  would 
be  reduced  to  the  old  limit  of  Latium,  shut  off  from  the  south  by  a 
chain  of  free  states,  and  from  the  north  by  the  Gauls,  without  the 
intervening  posts  which  had  been  gradually  formed  in  Etruria  to 
resist  them.  The  states  of  Bruttium,  with  the  one  exception  of 
Petelia,  joined  Hannibal.  All  Lucania,  all  the  Samnites  except  the 
Pentri,  the  Campanian  Calatia  and  Atella,  some  of  the  towns  of 
Apulia,  were  ready  to  shake  off  the  Roman  yoke  even  at  the  cost  of 
accepting  a  Punic  garrison.     Always  fated  to  take  the  losing  side 


332 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


the  Greek  Tarentum,  Metapontum,  Croton,  and  Locri  hastened  to 
renounce  allegiance  to  Rome. 

The  movement  was  so  general  that  Hannibal  seems  to  have 
thought  that  the  Romans  might  be  already  willing  to  yield,  and  he 
is  said  to  have  sent  an  emissary  to  Rome  with  the  deputation  of 
prisoners,  with  authority  to  treat.  But  to  complete  the  isolation  of 
Rome  it  was  necessary  to  occupy  Campania.  Leaving  his  heavy 
baggage  at  Compsa,  in  the  territory  of  the  Hirpini,  to  which  he  had 
been  invited  immediately  after  Cannae,  and  detaching  a  force  under 
Himilco  to  secure  Lucania  and  Bruttium,  he  entered  Campania  and 
approached  Naples.  A  seaport  was  necessary  to  him  for  the  recep- 
tion of  the  reinforcement  and  supplies  which  he  hoped  the  victory 
would  bring  from  home.  But  the  sight  of  its  lofty  walls  deterred  him 
from  attempting  a  storm,  and  the  citizens  showed  no  disposition  to 
open  their  gates.  He  turned  aside  to  Capua,  where  he  knew  the 
majority  were  prepared  to  welcome  him.  In  most  Campanian  towns 
the  aristocracy  wished  to  stand  by  Rome ;  the  populace,  in  hopes 
of  more  complete  autonomy,  were  inclined  to  Hannibal.  This  was 
specially  the  case  at  Capua,  where  the  "  knights  "  enjoyed  conubium 
with  Rome  and  were  connected  with  Roman  families,  while  300 
of  them  were  actually  serving  in  the  army  in  Sicily.  But  a 
revolution  of  the  previous  year  had  given  the  popular  party  the 
upper  hand,  and  though  a  regard  for  the  safety  of  the  300  in 
Sicily  induced  them  to  send  offers  of  assistance  to  Varro  at  Canusium, 
the  emissaries  were  so  convinced  of  Rome's  weakness  by  Varro's 
eager  acceptance,  that  on  their  return  they  persuaded  the  people  to 
open  communications  with  Hannibal.  He  consented  that  they  should 
retain  their  autonomy  ;  that  no  Campanian  should  be  under  the 
jurisdiction  of  a  Carthaginian  magistrate  or  serve  against  his  will  in 
the  Carthaginian  army  ;  and,  to  relieve  the  anxiety  of  the  "knights" 
for  the  safety  of  the  300  in  Sicily,  he  handed  over  300  Roman  prisoners 
as  hostages.  But  there  was  to  be  a  Punic  garrison  in  Capua,  and 
the  futility  of  all  stipulations  for  independence  was  at  once  shown 
by  Hannibal's  arresting  and  shipping  to  Carthage  the  leader  of  the 
Romanising  party,  Decius  Magius. 

Fixing  his  headquarters  at  Capua,  Hannibal  endeavoured  to 
secure  other  strong  places  in  Campania.  The  first  object  of  attack 
was  Nola,  about  twenty-one  miles  south  of  Capua.  Here  the  same 
division  of  feeling  existed,  but  the  aristocrats  were  still  in  the 
ascendant  and  contrived  to  communicate  with  Marcellus,  who  had 
now  left  the  command  in  Apulia  to  the  dictator,  and  established 
himself  at  Casilinum,  which  controlled  the  bridge  over  the  Voltumus. 
He  marched  up  that  river,  crossed  it  near  Saticula,  and  skirting 
Mount  Taburnus  came  in  sight  of  Nola.      Hannibal  retired  along  the 


1 


XXIV  HANNIBAL  IN  CAPUA  333 

road  towards  Naples,  and  turning  to  the  left  appeared  before  Nuceria,  Nuceria. 
sixteen  miles  from  Nola.      Here  he  must  have  spent  some  time,  for 
the  inhabitants  only  yielded  to  famine,  and  were  allowed  to  depart 
with  their  lives,  dispersing  into  other  Campanian  towns,  while  their 
own  was  plundered  and  burnt.      He  then  again  approached  Nola, 
now  occupied  by  Marcellus,  and  trusting  to  an  arrangement  with  the 
democratic  party  made  preparations  for  an  assault.      But   Marcellus  Repulse  at 
had  discovered  the  intrigue,  and  so  disposed  his  forces  as  to  bring  ^ola. 
them  out  from  three  separate  gates,  and  attack  the  Carthaginians 
— who   expected  to   find   the   town   divided  by   a  contest   between 
the  two  parties — on  three  points  at  once.     There  was  nothing  left 
but  to  retire.      Some  loss  was  inflicted  on  the  enemy,  but  the  chief 
satisfaction  was  that  for  the  first  time  Hannibal  had  sustained  some- 
thing like  a  check.i     The  siege  of  Nola  was  abandoned,  and  the 
traitors  within  the  walls  punished. 

Hannibal   next  attacked  Acerrae,  but  the  people  escaped,  and  Hannibal 
instead  of  securing  another  state  friendly  to  himself  he  could  only  "^^"1^*"^  «^ 
plunder  and  burn  a  deserted  town.      He  then  retired   into  winter     ^Z^^- 
quarters  at  Capua,  after  first  vainly  attempting  to  secure  Casilinum, 
then  occupied  by  a  garrison  of  men  from  Praeneste,  Perusia,  and 
other  towns,  who  had  been  too  late  to  join  the  army  at  Cannae. 
These  men  maintained  an  heroic  defence  through  the  winter  months, 
and  only  surrendered  eventually  when  reduced  to  the  last  extremity 
of  starvation  ;  and  it  was  not  until  the  beginning  of  2 1 5  that  the 
town  was  handed  over  to  the  people  of  Capua  and  occupied  by  a 
Punic  garrison.      Thus  though   Hannibal  was  in  the  heart  of  Cam- 
pania   he    had   secured   no    harbour  town,    and   was   watched    and 
threatened  from  the  Castra  Claudiana^  which  Marcellus  had  fortified 
above  Suessula,  and  was  debarred  from  Latium. 

Besides  a  somewhat  favourable  answer  brought  from  Delphi  by  Good  news 
Fabius  Pictor,  the  Romans  were  encouraged  by  good  news  from  from  Spain 
Spain  before  the  beginning  of  the  next  consular  year.  Hasdrubal  ^ffj^^^^^^ 
had  been  hampered  in  the  early  part  of  2 1 6  by  a  revolt  in  southern 
Spain,  over  which  he  triumphed  with  difficuhy  ;  and  when  he  ad- 
vanced later  in  the  year  to  the  Ebro  he  was  under  orders  to  make 
his  way  to  Italy,  which  impaired  his  prestige  in  Spain  and  made  it 
probable  that  the  country  behind  him  would  rise.      He  fouijd  the 

1  This  and  other  achievements  of  Marcellus  are  doubted,  chiefly  on  the 
authority  of  a  fragmentary  sentence  of  Polybius  (Plutarch,  Compar.  Marc,  et 
Pelop.),  "Marcellus  never  conquered  Hannibal."  But  Polybius  seems  to  mean 
"  in  a  pitched  battle."  Livy's  narrative  does  not  here  or  elsewhere  attribute  such 
a  victory  to  Marcellus.  In  this  instance  it  does  not  seem  certain  that  Hannibal 
was  personally  engaged,  and  a  check,  however  slight,  to  any  part  of  his  forces 
would  in  the  then  state  of  alarm  seem  almost  a  victory. 


March, 

2IS- 


334 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


21^.    COSS. 

C.  Posturn- 
ius  Albinus 
occ,  Tib. 
Sempron- 
ius  Grac- 
chus, M. 
Claudius 
Marcellus 
abd.,  Q. 
Fabius 
Maximus 
III. 


Scipios  on  the  Ebro,  and  after  a  few  days'  skirmishing  was  com- 
pletely defeated,  escaping  from  the  field  with  only  a  handful  of  men. 
This  not  only  prevented  his  reinforcement  of  Hannibal,  but  was 
followed  by  a  general  defection  of  the  Spanish  tribes.  It  also 
diverted  the  expedition  to  south  Italy  from  Carthage,  which  had 
been  sent  in  consequence  of  Mago's  report  of  the  victory  of  Cannae, 
when  he  had  poured  out  upon  the  Senate -House  floor  a  large 
measure  of  gold  rings  taken  from  the  hands  of  Roman  knights  and 
senators,  and  had  bidden  them  judge  from  that  the  number  of  the 
common  soldiers  slain.  When  the  news  of  the  Spanish  disaster 
came,  he  was  bidden  to  take  to  Spain  the  money,  elephants, 
and  Numidian  cavalry  which  had  been  voted  for  Italy,  while  another 
expedition  was  fitted  out  for  Sardinia,  said  at  that  time  to  be  ready 
to  revolt  from  Rome. 

The  elections  were  therefore  held  with  more  cheerful  feelings  ; 
but  they  were  scarcely  over  when  fresh  dismay  was  caused  by  the 
news  that  one  of  those  elected,  C.  Postumius,  had  fallen  in  the  valley 
of  the  Po.  He  had  been  sent  in  2 1 6  as  praetor  to  effect  a  diversion 
among  the  Gauls,  but  had  fallen  into  an  ambush  in  the  Silva  Litana^ 
near  Bononia,  and  had  perished  with  nearly  his  whole  army.  Thus 
the  hold  of  Rome  upon  northern  Italy  was  seriously  weakened. 
From  Sicily  and  Sardinia  also  came  appeals  for  provisions  and 
reinforcements,  which  the  Senate  had  not  the  means  to  supply,  while 
they  were  even  obliged  to  say  in  answer  to  similar  appeals  from  Italian 
towns,  such  as  Petelia  in  Bruttium,  that  they  must  consult  for  their 
own  safety.  To  crown  all,  Hiero  of  Syracuse  died  during  the  winter. 
He  had  been  the  consistent  and  liberal  friend  of  Rome  since  263, 
and  he  was  succeeded  by  his  youthful  grandson  Hieronymus,  whose 
policy  was  unknown,  but  whose  father  Gelon  had  belonged  to  an 
anti-Roman  faction. 

Roman  life,  however,  went  on  as  usual.  We  hear  of  the  dedica- 
tion of  a  temple  of  Venus,  an  exhibition  of  gladiators,  and  the  annual 
games.  Even  the  jealousy  of  the  orders  survived.  Marcellus  was 
elected  in  place  of  Postumius,  but  was  forced  to  abdicate  on  the 
report  of  bad  omens,  really  because  of  the  still  existing  prejudice 
against  two  plebeian  consuls,  and  was  succeeded  by  Fabius  Cunctator. 
The  plan  of  the  campaign,  under  the  influence  of  Fabius,  was  again 
to  be  one  of  caution.  Marcellus,  as  proconsul,  commanded  in  the 
Castra  Claudianaj  Fabius  and  Gracchus,  the  former  with  the 
veterans  who  had  wintered  at  Teanum,  the  latter  with  an  army 
composed  of  slaves  who  volunteered  in  Apulia,  and  of  allies, — en- 
camped the  first  near  Casilinum,  the  second  at  Liternum,  near  Cumae. 
Pitched  battles  were  avoided,  but  every  chance  was  seized  of  cutting 
off  stragglers,  foraging  parties,  or  messengers.      Apulia  and  Tarentum 


XXIV  HANNIBAL  ABANDONS  CAMPANIA  335 

were  guarded  by  legions  brought  from  Sicily,  where  they  were  re- 
placed by  those  disgraced  at  Cannae,  and  by  twenty-five  ships  under 
the  praetor  Valerius  ;  Q.  Fabius  guarded  the  coast  of  Latium  with 
twenty-five  ships  ;  Varro  went  to  Picenum  to  levy  troops. 

Against  this  strategy  of  Fabius  and  Gracchus  Hannibal  effected  Reported 
nothing  of  importance.      The  Roman  writers  dwell  on  the  demoralisa-  demoral- 
tion   of  his    army  by  the   luxuries   of  a  Capuan   winter.      The  men  "^^^^^ J^, 
could  not  bear  the  hardships  of  the  camp  any  longer,  and  stole  back  ^^       ^ ^^^ 
to  the  town  at  every  opportunity.      Hannibal's  losses  in  battle  had 
not  been  supplied  by  reinforcements  from  home ;  the  Italian  allies 
could   scarcely  have  been   enthusiastic  ;  and  the   attack  on  walled 
towns  which  was  necessary  in  Campania  was  that  in  which  he  was 
least  successful.     Thus  he  was  baffled  in  an  attempt  upon  Cumae  ; 
his    lieutenant    Hanno    sustained    a   defeat    near    Grumentum    at 
the  hands  of  Sempronius   Longus,  which  appears  to  have  confined 
him  to  Bruttium  ;  and  the  praetor  Valerius   recovered  the  revolted 
towns  of  the  Hirpini.      Meanwhile  Fabius  had  been  taking  various 
strongholds  in  northern  Campania,  and  had  even  marched  past  Hanni- 
bal and  effected  a  junction  with  Marcellus  near  Nola.      It  was  not 
till  towards  the  end  of  the  summer  that  Hannibal  learnt  that  Hanno 
had   been   reinforced   and    could   join   him.      He    determined    upon  Reinforce- 
striking  one  blow  for  the  possession  of  Campania  by  attacking  Nola,  ments 
explaining  to  the  Hirpini,  who  begged  for  his  aid,  that  he  would  be  '^J^^^^ 
thus  rendering  them  the  most  effectual  assistance.      But   Marcellus 
had   already   occupied   Nola  in   force,    and    defended    himself  with  Repulsed 
spirit.     After  one   unsuccessful  sortie  he  seized  an  opportunity  for  before 
attacking  Hannibal's  army   when  weakened  by  the  detachment  of  '^'=^^^- 
foragers,  and  drove  it  back  on  its  camp  with  heavy  loss.      This  was 
followed  by  almost  the  only  instance  of  any  important  desertion  from 
Hannibal's  army,  and  before  long  he  raised  the  siege,  removed  to 
Apulia,  and  went  into  winter  quarters  near  Arpi. 

Thus  the  tide  seemed  on  the  turn.  During  the  same  season  a  Sardinia 
Carthaginian  fleet  and  army  had  been  beaten  in  Sardinia ;  and  and  Spain. 
though  Scipio  had  written  towards  the  end  of  the  season  asking  for 
large  supplies  of  men  and  money,  and  describing  the  pressing  wants 
of  his  army,  yet  his  despatch  also  contained  accounts  of  fresh  suc- 
cesses ;  and  the  poverty  of  the  exchequer  had  been  relieved  by  the 
voluntary  contribution  of  syndicates  of  wealthy  men,  who  advanced 
the  money  for  the  service  in  Spain  on  the  faith  of  the  public  credit. 

Hannibal  had,  on  the  other  hand,  been  encouraged  by  the  offer  Treaty 
of  alliance  from  Philip  of  Macedon.      Twice  the  ambassadors  who  between 
came  from  the  king  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Romans  :  for  having  ^^^^^P  ^• 
eluded  their  captors  on   their  way  to   Hannibal  by  the  cunning   of  Hannibal, 
their  leader  Xenophanes,  they  were   again   taken   on   their    return 


336 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


journey.  But  a  second  body  of  envoys  was  more  successful,  and 
returned  to  Macedonia  with  a  treaty  sworn  to  by  Hannibal,  in  which 
Philip  promised  all  assistance  to  the  Carthaginians  in  Italy,  which 
was  to  be  left  to  them  after  the  war  ;  while  Hannibal  in  return  agreed 
to  prevent  the  Romans  invading  Macedonia,  or  exercising  power  in 
Corcyra,  Apollonia,  Epidamnus,  and  Pharos,  and  guaranteed  the 
interests  of  Demetrius  of  Pharos.  But  the  capture  of  the  first  envoys 
had  enlightened  the  Romans,  and  had  prevented  Philip  from  attempt- 
ing the  invasion  of  Italy  for  that  year  (215)  with  his  fleet  of  200 
vessels  which  he  had  in  readiness.  Nor  indeed,  though  remaining 
nominally  at  war  with  Rome  till  205,  did  he  ever  intervene  with 
effect.  His  hostility,  however,  compelled  the  Romans  to  keep  a 
fleet  in  the  Adriatic. 

A  new  phase  in  the  war  now  begins,  and  the  interest  is  in  great 
degree  transferred  to  Sicily.  The  will  of  Hiero  of  Syracuse  had 
committed  his  young  grandson  Hieronymus  and  the  state  to  a 
council  of  thirteen.  Two  of  them,  Andranodorus  and  Zoippus,  sons- 
in-law  of  Hiero,  were  opposed  to  the  Roman  alliance,  and  persuaded 
the  king  that  he  had  sovereign  rights  over  all  Sicily,  as  grandson  of 
Pyrrhus,  which  he  might  secure  by  negotiation  with  Carthage. 
Hannibal  promptly  sent  legates  to  Syracuse,  among  whom  were 
Hippocrates  and  Epicydes,  sons  of  a  Syracusan  exile  in  Carthage, 
who  at  once  gained  great  influence  in  the  court  and  army.  The 
praetor  Appius  Claudius  sent  a  warning  to  the  young  king,  who, 
however,  treated  the  Roman  legates  with  contumely;  taunted  them 
with  the  defeats  in  Italy  ;  and  reproached  the  Romans  for  having 
dared  to  send  a  fleet  into  Syracusan  waters  during  his  grandfather's 
hfetime.  Nor  did  he  stop  here.  He  at  once  sent  envoys  to 
Carthage  to  sign  a  treaty  in  which  the  Himera  was  acknowledged  as 
the  boundary  of  the  Carthaginian  territory  in  Sicily.  As  it  was 
about  to  be  signed,  however,  another  envoy  arrived  claiming  the 
whole  of  Sicily.  But  the  Carthaginian  government,  though  thus 
enlightened  as  to  the  nature  of  their  new  ally,  thought  it  too  import- 
ant to  secure  the  hostility  of  Syracuse  to  Rome  to  allow  them  to 
stand  on  trifles.  If  they  won,  Hieronymus  could  be  dealt  with  after- 
wards.    The  concession  was  therefore  made. 

Hieronymus  farther  committed  himself  by  telling  the  Roman 
envoys  sent  to  remonstrate  that  he  would  abide  by  his  grandfather's 
treaty,  if  the  Romans  repaid  the  gold  and  corn  supplied  by  Hiero, 
and  acknowledged  all  Sicily  east  of  the  Himera  to  be  Syracusan. 
This  meant  war,  and  preparations  were  immediately  made  for  it. 
Epicydes  and  Hippocrates  were  sent  to  attempt  towns  held  by 
Roman  garrisons,  and  the  king  at  the  head  of  an  army  started  for 
Leontini.     As  he  was  entering  the  town,  however,  he  was  assassinated 


XXIV  MOVEMENTS  IN  SICILY  AGAINST  ROME  337 

by  conspirators,  who,  whether  acting  from  private   motives  of  ven- 
geance or  on  a  hint  from  their  Carthaginian  friends,  pacified  the 
army  and  the  citizens  of  Syracuse  by  dilating  on  the  "liberty"  thus 
secured.      Andranodorus,  who  had  been  left  in  charge  of  Syracuse, 
ensconced  himself  in  Ortygia,  shut   off  from   the  rest  of  the  city  by 
strong  fortifications,  but  next   day  submitted   to   the  orders  of  the 
Senate  and  people,  and  was  elected  one  of  the  "  generals  "  to  whom 
the  government  of  the  city  was  now  to  be  assigned.      But  Hippo-  Hippocrates 
crates  and  Epicydes  presently  returned  to  Syracuse,  and  by  spread-  ^'^^ 
ing  a  report  that  Andranodorus  was  aiming  at  tyranny,  secured  his     ^^'^^  ^^' 
assassination  in  a  riot,  along  with  the  survivors  of  the  royal  family 
and  their  partisans,  and  were  themselves  elected  generals. 

The  election  of  these  agents  of  Hannibal  showed  that  Republican 
no  less  than  Royal  Syracuse  meant  to  renounce  the  Roman  alliance. 
They  did  not,  however,  openly  avow  this  purpose,  though  deprecat- 
ing a  mission  which  had  already  been  sent  to  the  Roman  camp.  A 
Roman  fleet  off  Murgantia  was  watching  events,  and  for  a  time  they 
remained  quiet  and  allowed  the  negotiation  with  Marcellus,  the  new 
consul  who  had  now  come  to  Sicily,  to  go  on.  But  when  a  Cartha-  Outbreak  at 
ginian  fleet  appeared  rounding  Pachynus,  they  threw  off  their  disguise  Syracuse. 
and  denounced  their  colleagues  as  ready  to  sacrifice  their  new  free- 
dom to  Rome.  The  appearance  of  the  Roman  fleet  at  the  mouth 
of  the  harbour  seemed  to  confirm  their  words.  The  excited  mob 
rushed  dov/n  to  the  beach  as  though  to  oppose  a  descent  of  the 
enemy,  and  were  with  difficulty  persuaded  of  their  impotence  and  of 
the  necessity  of  continuing  negotiation. 

But  Hippocrates  and  Epicydes  were  resolved  to  commit  Syracuse   The 
to  open  hostility  with  Rome.      The  Leontines  had  made  some  raids  Leontines 
on  Roman  territory,  and  had  refused  restitution,  affirming  that  they  P^^^  ^ 
were  not  bound  by  Syracusan  treaties.      The  Syracusans  sent  an  army 
ostensibly  to  enforce  their  remonstrance ;  but  meanwhile  Marcellus  had 
taken  Leontini,  where  he  found  and  executed  2000  Roman  deserters. 
Hippocrates  had  been  on  a  mission  to  Leontini,  and  escaping,  joined 
Epicydes  and  the  Syracusan  army  at  Herbessus,  which  they  horrified 
by  an  account  of  the  severities  of  Marcellus  at  Leontini.      They  then 
worked  on  the  jealousy  of  the  mercenaries  against  the  natives,  and 
on  the  gratitude  to  Hannibal  of  some  Cretans  who  had  been  released 
after  Thrasymene.      The    Syracusan    generals    had   to   fly   for   their 
lives,  and  the  feelings  of  the  mercenaries  were  still  farther  inflamed 
by  the  production  of  forged  letters  from  them  to  Marcellus,  congratu- 
lating him  on  the  capture  of  Leontini,  and  begging  him  to  expel  all  Hippocratei 
mercenaries    from    Sicily.       The    army    followed    Hippocrates    and  ^  . 
Epicydes  to  Syracuse,  forced  the  gates,  were  joined  by  the  mob,  and  ^^i^ 
having  massacred  the  generals  and  their  adherents,  re-elected  Hippo-  generals. 

Z 


338 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAr. 


crates  and  Epicycles  joint  generals  amidst  a  scene  of  universal 
licence,  in  which  slaves  were  freed  and  the  prisons  thrown  open. 

The  Romans  could  not  see  .Syracuse  in  the  hands  of  theii* 
bitterest  opponents  with  indifference.  Marcellus  at  once  occupied 
the  Olympieum,  a  mile  and  a  half  from  the  city  ;  and  his  demand 
that  the  authors  of  the  massacre  should  be  given  up,  exiles  restored, 
and  a  free  government  established,  having  been  rejected,  began  the 
siege  by  land  and  sea. 

Syracuse  was  fortified  in  three  compartments.  The  citadel  was 
the  island  Ortygia,  stretching  south  towards  Plemmyrium,  and 
enclosing  a  deep  bay,  five  miles  in  circumference,  which  formed  the 
Great  Harbour.      A  chain   of  forts  protected  its  coasts,  and  strong 


ENGLISH       MILES 


IValkcr  &■  Boutall  sc 


walls  the  entrance  to  the  bridge,  from  which  a  road  led  across  level 
ground  to  a  lofty  plateau  called  Achradina,  separated  from  another 
plateau  called  Epipolae  by  a  slight  depression.  A  wall  running 
north  and  south  from  sea  to  sea  defended  the  west  of  Achradina, 
which  was  farther  secured  by  a  wall  on  the  north  and  east  nearly 
touching  the  sea.  The  whole  of  Epipolae  was  enclosed  by  a  wall 
varying  in  height  according  to  the  nature  of  the  cliff.  It  included 
three  quarters,  Epipolae  proper  on  the  west,  Tycha  on  the  north, 
and  Neapolis  on  the  south.  Tycha  was  entered  by  a  road  from 
Leontini  through  a  gate  called  Hexapylon. 

The  place  was  too  strong  to  be  taken  by  assault,  and  the  defence 
was  conducted  with  extraordinary  vigour.  The  famous  Archimedes 
employed  all  his   engineering  and  mechanical   skill   in   constructing 


XXIV  BLOCKADE  OF  SYRACUSE  339 

machines  to  harass  the  besiegers  and  destroy  their  artillery.  Huge 
balistae  threw  immense  stones  upon  the  ships,  while  smaller  ones 
cannonaded  all  within  reach,  and  through  innumerable  apertures  in 
the  walls  sharp  missiles  called  "scorpions"  were  continually  dis- 
charged. When  the  Roman  vessels,  lashed  in  pairs,  approached  the 
sea  walls,  that  their  archers,  slingers,  and  javelin-throwers  might 
pick  off  those  who  manned  them,  lofty  cranes  swung  round  and 
dropped  iron  grappling-hooks  weighted  with  lead,  which,  catching 
the  prows,  raised  the  vessel  out  of  the  water,  and  letting  it  suddenly 
fall,  caused  it  to  ship  a  quantity  of  water  or  threw  the  sailors  over- 
board. These  and  many  similar  contrivances  baffled  Marcellus,  Marcellus 
who  resolved  to  turn  the  siege  into  a  blockade,  disposing  his  ships  blockades 
to  prevent  provisions  being  brought  in  by  sea.  Meanwhile  he  took  -^^^^" 
other  smaller  places,  such  as  Helorus,  Herbessus,  and  Megara,  and 
surprised  and  defeated  Epicydes  at  Acrillae.  But  he  failed  to  anti- 
cipate Himilco  at  Agrigentum,  who  arrived  with  a  strong  reinforce- 
ment, and  marched  to  the  relief  of  Syracuse,  encamping  eight  miles 
off  on  the  Anapus,  from  which  he  captured  the  Roman  magazines  at 
Murgantia.  Though  a  Carthaginian  fleet  under  Bomilcar  about  the 
same  time  failed  to  break  the  blockade,  the  success  of  Himilco 
caused  revolts  from  Rome  in  many  parts  of  the  island,  in  which 
Roman  garrisons  were  expelled  or  massacred.  The  movement  was 
exasperated  by  the  conduct  of  L.  Pinarius  at  Enna,  a  town  to  which 
peculiar  sanctity  attached  as  the  home  of  Ceres  and  Proserpine. 
Finding  the  people  ready  to  revolt,  and  demanding  the  keys  of  the 
citadel,  he  summoned  them  to  an  assembly  and  caused  his  soldiers 
to  attack  them.  In  the  confusion  which  followed  as  many  are  said 
to  have  perished  in  trying  to  escape  as  by  the  sword.  But  though 
the  horror  excited  by  this  severity  caused  many  adhesions  to 
Carthage  in  other  parts  of  the  island,  it  prevented  farther  defections 
in  the  neighbourhood.  Himilco  fell  back  upon  Agrigentum,  Epicydes 
on  Murgantia,  and  the  blockade  was  not  interrupted.  It  dragged  213.  The 
on  during  the  next  year,  in  which  Marcellus  continued  the  command  blockade 
as   proconsul,    without   visible  result.      The   genius    of   Archimedes  continued, 

11,1/-  T  .       ,     1   •  •  ,1  but  not 

pervaded  the  defence,  and  every  pomt  had  its  engme  or  elaborate  gf^ctive 

contrivance  for  baffling  the  besiegers  ;  while  the  blockade  at  sea 
seems  not  to  have  been  sufficiently  complete  to  prevent  provisions 
being  thrown  from  time  to  time  into  the  town. 

It  was  the  capture  of  a  blockade-runner  named  Damippus  which  212. 
led  to  the  discovery  of  a  weak  point  in  the  fortifications,  of  which  Escalade  oj 
Marcellus  was  quick  to  take  advantage.      In  negotiating  the  release  ^P^P^^^^- 
of  Damippus  the   Roman   envoys   met   those  of  Syracuse  near  the 
north  wall  of  Epipolae,  now  called  Scala  Graeca^  where  there  is  a 
break  in  the  cliff,  and  where   the  wall   seemed  to  them  capable  of 


340  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap. 

being  scaled.  One  of  them  roughly  calculated  its  height  by  count- 
ing the  layers  of  bricks,  and  reported  that  ladders  of  moderate 
length  would  suffice.  Waiting  until  he  learnt  from  a  deserter  that 
the  Syracusans  were  celebrating  a  three  days'  festival  of  Artemis,  in 
which  from  the  scarcity  of  other  luxuries  wine  would  be  freely 
taken,  Marcellus  prepared  a  night  attack.  The  walls  were  scaled, 
the  guards  surprised  at  their  cups  or  in  the  heavy  sleep  of  intoxica- 
tion, and  put  to  the  sword.  At  daybreak  Hexapylon  was  forced, 
and  the  Roman  army  entered.  Epipolae,  with  the  exception  of  the 
western  fortress  Euryalus,  was  thus  taken.  It  was  a  great  advantage, 
but,  owing  to  the  separation  of  Achradina  and  Ortygia,  did  not 
involve  possession  of  all  Syracuse.  The  garrison  in  Ortygia  did  not 
even  know  distinctly  what  had  happened.  Epicydes  thought  that 
some  few  Romans  had  climbed  into  Epipolae  under  cover  of  night, 
an^  came  expecting  to  drive  them  out  easily  ;  but  finding  the  enemy 
in  force  retired  to  Achradina. 

From  the  heights  of  Epipolae  Marcellus  gazed  on  one  of  the 
fairest  cities  of  the  world.  He  had  some  knowledge  of  Greek 
letters  ;  and  the  memory  of  the  Athenian  fleet  which  had  perished 
in  the  harbour,  and  of  the  Athenian  armies  ruined  beneath  its  walls, 
as  well  as  the  glories  of  its  kings  and  its  heroic  struggles  with  the 
Punic  foe,  brought  tears  to  his  eyes.  But  the  city  was  not  yet  won. 
His  rear  could  be  harassed  from  Euryalus,  the  walls  of  Achradina 
still  defied  him,  and  Ortygia  was  still  intact.  Euryalus  surrendered 
after  a  few  days  in  despair  of  relief.  But  while  Marcellus  was 
besieging  Epicydes  in  Achradina,  Bomilcar  arrived  with  the  rein- 
forcement from  Carthage.  Thereupon  Hippocrates  and  Himilco 
encamped  on  the  low  ground  between  the  city  and  Olympieum,  and 
attacked  Crispinus,  who  commanded  the  Roman  camp,  while  Epicydes 
prevented  Marcellus  coming  to  his  relief  by  sallies  from  Achradina. 
But  before  long  the  pestilence,  so  often  fatal  to  Carthaginian  armies 
on  the  same  spot,  broke  out  in  their  camp,  situated  on  low  marshy 
ground,  through  the  deadly  autumn  season.  Both  Hippocrates  and 
Himilco  fell  victims  to  it,  together  with  all  the  Carthaginians  in  the 
army,  while  the  Sicilians  for  the  most  part  escaped  by  rapidly  dis- 
persing. The  Romans  suffered,  but  less  severely,  for  they  were  on 
higher  ground,  and  had  become  inured  to  the  climate. 
f fleet  Epicydes  was  still  holding  Achradina  in  hopes  of  a  fresh 
squadron  of  relief  which  Bomilcar  had  returned  to  Carthage  to  fetch, 
and  encouraged  by  finding  that  the  Sicilians,  who  had  retired  from 
the  plague-stricken  camp,  were  collecting  stores  and  soldiers  in 
neighbouring  strongholds.  But  though  the  new  Punic  fleet  reached 
Pachynus,  it  M^as  prevented  from  rounding  the  promontory  by  con- 
trary winds  ;  and  Epicydes,  unable  to  bear  the  suspense,  set  sail  in 


XXIV  SACK  OF  SYRACUSE  341 

search  of  it,  and  was  followed  by  Marcellus  in  spite  of  the  inferiority 
in  the  number  of  his  ships.  At  last  the  east  wind  dropped,  and 
Bomilcar  stood  out  to  sea  to  round  Pachynus  :  but  when  he  sighted 
the  Roman  fleet  he  sent  back  his  transports  to  Africa,  and  coasting 
along  Sicily  made  the  harbour  of  Tarentum,  while  Epicydes  fled  to 
Agrigentum. 

The  Syracusans  thus  abandoned  were  ready  to  submit  in  hopes    The 
of  saving  their  lives  ;  some  of  Epicydes'  officers  were  assassinated,  Romans 
new  generals  elected,  and  envoys  from  the  city  and  the  Sicilian  camp  ^^S- 
outside  were  sent  to  Marcellus.     Certain  Roman  deserters,  who  ex-  dina, 
pected  no  mercy  from  him,  combined  with  the  mercenaries  in  trying  212. 
to  suppress  the  movement,  and  murdered  some  of  the  citizens.      But 
the    Spanish  Moericus,   commanding  in   Achradina,   was   soon   con- 
vinced that  his   safest   course  was   to  make  terms.      The  Romans 
were  admitted  into  Achradina,  and  found  little  to  resist  them  ;  while 
another  division  found  Ortygia  so  weakly  guarded,  that  they  landed 
without    difficulty   and    took    the    citadel.      A  guard   was    sent    by 
Marcellus  to  protect  the  treasuiy,  and  sentries  were  posted  at  the 
doors  of  those  citizens  who  had  been  in  the  Roman  camp.     The  rest 
of  the  city  was  given  up  to  the  soldiers  to  plunder,  though  with  orders 
to  take  no   life.       But  such  orders  could  not  prevent  all  violence, 
and  among  the  victims   of  it  was  the  famous  Archimedes  himself. 
Intent,  it  is   said,  on   some  diagrams  of  a  problem  in  geometry  or 
mechanics,   he  failed  to   answer    the   rough   address    of  a    soldier, 
perhaps  asking  who  he  was,  or,  more  likely,  demanding  money  or 
treasure,  and  was  cut  down  by  the  angry  ruffian, — to  the  chagrin  of 
Marcellus,  who  had  specially  wished  that  he  should  be  spared. 

The  wealth  of  the  city  was  great,  and  its  works  of  art  numerous    Works  of 
and  splendid.     These  were  for  the  most  part  removed  to  Rome,  to  «^^  i^ 
adorn  the  triumph  of  Marcellus,  and  to  be  finally  deposited  in  the  ^y^^^^^^- 
temples  of  Honor  and  Virtus,  which  he  had  vowed  during  the  Gallic 
war.i     Marcellus  was  not  personally  avaricious,  and  is  said  to  have 
refused  any  portion  of  the  spoils  with  the  exception  of  the  sphaera 
of  Archimedes.      But  the  exhibition  of  these  spoils  was  an  offence  to 
Greek   visitors'  to   Rome,  and  gave  an  impulse  to  the  passion  for 
adorning  private  houses,  as  well  as  temples,  with  Greek  works  of  art, 
which  had  already  begun  with   the  spoils  of  Magna   Graecia  and 
Capua. 

The  capture  of  Syracuse  was  followed  by  the  submission  of  nearly 
all   Sicily  ;  and  Marcellus  was  engaged  for  some  months  in  settling 

1  Apparently  Marcellus  did  not  live  to  "dedicate  "  these  temples  (Livy  xxvii. 
25).  Livy  observes  that  his  act  of  plunder  was  punished  by  the  after  destruction 
of  the  very  temples  in  which  it  was  stored.  They  seem  to  have  been  repaired  and 
rededicated  by  Marius. 


342 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Settlement 
of  Sicily  by 
Marcellus, 

2X2. 


the  terms  on  which  the  various  cities  were  to  belong  to  the  Roman 
alHance — terms  varying  in  Hberality  or  severity  according  to  their 
fidehty  to  Rome  in  the  late  war.  Both  Livy  and  Plutarch  praise  the 
equity  of  his  arrangements  ;  but  they  did  not,  and  perhaps  could  not, 
give  universal  satisfaction,  and  the  Syracusans  especially  sent  deputa- 
tions to  Rome  to  complain. 

But  Epicydes  and  Hanno  still  held  Agrigentum,  and  from  it 
forays  were  made  by  the  Numidian  cavalry  under  Hippocrates  or 
Mutines,  who  had  been  sent  by  Hannibal.  They  even  ventured  to 
march  out  and  pitch  a  camp  on  the  Himera,  and  the  still  existing 
loyalty  to  Carthage  seemed  once  more  about  to  declare  itself. 
Marcellus  therefore  decided  that  he  must  strike  a  final  blow.  He 
marched  to  the  Himera,  but  was  assailed  so  fiercely  by  Mutines, 
who  hastened  across  the  river  to  meet  him,  that  he  almost  sus- 
tained a  defeat ;  and  when  the  engagement  was  renewed  on  the 
next  day  his  advanced  guard  was  again  driven  within  the  lines. 
From  this  dangerous  position  he  partly  owed  his  deliverance  to 
divisions  among  the  enemy.  While  Mutines  was  absent  at  Heracleia 
trying  to  recall  the  mutinous  Numidians  who  had  retired  thither, 
Hanno  and  Epicydes,  against  his  advice,  crossed  the  river  to  attack 
Marcellus.  But  the  Numidians  refused  to  fight  in  the  absence  of 
Mutines,  and  Marcellus  won  an  easy  victory,  the  enemy  fearing  to 
stand  a  siege,  and  dispersing  in  wild  confusion  into  every  part  of  the 
country.  He  did  not,  however,  venture  to  besiege  Agrigentum. 
The  year  was  drawing  to  a  close  ;  he  had  fought  his  last  battle  in 
Sicily,  and  his  eyes  were  fixed  on  home  and  his  expected  triumph.  On 
his  departure  the  scattered  Carthaginians  rallied  and  collected  again 
in  Agrigentum,  which  held  out  for  two  more  years.  This  was  looked 
upon  as  a  fatal  objection  to  Marcellus  enjoying  a  regular  triumph.  He 
had  not  finished  the  war  ;  he  handed  over  his  army  to  his  successor, 
and  that  successor  found  an  enemy  still  within  his  province. 

Meanwhile  the  war  in  Italy  had  been  carried  on  with  varied 
fortune.  At  the  end  of  2 1  5  Hannibal  had  retired  into  winter  quarters 
at  Arpi.  Here  slight  skirmishes  took  place  between  him  and  the 
consul  Sempronius  Gracchus,  who  had  followed  him,  but  no  decisive 
battle.  In  the  spring  of  214  he  returned  to  the  camp  at  Tifata  on 
the  urgent  entreaty  of  the  people  of  Capua,  who  trembled  at  the  vast 
preparations  made  at  Rome  for  the  next  year's  campaign.  Though 
the  Roman  exchequer  was  exhausted,  wealthy  men  had  liberally  con- 
tributed to  a  loan  on  the  credit  of  the  State,  and  an  extraordinary 
property-tax  for  the  fleet  had  been  cheerfully  borne.  There  were  to 
be  eighteen  legions,  or  about  1 80,000  men,  on  foot ;  and  Fabius 
Maximus,  whose  hand  had  been  heavy  on  Campania  in  215,  was 
again  to  command  there  as  consul. 


XXIV  HANNIBAL  HOPES  FOR  TARENTUM  343 

As  soon  as  he  heard  of  Hannibal  having  quitted  Arpi,  Fabius  Hannibal 
hastened  to  join  his  legions  near  Casilinum,  ordering  Gracchus,  now  (igain  in 
proconsul,  to  advance  to  Beneventum.      Hannibal,  however,  did  not  '-^''^Z'"'"^. 
stay   the  whole  summer   in    Campania.      He  attempted   to    surprise 
Puteoli  by  a  feint  of  going  to  offer  sacrifice  at  the  lake  Avernus  : 
once  more  approached  Nola,  and  was  once  more  baffled  under  its 
walls  by  Marcellus  with  some  loss.      But  while  near  the  lake  Avernus 
he   had   been  visited   by   certain   young  men   from   Tarentum,   who 
assured  him  of  a  party  there  ready  to  admit  him.      The  bait  offered  Invited  to 
by  the  acquisition  of  such  a  harbour  as  that  of  Tarentum  was  too   Tarentum. 
strong  to  be  resisted.      Casilinum  and  Capua  were  left  to  their  fate, 
and  he  marched  away  to  Apulia.      Both  consuls  (for  Marcellus  was 
not  yet  ordered  to  Sicily)  united  in  the  assault  upon  Casilinum,  which 
soon  fell,  and  with  it  the  principal  bridge  over  the  Volturnus  again 
passed  into  Roman  hands — an  advantage  not  afterwards  lost.      In 
many  ways  the  Carthaginian  cause  was  at  a  low  ebb.      In   Spain  the 
Roman  arms  were  prospering.      Philip  of  Macedon  had  taken  Oricum, 
but  lost  it  again  to  Valerius  ;  and  had  been  surprised  while  besieging 
Apollonia,  and  forced  to  fly  for  his  life.      Fabius  was  reconquering 
Samnium.       Bruttium  was    entrusted    to    Hanno,  who   had   secured 
Locri  and  Croton,  but  had  failed  to  take  Rhegium  ;  and  when  in  2 1 4 
he  tried  to  intercept  Gracchus  at  Beneventum,  he  had  been  decisively 
beaten,  and  an  advantage  which  he  afterwards  gained  over  a  detach- 
ment of  Gracchus's  army  in  Lucania  led  to  nothing. 

All  the  more  was  it  necessary  for  Hannibal  to  strike  some  brilliant  Disap- 
blow  at  Tarentum.      But  on  his  arrival  he  was  disappointed  in  the  pointed  at 
hope  of  finding  treason  within  the  walls  ready  to  co-operate  with  him.   tarentum. 
On    the  contrary,   the    Roman  garrison    had   been  reinforced   under 
M.  Livius  Macatus  from  Brundisium,  and  he  was  obliged  to  fall  back 
on  Salapia,  where  he  prepared  for  the  winter  by  collecting  corn  from 
Metapontum  and   Heracleia,  scouring  the  district  of  the   Sallentini 
with  his  Numidian  cavalry.      But  neither  during  the  winter  nor  the 
next   summer  (213)  was  any  material   progress  made  in   the  great 
object  of  taking  Tarentum.      The  consul   Fabius  (son  of  Cunctator)  213.  Q. 
possessed  himself  of  Arpi,  once  the  winter  quarters  of  the  Cartha-  ^^^i^^ 
ginians,  and   Hannibal  spent  the  whole  summer  in  capturing  petty  ^^^^^'-^^ 
places  in  the  territory  of  Tarentum  or  in  fruitless  demonstration  against  Sempron- 
the  town  itself     A  year  of  precious  time  was  lost  ;  some  of  the  Greek  ius 
towns  in  Lucania  were  returning  to  their  allegiance  to  Rome,  and  in   Gracchus 
Campania  the  leading  citizens  of  Capua  were  making  secret  overtures 
to  secure  their  pardon. 

But  early  in  212  the  long -delayed  blow  fell.  The  Tarentines 
and  Thurians  had  been  forced  to  give  hostages  for  their  fidelity  to 
Rome,   who   had  been  kept   in   somewhat   careless   custody   in   the 


344 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Atrium  Libertatis.  Induced  to  attempt  an  escape,  they  had  been 
caught  at  Tarracina,  brought  back,  and  scourged  and  hurled  from  the 
Tarpeian  rock.  This  severity  roused  indignation  at  Tarentum  and 
Thurii,  and  two  young  men,  named  Nico  and  Philumenus,  undertook 
to  deHver  Tarentum  to  Hannibal.  They  obtained  an  interview  by 
allowing  themselves  to  be  caught  by  his  sentries  while  hunting,  and 
agreed  on  a  plan.  Philumenus,  pretending  that  the  presence  of  the 
Punic  army  made  it  dangerous  to  return  from  his  expeditions  before 
nightfall,  made  a  practice  of  bringing  his  dogs  and  game  to  one  of 
the  smaller  town  gates  after  dark,  so  that  the  sentry  might  be  accus- 


HARBOUR  OF  TARENTUM 


ENGLISH      MILES 


Gulf 


:-      Choerades 


lyalfcer  &  Boitfall  sc. 


tomed  to  admit  him  when  he  whistled.  Nico  stayed  in  the  town  to 
answer  Hannibal's  fire  signal.  Feigning  sickness  to  account  for 
remaining  so  long  in  one  camp,  at  the  time  agreed  Hannibal  sent 
forward  some  light  infantry  and  cavalry  along  the  road  to  Tarentum, 
who  were  to  force  back  all  whom  they  found  going  towards  the  town, 
and  kill  those  coming  from  it.  When  this  was  reported  at  Tarentum, 
Livius,  thinking  it  one  of  the  ordinary  raids,  sent  some  cavalry  at 
daybreak  to  stop  it.  But  by  a  forced  march  Hannibal  had  already 
caught  up  his  skirmishers  with  his  main  army  about  fifteen  miles 
from  the  town,  and,  being  joined  by  Philumenus,  started  at  midnight 


XXIV  HANNIBAL  ENTERS  TARENTUM  345 

under  his  guidance.  Arrived  at  the  walls,  Philumenus  with  one 
division  went  to  his  usual  gate,  Hannibal  with  the  other  to  the 
eastern  or  Temenid  gate  leading  to  the  street  of  tombs  or 
Batheia. 

A  small  peninsula  almost  closes  the  mouth  of  an  inlet  of  the  sea,  Tarentutn. 
the  Mare  piccolo,  six  miles  in  length,  and  between  two  and  three  in 
breadth,  which  constituted  the  harbour  of  Tarentum.  It  is  rocky  and 
somewhat  elevated,  and  on  it  was  the  citadel.  The  town,  enclosed 
by  walls,  had  spread  to  the  lower  ground  south  of  the  harbour,  but 
the  peninsula  was  so  fortified  as  to  be  a  stronghold  independent  of 
the  town,  while  its  northern  extremity  commanded  the  entrance  to 
the  harbour. 

There  had  been  a  festival  and  banquet,  and  Livius  and  his  retinue  Hannibal 
returned  home  late  at  night.     The  licence  of  the  feast  enabled  the  enters  the 
conspirators  to  remain  in  the  streets  in  apparent  mirth,  so  that,  when    '^^'^'  ^^^' 
Hannibal's  fire  signal  was  given  and  answered,  some  of  them  went  at 
once  to  the  Temenid  gate,  overpowered  and  killed  the  guard,  and 
forced  it  open  to  receive  Hannibal,  who  marched  down  the  Batheia 
to  the  Forum.    At  the  same  time  Philumenus  with  1 000  men  appeared 
at  his  usual  gate.      He  was  admitted  even  more  quickly  than  usual, 
as  he  explained  that  he  had  brought  so  huge  a  boar  that  the  bearers 
were  impatient.     As  the  sentry  turned  to  look  at  it,  he  transfixed 
him  with  his  hunting  spear.      Some  of  his  men  then  rushed  through 
the  wicket  and  forced  open  the  gate  to  admit  the  rest,  who  at  once 
joined  Hannibal  in  the  Forum.     The  principal  streets  were  occupied 
at   either  end,  and   orders   were   given   to   kill   all   Romans,  but  to 

promise  citizens  that  if  they  would  keep  indoors  they  should  not  be- 

hurt.  The  silence  of  the  night  was  broken  by  these  movements,  and 
Livius,  roused  from  sleep,  escaped  in  a  boat  across  the  harbour  to  Livius 
the  citadel,  and  was  there  joined  by  such  Romans  as  also  managed  to  escapes. 
escape,  and  by  those  Tarentines  who  were  faithful  to  Rome.  The 
people,  who  only  learnt  what  had  happened  by  seeing  in  the  morning 
the  corpses  of  the  Romans  about  the  streets,  were  summoned  to  a 
meeting  in  the  theatre,  and  assured  by  Hannibal  that  they  had  nothing 
to  fear  ;  he  had  come  to  deliver  them  from  their  Roman  tyrants. 
Every  citizen  was  to  mark  his  door  with  chalk,  and  it  would  be  un- 
injured ;  but  he  would  punish  with  death,  as  an  enemy,  any  who  so 
marked  a  door  where  a  Roman  dwelt. 

Livius  atoned  for  his  supineness  or  credulity  by  the  gallantry  with  M.  Livius 
which  he  maintained  himself  on  the  citadel.      Hannibal  soon  gave  up  ^'^o.catus 
the  idea  of  a  storm,  and  attempted  a  blockade.      He  erected  earth-  ^^^^^^^ 
works  across  the  neck  of  the   peninsula  to   prevent  sallies   of  the  2i2-20(). 
Roman  garrison,  and,  inducing  the  citizens  to  drag  their  ships  from 
the   harbour  over   the  flat  space   between  it  and  the  open  sea,  en- 


346 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


A  convoy 
of  corn  i?i- 
tercepted, 


Victory  of 
Hannibal 
at 

Herdonea, 
late  in  212. 


deavoured  to  stop  provisions  being  thrown  into  the  citadel.  This 
blockade  never  seems  to  have  been  efifective,  and  Livius  held  the 
citadel  until  Fabius  recovered  the  town  in  209,  the  use  of  which  to 
Hannibal  was  greatly  diminished,  if  not  destroyed,  by  his  exclusion 
from  the  harbour. 

Meanwhile  the  people  of  Capua  felt  their  fate  approaching.  One 
Roman  army  was  entrenched  at  Suessula,  another  held  the  bridge- 
town  of  Casilinum.  The  country  had  been  thoroughly  pillaged  by 
Fabius  and  the  autumn  sowing  prevented  ;  and  though  partly  pro- 
tected by  the  Punic  camp  on  Tifata,  they  were  in  danger  of  starvation. 
In  answer  to  urgent  appeals  Hannibal  ordered  Hanno  to  collect  corn 
for  the  town.  But  the  consuls  were  in  Samnium,  and,  hearing  that 
Hanno  was  encamped  near  Beneventum  for  this  purpose,  Fulvius 
entered  that  town  at  night,  learned  that  Hanno  was  absent  on  a 
foray,  and  that  the  camp,  under  the  command  of  a  subordinate,  was 
crowded  with  peasants  sent  with  2000  carts  from  Campania  to  fetch 
the  corn.  He  started  soon  after  midnight  to  attack  it,  and,  in  spite 
of  the  strength  of  the  position,  and  the  determined  resistance  of  the 
Carthaginians,  succeeded  in  storming  it.  Six  thousand  of  the  enemy 
are  said  to  have  been  killed,  and  the  carriers  with  their  waggons  and 
beasts  of  burden  fell  to  the  victors,  along  with  much  other  booty 
collected  by  Hanno.  The  consuls  then  united  their  forces  and  marched 
from  Beneventum  along  the  Appian  road  into  Campania,  ordering  Tib. 
Gracchus  the  proconsul  to  leave  Lucania  and  reinforce  the  Roman 
garrison  at  Beneventum  in  their  rear.  Gracchus,  with  one  cohort, 
fell  into  an  ambush  and  perished  ;  but  the  bulk  of  his  army  under 
the  quaestor  Cornelius  eventually  arrived  in  Campania.  Hannibal 
himself  now  found  it  necessary  to  return  to  the  camp  on  Mount 
Tifata  ;  but  he  did  not  succeed  in  bringing  the  consuls  to  a  battle, 
and  presently  darted  upon  a  Roman  force  in  Lucania  commanded  by 
M.  Centenius,  who  had  persuaded  the  Senate  to  entrust  him  with  it. 
This  was  easily  crushed,  and  Hannibal  hurried  into  Apulia,  where, 
at  Herdonea,  he  annihilated  the  army  of  the  praetor  Cn.  Fulvius, 
which  had  been  plundering  Apulian  towns.  Content  with  these 
successes,  he  took  up  winter  quarters  in  Apulia,  once  more  leaving 
Capua  to  its  own  resources.  The  consuls  had  now  begun  the  siege 
in  earnest.  Magazines  were  established  at  Casilinum  and  a  fortress  at 
the  mouth  of  the  Volturnus  ;  Puteoli  was  garrisoned  to  secure  supplies 
of  corn  and  war  material  by  sea  ;  and  the  praetor  Claudius  Nero 
ordered  up  from  the  Castra  Claiidiana :  so  that  three  Roman  armies 
were  besieging  Capua  at  three  points  at  once.  The  citizens,  however, 
still  relied  on  help  from  Hannibal,  with  whom  they  had  again  com- 
municated before  the  lines  of  investment  were  complete;  and  they 
contemptuously  rejected  the  offer  from  Rome,  allowing  any  one  who 


XXIV  HANNIBAL  FAILS  TO  RELIEVE  CAPUA  347 

chose  to  quit  the  city  taking  his  property  with  him  before  the  next 
ides  of  March. 

Through  the  winter  and  spring,  therefore,  Fulvius  and  Claudius,  Hannibal 
whose  impcrium  was  extended  until  they  should  have  taken  Capua,  attempts  to 
continually  drew  their  lines  closer  and  closer  round  the  doomed  city  ;  '^^^^^^ 
and  though  the  superiority  of  the  Campanian  horse  enabled  the  be-  ^^^  ' 
sieged  to  make  up  somewhat  for  the  defeat  of  their  infantry  in  their 
sorties,!  the  investment  was  so  strictly  kept  that  it  was  with  great 
difficulty  that,  at  length,  a  Numidian  soldier,  who  volunteered  the 
service,  was  able  to  carry  a  message  to  Hannibal  imploring  help. 
He  had  to  choose  between  two  needs  almost  equally  pressing.  To 
take  the  citadel  of  Tarentum  was  necessary  in  order  to  acquire  a 
large  and  safe  harbour  ;  while  the  loss  of  Capua  involved  that  of  all 
Campania.  He  decided,  however,  to  relieve  Capua  first,  because  he 
found  that  the  eyes  of  all  Italian  peoples  were  fixed  on  it,  and  that 
on  its  fate  depended  the  side  which  they  would  take.  He  hastened 
to  Tifata  with  a  picked  body  of  men,  in  advance  of  his  heavy-armed 
and  baggage,  and  concealed  himself  in  one  of  the  valleys  until  he 
had  communicated  with  the  besieged  garrison,  in  order  that  a  sortie 
from  the  town  might  be  made  simultaneously  with  his  own  attack. 
The  accounts  which  Livy  followed  differed  as  to  the  nature  and 
importance  of  the  struggle  ;  but  it  seems  clear  that,  though  Hannibal 
eventually  withdrew  his  men,  the  Romans  could  not  pursue.  Ap. 
Claudius,  the  proconsul,  was  severely  wounded,  and  one  of  the  Roman 
camps  nearly  taken. 

Still,  both   Hannibal  and  the  Campanians  had  lost  heavily,  and  211.  Coss. 
the  Roman  lines  of  investment  were  not  broken.      It  was  reported,   Cn. 
also,  that  the  new  consuls  were,  before  going  to  their  provinces,  to  ^"'^^"-^ 
undertake  operations  near  Capua,  which  might  cut  Hannibal  off  from  j^^ius  P 
retreat.     He  accordingly  determined  on  a  bold  stroke, — no  less  than  Sulpicius 
an  advance  upon  Rome  itself     Even  if  he  effected  nothing  against  the  Galba 
city,  he  expected  to  cause  so  much  alarm  that  at  least  one  of  the  ^^'^x^^'"^^- 
proconsuls  would  be  recalled,  and  the  strain  on   Capua  be  lessened. 
A  hardy  Numidian  made  his  way  into  the  town  with  a  letter,  bidding 
the  garrison  not  to  be  alarmed  at  his  departure,  for  he  was  gone  to 
Rome  to  divert  the  Roman  legions  from  Capua.      Seizing  a  number 
of  boats  on  the  Volturnus,  he  got  his  army  across  the  river  on  the 

^  It  is  said  that  tlie  disasters  of  the  Roman  cavalry  led  to  a  change  in  the  army. 
The  rorarii  (light-armed)  had  to  accompany  the  cavalry,  each  horseman  carrying 
one  of  them  behind  him  on  to  the  field  ;  and  henceforth  it  was  found  convenient 
to  mix  them  with  the  several  maniples,  instead  of  forming  them  in  a  separate 
corps  with  separate  officers.  They  were  only  after  that  officially  called  velites  (Livy 
XX vi.  4),  though  Livy  loosely  uses  the  term  before  for  what  were  properly  called 
rorarii  (see  p.  216). 


34« 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Hannibats 
march  on 
Rome, 


Prepara- 
tions at 
Rome. 


fifth  day  after  his  arrival  before  Capua,  and  was  soon  in  full  march 
along  the  line  of  the  via  Lati7ta,  though  often  diverging  from  it,  and 
being  careful  to  avoid  towns  and  strong  places.  His  only  stoppages 
were  caused  by  the  need  of  rest  or  supplies.  Thus,  after  leaving 
Gales,  his  first  point  north  of  the  Voltumus,  we  hear  of  a  two  days' 
halt  at  the  foot  of  Mount  Casinum,  and  another  of  perhaps  somewhat 
longer  duration  in  the  territory  of  Fregellae,  where  the  road  twice 
crosses  the  winding  Liris  by  bridges  which  the  inhabitants  had  broken 
down,  thereby  causing  the  enemy  some  delay,  but  bringing  upon 
themselves  a  more  severe  devastation.  Having  effected  the  two 
crossings,  he  kept  along  the  same  line  of  road  till  he  came  under  the 
walls  of  Tusculum.  The  Tusculans  closed  their  gates,  and  Hannibal, 
having  no  means  or  time  for  assault  or  siege,  pressed  onwards.  He 
now,  however,  quitted  the  line  of  the  Latin  road,  and,  turning  to  the 
right,  descended  upon  Gabii.  He  was  thus  about  thirteen  miles  from 
Rome  by  the  via  Praenestina.  From  this  point  Livy's  account  is 
very  difficult  to  follow.  Hannibal  is  said  to  have  entered  the  territory 
of  the  Pupinian  tribe,  and  to  have  pitched  a  camp  on  the  Anio,  only 
three  miles  from  the  city,  from  which  position  he  rode  up  to  the 
walls  with  a  few  horsemen,  and  surveyed  them  from  the  Golline  gate 
to  the  temple  of  Hercules.  If  so,  he  must  afterwards  have  crossed 
to  the  right  bank  of  the  Anio,  and  recrossed  it  from  his  camp  to 
offer  battle.  1 

Meanwhile  at  Rome  the  utmost  alarm  prevailed.  News  of 
Hannibal's  advance  had  been  hastily  sent  by  Fulvius  Flaccus,  and 
the  Senate  had  bidden  him  use  his  discretion  whether  he  could  come 
to  the  city  without  risking  the  siege  of  Gapua,  which  was  not  to  be 
abandoned.2  But  before  it  was  known  at  Rome  what  he  meant  to 
do,  a  messenger  arrived  from  Fregellae,  who  had  travelled  night  and 
day  with  tidings  of  Hannibal  being  already  on  the  Liris.     Though 


^  The  position  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Anio  is  more  easy  to  understand  if 
we  accept  Polybius's  account,  who  sends  Hannibal  to  Rome  "  through  Samnium," 
which  would  bring  him  to  the  right  bank  of  the  Anio  by  the  via  Salaria  or  via 
Nomentana.  But  the  fragment  of  Polybius  (ix.  5)  is  a  very  brief  summary  ;  and  he 
seems  to  have  adopted  the  error,  shared  by  Coelius,  of  confounding  Hannibal's 
line  of  march  to  Rome  with  that  of  his  return.  It  seems  difficult  to  believe  that 
in  an  expedition,  in  which  so  much  depended  on  speed,  he  should  have  gone 
so  far  round,  or  that  the  first  news  received  at  Rome  of  his  march  should  have 
been  his  appearance  on  the  Anio.  To  make  Livy's  account  possible,  we  have  to 
assume  that,  after  leaving  Gabii,  and  surveying  the  walls,  Hannibal  crossed  the 
Anio,  so  as  to  have  that  river  between  his  camp  and  the  enemy. 

2  Some  difficulty  has  been  also  made  about  this,  as  though  there  was  not  time 
for  the  communication.  But  the  via  Appia  was  open,  and  the  distance  to  Rome 
(124  Roman,  about  112  English  miles)  could  be  done  by  a  horseman  probably  in 
two  days,  while  Hannibal  was  marching  with  several  divergences  and  halts  along 
the  via  Latina  (145  Roman,  about  130  English  miles). 


i 


XXIV  HANNIBAL  AT  THE  WALLS  OF  ROME  349 

this  intensified   the  alarm,  neither  people,   Senate,  nor  magistrates 
were  wanting  to  their  duties,  and  active  preparations  were  made  for 
defence.     The  new  levies,  some   of  them   destined  for   Spain,    and 
others  for  Macedonia,  were  in  the  city,  and  were  now  at  the  disposal 
of  the  consuls.      They  were  farther  encouraged  by  the  arrival  of  2000 
troops  from   Alba   Fucentia,  who  had  hurried  to   Rome  when  they 
heard  of  Hannibal's  march,  and  by  the  news  that  Q.  Fulvius  was  on  ^.  Fidvius 
the  way  from   Capua,  along  the  Appian  road,   with  a  considerable  arrives  at 
detachment.      He  would  be  certain  to  outstrip  Hannibal ;  for  not  only  ^ome, 
was  the  distance  shorter  than  that  by  the  Latin  road  ;  but,  as  he  was  ^^^' 
marching  through  friendly  towns  and  country,  the  people  of  which 
were  eager  to  assist  him,  he  was  not  obliged  to  stop  to  collect  pro- 
visions or  levy  contributions.     By  the  time  that  he  arrived  at  the  Porta 
Capena  it  was  known  that  Hannibal  had  left  the   Latin   road,  and 
was  approaching  Rome  along  the  line  of  the  Anio.      He  therefore 
marched  through  the  city,  and  with  the  consuls  encamped  between 
the  CoUine  and  Esquiline  gates. 

The  battle  which  Hannibal  offered,  crossing  the  Anio  from  his  Hannibal 
camp,  is  said  to  have  been  twice  prevented  by  violent  storms,  although  dis- 
on  each  day  the  weather  cleared  immediately  on  his  return  to  camp,  ^ouraged. 
This  seemed  to  be  ominous  of  failure,  as  though  his  attempt  were 
displeasing  to  the  gods  ;  and  he  was  still  more  irritated  and  depressed 
to  find  that  he  was  making  no  serious  impression  on  the  confidence 
of  the  people.      In  spite  of  his  presence  the  contingent  of  troops  was   ^ 
despatched  to  Spain,  and  he  was  told  that  the  very  meadow  on  which^^--' 
he  was  encamped  had  been  put  up  to  auction,  and  purchased  at  its  full 
value.      He  retaliated,  indeed,  by  offering  for  sale  the  silversmiths'  or 
bankers'  stalls  round  the  Forum  ;  but  in  fact  he  made  up  his  mind 
that  an  assault  upon  Rome  was  hopeless  ;  and  that  all  he  could  do 
was  to  return  to  Capua  with  his  immense  booty,  in  hopes  of  being  in 
time  to  take  advantage  of  the  absence  of  Fulvius  and  his  army.      He 
retired,  therefore,  towards  the  river  Tutia,  a  tributary  of  the  Anio. 

But  a  return  by  the  direct  route  by  which  he  had  come  was  not  Hannibal's 
easy.  The  consul  Publius  Sulpicius  had  caused  the  bridges  to  be  return. 
broken  down  along  the  Anio,  and  Hannibal  had  to  march  higher 
up  the  river  in  search  of  a  ford,  the  consul  marching  parallel 
to  him  up  the  left  bank.  Fording  a  stream  in  the  presence  of  an 
enemy,  though  protected  by  his  Numidian  cavalry,  his  army  suffered 
considerably,  and  a  great  part  of  the  booty  was  recovered  by  the 
Romans,  who  hung  upon  the  rear  of  the  retreating  army, — keeping 
on  higher  ground  indeed,  and  only  cutting  off  stragglers,  but  yet 
annoying  Hannibal  so  much  that,  at  the  end  of  five  days,  he  suddenly 
turned  upon  his  pursuers,  inflicted  a  severe  loss  upon  them,  and 
drove  the  rest  back  to  their  camp.      But  he  could  take  no  immediate 


350 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Punish- 
ment of 
Capua. 


advantage  of  this  success,  beyond  continuing  his  retreat  through 
Samnium  unmolested.  He  had  now  learnt  that  his  movement  had 
failed  to  raise  the  siege  of  Capua.  Appius  had  never  quitted  his 
position,  and  Fulvius  had  returned  thither  with  all  speed.  He  there- 
fore made  for  the  west  coast  by  Reate,  Amiternum,  and  over  the 
Apennines  into  the  territory  of  the  Marrucini.  From  this  point  down 
into  Apulia  he  was  marching  through  territory  for  the  most  part  in 
his  interests  or  subject  to  his  power ;  and  he  consoled  himself  for  the 
loss  of  Campania,  which  he  was  thus  abandoning,  by  a  dash  into 
Bruttium,  to  secure  Rhegium  as  compensation  for  the  harbours  of 
Campania.  His  march  was  so  rapid,  and  his  presence  thus  far  south 
so  unexpected,  that  he  all  but  took  the  town,  and,  at  any  rate, 
thoroughly  wasted  the  territory,  and  captured  many  of  the  inhabitants. 
But  Rhegium  stood  firm  ;  and  Hannibal  was  again  compelled  to  look 
for  the  harbour,  which  it  was  imperatively  necessary  that  he  should 
have  on  the  Italian  coast,  to  the  chance  of  taking  the  citadel  at 
Tarentum. 

Meanwhile  Capua,  deprived  of  its  last  hope,  had  nothing  but 
surrender  and  punishment  to  expect.  So  deeply  did  the  people  feel 
that  they  had  sinned  beyond  forgiveness,  that  a  message  from  Flaccus 
again  offering  amnesty  to  any  citizen  who,  before  a  fixed  day,  trans- 
ferred himself  to  the  Roman  camp  met  with  no  response.  They  pre- 
ferred the  desperate  chance  of  the  officers  of  the  Punic  garrison  being 
yet  able  to  communicate  with  Hannibal,  and  induce  him  to  come  once 
more  to  their  rescue.  But  the  Carthaginian  emissaries  were  inter- 
cepted, and  sent  back  into  the  town,  scarred  with  Roman  rods  and 
with  their  hands  cut  off.  The  desperate  people  turned  to  the  nobles, 
whom  their  internal  disputes  had  reduced  to  impotence,  but  could 
get  no  help  from  them.  Vibius  Virius,  who  had  been  the  author  of 
the  revolt,  had  nothing  better  to  offer  than  to  invite  all  members  of 
the  Senate  to  a  final  banquet,  to  be  followed  by  a  common  draught 
of  poison.  Even  for  that  the  dispirited  senators  had  not  the 
courage.  Seven -and -twenty  only  appeared  to  share  the  poisoned 
cup  :  the  rest  sent  messengers  to  the  Roman  camp,  offering  uncon- 
ditional surrender.  ^Jext  day  the  gates  were  thrown  open  ;  the  Car- 
thaginian garrison  were  made  prisoners  ;  and  the  members  of  the 
Senate  were  ordered  to  proceed  to  the  camp,  where  they  were  at 
once  cast  into  chains.  All  arms  were  given  up,  and  all  gold  and 
silver  handed  over  to  the  quaestors. 

The  punishment  to  be  inflicted  on  the  town  was  referred  by 
Fulvius  Flaccus  to  the  Senate.  But  he  at  once  proceeded  to  wreak 
vengeance  on  the  Capuan  senators.  Twenty-five  of  them  were  at  Cales, 
twenty-eight  in  Teanum.  He  proceeded  to  both  these  places,  con- 
demned the  men,  and  witnessed  their  execution,  without  waiting,  accord- 


THE  SETTLEMENT  OF  CAMPANIA  351 


ing  to  one  story,  for  the  answer  of  the  Senate,  or  even  refusing  to  open 
it  at  the  moment  of  the  execution  ;  and  according  to  another,  avaiHng 
himself  of  a  clause  in  the  answer  which  seemed  to  leave  the  matter  to  211. 
his  discretion.      For  the  rest  a  senatus  consultuvi^  passed  after  con-  ^^"^^^^ 
siderable  discussion,  ordained   that   the   town    of  Capua  was   to   be  ^^  Cam- 
left  standing,  but  its  people  wholly  removed.      Some  of  the  nobles  panis, 
were   reserved  in  custody  of  Latin  towns,  the  rest   of  the   citizens  Livy  xxvi. 
were  sold  as  slaves.      The  territory  was  made  public  land,  in  which  34- 
Roman  tenants  {aratores)  were  to  be  settled.      Public  buildings  were 
to  be   the  property  of  the  Roman  people.      The  town  was  for   the 
present  to  be  occupied  by  freedmen,   artisans,  and   such  others  as, 
not  being  citizens,  had  not  shared  in  the  guilt.      They  were  to  have 
no   local   magistrates,   no   assembly,  no   corporate   existence ;  but   a 
praefectus  was  to  be  sent  annually  from  Rome  to  administer  justice 
{piri  dicundo).      As   to    the   cities   lately   under   the  jurisdiction   of  The  other 
Capua  —  in    them    distinctions   were    made    between    whole    towns,   Campan- 
families,   and  even  individuals,  according  to  the  ascertained   extent  ^^'^  towns. 
of  their  loyalty  or  treason.      Those  who  had  not  themselves,  or  whose 
parents  had  not  been  in  the  enemy's   camp,  were  to  be  free,  but 
to  be  for  ever  debarred  from  either  the  full  Roman  citizenship   or 
Latinitas.     All  who  had  been  in  Capua  when  its  gates  were  closed 
to  the  Romans  were,  within  a  fixed  date,  to  remove  north  of  the  Tiber. 
Those  who,  without  being  in  Capua  or  other  revolted  towns,  had  yet 
not  openly  joined  the  Romans,  were  to  live  north  of  the  Liris.      Those 
who  had  come  over  to  the  Roman  camp  before  Hannibal's  arrival 
might  live  between  the  Volturnus  and  the  Liris.      No  one,  to  which- 
ever of  these  categories  he  belonged,   was  to  have  house   or  land 
within  fifteen  miles  of  the  sea.      Those  removed  beyond  the  Tiber 
were  not  to  acquire  property  or  build  houses  except  at  Veii,  Sutrium, 
or  Nepete,  or  hold  more  than  sixty  jugera  of  land.      The   property 
of  all  who  had  held  office  at  Capua,  Atella,  or  Calatia  was  to  be  sold. 
The  material  prosperity  of  Capua  soon  revived,  but  it  remained  a 
mere  market  town  without  local  government  {pagtts  or  conciliabulnui) 
until  the  Social  war  (90),  or  perhaps  till  made  a  colony  by  Julius 
Caesar  in   59.      The   Campanian   plains,   in    spite   of  agrarian   laws, 
remained  ager  publicus,  paying  a  rent  to  the  State,  till  Caesar  settled 
citizens  and  veterans  on  them  with  freehold  allotments. 

For  the  next  two  years  the  war  in  Italy  centred  round  the  citadel  2io-2og. 
of  Tarentum.  The  obstinate  defence  of  it  by  M.  Livius,  whose  Tarentzim. 
negligence  had  lost  the  town,  was  of  grave  detriment  to  Hannibal. 
City  after  city  returned  to  its  allegiance,  and  Hannibal  was  unable 
to  detach  sufficient  troops  to  restrain  or  punish  them.  And  though 
a  fleet  of  Roman  ships,  which  endeavoured  to  victual  the  citadel,  was 
scattered  by  some  Tarentine  vessels  under  Democrates  \  and  though 


352 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Cn.  Fulvius  the  proconsul  was  defeated  and  killed  by  Hannibal  at 
Herdonea,  Marcellus,  who  had  taken  Salapia,  was  still  confident.  He 
followed  Hannibal  over  the  borders  of  Lucania,  and  at  Numistro,  near 
Volcentum,  fought  him  without  failure,  if  without  marked  success, 
following  him  to  Apulia  as  he  retired  on  the  night  after  the  battle.  So 
also  when  next  year  the  veteran  Fabius  resolved  to  attempt  the 
recovery  of  Tarentum  and  the  relief  of  the  citadel,  Marcellus  was  able 
to  keep  Hannibal  in  play  and  cover  the  attack.  Of  the  three  days' 
fighting  at  Canusium,  the  result  of  the  first  was  doubtful ;  and  though 
Hannibal  gained  a  partial  victory  on  the  second  day,  both  suffered 
so  severely  on  the  third,  that  Hannibal  broke  up  his  camp  in  the 
night  and  again  retired  to  Bruttium  ;  while  Marcellus  retreated  to 
Venusia,  from  which  he  did  not  venture  out  again  for  the  rest  of 
the  summer. 

Meanwhile  the  consul  Q.  Fulvius  was  recovering  the  Hirpini,  the 
people  of  Volceium,  and  other  Lucanians,  who  dismissed  their  Punic 
garrisons  and  accepted  his  clemency  :  and  Fabius  was  steadily  advanc- 
ing on  Tarentum.  He  had  already  taken  a  town  of  the  Sallentini  when 
the  commander  of  the  Bruttian  garrison  placed  in  Tarentum  by 
Hannibal  offered  to  betray  the  town  to  him.  The  intrigue  was  con- 
ducted by  a  Bruttian  serving  in  the  Roman  army,  whose  sister  was 
beloved  by  the  commander  ;  and  its  result  was  to  allow  the  Romans 
to  scale  the  wall  unresisted  where  the  Bruttian  guards  were  stationed. 
Some  stand  was  made  by  the  Tarentines  in  the  Forum  ;  but  when 
their  leaders  fell,  an  indiscriminate  slaughter  of  Tarentine  and 
Carthaginian  began,  and  those  citizens  who  survived,  to  the  number 
it  is  said  of  30,000,  were  sold  into  slavery.  Besides  the  price  of 
these  captives  vast  stores  of  silver  and  gold  and  works  of  art  fell 
into  the  hands  of  the  victors.  The  deportation  of  these  last  to 
Rome  does  not  appear  to  have  been  so  complete  as  at  Syracuse,  for 
Fabius  exclaimed  contemptuously,  "  Let  us  leave  them  their  angry 
gods  "  ;  but  a  colossal  Hercules  was  transferred  to  the  Capitol,  and 
probably  a  large  proportion  of  other  statues  and  pictures. ^ 

While  this  severe  blow  to  his  hopes  was  being  struck,  Hannibal 
himself  was  far  off  at  Caulonia,  which  he  had  relieved  from  a  siege 
undertaken  at  the  suggestion  of  Fulvius,  by  a  mixed  force  of  free- 
booters and  Bruttians  collected  in  the  previous  year  by  Laevinus  at 
Rhegium.  Hearing  of  the  danger  of  Tarentum,  he  hastened  thither, 
but  found  that  all  was  over  ;  and,  retiring  slowly  to  Metapontum, 
tried  to  tempt  Fabius  into  an  ambush  by  means  of  a  feigned  offer 
from  the   Metapontines  to  surrender.      But  when  the  day  came   for 

'  Plutarch  {Marc  xxi. )  expressly  contrasts  his  conduct  with  that  of  Marcellus, 
and  the  same  is  implied  in  Fad.  xxii.  and  Livy  xxvii.  16.  Yet  it  may  be  that  he  only 
spared  wliat  it  was  inconvenient  to  take  (PUny  A'^.  //.  xxxiv.  §  40,  Strabo  6,  3,  i). 


XXIV  HANNIBAL  CONFINED  TO  LUCANIA  353 

Fabius  to  go  the  omens  were  unfavourable,  the  haruspex  warned  him 
against  "  the  fraud  of  the  enemy,"  and  Fabius  did  not  start ;  and 
catching  some  of  the  Metapontine  agents  sent  to  inquire  the  reason, 
forced  them  by  threats  of  torture  to  confess.  For  the  rest  of  the  season 
Fabius  pursued  his  old  waiting  game,  and  Marcellus  had  not  suffi- 
ciently recovered  from  his  three  days'  battle  with  Hannibal  to  venture 
from  Venusia.  Fabius's  success  at  Tarentum  shielded  him  from  the 
discontent  at  Rome  at  the  slow  progress  of  the  war,  but  Marcellus 
was  vehemently  assailed  as  prolonging  it  for  his  private  advantage. 

He   defended   himself  triumphantly  and  was   re-elected  consul  208.  Coss. 
for  the  fifth  time  ;  though  the  difficulties  thrown  in  his  way  by  the  ^Y' 
pontifices     show    the    animus     of   his    enemies.       However,    great  j^./^^  ^^^. 
exertions  were  made.      Twenty-one  legions  were  on  foot ;   in  every   ^    j^ 
direction  the  war  was  to  be  maintained.    Marcellus  returned  to  Venusia  Quinctius 
with  a   reinforcement ;    and  the  consuls   were  eager  to  distinguish  Ctispinus. 
their  year  of  office  by  the  final  expulsion  of  Hannibal  from   Italy. 
And  this  seemed  now  far  from  unlikely.      The  fall  of  Capua  had  cut 
him  off  from  Campania,   the  recapture   of  Tarentum  from  Apulia. 
He  seems  to  have  been  almost  confined  to  south  Lucania,  and  to 
have   depended   chiefly   on   Croton   and   other   Greek  cities   of  the 
coast.     The  consul  Crispinus,  who  had  succeeded  to  the  command  of 
Fabius's  army,  wished  to  emulate  his  achievement  at  Tarentum  by 
the  capture  of  Locri,  one  of  the  chief  of  these  Greek  cities.     But  Hannibal 
Hannibal  moved  down  to  relieve  it  and  was  already  encamped  on  the  0^  ^^'^ 
Lacinian    promontory.     Crispinus  abandoned  the  siege  to  effect  a  •^^^^'^^^'^ 
junction  with   Marcellus  starting  from  Venusia.      This  was  effected  ^^^^ 
between  Venusia  and   Bantia  ;    but  the  combined  army  could  not 
move  southwards  upon  Locri,  because  Hannibal,  who  had  followed, 
was  encamped  a  few  miles  off.       They  endeavoured,   however,  to 
promote  the  siege  by  ordering  L.   Cincius  to  come  from  Sicily,  and 
by    obtaining    a    detachment    from    Tarentum.      The     latter    was 
intercepted  by  some  of  Hannibal's  troops  who  lay  in  wait  for  it  on 
the  road  from  Tarentum  ;  and  the  consuls  themselves  soon  fell  into 
a  similar  snare. 

There  was  a  wooded  knoll  between  the  Roman  and  Carthaginian 
camps  which  seemed  to  the  Romans  a  good  basis  of  attack  if  properly 
occupied.  Before  doing  this,  however,  the  consuls  started  to  recon-  Death  of 
noitre  it  personally,  accompanied  by  a  small  body  of  cavalry  and  by  two  Marcellus. 
or  three  officers,  among  whom  was  the  consul's  son  M.  Marcellus. 
But  Hannibal  had  also  observed  the  advantages  of  the  post,  and  had 
taken  care  to  station  near  it  some  of  his  Numidian  cavalry  :  or,  as 
Polybius  says,  the  Numidian  cavalry,  whose  constant  duty  it  was  to 
be  lying  in  wait  to  cut  off  skirmishers,  happened  on  that  day  to  be 
concealed  at  its  foot.     As  soon  as  their  scouts  told  them  that  a  body 

2  A 


354 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Character 
of  Mancl- 
lus. 


J  lis  con- 
tests with 
Hannibal. 


His  con- 
duct ifi 
Sicily. 


of  the  enemy  were  coming  over  the  brow  of  the  hill,  they  ascended  by 
a  more  circuitous  route  and  got  between  the  consuls  and  their  camp. 
Finding  that  they  were  after  all  but  a  small  party,  they  charged  them 
down  hill.  The  consul  Claudius  with  many  more  was  killed,  his 
son  and  the  other  consul  Crispinus  were  wounded,  and  the  sur- 
vivors with  difficulty  regained  the  camp. 

Thus  fell  Marcellus,  a  great  soldier  if  not  a  great  man.  His 
character  was  a  subject  of  dispute  among  his  contemporaries,  and 
his  achievements  were  very  early  depreciated.  He  represents  a 
class  of  Roman  officers  which  was  about  to  be  superseded  by  another 
more  cultivated  if  not  more  able.  The  friends  and  admirers  of  the 
Scipios  could  see  little  that  was  admirable  in  a  man  whose  soldier- 
like roughness  and  perhaps  cruelty  were  not  relieved  by  the  dis- 
criminating taste  for  art  and  literature  which  was  becoming  the 
fashion.  Polybius  indeed,  the  friend  and  panegyrist  of  the  Scipios,  had 
learnt  from  them  to  disbelieve  entirely  in  his  victories  over  Hannibal ; 
yet  though  they  were  doubtless  made  the  most  of  in  his  son's 
latidatio,  on  which  the  accounts  in  Livy  and  Plutarch  may  have  been 
founded,  it  seems  certain  that,  if  he  did  not  beat  Hannibal,  he 
managed  on  ev.ery  occasion  to  avoid  disastrous  defeat  himself  If 
he  did  not  win  a  Zama,  neither  did  he  lose  a  Cannae.  A  Roman 
general  who  in  a  contest  with  Hannibal  left  the  result  only 
doubtful  did  in  effect  win  a  victory.  For  to  Hannibal  time  and  impres- 
sion were  everything.  If  he  was  to  have  any  hope  of  keeping  his 
position  in  Italy  his  career  of  victory  must  be  unbroken.  Every 
month  which  saw  him  only  at  a  standstill  encouraged  cities  to  fall  off, 
diminished  an  army  which  was  hardly  ever  recruited  from  home,  and 
brought  him  nearer  to  the  end  of  his  resources.  Certainly  the  so- 
called  victory  on  the  third  day's  fighting  at  Canusium  was  such 
that  the  victor  had  to  let  the  conquered  general  move  off  unopposed, 
and  was  obliged  to  shut  himself  up  within  walls  for  the  remainder 
of  the  season.  Still  Hannibal  did  withdraw  for  the  time,  and  made 
no  farther  attack.  He  had  destroyed  no  Roman  army,  and  had 
gained  no  fresh  adherent.  Nor  were  the  severities  in  Sicily  shocking 
to  the  feelings  of  the  time  :  the  execution  at  Leontini  of  2000  Roman 
deserters  was  not  much  worse  than  that  of  the  garrison  of  Rhegium  in 
the  previous  war  ;  and  the  massacre  at  Enna— of  which  he  was  not 
the  author,  although  he  expressed  approval  of  it — might  have  been 
defended  on  the  grounds  of  necessity,  in  the  case  of  a  populace 
determined  on  defection.  His  reputation  indeed  at  Rome  suffered 
less  from  any  of  these  things  than  from  the  imprudence  which  cost 
him  his  life  ;  and  those  who  could  not  deny  him  the  merit  of  a 
brave  and  successful  soldier,  could  plausibly  refuse  him  the  reputation 
of  a  careful  general.      Hannibal  himself  did  not   undervalue   him  ; 


Hannibal''  s 


XXIV  HASDRUBAL  COMING  FROM  SPAIN  355 

and  gave  evidence  of  his  respect  by  being   careful   that  his   body 
should  receive  decent  burial. 

Hannibal  now  made  one  last  attempt  in  Apulia.  He  used  the  208. 
signet  ring  of  the  dead  consul  to  induce  the  people  of  Salapia  to  open 
their  gates  as  though  to  Marcellus.  Previous  information,  however,  ^^^^1-^ 
had  reached  the  Salapians  and  the  ruse  failed.  He  approached 
the  town  :  his  first  line  of  Roman  deserters  called  out  in  Latin  to 
the  sentries  to  "  open  to  the  consul."  The  portcullis  was  slowly 
hauled  up,  the  Roman  deserters  rushed  in, — suddenly  it  fell  with  a 
crash.  The  faithless  Romans  were  trapped  and  easily  killed  ;  while 
the  rest  of  Hannibal's  army  was  overwhelmed  by  every  kind  of 
missile  and  weight  from  the  walls,  and  had  to  retire.  He  returned, 
however,  unmolested  and  raised  the  siege  of  Locri. 

Still  he  was  in  a  situation  which  admitted  but  one  solution.  He 
must  be  reinforced  with  men  and  money,  or  he  must  abandon  all 
but  the  southern  extremity  of  Italy  and  perhaps  Italy  itself  It 
was  therefore  with  keen  anxiety  that  he  looked  forward  to  being 
joined  by  his  brother  Hasdrubal,  who  was  said  at  length  to  be  on  his  Nero. 
way  from  Spain  with  an  army  and  a  great  sum  of  gold  to  hire 
mercenaries.  The  rumour  of  his  coming  caused  corresponding  Hasdrubal. 
anxiety  at  Rome.  The  two  consuls  for  207  were  M.  Livius  Salinator, 
who  had  in  219  distinguished  himself  in  the  war  in  Illyricum,  but 
had  been  (it  seems  unjustly)  condemned  for  malversation  in  dealing 
with  the  spoil,  and  had  retired  to  the  country  in  dudgeon,  and  C. 
Claudius  Nero,  who  had  served  as  legatus  under  Marcellus  at 
Canusium,  The  two  men  were  at  enmity  ;  but  yielded  to  the  advice 
of  Fabius  Maximus  and  the  remonstrances  of  the  Senate  to  lay 
aside  their  private  quarrel  in  the  interests  of  the  State.  They  were 
assigned  separate  provinces.  To  Livius  was  allotted  the  north  of  Italy, 
to  oppose  Hasdrubal ;  to  Claudius  the  command  in  south  Italy,  against 
Hannibal.  They  were  allowed  to  select  for  their  service  any  of  the 
legions  then  on  foot,  and  to  "  supplement "  them  by  fresh  levies  at 
their  discretion.  Every  effort  was  made  that  the  consuls  should  be 
early  in  the  field  ;  but  even  so,  before  they  had  started,  letters  were 
received  at  Rome  from  the  praetor  L.  Porcius,  who  was  in  Cis-Alpine 
Gaul,  announcing  that  Hasdrubal  was  on  his  way. 

He   quitted   Spain   late  in   209,   leaving  his  brother  Mago  and  Hasdrubal 
Hasdrubal,  son  of  Cisco,  in  charge.      He  had  been  unable  to  cross  the  ^^^^^^^  ^^'^ 
eastern  Pyrenees,  as  Hannibal  had  done,  because  the  Romans  held  ^^     ^^^' 
the  north-eastern  corner  of  Spain.      He  therefore  crossed  into  south-  remains  in 
western  Gaul,  and  spent  the  year  208  there,  going  apparently  as  Sou/h 
far  north   as   the   Arverni   (Auvergne),  collecting  allies   and  hiring  ^'^^^^  -^8. 
mercenaries.      He  probably  crossed  the  Alps  by  a  comparatively  easy 
pass,  either  that  of  Mont  Gen^vre  or  Col  de  I'Argentiere.     At  any  rate. 


356  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap. 

he  did  not  suffer  as  Hannibal  had  done.  He  must  have  crossed 
somewhat  early  in  the  season  ;  but  he  had  friendly  natives  all  the 
way,  and  probably  better  information  and  guidance  ;  and  accordingly 
he  arrived  in  Italy  sooner  than  either  the  Romans  or  Hannibal 
expected  him.  Moving  down  the  valley  of  the  Po,  unfortunately 
for  his  own  success,  he  was  induced  to  spend  a  considerable  time  in 
attempting  to  reduce  Placentia,  instead  of  pushing  on  to  Ariminum. 

Meanwhile  Hannibal  had  drawn  his  troops  from  their  winter 
quarters,  and  had  advanced  to  Grumentum,  in  the  centre  of  Lucania, 
and  pitched  his  camp  close  to  its  walls.  The  consul  Claudius  Nero 
was  at  Venusia,  connected  with  Grumentum  by  a  good  road,  a  distance 
of  about  fifty  miles.  Carefully  reconnoitring  in  advance,  the  Roman 
came  down  this  road,  and  pitched  his  camp  about  a  mile  from  that 
of  Hannibal,  with  a  stretch  of  plain  between.  No  regular  battle  took 
place,  but  after  several  skirmishes,  one  of  which  nearly  amounted  to 
a  battle,  he  arranged  an  ambuscade  whereby  he  inflicted  something 
like  a  defeat  upon  Hannibal.  He,  however,  lost  i  500  men  in  the 
fight,  and  Hannibal  was  able  to  elude  him  and  march  off  in  the  night 
towards  Venusia,  in  the  very  direction  from  which  the  consul  had 
come.  Thither  Nero  followed,  and  another  skirmish  took  place,  in 
which  the  Carthaginians  lost  heavily,  and  retired  on  Metapontum. 
Still  Hannibal  was  able  with  reinforcements  obtained  there  once 
more  to  advance  on  Venusia  and  Canusium,  Nero  following  on  his 
heels,  but  not  venturing  to  attack  him. 

But  greater  events  were  at  hand.  Four  Gallic  horsemen  were 
galloping  down  south,  and  hearing  that  Hannibal  was  retiring  towards 
Metapontum,  endeavoured  to  follow  him  there.  But  they  lost  their 
way,  and  found  themselves  at  Tarentum  instead.  They  were  caught 
by  a  Roman  foraging  party  and  taken  to  the  propraetor  Q.  Claudius. 
Threatened  with  torture,  they  confessed  that  they  were  carrying  a 
letter  from  Hasdrubal  to  Hannibal,  and  were  immediately  sent  to  the 
consul  Nero,  The  despatch"  announced  that  Hasdrubal  was  on  his 
march  from  Ariminum,  and  expected  Hannibal  to  meet  him  in 
Umbria.  After  sending  a  message  home  urging  that  a  force  be 
posted  at  Narnia,  which  commanded  the  road  through  Umbria  to 
Rome,  Nero  resolved  upon  a  step,  which  though  it  involved  the 
irregularity  of  leaving  his  province,  would,  if  successful,  baffle 
Hasdrubal  and  destroy  Hannibal's  hopes.  This  was  to  march  away 
without  Hannibal's  knowledge,  and  join  Livius  in  resisting  Hasdrubal, 
whom  he  had  already  met  in  Spain  and  had  reason  to  respect. 

He  left  men  to  defend  his  camp  and  keep  up  appearances,  and 
starting  by  night,  sent  forward  a  message  to  Livius  announcing  his 
approach.  His  soldiers  had  been  eager  to  volunteer,  and  the  Italian 
allies  on  the  route  aided  him  with  enthusiasm.  Livius  was  on  the  Sena, 


XXIV  NERO  JOINS  HIS  COLLEAGUE  NEAR  SENA  357 

with  Hasdrubal  within  a  mile  of  him  ;  and,  that  his  enemy  might  not 
know  that  he  had  been  reinforced,  he  sent  a  message  to  Nero  begging 
him  to  march  into  camp  by  night.      On  his  arrival  he  would  have 
had  him   wait   some    days    to    refresh    his   men ;   but    Nero's   plan 
demanded  haste.      He  wished  to  defeat  Hasdrubal,  and  march  back  207. 
to  his  camp  at  Venusia  before  Hannibal  was  aware   of  his  absence,  ^omafi 
The     praetor     L.    Porcius     Licinus     who     had    been     hanging     on  ■'^^^^l 
Hasdrubal's  rear,  keeping  on  high  ground,  and  annoying  the  enemy,  Metaurus. 
had  joined  a  few  days  before  ;  so  that  the   Romans  probably  had  at 
least  six  legions,  or  about  60,000  men.      The  council  of  war  after  a 
long  debate  decided  on  immediate  action  ;  the  signal  was  given  on 
the  day  after  Nero's  arrival,  and  the  troops  drawn  out  for  battle. 

Hasdrubal's  experienced  eye  at  once  detected  what  had  happened.  Hasdrubal 
He  noticed  the  signs  of  a  long  march  in  the  worn  arms  and  the  thin  ^''^^f  ^^ 
horses   of  troops   which  he    had   not    seen    before,  and   noted   the  ^J^^^^^  ^ 
increased  numbers.     Yet  he  could  not  discover  that  the  camps  were 
enlarged,  or  increased  in  number.     As  before,  there  was  the  consul's 
camp  and  the  praetor's.    But  he  had  had  experience  of  Roman  discipline 
in  Spain,  and  he  noticed  that   in  the   consul's   camp   two  trumpets 
sounded  to  arms  instead  of  one  ;  and  he  knew  that  this  indicated  the 
presence  of  the  other  consul.      What  if  it  also  indicated  that  Hannibal 
had  been  conquered  and  perhaps  slain  ?     Or  that  his  letter  had  been 
intercepted  by  the   Romans  ?      Overcome  with  anxiety,   he  ordered 
instant  preparations  for  breaking  up  the  camp  and  marching  away 
by  night.      In  the  confusion  of  the  darkness  his  guides  deserted,  and  He  fails  to 
when  day  broke  he  found  himself  still   on   the  south  bank  of   the  c^o^^  t^^ 
Metaurus  marching  up  stream  in  search  of  a  ford  which  he  seemed  ^^*^'"^^' 
to  have  no  chance  of  finding.      The  banks  of  the  river  seemed  to  get 
higher  and  higher  the  farther  he  got  from  the  sea,  and  the  windings 
of  the  stream  kept  him  so  long  on  the  march  without  accomplishing 
any  sensible  distance  that  the  enemy  had  time  to  catch  him  up. 

Wearied  and  harassed  by  their  attacks,  he  tried  to  fortify  a  camp  Hasdrubal 
on  some  rising  ground  near  the  river.      But  both  consuls  were  now  ^^(^"ds  at 
upon  him,  and  he  was  forced  to  fight.     Thus  caught  at  a  disadvantage,  '^^•^" 
he   showed  high   qualities  both  as  a  tactician  and  a  soldier.      He 
availed  himself  of  some  rough  hilly  ground  to  place  the  Gauls  on  his 
left  out  of  danger  of  attack  by  the  Roman  right  commanded  by  Nero ; 
while  his  right  and  centre  (in  which  he  took  post  himself),  having 
a  somewhat  narrow  ground  to  cover,  were  more  than  usually  deep, 
and  were  protected  by  a  line  of  elephants,  immediately  behind  whom 
were  his  brave  Ligurian  allies  ;  while  his  extreme  right,  engaged  with 
the  Roman  left,  consisted  of  his  veterans  from  Spain,  who  had  often 
fought  with  Romans  before. 

The  battle  began  by  a  charge  of  elephants.     For  a  time  they  threw 


358 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


the  Roman  antlsignani  into  confusion  and  made  them  give  ground  ; 
but  presently  in  the  heat  of  the  combat  these  animals  became 
unmanageable,  and  as  usual  did  as  much  harm  to  their  masters  as 
to  the  enemy.  Nevertheless  the  struggle  was  violent  and  protracted, 
and  the  loss  on  both  sides  severe.  It  was  finally  decided  by  a  move- 
ment of  Nero.  He  had  in  vain  tried  to  get  at  the  Gauls  on  the 
enemy's  left.  They  were  too  securely  protected  by  the  rough  ground 
to  be  reached  in  front  ;  and  after  some  fruitless  efforts  he  suddenly 
wheeled  his  men  to  the  left  and  executed  a  flank  movement  on  the 
rear  of  the  whole  line,  marching  steadily  to  the  left,  past  the  Roman 
left  flank,  till  he  found  himself  in  a  position  to  charge  the  veterans 
and  Ligurians  on  the  rear  and  flank  ;  and  even  reached  the  Gauls  on 
the  enemy's  left.  Hasdrubal's  army  had  made  a  gallant  fight,  but 
many  were  worn  out  by  night-marching  and  sleeplessness,  and  were 
now  cut  down  almost  without  resistance.  He  himself  fought  with  the 
utmost  courage  to  the  last,  cheering  on  his  men,  encouraging  the 
weary,  and  recalling  those  who  attempted  flight ;  till,  seeing  that  all 
was  lost,  he  put  spurs  to  his  horse,  and  rushing  upon  a  Roman 
cohort  died  sword  in  hand.  Ten  thousand  of  Hasdrubal's  army  fell, 
and  a  large  number  were  taken  prisoners.  The  spoil  also  was  rich, 
for  Hasdrubal  had  plundered  the  country,  and  was  conveying  large 
sums  of  gold  and  silver  for  his  brother's  use.  As  many  as  4000 
Roman  captives  were  said  to  have  been  released.  The  Gauls  and 
Ligurians  in  large  numbers  found  means  to  cross  the  river  and 
escape,  Livius  refusing  to  pursue  them,  that  they  might  carry  to 
their  countrymen  the  news  of  their  defeat  and  of  Roman  valour. 

On  the  same  night  Nero  started  on  his  return  march,  carrying 
with  him  the  head  of  the  brave  Hasdrubal,  which  on  his  arrival  he 
caused  to  be  thrown  in  front  of  the  Carthaginian  lines,  while  some 
African  prisoners  were  also  displayed,  and  two  of  them  allowed  to 
go  to  Hannibal  with  the  news.  The  brutality  of  the  treatment  of 
Hasdrubal  is  a  contrast,  not  creditable  to  Roman  feeling,  with  Han- 
nibal's respectful  treatment  of  the  corpse  of  his  great  opponent 
Marcellus.  The  Romans  were  fighting  for  life  and  freedom  with  an 
invaderj^and  an  invader  is  apt  to  be  regarded  as  a  wild  beast  rather 
than  an  honourable  enemy. 

Naturally  the  news  was  received  at  Rome  with  a  transport  of 
joy.  At  first  people  could  not  believe  it,  from  the  intensity  of  their 
wish  that  it  might  be  true.  It  had  been  felt  that  a  crisis  of  the 
utmost  importance  was  at  hand  :  if  Hannibal  were  reinforced  and 
enriched  the  war  would  have  to  be  fought  again,  and  bitter  experience 
had  proved  his  superiority  in  the  field  to  any  living  Roman.  The 
anxiety  therefore  had  been  extreme,  and  the  relief  was  in  proportion. 
In  the  midst  of  preparation  for  the  supreme  effort  to  save  their  homes 


XXIV       EFFECTS  OF  THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  METAURUS  359 

and   lives   they  suddenly  found   themselves   safe  from  all   chance  of 
attack,  and  with  hopes — rendered  exaggerated  by  the  reaction — of 
driving  the  dreaded  enemy  from  the  land.      Nor  were  they  wrong.    The 
Hannibal  himself  at  once  recognised  the  gravity  of  the  disaster,  and  decisive 
withdrawing  to  Lacinium,  concentrated  there  all  his  available  forces,  i^^fl^^^^^<^^ 
taking  with  him  the  Metapontines  whom  he  could  no  longer  protect.   ^^^/^  ^^^ 
And  whether  or  no  he  really  said,  as  Livy  represents,  that  he  "  recog-  Hannibal'. 
nised  the  fortune  of  Carthage,"  words  which   Horace  has  embalmed  position. 
in  his  spirited  lines — 

Occidit  occidit 
spes  omnis  et  fortuna  nostri 

nominis  Plasdrubale  interempto — 

the  words  express  a  fact.      His  chance  in  Italy  was  over.      The  war  Hannibal 
was  from  that  time  to  be  decided  in  Spain  and  Africa.      Hannibal  ^^^^^  ^P 
indeed  stayed  three   more  years  in   Italy ;  but  he   seems  to    have  ^^^^-^^-^^ 
almost  confined  himself  to  his  quarters  near  the  temple  of  Juno  on  the  frojnon- 
Lacinian    promontory,   where    he    left  that   engraved  record   of  his  tory, 
achievements  and  the  numbers  of  his  troops,  in  Greek  and  Punic  20^-203. 
characters,  which  Polybius  saw  and  copied. 

Even  at  this  low  ebb  of  his  fortunes  he  showed  his  extraordinary 
qualities  as  a  commander  of  men.  Without  adequate  money  or 
means  of  supply  he  kept  his  heterogeneous  army  together,  untroubled 
by  mutiny  or  serious  desertion  ;  and  though  he  struck  no  farther 
blow  of  any  consequence,  he  remained  almost  unmolested — a  lion  at 
bay  whom  the  hunters  dared  not  stir.  It  was  the  course  of  events 
elsewhere,  and  the  imminent  peril  of  his  own  country,  which  did 
what  the  Roman  armies  could  not  do,  and  forced  him  to  leave 
Italy. 

Authorities. —See  p.  312. 


CHAPTER   XXV 

SECOND  PUNIC  WAR — Concluded 

From  the  Battle  of  the  Metaurus  (207)  to  the  Battle  of 
Zama  {202) 

Change  in  the  location  of  the  war — Events  in  Sicily  from  210  and  settlement  of 
the  island — The  war  in  Spain  from  215 — Recovery  of  Saguntum — Syphax — 
Fall  of  the  Scipios(2i2) — Gallantry  of  L.  Marcius — C.  Claudius  in  Spain  out- 
witted by  Hasdrubal  (211-210) — Character  of  P.  Cornelius  Scipio — Elected 
proconsul  for  Spain  (211) — His  first  year  in  Spain  spent  in  negotiations  (210- 
209) — Capture  of  New  Carthage  and  release  of  hostages  (209) — Battle  of 
Baecula  and  departure  of  Hasdrubal  for  Italy  (208) — Battle  of  Ilipa — Scipio's 
visit  to  Syphax  :  his  illness,  and  the  mutiny  on  the  Sucro — His  interview  with 
Masannasa — The  defeat  of  Indibilis  and  Mandonius  (207-206) — Scipio  returns 
to  Rome  (206-205) — Scipio  elected  consul  has  Sicily  as  his  province,  and 
prepares  to  invade  Africa  (205) — The  disturbance  at  Locri  and  accusations  of 
Scipio  (205-204) — He  crosses  to  Africa,  is  joined  by  Masannasa,  and  winters 
near  Utica  (204-203) — Storm  and  burning  of  the  camps  of  Hasdrubal  and 
Syphax  (203) — Hannibal  returns  to  Africa  (203) — Negotiations  for  peace 
broken  off — Hannibal's  interview  with  Scipio — Victory  at  Zama  and  terms 
imposed  on  Carthage  (202). 

When  Marcellus  quitted  Sicily  he  did  not  leave  it  clear  of  Car- 
thaginians. Agrigentum  still  held  out,  and  was  presently  reinforced 
from  Carthage,  which  caused  the  defection  of  certain  Sicel  (not 
Greek)  towns,  such  as  Morgantia,  Hybla,  and  Macella.  They  were 
easily  reduced  by  the  praetor,  and  their  territory  divided  among 
Roman  adherents.  Still  the  war  was  not  finished,  and  Marcellus 
was  refused  a  triumph.^  He  was,  however,  elected  consul  for  the 
fourth  time  for  210  with   Laevinus,  lately  engaged  with  Philip  of 

^  He  was  allowed  a  triumphal  procession  up  the  Alban  mount,  but  only  an 
ovatio  in  the  city  (Livy,  xxvi.  21).  In  the  ovatio  there  was  no  chariot  or  laurel 
crown  ;  the  general  entered  on  foot  crowned  with  myrtle.  The  locus  classicus 
on  this  subject  is  Gellius  v.  6.  Plutarch  [Marc.  xxii. )  attributes  the  refusal  of  a 
triumph  to  jealousy.  But  the  technical  objection  was  valid  (though  not  always 
maintained)  that  a  general  to  triumph  must  bring  home  his  army  on  the  com- 
pletion of  a  war,  and  not  hand  it  over  to  a  successor  in  his  "  province." 


CHAP.  XXV  FALL  OF  AGRIGENTUM  361 

Macedon.      The   lateness   of  the   return   of   Laevinus   from   Greece  210. 
caused  a  delay  in  the  allotment  of  provinces,  but  finally  Sicily  and  Coss.  M. 
the  fleet   fell  to   Marcellus,    Italy  to   Laevinus.      But   envoys  from  ^^'^"/f 
Syracuse  were  in  Rome,  and  they  expressed  the  utmost  consternation  jy^   ^ 
at    Sicily  being    again    governed   by   Marcellus,       "  He    had    been   Valerius 
ruthless  before,   what   would   he   be  with   the  knowledge  that   they  Laevinus. 
come  to  Rome  to  complain  of  him  ?     Better  for  the  island  to  be 
destroyed  by  the  fires  of  Etna  or  sunk  in  the  sea ! "     To  many  at 
Rome  indeed,  remembering  the  life-long  fidelity  of  Hiero,  the  fate  of 
Syracuse  had  seemed  cruel  in  spite  of  subsequent  defections.      But 
the   envoys  could  not  fairly  plead  that  these   defections  had  been 
wholly  the  work  of  their  rulers  ;  and  the  Senate,  after  listening  to 
them  and  to    Marcellus,  confirmed  his  "  acts,"  while  promising  in 
general  terms  to  take  the  fortunes  of  Syracuse  into  kindly  considera- 
tion.     But,  however  stern  in   Sicily,  Marcellus  now  proved  willing  to 
make  a  graceful  concession.     He  affirmed  indeed  that  the  deputation 
had  been  got  up  by  his  personal  enemy  the  praetor  M.  Cornelius  ; 
but  before  the  passing  of  the  decree  he  had  exchanged  provinces 
with   Laevinus,    and    undertaken    the    campaign    against    Hannibal, 
which  was  to  be  his  last. 

No  warlike  movement  was   made   in    Sicily  until  the   autumn.  Fall  of 
When    Laevinus   at   last   arrived  his   first   care  was   to   relieve  the  Agrigen- 
distractions  and  miseries  of  Syracuse.      He  then  marched  against  ^^^'  ^^^* 
Agrigentum,  from  which  Hanno's  Numidian  cavalry  was  scouring  the 
country.    At  his  approach  Hanno  was  promptly  betrayed  by  Mutines, 
whom  Hannibal  had  sent  to  take  the  place  of  Hippocrates  at  the  head 
of  the  cavalry.      Hanno  deprived  him  of  this  command,  and  Mutines 
revenged   himself  by  opening   communications  with    Laevinus,  and 
throwing  open  the  gate  nearest  the  sea  to  the  Roman  troops.    Hanno 
and  Epicydes  escaped  to  the  beach,  and  crossed  in  a  small  vessel  to 
Carthage  ;  but   the  Punic   garrison,  and  such   Sicilians  as  were  in 
arms,  were  cut  to  pieces  as   they  endeavoured  to   fly  through  the 
gates  ;   the  leading  men  in  the  city  were  executed,  and  the  other 
inhabitants   sold  as   slaves :   a  terrible   example   which   caused   the  Submission 
speedy  surrender  of  twenty  other  towns,  six  more  being  reduced  by  of  Sicilian 
force.     These  were  treated  with  greater  or  less  severity  according    ^'^"■^' 
to  their  conduct,  but  in  all  of  them  Laevinus  induced  or  forced  the 
inhabitants  to  abandon  arms  and  devote  themselves  to  agriculture. 
Sicily  was  to  be  the  granary  of  Rome.      There  was  to  be  no  more 
local   independence   of   small    sovereign    states,    warring   with    each 
other  or  joining  external  powers.      Though  certain  local  laws  and 
franchises   were   retained   all  were   to   be  under  the  praetor.      One 
element   of  mischief  the   consul  removed   altogether.      He   took  to 
Italy  a  mixed  crowd  of  different  nationalities,  bankrupts,  exiles,  and 


362 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Division  of 
Spain. 


criminals,  who  to  the  number  of  4000  had  been  long  living  on 
plunder  at  Agathyrna.  These  we  have  seen  settled  near  Rhegium, 
and  employed  in  harrying  its  territory  and  besieging  Caulonia. 

The  close  of  210  therefore  witnessed  the  final  expulsion  of  the 
Carthaginians  from  Sicily,  and  its  entire  submission  to  Rome. 
Henceforth  its  regular  military  establishment  consisted  of  two  legions 
made  up  of  the  disgraced  survivors  of  Cannae  and  Herdonea,  kept 
there  in  perpetuity  till  the  end  of  the  war,  without  being  able  to 
count  their  years  of  service  or  enjoying  the  usual  privileges  of 
furlough.i  Even  the  naval  force  was  temporarily  diminished  by 
thirty  triremes  being  sent  to  Tarentum,  while  the  remainder  were  to 
make  descents  upon  the  African  coast.  But  a  permanent  reduction 
of  the  naval  force  at  Lilybaeum  was  not  thought  possible  until  in  207 
Laevinus — who  had  returned  to  Sicily  in  the  previous  year  after  the 
recovery  of  Tarentum,  and  now  had  a  fleet  of  100  vessels-^had 
made  the  seas  safe  for  the  corn  ships  by  a  decisive  victory  over  the 
Carthaginian  ships.  He  had  been  ravaging  the  coast  near  Utica, 
and  on  his  way  back  to  Lilybaeum  fell  in  with  the  Punic  fleet  of 
seventy  sail,  of  which  he  took  seventeen  and  sunk  four.  After  this 
the  winter  of  206-205  was  uneventful ;  the  greater  part  of  the  fleet 
was  taken  home,  and  it  was  not  till  P.  Scipio's  arrival  in  205  that 
Sicily  again  became  the  scene  of  military  preparations  as  a  stepping- 
stone  to  Africa.  This  last  was  the  natural  sequel  of  his  achievements 
in  Spain,  and  we  must  therefore  go  back  to  trace  the  events  in  that 
country. 

We  have  already  seen  that  the  operations  of  Gnaeus  in  217,  and 
of  the  two  brothers  Gnaeus  and  Publius  in  216-215,  had  secured  the 
Roman  position  north  of  the  Ebro.  Tarraco  was  their  regular  winter 
quarters,  and  the  Roman  position  there  was  never  seriously  in 
danger.  The  course  of  the  campaigns  of  the  next  ten  years  (2 1 5-206) 
is  not  clear  either  as  to  its  chronology  or  geography,  but  some 
general  facts  may  be  grasped.  Spain  (excluding  Lusitania)  may  for 
our  purpose  be  roughly  divided  into  three  parts  :  the  district  north 
of  the  Ebro  ;  that  between  the  Ebro  and  the  Saltus  Castulonensis 
{Sierra  More?ta)  ;  and  that  between  these  mountains  and  the  sea. 
The  first,  as  yet  without  distinctive  name,  was  inhabited  by  several 
powerful  tribes,  of  which  the  chief  were  the  Ilergetes.  The  second 
—  afterwards  called  Tarraconensis  —  contained  the  Celtiberi,  Car- 
petani,  Oretani,  Bastetani,  and  others.  The  third — Baetica — we  may 
regard  as  bounded  on  the  west  by  the  Anas  {Guadiana\  and  watered 
by  the   Baetis  {Gttadalqttiver)^  which  divides  it  almost  in  half      The 


^  Their  ignominia  was  farther  marked  by  the  censors  of  209,  who  deprived 
the  equites  among  them  of  the  equi  pnblici,  ordering  them  to  supply  their  own. 


I 


THE  SCIPIOS  IN  SPAIN  363 


Romans,  as  has  been  said,  held  the  first  of  these  districts  or  part  of 
it,  but  the  Carthaginians  were  supreme  in  Baetica.  The  tribes  of 
the  intervening  district  joined  first  one  side  and  then  the  other,  as  their 
fears  or  their  interest  dictated.  Some  were  never  subdued  by  either ; 
some  had  given  hostages  to  Hannibal  or  Hasdrubal,  and  were  only 
restrained  by  fears  for  them  from  joining  the  Romans  ;  many  cared 
for  neither,  and  only  wished  to  be  left  to  their  strongholds  and 
predatory  habits.  On  the  coast  of  this  middle  district  were  the 
cities  of  Saguntum  and  New  Carthage,  and  the  possession  of  these 
(especially  of  New  Carthage)  was  of  the  first  importance  as  impressing 
the  native  tribes,  and  as  offering  facilities  for  the  advance  of  the 
Romans  from  the  north  or  of  the  Carthaginians  from  the  south. 
Baetica  contained  rich  silver  mines  (as  well  perhaps  as  New  Carthage 
itself),  from  which  the  Carthaginians  drew  the  means  of  supporting 
the  war.  It  was  therefore  a  great  object  to  drive  them  out  of  it,  and 
in  the  varied  fortunes  of  the  next  ten  years'  war  we  shall  see  that, 
when  the  Romans  are  most  successful,  the  fighting  is  on  or  south  of 
the  Baetis,  and  the  intervening  tribes  favour  the  Roman  cause  ; 
when  the  Romans  are  unsuccessful,  the  Punic  arms  force  the 
adhesion  of  the  central  tribes,  and  push  the  war  up  to  the  Ebro. 
When  the  Roman  cause  is  lowest  of  all,  the  Ilergetes  on  the  north 
of  the  Ebro  break  off. 

The    next    year    and    a    half  was    marked  by    an    addition    to  213-211. 
the   native   allies,  and  by  abortive  negotiations  with  Syphax,  king  Fall  of  the 
of  western  Numidia,   with  a  view  to   an   invasion  of  Africa.      But     ^''■P^°^- 
it   was    barren    of  military    achievement.      The    Carthaginians    in- 
creased their  forces  in  Spain  ;  prevented  Syphax  from  joining  the 
Romans  by  instigating  Gala,   the  father    of  Masannasa,   to   attack 
him ;    and   engaged    Masannasa  himself  to   take   over   a    body    of 
Numidian    cavalry.      The   Romans,   on  their   side,    had   secured   a 
force  of  20,000  Celtiberians,  and  had  prevented  Hasdrubal's  march 
on    Italy  ;    but    they  found    themselves    now    confronted    by   three 
powerful  armies,  and  it  was  not  until  late  in  212  that  they  deter-  The  three 
mined  to  attack  them.      Mago  and   Hasdrubal,  son  of  Cisco,  were  Punic 


close  together ;  Hasdrubal,  son  of  Hamilcar,  was  separated  by  a 
considerable  distance  from  the  other  two.  Geographical  details  are 
quite  uncertain,  but  it  seems  that  all  three  were  at  no  great  distance 
from  the  Ebro,  which  in  itself  shows  that  the  previous  inactivity  of 
the  Scipios  had  been  compulsory.  They  now  decided  to  make  a 
simultaneous  attack  on  the  two  Carthaginian  positions.  Publius, 
with  two-thirds  of  the  army,  was  to  attack  Mago  and  Hasdrubal 
Gisconis  ;  Gnaeus,  with  the  rest  of  the  veterans  and  the  Celtiberian 
allies,  Hasdrubal  son  of  Hamilcar,  But  as  Gnaeus  approached  the 
enemy   the    Celtiberians    were    tampered   with   by    Hasdrubal,   and 


armies. 


364 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


suddenly  abandoned  the  Roman  camp  ;  and  nothing  remained  for 
the  weakened  army  but  retreat,  which  Gnaeus  at  once  attempted, 
followed  closely  by  the  enemy.  Publius  was  still  more  unfortunate, 
or  imprudent  in  his  choice  of  ground.  He  found  himself  harassed 
by  Masannasa's  cavalry,  of  whose  arrival  in  Africa  he  seems  not  to 
have  known  ;  his  fatigue  parties  were  cut  off,  and  he  was  kept  in 
constant  alarm  and  want  of  necessaries.  To  make  matters  worse, 
he  heard  that  Indibilis  was  on  his  way  with  7500  Suessetani  to 
join  Mago.  He  resolved  to  quit  his  camp  and  intercept  this  rein- 
forcement. It  was  a  desperate  move,  for  unless  he  eluded  Mago's 
observation  he  would  be  between  two  hostile  forces,  away  from  the 
protection  of  his  camp.  And,  in  fact,  when  he  had  all  but  defeated 
Indibilis,  he  suddenly  found  his  rear  attacked  by  the  Numidian 
cavalry.  Thus  caught  he  exerted  himself  gallantly,  but  before  long 
fell  mortally  wounded.  For  the  heavy -armed  soldiers  to  escape 
cavalry  was  impossible,  and  nightfall  alone  prevented  the  slaughter 
from  being  complete.  Happily  for  the  survivors  the  Carthaginians, 
instead  of  pursuing,  hurried  away  next  morning  to  join  Hasdrubal 
son  of  Hamilcar  against  Gnaeus.  This  junction  was  not  effected  for 
about  three  weeks,  but  yet  before  Gnaeus  had  heard  of  his  brother's 
fall.  He  divined  it,  however,  from  observing  the  increase  in  the 
enemy's  numbers,  and  endeavoured  to  retreat  under  cover  of  night. 
But  the  cavalry  caught  him  up,  and  a  slight  eminence  in  a  generally 
flat  country  offered  the  only  hope  of  defence.  There  was  no  time 
for  entrenchment ;  the  packs  of  the  sumpter  beasts  and  other  baggage 
were  piled  up  to  form  a  rampart,  but  soon  fell  before  an  enemy 
flushed  with  victory  and  confident  in  superior  numbers.  Gnaeus 
seems  to  have  fallen  almost  at  the  first  charge  with  many  of  his 
men.  The  greater  part  found  protection  in  a  neighbouring  forest, 
and  eventually  reached  the  camp  fortified  by  Publius. 

The  Scipios  had  exercised  great  influence  in  Spain,  and  their 
loss  seemed  a  deathblow  to  the  Roman  cause.  That  the  disaster  did 
not  in  fact  prove  utterly  ruinous  was  due  to  the  energy  of  L.  Marcius, 
a  young  eques  in  the  anny  of  Gnaeus.  He  collected  the  fugitives, 
drew  reinforcements  from  places  in  which  there  were  Roman 
garrisons,  and  having  effected  a  junction  with  Fonteius,  whom 
Publius  had  left  in  charge  of  his  camp,  led  the  combined  army 
across  the  Ebro  and  encamped  in  safety.  Hasdrubal  Gisconis 
followed,  hoping  to  sweep  the  Romans  out  of  Spain  ;  but  L.  Marcius 
inspired  his  men  with  such  enthusiasm,  exhorting  them  not  to 
lament  but  to  avenge  their  beloved  commanders,  that  when  the 
enemy's  bugles  were  heard,  the  excited  soldiers,  almost  in  spite  of 
their  leader,  burst  from  the  camp  upon  the  foe  advancing  in  loose 
order  and  expecting  an  easy  prey.      The  attack  was  so  unexpected 


XXV  L.  MARCIUS  SAVES  THE  ROMAN  ARMY  365 

and  desperate  that  the  Carthaginians  halted,  wavered,  and  finally 

broke  into  full  retreat.      Marcius,  with  the  prudence  of  a  practised  Marcius 

commander,  exerted  himself  with  voice  and  hand  to  prevent  pursuit,  -^^^^-^  ^^^ 

which  might  easily  have  proved  fatal  to  such  inferior  numbers,  and  ^^''^-^• 

brought  back  the  excited  soldiers  into  the  camp.    The  Carthaginians, 

who  had  yielded  to  a  sudden  panic,  soon  recovered  themselves  when 

they  found  the  pursuit  stopped,  and  returned  leisurely  to  their  own 

camp.     Livy  found  various  accounts  of  the  subsequent  achievements 

of  L.  Marcius,  and  prefers  that  which  represents  him  as  capturing 

two  Punic  camps  and  killing  many  thousands  of  the  enemy.     But  if 

the  Carthaginian  camps  had  thus  been  stormed,  we  should  hardly 

expect  the.  Romans  to  have  been  confined,  as  they  were,  to  a  narrow 

district  north  of  the  Ebro ;  or  that  there  should  have  been  a  general 

defection,  as  there  seems  to  have  been,  throughout  Spain.      On  the 

other  hand,  it  is  clear  that  Marcius  must  in  some  way  have  checked 

the  Carthaginian  advance.      For  when  in  the  late  summer  of  2 1 1 

the  praetor  C.  Claudius  Nero  arrived,  he  found  the  army  encamped 

on  the   Ebro,   and   the  headquarters   at   Tarraco  undisturbed,    and 

no  forward  movement  on  foot  on  the  part  of  the  Punic  generals. 

Nero,  destined  to  be  famous  afterwards  on  the  Metaurus,  effected  c.  Claud- 
nothing  in  Spain.     He  had  been  sent  with  a  considerable  force  after  ius  Nero 
the  fall  of  Capua,  and  taking  over  the  army  of  Marcius  advanced  ^^  Spain, 
into  Baetica,  and  succeeded  in  catching  Hasdrubal  son  of  Hamilcar  ^'^' 
in  a  wooded  valley  near  Ilitergis,  but  was  outwitted  by  a  pretended 
negotiation  for  the  evacuation  of  Spain,  while  Hasdrubal  withdrew 
his  men  from  their  dangerous  position.     The  Senate  determined  to 
supersede  Nero  by  some  ofl&cer  of  experience.      But  it  was  difficult 
to  find  any  one  willing  to  undertake  the  task.      Spain  was  now,  as 
later,  apt  to  become  the  grave  of  military  reputations,  and  the  recent 
fall   of  the   Scipios   enhanced  the  feeling   against   the  undertaking. 
The   ordinary  magistrates  were   perhaps  fully  employed   elsewhere, 
and  at  any  rate  some  special  appointment  was  thought  necessary  and 
was  referred  to  the  comitia.      But  when  the  comitia  met,  no  one  had 
given  in  his  name.      It  was  at  this  crisis  that  P.  Cornelius  Scipio,  />.  Comel- 
son  of  the  Publius  who  had  recently  fallen  in  Spain,  proclaimed  his  ius  Scipio 
willingness  to  undertake   the  command.      He  was  only  twenty-four  (^A^- 
years  old,  and  custom — though  no  law  as  yet — confined  the  consular  ^IJ^'^)^ 
rank  to  men  nearly  twenty  years  older.      But  Scipio  had  before  bid  take  the 
defiance  to  such  restrictions,  and  had  already  given  proof  of  courage  command. 
and  energy.      In  218  he  had  saved  his  father's  life  on  the  Ticinus ; 
in   216  had  prevented  the  contemplated  desertion  of  young  nobles 
after  Cannae ;  and  when  elected  aedile  for  2 1 2  had  replied  to  objectors, 
that  if  all  the  centuriae  named  him,  that  would  make  him  old  enough. 
His  good  looks  and  a  certain  dignified  reserve  impressed  people  with 


366  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap. 

confidence,  enhanced  by  the  popular  behef,  which  he  at  least  did  not 
discourage,  that  he  enjoyed  in  some  special  way  the  favour  and 
intimacy  of  the  gods.  At  times  his  face  was  said  to  glow  and  his 
whole  form  to  expand,  as  from  divine  afflatus,  and  the  soldiers  who 
saw  him  caught  some  of  his  enthusiasm  and  felt  assured  of  victory. 
With  all  this  he  was  wary  and  calculating,  leaving  nothing  to  chance, 
and  taking  all  precautions  of  a  prudent  general.  He  had  also  the 
faculty  of  gaining  the  respect  of  equals  and  enemies.  It  was  chiefly 
owing  to  him  that  Masannasa  became  a  firm  ally  of  Rome,  that 
Syphax  wavered  in  allegiance  to  Carthage.  From  Hannibal  himself 
he  extorted  warm  admiration,  and  upon  Prusias  and  Antiochus  exer- 
cised commanding  influence.  His  greatness  showed  itself  in  his 
appreciation  of  good  qualities  in  others.  L.  Marcius,  neglected  by 
Nero,  was  honoured  and  employed  by  him,  and  the  disgraced  soldiers 
of  Cannae  were  freely  admitted  to  his  army  of  Africa.  Though  not 
specially  connected,  like  the  younger  Africanus,  with  literary  men, 
he  was  highly  educated,  and  represented  the  more  refined  and  liberal 
class  of  nobles,  as  opposed  to  the  party  whose  typical  hero  was 
Fabius,  and  who  were  displeased  even  at  success  if  it  involved 
breaches  of  custom  or  tended  to  trench  on  senatorial  dignity.  Such 
was  the  man  who  now  came  forward  with  the  confidence  of  youth, 
yet  with  the  gravity  becoming  his  rank.  His  election  was  carried 
with  enthusiasm.  And  when  doubts  arose  on  account  of  his  age 
and  the  unfortunate  associations  attaching  to  his  name  in  Spain,  he 
calmed  the  feelings  of  the  people  by  a  speech  which  soothed  alarm 
and  inspired  hope. 
P.  Cornel-  Late  in  211,  or  early  in  210,  he  reached  Spain  with  a  reinforce- 

ius  Scipio  ment  of  men  and  ships.  But  the  year  210  witnessed,  it  seems,  no 
warlike  operations  :  it  was  taken  up  with  negotiations  and  visits  to 
allies,  whose  deputies  had  waited  upon  him  almost  immediately  on  his 
arrival  at  Tarraco.  However,  he  did  not  neglect  the  army  already 
in  the  country,  or  show  jealousy  of  L.  Marcius.  He  treated  him 
with  all  honour  ;  and  visiting  the  men  in  their  quarters,  praised  them 
for  the  courage  with  which  they  had  defended  the  province  and  allies ; 
and  by  word  and  deed  inspired  that  feeling  of  confidence  which  in 
war  largely  contributes  to  its  own  fulfilment.  He  found  that  he  had 
three  Carthaginian  armies  with  which  to  reckon.  Mago  was  in 
the  vicinity  of  Carteia  (Gibraltar),  Hasdrubal  Gisconis  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Tagus,  Hasdrubal  son  of  Hamilcar  in  Central  Spain  among 
the  Carpetani, — a  position  of  things  which  shows  that  Marcius  had 
been  on  the  whole  successful ;  and  this  is  farther  confirmed  by  the 
fact  that  Saguntum  was  still  occupied  by  a  Roman  garrison  and  its 
restored  inhabitants.  Scipio  had  made  careful  inquiries  as  to  the 
state  of  things  in  Spain  before  leaving  Rome.      Still  it  was  not  easy 


in  Cipatn 
211-210. 


i 


XXV  SCIPIO  RESOLVES  TO  TAKE  NEW  CARTHAGE  367 

to  decide  to  what  point  to  direct  his  attack.      If  he  marched  against  His  plan  oj 
the  nearest  of  the  three,  Hasdrubal  son  of  Hamilcar,  he  might  be  (^Hacking 
met  by  a  combination  of  all.      Hasdrubal  son  of  Cisco  might  march  ^/^, 
up  the  Tagus,  and  Mago  through  the  now  friendly  tribes  of  the  south,    winter  of 
If  he  avoided  this  and  marched  south  to  attack  Mago,  a  junction  of  2io-2og. 
the  two  Hasdrubals  might  shut  him  off  from  return.      But  there  was 
one  town,  the  chief  seat  of  Carthaginian  power,  from  which  all  three 
camps  were  at  a  considerable  distance,  the  nearest  not  less  than  ten 
days'  march.      If  NEW  CARTHAGE  became  Roman  instead  of  Car- 
thaginian   it   would  serve  as   a    headquarters   as    safe  as    Tarraco, 
commanding  the  south  and  the  nearest  crossing  to  Carthage.      He 
had  therefore  privately  resolved  to  leave  all  three  generals  alone  and 
make  straight  for  it.      Extreme  secrecy  was  needed  lest  the  Punic 
commanders  should  anticipate  him.      During  the  winter,  therefore, 
he  quietly  informed  himself  of  everything  concerning  it,  the  use  and 
conveniency  of  its  harbour,  the  nature  of  its  defences,  and  the  number 
of  its  garrison.    So  secure  had  it  seemed  to  the  Carthaginian  leaders, 
that   though   their   magazines,    their   money,    and  all   their   Spanish 
hostages  were  there,  though  it  was  the  place  of  landing  for  all  stores 
and  reinforcements  from  home,  it  was  only  protected  by  a  garrison 
of  1000  men,  while  its  numerous  inhabitants  consisted  for  the  most 
part  of  mechanics  and  fishermen,  wholly  unaccustomed  to  arms. 

The  bay  on  which  New  Carthage  stood  was  an  indentation  of  New 
about  a  mile  in  length,  forming  a  good  harbour,  and  partially  closed  Carthage. 
by  the  island  Skombraria.     At  the  bottom  of  this  bay  was  a  Cher- 
sonese, on  which  were  two  elevations  of  201  and    123  feet  respect- 
ively, one  called  the  mount  of  Asclepius,  on  the  east,  and  the  other 
the  mount  of  Hasdrubal  (who  had  built  a  palace  on  it)  on  the  west 
side.     The  depression  between  these  two  towards  the  sea  was  pro- 
tected by  a  wall.    On  the  north  of  the  town  were  three  hills,  which — 
taking  them  from  west  to  east — were  called  Mons  Saturni  (151  feet), 
Mons  Aletis  (144  feet),  and  Mons  Vulcani  (168  feet).    The  city  wall, 
forming  a  circuit  of  between  two  and  three  miles,  followed  the  line  of 
these  hills.      But  besides  this,  two-thirds  of  the  wall  was  protected 
by  a  great  inland  sea  or  lagoon  (now  dry),  which,  communicating   The  lagoon. 
with  the  harbour  to  the  west  of  the  town,  swept  round  the  north  and  I 

part  of  the  eastern  walls,  leaving  a  neck  of  land  of  about  a  third  of  a 
mile  in  extent.  Here  was  the  natural  approach  to  the  city,  and  along 
this  space  therefore  the  walls  were  lofty  and  strong.  That  part  of 
them  which  was  washed  by  the  lagoon  was  comparatively  low  and 
less  carefully  guarded,  as  not  being  open  to  escalade.  Scipio,  how- 
ever, had  learnt  from  native  fishermen  that  at  certain  states  of  the 
tide  the  lagoon  was  shallow  enough  to  allow  an  approach  to  the 
walls,  and  had  a  plan  ready  which  he  carried  out  successfully. 


368 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Laelius,  his  life-long  friend,  who  alone  was  in  the  secret  of  the 
expedition,  was  directed  to  be  at  New  Carthage  with  the  fleet  on  a 
fixed  day,  to  assist  in  the  assault,  and  to  take  off  the  troops  in  case 
of  failure.  The  men  generally  were  easily  kept  in  the  dark,  for  the 
veterans  were  accustomed  to  march  south  into  Baetica,  and  when 
Scipio  led  them  across  the  Ebro  there  was  nothing  to  show  to  what 
point  their  march  was  directed.  The  distance  between  the  Ebro  and 
New  Carthage,  about  300  miles,  was  rapidly  accomplished.  1  And 
it  was  not  until  they  were  encamped  in  sight  of  the  city  walls  that 
Scipio  explained  to  his  men  the  object  of  their  march. 

The  fleet  under  LaeHus  arrived  in  the  harbour  simultaneously 
with  the  army,  and  Scipio  lost  no  time  in  commencing  operations. 
His  camp  was  pitched  opposite  the  city  gate,  in  the  lofty  walls 
which  faced  to  the  north-east  upon  the  neck  of  land  between  the 
lagoon  and  the  sea.  He  drew  lines  of  defence  on  his  rear,  but  left 
the  front  of  his  camp  open.  He  was  not  afraid  of  the  weak  garrison 
of  the  town,  but  an  attack  of  any  of  the  three  Punic  generals  who 
might  arrive  to  raise  the  siege  must  be  provided  against.  Mago,  the 
commandant  of  the  Punic  garrison,  was  taken  by  surprise,  but 
organised  a  resistance  with  courage  and  skill.  He  divided  his  1000 
men  between  the  part  of  the  walls  attacked  by  Scipio  and  the  citadel. 
He  armed  2000  of  the  most  available  of  the  citizens,  and  placed 
them  at  the  gates  fronting  the  Romans,  ready  to  sally  against  the 
enemy.  Scipio  drew  these  men  out  by  sending  a  detachment  to 
threaten  an  escalade,  covered  by  2000  of  his  best  troops,  whom  he 
would  be  able  to  support  all  the  more  promptly  that  his  men  would 
not  have  to  file  out  of  a  narrow  gate,  but  could  start  from  all  parts 
of  the  camp  at  once.  Their  approach  to  the  wall  was  met  by  a  sally, 
which  they  repulsed  with  great  loss  to  the  enemy.  The  garrison  had 
advanced  a  quarter  of  a  mile  to  attack  the  besiegers,  their  supports 
could  only  come  up  slowly  through  the  gate,  and  when  beaten  back 
they  had  all  to  crowd  through  the  same  narrow  entrance,  losing 
almost  as  many  in  the  crush  as  on  the  field.  The  Romans  all  but 
forced  their  way  in  with  the  fugitives,  and  at  least  were  able  to  fix 
their  ladders  on  the  walls,  which  however  proved  to  be  too  high  and 
well  defended  to  be  thus  taken.  But  to  the  mortification  of  the 
defenders  the  attempt,  from  which  towards  the  afternoon  the  Romans 
had  desisted  with  some  loss,  was  renewed  later  in  the  day.      This, 


^  Polybius  (x.  11)  says  that  he  arrived  on  the  seventh  day,  without  clearly 
stating  the  point  of  departure  from  which  he  is  reckoning.  Livy  (xxvi.  42)  says 
outright  "on  the  seventh  day  from  the  Ebro."  It  is  clear  that  for  an  army  to 
march  300  miles  in  seven  days  is  practically  impossible.  Livy  is  simply  copying 
Polybius,  and  the  only  solution  seems  to  be  to  suppose  an  early  corruption  in  the 
text  of  the  latter. 


XXV  FALL  OF  NEW  CARTHAGE  369 

however,   was   only  to   cover  another  movement.      Men    had   been 

standing  by  the  side  of  the  lagoon  furnished  with  ladders,  and  the 

time  was  now  come  at  which  Scipio  had  learnt  that  its  waters  would 

ebb.     They  were  in  fact  visibly  sinking,  and  he  bade  the  men  step  The  lagoon 

in  without   fear  and    make  for  the   low  part   of  the  wall.      It   was  passed. 

successfully   scaled  and  found  to  be  almost  deserted,   the  garrison 

being  attracted  to  the  other  Roman  assault.      The  few  guards  met 

by  the  Roman  soldiers,  as  they  made  their  way  along  the  walls,  were 

easily  overpowered  ;  and  presently  the  gates  facing  the  Roman  camp, 

already  assaulted  from  without,  were  reached  and  forced  open.    Thus 

the  city  was  in  the  hands  of  the  Romans,  by  the  aid  it  seemed  of 

that  Neptune  who,  as  Scipio  had  told  them,  had  appeared  to  him  in 

his  sleep  and  suggested  the  plan. 

Hanno,  who  had  retired  to  the  citadel,  presently  surrendered  on  Surrender 
promise  of  his  life,  and  the  indiscriminate  slaughter,  which  had  been  of  Hanno. 
permitted  as  long  as  any  part  of  the  city  held  out,  was  stopped,  and  ^/^  j      f 
the  soldiers  were  confined  to  taking  booty.      They  were  ordered  to  ^f^g  town, 
collect  it  in  the  market-place,  and  to  bivouac  by  it  for  the  night.      It  209. 
was  extraordinarily  rich.      The  gold  and  silver,  coined  and  uncoined, 
with  cups  and  plate,  amounted  to  more  than  600  talents  (^144,000), 
and  was  handed  over  to  the  quaestor.     But  besides  this,  and  a  vast 
miscellaneous  booty,   which  was  divided    among    the   army,    Scipio 
obtained  a  great  store  of  war  material-^arms,  missiles,  and  catapults  ; 
immense  granaries  of  spelt  and  barley,  1 8  vessels  of  war  and   113 
merchant  vessels,  many  of  them  laden  with  corn  or  naval  stores,  and 
10,000  captives  of  full  age.      These  last  were  not  sold.     Those  who 
seemed  suitable  were  drafted  into  the  navy,  now  increased  by  the 
addition  of  the  captured  vessels  ;  while  those  skilled  in  handicrafts, 
especially  armourers  and  the  like,  were  encouraged  to  carry  on  their 
industries  under  the  superintendence  of  a  Roman  overseer  to  each 
thirty  of  them,  with  the  promise  of  liberty  at  the  end  of  the  war  if 
they  deserved   it.      At  present  they  were  to  be  slaves,   not  of  any 
individual,  but  of  the  Roman  people.      Laelius  was  sent  home  with 
the  news,  carrying  with  him  Mago  and  fifteen  Carthaginian  senators. 
Scipio  remained  at  New  Carthage,  seeing  to  the  restoration  of  the 
fortifications,  drilling  his  men,  and  practising  his  ships  till  it  was  time 
to  return  to  Tarraco. 

The  wealth  thus  obtained  was  of  great  importance  in  sparing  the  Importance 
exhausted  treasury  at  home,  but  he  had  also  secured  a  base  of  opera-  of  the 
tions  in  the  heart  of  the  enemy's  country,  which  he  was  converting  ^/^^''^  °f 
into  a  "  workshop  of  war"  to  supply  his  own  needs,  while  he  deprived  Cartha^e 
them  of  their  best  port  and  source  of  supplies.     What  this  did  for 
the  Roman  cause  in  Spain  was  shown  by  the  deputations  which  met 
Scipio  on  his  return  march  proffering  submission  and  alliance.     These 

2  15 


370 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


The 

hostages. 


Impression 

through 

Spain. 


Scipio  in 

Baetica, 

208. 


envoys  of  native  tribes  were  told  to  meet  him  at  Tarraco,  where  he 
meant  to  hold  a  congress  of  representatives  of  Spain  north  and  south 
of  the  Ebro  alike.  Scipio  had  also  found  at  New  Carthage  a  means 
of  winning  the  regard  and  gratitude  of  the  chiefs.  There  were 
there  300  hostages,  some  children,  both  boys  and  girls,  some  young 
men,  some  grown  women.  These  he  treated  with  fatherly  kindness, 
presenting  them  with  suitable  presents,  and  promising  them  an  early 
restoration  to  their  homes.  A  special  appeal  for  protection  against 
the  licentiousness  of  their  Carthaginian  guards  from  the  wife  and 
daughters  of  Mandonius  was  courteously  answered  by  Scipio,  who 
caused  them  to  be  carefully  guarded  to  Tarraco  ;  and  the  self-control 
which  he  exercised  in  the  case  of  a  beautiful  girl  taken  prisoner  by 
Roman  soldiers,  whom  he  restored  to  her  father  without  ransom,  still 
farther  enhanced  his  reputation  among  the  Spaniards.  His  winter 
quarters  at  Tarraco  were  thronged  by  chiefs  who  came  to  receive  their 
relatives  and  declare  their  adhesion  to  the  Roman  cause.  The  move- 
ment was  begun  by  Edeco,  chief  of  the  Edeloni.  But  presently  it  was 
joined  also  by  the  leaders  of  the  Ilergetes,  Indibilis  and  Mandonius, 
who  were  serving  in  Hasdrubal's  camp,  but  were  discontented  at  the 
overbearing  conduct  of  the  Carthaginians.  The  news  of  Scipio's 
kindness  to  Mandonius's  wife  and  daughters  confirmed  a  resolution 
to  which  they  had  been  coming.  They  quitted  Hasdrubal,  and,  en- 
trenching themselves  separately,  waited  an  opportunity  of  joining 
Scipio,  with  whom  they  were  already  in  communication. 

They  accordingly  did  so  when  in  the  following  year  Scipio 
marched  into  Baetica  to  attack  Hasdrubal,  son  of  Hamilcar,  who 
seems  to  have  moved  there  after  the  fall  of  New  Carthage,  to  supply 
himself  with  money  from  the  mines  as  a  preparation  for  his  march 
into  Italy,  for  which  the  low  state  of  the  Carthaginian  fortunes  in  Spain 
made  him  think  the  time  had  come.  Hasdrubal  neither  expected 
nor  wished  to  get  away  without  fighting  Scipio,  and  seems  to  have 
been  desirous  of  putting  this  last  chance  to  the  test.  His  camp  was 
at  Baecula,  but  on  Scipio's  approach  he  shifted  his  quarters  to  a 
more  favourable  position,  where  his  rear  was  protected  by  a  river  and 
his  front  by  a  steep  ascent.  Strong,  however,  as  the  position  was, 
Scipio  attempted  to  storm  it ;  and  though  he  did  not  entirely  succeed, 
the  result  of  the  fighting  seems  to  have  decided  Hasdrubal  against 
farther  risk.  He  had  sent  on  his  elephants  and  money  towards  the 
Tagus  to  meet  Hasdrubal,  son  of  Cisco,  and  during  the  night  following 
the  assault  marched  after  them.  But  Scipio,  though  he  was  able  to 
occupy  the  abandoned  camp,  had  won  no  such  victory  as  enabled 
him  to  follow,  in  the  face  of  two  other  unconquered  armies,  which  he 
knew  to  be  within  a  moderate  distance.  Hasdrubal  therefore  marched 
off  undisturbed  towards  the  lower  Tagus,  where  he  effected  a  junction 


XXV         LAST  EFFORTS  OF  CARTHAGINIANS  IN  SPAIN  371 


with  Hasdrubal,  son  of  Cisco,  and  Mago.     After  some  rearrange-  Hasdrubal 
ment  of  forces  he  continued  on  his  way  to  the  western  Pyrenees,  and  go^^  to 
thence  into  Gaul,  to  prepare  for  his  march  into  Italy  which  was  to  9^"^"^^^^ 
find  Its  catastrophe  on  the  Metaurus. 

Scipio  had  thus  let  his  enemy  slip,  and  could  only  make  up  for 
this  by  warning  the  government  at  home,  as  soon  as  he  had  ascer- 
tained, by  sending  horsemen  to  watch  the  retiring  army,  the  direction 
of  their  march.  After  remaining  some  time  in  the  camp  of  Hasdrubal, 
and  farther  conciliating  the  Spaniards  by  dismissing  Spanish  prisoners  winter  of 
to  their  homes,  he  led  his  army  back  to  winter  quarters  at  Tarraco.  208-207. 
The  remaining  Carthaginian  generals  made  no  attempt  to  molest  him. 
Hasdrubal,  son  of  Cisco,  went  to  Lusitania  to  raise  fresh  recruits, 
and  Mago  to  Cades,  a  Punic  settlement  which  had  now  become  their 
headquarters  and  port  of  landing  from  Africa,  and  as  yet  had  had  no 
experience  of  Roman  arms. 

The  arrangement  of  events  during  the  next  two  years  (207-206)  207-206. 

is  not  clear,  but  as  the  war  was  practically  brought  to  a  conclusion  Gradual 

by  the  end  of  206  it  must  be  that  on  the  whole  the  Roman  arms  (advance  of 
,.,  .,  ,  _^^.._  .  ^^         the  Roman 

were  steadily  progressmg  throughout.      P.  Scipio  first  opposed  Has-  ^^^^^ 

drubal,  son  of  Cisco,  in  Baetica ;  Silanus  confronted  Mago  in  Celtiberia ; 
and  the  proconsul's  brother,  L.,  Scipio,  was  among  the  Bastitani,  a 
powerful  tribe  on  the  south-east  coast.  The  Carthaginians  at  home  now 
resolved  upon  a  greater  effort.  A  new  army  was  sent  to  Spain  under 
Hanno,  which,  joining  Mago  and  his  Celtiberian  allies,  was  checked 
if  not  beaten  by  Silanus  ;  while  L.  Scipio  took  Aurinx  near  Munda, 
and  sufficient  success  was  obtained  to  warrant  his  being  sent  home 
with  captives  and  a  triumphant  despatch.  The  Carthaginian  cause 
was  everywhere  failing,  Hasdrubal  had  fallen  on  the  Metaurus  :  the 
armies  in  Spain  had  been  steadily  pushed  southwards,  until  a  small 
district  from  Cades  to  Carteia  was  all  they  could  count  their  own. 

But  another  effort  was  to  be  made.  In  the  latter  part  of  207  Battle  of 
Masannasa  appears  to  have  crossed  to  Spain  again  with  Numidian  Jiip('^>  206. 
cavalry.  Mago  had  been  able  to  raise  50,000  infantry  and  4500 
cavalry,  for  the  Spaniards  have  always  shown  a  curious  faculty  for 
renewing  a  lost  war  by  endless  local  efforts  ;  and  just  when  their 
fortunes  seemed  lowest  Mago  and  Hasdrubal  found  themselves  at 
the  head  of  a  large  army.  Scipio,  who  had  also  obtained  reinforce- 
ments from  a  chief  named  Colichas,  marched  southward  on  hearing 
that  Hasdrubal  had  ventured  again  into  Baetica  and  was  encamped 
near  Ilipa  on  the  Baetis.  He  pitched  his  camp  near  Baecula,  and 
after  suffering  some  annoyance  from  Masannasa's  cavalry  and  spending 
some  days  in  skirmishing,  led  out  his  army  and  offered  battle.  He 
distrusted  his  Spanish  troops,  however,  and  took  care  that  the  results 
of  the  battle  should  depend  upon  the  Romans.      These  were  placed 


372 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


on  his  two  wings  and  advanced  at  a  brisk  pace,  while  the  Spaniards 
in  the  centre  were  ordered  to  advance  slowly.  His  two  wings  therefore 
engaged  and  defeated  the  two  wings  of  the  enemy,  whose  men, 
having  been  forced  out  of  camp  very  early  by  the  Roman  cavalry 
skirmishing  up  to  their  lines,  were  hungry  and  weary.  The  Car- 
thaginian centre  could  not  aid  the  wings,  because  they  could  see 
Scipio's  Spaniards  advancing,  and  yet  could  not  get  into  contact 
with  the  enemy.  By  thus  "  refusing  his  centre  "  Scipio  secured  that 
the  best  soldiers  of  the  enemy  should  never  be  engaged  at  all.  The 
rout  of  Hasdrubal's  wings  infected  the  centre,  and  he  was  soon  in 
full  retreat.  The  Romans  were  said  to  have  been  only  prevented 
from  storming  the  camp  by  a  violent  storm  of  rain. 

The  loss  of  the  battle  was  followed  by  the  desertion  of  many  of 
their  allies,  and  the  wearied  Carthaginian  soldiers,  who  had  had  to 
spend  much  of  the  time  imperatively  needed  for  rest  in  strengthening 
their  defences,  before  daylight  next  morning  had  abandoned  the 
camp  and  were  in  full  retreat.  The  Romans  followed,  hoping  to  cut 
them  off  at  the  passage  of  the  Baetis,  to  which  natives  had  guided 
them  by  a  shorter  route.  But  Hasdrubal,  finding  the  river  closed  to 
him,  abandoned  any  attempt  to  force  a  passage,  and  turning  south- 
ward made  for  the  coast  of  the  ocean,  which  was  reached,  though 
with  much  loss  at  the  hands  of  the  pursuing  cavalry.  Finding  some 
ships  ready  he  made  his  way  to  Gades,  from  which  he  sent  back 
the  ships  to  bring  off  Mago  and  some  of  his  men.  The  great  army, 
collected  with  such  pains,  was  utterly  dispersed  and  broken  up. 
Many  had  perished  in  the  battle  and  the  retreat,  many  more  deserted 
to  the  Romans,  and  some  of  the  remainder  found  refuge  in  the 
neighbouring  towns.  But  to  all  effective  purposes  the  Carthaginians 
were  now  driven  from  Spain,  and  Lucius  Scipio  was  again  sent  home, 
with  many  captives  of  rank,  to  carry  the  joyful  news. 

Between  this  time  and  the  end  of  206  there  was  indeed  some 
fighting  with  natives,  and  some  difficulties  tp  overcome  with  the 
Roman  army  itself.  Hasdrubal,  son  of  Cisco,  and  Mago  were  still  in 
Spain,  but  they  were  confined  to  the  island  and  district  of  Gades,  while 
Adherbal  still  commanded  some  ships  in  its  harbour.  But  Scipio  felt 
satisfied  that  he  could  leave  the  rest  of  the  campaign  to  Silanus,  while 
he  concerted  measures  for  his  great  plan  of  transferring  the  war  to 
Africa.  Returning  to  Tarraco  he  sent  Laelius  with  presents  to 
Syphax,  king  of  the  Massaesylians,  to  detach  him  from  Carthage, 
and  when  Laelius  reported  that  he  was  well  inclined  but  desired  to 
negotiate  with  the  general  personally,  Scipio  resolved  to  go.  He 
arrived  on  the  coast  of  Africa  in  the  dominions  of  Syphax  almost 
simultaneously  with  Hasdrubal,  son  of  Cisco,  who  was  sailing  home 
from  Gades.      Syphax  entertained  both  with  equal  courtesy.      Scipio 


XXV  MUTINY  IN  THE  ROMAN  ARMY  373 

lay  on  the  same  couch  with  Hasdrubal  at  supper,  who  was  much 
impressed  by  his  dignified  courtesy.  "  Scipio  seemed  to  him,"  he 
said,  "  even  more  admirable  in  conversation  than  in  war."  Syphax 
himself  also  was  won  over,  or  pretended  to  be  so,  and  made  some 
terms  with  Scipio  which  were  satisfactory  at  the  time,  though  he 
proved  in  the  future  a  fickle  and  worthless  ally. 

On  his  return  to  Spain  Scipio  found  that  L.  Marcius  had  reduced  Illness  of 
Castulo,  Illiturgis,  Astapa,  and  other  places  which  had  declared  for  'S'«>?<?. 
the   Carthaginians,   and    he    now    celebrated    his    triumph    at   New 
Carthage  by  feasts  and  gladiatorial  shows.     But  the  fatigues  of  the 
war  had  been  too  much  for  him  ;  he  became   seriously  ill,  and  a 
report   was   circulated   of  his   death.       The   effect   was   remarkable. 
Indibilis  and  Mandonius,  whose  hopes  in  joining  the  Roman  alliance  indibilis 
had   not   been   fully   gratified,    led   their  peoples,   the    Ilergetes  and  and  Man- 
Lacetani,  across  the  Ebro  and  descended  upon  central  Spain.     Even  "^^^"'•^'^ 
some  Roman  troops,  stationed  on  the  Sucro  to  overawe  the  central 
tribes,  growing  licentious  from  long  inactivity,  broke  out  into  mutiny.  Mutiny  of 
drove  their  tribunes  out  of  the  camp,  and  elected  two  private  soldiers  Roman 
to  command  them,  who  assumed  the  ensigns  of  the  highest  military  ^''^^A 
rank.     They  alleged  arrears  of  pay,  and  hoped  to  recoup  themselves 
by  unrestrained  plunder.     When   the  new  commanders   had  for  a 
short  time  enjoyed  their  power  and  the  men  their  license,  it  became 
known  that  the  rumours  of  Scipio's  death  were  false,  and  even  the 
severity  of  his  illness  exaggerated.     The  feeling  of  uneasiness  and 
alarm  began  to  take  the  place  of  over-confidence,  and  presently  the 
camp  was  visited  by  seven  military  tribunes,  who  invited  the  soldiers 
to  come  on  a  fixed  day  separately  or  in  a  body  to  New  Carthage  to 
receive  their  pay,  with  which  Scipio  had  taken  care  to  provide  himself. 
They  resolved  to  go  in  a  body,  and  were  confinned  in  their  belief 
that  the  proconsul  meant  to  treat  them  gently  by  meeting  the  advanced 
guard  of  an  army  leaving   New   Carthage  for  a   campaign  against 
Indibilis  as  they  arrived  at  the  gates  of  New  Carthage.      But,  though 
they   did  not  know   it,  these   troops   returned   to   the   town   in  the 
evening  ;  and  their  own  leaders,  to  the  number  of  thirty-five,  after 
being  entertained  by  officers  in  the  town,  had  been  arrested.      At 
daybreak  next  morning,  being  summoned  to  a  meeting,  they  went 
in  high  spirits,  expecting  the  satisfaction  of  their  demands.    Assembled 
before  the  tribunal,  they  found  themselves  surrounded   by  the  men 
whom  they  believed   to   have  left  the  town  :  but,   though   rendered 
uneasy  at   the  sight,  they  did  not  know  what  was  really  going  to 
happen.       Presently    Scipio    himself   appeared    in   the   tribunal    and 
addressed  them,  and  his  words  must  at  once  have  warned  them  that 
their  high  hopes   were   vain.      He   pointed  out    that    their  alleged 
grievances  were  groundless  ;    that   the  arrears   of  pay  should  have 


374 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Mago 
leaves 
Spain  for 
Italy. 


Scipio 
prepares 
to  return 
home,  206. 
Defeat  of 
the 
Iler^etes. 


Adhesion  of 
Masan- 


been  asked  for  from  himself  with  proper  respect  and  submission  ; 
that  in  any  case  it  did  not  justify  rebeUion  against  their  country  and 
joining  with  her  enemies  ;  that  their  idea  of  becoming  masters  of 
Spain  under  such  leadership  as  they  had  adopted  was  ludicrous  ;  and 
that  their  only  excuse  lay  in  the  fickleness  and  gullibility  of  a  crowd, 
which,  "  like  the  sea  which  is  in  itself  safe  and  quiet,  but  when  winds 
fall  violently  upon  it,  takes  the  character  of  the  blasts  which  lash  it 
into  fury."  Therefore,  he  concluded,  he  should  pardon  them,  but 
should  show  no  mercy  to  the  leaders  who  had  seduced  them  to 
mutiny.  Thunderstruck  by  the  severity  of  the  general,  and  by  the 
sudden  clashing  of  swords  and  shields  from  the  troops  surrounding 
them,  the  men  looked  on  with  silent  terror  while  the  thirty-five  ring- 
leaders were  brought  out,  stripped,  and  bound,  and  submitted  to  the 
usual  military  punishment  of  scourging  and  beheading.  Without  a 
word  or  movement  of  resistance,  the  cowed  mutineers  took  the 
military  oath  of  obedience  and  received  the  promised  pardon. 

Meanwhile  L.  Marcius  had  been  suppressing  some  fresh  attempts 
of  Hanno,  an  officer  of  Mago's,  in  the  valley  of  the  Baetis ;  and 
Laelius  had  in  vain  tried  to  take  advantage  of  treason  from  within 
to  seize  Gades.  This  failure,  with  the  news  of  the  movement  of 
IndibiHs,  and  of  the  mutiny,  had  encouraged  Mago  to  send  home 
asking  for  reinforcements.  But  the  Carthaginian  government  had 
abandoned  hope  in  Spain,  and  ordered  Mago  to  go  by  sea  to  Liguria, 
and  create  a  diversion  for  Hannibal  by  rousing  the  Ligurians  and 
Italian  Gauls.  He  accordingly  set  sail,  furnished  with  money  from 
home  and  by  exactions  in  Spain,  and  after  touching  on  the  coast 
near  New  Carthage,  from  which  he  was  driven  by  the  Roman  garri- 
son, and  vainly  attempting  to  return  to  Gades,  finally  arrived  at 
Minorca,  and  wintered  there  in  preparation  for  the  crossing  to  Italy 
in  the  spring. 

Scipio  was  to  go  home  at  the  end  of  206  ;  but  had  still  to  repress 
Indibilis  and  Mandonius.  A  fourteen  days'  march  brought  him  from 
New  Carthage  into  the  valley  of  the  Ebro,  where  the  Ilergetes  appear 
to  have  been  easily  defeated,  though  Mandonius  and  Indibilis  escaped. 
They  shortly  afterwards  submitted,  and  were  allowed  to  compound 
for  their  treason  by  a  fine  ;  but  under  Scipio's  successors  started 
another  movement  which  cost  them  their  lives.  This  defeat  of  the 
Ilergetes  had  not  only  convinced  Mago  that  he  had  no  more  to 
hope  for  in  Spain,  but  had  also  decided  Masannasa  on  the  plan  of 
joining  Rome,  to  which  his  interests  in  Africa,  opposed  by  Syphax 
and  Carthage,  had  also  been  bringing  him.  He  had  for  some  time 
been  in  communication  with  the  propraetor,  M.  Silanus,  but  wished 
to  have  an  interview  with  Scipio  himself ;  and  accordingly  when, 
under  pretence  of  acquiring  more  room  for  his  cavalry  he  had  crossed 


i 


XXV  SCIPIO'S  RETURN  TO  ROME  375 

from  the  islands  of  Gades  to  the  mainland,  Scipio  thought  it  worth 
while  to  journey  across  Spain  to  meet  him.  For  being  now  wholly 
bent  on  his  expedition  against  Carthage,  every  alliance  in  Africa  was 
of  value  in  his  eyes.  Masannasa  was  completely  won  by  Scipio,  and 
promised  the  utmost  help  in  his  power.  Solemn  pledges  of  friend- 
ship were  interchanged,  and  Scipio  returned  to  Tarraco  with  the 
assurance  that  the  famous  Numidian  cavalry  would  be  at  his  service 
whenever  he  landed  in  Africa. 

He  might,  perhaps,  have  wished  to  go  there  without  returning  to  Scipio 
Rome.      But  the   Senate  was  jealous  of  farther   military  command  returns  to 
being  in  the  hands  of  one   who  had  not  held  the  highest  office  at  ^^^^^^^^f 
home.      His  successor  was  already  appointed,  and  as  he  could  not  206. 
look  for  a  farther  extension  of  imperitcm  in  Spain,  with  leave  to  go  to 
Africa,  he  wished  to  hand  over  his  province  at  once,  and  arrive  in 
Rome  in  time  for  the  consular  elections.      He  was  received  by  the 
Senate   sitting  in   the  temple  of  Bellona,   that   he  might   claim   his 
triumph  before  losing  his  iinperhtm  by  entering  the  pomoerium.      He 
reported  that  he  "  had  fought  with  four  generals  and  four  victorious 
armies,  and  had  not  left  a  single  Carthaginian  {i.e.  Carthaginian  sol- 
dier) in  Spain."      The  triumph  was  refused  on  the  technical  ground 
that  he  had  held  no   regular  magistracy ;  he  had  had  proconsular 
power,  but  had  been  neither  consul  nor  praetor. 

Scipio   cared  little  for  the  triumph.      He  felt  certain  of  getting  205.  Coss. 
from   the   people   what   he    wanted,  in    spite   of  senatorial  jealousy.  ^-  ^^^!^^f' 
Accordingly  at  the  next  Comitia  all  the  centuries  named  him  consul,  p  i^i^f^i^^ 
the  crowd  of  voters  being  unusually  great.      His  colleague  was   P.   Crassus. 
Licinius    Crassus,    who,    as    pontifex   maximus,   would  be   unable   to 
leave  Italy.i     It  was  clear,  therefore,  that  whatever  foreign  "  province  " 
was  assigned  to  the  consuls  would   have  to  be  his.      That  the  people 
supported  his  wishes  was  made  clear  by  the  crowds  which  frequented 
his  house,  or  followed  him  when  he  appeared  in  public,  and  the  con- 
fident predictions  heard  on  all  sides  that  he  would  finish  the  second 
Punic  war,  as  Lutatius  finished  the  first.      Sicily  and  Bruttium  were 
the   provinces  assigned  to  the  consuls  ;  but   there  was  no  need  for 
them  to  draw  lots  ;  as  Crassus  could  not  leave  Italy,  it  followed  that  Contro- 
Scipio  must  have  Sicily.     But  as  he  also  desired  authority  to  extend  his  ""^^sy 
operations  to  Africa,  if  it  seemed  good,  he  brought  this  question  before  ^^     ^ 
the  Senate  at  its  first  meeting  under  his  presidency ;  and  let  it  be  known  ^^  Scipids 
that,  if  the  Senate  refused  its  sanction,  he  would  appeal  to  the  people  proposal, 
for  a  law  giving  him  the  required  permission.     Thus  he  had  two  parties  March 
in  the  Senate  opposed  to  him.     One,  to  whom  the  extension  of  the  war  ^^•^' 
into  Africa  seemed  a  dangerous  deviation  from  the  Fabian  policy  of 

^  A  rule  first  violated  by  Crassus  in  131,  and  often  afterwards.      Livy,  Ep.  59. 


376 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Scipio 
authorised 
to  invade 
Africa, 
20S- 


caution  ;  the  other,  who  were  jealous  of  transferring  to  the  people  the 
arrangement  of  the  provinces,  which,  by  a  well-established  convention, 
had  been  left  to  the  Senate.  The  view  of  the  former  was  stated  by 
the  aged  Fabius  himself,  who,  in  an  elaborate  speech,  pointed  out 
the  risks  and  dangers  of  an  expedition  into  Africa  while  Hannibal  was 
still  in  Italy ;  and  declared  that  a  consular  army  was  not  enrolled  to 
serve  the  private  ambition  of  the  consul,  but  to  guard  Italy  and  the 
city.  Scipio  answered  that  the  expedition  to  Africa  would  force 
Hannibal  to  leave  Italy  more  effectually  than  an  attack  on  him  there, 
and  that  it  was  due  to  the  dignity  of  the  Roman  people  that  the 
enemy  should  at  length  suffer  what  they  had  so  long  been  inflicting. 

The  other  objection  was  stated  by  Q.  Fulvius  Flaccus,  the  victor 
of  Capua,  who  had  been  dictator  and  four  times  consul.  He  asked 
the  consul  directly  whether  it  was  his  intention  to  leave  the  arrange- 
ment of  the  provinces  to  the  Senate  and  abide  by  its  decision,  or 
to  bring  a  rogation  before  the  people  ?  And  on  Scipio's  replying 
evasively  that  "he  would  act  for  the  best  interests  of  the  Republic," 
Fulvius  appealed  to  the  tribunes  to  protect  him  if  he  refused  to  vote, 
when  he  knew  that  the  consul  would  not  abide  by  the  vote  of  the 
majority  if  against  his  wishes.  The  tribunes  decided  that,  if  Scipio 
determined  to  refer  the  matter  to  the  people,  they  would  protect  any 
senator  refusing  to  vote.  Next  day  Scipio,  after  a  conference  with 
his  colleague,  gave  the  required  assurance,  and  the  Senate  on  their 
part  compromised  the  matter  by  allowing  him  the  province  of  Sicily, 
with  permission  to  cross  to  Africa  "  if  he  should  consider  it  to  be  for 
the  interests  of  the  Republic."  He  was,  in  fact,  in  the  same  position 
as  the  commanders  on  the  Greek  coast  had  been  during  the  last 
few  years.  Their  province  is  sometimes  described  as  "  Greece,"  as 
"  Greece  and  Macedonia,"  sometimes  simply  as  the  "  fleet " ;  the  truth 
being  that  a  discretion  had  to  be  allowed,  and  the  exact  bounds  of 
such  a  "  province  "  could  not  be  defined. 

Moreover  he  was  not  sent  to  Sicily  as  a  provincial  governor ; 
the  annual  praetor  would  go  there  as  usual.  It  was  a  military  com- 
mand,— which  was  now  only  needed  in  Sicily  as  a  base  for  farther 
operations.  Though  the  Senate  had  thus  given  in,  it  did  not  refrain 
from  showing  its  jealousy.  Scipio  was  refused  authority  to  levy  troops 
beyond  those  already  serving  in  Sicily,  which,  together  with  the  ships, 
were  put  under  his  command.  This,  however,  did  not  trouble  him. 
He  could  not  well  be  forbidden  to  employ  volunteers,  and  of  these  he 
soon  had  7000  from  various  cities  in  Etruria,  some  of  which  offered 
new  ships  and  eveiy  kind  of  material  for  their  outfit,  and  large  sup- 
plies of  corn.  Thus  furnished  with  a  considerable  force,  without 
expense  to  the  treasury,  he  sailed  to  Sicily,  leaving  the  Senate  to 
concert  resistance  to  Mago,  who  had  seized  Genua  and  Savona,  and 


SCIPIO  IN  SICILY  377 


was  collecting  a  large  army  of  Ligurians,  with  the  hope  of  marching 
south  to  join  Hannibal. 

Scipio  spent  the  remainder  of  this  autumn  and  the  winter  following  Scipio  in 
in   Sicily,    collecting   provisions   and   stores,   repairing   and   refitting  Sicily, 
ships,  and  organising   his   army  for  his   meditated   expedition   into  ^°S-'^o4. 
Africa.      He  had  been  accompanied  to  the  island  by  300  equites,  for 
whom  the  Senate  refused  equipment.      But  he  used  his   power  of 
enforcing  the  service  of  inhabitants  of  Sicilian  towns  to  equip  them. 
Summoning  out  300  Sicilians,  he  offered  to  allow  them  to  abstain 
from  the  service  on  condition  that  they  gave  their  horses  and  arms  to 
his  Italians  as  their  substitutes.      The  offer  was  gladly  accepted,  and 
Scipio  had  thus  a  body  of  cavalry  in  which  he  felt  confidence.      His 
popularity  in  Sicily  was  farther  increased  by  the  equity  with  which 
he  decided  disputes  between  the  Sicihans  and  Italian  settlers  ;  and, 
though  he  did  not  go  to  Africa  himself  this  year,  he  sent  Laelius  prepar- 
with  a  fleet,  who  was  immediately  joined  by  Masannasa,  and  returned  ations  in 
laden  with  spoils  from  the  African  coast.     This  expedition  had  caused  Carthage, 
the  greatest  alarm  in  Carthage,  where  a  fleet  was  hurriedly  sent  out      ^' 
to  attack  Laelius  at  Hippo  ;   preparations  for  raising  an  army  and 
victualling  the  city  were  hastily  made  ;   and  messages  sent  round  to 
the  neighbouring  Libyan   tribes  to  ask  for  help  ;  while  money  was 
despatched  to  king  Philip  of  Macedonia  to  induce  him  to  effect  a 
diversion  by  invading  Italy. 

The  success  of  Laelius  and  the  ascertained  fidelity  of  Masannasa  Troubles 
made  the  Roman  army  eager  to  cross  at  once.  But  Scipio  had  a-i  Locri, 
apparently  determined  not  to  make  his  expedition  till  the  following  ^^-S- 
spring,  and  was  at  any  rate  detained  for  a  time  by  the  prospect  of 
wresting  an  important  Greek  town  in  Italy  from  the  Carthaginians. 
Locri  had  early  revolted  to  the  Punic  side,  driving  out  its  aristocrats, 
who  were  generally  favourable  to  Rome.  These  men  had  found  a 
refuge  at  Rhegium  ;  and  they  now,  at  the  head  of  a  force  of  mis- 
cellaneous refugees,  made  their  way  thither  and  effected  an  escalade 
in  the  night.  The  Punic  garrison  still  held  one  of  the  two  citadels, 
while  the  other  was  occupied  by  Q.  Pleminius,  the  propraetor,  who 
had  been  ordered  by  Scipio  to  support  the  invaders  from  Rhegium. 
The  two  citadels  were  thus  the  bases  from  which  sallies  were  made 
for  some  days  by  the  opposing  forces.  Hannibal  was  said  to  be 
approaching  to  relieve  the  Carthaginian  garrison  ;  and  Scipio,  being 
told  that  Pleminius  was  in  danger,  crossed  at  once  to  Locri.  Hanni- 
bal had  advanced  from  his  position  on  the  Lacinian  promontor)-^  to 
the  bank  of  the  river  Butrotus,  and  had  even  approached  the  walls  of 
the  city  so  close,  it  is  said,  that  a  missile  killed  a  man  at  his  side. 
But,  as  usual,  he  could  not  or  would  not  attempt  an  attack  upon 
walls,  and  hearing  that  Scipio  was  in  the  town  he  retired,  sending 


378 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


word  to  Hamilcar  to  provide  for  his  own  safety.  Hamilcar  accord- 
ingly abandoned  the  citadel  during  the  night,  and  hastened  to  unite 
himself  with  Hannibal's  relieving  army.  Scipio  then  put  Pleminius  in 
charge  of  the  citadel  and  town,  and  returned  to  Messana. 

But  quarrels  arose  between  the  garrison  under  Pleminius,  which 
he  had  brought  from  Rhegium,  and  the  soldiers  whom  Scipio  had 
placed  in  Locri,  under  the  command  of  some  tribunes.  Pleminius 
took  the  side  of  his  own  men,  arrested  and  flogged  the  tribunes,  and 
was  almost  killed  himself  in  the  military  riot  which  followed.  Scipio 
hurried  across  again,  and  summoned  both  Pleminius  and  the  tribunes 
before  him.  He  acquitted  Pleminius,  and  ordered  the  tribunes  to  be 
sent  in  chains  to  Rome  to  be  judged  by  the  Senate.  But  directly  he 
had  returned  to  Syracuse  Pleminius  vented  his  anger  by  putting 
them  to  death  in  circumstances  of  atrocious  cruelty,  and  cast  out 
their  bodies  unburied.  Nor  was  this  all.  He  treated  the  natives 
with  abominable  violence,  especially  those  whom  he  discovered  to 
have  complained  of  his  conduct  to  Scipio,  while  he  made  the  Roman 
government  scandalous  by  licentiousness  and  extortion. 

The  Locrians  sent  legates  to  lay  their  case  before  the  Senate, 
especially  complaining  of  Pleminius's  sacrilegious  avarice  in  plundering 
the  temple  of  Proserpine.  The  Senate  asked  them  whether  they 
had  reported  their  grievance  to  Scipio.  They  replied  that  they  had, 
but  that  he  was  wholly  occupied  in  his  preparations  for  his  voyage 
to  Africa ;  and  that,  moreover,  when  he  had  heard  the  case  before, 
he  had  condemned  the  tribunes  to  imprisonment,  and  had  left 
the  guilty  Pleminius  in  power.  This  was  too  good  an  opportunity 
to  be  passed  over  by  Scipio's  enemies.  Fabius  demanded  that 
Pleminius  should  be  brought  in  chains  to  Rome,  and  that  Scipio 
should  be  recalled  for  having  left  his  province.  Other  rumours 
asserted  that  he  was  leading  an  idle  if  not  luxurious  life  in  Syracuse, 
amusing  himself  with  sports  or  literature,  while  his  army  was  ener- 
vated by  the  delights  of  the  town,  and  Carthage  and  Hannibal  were 
forgotten.  There  was  for  the  moment  a  strong  feeling  against  him. 
Yet  wiser  counsels  prevailed.  On  the  motion  of  the  consular  Q. 
Caecilius  Metellus  it  was  resolved  to  recall  Pleminius,  and  to  send 
ten  commissioners  with  an  aedile  and  two  tribunes  of  the  plebs  to 
investigate  the  case,  and  if  it  should  appear  that  what  had  gone  on 
at  Locri  was  by  the  wish  or  order  of  Scipio,  to  bring  him  back  to 
Rome,  even  if  he  had  already  crossed  to  Africa. 

Meanwhile  Pleminius  appears  to  have  been  already  arrested  by 
Scipio's  order,  and  the  Locrian  envoys  disclaimed  any  intention  of 
accusing  Scipio  of  anything  beyond  not  having  been  sufficiently 
moved  by  their  miseries. 

The  Fabian  party  in  the  Senate,  however,  seems  to  have  thought 


1 


XXV  SCIPIO  CP:0SSES  to  AFRICA  379 

that,  though  thus  relieved  from  compHcity  with  Pleminius,  Scipio  Scipio 
would  be  found  to  have  neglected  the  preparations  for  the  invasion  of  acquitted. 
Africa.  Hut  the  commissioners  found  everything  in  Syracuse  in  the 
highest  state  of  efficiency.  The  fleet  and  army  were  splendidly 
trained  and  disciplined,  the  arsenals  were  full  of  stores,  and  Scipio 
was  content,  without  condescending  to  defend  himself,  that  they 
should  judge  with  their  own  eyes.  Their  report  left  the  Senate  no 
excuse.  A  decree  was  passed  sanctioning  his  immediate  invasion  of 
Africa,  and  authorising  him  to  select  for  the  purpose  whatever  troops 
in  Sicily  he  thought  fit. 

An  emissary  from  Syphax  had  informed  Scipio  that  no  help  must  Scipio 
be  expected  from  him.  The  king  had  in  fact  made  terms  with  <:f'osses  to 
Carthage,  and  had  married  Sophanisba,  daughter  of  Hasdrubal,  son  J'^'^°" 
of  Cisco,  whose  influence  secured  him  to  the  side  of  Carthage.  The 
army,  however,  was  not  admitted  to  the  knowledge  of  this  dis- 
couraging circumstance,  and  the  arrangements  with  the  praetor  in 
Sicily  as  to  what  troops  were  to  be  taken  were  made  without  difficulty. 
Scipio  warmly  welcomed  volunteers  from  the  armies  of  Cannae  and 
Herdonea,  and  mustered  a  force  variously  estimated  at  10,000  foot  His  forces. 
with  2200  cavalry  and  16,000  infantry  with  1600  cavalry.  The 
transports,  the  provisioning  of  which  had  been  entrusted  to  the 
praetor,  were  convoyed  by  sixty  war-vessels  in  two  divisions — one 
under  Scipio  and  his  brother  Lucius,  the  other  under  Laelius  and  his 
quaestor  M.  Porcius  Cato — distinguished  from  the  transports  by 
carrying  only  one  lantern  instead  of  two  on  their  prows.  The  start 
from  Lilybaeum  was  solemn  and  impressive.  The  inhabitants 
crowded  down  to  the  harbour ;  legates  from  Sicilian  cities  were  there 
to  offer  good  wishes  ;  and  the  soldiers  who  were  to  be  left  behind 
came  to  bid  their  comrades  good-bye.  At  daybreak  a  herald  The 
proclaimed  silence,  and  Scipio,  standing  on  the  prow  of  his  ship,  departure. 
offered  a  solemn  prayer  to  the  gods  of  sea  and  land,  performed  the 
usual  sacrifice,  and  cast  the  entrails  of  the  victims  into  the  sea. 
Then  he  gave  the  word,  a  trumpet  sounded,  and  the  start  was  made. 
The  point  aimed  at  was  the  coast  of  the  Lesser  Syrtis,  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  which  Masannasa  was  ready  to  welcome  them  with  a 
force  of  cavaliy.  But  the  plan  seems  to  have  been  changed  during 
the  voyage.  They  had  started  in  fine  weather  and  with  a  fair  wind, 
but  towards  noon  a  fog  had  come  on,  lasting  through  the  next  night. 
At  daybreak  it  was  dispersed  by  a  brisk  breeze,  and  the  shore  of 
Africa  was  seen  for  the  first  time  in  the  distance.  But  again  at  noon 
the  fog  thickened  and  lasted  through  the  night,  so  that  the  ships  had 
to  lay-to  until  daybreak,  when  Scipio  ordered  the  pilots  to  make  for 
the  nearest  point.  This  proved  to  be  the  "  Fair  Promontory," — 
name  of  good  omen, — and  there  the  troops  were  landed  and  pitched 


38o 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


their  camp  on  some  high  ground,  while  the  fleet  was  sent  on  to 
Utica. 

The  alarm  at  Carthage  was  naturally  great.  Many  temporary 
descents  had  been  made  on  the  African  coasts  by  Roman  forces,  but 
Scipio's  landing  was  a  real  invasion,  such  as  had  not  been  known 
since  the  days  of  Regulus,  and  the  city  itself  was  in  danger. 
The  gates  were  closed,  the  walls  manned,  pickets  set ;  while  500 
cavalry,  sent  out  to  reconnoitre  Scipio's  position,  fell  in  with  his 
skirmishing  parties  and  suffered  some  loss.  His  first  movements, 
however,  were  practically  unopposed.  He  harried  the  country, 
took  fortified  places,  and  sent  off  booty  and  captives  by  the 
thousand  to  the  transports.  Best  of  all  he  was  joined  by  Masannasa 
and  his  cavalry,  influenced  perhaps  by  admiration  for  Scipio,  but 
still  more  by  his  personal  interests.  His  father  Gala,  king  of  the 
Massylians,  had  died  whilst  he  was  engaged  in  Spain,  and  in 
his  absence  the  kingdom  had  been  secured  for  his  boy -cousin 
Lacumaces,  whose  tutor  Mazetulus  practically  ruled  it.  Mazetulus 
was  in  the  Carthaginian  interest,  and  Masannasa  had  therefore  to 
look  elsewhere  for  help  to  recover  his  rights.  By  the  aid  of  Bocchus, 
king  of  Mauretania,  he  drove  Mazetulus  and  his  ward  to  take  refuge 
in  Carthaginian  territory.  They  were  afterwards  induced  to  return 
and  acknowledge  Masannasa's  rights.  But  at  the  instigation  of 
Hasdrubal,  son  of  Cisco,  their  cause  was  taken  up  by  Syphax  ;  and 
Masannasa,  beaten  in  the  field,  fled  to  the  mountains,  where  for  some 
time  he  led  an  adventurous  life,  plundering  Carthaginian  lands,  and 
hunted  by  the  troops  of  Carthage  and  Syphax.  He  was  looking 
forward  to  Scipio's  arrival  as  a  means  of  recovering  his  dominions, 
and  seems  to  have  been  waiting  for  him  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the 
Lesser  Syrtis  {inter  PunicaEmporiay.  but  when  Hasdrubal  and  Syphax 
were  recalled  from  their  operations  against  him  to  prevent  Scipio's 
advance  on  Carthage,  he  was  able  to  make  his  way  to  the  Roman 
camp  near  Utica. 

He  had  already  assisted  in  repulsing  the  skirmishing  attack  of 
Hanno's  cavalry,  which  had  been  sent  in  advance  in  the  vain  hope 
of  saving  the  country  from  plunder,  when  Hasdrubal  and  Syphax 
arrived  in  view  of  Scipio's  quarters,  and  encamped  within  sight  of 
each  other,  and  at  no  great  distance  from  the  Roman  camp.  Scipio 
had  now  selected  his  winter  quarters,  after  convincing  himself  that 
Utica  could  not  be  carried  by  assault.  The  ships  continued  the 
blockade,  and  those  that  were  drawn  up  on  shore  were  protected  by 
the  army,  which  was  encamped  on  a  promontory  to  cover  them. 
But  Scipio's  position  during  the  winter  months  of  204-203  was  not 
satisfactory.  He  was  shut  up  in  a  somewhat  confined  space  by  two 
armies    greatly    superior    in    numbers    to    his    own.       At    Carthage 


1 


BURNING  OF  CARTHAGINIAN  &  NUMIDIAN  CAMPS     381 


advantage  was  being  taken  of  the  respite  to  prepare  a  powerful  fleet  Winter  of 
to  intercept  his  supplies,  provision  the  city,  and  threaten  the  blockade  204-20 j. 
of  Utica.  Not  thinking  himself  therefore  strong  enough  to  offer 
battle  to  Syphax  and  Hasdrubal  combined,  he  resolved  to  detach 
Syphax  by  negotiation.  All  through  the  winter  legates  went  back- 
wards and  forwards  between  the  Roman  and  Numidian  camp. 
Syphax  wished  to  play  the  part  of  mediator,  and  perhaps  was  not 
strongly  on  either  side.  But  he  was  still  under  the  influence  of 
Sophanisba,  and  would  not  abandon  Carthage  altogether.  He  went 
back  again  and  again  to  the  proposal  that  the  Romans  and  Car- 
thaginians should  agree,  the  one  to  evacuate  Africa  and  the  other 
Italy,  leaving  all  places  between  the  two  as  they  were.  These 
negotiations,  however,  were  without  result ;  and  when  spring  came,  spring  of 
Scipio,  knowing  that  the  Carthaginians  had  employed  the  winter  203. 
months  in  fitting  out  a  great  fleet,  and  having  come  to  the  conclusion 
that  Syphax — who  had  been  strengthening  his  army  by  fresh  recruits, 
had  seized  a  town  containing  Roman  stores,  and  had  first  tampered 
with  and  then  tried  to  poison  Masannasa — was  not  prepared  to 
change  sides,  but  was  still  under  the  influence  of  his  Carthaginian 
wife,  made  up  his  mind  to  put  in  practice  what  he  had  been  preparing 
all  along. 

He  had  taken  care  that  among  the  legates  sent  from  time  to  time  Scipio 
to   Syphax  there  should  be  some  of  sufficient  mihtary  experience,  prepares  to 

disguised  in  various  ways,  to  be  capable  of  reporting  on  the  position  '^f''^';'^ 

,  iri  :  TT  out.-.    Syphax 

and  strength  of  the  enemy's  camp.      He  now  gave  Syphax  a  hmt  ^^^ 

that  he  was  ready  to  listen  to  his  terms.      Syphax  entered  eagerly  Hasdrubal, 

into  the  negotiations,  and  the  messengers  between  the  camps  became  203. 

still  more  frequent,  till  Scipio  obtained  all  the  information  he  required. 

The  huts  in  the  two  camps  he  found  were  of  wood  and  thatched 

with  reeds,  while  those  of  the   Numidian  reinforcements  were  of  still 

lighter  material,  and  for  the  most  part  were  outside  the  camps.    Such 

huts  could  easily  be  burnt,  and  this  Scipio  determined  to  attempt. 

But  he  took   care  first  to  distract  the  enemy's  attention.     At  the 

beginning  of  spring  he  began  launching  his  ships  and  getting  the 

engines  on  them  into  working  order,  as  though  he  meant  once  more 

to  assault  Utica.     When  all  his  preparations  were  complete  he  sent 

a  final  message  to  Syphax,  desiring  to  be  authoritatively  assured  that 

the  Carthaginians  would  ratify  the  terms  proposed  by  Syphax  if  he 

accepted  them  for  Rome.       Syphax   obtained   the   assurance  from 

Hasdrubal,  and  thenceforth  behaved  as  if  peace  were  certain,  relaxing 

all  the  usual  precautions,  and  allowing  his  men  to  go  backwards  and 

forwards  to  the  camp  as  if  there  were  no  enemy  near.    His  exultation 

indeed  was  dashed  by  a  second  message  from  Scipio  informing  him 

that,  though  anxious  to  confirm  the  peace  himself,  the  majority  of  his 


382  HISTORY  OF  ROME 


council  disagreed  with  him.  Still  such  preparations  as  Syphax  saw 
going  on  in  the  Roman  quarters  seemed  to  point  to  a  leisurely- 
resumption  of  the  siege  of  Utica,  and  he  was  wholly  unprepared  for 
an  attack  upon  himself.  This,  however,  was  what  was  impending, 
unknown  to  the  Roman  army  itself. 
Burning  of  The  tribunes  most  in  Scipio's  confidence  were  ordered  on  a 
certain  day  to  see  that  their  men  had  their  evening  meal  served  out 
early,  that  when  the  usual  bugles  sounded  at  supper-time  they 
might  be  prepared,  instead  of  eating,  to  march  out  at  once  without 
exciting  suspicion.  It  was  early  in  the  year,  and  by  the  end  of  the 
first  watch  it  was  possible  to  march  out  without  being  observed. 
Soon  after  midnight  the  whole  army  had  covered  the  seven  miles 
between  their  camp  and  the  enemy.  The  Roman  army  was  then 
divided.  One  half,  under  the  direction  of  Laelius  and  Masannasa, 
was  despatched  to  the  camp  of  Syphax,  while  Scipio  himself  led  the 
other  towards  that  of  Hasdrubal,  the  more  distant  of  the  two. 
Masannasa  and  Laelius  advanced  in  two  divisions,  the  former  leading, 
as  being  better  acquainted  with  the  locality,  and  Laelius  occupying 
the  rear  as  a  reserve.  Masannasa  stationed  men  at  all  possible 
outlets,  and  in  a  short  time  the  huts  outside  and  immediately  inside 
the  camp  were  blazing.  The  fire  once  alight  caught  row  after  row 
with  marvellous  rapidity,  and  a  scene  of  indescribable  confusion 
followed.  The  Numidians  could  not  understand  what  was  going  on, 
nor  were  Syphax  and  the  men  within  the  camp  better  informed. 
Thinking  it  an  accidental  conflagration  they  leapt  out  of  bed,  or 
sprang  up  from  their  camp  fires  where  they  were  feasting  and 
drinking,  sometimes  with  the  cup  still  in  their  hands,  and  rushed 
towards  the  burning  tents.  Numbers  of  them  were  trampled  to 
death  in  the  crowd,  or  perished  in  the  flames,  while  those  who 
escaped  these  dangers  fell  into  the  hands  of  Masannasa's  pickets, 
and  were  killed  before  they  had  time  to  understand  what  had 
happened. 

Meanwhile  the  men  in  Hasdrubal's  camp,  observing  the  con- 
flagration in  that  of  Syphax,  which  they  imagined  to  be  accidental, 
either  started  to  render  aid,  or  stood  unarmed  outside  the  gate  gazing 
at  the  dreadful  spectacle.  Both  alike  were  speedily  attacked  and 
put  to  the  sword  by  Scipio's  division,  which  also  forced  its  way  into 
the  camp  and  fired  the  huts.  Both  camps  were  now  suffering  equal 
horrors.  The  flames  spread  so  rapidly  that  the  surging  mass  of 
panic-stricken  men  could  not  force  its  way  along  the  pathways, 
choked  by  horses  and  other  beasts  of  burden,  consuming  in  the 
flames,  or  in  a  state  of  frantic  terror.  Defence  in  such  circumstances 
was  not  to  be  thought  of,  and  escape  all  but  hopeless.  Syphax  and 
Hasdrubal  indeed,  accompanied  by  a  few  horsemen,  did  manage  to 


XXV  THE  CARTHAGINIANS  REINFORCED  383 

— I 

make  their  way  out,  as  well  as  some  others.  But  the  vast  majority 
of  those  two  great  armies,  with  their  immense  trains  of  horses,  beasts 
of  burden,  and  slaves,  either  perished  in  the  flames  or  fell  unarmed 
and  defenceless  under  the  Roman  sword. 

Whatever  we  may  think  of  the  morality  of  such  an  operation   The  effects 
undertaken    in    the    midst    of   negotiations,    its    effect    was    signal,  ^f  *^^ 
Instead   of  watching  their    enemy   shut  up  on  a  promontory  and  ^ifjl^j^^^""' 
exhausting  his  strength  on  the  siege  of  Utica,  which  they  could  view  camp, 
with  comparative  indifference,  the  Carthaginians  were  now  in  daily  203. 
expectation  of  seeing  the  Roman  standards  from  their  own  walls. 
They  gratified  their  wrath  indeed  by  condemning  Hasdrubal  to  death 
in  his  absence, — for  he  knew  only  too  well  what  to  expect,  and  was 
hiding  in  the  country,  where  he  soon  collected  a  band  of  followers. 
But,  that  done,  they  anxiously  debated  their  next  step.      Should  they 
send  for  Hannibal  ?     Should   they  ask  for  a  truce  from  Scipio  to 
discuss  terms  of  peace  ?     Or  should  they  still  hold  out  and  induce 
Syphax  once  more  to  rally  to  their  aid  ? 

The  last  and  most  courageous  course  was  decided  upon,  princi-   The 
pally,  we  are  told,  by  the  influence  of  the  Barcine  faction,  to  whom  Cartha- 
war  with  Rome  was  an  hereditary  policy,  as  well  as  by  this  time  a  ^l^^^"^' 
matter  of  life  or  death   to    themselves.     There  were  also   reasons  arrival  of 
against   despair.      Syphax   was  still  at   the  head  of  a   considerable  Celtiherian 
force,    having   escaped    Scipio's  pursuit,   and  was  said   to  be  safely  ff^^^^^^n- 
established  at  Abba,  collecting  scattered  fragments  of  his  army.      He  J^^^^/^^ 
was  indeed  meditating  a  farther  flight  into  his  own  dominions,  but  if  still  to 
he  could  be  induced  to  remain,  there  might  still  be  hope  of  preventing  resist. 
Scipio's  approach.      They  and  Syphax  were  presently  encouraged  by 
the  arrival  of  more  than  4000    Celtiberians,  who  had  been   hired 
by  Carthaginian   recruiting   agents.      Their  numbers  were  exagger- 
ated at  Carthage,  and  their  warlike  qualities  much  vaunted.     The 
spirit  of  the  people  revived,  and  it  was  resolved  once  more  to  try 
their  fortunes  in  the  field.      Within  a  month  Hasdrubal  again  led 
out  an  army  from  Carthage,  and  joined  Syphax  and  the  Celtiberians 
on  the  "  Great  Plains." 

When  Scipio,  who  was  preparing  to  press  on  the  siege  of  Utica,  Scipio  goes 
heard  of  this  new  rally  of  the  enemy  he  threw  everything  else  aside 
in  order  to  meet  and  crush  it.  His  imperhnn  was  now  extended  till 
the  end  of  the  war,  and  having  received  reinforcements  and  supplies 
of  corn  from  Sardinia,  Sicily,  and  Spain,  he  could  more  easily  divide 
his  forces.  Leaving  troops  to  support  the  ships  in  blockading  Utica, 
he  marched  to  meet  the  enemy  in  the  Great  Plains. 

On  the  fifth  day  he  pitched  his  camp  on  a  hill  between  three  and 
four  miles  from  the  Carthaginian  camp  ;  on  the  next  descended  into 
the  plain  and  encamped  within  a  mile  of  the  enemy.     Two  days 


to  meet 
them. 


384 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


were  then  spent  in  cavalry  skirmishes,  and  on  the  fourth  both  sides 
drew  out  for  battle.  Scipio  followed  the  tactics  which  he  had 
employed  before.  The  chief  part  of  the  fighting  in  the  early  part  of 
the  day  was  left  to  the  cavalry  on  the  two  wings,  and  it  was  not 
until  he  found  himself  successful  on  both  that  he  brought  the  heavy 
armed  troops  in  the  centre  into  contact  with  the  enemy.  Here  the 
Celtiberians  offered  a  stubborn  resistance,  inflicting  considerable  loss 
on  the  Romans,  and  though  they  were  eventually  cut  to  pieces,  the 
delay  enabled  Syphax  and  Hasdrubal  to  escape  from  the  field. 
Syphax  hurried  off  with  his  light  horsemen  to  his  own  dominions, 
soon  to  be  pursued  and  taken  by  his  bitterest  enemy. 

Leaving  Laelius  and  Masannasa  to  follow  Syphax,  Scipio  advanced 
towards  Carthage,  receiving  the  submission  of  town  after  town,  and 
carrying  those  which  resisted  by  assault.  He  found  little  indeed  to 
withstand  him.  The  government  of  Carthage  had  been  forced,  owing 
to  the  protracted  war,  to  levy  heavy  imposts  of  men  and  money,  and 
the  wretched  Libyans  welcomed  a  change  of  masters,  which  could 
not,  they  thought,  be  for  the  worse.  Finding  himself  after  some 
weeks  gorged  with  booty,  Scipio  despatched  it  to  the  camp  on  the 
sea  near  Utica,  and,  thus  lightened,  marched  to  Tunes,  pitching  his 
camp  in  sight  of  the  walls  of  Carthage. 

The  Carthaginians,  however,  were  not  yet  at  the  end  of  their 
resources.  They  had  sent  to  Italy  to  recall  Hannibal  and  Mago  ; 
and  meanwhile  diverted  Scipio's  attention  from  themselves  by  de- 
spatching a  fleet  to  attack  the  Roman  ships  at  Utica.  From  Tunes 
Scipio  and  his  officers  could  see  the  fleet  leaving  the  harbour  and 
steering  for  Utica.  Alarmed  for  his  own  ships,  he  broke  up  his 
camp,  and  made  a  rapid  march  to  Utica  also.  There  he  found,  as 
he  expected,  that  the  Roman  ships  were  in  no  situation  to  fight. 
They  were  moored  under  the  walls,  and  heavily  laden  with  machines 
for  assaulting  and  battering  them,  and  would  be  helpless  before  a 
well-managed  fleet  of  war  vessels,  able  to  move  at  pleasure,  to  charge 
and  retire,  and  practise  all  their  skill.  He  was  obliged,  therefore,  to 
protect  his  ships  of  war  by  a  triple  or  quadruple  ring  of  transports, 
from  which,  as  from  an  entrenchment,  the  lighter  craft  might  dash 
out  to  annoy  the  enemy,  and  behind  which  they  might  again  retire 
for  safety.  The  dilatoriness  of  the  Carthaginian  fleet  had  given  time 
for  these  hasty  arrangements  ;  and,  when  it  at  last  arrived,  it  found 
the  bustle  of  preparation  over,  and  all  in  readiness  to  receive  them. 
The  Carthaginians,  however,  inflicted  some  loss  on  the  Romans,  and 
by  means  of  long  poles,  to  which  great  hooks  were  suspended  by  iron 
chains,  dragged  off  six  of  the  transports. 

But  whatever  satisfaction  this  slight  advantage  may  have  caused 
in  Carthage  was  outbalanced  by  the  success  of  Laelius  and  Masan- 


XXV  DEFEAT  OF  MAGO  IN  ITALY  385 

nasa  against  Syphax.  While  Scipio  was  engaged  on  his  march  to 
Carthage  they  had  pursued  the  unfortunate  king  into  Numidia.  He 
had  there  been  able  again  to  collect  an  army,  but  had  been  defeated, 
and  was  now  a  prisoner  in  the  Roman  camp  ;  whilst  Masannasa 
recovered  his  own  dominions  with  part  of  those  of  Syphax. 

Thus  deprived  of  hope   from  Numidia,  the   Carthaginians  sent  The 
ambassadors  to  Scipio  to  ask  for  terms.     They  might,  at  any  rate,  by  Cartha- 
so  doing  obtain  sufficient  delay  to  allow  for  the  return  of  Hannibal  :  S^"^^^^^ 
and,  if  his  presence  did  not  improve  their  prospects,  they  would  not 
be  any  worse  off  than  before.      They  accordingly  made  no  difficulty 
about   the   conditions,    which,   besides  the  usual   stipulation   for   re-   Terms 
turn  of  captives,  deserters,  and  runaway  slaves,  demanded  the  with-  demanded. 
drawal  of  Carthaginian  armies  from  Italy  and  Gaul ;  the  renunciation 
of  all  claims  in  Spain  ;  the  evacuation  of  all  islands  between  Africa 
and  Italy  ;  the  surrender  of  all  but  twenty  ships  of  war ;  an  imme- 
diate supply  of  300,000  modii  of  spelt  and  300,000  of  barley,  and 
an  indemnity  of  5000  talents. 

A  three  months'  truce  was  granted  to  obtain  the  ratification  from  Defeat  of 
Rome,  and  a  few  deserters  and  runaways  were  handed  over  to  Scipio  Mago  in 
to  prove  the  sincerity  of  the  Carthaginian  government.      The  Roman     "^v^^"^ 
Senate  was  not,  however,  in  a  mood  for  concession.    Laelius,  accom- 
panied by  agents  of  Masannasa,  had  already  informed  the  fathers  of 
the  true  state  of  affairs  in  Africa,  and  any  anxiety  which  might  have 
been  felt  from  the  presence  of  Mago  in   Italy  was  dissipated  by  the 
victory  of  Quintilius  Varus  and   M.  Cornelius.      Mago  had  advanced 
into  the  territories  of  the  Insubrian  Gauls,  but  had  been  completely 
defeated,  and  was  himself  so  severely  wounded  that  he  died  on  board 
ship  off  Sardinia,  while  most  of  his  ships  were  captured  by  the  Roman 
squadron  stationed  in  Sardinian  waters.     The  entire  recovery  of  Roman 
influence  in  Italian  Gaul  was  farther  testified  by  the  long-delayed  release 
of  Gains  Servilius  and  Gains  Lutatius,  the  triumvirs  seized  sixteen 
years  previously  by  the  Gauls  in  the  attack  on  Placentia. 

To  satisfy  the  Roman  expectations  at  this  time,  therefore,  a  very   The 
complete  submission  on  the  part  of  the  Carthaginian  legates  would  embassy 
have  to  be  made.      But  when  they  appeared  before  the  Senate  they  A^'^-^- 
professed  to  have  no  farther  commission  than  to  explain  that  the  sole 
responsibility  of  the  war  rested  on  Hannibal,  and  to  ask  for  peace  on 
the  terms  arranged  at  the  end  of  the  last  war  with  the  consul  Lutatius 
(241).       They  were   promptly  dismissed   without   being   allowed   to 
enter  the  city.^ 

^  This  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  assertion  of  Polybius  that  the  Senate  signi- 
fied to  Scipio  that  they  would  accept  the  terms  he  had  imposed.  The  Punic 
envoys  were  dismissed,  it  appears,  because  they  did  not  ask  for  these  terms,  but 
for  something  else,  viz. ,  the  status  quo  at  the  end  of  the  first  Punic  war. 

2  C 


386 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Meanwhile  the  resolution  of  the  Carthaginian  Senate  had  been 
communicated  to  Hannibal,  and  he  knew  that  his  career  in  Italy  was 
at  an  end — that  wonderful  career  of  brilliant  victory,  of  indomitable 
resolution,  of  almost  ceaseless  activity.  It  was  only  in  the  previous 
year  that  he  had  for  the  last  time  defeated  a  Roman  consul,  and 
driven  him  back  with  the  loss  of  1200  men  into  his  camp  ;  and  even 
if  it  is  true  that  Sempronius  had  been  able  to  retaliate  shortly  after- 
wards by  a  similar  defeat  of  Carthaginian  skirmishing  parties,  nothing 
had  happened  which  gave  his  enemies  any  hope  of  dislodging  him 
from  Lacinium,  where,  for  nearly  three  years,  he  "  greatly  stood  at 
bay."  Now  all  was  to  go  for  nothing.  That  his  victories  had  been 
fruitless  was  very  greatly  due  to  the  niggardly  support  which  he  had 
received  from  home.  And  now  he  was  recalled  to  save  it  from  the 
dangers  which  that  dilatory  and  jealous  policy  had  done  so  much 
to  create.  But  however  keen  his  regrets  or  just  his  resentment, 
Hannibal  recognised  the  inevitable  duty  of  obedience,  and  indeed 
had,  for  some  time  past,  been  silently  preparing  for  the  necessity  which 
he  foresaw.  Ships  had  been  got  ready  in  the  harbour  of  Croton  ; 
the  less  useful  part  of  his  forces  had  been  drafted  on  various  pretexts 
into  towns  still  under  his  influence  in  Bruttium  ;  and  it  is  asserted  by 
Livy — perhaps  from  malignant  rumour,  which  constantly  attributed 
cruelty  to  Hannibal — that  a  number  of  Italians  who  had  taken  refuge 
in  the  sanctuary  of  Juno  in  Lacinium,  to  avoid  the  campaign  in 
Africa,  had  been  slain  in  violation  of  the  sanctity  of  the  place.  What- 
ever may  be  the  truth  of  such  stories,  it  is  easy  to  believe  that 
Hannibal  embarked  in  obedience  to  the  summons  with  keen  feelings 
of  disappointment ;  that,  casting  his  eyes  back  upon  the  retreating 
shores  of  Italy,  he  thought  of  what  might  have  been  had  he  led  his 
soldiers  to  Rome  straight  from  the  bloody  field  of  Cannae,  and  had 
not  spent  time  and  strength  in  the  pleasant  lands  or  round  the  walled 
towns  of  Campania. 

The  great  enemy  was  gone :  and  the  consul  Cn.  Servilius 
Caepio,  exulting  at  the  thought  that  Italy  had  been  freed  in  his  year 
of  office,  and  while  the  war  with  Hannibal  was  his  special  province, 
was  eager  to  crown  his  glory  by  pursuing  him  to  Africa.  But  in 
Sicily  he  was  overtaken  by  an  order  to  return.  The  anxiety  at  Rome 
was  still  great,  and  the  Senate  had  compelled  his  colleague  to  name 
a  dictator  for  the  express  purpose  of  summoning  him  back  by  the 
authority  of  his  majus  imperium. 

Hannibal,  meanwhile,  crossed  safely  to  Africa,  and  disembarked 
at  Leptis.^    He  seems  to  have  spent  the  winter  in  negotiating  alliances 

■^  Of  Hannibal's  proceedings  in  Africa  it  is  impossible  to  get  a  reasonable 
view  from  Livy.  Perhaps  he  found  no  account  in  his  authorities,  yet  both  Appian 
and  Zonaras  give  at  least  an  intelligible  narrative.     According  to  Livy  Hannibal 


XXV  THE  LAST  PROVOCATION  FROM  CARTHAGE  387 

with  Numidian  princes,  whose  jealousy  of  Masannasa  he  sought  to  Hannibal 
stir  up,  and  in  collecting  stores,  horses,  and  Numidian  cavalry.      For  in  Africa. 
in  spite  of  the  Senate  having  approved  the  terms  offered  by  Scipio    .  "'^^^ 
to  the  Carthaginians,  a  campaign  was  now  inevitable.      The  Senate  203-202. ' 
had  left  Scipio  full  discretion  ;  and  an  incident  had  since  happened 
which,  in  his  view,  amounted  to  a  breach  of  the  truce  on  the  part  of 
the  Carthaginians. 

A  large  fleet  of  transports,  laden  with  provisions  for  the  Roman   The  seizure 
army,  and  convoyed  by  thirty  war  vessels  under  Cn.  Octavius  from  of  Roman 
Sardinia,  was  blown  by  a  storm  upon  an  island  in  the  bay  of  Car-  ^  ^^^'  ^°^' 
thage,  within  sight  of  the  city.      The  opportunity  v/as  too  tempting 
to  the  citizens,  who  had  been  suffering  from  short  supplies  ;  and,  in 
spite  of  remonstrances  from  those  in  favour  of  maintaining  the  truce, 
the  people  voted  for  seizing  the  prey.      Scipio  at  once  despatched 
envoys  to  remonstrate  ;  who,  after  an  audience  of  the  Senate,  were 
introduced  to  a  public  meeting,  and  reproached  the  citizens  with  the 
breach   of  a   treaty  which   they   had   themselves  sought   with  such 
abject   humiliation,    and   had    now  infringed  because   they  believed 
themselves  safe  under  the  protection  of  Hannibal.      The  people  were   The 
again  divided  in  opinion  ;  but  the  majority,  both  of  the  Senate  and  Cartha- 
the  people,  were  against  restoring  the  booty,  and  were  irritated  at  the  S^^J-'^^^ 
haughty  tone   of  the   Roman   legates.      The  war  party  once  more  reparation 
gained  the  ascendant,  and  even  contrived  a  plot  which  would  make  and  i?ijure 
the  renewal  of  hostilities  inevitable.      The  Roman  envoys  were  sent  ^^^  Roman 
back  to  the   Roman  camp  near  Utica  without  an  answer,  but  under    ^^^  ^^' 
the  safe  conduct  of  two  triremes.      But  these  triremes  were  only  to 
convoy  them  within  sight  of  the  Roman  lines  ;  and  a  message  was 
sent  to   Hasdrubal,  the  admiral  of  the  Punic  fleet  at  Utica,  to  have 
vessels  ready  to  attack  them  as  soon  as  the  convoy  withdrew.      The 
order  was  obeyed,   and   the  legates  barely  escaped  captivity,  while 
many  of  their  crew  were  killed  or  wounded. 

This  was  the  signal  for  the  recommencement  of  the  war,  and  in   The  war 
a  fiercer  and  more  angry  spirit  than  before  :  the  Romans  incensed  '^'^^ewed, 
by  the   outrage,  the    Carthaginians  rendered  desperate  by  the   con- 
sciousness that  they  had  fatally  committed  themselves. 

Accordingly  Scipio  now  treated  the  inhabitants  of  Carthaginian 
territory  with  great   additional   severity.       Towns   were    no    longer 

lands  at  Leptis  in  203  (xxx.  25)  :  in  202  he  goes  to  Adrumetum,  rested  his  soldiers 
there  for  a  few  days,  ad  rejiciendum  ex  jactatione  maritima — as  though  they  had 
just  landed  ! — and  starts  at  once  by  forced  inarches  for  Zama  (xxx.  29).  Then 
follow  the  incidents  of  the  Punic  spies  spared  by  Scipio,  the  interview  with  Scipio 
himself,  and  the  speeches,  different  from  and  much  longer  than  those  in  Polybius 
(xxx.  29-31),  and  the  battle  next  day  (xxx.  32).  There  is  no  word  of  the 
winter's  preparations  or  the  campaign  before  the  battle,  and  no  chronological 
data,  except  the  two  years. 


388 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Campaign 
of  Scipio  in 
Cartha' 
ginian 
territory. 


Scipio 
restores 
the  Cartha- 
ginian 
envoys. 


Hannibal 
will  choose 
his  own 
time. 


Meeting  of 
Hannibal 
and  Scipio. 


admitted  to  terms  on  their  submission,  but  were  ruthlessly  stormed 
and  their  inhabitants  enslaved,  and  every  preparation  made  for  the 
decisive  battle  which  he  now  saw  was  inevitable.  Masannasa  had 
departed  in  the  previous  autumn  to  secure  his  own  dominions,  with 
the  addition  of  a  great  part  of  those  of  Syphax  ;  but  he  was  now 
summoned  to  return  to  the  help  of  the  Roman  army  with  all  the 
cavalry  he  could  muster.  He  was  ready  to  do  this,  for  his  existence 
and  his  power  now  depended  on  Roman  success,  as  Hannibal  was 
careful  to  point  out  to  rival  Numidian  princes.  The  return  of  the 
Carthaginian  envoys  also  gave  Scipio  an  opportunity  of  putting  him- 
self diplomatically  in  the  right.  Not  knowing  what  had  happened, 
they  came  to  the  Roman  camp  at  Utica,  and  were  detained  by 
Baebius,  the  officer  in  command,  awaiting  Scipio's  instructions. 
Scipio  immediately  ordered  them  to  be  sent  home  uninjured :  a 
respect  for  international  and  religious  obligation  which  made  the 
desired  impression,  and  was  commended  by  Hannibal  himself 

But  the  people  of  Carthage  were  impatient  once  more  to  try  the 
fortune  of  war,  now  that  they  had  at  the  head  of  their  forces  the 
famous  general  who  had  so  often  defeated  the  Romans  in  the  field. 
But  he  declined  to  be  hurried.  In  answer  to  urgent  messages  he 
bade  the  citizens  "  attend  to  their  own  affairs,  and  leave  him  to  choose 
his  own  time  of  fighting."  In  the  course  of  the  summer,  however, 
he  moved  to  the  neighbourhood  of  Zama,  and  attempted  to  recon- 
noitre the  position  and  forces  of  Scipio.  His  spies  were  caught,  and, 
by  Scipio's  orders,  shown  everything  and  sent  back  unharmed.  A 
cavalry  skirmish  took  place,  which  resulted  in  favour  of  the  Romans  : 
and  then  Hannibal  seems  to  have  wished  to  treat.  It  seems  that  he 
still  had  hopes,  based  partly,  perhaps,  on  the  moderation  of  Scipio 
and  his  own  exceptional  renown,  that  some  conditions  might  be 
obtained  which  would  content  the  Romans  without  rousing  too 
fiercely  the  passions  of  the  war  party  at  home.  Thus,  if  the  Romans 
would  accept  the  absolute  cession  of  Sicily,  Sardinia,  and  Spain,  with 
a  pledge  on  the  part  of  Carthage  that  she  would  never  take  up  arms 
for  their  recovery,  and  a  larger  indemnity  for  the  captured  ships  ; 
and,  in  return,  would  remit  some  of  the  more  galling  of  the  pre- 
liminaries, a  peace  might  be  made  honourable  to  both  sides.  But 
this  hope  proved  abortive  in  two  ways.  In  the  interview  which  he 
sought  and  obtained  with  Scipio  (of  the  truth  of  which  there  is  no 
reasonable  ground  for  doubting)  ^  he  was  given  clearly  to  understand 


^  Ihne,  of  course,  rejects  it  as  a  fairy  tale.  But  we  cannot  suppose  that  of 
a  matter  so  interesting  in  the  history  of  the  Scipios  Polybius  should  have  not 
had  means  of  knowing  the  truth.  No  doubt  many  inaccurate  versions  of  it  got 
about,  and  the  writers  of  so-called  histories  exercised  their  ingenuity  in  inventing 
speeches.      But  if  any  one  will  compare  those  given  by  Polybius  with  those  in 


I 


BATTLE  OF  ZAMA  389 


that  the  Romans  held  that  they  had  already  got  by  their  own  exertions 
and  victories  all  that  he  offered  as  a  concession,  and  that  the  late 
action  of  the  Carthaginian  government  had  rendered  indulgence  im- 
possible. In  the  second  place  the  war  party  in  Carthage  was  irre- 
concilable. A  popular  outbreak  had  taken  place  at  the  very  mention 
of  peace,  and  the  vengeance  of  the  people  had  fallen  on  Hasdrubal, 
whom  they  believed  to  have  prolonged  the  war  from  deliberate  treason 
as  much  as  from  incompetence.  Hannibal  had  demanded  on  his 
arrival  in  Africa  that  he  should  be  pardoned,  and  he  was  living  in 
retirement  at  Carthage.  In  the  excitement  now  aroused  by  the  sug-  Death  of 
gestion  of  making  submission  to  Rome  he  was  again  sought  out,  and  Hasdrubal. 
would  have  been  torn  to  pieces  or  crucified,  had  he  not  taken  refuge 
in  the  mausoleum  of  his  family,  and  there  poisoned  himself 

There  was  nothing  for  it,  therefore,  but  to  fight.      It  was  getting  Battle  of 
late  in  the  year,i  and  Scipio  was  impatient  to  end  the  war.      For  the  Z.ama 
adverse  party  at  home  had  shown  a  disposition  to  snatch  the  credit  ^  .  1 
from  him,  and,  in   spite  of  a  popular  vote  assigning  Africa  still  to  202. 
Scipio,  the  Senate  had  allowed  the  consuls  to  draw  lots  for  it,  and 
had  arranged  that  Tib.  Claudius   Nero  (to  whom  it  fell)  should  cross 
thither  with  a  fleet   of  fifty  quinqueremes,  and  enjoy  equal  powers 
with  Scipio,  the  result  of  which  would  be  that,  as  consul,  the  triumph 
would  be  his. 

The  battle  which  followed  the  abortive  negotiation  was  probably 
fought  several  days'  march  from  Zama,  which  has  supplied  its  name, 
and  which  was,  it  seems,  the  scene  of  the  previous  cavalry  skirmish  : 
and  from  one  at  least  of  our  authorities  it  would  appear  that  Scipio 
managed  to  force  Hannibal  to  fight  on  ground  unfavourable  to 
himself,  having  come  up  with  him  while  in  the  act  of  changing  camp. 
Hannibal  had  an  army  broadly  divided  into  five  classes  :  there  was  Hannibal. 
his  veteran  *'  army  of  Italy,"  on  which  he  could  thoroughly  rely  ;  army. 
secondly,  there  was  a  considerable  body  of  Numidian  cavalry,  secured 
during  the  previous  winter  ;  thirdly,  there  were,  besides  a  corps  of 
Macedonians,  1 200  mercenaries,  partly  Europeans, — Celts,  Ligurians, 
and  Baliarians — and  partly  natives  of  Mauretania  ;  fourthly,  a  newly 
raised  force  of  Libyans  and  Carthaginians  ;  and,  lastly,  a  large  number 
of  elephants.  The  mercenaries  were  to  occupy  the  front  rank  in  the 
centre  covered  by  the  elephants,  while  on  either  wing  were  the  Cartha- 
ginian and  Numidian  cavalry  ;  and  on  the  rear  of  the  whole  were 
stationed  the  veterans  of  the  "  army  of  Italy." 

On  this  occasion,   as  often,  the   elephants  proved  disastrous   to 

Livy,  he  will  see  the  difference  between  a  sober  amplification  of  data  supplied  and 
a  piece  of  rhetorical  fine  writing  (Polyb.  xv.  6-8,  Livy  xxx.  30,  31). 

^  The  date  of  the  battle  has  been  fixed  on  i8th  of  October,  because  of  an 
eclipse. 


390  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap. 

their  own  side.  The  Romans  had  got  used  to  them,  and  provided 
against  them  by  the  simple  expedient  of  leaving  space  for  them  to 
run  through.  Their  order  was  in  three  lines  as  usual,  but  instead  of 
the  maniples  being  arranged  in  the  quincunx,  like  the  spaces  on  a 
chessboard,  they  were  drawn  up  immediately  behind  each  other,  so 
as  to  leave  spaces  in  the  lines.  ^  These  spaces  were  at  first  filled 
with  the  light-armed  or  velites^  who,  when  the  elephants  charged, 
first  irritated  them  with  missiles,  and  then  stepped  aside  behind  the 
maniples.  Some  of  the  animals  at  the  very  beginning  got  unmanage- 
able, being  frightened  by  the  noise  of  trumpets  and  horns  sound  in  jj 
the  charge,  and  rushed  back  upon  the  Numidians ;  others,  though 
they  did  charge  the  enemy  and  inflicted  some  damage,  got  so  pelted 
with  missiles  that  they  either  ran  straight  away  down  the  spaces 
between  the  Roman  maniples  and  were  of  no  more  use,  or  turned 
and  rushed  off  the  field  between  the  two  armies.  At  the  best  they 
had  done  little  good  to  their  owners.  The  Numidian  cavalry  also 
on  Hannibal's  left  wing  were  routed  by  Masannasa,  and  the  Cartha- 
ginian cavalry  on  their  right  by  Laelius. 

It  remained  to  be  seen  which  of  the  two  bodies  of  heavy-armed 
was  the  stronger.  The  miscellaneous  mercenaries  of  Hannibal  met 
in  a  death-grapple  with  Roman  legions,  but,  though  they  fought 
well,  they  were  inferior  both  in  strength  and  in  the  excellence  of 
their  weapons.  Moreover,  in  the  m^l^e  tlu>  Koinni ;  uppoind  tach 
other  well,  the  rear  ranks  pressing  on  tlu>  r  n  iumu,  ullm-  up  the 
places  of  those  that  fell,  and  adding  their  wc  i-lu  to  tlu  imi>,u  t  ;  but 
in  the  case  of  the  enemy  the  mercenaries  dul  not  mul  tluMnsrh  os 
backed  up  by  the  Carthaginians  in  their  rear.  These  last,  probably 
raw  levies,  lost  heart  and  did  not  advan(^(\  ni^til  the  nior(  on.nios,  finding 
themselves  overpowered,  anil  Ih-Ih-mh;;  ih.it  tlu'\  wru-  l>i-ii.i\i\l  by 
their  own  side,  turned  upon-  kW  ('.mli.i-mi.in:.  .nul  lu-jMn  id  cut 
their  way  through  them.  Tlu>  Uomins  li.lloudl  rlo c,  and  the 
Carthaginians,  thus  driven  to  l>.i\,  .uul  mulin;;  ihmiM-Krs  engaged 
with  two  enemies,  fought  fo  I  ilu-n  lixr-.  with  Mi.h  iK'sjuMation  that 
for  a  time  they  threw  tlu>  Kom.in  :,;,*;.;.-/  mio -.oim- di.souler.  This 
was,  however,  quickly  n\ntu\l  ;  .uul  i\i-imi.ill\  ihr  lu-Ul  was  thickly 
strewn  with  the  bodies  both  of  the  Carthaginians  and  mercenaries  slain 

1  Not  ♦  .  • 


but 


XXV  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR  391 

by  eacli  other  or  by  the  Romans.  The  survivors  endeavoured  to 
take  refuge  in  the  lines  of  the  veterans  whom  Hannibal  was  keeping 
in  reserve,  but  he  ordered  his  men  to  lower  their  spears  and  repulse 
them,  and  they  accordingly  escaped  as  they  best  could  off  the  field 
to  the  ground  lately  occupied  by  the  cavalry. 

The  last  combat  was  with  the  veteran  reserve.  The  Romans  Final 
could  not  charge  over  ground  encumbered  with  the  debris  of  the  ^^''J^Sgi^ 
fight,  with  dead  and  dying  :  the  front  line,  moreover,  was  in  disorder,  ^11  ..  .. 
having  gone  in  pursuit  of  the  flying  mercenaries.  These  obstacles,  veterans. 
probably  also  prevented  an  advance  of  Hannibal's  veterans,  which  it 
might  have  been  difficult  to  withstand.  At  any  rate  they  did  not  stir  : 
and  Scipio  had  time  to  have  the  wounded  removed  to  the  rear,  and 
to  rally  the  Jiastati  by  sound  of  bugle.  The  principcs  and  triarii 
were  then  brought  slowly  up  so  as  to  fall  into  line  with  the  hastati^ 
and,  thus  formed,  the  whole  line  advanced  to  the  charge.  It  was 
the  most  severe  fighting  of  the  day.  The  veterans  stood  their 
ground  with  obstinate  valour  without  giving  way  a  step,  each  man 
that  was  killed  falling  in  his  place.  The  battle  was  only  won  at 
length  by  the  return  of  the  cavalry  under  Masannasa  and  Laelius 
from  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy's  horse.  They  now  fell  upon 
Hannibal's  rear,  and  in  a  short  time  the  whole  was  in  confusion. 
Many  were  killed  where  they  stood,  nor  had  those  who  fled  much 
chance  of  escape,  for  the  country  was  flat  and  open,  and  the  horse- 
men easily  caught  and  cut  them  down.  Twenty  thousand  are  said 
to  have  fallen,  and  almost  as  many  to  have  been  taken  prisoners, 
while  the  Roman  loss  is  set  down  as  1 500.  Hannibal  himself 
escaped  with  some  cavalry  to  Adrumetum  and  thence  to  Carthage, 
but  his  camp  fell  into  the  hands  of  Scipio,  and  the  country  between 
it  and  Carthage  itself  was  at  the  mercy  of  the  Roman  general. 

The  war  was  at  an  end.     As  far  indeed  as  the  objects  for  which  End  of 
it  had  been  undertaken  were  concerned  it  had  been  over  long  before.  ^^^  '"^^''^> 
From  Spain  and  Sardinia  the  Carthaginians  had  been  finally  expelled.  ^°'' 
The  attempted  combination  of  the  north  Italian  peoples  against  Rome 
had  fallen  to  pieces  with  the  retirement  and  death  of  Mago  ;  and  the 
more  formidable  and  once  all  but  successful  rising  of  the  southern 
Italians  and  Greeks  had  collapsed  with  the  recovery  of  Campania, 
the  fall  of  Tarentum,  and  the  final  retirement  of  Hannibal.      For  the 
last   two   years   the    Carthaginians   had    been    fighting,   not   for  the 
extension  of  territory,  but  for  bare  existence.      That  too  was  now 
over.     They  had  no  new  army  to  put  in  the  field,  and  an  auxiliary 
force  of  cavalry  under  Vermina,  son  of  king   Syphax,  which  arrived 
after  the  battle,  was  cut  to  pieces  by  the  victorious  Romans.      Nor 
were  the  Carthaginian  ships,  especially  in  the  presence  of  a  Roman 
fleet,    sufificicnt    to    keep     their    harbour    open    and    the    sea    safe. 


392 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


They  must  take  what  terms  they  could  get  if  they  would  avoid  a 
siege. 

Accordingly  when  Scipio,  having  sent  on  his  main  army  under 
Cn.  Octavius  to  Tunes  by  land,  returned  to  Utica,  and  thence  with 
a  fleet,  lately  strengthened  by  a  squadron  under  P.  Lentulus,  started 
for  Tunes,  he  was  met  by  a  ship  decked  with  olive  branches  and 
all  the  other  signs  of  submission  and  peace.  He  would  not 
receive  the  ambassadors  then,  but  appointed  them  to  meet  him  at 
Tunes. 

The  answer  they  received  was  brief  and  haughty.  "  They 
deserved  nothing  at  his  hands  but  condign  punishment,"  he  told 
them,  "  yet  the  Romans  had  resolved  to  treat  them  with  magnanimity. 
They  must,  however,  thankfully  receive  any  terms  offered  them." 
These  were  of  course  of  increased  stringency,  but  yet  such  as  left 
Carthage  still  a  nation  and  free.  The  territory  in  Africa  held  before 
the  war  they  were  still  to  possess  with  all  appurtenances.  They 
were  to  enjoy  their  own  laws  and  have  no  Roman  garrison.  But 
they  were  to  return  the  ships  and  goods  taken  during  the  truce  in 
full,  with  all  captives  or  runaway  slaves  ;  to  hand  over  to  the 
Romans  all  their  elephants,  and  all  war  vessels  except  twenty  ;  to 
wage  no  war  outside  Africa,  and  none  within  it  without  permission  of 
Rome  ;  to  restore  Masannasa  all  his  dominions  and  property ;  to 
pay  10,000  talents  in  yearly  instalments  within  fifty  years  ;  and  to 
give  100  hostages  for  their  good  faith,  selected  by  the  Roman 
general  among  youths  between  fourteen  and  thirty  years  of  age. 
Lastly,  as  a  preliminary,  they  were  to  supply  the  Roman  army  with 
provisions  and  pay  for  three  months,  or  until  such  time  as  a  ratifica- 
tion should  come  from  Rome. 

The  money  fine  (about  ^2,400,000)  was  not  an  excessive  one 
when  spread  over  fifty  years,  and  the  limits  assigned  to  the  territory 
in  Africa  were  reasonable.  The  two  points  which  were  almost 
intolerable  to  the  Carthaginians,  even  in  their  present  state  of 
humiliation,  were  the  surrender  of  the  ships — without  which  their 
commerce  and  their  wealth  must  be  ruined — and  the  prohibition  of 
war  in  Africa  without  permission  from  Rome.  This  would  subject 
them  to  constant  encroachments  from  the  Numidian  princes,  galling 
to  their  feelings  as  well  as  ruinous  to  their  agriculture,  especially  as 
their  enemy  Masannasa  was  to  be  established  on  their  frontier  with 
additional  power.  It  would  be,  moreover,  a  standing  witness  that 
they  were  not  really  a  free  State,  but  were  under  the  dictation  of 
another  government. 

Some  spirits,  braver  or  more  reckless  than  the  rest,  were  still 
found  in  Carthage  to  urge  the  rejection  of  the  terms  at  all  hazards. 
But   Hannibal  was  present,  and  in  plain  words  warned  his  country- 


XXV  TERMS  OF  THE  PEACE  ACCEPTED  393 

men  that  they  had  no  choice,  and  had  reason  to  be  thankful  that  the  Hannibal 
terms  were  no  worse.      He  even  roughly  pulled  down   one   of  the  insists  on 
senators  who  rose  to  speak  on  the  other  side,  excusing  himself  by   ,  f  ^^^^ 
saying  that  he  had  been  so  long  time  abroad  with  the  army  that  he  accepted. 
had  forgotten  the  habits  of  civil  life. 

Both  Scipio  and  Hannibal  in  fact  were  acting  wisely  :  Scipio, 
in  not  wishing  to  destroy  a  great  and  populous  city,  and  to  drag  on 
a  war  which  had  already  pressed  on  his  countrymen  for  sixteen 
years ;  and  Hannibal,  in  counselling  submission  rather  than  the 
endurance  of  a  long  siege,  which,  even  if  it  ultimately  failed,  must 
entail  suffering  and  ruin  beyond  calculation. 

The    legates    returned    to    Scipio    signifying  the  acceptance    of  March 
the  terms.      The  only  point  still  to  be  settled  was  the  amount  due  ^^^-      -^^^ 
for  the  stores  on  board  the  ships  captured  during  the  last  armistice,      f^'.   ^' 
They  were  now  scattered  in   every  direction,   and   it  would  be  im-  accept  the 
possible  to  recover  them,  but  the  valuation  of  the  amount  due  on  terms. 
them  was  left  to  Scipio  to  arrange.     The  envoys  were  immediately  sent  Coss. 
off  to  Rome,  where  they  were  received  not  unkindly,  and  allowed  to  Gnceus 
select  about  200  of  their  countrymen,  who   were    prisoners    there,   Cornelius 
to  take  back  with  them  to  Africa,  with  a  message  to  Scipio  that  the  p  'y^^^'^ 
Senate  desired  that,  on  the  conclusion  of  the  peace,  they  should  be  paetus, 
set  free  without  ransom.      There  was  still  some  caballing  at  Rome  201. 
to  share  the  triumph  of  Scipio  ;  Cn.  Cornelius  Lentulus,  one  of  the 
consuls — who  by  a  combination  of  circumstances  were  elected  late 
this  year — insisted  on  having  Africa  as  his  province,  and  the  Senate, 
as  a  compromise,  gave  him  the  fleet,  with  orders  to  go  to   Sicily, 
and,  if  any  renewal  of  the  war  took  place,  to  cross  to  Africa.      But 
nothing  changed  the  minds  of  the  people.      The  question  being  put 
to  them  they  voted  to  extend  Scipio's  imperium  in  Africa,  and  that 
the  Senate  should  solemnly  (Jurati)  decide  as  to  who  was  to  preside 
at   the   making   of  the   peace   {dare  pace7n\    and    bring   home    the 
victorious  army.      The  sentiments  of  the  people  on  this  head,  how- 
ever, were  so  clear  that  the  Senate  could  but  assign  both  honours 
to    Scipio.       Fetials   were   sent   to   see   that   the   proper   ritual   was 
observed    in   making   the   peace,  at  which  he  presided ;   and   then, 
having  caused   the    Carthaginian   fleet  of  500  vessels   to  be  burnt, 
and    having    taken    over    and    punished    deserters,    and    installed 
Masannasa  in  his  new  dominions  taken  from  Syphax,  he  prepared 
to  depart. 

These  various  arrangements  had  been  made  with  the  assistance  of  Scipio  s 
ten  commissioners  sent  out,  according  to  precedent,  to  the  conquered  ^^^"^'^  ^^ 
country   to   assist    the    proconsul.       When    they   were    finished    he 
sent    Cn.    Octavius   to  Sicily  to   hand   over  the  fleet   to  the  consul 
Cornelius,    and   put    his  men    on    board    the   remaining   transports. 


rece^ 
2or 


394  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap,  xxv 

At   Lilybaeum  he  parted  with  his  troops,  sending  them  by  sea  to 
Rome,  while  he  went  by  land  to  Messana,  and  crossed  to  Rhegium. 
^\^  His  journey  through  Italy  was  a  triumphal  progress.    The  people 

*2Z^i;^T^  of  the  cities  poured  out  to  greet  the  conqueror ;  the  country  folk 
lined  the  roads  as  he  passed,  and  he  was  everywhere  greeted  as  the 
saviour  of  Italy.  The  journey  was  crowned  by  a  magnificent  triumph 
at  Rome,  followed  by  splendid  games,  lasting  several  days,  for  which 
he  supplied  the  money.  It  seems  doubtful  whether  king  Syphax  was 
in  the  procession,  as  Polybius  asserts.  Livy  says  that  he  died  at 
Tibur  shortly  before,  but  that  his  public  funeral  about  the  same  time 
served  to  bring  his  defeat  and  capture  prominently  before  the  people. 
He  had  not  been  treated  ungenerously,  and  his  son  Vermina  was 
afterwards  restored  to  part  of  his  father's  dominions,  Scipio  hence- 
Africanus.  forth  adopted  the  cognomen  of  Africanus,  which  descended  to  his 
family.  It  was  not,  as  Livy  says,  the  first  instance  of  a  name  taken 
from  a  conquered  country,  for  M.  Valerius  Maximus  had  assumed 
the  title  of  Messalla  from  his  conquest  of  Messana  in  263,  but  it 
seems  to  have  set  a  fashion  afterwards  widely  followed  by  many  who 
had  less  claim  to  such  honour. 

The  joy  at  Rome  was  well  grounded.  The  long  agony  of 
Hannibal's  occupation  of  Italy  was  at  an  end.  The  dreaded  enemy 
had  not  only  been  driven  from  Italy,  but  had  been  beaten  in  his  own 
country.  Italy  was  free ;  Spain  was  open  to  Roman  trade  and 
Roman  arms ;  the  islands  of  the  western  Mediterranean  were 
occupied  by  Roman  fleets  and  soldiers  ;  and  the  great  question  had 
been  settled  for  ever,  whether  western  Europe  was  to  be  Latin  or 
Semitic. 

Authorities  for  the  second  Punic  war,  see  p.  312. 


CHAPTER    XXVI 

DOMESTIC  AFFAIRS  AFTER  THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR 

Settlement  of  Italy  after  the  second  Punic  war — Changes  in  Roman  life  during 
the  epoch — The  Senate — The  army — Tendency  to  leave  country  life — Litera- 
ture :  Ennius,  Plautus — Their  illustration  of  city  life — Their  identification  of 
Greek  and  Roman  gods — Cato  and  country  life. 

At  the  end  of  the  Hannibalian  war  Rome  was  supreme  in  Italy,  but  Settlement 

her  supremacy  had  to  be  secured,  and  the  traces  of  the  struggle  of  Italy. 

wiped  out.     The  Italian  towns  generally  returned  to  the  position  of 

socii  without  change  of  status  or  additional  burdens.      But  to  this 

rule  there  were  some  exceptions.     The  Bruttii  had  set  the  example  of  The 

revolt  to  Hannibal,  and  were  now  punished  by  being  degraded,  at  any  Bruttii. 

rate  for  the  present  generation,  from  the  position  of  socii;  they  were 

not  enrolled  with  the  army,  being  only  allowed  to  serve  magistrates 

as  lorariij  and  their  whole  country  was  assigned  as  a  provmce  to  one 

of  the  praetors.      But  the  Greek  cities  fringing  the  southern  shores 

of  Italy  secured  more  indulgent  treatment.      Even  Tarentum,  which  The  Greek 

some  wished  to  degrade  to  the  position  of  Capua,  appears  to  have  re-  cities. 

mained  a  civitas  foederata  on  terms  not  worse  than  those  enjoyed  by 

the  loyal  towns  Naples  and  Rhegium,  whereby  local  freedom  was 

secured  on  the  payment  of  a  fixed  stipendium^  and  the  supply  of 

a  fixed  number  of  soldiers  or  seamen  upon  conditions  differing  in  the 

different  states.^ 

In  Campania  the  amount  of  punishment  had  been  carefully  Campania. 
apportioned  to  the  degree  of  guilt,  distinctions  being  drawn  not 
only  between  whole  towns  but  also  between  families  and  individuals. 
As  a  rule  the  existing  generation  was  deprived  of  all  civil  rights  but 
was  not  enslaved.  Exceptions  were  towns  which  had  remained  loyal 
and    had    suffered  at    Hannibal's  hands.      Such   was    Nuceria,    the 

^  Thus  we  find  the  Locrians  claiming  exemption  from  service  out  of  Italy,  and 
apparently  getting  their  claim  allowed  (Polyb.  xii.  5). 


396 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


inhabitants  of  which,  having  abandoned  the  town  rather  than  submit 
to  Hannibal,  were  now  allowed  to  transfer  themselves  to  Atella  (the 
Atellani  being  removed  to  Calabria),  and  to  retain  all  rights  and 
privileges  enjoyed  before.  In  like  manner  the  people  of  Acerra 
returned  to  their  town  and  rebuilt  its  ruins  (210),  Nuceria  was 
repeopled  by  other  loyalists,  and  in  the  next  generation  was  again 
an  important  town.  With  these  exceptions  the  Campanians  were  so 
moved  about  and  split  up,  that  there  was  nothing  to  fear  from  them  ; 
and  a  large  tract  of  their  country  was  retained  as  ager  publicus  and 
leased  to  Roman  tenants. 

In  Etruria  no  special  measures  seem  to  have  been  taken.  Towns 
like  Arretium,  where  signs  of  revolt  had  been  manifested,  were  over- 
awed by  arms,  and  their  senators  forced  to  give  hostages.  This  had 
proved  so  effectual  that  towards  the  end  of  the  war  they  were  wholly 
pacified  ;  and  it  was  Arretium  among  other  Etruscan  towns  which, 
in  205,  furnished  Scipio  with  such  voluntary  contributions  as  enabled 
him  to  go  well  equipped  to  Sicily. 

For  the  rest,  two  methods  were  employed  for  Romanising  Italy. 
Confiscated  lands  were  divided  among  Roman  citizens,  and  colonies 
were  sent  out  to  various  parts  with  full  civil  rights.  Thus  we  hear 
of  a  commission  of  ten  to  divide  the  ager  publicus  in  Samnium  and 
Apulia,  in  201,  among  the  veterans  of  Scipio's  army,  while  a  great 
batch  of  colonies  was  decided  upon  immediately  after  the  war,  and 
actually  formed  in  194.  In  Campania  were  thus  settled  Liternum, 
Salernum,  and  Volturnum ;  in  Lucania,  Buxentum  on  the  site  of  the 
Greek  Pyxi ;  in  Apulia,  while  Venusia  received  a  supplementum, 
Sipontum  was  newly  founded  ;  in  Bruttium  Tempsa  and  Croton  were 
made  Roman  colonies.  "Latin"  colonies  were  also  established  at 
Thurii  under  the  name  of  Copia,  and  at  Vibo  under  that  of  Valentia. 

Thus  communities  of  Romans  were  being  established  in  all  parts 
of  Italy.  But  the  war  had  also  tried  the  fidelity  or  shaken  the  pros- 
perity of  those  already  existing.  In  209  twelve  Latin  colonies  ^ 
refused  to  contribute  men  or  money.  They  excused  themselves 
indeed  on  the  ground  of  inability,  but  the  Senate  believed  that  they 
desired  to  abandon  the  empire.  Affairs  in  Italy  were  then  in  too 
critical  a  state  to  allow  of  compulsion  or  punishment ;  but  in  204, 
when  the  fall  of  Capua  and  Tarentum,  and  the  retirement  of  Hanni- 
bal to  the  Lacinian  promontory,  had  removed  the  tension  of  the  war, 
the  Senate  resolved  to  show  its  sense  of  their  disloyalty.  Their 
magistrates  were  summoned  to  Rome  and  were  informed  that  each 
colony  must  furnish  twice  the  usual  number  of  infantry  with    120 


^  They  were  Ardea,  Nepete,  Sutrium,  Alba  Fucentia,  Carseoli,  Cora,  Suessa, 
Circeii,  Setia,  Cales,  Narnia,  Interamna  (Livy  xxvii.  9). 


XXVI  SETTLEMENT  OF  ITALY  397 

cavalry.  If  cavalry  was  impossible,  three  foot  soldiers  were  to  be 
sent  in  lieu  of  each  cavalry  man,  while  in  addition  to  the  property 
tax  or  tributum,  on  the  same  scale  as  that  raised  from  Roman 
citizens  on  the  valuation  of  the  censors,  each  colony  was  to  pay 
yearly  a  percentage  to  the  Roman  treasury.  In  case  of  non-compli- 
ance the  magistrates  were  to  be  retained  as  hostages.  As  the 
colonies  had  avoided  military  service  for  six  years  they  had  no  real 
difficulty  in  obeying.  Other  Latin  colonies  had  not  shown  a  similar 
disloyalty,  and  Livy  enumerates  eighteen  which  had  been  conspicuous 
for  their  good  services.^  Even  the  maritime  colonies  of  Roman  Coloniae 
citizens  submitted  in  207  to  the  suspension  of  their  exemption  from  ''naritimae. 
military  service  so  long  as  an  enemy  was  in  Italy.^ 

In  the  north  the  two  Latin  colonies,  Placentia  and  Cremona,  Placentia 
had  suffered  severely  from  the  Gauls  while  the  Roman  arms  ««^ 
were  engaged  elsewhere.  Their  lands  were  wasted,  and  the  C^^^^^^''- 
number  of  colonists  diminished  by  losses  in  the  field  and  by  the 
departure  of  whole  families  in  search  of  safety.  In  206  the 
Senate  tried  to  remedy  this  state  of  things  by  ordering  all  absent 
coloni  to  return,  and  by  sending  an  army  under  a  praetor  to  protect 
them.  But  in  200  we  find  a  mixed  body  of  Gauls  and  Ligurians 
again  invading  them.  Placentia  seems  to  have  been  partly  de- 
stroyed, but  Cremona  closed  its  gates  and  held  out  till  it  was 
relieved  by  the  consul  Aurelius  Cotta.  It  was  not  until  195  that 
the  two  colonies  were  finally  restored  to  prosperity  and  their  enemies 
crushed  by  the  consul  Valerius  Flaccus  ;  and  more  wars  had  to  be 
fought  before  the  Romans  had  a  firm  hold  upon  the  valley  of  the  Po. 
But  from  Etruria  southward  Italy  was  now  secured,  and  the  grievances 
which  afterwards  led  to  the  Social  war,  though  arising  from  the  nature 
of  this  settlement,  were  of  a  different  kind,  and  more  analogous  to  the 
old  quarrel  of  patrician  and  plebeian. 

Meanwhile  some  changes,  political  and  social,  had  been  develop-  changes  in 

ing  themselves  in   Rome  itself.      Of  the  former,   perhaps  the  most  Rome. 

striking  was  the  growth  of  the  power  of  the  Senate.      There  was  no  Increased 

formal  alteration   of  its  functions  ;   it  had  no  more  legally  defined  f^^l  ^ 

c  1  ■,  •  y         -i     r  •        -,  ,1    ^^<^  Senate. 

powers  of  control  over  the  magistrates  than  before  ;  its  decrees  could 

always  be  overridden  by  a  lex  or  piebiscituiti.     But  in  practice  nearly 

the  whole   administration   was    directed    by   it.     While   magistrates 

^  Livy  xxvii.  10. 

-  The  maritime  Roman  colonies  had  this  privilege  {vacatio  militiae),  though 
they  were  bound  to  furnish  men  for  the  fleet  (Livy  xxxvi.  3).  In  207  Ostia,  Alsium, 
Antium,  Anxur,  Minturnae,  Sinuessa,  and  Sena  all  applied  to  be  allowed  to 
maintain  this  vacatio  militiae,  but  with  the  exception  of  Antium  and  Ostia  were 
refused.  In  these  two  last  men  of  military  age  were  forced  to  take  an  oath  not 
to  pass  a  night  outside  the  walls  of  their  towns  (Livy  xxvii.  33). 


398  HISTORY  OF  ROME 


were  loyal  to  the  unwritten  constitution,  and  anxious  that  the  respon- 
sibility of  their  acts  should  not  rest  wholly  on  themselves,  questions 
of  every  kind  were  referred  to  the  Senate  ;  and  the  number  of  such 
questions  largely  increased  in  a  time  of  war,  and  when  the  relations 
with  other   states  were   numerous   and   complicated.      Thus  certain 
Depart-        administrative  departments  were  tacitly  allowed  to  fall  into  the  hands 
ments  left     of  the   Senate.      It    received    and    answered    foreign    ambassadors, 
to  the  directed  the  movements  of  commanders  in  a  campaign  ;  and,  above 

all,  the  interference  of  the  Roman  government  in  the  internal  affairs 
of  the  Italian  socii,  sometimes  very  minute  and  strict,^  was  wielded 
entirely  by  it.  Again,  the  "  provinces  "  of  the  magistrates  were,  as 
a  rule,  settled  by  lot ;  but  the  Senate  decided  for  which  of  these 
provinces  the  several  colleges  of  magistrates  should  draw,  and  in 
cases  of  special  importance  assigned  the  provinces  without  lot.  Its 
claim  to  do  so  was  generally  admitted,  and  if  now  and  again  some 
consul  or  praetor  resisted,  it  was  politic  enough  to  give  in,  or,  to 
avoid  responsibility  by  referring  the  matter  to  the  people.  In  a  few 
cases,  such  as  that  of  Terentius  Varro  and  Publius  Scipio,  where 
popular  feeling  was  strongly  opposed  to  the  wishes  of  the  senators, 
they  yielded  with  no  great  show  of  reluctance.  And  such  conces- 
sions were  frequently  rewarded  by  the  strengthening  of  their  own 
hands  ;  for  it  often  happened  that  when  the  Senate  referred  a  matter 
to  the  people,  the  popular  vote  remitted  it  to  the  judgment  of  the 
Senate.  The  people  and  Senate,  in  fact,  were  as  yet  on  the  whole 
of  one  mind  ;  and  it  had  not  yet  occurred  to  any  statesman  to  call 
out  the  dormant  powers  of  the  people  to  defeat  the  Senate  for  his 
own  purposes. 
The  Senate  Not  less    remarkable  was  the  gradual  change  which  had   been 

Jilled  with  taking  place  in  the  composition  of  the  Senate  itself.  Briefly,  it  had 
ex-qfficta  s,  ^^^^^^  ^q  contain  a  preponderance  of  members  drawn  from  the  old 
mostly  of  .   .  TO,,  ,     .  -     ,  ,     . 

plebeian        patrician  gentes^  modified  by  an  admixture  of  plebeian  magistrates 

origin.  and  ex-magistrates.      It  was  now  filled  in  an  overwhelming  majority 

with  an  official  class  drawn  from  plebeian  families  ;  a  result  arising 
partly  from  the  natural  decline  in  the  number  of  the  patrician  gejttes^ 
partly  from  the  increase  in  the  number  of  magistrates,  who  thus 
generally  sufficed  to  fill  up  the  vacancies.  If  they  did  not,  as  the 
Dictator  appointed  in  216  to  make  up  the  Senate  found  to  be  the 
case,  then  those  vacancies  were  supplied  by  men  distinguished  in  the 
army,  who  were  as  likely  to  be  plebeians  as  patricians.  In  the  next 
eight  lectiones  (from  214  to  179)  no  such  measure  was  necessary,  the 
ex-magistrates  being  found  sufficient  to  fill  the  places,  so  that  the 
Senate  was  steadily  recruited  from  the  middle  ranks  of  the  citizens, 


^  See  the  case  of  the  ' '  Bacchanalia. ' 


1 


XXVI  THE  SENATE  AND  THE  ARMY  399 

and  consisted  of  an  official  class,  the  members  of  which  had  all  had 
experience  in  the  practical  work  of  government.^  As  consuls  or 
dictators,  they  had  commanded  armies  ;  as  praetors  had  transacted 
legal  and  judicial  business  ;  as  aediles  had  been  responsible  for  police 
and  internal  order;  as  quaestors  had  learnt  the  management  of  finance. 
They  formed  a  new  nobility,  which  for  the  next  century  and  a  half  The  neiu 
was  to  conduct  the  multifarious  business  of  an  already  mighty  empire,  nobility. 
It  is  their  gradual  deterioration  under  the  temptations  to  luxury  at 
home,  and  peculation  or  oppression  abroad,  which  led  to  the  revolu- 
tions of  the  future.  Already  they  were  beginning  to  rouse 
popular  suspicion.  The  tribune  who  fulminated  against  Marcellus 
in  209  included  the  nobility  generally  under  the  charge  of  protract- 
ing the  war  for  selfish  purposes  ;  and  the  plebiscituin  Claudiuni 
(2 1 8),  which  forbade  a  senator  or  his  son  owning  a  vessel  of  more 
than  300  amphorae  burden,  illustrates  both  the  ideal  of  a  senator's 
position,  which  should  be  above  the  temptations  of  mercantile  trans- 
actions, and  the  suspicion  already  aroused  that  the  senators  did  not 
act  up  to  it. 

In  the  army  no  important   change   in  formal   constitution   had  The  army. 
taken  place,  beyond  the  organisation  of  the  rorarii^  the  light-armed 
men  formerly  distributed  among  the  maniples,  into  a  separate  corps 
under  the  name  of  velites.      Service  in  the  legions  was  still  theoretic-    Velites. 
ally  a  privilege  of  those  included  in  the  five  classes.      But  the  needs 
of  the  time  had  occasionally  caused  freedmen,  or  slaves  manumitted 
for  the   purpose,    to   be  employed ;  and   the  socii  from   the   Italian  Socii. 
towns  became  a  regular  element  in  every  Roman  army,  equalling  in 
number  the  citizen  soldiers  of  the  legion.      Serving  side  by  side  with 
them  the  Roman  soldier  became  less  Roman  and  perhaps  somewhat  less 
amenable  to  discipline.  ^     Long  service  abroad  also,  often  without  fur- 
lough,^  made  men  unfit  for  civil  life,  and  at  any  rate  prevented  them 
from  providing  for  themselves.    The  military  class,  therefore,  became   The 
more  distinctly  marked  off,  and  those  settlements  of  veterans  on  con-  veterans. 
fiscated  lands  were  begun  which  in  after  days  offered  many  oppor- 
tunities to  the  promoters  of  civil  war. 

Though  some  instances  of  fraud  are  retailed  by  Livy  during  this  Decline  in 
period,  the  high  standard  of  official  honesty,  so  admired  by  Polybius,  f^umbers  of 
was  not  yet  seriously  impaired.    Rich  men  were  still  patriotic  enough  ^^  ^^^^^' 

^  In  the  list  of  the  Senate  for  179,  ingeniously  and  laboriously  compiled  by 
Willems  [le  Sinat,  ch.  xi, ),  of  304  members  88  only  belong  to  patrician  gentes, 
216  are  plebeians  ;  all  are  members  in  virtue  of  having  held  office. 

^  Mutinies  were  rare,  but  it  may  be  noticed  that  the  mutineers  in  Spain  (206) 
selected  two  Italians,  not  Romans,  to  command  them. 

^  The  mutineers  in  Macedonia  (199)  complained  that  they  had  served  con- 
tinuously in  Africa,  Sicily,  and  Macedonia,  and  had  not  seen  Italy  for  many 
years  (Livy  xxxii.  3). 


400 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Aba?ido?i- 
me?it  of 
country  fo7 
city. 


Importa- 
tion of 
■works  of 
Greek  art. 


Literature, 
(i)  Ennius 
{239- T 69)  ; 


to  supply  the  needs  of  the  state  ;  and  no  elements  of  disorder  were 
brought  to  light  by  the  critical  position  of  the  city.^  Yet  two  effects 
of  the  war  were  somewhat  disquieting.  The  first  was  a  serious 
decline  in  the  number  of  the  citizens,  amounting  between  222  and  204 
to  more  than  50,000  ;  the  second  was  the  increased  tendency  of  the 
farmers  to  leave  the  country  and  come  to  Rome.  Once  there  it  was 
difficult  to  induce  them  to  return.  Their  farmhouses  had  perhaps 
been  burnt,  their  cattle  driven  away,  their  free  labourers  enrolled  in 
the  legions,  and  their  slaves  run  away.  It  was  too  much  to  expect 
them  to  leave  the  city,  with  its  occupations  and  amusements,  and  take 
up  again  the  toils  of  country  life,  which  seemed  to  promise  only 
bankruptcy.  The  opening  of  the  vast  wheat  fields  of  Africa,  Sicily, 
and  Sardinia  lowered  the  price  of  corn  and  made  farming  in  Italy 
unprofitable,  except  perhaps  on  a  large  scale,  and  by  means  of  slave 
labour.  The  constant  tendency,  therefore,  of  the  small  farmer  would 
be  to  sell  his  holding  and  come  to  Rome,  there  to  invest  his  capital 
in  commerce,  and  trust  to  cheap  food  and  the  chances  of  city  life. 
This  tendency,  which  had  existed  long  before  the  second  Punic 
war,  seems  to  have  at  least  received  some  impetus  from  it,  and  was 
in  the  future  to  increase  to  an  alarming  extent.  For  the  present  we 
are  told  that  the  consuls  exerted  all  their  authority  to  induce  the 
farmers  to  return  to  the  country. 

This  age  also  not  only  saw  an  extension  of  the  taste  for  the 
objects  of  Greek  art,  consequent  on  the  large  importations  of  such 
things  from  Syracuse,  Capua,  Tarentum,  and  other  towns,  but  also 
the  definite  establishment  of  a  literature  based  on  Greek  models. 
Livius  and  Naevius  had  set  a  fashion  which  soon  found  followers  ; 
and  two  writers  should  be  noticed  now  who  confirmed  this  tendency, 
and,  with  one  who  resisted  it,  did  much  to  fix  Latin  as  a  literary 
language,  and  in  different  ways  illustrate  Roman  life. 

Q.  Ennius  was  born  at  Rudiae  in  Calabria,  and  was 
brought  to  Rome  by  Cato,  who  met  him  in  Sardinia  in  203.  From 
that  time,  with  the  exception  of  a  second  service  in  the  army  of 
Nobilior  in  191,  he  lived  principally  at  Rome,  where  he  supported 
himself  by  teaching — being  acquainted  with  Oscan,  Latin,  and  Greek 
— and  by  writing.  He  was  the  chosen  friend  of  Africanus  and  other 
nobles,  and  professed  to  be  a  disciple  of  the  Pythagorean  school  of 
philosophy.  He  seems,  however,  to  have  been  imbued  with  the 
rationalising  spirit  of  the  Epicureans  ;  for  he  translated  the  '  Sacred 
Treatise '  of  Euhemerus,  in  which  he  applied  the  account  of  the  gods 
as  originally  great  kings  and  captains  to  the  Latin  divinities  ;  and 


^  A  fire  in  210  created  some  feeling  of  uneasiness,  but  it  was  eventually  put 
down  to  certain  Campanians,  and  was  very  likely  accidental. 


XXVI  ENNIUS  AND  THE  ROMAN  NOBLES  401 

his  favourite  tragedian  was  Euripides,  whose  plays  he  translated  for  his  works ; 
the  Roman  stage. ^      He  wrote  also  Saturae  and  epigrams,  a  pane- 
gyric of  Scipio,  and  other  poems.      His  most  famous  work  was  the 
Annates^  a  history  of  Rome  from  its  foundation  to  his  own  day,  in 
hexameter  verse,    in  which  he  freely  used   the   early  legends,   and 
doubtless  did  much  to  fix  them  in  the  popular  imagination.      Among 
the  fragments  of  this  poem  there  is  one  which  may  help  us  to  realise 
the  growing  influence  of  the  Greek  man  of  letters  among  the  nobles 
of  the  day,  who,  like  Sulla,   Lucullus,  and  Pompey  in  a  later  age, 
usually   entertained   one  or    more    such    about    their    persons.      He  his  descrip- 
speaks   of  the  great   man  after   delivering   some   public   oration    as  Hon  of  the 
"  Calling  for  him  in  whose  company  and  conversation  at  table  he   ^^^^^  ^^^' 
took  delight,  when  wearied  with  public  business  for  more  than  half  f^j^^^ 
the  day  in  the  broad  Forum  or  the  sacred  Senate  ;  one  to  whom  he 
could  confide  his  secrets,  small  and  great,  and  safely  utter  whatever 
rose  to  his  lips,   good  or  bad  ;  one  with  whom  he  could  share  his 
relaxations  in  public  or  private.     Such  a  man  must  be  of  the  strictest 
honour  ;    not  likely  to  make  mischief  either  from  levity  or  malice  ; 
learned,   loyal,   pleasant,   witty ;   content  with  his  own   and   seeking 
nothing  more  ;  with  tact  to  seize  the  moment  for  speech,  brief  and 
to  the  point.      He  must  be  skilled  in  antiquities  and  history,  ready 
with  piecedents,   ancient  and  modern  ;    and  above  all,   must  know 
when  to  be  silent.''  ^ 

If  this  gives  us  a  glimpse  of  the  manners  of  the  great,  from  {2)  Plautus 
another  poet,  a  considerable  part  of  whose  work  has  come  to  us,  {^54-^ ^4)- 
we  may  learn  something  of  common  life.  T.  Maccius  Plautus 
was  born  about  254  at  Sassina,  in  Umbria.  We  know  little  of  his 
life  beyond  the  fact  that  his  parents  were  poor  though  free,  and  that 
coming  to  Rome  as  an  actor  he  lost  the  money  there  gained  by 
speculation,  and  became  so  reduced  that  he  was  obliged  to  work  for 
hire  in  a  mill. 

Though  the  plays,  some  of  which  were  composed  in  the  intervals 
of  this  servile  work,  were,  like  those  of  his  predecessors,  translated 
from  the  Greek  of  the  later  comedy,  yet  he  used  his  models  more 
freely,   and,   without  attempting   originality  in   plot   or  generally  in 

^  A  passage  in  one  of  his  translations  contains  a  statement  of  Epicurean 
doctrine,  which  he  probably  would  have  softened  if  he  had  not  agreed  with  it. 
Trag.  354,  ed.  Vahlen : — 

Ego  deum  genus  esse  semper  dixl  et  dicam  ccelitum, 
Sed  eos  non  curare  opinor  quid  agat  humanum  genus. 
Nam  si  curent,  bene  bonis  sit,  male  malis,  quod  nunc  abest. 

2  Ennius,  Annales,  239,  ed.  Vahlen.  A  comparison  with  similar  maxims  of 
Horace  for  intercourse  with  the  great  {e.g.  Epp.  i,  7,  46  ;  1,18)  will  show  how, 
with  externals  not  much  changed,  the  superiority  in  dignity  and  simplicity  is  with 
the  earlier  age. 

2  D 


402 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Popular 
prejudices. 


Greek 
terms 
etnployed 
by  Plautus. 


dialogue,  introduced  Roman  allusions  and  expressions  which  almost 
for  the  first  time  in  surviving  Latin  literature  seem  to  show  us  the 
people  and  their  thoughts  and  opinions.  Thus,  though  the  Punic 
wars  are  only  once  alluded  to,  the  national  prejudice  against  the 
double-faced  Carthaginians  comes  out  in  the  description  of  a  char- 
acter in  the  Poenulus^  who  "  knows  everything  and  pretends  to  know 
nothing — a  true  Carthaginian  "  ;  just  as  another  national  prejudice  as 
to  the  morals  of  the  Greeks  is  betrayed  by  the  use  of  pergraecari 
and  co7igraecari  to  indicate  loose  and  luxurious  habits. ^ 

Again,  the  signs  of  the  growth  of  a  foreign  element  in  Rome  may 
be  detected  in  the  terms  for  which  Plautus  found  no  ready  equivalent 
in  Latin.  Thus  the  banker  is  called  frapezita,  and,  like  other  Greek 
men  of  business,  was  supposed  to  be  a  cheat,  cunning  at  evading  the 
laws. 2  So  also  terms  connected  with  shipping  are  mostly  Greek.  The 
merchant  adventurer,  sailing  in  his  own  ship,  is  nauclerus^  though 
the  speculator  in  such  gear  is  a  mercator.,  and  sea-sickness  is  nausea; 
for,  in  spite  of  the  naval  efforts  of  the  first  Punic  war,  the  Romans 
had  not  become  a  sea-going  folk  ;  and  socii  navales,  as  a  term  for 
their  sailors,  witnesses  to  the  source  from  which  they  got  them.^ 

Certain  luxuries  also  appear  to  have  had  no  Latin  name  in  use. 
The  maker  of  fancy-bread  or  rolls  was  artoptaj^  the  refreshment 
bar  was  a  therniopoHumj^  the  best  perfume  was  7mirrha,  the  per- 
fumer niyropola  or  inyrobreccharms,  and  his  shop  a  myropolhmi  j 
while  the  perfumed  douche  after  the  bath  is  described  by  a  hybrid 
expression  as  unguenticm  eccheumataJ^  Ladies  did  not  live  apart  in 
a  Roman  house  as  at  Athens,  and  there  was  no  equivalent  for  the 
Gr&ek  gy?tcecaeu7n  to  the  time  of  Cicero.'^  Nor  was  there  any  word 
in  Latin  for  the  needy  hanger  on,  the  parasitus  or  sycophanta^  a  con- 
temptible connexion  far  removed  from  that  of  cliens  and  patronus  j 
and  while  he  uses  a  Latin  word  for  dice  {alea)  the  throw  is  constantly 
expressed  by  the  Greek  bolus. 

Again,  the  early  Roman  was  exercised  in  arms,  in  real  or  mimic 
war,  and  the  manly  exercises  of  the  Campus,^  without  the  more  artificial 
arrangements  common  in  Greece.  The  palaestra  and  gymtiasium 
therefore  could  only  be  described  by  their  Greek  names,  though  they 
speedily  became  acclimatised,  along  with  the  bath  and  its  luxuries, 
while  the  larger  private  houses  already  had  the  a?nbulacrujn  and 
porttcus,  which  served  some  of  the  purposes  of  the  palaestra. 


^  Poen.  pr.  112  ;  Cist,  i,  i,  21,  61  ;  4,  3,  21  ;  Bacch.  4,  6,  15  etc. 

^  Pseud.  2,  4,  67  ;   Cure.  4,  2,  23.     But  mensa  for  a  bank  is  used,  Cure.  5,  3,  4. 

^  Mil.  4,  3,  15  ;  Asin.  i,  i,  55  ;   Merc.  2,  3,  54. 

^  Aul.  2,  9,  4.  ^  Cure.  2,  3,  13. 

6  As.  5,  2,  79;  Cas.  2,  3,  10;  Aul.  3,  5,  37;  Amph.  4,  i,  3;  Poen.  3,  3,  88. 

^  Most.  3,  2,  68  ;  Cicero,  2  Phil.  §  95.  ^  Bacch.  3,  3,  24  ;   Most,  i,  2,  6j. 


XXVI  SLAVERY  AMONG  THE  ROMANS  403 

The   value   of  eloquence,   and    the   rise   of  the   new  nobility  by  Eloquence 
popular   favour   gained   in   pleading   causes,    are   illustrated    by   the  and  the 
advice  given   to  the   young  man    in   the    Trinumus^    "  to   serve   his  "^V^ 
friends  in  the  Forum  if  he  wishes  for  public  office  "  ;  and  by  another 
passage  describing  the  growing  desire  of  such  men  to  have  round 
them   a   body   of  well-to-do  clients,   without   much    regard    to    their 
character.    These  are  the  "  clients  "  of  the  later  Republic,  not  heredi- 
tary dependents,  but  men  whose  interests  centred  round  some  leader, 
statesman,  or  general,  and  formed  the  nucleus  of  the  coming  revolu- 
tions.i      Closely  allied  is  the  appearance  of  bribery,  as  office  began  Ambitus. 
to  be  valuable  from  the  foreign  provinces.      The  first   law  against 
mnbitus  was  not  passed  till   181,  but  the  thing  itself  was  becoming 
notorious,  and  the  tipsy  slave  in  the  Trinwnus  is  made  to  moralise 
with  solemnity  on  the  growing  scandal.^ 

A  still  graver  feature  in  Roman  life,  copiously  illustrated  by  Slaves  in 
Plautus,  is  the  number  and  ill-treatment  of  slaves.  Though  Greek  coitiedy  and 
in  name  and  in  the  parts  they  sustain  in  the  plays,  yet  the  extra-  ^'^^  ^J^' 
ordinary  fertility  of  expressions,  wholly  Latin,  for  their  torture  or 
punishment,  throws  a  lurid  light  on  the  position  of  these  unfortunate 
men  and  women.  ^  The  cat  (Jiagrum)^  and  the  rods  {virgae)  are  the 
usual  implements  of  punishment.  But  there  are  numberless  worse 
modes  of  torture.  The  poor  wretch  was  sometimes  hung  by  his 
hands  to  a  beam,  with  weights  attached  to  his  feet,  while  his  flesh, 
was  pierced  with  goads.  Sometimes  a  heavy  fork  of  wood  was 
placed  on  his  neck,  to  the  ends  of  which  his  hands  were  bound,  and 
he  was  flogged  or  goaded  as  he  staggered  under  the  weight ;  and  if 
he  stole  he  was  branded  with  the  letters  FUR.^  A  punishment  Slaves  in 
much  dreaded  was  the  being  transferred  to  the  country  establishment,  thecountry. 
and  there  being  forced  to  work  in  chains  on  the  land,  to  grind  at 
the  mill,  to  hew  wood  and  draw  water,  or  labour  in  the  stone 
quarries,  imprisoned  during  the  night  in  the  hateful  ergastuhmi. 
Finally  their  masters  could,  and  sometimes  did,  punish  them  by 
execution  on  the  cross.  The  honest  slave  in  the  Miles  (2  4,  19) 
is  made  to  say,  "  I  know  that  a  cross  will  be  my  grave.  That  was 
the  sepulchre  of  my  father  and  grandfathers  to  the  fourth  genera- 
tion." After  making  allowance  for  comic  exaggeration,  it  seems 
clear  that,  if  such  language  was  to  have  any  point  at  all,  it  must 
indicate  a  vast  growth  in  the  number  of  slaves,  whose  masters 
believed  that  they  could  only  hold  them  in  subjection  by  the  utmost 
severity  ;  and  particularly  that  the  hardest  labours  of  the  farm  were 

1  Trin.  3,  2,  25;  Men.  4,  2,  1-30. 

2  Trin,  4,  3,  26. 

3  For  severities  to  women  see  Merc.  2,  3,  jj\  True.  4,  3,  i-io. 

■*  For  list  of  slave  punishments  see  particularly  Asin.  3,  21 ;  Men.  5,  6,  8. 


404 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Street  life 
as  described 
by  Plautus. 


Identifica- 
tion of 
Roman 
and  Greek 
divinities. 


now  performed  almost  entirely  by  them.  When  this  began  we  can- 
not tell  exactly  ;  but  the  Punic  wars,  in  flooding  the  markets  with 
slaves,  doubtless  largely  extended  it ;  and  as  the  Roman  citizens 
became  more  and  more  averse  to  the  dulness  of  the  country  these 
large  gangs  of  slaves  became  a  real  danger  to  the  State. 

Of  the  daily  life  of  the  streets  it  is  not  so  easy  to  get  a  view.  A 
passage  in  the  Curculio  ^  will  show  us  the  Forum  and  its  neighbour- 
hood— the  comitiuin  crowded  with  electors  listening  to  the  profes- 
sions of  candidates,  as  well  as  a  spot  on  the  north  of  the  Forum  near 
the  altar  of  Venus  Cloacina ;  the  street  near  the  Basilica  haunted  by 
idlers  and  loose  women  ;  the  fishmarket  full  of  purchasers,  eyed 
anxiously  by  hangers-on  watching  for  an  invitation  to  dinner.  The  men 
of  wealth  do  business  in  the  part  of  the  Forum  nearest  the  capitol. 
In  the  centre  by  the  lacus  Curtius  are  idle  gossips.  Near  the  veteres 
tabernae,  on  the  south  side,  congregate  the  money-lenders.  Near  the 
temple  of  Castor  and  the  vicus  Tusciis  are  more  loose  characters  ; 
while  the  Velabrum  is  full  of  tradesmen's  shops,  such  as  butchers 
and  bakers ;  and  the  Subura  is  lined  with  eating  -  houses  and 
taverns.  At  the  porta  trigemina.,  and  all  along  the  road  to  Ostia, 
stand  or  crouch  the  beggars  with  which  every  visitor  is  well 
acquainted  to  this  day.^  In  the  midst  the  aediles  exercise  the  office 
of  police  and  petty  magistrates  :  see  that  the  streets  are  cleaned  j 
regulate  the  markets ;  test  the  soundness  of  the  goods  offered  for 
sale  ;  and,  when  the  games  are  coming  on,  give  out  contracts  for 
theatrical  properties,  and  exercise  control  over  the  actors,  who  are 
mostly  slaves,  punishing  those  who  do  ill.^ 

Lastly,  in  both  Ennius  and  Plautus  we  see  the  identification  of  the 
Greek  and  Latin  gods  all  but  complete.  It  was  perhaps  the  exigences 
of  translation  that  helped  on  the  process,  which  doubtless  had  also 
other  determining  causes.  At  any  rate,  Ennius  gives  the  list  of  the 
twelve  gods  of  the  Greeks  under  their  Latin  titles,*  which  is  also 
repeated  by  Plautus,  with  some  variations  and  additions,  such  as 
Summanus  (  =  Pluto),  and  others,  most  of  whom  had  temples  in 
Rome.  A  number  of  rural  deities  were  still  locally  worshipped, 
who  had  no  Greek  analogues  ;  ^   but  the  State  religion  was  henceforth 


^  Cure.  4,  I.  The  genuineness  of  the  passage  is  doubted  because  of  the  men- 
tion of  the  basilica,  for  the  Basilica  Porcia  was  built  in  Cato's  censorship,  B.C. 
184,  the  year  of  Plautus' s  death.  But  as  sub-basilicani  occurs  in  Capt.  4,  2,  36, 
it  seems  better  to  believe  that  the  name  was  attached  to  some  building  earlier. 
At  any  rate  the  passage,  if  an  insertion,  is  old  enough  for  our  purpose. 

2  Cist.  I,  2,  3;  Capt.  I,  I,  22. 

3  For  the  various  functions  of  the  aediles  see  Stich.  2,  3,  29  ;  Men.  4,  2,  25; 
Capt.  4,  2,  34;  Rud.  2,  3,  43;  Trin.  i,  3,  80 ;  4,  2,  148, 

■*  Ennius,  Annales,  i  fr. ;  Plautus,  Bacch.  4,  7,  31. 
°  Enumerated  by  Varro,  R.R.  i. 


XXVI  CATO  AND  COUNTRY  LIFE  405 

confined  to  the  worship  of  these  deities,  with  certain  additions,  such 
as  that  of  the  Bona  Dea  or  Magna  Mater,  introduced  from  Asia  in 
205.  Thus  Roman  theology,  if  not  now  for  the  first  time  settled, 
received  its  first  definite  expression  in  literature.^ 

Thirdly,  from  M.  PORCIUS  Cato,  who  stoutly  resisted  the  fashion  (j)  Cato 
of  writing  or  copying  Greek,  and  who  was  prolific  in  speeches  and  {2j4-i4g). 
histories,  we  have  a  treatise  on  the  management  of  a  farm  of  about 
1 00  jugera,  from  which  something  may  be  gathered  of  the  country 
life  at  this  period, — all  the  more  interesting  from  the  consideration 
that  in  no  other  sphere  is  custom  so  persistent,  and  that  therefore  in 
many  respects  we  may  feel  sure  that  what  we  read  applies  equally  to 
Latin  farmers  many  generations  before.      In  his  preface  he  praises  Praise  of 
farming    above    other    industries.      In   ancient   times,    he   says,    the  f^^^ntng. 
highest  compliment  was  to  call  a  man  a  good  farmer.      It  is  farmers 
who  are  the  mainstay  of  the  state  :  they  are  the  bravest  men  and 
the  best  soldiers  ;  their  trade  is  not  open  to  the  risks  of  the  merchant 
or  the  odium  of  the  money-lender.      Farming,  however,  must  not  be 
treated  as  of  secondary  importance  :  a  man  should  make  his  chief 
residence  in   the  country,  only  lodging  in  the  city  for   the   sake  of 
public  duties.      Those  done  he  should,  like   Cincinnatus,   return   to 
his  farm.      In   Cato's  time  the  actual  work,  once  performed  by  the 
farmer  and  his  free  labourers,  was  done  by  slaves,  for  whose  manage- 
ment, allowance  of  food,  dress,  and  wooden   shoes   he  gives   minute 
directions.      But  the  old  habits  and  customs  still  remained,  especially 
in  the  methods  of  securing  the  favour  of  the  gods  for  the  operations 
of  the  farm.      The  first  thing  the  owner  must  do  on  arriving  at  his  Country 
house  is  to  greet  the  Lar  Familiaris  :  before  a  sickle  can  be  put  into  ^^^^  ^°  ^J 
the  corn  an  offering   of  incense   must  be  made  to  Janus,  Jupiter,   ^^^^^^  • 
and  Juno,  and  a   pig  sacrificed  to   Ceres,   to  whom  also  first-fruits 
must  be  given  when  the  crops  are  about  to  be  stored  in  the  barn. 
When  the  grain  is  sown  a  daps  is  to  be  given  to  Jupiter.      When  the 
oxen  are  turned  out  into  the  meadows  an  offering  is  to  be  made  to 
Mars    Silvanus.      If  a   woodland   is   to  be   cleared  a  pig   must   be 
offered  to  the  deity  inhabiting  it,  and  another  when  the  ground  is 

1  The  list  of  the  twelve  gods  in  Ennius  is  contained  in  the  distich : — 

luno  Vesta  Minerva  Ceres  Diana  Venus  :  Mars 
Mercurius  lovis  Neptunus  Volcanus  Apollo. 

Mars,  who  in  the  Latin  religion  was  the  god  of  death  and  destruction,  here  repre- 
sents Ares,  the  god  of  war.  Plautus  adds  Latona,  Spes,  Ops,  Castor  and  Pollux, 
Virtus,  Hercules,  Submanus,  Sol,  Saturnus,  all  of  whom,  except  Latona  and  Sub- 
manus,  had  temples  at  Rome.  The  worship  of  Apollo,  which  seems  at  first  not 
to  have  caught  on  at  Rome,  though  he  had  a  temple  since  413,  was  much  pro- 
moted by  the  establishment  of  the  ludi  Apollinares  in  212.  There  was  no 
temple  of  Latona,  yet  her  name  was  joined  with  that  of  Apollo  in  a  lectisierniutn 
held  in  396  to  avert  a  pestilence  (Livy  v.  13). 


406 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


first  broken  by  the  plough.  Mars,  in  this  rustic  hierarchy,  was 
god  of  Wight  and  murrain  to  crop  and  flock,  and  a  form  of  prayer 
is  given  to  be  used  to  him  by  the  farmer. i  Such  a  farm 
would  contain  plough-land,  meadow,  garden,  olive-grove,  orchards 
of  apple,  pear,  and  figs ;  with  woodland,  in  which  the  chief 
trees  were  elm,  poplar,  cypress,  oak,  ilex,  and  willow  for  basket- 
work.  The  beasts  used  on  the  farm  were  oxen,  mules,  and  asses 
for  the  mill  ;  horses  seem  seldom  employed  for  agricultural 
purposes.  The  food  used  in  the  farm  -  house  is  shown  by  the 
directions  to  the  villica,  who  is  always  to  have  a  good  store  of 
poultry,  eggs,  dried-peas,  service-berries,  figs,  raisins,  walnuts,  and 
preserved  or  dried  fruits  of  various  kinds,  and  must  be  skilled  in 
grinding  fine  or  coarse  meal  or  groats.  Nothing  is  to  be  wasted  : 
the  worn  saguin  served  out  to  the  slave  is  to  be  returned  before  a 
new  one  is  given,  in  order  to  make  patchwork  coverlets.  The  wind- 
falls of  the  olives  are  to  be  collected  to  make  puhne7ttarium  for  the 
slaves^  and  the  skins  of  the  pressed  grapes  to  make  their  wine  or 
posca.  Every  eighth  day  the  farm  produce  is  to  be  taken  to  Rome 
or  elsewhere  for  market,  while  at  certain  seasons  there  were  fairs 
{inercatus)^  such  as  that  at  the  grove  of  Feronia  at  the  foot  of  Mount 
Soracte.  Wet  weather  was  to  be  utilised  for  clearing  or  repairing 
the  oil  or  wine  vessels  and  other  implements  ;  while  the  olive  crop 
was  gathered  by  bands  of  leguli  or  pickers  at  a  special  rate,  or 
sometimes  sold  on  the  trees  at  a  valuation.  The  four  great  holidays 
in  the  year  were  the  Lupercalia  in   March,  the  Palilia  in  April,  the 


^  The  formula  of  the  Arval   Brethren  for  this   purpose  is  preserved  in  an 
inscription  discovered  in  1778  : — 

Enos,  Lases,  iuvate  (ter) 

Neve  lue  rue,  Marmar,  sins  incurrere  in  pleores.  (ter) 
Satur  fu,  fere  Mars.    Limen  sali.  Sta.  Berber,  (ter) 
Semunis  alternei  advocapit  conctos.  (ter) 
Enos,  Marmar,  iuvato.  (ter) 
Triumpe,  Triumpe,  Triumpe,  Triumpe. 

Which  the  Bishop  of  Salisbury  thus  translates  : — 

Help  us,  oh  Lares,  help  us.  Lares,  help  us  I 
And  thou,  oh  Marmar,  suffer  not 
Fell  plague  and  ruin's  rot 
Our  folk  to  devastate. 

Be  satiate,  oh  fierce  Mars,  be  satiate  ! 
(Leap  o'er  the  threshold  !  Halt  !  Now  beat  the  ground) 

Be  satiate,  oh  fierce  Mars,  be  satiate  ! 
(Leap  o'er  the  threshold  !  Halt  !  Now  beat  the  ground) 

Be  satiate,  oh  fierce  Mars,  be  satiate  ! 
(Leap  o'er  the  threshold  !  Halt  !  Now  beat  the  ground  !) 
(Call  to  your  aid  the  heroes  all,  call  in  alternate  strain  ! 

Call,  call,  the  heroes  all, 
Call  to  your  aid  the  heroes  all,  call  in  alternate  strain  !) 
Help  us,  oh  Marmar,  help  us,  Marmar,  help  us  ! 
(Bound  high  in  solemn  measure,  bound  and  bound  again, 

Bound  high  and  bound  again  !) 


XXVI  THE  HABITS  OF  FARMERS  407 

Saturnalia  in  December,  and  the  Compitalia  in  January.  In  the 
two  last  named  the  slaves  were  specially  permitted  to  share  ;  but 
from  religious  functions  of  the  family  generally  they  were  jealously 
excluded.  On  other  holy  days,  though  work  did  not  cease,  it  was  of 
a  lighter  kind,  or  was  bestowed  upon  the  highways  on  the  demand  of  the 
authorities  of  the  pagus.  Many  recipes  for  country  dishes,  simples, 
and  fomentations  were  traditional  among  the  farmers,  who  still 
believed  that  even  a  dislocated  limb  would  yield  to  a  charm  recited 
with  the  cabalistic  words,  of  which  Cato  gives  a  specimen. 1  Such 
was  the  life  that  in  its  primitive  simplicity  still  lingered  in  the 
country  districts  of  Latium  and  Campania,  while  in  mountainous 
districts  the  shepherds  formed  a  distinct  and  hardy  class,  and  in  the  Shepherds 
woodlands  and  forests  there  were  large  bands  of  swineherds,  of  and  swim 
whose  methods  and  habits  Polybius  has  left  us  some  curious  '^''^•^• 
particulars. 2  It  was  such  men  that  formed  the  backbone  of  the 
nation  :  it  was  from  them  that  the  armies  which  conquered  the  world 
were  replenished.  And  even  in  regard  to  the  intellectual  life  of  the 
state,  it  will  be  observed  that  of  the  three  men  here  mentioned  as 
representatives  of  literature  one  was  a  South  Italian,  the  other  an 
Umbrian,  and  that  the  third,  though  a  Latin  and  a  Roman  citizen  by 
birth,  lived  chiefly  in  the  country.  Rome  had  the  power  (the  true  note 
of  a  nation)  of  absorbing  and  inspiring  all  with  her  spirit  ;  but  the 
best  of  the  raw  material  was  found  not  in  the  city  but  in  the  country. 

^  Motas  vaeta  daries  dardares  astataries  dissunapiter,  R.R.  160. 
2  Polybius  xii.  4, 


4o6 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


first  broken  by  the  plough.  Mars,  in  this  rustic  hierarchy,  was 
god  of  blight  and  murrain  to  crop  and  flock,  and  a  form  of  prayer 
is  given  to  be  used  to  him  by  the  farmer. i  Such  a  farm 
would  contain  plough-land,  meadow,  garden,  olive-grove,  orchards 
of  apple,  pear,  and  figs ;  with  woodland,  in  which  the  chief 
trees  were  elm,  poplar,  cypress,  oak,  ilex,  and  willow  for  basket- 
work.  The  beasts  used  on  the  farm  were  oxen,  mules,  and  asses 
for  the  mill ;  horses  seem  seldom  employed  for  agricultural 
purposes.  The  food  used  in  the  farm-house  is  shown  by  the 
directions  to  the  villica,  who  is  always  to  have  a  good  store  of 
poultry,  eggs,  dried-peas,  service-berries,  figs,  raisins,  walnuts,  and 
preserved  or  dried  fruits  of  various  kinds,  and  must  be  skilled  in 
grinding  fine  or  coarse  meal  or  groats.  Nothing  is  to  be  wasted  : 
the  worn  sagian  served  out  to  the  slave  is  to  be  returned  before  a 
new  one  is  given,  in  order  to  make  patchwork  coverlets.  The  wind- 
falls of  the  olives  are  to  be  collected  to  make  pulmentarium  for  the 
slaves,  and  the  skins  of  the  pressed  grapes  to  make  their  wine  or 
posca.  Every  eighth  day  the  farm  produce  is  to  be  taken  to  Rome 
or  elsewhere  for  market,  while  at  certain  seasons  there  were  fairs 
{inercatus\  such  as  that  at  the  grove  of  Feronia  at  the  foot  of  Mount 
Soracte.  Wet  weather  was  to  be  utilised  for  clearing  or  repairing 
the  oil  or  wine  vessels  and  other  implements  ;  while  the  olive  crop 
was  gathered  by  bands  of  legiili  or  pickers  at  a  special  rate,  or 
sometimes  sold  on  the  trees  at  a  valuation.  The  four  great  holidays 
in  the  year  were  the  Lupercalia  in   March,  the  Palilia  in  April,  the 


^  The  formula  of  the  Arval  Brethren  for  this   purpose  is 
inscription  discovered  in  1778  : — 

Enos,  Lases,  iuvate  (ter) 

Neve  lue  rue,  Marmar,  sins  incurrere  in  pleores.  (ter) 
Satur  fu,  fere  Mars.    Limen  sail.  Sta.  Berber,  (ter) 
Semunis  alternei  advocapit  conctos.  (ter) 
Enos,  Marmar,  iuvato.  (ter) 
Triumpe,  Triumpe,  Triumpe,  Triumpe. 

Which  the  Bishop  of  Salisbury  thus  translates  : — 

Help  us,  oh  Lares,  help  us.  Lares,  help  us  I 
And  thou,  oh  Marmar,  suffer  not 
Fell  plague  and  ruin's  rot 
Our  folk  to  devastate. 

Be  satiate,  oh  fierce  Mars,  be  satiate  ! 
(Leap  o'er  the  threshold  !  Halt  !  Now  beat  the  ground) 

Be  satiate,  oh  fierce  Mars,  be  satiate  ! 
(Leap  o'er  the  threshold  !  Halt  !  Now  beat  the  ground) 

Be  satiate,  oh  fierce  Mars,  be  satiate  ! 
(Leap  o'er  the  threshold  !  Halt  !  Now  beat  the  ground  !) 
(Call  to  your  aid  the  heroes  all,  call  in  alternate  strain  ! 

Call,  call,  the  heroes  all, 
Call  to  your  aid  the  heroes  all,  call  in  alternate  strain  !) 
Help  us,  oh  Marmar,  help  us,  Marmar,  help  us  ! 
(Bound  high  in  solemn  measure,  bound  and  bound  again, 

Bound  high  and  bound  again  !) 


preserved  in  an 


XXVI  THE  HABITS  OF  FARMERS  407 

vSaturnalia  in  December,  and  the  Compitalia  in  January.  In  the 
two  last  named  the  slaves  were  specially  permitted  to  share  ;  but 
from  religious  functions  of  the  family  generally  they  were  jealously 
excluded.  On  other  holy  days,  though  work  did  not  cease,  it  was  of 
a  lighter  kind,  or  was  bestowed  upon  the  highways  on  the  demand  of  the 
authorities  of  the  j[)agus.  Many  recipes  for  countiy  dishes,  simples, 
and  fomentations  were  traditional  among  the  farmers,  who  still 
believed  that  even  a  dislocated  limb  would  yield  to  a  charm  recited 
with  the  cabalistic  words,  of  which  Cato  gives  a  specimen. ^  Such 
was  the  life  that  in  its  primitive  simplicity  still  lingered  in  the 
country  districts  of  Latium  and  Campania,  while  in  mountainous 
districts  the  shepherds  formed  a  distinct  and  hardy  class,  and  in  the  Shepherds 
woodlands  and  forests  there  were  large  bands  of  swineherds,  of  <^nd  swim 
whose  methods  and  habits  Polybius  has  left  us  some  curious  '^^''^•^• 
particulars. 2  It  was  such  men  that  formed  the  backbone  of  the 
nation  :  it  was  from  them  that  the  armies  which  conquered  the  world 
were  replenished.  And  even  in  regard  to  the  intellectual  life  of  the 
state,  it  will  be  observed  that  of  the  three  men  here  mentioned  as 
representatives  of  literature  one  was  a  South  Italian,  the  other  an 
Umbrian,  and  that  the  third,  though  a  Latin  and  a  Roman  citizen  by 
birth,  lived  chiefly  in  the  country.  Rome  had  the  power  (the  true  note 
of  a  nation)  of  absorbing  and  inspiring  all  with  her  spirit  ;  but  the 
best  of  the  raw  material  was  found  not  in  the  city  but  in  the  country. 

1  Motas  vaeta  daries  dardares  astataries  dissunapiter,  R.R.  160. 
^  Polybius  xii.  4. 


CHAPTER   XXVII 

THE    FIRST    MACEDONIAN    WAR 

214-205 

The  state  of  Asia  and  Greece  from  323  to  215 — The  development  of  the  three 
great  kingdoms  of  Egypt,  Asia,  and  Macedonia — The  lesser  Asiatic  powers, 
Pergamos,  Bithynia,  Cappadocia,  and  Galatia — The  extent  of  the  Macedonian 
influence  in  Asia  and  Greece — The  Achaean  and  Aetolian  Leagues — The  ac- 
cession of  Philip  V. — He  conceives  the  idea  of  invading  Italy — His  treaty  with 
Hannibal — The  Romans  declare  war  with  him  (215) — His  defeat  at  Apollonia 
— His  vigorous  measures  and  victory  over  the  Aetolians  at  Lamia  (209) — 
The  war  languishes  for  some  time  (208-206),  but  the  Romans,  by  the  advice 
of  Sulpicius,  are  unwilling  to  make  peace — The  Aetolians  therefore  make  a 
separate  peace  with  Philip  :  followed  by  general  pacification  at  Phoenice  (205). 


The 

importance 
of  the 
Macedon- 
ian wa?'s. 


Divisions 
of  the 
Empire  of 
Alexander, 


Among  the  incidents  of  the  struggle  with  Hannibal  had  been  a 
collision  with  the  king  of  Macedonia,  What  is  called  the  first 
Macedonian  war  (214-205)  was  not  marked  by  any  great  battles  or 
important  changes  of  territory,  but  it  pledged  the  Romans  to  a  certain 
protectorate  and  the  maintenance  of  a  definite  state  of  affairs  in 
Greece  and  Asia  Minor.  This  led  to  the  second  war  with  Philip 
(200-197),  and  to  the  extension  of  that  protectorate  over  all  Greece  ; 
and  this  in  its  turn  involved  the  war  with  Antiochus  and  the 
Aqtolians,  and  another  large  extension  of  Roman  responsibility  (193- 
188).  The  Romans  thereby  took  their  place  in  the  development  of 
a  world-wide  history.  The  affairs  of  Africa,  Italy,  Greece,  and  Asia 
became  inextricably  involved  ;  and  our  narrative  can  no  longer  be 
confined  to  the  rise  or  fortunes  of  an  Italian  power  :  it  becomes  part 
of  the  history  of  the  civilised  world.  It  is  necessary,  therefore,  to 
obtain  at  least  an  outline  of  the  political  state  of  the  world  at  the 
time. 

The  victories  of  Alexander  the  Great  had  for  a  brief  period  welded 
into  one  huge  empire  the  Greek  peninsula,  nearly  all  Asia  up  to  the 
Punjaub,  the  Islands,  and  Egypt.  At  his  death  (323)  disintegration 
immediately  began.      For  a  time  the  whole  remained  nominally  under 


CHAP.  XXVII  THE  DISRUPTION  OF  ALEXANDER'S  EMPIRE      409 

his  successors  on  the  throne  of  Macedonia  or  their  guardians.  But 
the  generals  or  native  princes  who  retained  or  undertook  the  adminis- 
tration of  the  several  provinces,  nearly  thirty  in  number,  were  bent 
on  establishing  practical  independence,  and  were  for  the  most  part  in 
continual  hostility  with  each  other. 

From  this  confusion  there  emerged  in  306  five  great  powers,  the  The  six 
rulers  of  which  then  for  the  first  time  called  themselves  kings— Egypt  ki'>^g^^  306. 
under  Ptolemy,  son  of  Lagus  ;  Syria  under  Antigonus  ;  Upper  Asia 
under  Seleucus  ;  Thrace  under  Lysimachus  ;  Macedonia  under  Cas- 
sander.  In  addition  to  these,  Demetrius  Poliorcetes  (a  son  of 
Antigonus  of  Syria)  also  assumed  the  title  of  king,  though  without 
definite  dominions,  his  chief  work  during  the  next  few  years  being 
to  pose  as  the  champion  of  Greek  freedom,  guaranteed  by  treaty  in 
3 1 1  against  Macedonia,  in  the  course  of  which  he  received  the  title 
of  general  (i^ye/xwv)  of  all  Greece. 

The  ambition  of  Antigonus  caused  a  general  combination  against  joi.   The 
him.      In  301,  at  the  battle  of  Ipsus,  he  was  defeated  and  killed,  and  ^^^^^^  ^f 
his  dominions  were  divided.      There  were  now  four  great  kingdoms —  ^^^^  '^? 
Egypt  under  Ptolemy ;  Syria  (or,  as  it  was  called,  Asia)  under  Seleucus ;  of  four 
Thrace  and  Asia  Minor  under  Lysimachus  ;   and   Macedonia  under  great 
Cassander.      Demetrius  PoHorcetes  still  kept  the  title  of  king  and  the  kingdoms. 
possession  of  Cyprus  and  part  of  Phoenicia,  though,  after  he  had  been 
defeated  with   his   father  at   Ipsus,  the   Athenians   refused  to  admit 
him  within  their  walls. 

In  297,  however,  he  determined  to  reassert  himself  in  Greece.  Macedonia 
He  took  Athens  after  a  long  siege,  and  was  proceeding  to  make  f^om  297 
himself  master  of   Peloponnesus  when  he  was  recalled  to  greater  ^^  ^^°' 
hopes.      Cassander,  king  of  Macedonia,  died  in  296,  and  was  suc- 
ceeded by  his  son  Philip  IV.,  who  within  a  few  months  also  died, 
and  was  succeeded  by  his  two  brothers  Antipater  and  Alexander. 
The  joint  kings   soon  quarrelled,  and   the  younger  one,  Alexander, 
asked  help  both  of  Demetrius  and  Pyrrhus,  king  of  Epirus,     Pyrrhus 
was   the   first   to  arrive.      He  drove  out  Antipater  and  established 
Alexander  on  the  throne  ;  and  when  Demetrius  came  later  he  found  Demetrius 
himself  coldly  received.      He  even  believed,  or  affected  to  believe,  ^-j 
that  Alexander  was  attempting  to  have  him  poisoned.      He  therefore  ^^"^'^    ' 
anticipated  the  treachery  by  causing  him  to  be  assassinated,  and  was 
himself  proclaimed  king  (294).      But  his  ambitious  policy  in  Greece, 
Thrace,  and  Asia  ended  in  final  overthrow  at  the  hands  of  Seleucus 
in  286.      Three  years  later  he  died  in  captivity.      For  ten  years  (286-   Ten  years 
277)  Macedonia  was  the  scene  of  constant  confusion  and  revolution,  (Anarchy, 
now  divided  between  Lysimachus  of  Thrace  and  Pyrrhus  of  Epirus,  ^    "'^^^" 
now  seized  by  various  pretenders  whose  hold  on  power  was  short  and 
stormy.       The   confusion  seemed  rendered  hopeless  by  the  wave  of 


4IO 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Gallic  invasion  which  swept  over  the  country,  and  in  which  king 
Ptolemy  Ceraunus  lost  his  life  (280)  ;  until  in  277  Antigonus  Gonatas, 
son  of  Demetrius,  obtained  peaceful  possession  of  the  crown  ;  and  in 
a  reign  extending  (with  two  brief  interruptions)  over  thirty-eight  years, 
guided  the  country  back  into  paths  of  order  and  material  prosperity. 
He  was  succeeded  by  his  son  Demetrius  II.  (239),  who  on  his  death 
in  229  left  a  son  eight  years  old  named  Philip,  under  the  guardianship 
of  his  cousin  Antigonus  Doson,  who,  while  treating  the  boy  with  all 
kindness,  practically  remained  king  until  his  death  in  220.  In  that 
year  Philip  V.  began  his  real  reign  ;  and  it  was  with  him  that  the 
Romans  came  in  contact. 

The  Macedonian  kingdom  thus  transmitted  was  something  more 
than  the  territory  known  geographically  by  that  name.  Though 
Greece  was  nominally  free,  Macedonian  influence  was  widely  ac- 
knowledged in  a  large  part  of  it,  and  Macedonian  garrisons  were 
stationed  in  many  of  the  towns,  especially  in  the  three  "  fetters  of 
Greece  " — Demetrias,  Chalcis,  and  Acro-Corinthus,  which  controlled 
Thessaly,  Euboea,  and  Peloponnesus  respectively.  It  is  true  that 
even  in  Thessaly  the  people  were  supposed  to  enjoy  their  own  con- 
stitution and  laws,  and  not  to  be  subjects  in  the  same  sense  as  the 
Macedonians  ;  but  practically  they  were  entirely  at  the  orders  of  the 
king  or  his  ministers,  as  were  also  the  people  of  Locris,  Phocis, 
and  Doris.  Even  in  Attica  and  Peloponnesus  there  were  several 
towns  in  which  a  Macedonian  garrison  was  placed,  and  in  which, 
therefore,  the  orders  of  the  Macedonian  government  were  paramount. 
Moreover,  the  superior  vigour  and  energy  of  the  Macedonians 
gave  them  a  special  prestige,  not  only  in  Greece,  but  among  the 
less  manly  subjects  of  the  other  kings  also.  It  became  the  fashion 
to  imitate  their  manners  and  dress,  no  less  than  their  military 
tactics  and  methods  of  drill  ;  and  although  they  were  content 
with,  and  even  proud  of  their  monarchical  government,  they 
retained  and  exercised  a  privilege  of  free  speech  and  blunt  re- 
monstrances with  the  king  that  moved  the  surprise  and  envy  of  more 
servile  peoples. 

The  Thracian  kingdom  of  Lysimachus  disappeared  with  the  death 
of  that  monarch  in  281  in  a  war  with  Seleucus  of  Syria;  who  was 
himself  assassinated  in  the  course  of  the  next  year  (280)  at  the 
instigation  of  Ptolemy  Ceraunus.  From  that  time  Thrace  ceased  to 
be  among  the  great  powers.  It  fell  into  a  state  of  complete  anarchy. 
The  cities  of  the  Chersonese  were  claimed  by  the  king  of  Egypt  and 
actually  annexed  by  him  in  247  ;  while  Asia  Minor  passed  to  the 
kings  of  Syria,  or  maintained  a  virtual  independence.  Thus  we  find 
at  Pergamus  a  wealthy  citizen  named  Attains  assuming  in  241  the 
title  of  king,  and  his  kingdom  at  one  time  embracing  a  large  part  of 


XXVII  EGYPT,  SYRIA,  AND  MACEDONIA  411 

Asia  Minor,  at  another  reduced  almost  to  the  single  city  of  Pergamus 

and  its  immediate  territory. 

The  government  of  Egypt  had  throughout  these  changes  remained  Egypt 

firmly  in  the  family  of  the  Lagidae.      Up  to  205  four  Ptolemies  had  peaceful 

succeeded  each  other  in  peaceful  succession,  and  established  their  ^^^ ,,, 

1     1       .r-.      1     1  1-11  •         weaitfiy. 

authority  m  Cyrene,  Cyprus,  and  the  Cyclades,  while  the  possession 

of  Coele-Syria  and  Palestine  was  a  constant  source  of  dispute  between 

them    and    the    Seleucid    kings    of   Asia.       The   dynasty,   however, 

remained    Greek,   and   gathered   round   it   in   Alexandria    Greek   or 

Macedonian   troops,  Greek  writers  and   libraries,  and   Greek  artists, 

and  never  amalgamated  with  the  people,  who  then,    as  now,  were 

apparently   content,    though   with   occasional   outbursts    of  fanatical 

violence,  to  produce  the  wealth  of  that  extraordinary  soil  on  the  sole 

condition    of  being   allowed    to    live   and   serve.      But  though   the 

Ptolemies   did  not   aspire,    like   the  kings   of  Asia,    to   world-wide 

conquests,  they  attracted   the  commerce  of  the  East  and  West  to 

Alexandria,  and  had  the  influence  which  accompanies  wealth. 

The  Seleucid  kings  of  Syria  or  Asia  regarded  themselves  as  Asia, 
occupying  the  place  of  the  old  Persian  Empire,  as  organised  or  301-220. 
subdued  by  Alexander.  All  Asia  belonged  to  them  in  theory.  Yet 
large  parts  of  it  had  really  become  divided  into  separate  independent 
kingdoms,  and  those  parts  which  were  nominally  satrapies  of  the 
kingdom  were  in  real  truth  constantly  in  rebellion.  Little  more  than 
Cilicia,  together  with  Syria  Superior  or  Phoenicia,  was  practically  in 
the  hands  of  the  king  ;  and  even  here  the  possession  of  coast  towns 
was  often  disputed  by  the  king  of  Egypt.  Of  the  attempts  of 
Antiochus  the  Great  to  make  his  kingdom  of  Asia  a  reality  we  shall 
have  to  speak  hereafter. 

The  result  of  these  developments  was  the  existence  of  three  large  Three 
powers — Syrid.  or  Asia,  Egypt,  and  Macedonia ;   while  in  Asia  the  l^^^g^ 
great  king's  dominions  were  fringed  by  a  number  of  smaller  king-   y''^.  ^^^ ' 
doms  or  states — Pergamus,  Bithynia,  Cappadocia,  and  Pontus,  ruled  £gyp^, 
by  kings  ;    and    a    region    on    the   Halys,   in  which  the  wandering  Mace- 
Gauls  had  found  a  home  and  estabhshed  a  polity  since  about  250,  ^onia. 
and  which  obtained  the  name  of  Galatia  from  them.      It  was  to  their  ^^ve 
courageous  resistance  to  these  marauders  that  Attalus  chiefly  owed  ^^^^"^(^^y 
his  royalty  and  Prusias  of  Bithynia  his  reputation.       In  the  far  East  p^ylamus 
the  Bactrians   and  Parthians  successfully  resisted   the  attempts    of  Bithynia, 
Antiochus  to  annex  them  ;  and  lastly,  throughout  Asia  there  were  Cappa- 
a  number  of  Hellenic  settlements,  independent  or  semi-independent,  ^ocia, 
which  tended  to  keep  alive  a  certain  culture,  and  at  any  rate  the  q^i^^i^ 
knowledge  of  the  Greek  language,  in  the  various  dynasties  with  which  2JJ-187. 
Rome  afterwards  came  in  contact. 

While   the   kingdoms  of  the    East  were   thus   breaking  up  and 


412 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


reforming,  Greece  in  some  of  its  essential  features  remained  what  it 
had  always  been.  It  was  still  a  race  and  not  a  dynasty  that  was 
meant  by  that  term.  No  man  called  himself  king  of  Greece  :  no 
body  of  men,  whether  hereditary  or  elective,  could  speak  for  all 
Greece.  The  love  of  local  autonomy  had  survived  ruinous  internal 
strife,  commercial  disaster,  and  foreign  conquest.  Yet  there  was  a 
real  unity  in  this  disunion.  A  common  origin,  language,  and  religion 
still  caused  the  Greeks  to  stand  out  before  the  world  as  a  distinct 
nation,  representing  a  culture  and  civilisation  in  which  all  wished  to 
share,  and  which  all  recognised  as  Greek  and  Greek  alone. 

It  must  partly  be  attributed  to  the  sentiment  excited  by  their 
character  and  unique  intellectual  position  that  the  freedom  of  the 
Greeks  had  been  so  often,  at  least  in  name,  respected.  Philip  II. 
and  Alexander  the  Great  had  both  been  content  to  accept  the  title 
of  their  "general"  [lyye/xwi/],  and  had  posed  as  champions  of  Hel- 
lenism. The  same  position  was  taken  up  by  Antipater  in  321  as 
guardian  of  the  Macedonian  kingdom,  and  in  312  by  Cassander,  who 
explicitly  confirmed  the  freedom  of  Greece.  Demetrius  Poliorcetes, 
indeed,  in  307,  made  himself  master  of  Athens  ;  but  he  took  the 
same  title  as  did  Philip  II.  and  Alexander,  and  professed  to  champion 
Greek  freedom  against  Macedonia.  When  he  became  king  of 
Macedonia  (295-287)  his  rule  over  Greece  was  continued,  and  for 
that  period,  more  nearly  than  at  any  other,  Greece  was  formally  part 
of  a  kingdom.  But  in  the  confusion  in  Macedonia  which  followed 
his  defeat  in  Asia,  to  the  succession  of  his  son  Antigonus  Gonatas 
(287-277),  Greece  became  for  the  most  part  again  practically  free  ; 
and  though  in  some  cities  there  were  still  Macedonian  garrisons,  in 
the  majority  the  old  autonomy  remained,  and  also,  unhappily,  the  old 
divisions  and  quarrels. 

But  the  centres  of  power  and  influence  were  not  the  same  as  of 
old.  The  Asiatic  Greek  cities  had  grown  in  wealth  and  importance 
beyond  those  in  Greece  proper.  And  in  Greece  proper  itself  there 
had  been  a  great  change.  Athens  still  retained  her  walls  and  the 
walls  of  the  Peiraeus,  though  the  long  walls  which  united  the  two  had 
fallen  into  ruin  ;  but  of  her  wide  possessions  outside  Attica  nothing 
remained.  She  still  attracted  the  admiration  as  well  as  the  benefac- 
tions of  various  kings  and  princes,  but  of  political  power  or  influence 
she  had  become  wholly  bereft,  and  was  content  to  rest  upon  the 
glories  of  her  past  and  the  reputation  of  her  schools  of  philosophy. 
Her  dread  of  the  power  of  Macedonia  caused  her  to  be  closely  allied 
with  the  Aetolians,  and  inclined  from  the  first  to  welcome  the  Roman 
alliance. 

Thebes  had  never  recovered  from  the  vengeance  of  Alexander, 
and  with  Boeotia  generally  was   in  a  feeble  and  demoralised  state, 


XXVII  THE  AETOLIAN  LEAGUE  413 

without  patriotism  or  public  spirit,  its  old  institutions  only  existing  in 
the  form  of  meaningless  and  demoralising  celebrations  and  banquets, 
and  was  disposed  to  rely  wholly  on  the  Macedonian  protection. 

Sparta,  far  from  retaining  her  old  ascendency,  had  been  reduced  Sparta. 
to  the  narrow  limits  of  the  ancient  Laconia,  With  the  flight  of 
Cleomenes  (222)  she  had  lost  the  semblance  of  her  peculiar  consti- 
tution, and  had  fallen  into  the  hands  of  a  series  of  tyrants,  the  last  of 
whom,  called  Nabis  (207),  made  himself  formidable  by  collecting 
round  him  a  body  of  mercenaries  gathered  from  all  the  worst  ele- 
ments of  Greece,  and  by  joining  in  close  alliance  with  the  pirates  of 
Crete.  From  enmity  to  the  Achaean  League,  which  was  inclined  to 
Macedonian  protection,  Sparta,  like  Elis  and  Messenia,  was  during 
this  period  in  sympathy  rather  with  Aetolia,  and  against  the  political 
union  of  Peloponnesus. 

The  confederacies  {koivo)  of  Epirus  and  Acarnania  were  of  no  Acamania 
political  importance.     The  Romans  had  already  obtained  a  footing  and 
at  various  points  in  their  territories,  as  at  Corcyra  and  Dyrrachium  ;  ^P^^^^- 
but  as  a  rule  they  were  inclined  to  cling  to  Macedonian  protection 
against  the  piracies  or  the  encroachments  of  the  Aetolians. 

In  the  midst  of  this  general  decay  two  powers  had  gained  and 
for  some  time  had  maintained  something  like  consistence  and  life. 
These  were  the  Aetolian  and  Achaean  Leagues. 

The  Aetolians  had  in  ancient  times  been  little  known  in  Greece. 
Strange  stories  were  told  of  their  wild  and  savage  life,  their  raw  food, 
and  their  open  mountain  villages.  Yet  when  the  Athenian  Demos- 
thenes invaded  them  in  426  they  had  shown  that  they  could  combine 
for  self-protection  ;  and  both  Sparta  in  her  day  of  power  and  Philip 
IL  of  Macedonia  had  had  to  reckon  with  them.  They  first  appear  as 
taking  a  distinct  part  in  Greek  politics  in  the  Lamian  war  of  322. 
The  presence  of  their  soldiers  at  Crannon  brought  upon  them  an  Services 
invasion  of  the  Macedonian  generals,  which  they  baffled  by  retreating  of  the 
to  their  mountains  ;  and  their  reputation  in  Greece  was  much  extended  ^  ^  ^^'"' 
by  their  services  against  the  invading  Gauls  in  280-279.  It  was  they 
who  defended  Delphi,  and  did  most  to  cut  to  pieces  the  barbarous 
horde.  From  this  time  they  stood  out  as  one  of  the  chief  powers  in 
Greece.  They  joined  to  their  League  parts  of  western  Acarnania, 
southern  Epirus,  many  cities  in  Thessaly,  as  Pharsalus,  Echinus, 
Demetrias,  Hypata,  and  Herecleia  ;  in  Peloponnesus,  as  Mantinea, 
Tegea,  Orchomenus,  and  others  ;  in  Thrace,  as  Lysimacheia ;  in 
Asia  Minor,  as  Cius  and  Chalcedon.  The  exact  nature  of  the  rela- 
tions between  the  League  and  these  outlying  towns  is  somewhat 
obscure  ;  but  it  at  least  involved  the  obligation  of  protection  against 
the  attacks  of  others  ;  and  though  the  League  government  was  not 
always  able  to  supply  that  protection  with  sufficient   promptitude,  it 


4H  HISTORY  OF  ROME 


The  was  never  absolutely  refused. i     At  home  there  was  a  regularly  con- 

fnhe'^^''^  stituted  government  capable  of  speaking  in  the  name  of  the  whole 
Aetolia?i       people.       A   Strategus,  assisted  by  thirty  counsellors  or  Apocleti,  a 
League.         hipparch,  and  a  secretary  were  elected  every  year.      The  assembly  of 
the  people  was  held  at  Thermus  for  this  election,  and  at  other  times 
and   places  as  required  by  public  business.      The  decisions  of  this 
assembly  were  of  absolute  authority  ;  but  the  general  poHcy  of  the 
League  was   much  influenced   by   the   views  and   character  of  the 
strategus  for  the  time  being.      That  policy  seems  on  the  whole  to 
Their  have  been  highly  oppressive   to  their  neighbours.      The  system  of 

^and^'^^^  private  or  public  piracy  was  openly  recognised  ;  private  citizens  main- 
predatory  Gained  the  right  of  hiring  themselves  out  in  bodies  to  fight  for  any 
habits.  government  that  would  pay  them  ;  and  wherever  war  was  going  on 

they  professed  to  have  the  right  of  carrying  off  spoil  from  either  of 
the  contending  parties,  whether  friends  or  enemies. 
The  The   second  important  power  in    Greece  at   this   time  was  the 

Achaean       ACHAEAN   LEAGUE.      Twelve  cities  of  Achaia,  the  northern  district 
Itsoriknal  ^^  Peloponnesus,  had  formed  a  league  long  before  Herodotus  wrote. 
elements.       ^^  ^^^  riot  been  one  of  the  great  powers  in  the  days  when  Sparta  and 
Athens  were  the  leading  states  in  Greece,  yet  it  had  always  enjoyed 
a  special  reputation  for  good  faith  and  disinterested  conduct,  which 
led  to  its  being  selected  to  arbitrate  in  more  than  one  dispute  between 
Greek   towns.      During  the   Macedonian    period   it   had   shared  the 
general  decline.      Many  of  its  towns  were  occupied  by  Macedonian 
garrisons  ;  some   had   by  natural   causes   become  deserted  or  fallen 
into  complete  insignificance  ;    and  the  old  federal  union  or  govern- 
ment was  at  the  beginning  of  the  third  century  B.C.  scarcely  more  than 
The  revival  a  memory  or  tradition.      A  revival,  however,  had  been  begun  in  284 
of  the  ]3y  fQ^j.  cities  of  the  old  federation — Dymae,  Patrae,  Tritaea,  Pharae 

284.^^ ^^  — again  forming  a  league  for  mutual  assistance.  These  were  soon 
afterwards  joined  by  three  others,  and  for  twenty-five  years  (279-255) 
these  seven  cities  constituted  the  entire  League,  electing  two  strategi 
annually  in  turns.  In  255  the  dual  office  was  aboHshed,  and  for  the 
first  time  Margos  was  elected  sole  strategus.  From  this  date  the 
League  rose  rapidly  in  importance.  About  three  years  later  it  was 
joined  by  Sicyon  under  the  influence  of  Aratus,  the  true  founder  of 

^  An  inscription  (C.  I,  G,  2350)  containing  the  terras  made  with  the  island 
Keos  (about  B.C.  240-220)  will  show  something  of  w^hat  was  implied  in  such  an 
arrangement:  "The  Aetolians  think  it  good  to  preserve  the  existing  friendship 
with  the  Keians,  and  that  no  Aetolian  shall  plunder  the  Keians  from  whatsoever 
port  he  may  sail,  either  by  land  or  sea,  either  on  the  score  of  an  Amphictyonic 
decree  or  any  other — the  Keians  being  now  Aetolians.  But  if  any  one  shall 
plunder  the  Keians  the  strategus  of  the  time  being  shall  have  power  to  decide  upon 
goods  brought  into  Aetolia,  and  his  assessors  shall  have  authority  to  levy  the  fine 
for  the  Keians  upon  those  who  plundered  them. " 


XXVII  THE  ACHAEAN  LEAGUE  415 

the  new  League,  who  expelled  the  tyrant  from  his  native  town,  and 
on  being  elected  strategus  of  the  League  for  the  second  time,  in  243, 
set  himself  to  persuade  the  other  cities  of  Peloponnesus  also  to  expel 
their  tyrants  and  Macedonian  garrisons,  and  to  join  the  League, 
which  implied  free  democratic  institutions  in  each  of  its  members. 
Corinth  and  Megara  joined  in  243  ;  and  when  the  death  of  king 
Demetrius  (229)  seemed  to  weaken  the  influence  of  Macedonia,  there 
was  a  wide-spread  movement  among  the  tyrants  of  Peloponnesian 
states  to  resign  their  powers,  and  add  their  cities  to  the  League. 
Thus  it  was  at  this  time  that  Megalopolis,  Argos,  Hermione,  and 
Phlius  gave  in  their  adhesion  ;  and  the  League  came  now  to  include 
all  Peloponnesus  except  Elis  and  Laconia,  and  some  towns  in  Arcadia 
which  were  members  of  the  Aetolian  League. 

The  great  adversary  of  this  revived  Achaean  League  was  Cleomenes    The  war  c 
of  Sparta,  whose  hostility  was  supported  by  the  jealousy  of  the  Aetol-  ^^f  Leagm 
ians.       The   Cleomenic  war  (227-221),  while  it  ruined   Cleomenes  ^J^^^^^^^. 
and  enfeebled  Sparta,  introduced  again  the  influence  of  Macedonia  22j-22i, 
in   Peloponnesus.      Antigonus   Doson  responded  to  the  invitation  of  and  the 
Aratus  to  assist  the  Achaeans  against  Sparta  in  224,  crushed  Cleo-  renewed 
menes  at  Sallasia  (221),  and  then  returned  home  to  die.      His  death  "^^^''' 

'  fCTCTlCC  of 

(220)  was  followed  by  renewed  activity  on  the  part  of  the  Aetolians.  Macedonic 
Under  Dorimachus  they  had  for  some  time  been  employed  in  infest- 
ing Messenia  from   Phigaleia    in  Arcadia,   which  belonged  to  their 
League  ;  and  now  (220)  the  same  man,  along  with  a  restless  soldier 
named  Scopas,  induced  the  existing  Aetolian  strategus,  Ariston,  who 
was  a  man  of  no  military  talent  or  force  of  character,  to  sanction  a 
regular  war, — though  without  any  formal  diplomatic  breach.      The    War  with 
youth  of  the  new  sovereign  of  Macedonia,  Philip  V.  (then  seventeen  ^^^ 
years  old)  encouraged  the  belief  that  active  steps  would  not  be  taken  ^J  ^  ^'^^^' 
by  the  Macedonians.      It  was  always  an  object  of  the  Aetolians  to 
establish  or  extend  their  power  in  Acarnania  and  Epirus,  and  Messenia 
was  the  constant  field  for  their  depredations.     In  all  directions,  there- 
fore, their  privateers  went  forth,  damaging  their  enemies  and  enriching 
the  State.      The  Achaeans,  under  the  influence  of  Aratus,  proclaimed 
war.      But  though  Aratus  had   many  of  the   highest   qualities   of  a 
statesman  and  mihtary  organiser,  he  was  ineffective  in  the  field.    The  Philip  V. 
Achaeans  suffered  many  reverses  ;   and  in  the  meeting  of  the  League  invited im 
in  the  summer  of  220  it  was  resolved  to  solicit  the  alliance  of  Epirus,  *^^  ^^^^' 
Boeotia,  Phocis,  Acarnania,  and  Philip  of  Macedon  against  the  com-  -^'^^'^^•^'^■^• 
mon  enemy.      In  the  war  which  followed  (220-217)  the  youthful  king 
Philip  showed  both  energy  and  skill  beyond  his  age,  and  the  Aetolians 
were  glad  in   216  to  negotiate   a   peace,  which  was  suggested  by 
emissaries  from  the  sea  powers  Chios,  Rhodes,  and  Byzantium,  and 
from  king  Ptolemy  of  Egypt. 


4i6 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Philip 

conceives 

the 

ambition,  of 

invading 

Italy. 


Influence  of 
Demetrius 
of  Pharos. 


But  if  the  Aetolians  were  prepared  for  peace  so  was  king  Philip. 
In  the  course  of  his  great  campaign  his  ambition  had  become  roused, 
and  the  ideas  of  Empire  which  had  inspired  previous  kings  of  Mace- 
donia had  taken  possession  of  him.  He  soon  ceased  to  be  merely  the 
champion  of  Achaean  independence  and  of  Greece  against  Aetolian 
wrong-doing.  His  eyes  were  turned,  like  those  of  Alexander  and 
Pyrrhus  of  Epirus,  to  the  West.  The  suggestion  came  from  Demetrius 
of  Pharos,  who  had  taken  refuge  with  him  in  2 1 9  after  the  victories 
of  Aemilius  Paullus  in  the  Illyrian  war,  Polybius  assigns  the  deteriora- 
tion in  Philip's  character  to  the  influence  of  this  unprincipled  adven- 
turer, whose  objects  in  the  advice  given  to  the  king  were  purely 
selfish.  He  desired  the  humiliation  of  Rome  to  gratify  his  personal 
vengeance,  but  still  more  because  by  that  means  alone  could  he  hope 
to  recover  his  lost  dominions.  He  therefore  constantly  instigated 
Philip  to  leave  Greece,  where  he  was  now  sufficiently  strong,  and  to 
turn  his  attention  to  conquests  in  Illyria  as  a  stepping-stone  to  Italy. 
In   the   summer  of  217,   as  Philip  was  watching  the    sports   at   the 


Philip 
makes 
peace  with 
the 
Aetolians. 


Prepar- 
ations for 
the  Italian 
war,  21^- 
216. 


A  Roman 
squadron  of 
observa- 


tion, 
216. 


at  Thrasymene  (22nd  June).  The  king  showed  the  letter  at  first  to 
no  one  except  Demetrius,  who  at  once  Urged  him  to  seize  the  oppor- 
tunity of  pushing  his  designs  upon  Italy.  Philip  found  no  opposition 
in  his  council  when  the  measure  was  proposed  to  them.  Aratus 
could  not  deny  that  the  successes  won  by  the  king  were  sufficient  to 
enable  him  to  make  peace  with  dignity  ;  and  others  were  eager  for 
any  arrangement  which  would  unite  Greece  in  the  presence  of  the 
growing  power  of  Rome. 

Philip  immediately  set  about  his  preparations.  In  the  winter 
of  217-216  a  hundred  galleys  were  built  for  him  by  Illyrian  ship- 
builders ;  and  by  the  summer  of  2 1 6  they  were  afloat,  and  their  crews 
in  training.  But  the  Romans  were  not  wholly  unprepared.  Scerdi- 
laidas,  one  of  the  princes  who  had  been  established  by  Roman  in- 
fluence or  consent  in  part  of  the  dominions  of  Queen  Teuta,  had 
given  information  at  Rome  of  the  suspicious  preparations  of  Philip, 
and  had  asked  aid  for  himself. 

The  Romans,  however,  were  wholly  bent  upon  the  struggle  with 
Hannibal,  and  the  preparations  for  the  battle  of  Cannae.  They 
therefore  merely  sent  an  order  to  the  commander  of  the  fleet  at 
Lilybaeum  to  detach  a  squadron  of  ten  ships  to  watch  the  Illyrian 
coast.  But  as  it  happened,  this  proved  sufficient  to  alarm  Philip. 
He  was  about  to  enter  the  mouth  of  the  Aous  when  some  vessels 
arrived  in  haste  with  information  that  the  Roman  fleet  was  at  Rhegium 
on  its  way  to  Apollonia.  Philip  and  his  fleet  were  seized  with  a 
panic,  and  sailed  back  day  and  night  until  they  reached  Cephallenia. 
There  he  endeavoured  to  excuse  his  ignominious  flight  by  pretending 


XXVII  PHILIP  AND  HANNIBAL  417 

that  he  had  been  invited  to  carry  out  some  operations  in  Peloponnesus. 
But  he  had  lost  a  great  opportunity  in  Illyria  ;  and  it  was  not  till 
after  the  battle  of  Cannae  and  Hannibal's  advance  into  Campania 
that  he  ventured  on  farther  steps. 

At  Rome,  meanwhile,  it  had  become  clear  that  Philip  was  dan-  The 
gerous,  and  that  the  origin  of  his  policy  was  the  advice  of  Demetrius,  Romans 
for  whose  surrender  accordingly  an  embassy  was  sent  just   before  ^^J^^^J^f 
the  battle  of  Cannae.     The  news  of  that  disaster,  however,  decided  j.^nder  of 
Philip  to  openly  join  the  Carthaginians.     We  have  seen  how  his  Demetrius, 
ambassadors  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Romans  with  the  text  of  the  216. 
treaty,  thus  giving  them  timely  warning  of  what  was  going  on. 

It  was  not  till   2 1  5   that  Philip  learnt  what  had  happened,  and  Philip 
despatched  new  emissaries  to   Hannibal.      These  last  succeeded  in  ^akes  a 
bringing  to  him  a  copy  of  the  treaty  to  which  Hannibal  had  sworn  ;  ^^/„^^^  ^ 
but  even  then  he  took  no  immediate  measures  in  aid  of  his  new  ally.   2tj. 
Either   the   Roman  fleet  now  permanently  stationed  at  Brundisium 
alarmed  him,  or  his  thoughts  had  been  recalled  to  Greece.     A  revolu- 
tion in  Messenia  had  given  him  an  opportunity  of  getting  rid  of  the 
oligarchical  party  opposed  to  him  there  :  and  for  two  years  (215-213) 
he  was   more   or   less    engaged    in  this  country.       His  evil  genius,  Philip's 
Demetrius  of  Pharos,  fell  in  2 1 4  during  an  assault  on  Mount  Ithome  ;  ^<^^^  ^f 
but  Philip  continued  the  attack  upon  the   Messenians  afterwards  in  ^^^^Q'^^^e 
person  ;  in  the   course  of  which,  in  addition  to  many  other  acts  of  214-21  j. ' 
cruelty,  he  was  believed  to  have  got  rid  of  Aratus  by  poison.      These 
proceedings,  however,  did  much  to  ruin  his  popularity  among  the 
Greeks,  and  disposed  even  the  Achaeans,  who  owed  so  much  to  the 
Macedonian  kings,  to  attach  themselves  to  Rome. 

At  the  time,  therefore,  at  which   Philip  provoked  the  enmity  of  The 
Rome,  the  hostility  which  he  had  roused  against  himself  in  Greece,  elements 
and  the  mutual  animosities    of  the  Greeks  themselves,   afforded  a  ^^'J-,- ^ 

'  .  opposition 

ready  means  of  forming  a  combmation  agamst  him.  Sparta,  mdeed,  ^^  philip. 
chiefly  from  hostility  to  the  Achaean  League,  and  because  its #ty rant 
found  every  man's  hand  against  him,  was  ready  to  maintain  alliance 
with  Philip.  But  the  Achaeans,  his  usual  allies,  had  been  deeply 
offended  by  his  proceedings  in  Messenia  and  stood  aloof.  The 
Aetolians  desired  extension  of  territory  at  his  expense,  and  were 
especially  jealous  as  to  Acarnania  and  the  Thessalian  and  Asiatic 
towns  which  belonged  to  their  League.  The  Illyrian  princes,  Scerdi- 
laidas  and  his  son  Pleuratus,  owed  their  position  to  Roman  favour, 
and  were  always  apprehensive  of  Macedonian  encroachment.  The 
ruler  of  the  Athamanians,  Anaxymander,  had  also  reason  to  fear  his 
more  powerful  neighbour,  and  was  glad  to  join  the  Roman  attack  ; 
while  in  Asia  Minor  the  king  of  Pergamus  from  the  first  was  ener- 
getically on  the  side  of  Rome  :  for  Philip  was  encroaching  in  the 

2  E 


4i8 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Thracian  Chersonese  and  even  in  Asia  itself,  and,  moreover,  was  a 
friend  and  relation  of  Prusias  of  Bithynia,  his  own  constant  enemy. 
Antiochus  the  Great  had  secured  the  chief  power  in  Asia  Minor  by 
the  capture  and  death  of  his  cousin  Achaeus,  who  had  taken  it  from 
Attains,  but  was  at  present  (212-205)  engaged  in  his  expedition  into 
Upper  Asia,  and  did  not  as  yet  affect  Greek  politics. 

The  terms  of  Philip's  treaty  with  Hannibal,  by  which  he  engaged 
to  exclude  the  Romans  from  Corcyra  and  lUyria,  determined  the 
Roman  government  to  proclaim  war  against  him,  although  they  were 
engaged  at  the  same  time  in  their  life  and  death  struggle  with 
Hannibal.  But  little  was  done  on  either  side  for  the  first  three  years. 
A  fleet  indeed,  with  one  legion,  was  stationed  at  Brundisium,  under 
the  propraetor  M.  Valerius,  with  general  orders  to  keep  guard  against 
an  invasion,  but  at  first  had  little  to  do.  In  214  a  message  from 
Oricum  informed  Valerius  that  Philip,  with  120  ships,  had  sailed  up 
the  Aous  ;  was  attacking  Apollonia  ;  and  was  likely  to  attack  Oricum 
also.  These  Greek  towns  in  Illyria  were  convenient  places  of  landing 
from  Brundisium,  the  latter  at  the  mouth  of  the  Aous,  the  former 
some  seven  miles  up  the  stream,  and  were  already  closely  allied  with 
Rome.  Valerius,  therefore,  acted  promptly.  Leaving  T.  Valerius 
in  charge  of  Brundisium,  he  crossed  with  his  main  fleet  to  Oricum, 
expelled  the  Macedonian  garrison,  and  then  advanced  by  land  to 
Apollonia.  He  threw  himself  with  2000  men  into  the  town  by  a  road 
which  the  king  had  neglected  to  guard,  and  joined  the  Apolloniates 
in  a  sally  upon  the  king's  camp.  Philip  escaped  with  difficulty, 
abandoning  his  camp  and  siege  artillery,  which  was  appropriated  to 
the  defence  of  the  town. 

M.  Valerius  wintered  in  Oricum,  and  his  tmpen'um  was  prolonged 
through  213  and  2 1 2.  We  have  no  details  of  his  operations  in  those 
years,  though  he  is  said  to  have  been  successful  both  by  land  and 
sea.  He  concluded  a  treaty  with  the  AetoHan  League  (211),  which 
was  to  include,  if  they  wished  it,  the  Eleans,  Lacedaemonians,  king 
Attalus,  and  the  Illyrian  princes  Pleuratus  and  Scerdilaidas,  in  virtue 
of  which  the  Aetolians  undertook  to  make  war  on  Philip  and  to 
supply  a  minimum  of  twenty-five  quinqueremes  to  the  Roman  fleet ; 
and  in  return  were  to  be  allowed  to  take  Acarnania,  and  retain  all 
towns  that  might  be  taken  as  far  north  as  Corcyra.  The  Aetolians 
at  once  commenced  operations,  and  Valerius  took  Zacynthus,  which, 
with  Oeniadae  and  Nasus  in  Acarnania,  he  caused  to  be  assigned  to 
the  Aetolian  League.  Corcyra  itself  was  held  as  a  dependency  of 
Rome. 

Philip,  threatened  by  this  formidable  combination,  retaliated  by 
a  rapid  march  upon  the  territory  of  Apollonia.  From  thence  he 
hurried  into  Thessaly  to  secure  the  loyalty  and  co-operation  of  the 


XXVII  THE  LEAGUE  AGAINST  PHILIP  419 

Thessalian   towns.      From  Thessaly  he  was  recalled  to  defend  his  Philip's 
frontiers   from    an   invasion    of   Thracians   and    Maedi  ;    and    while  vigorous 
engaged  with  them  he  heard  that  the  Aetolians  were  invading  Acar-  '«^«^"''^-^- 
nania.      He  hurried  off  to  the  rescue,  but  learnt  on  the  way  that 
they  had  retired. 

In  the  spring  of  210  Valerius  sailed  from  Corcyra  to  Naupactus,  2io-2os- 
and  took  Anticyra  in  Locris  ;  but  while  there  was  recalled  to  Rome  Stdpictus 
to   enter   upon  his  consulship.       His  successor  P.   Sulpicius  Galba  J^^^^^ 
did  httle  at  first.      But  in  this  or  the  following  year  king  Attains  of  the  fleet. 
purchased  the  island  of  Aegina  from  the  Aetolians  for  thirty  talents, 
and  made   it  the  headquarters  of  his  fleet.      There  Sulpicius  joined 
him,   and  the   two   projected  an    attack  upon  all   points  in   eastern 
Greece  in  the  hands  of  the  king  of  Macedonia.      Philip  replied  to    Victory  of 
this  move  by  taking  Echinus,  a  strong  town  on  the  coast  of  Phthiotis  Philip  ovet 
belonging  to  the  Aetolians,  in  spite  of  the  efforts  of  Sulpicius  and  the  ^giQii^ns 
Aetolians  to  relieve  it.     He  then  resolved  to  proceed  to  Peloponnesus  at  Lamia, 
and  recover  the  friendship  of  the  Achaeans  by  helping  them  against  2og. 
their  enemy  Machanidas,  tyrant  of  Sparta.      The  Aetolian  army,  sup- 
ported by  some  troops  of  Attains  and  a  thousand  Roman  soldiers,  tried 
to  prevent  him,  but  were  beaten  with  considerable  loss  at  Lamia.      At 
the  harbour  town  of  Lamia,  called  Phalara,   legates  from  Ptolemy,    The  mari- 
Rhodes,  Athens,  and  Chios  met  the  king  and  endeavoured  to  induce  timepower 
him  to  make  peace.      Their  efforts,  however,  were  in  vain,  and  he/^^^''^ 
continued  his  march  into  Peloponnesus,  strengthening  and  securing  ^ 
Euboea  on  his  way  against  a  possible  attack  of  Attains.      He  resided 
at  Argos  during  the  following  autumn  and  winter,  attended  another 
abortive  peace  conference  at  Aegium,   and  gained  a   small  success 
over  a  Roman  force  which  was  making  a  raid  upon  the  territory  of 
Sicyon.      But  the  licentious  conduct  of  the  king  and  his  court  during 
the  winter  still  farther  alienated  the  feelings  of  the  Achaeans,  and  he 
returned  to  Demetrias  in  the  spring  of  208  to  find  himself  beset  with 
appeals  from  every  quarter,  testifying  to  the  activity  of  his  enemies, 
while  he  had  done  much  during  the  past  months  to  deprive  himself 
of  his  friends.    Thus  the  Achaeans  called  for  help  against  an  impend-   The 
ing  attack  by  Machanidas  of  Sparta  and  the  Aetolians  ;  the  Boeotians  expected 
and  Euboeans  against  Attains    and  the   Romans  ;  the  Acarnanians  ^^^^^^^ons 
and  Epirotes  expected  to   be  attacked  by  Aetolians  or  by  Scerdi- 
laidas  and  Pleuratus  ;  whilst  the   frontiers  of  Macedonia  itself  were 
threatened  by  hostile  Thracian  tribes,   and  Philip  was  cut  off  from 
the  south  by  Aetolian  troops  holding  the  pass  of  Thermopylae. 

In  the  presence  of  these  various  and  formidable  dangers  Philip  Philip's 
showed  his  highest   qualities  of  courage  and  vigour.      The  several  energy. 
delegates  were  dismissed  with  promises  of  aid,  which,  as  far  as  his 
means  extended,  was  promptly  given.     A  garrison  was  sent  to  the 


420 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Philip 
orders  a 
new  fleet  to 
be  built, 
208-207, 


island  of  Peparethus  to  intercept  Attains  when  he  came  as  usual  to 
Aegina  ;  other  troops  under  Polyphontes  were  sent  to  Boeotia  and 
Phocis  ;  others  under  Menippus  to  Euboea.  He  himself  advanced 
to  Scotussa,  on  the  borders  of  Phthiotis,  with  the  intention  of  inter- 
rupting a  conference  summoned  by  the  Aetolians  at  Heracleia, 
immediately  to  the  north  of  Thermopylae.  He  was  too  late  to 
interrupt  the  congress,  but  he  left  a  strong  force  at  Scotussa  and 
retired  to  Demetrias,  as  the  best  centre  from  which  to  keep  watch 
over  Peparethus,  Phocis,  and  Euboea,  between  which  places  and 
Demetrias  he  established  a  system  of  fire  signals  or  beacons,  whereby 
he  would  at  once  become  aware  of  any  attack  made  upon  any  one  of 
these  points. 

Meanwhile  king  Attains,  after  leaving  the  conference  at  Heracleia, 
joined  Sulpicius  at  Aegina,  and  the  combined  forces  made  an  attack 
upon  Euboea.  Oreos  on  the  north  of  the  island  was  taken,  but 
Chalcis  was  successfully  held  by  the  Macedonian  garrison,  and  the 
rest  of  the  campaign  was  unfavourable  to  the  allies.  Attains,  while 
attempting  a  descent  upon  the  coast  of  Opuntian  Locris,  was  sur- 
prised by  Philip,  who  had  been  warned  by  his  beacons  of  the  danger 
to  Euboea,  and  was  marching  southward.  Attalus  was  obliged  to 
fly  back  to  Oreos,  whence  he  was  recalled  home  by  the  news  that 
Prusias  of  Bithynia  was  invading  the  Pergamene  territory.  Sulpicius 
also  remained  inactive  at  Aegina  :  while  Philip  continued  his  march 
towards  Peloponnesus,  after  again  rejecting  proposals  of  peace 
suggested  by  envoys  from  Egypt  and  Rhodes. 

In  Peloponnese  his  ostensible  object  was  to  assist  the  Achaeans 
against  Machanidas  of  Sparta.  But  he  also  hoped  to  find  a  squadron 
of  Carthaginian  ships  in  the  harbour  of  Aegium,  where  he  attended 
the  autumn  assembly  of  the  Achaean  League.  The  Punic  admiral, 
however,  had  feared  to  enter  the  Corinthian  Gulf  lest  he  should  be 
caught  there  by  Sulpicius,  who,  as  he  was  informed,  was  shortly  to 
be  expected  at  Naupactus. 

Finding,  therefore,  that  he  must  depend  on  his  own  resources 
for  continuing  the  war  at  sea,  Philip  ordered  one  hundred  new  ships 
to  be  built  at  Cassandreia  (Potidaea).  But  of  the  operations  of  the 
next  two  years  (207-206)  we  have  no  details.  Stirring  events  in  Spain 
and  Italy  distracted  the  attention  of  the  Romans  from  Greece  ;  the 
Aetolians  professed  to  feel  themselves  neglected  by  their  allies  ;  and 
the  absence  of  king  Attalus,  who  was  detained  in  Asia  by  troubles 
at  home,  helped  to  cause  the  war  to  be  carried  on  slackly.  On  his 
side  Philip  had  some  reason  to  desire  an  accommodation  with  the 
Aetolians,  The  Achaeans,  under  the  inspiring  leadership  of  Philo- 
poemen,  gained  a  great  victory  over  the  Spartans  at  Mantinea,  in 
which   the   tyrant    Machanidas  was  killed  (207)  ;  and   Nabis,  who 


or 


XXVII  PACIFICATION  OF  PHOENICE  421 

contrived  to  seize  the  tyranny  in  succession  to  him,  devoted  the 
earlier  part  of  his  reign  to  strengthening  his  position  in  Sparta,  and 
left  the  Achaeans  alone.  It  did  not  suit  Philip's  policy  that  the 
Achaeans  should  be  independent  of  his  aid.  He  is  said  to  have 
tried  to  get  Philopoemen  poisoned  ;  and  at  any  rate  circumstances 
combined  to  make  both  the  king  and  the  Aetolians  ready  to  listen  to 
suggestions  of  peace. 

Accordingly  negotiations    for   a   general  pacification  were  more  NegoH 
than  once  renewed,  with  the  good  offices  as  before  of  Egypt  and  the  ations  fc 
maritime    powers,    in    the    years     207    and    206,    and   were   only  (^  general 
prevented    from    succeeding    by   the    opposition    of   Sulpicius,    who   1^^^  j,y 
persuaded  the  Senate  that  it  was  for  the  Roman  interests  that  Philip  Sulpicius, 
and  the  Aetolians  should  remain  at  war  with  each  other.      P.    Sem-  206. 
pronius  was  therefore  sent  out  in  205  with  a  reinforcement  of  10,000 
infantry  and  1000  cavalry.      But  when  he  arrived  to  relieve  Sulpicius   The 
he  found  that  the  Aetolians  had  already  accepted  a  separate  peace  Aetolians 
with  Philip.      By  so  acting  they  violated  the  treaty  of  211,  and  for-  ''"■<^ke  a 
feited  the  advantages  secured  to  them  by  that  arrangement ;  but  the  ^Sace^with 
immediate  result  was  that  in  a  few  months  negotiations  were  renewed,  philip. 
and  a  suspension  of  hostilities,  at  least  for  a  time,  for  all  who  had 
been  parties  to  the  war  was  agreed  upon. 

The  advent  of  the  Roman  army  under  Sempronius  had  been  the  Peace  of 
signal  for  the  rising  of  the  Parthini  and  other  Illyrian  tribes,  to  Phoenice, 
counteract  which  Philip  invaded  the  territory  of  Apollonia,  hoping  to  ^^^' 
provoke  Sempronius  to  come  out  of  that  city  and  give  him  battle. 
He  failed  to  do  this,  and  while  he  was  still  there  he  was  approached 
by  legates  of  the  Epirotes.  There  was  a  general  weariness  of  the 
war,  which  had  now  dragged  on  for  nine  years  without  producing 
much  definite  result ;  and  the  Epirotes  induced  Philip  to  consent  to 
meet  Sempronius,  and  the  representatives  of  other  nations  interested, 
at  Phoenice,  in  Epirus.  The  only  condition  exacted  from  Philip, 
beyond  the  undertaking  not  to  molest  states  in  alliance  with  Rome, 
seems  to  have  been  the  surrender  to  Rome  of  his  suzerainty  over  the 
Parthini  and  certain  towns  in  Epirus,  with  the  reservation  of  Atin- 
tania  for  future  consideration.  No  question  of  all  that  had  induced 
the  various  parties  to  the  war  to  join  in  it  was  settled  or,  apparently, 
discussed.  It  was  a  peace  on  the  basis  of  the  status  quo  ante^  and 
could  hardly  be  anything  better  than  an  armistice. 

The  real  importance  of  the  treaty,  as  expressing  the  results  of  Importance 
the  nine  years'  desultory  warfare,  was  that  it  clearly  defined  the  two  °f  ^^^^ 
sides, — the  protectorates  of  Macedonia  and  Rome, — for  the  safety    ^^'^  y- 
of  which    they   were    respectively   pledged.      On    Philip's    side    the   The  two 
parties   to   the  peace  were  Prusias  of  Bithynia,  the  Achaeans,  the  confeder- 
Boeotians,    Thessalians,    Acarnanians,    Epirotes ;    on    that    of    the  ""^•^* 


422 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP.  XXVII 


Romans,  the  people  of  Ilium,i  king  Attains,  Nabis  of  Sparta,  the 
Eleans,  Messenians,  and  Athenians.  Having  already  made  their 
own  terms  with  Philip,  the  Aetolians  were  not  parties  to  this  treaty, 
and  were  not  pledged,  as  were  the  others,  to  resent  an  attack  upon 
a  member  of  either  body  of  allies.  They  would  have  to  be  dealt 
with  separately  at  any  future  outbreak  of  hostilities  ;  but  they  did 
not  consider  their  treaty  with  Rome  of  2 ii  to  be  abrogated,  and  we 
shall  find  them  hereafter  claiming  the  possession  of  captured  cities 
in  virtue  of  it.  For  the  Romans  the  war  had  served  its  immediate 
object,  which  was  to  prevent  Philip  from  giving  help  to  Hannibal, 
but  it  had  left  its  legacy  of  responsibility  and  therefore  of  danger  for 
the  future.  Each  of  the  parties  to  the  treaty  on  the  Roman  side 
would  be  certain  to  appeal  to  Rome  in  case  of  encroachment  or 
injury  of  any  sort  from  Aetolian  or  Macedonian  ;  and  to  such  appeals 
neither  honour  nor  interest  would  allow  the  Senate  to  turn  a  deaf 
ear.  Troubles  of  this  sort  were  only  too  likely  to  arise ;  Philip 
was  neither  beaten  nor  dismayed.  The  Achaean  League  had  not 
approached  its  great  object  of  combining  all  Peloponnesus  in  one 
confederacy,  and  had  continually  to  fear  the  encroachments  of  the 
Spartan  tyrants  and  the  hostility  of  the  Aetolians.  The  outlying 
towns  joined  to  the  Aetolian  League  would  be  a  constant  source  of 
quarrel  between  them  and  the  sovereign  of  Macedonia.  It  must 
have  been  evident  to  all  prudent  men  that  a  renewal  of  the  war  was 
not  far  distant,  and  that  the  question  of  Roman  or  Macedonian 
supremacy  on  the  east  of  the  Adriatic  would  have  to  be  decided  by 
arms. 

^  That  is  New  Ilium,  which  was  believed  to  represent  the  ancient  Troy,  or  at 
least  a  restoration  of  it  on  a  closely  contiguous  spot.  It  had  some  time  during 
this  war  applied  for  Roman  protection  on  the  ground  of  the  Trojan  descent  of 
Romulus,  and  a  strong  sentiment  in  its  favour  had  been  roused  at  Rome,  though 
its  inhabitants  were  really  Aetolian  Greeks.  We  shall  see  the  same  sentiment 
influencing  the  part  taken  by  the  Romans  again  ;  and  at  any  rate  it  seems  to  be 
the  first  Asiatic  city  enjoying  the  direct  protection  of  Rome. 


Authorities. — The  history  of  this  war  is  given  in  a  fragmentary  manner  by 
Livy  in  the  intervals  of  his  account  of  the  Hannibalian  war  (xxii. -xxix. ).  A  very 
full  account  of  Philip's  character  and  his  policy  in  Greece  is  given  by  Polybius,  but 
of  the  actual  war  with  Rome  the  surviving  fragments  contain  only  a  few  details. 
There  is  an  interesting  account  of  Philip's  first  idea  of  joining  in  the  struggle  (v. 
loi),  and  the  text  of  his  treaty  with  Hannibal  (vii.  9),  but  little  more.  The  influ- 
ence of  Demetrius  of  Pharos,  on  which  Polybius  lays  stress,  is  dwelt  upon  by  Trogus 
(Just,  xxviii. );  an  account  of  the  peace  of  Phoenice  is  given  by  Appian,  Macedon.  3. 
But  the  usual  secondary  authorities  pass  over  this  war  very  lightly. 


CHAPTER    XXVIII 

THE    SECOND    MACEDONIAN    WAR 
200-195 

The  conduct  of  king  Philip  during  the  peace  of  205-200  —  His  league  with 
Antiochus  against  Egypt  (205),  and  his  attacks  on  the  Cyclades  and  Thracian 
Chersonese  of  Asia  (202-201) — The  Rhodians  and  king  Attains  declare  war 
with  him  (201) — Appeals  from  Ptolemy  and  the  Greek  states  to  Rome — The 
Roman  commissioners  in  Egypt  and  Greece  (203-201) — The  Romans  pro- 
claim war  (200) — P.  Sulpicius  Galba  lands  in  Epirus  and  sends  aid  to  Athens 
— Ineffective  campaigns  of  200  and  199 — Arrival  of  T.  Quintius  Flamininus 
(198) — Victory  of  Flamininus  in  the  Antigoneian  Pass  and  his  march  through 
Greece — The  Achaean  League  join  Rome  (198) — Peace  congress  of  Nicaea 
fails  (198-197) — Campaign  of  197  and  battle  of  Cynoscephalae — Freedom  of 
some  Greek  states  proclaimed  at  Isthmian  games  (196) — War  with  Nabis  of 
Sparta,  settlement  of  Greece  and  triumph  of  Flamininus  (195-194). 

When  the  treaty  of  Phoenice  was  referred  to  the  Senate  no  difficulty   The  peace 
was  made  as  to  its  ratification.     The  attention  of  Government  and  0/203-200. 
people    alike   was    fixed    upon   Africa    and    the    final    conflict   with  Provoca- 
Carthage.       But   from   the   very   first    Philip    committed   himself  to  tions  of 
measures   which   were    neither    unnoticed    nor  forgotten   at   Rome,   ^p"?.. 
although  for  the  moment  they  were  ignored.  ^' 

About  the  very  time  at  which  the  peace  was  being  settled  he  had  A  Mace- 
received  an  application  from  Carthage,  now  in  desperate  straits,  to  doman 
effect  a  diversion  in  its  favour  by  invading  Italy  or  Sicily.     The  king  f^anmbul 
could  not  openly  renounce  his  new  alliance ;  but  he  either  commis-  in  Africa. 
sioned  one  of  his  nobles,  named  Sopater,  to  raise,  or  connived  at  his 
raising,  a  body  of  4000  men  to  cross  to  Africa.     These  men  fought 
at  Zama  under  Hannibal,  and  many  of  them  became  prisoners  of 
war  to  the  Romans.     This  fact  could  not  be  denied ;  but  it  was  done 
in  such  a  way  as  to  enable  the  king  to  disavow  it ;  and  though  the 
truth  was  thoroughly  understood  at  Rome,  there  was  no  disposition 
at  present  to  allow  anything  to  interfere  with  the  complete  settlement 
of  the  quarrel  with  Carthage. 


424 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


But  more  than  this,  Philip  almost  at  once  began  a  series  of 
aggressions  in  Greece  and  Asia.  Antiochus  had  returned  in  205 
from  his  great  expedition  into  central  Asia,  flushed  with  success, 
and  with  a  reputation  for  personal  gallantry  and  military  capacity 
which  had  gained  him  the  title  of  the  Great,  hardly  justified  by  his 
conduct  in  the  subsequent  struggle  with  Rome.  Towards  the  end 
of  the  year  he  entered  into  a  flagitious  bargain  with  Philip  to  divide 
between  them  the  outlying  dominions  of  the  youthful  king  of  Egypt, 
Ptolemy  Epiphanes.  His  own  share  was  to  be  Coele-Syria  and 
Palestine,  with  parts  of  Gyrene  and  Egypt  itself ;  Philip's  was  to  be 
the  Cyclades  and  the  cities  and  islands  of  Ionia. 

In  order  to  carry  out  his  part  of  the  arrangement  Philip  was 
obliged  to  strengthen  his  power  in  the  Aegean,  and  this  at  once 
involved  him  in  hostilities  with  Attains  of  Pergamus,  and  with  the 
powerful  naval  state  of  Rhodes.  He  employed  for  his  purposes 
Heracleides  of  Tarentum,  who  had  been  guilty  of  double  treason 
during  the  conflict  of  Hannibal  and  the  Romans  for  that  town,  and 
Dicaearchus,  an  Aetolian  pirate. 

He  began  with  an  attack  upon  the  Cyclades,  the  reduction  of 
which  was  at  once  commenced  by  Dicaearchus  with  a  squadron  of 
twenty  ships.  To  Heracleides  was  committed  the  task  of  preventing 
the  Rhodians,  the  naval  guardians  of  the  Aegean,  from  interfering  to 
protect  the  Islands.  This  he  did  first  by  aiding  the  Cretans  in  a 
war  against  Rhodes,  in  which  their  piracies  had  involved  them,  and 
secondly  by  a  piece  of  congenial  treachery.  He  crossed  to  Rhodes, 
pretending  that  he  had  abandoned  the  service  of  Philip,  and  having 
gained  the  confidence  of  the  authorities,  found  an  opportunity  of 
setting  fire  to  the  arsenal  and  burning  enough  of  their  ships  to  cripple 
for  a  time  any  expeditions  for  the  relief  of  the  Cyclades, 

Philip  himself  marched  at  the  head  of  an  army  towards  the 
Hellespont,  and  seized  Lysimacheia,  which  commanded  the  entrance 
of  the  Thracian  Chersonese,  and  had  for  some  time  been  a  member 
of  the  Aetolian  League,  though  formerly  belonging  to  the  king  of 
Egypt.  He  then  crossed  to  the  Asiatic  side  and  took  two  other 
towns,  which  were  also  at  that  time  in  political  connexion  with  the 
Aetolians,  Chalcedon  and  Cius,  and  annexed  them  to  the  dominions 
of  his  brother-in-law  Prusias  of  Bithynia.  But  in  the  case  of  Cius  it 
was  only  an  empty  town  which  he  thus  handed  over.  The  Cians 
made  a  stout  resistance,  and  when  at  length,  in  spite  of  the 
remonstrances  of  envoys  from  Rhodes,  he  succeeded  in  taking 
the  place,  he  broke  his  promise  of  granting  impunity  to  the  people. 
They  were  sold  as  slaves  and  their  property  treated  as  spoils  of 
war, — a  cruelty  inflicted  also  on  the  people  of  Thasos  on  his  way 
home,  although  they  had  surrendered  without  a  struggle. 


I 


XXVIII    PHILIP  AT  WAR  WITH  ATTALUS  AND  RHODES         425 

These  acts  were  not  intended  as  a  provocation  to  the  AetoHan  The 
League.      They    were     done     in     pursuance    of    his    bargain    with  Khodians 
Antiochus,    in    virtue   of  which    Philip   claimed  all   places  that  had  T/f /^?'^ 
belonged  to   the   king   of  Egypt  in  the  Aegean   and  the  coasts  of  proclaim 
Europe  and  Asia.      But  they  at  once  aroused  the  fears  and  anger  of  war 
Attalus  and  the  Rhodians.     The  fate   of   Cius  had   been  watched  against 
with    great    anxiety    at    Rhodes,    but    by    messages    of    pretended  ^^^^^^P^ 
moderation    Philip    had   prevented    active    measures   for    its    relief. 
When  the  news  of  its  fall  and  the  treatment  of  its  people  became 
known,  both  Attalus  and  the  Rhodians  determined  upon  war,  and 
a  powerful  fleet  was  prepared  for  the  spring  of  201. 

But   Philip  ofice  more  displayed  the  greatest  spirit  and  activity.   Philip 
Early   in   201    he   invaded   the    territory  of  Attalus,   and   advanced  invades 
up  to  the  walls  of  Pergamus  itself.      Being  unable  to  take  the  city  he  J'^^ 
ravaged  the  suburbs,  sparing  neither  house  nor  temple.      But  in  spite  ^^^ 
of  this   plunder,    and   the    sack   of  Thyatira  and  the  neighbouring  territory  of 
lands,  he  soon  found  himself  short  of  provisions  ;    nor  did  Zeuxis,  Pergamus. 
Antiochus's  satrap  at  Sardis,  supply  his  wants  as  he  had  hoped.      He 
therefore  went  on  board  his  fleet  to  attack  the  islands. 

He  had  already  taken  Samos  and  was  besieging  Chios  when  the  Battle  of 
combined  fleet  of  Attalus  and  Rhodes  appeared.      Finding  the  siege  Chios, 
of  Chios  long  and  difficult  he  resolved  to  retire  to  Samos,  and  to  ^^^' 
do  so  was  obliged  to  elude  or  conquer  the  allied  fleet.       Failing  to 
elude  them  he  was  forced  to  fight.      His  ships  on  the  whole  got  the 
worst  of  the  battle  :  yet  Attalus  himself  was   all  but  captured,'  and 
with  difficulty  escaped  to  Erythrae,  with  the  loss  of  his  own  ship  and 
others  attending  it.     The  losses,  indeed,  on  both  sides  were  serious, 
including  the  chief  admiral  of  both  fleets. 

But  if  the  battle  of  Chios  was  of  doubtful  result,  the  same  could  Philip's 
not  be  said  when  it  was  renewed  shortly  afterwards  off  Lade.  Here  "^^^^^^y  ^^ 
Philip's  victory  was  decisive,  and  was  followed  by  the  occupation  of 
Caria  and  the  reduction  of  the  Rhodian  Peraea.  But  while  he  was 
thus  employed  on  land,  Attalus  and  the  Rhodians  had  repaired  and 
increased  their  fleets,  which  were  now  strong  enough  to  prevent  him 
from  attempting  to  return  to  Macedonia.  He  therefore  wintered  in 
Caria,  although  reports  reached  him  of  disturbances  in  Macedonia 
which  made  him  anxious  to  be  at  home.  Again  his  provisions  ran 
short,  and  he  was  reduced  to  humiliating  supplications  for  supplies, 
and  was  compelled  to  allow  his  army  to  live  on  simple  robbery.  In 
the  spring,  however,  he  eluded  the  hostile  fleets,  which,  after  vainly 
chasing  him  for  a  time,  put  in  at  Aegina  (200). 

From  Aegina  Attalus  crossed  by  invitation  to  Athens.  The 
Athenians  had  already  had  cause  of  complaint  against  Philip  for 
assisting  a  raid  of  Acarnanians  upon  their  territory ;  and,  therefore, 


426 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


their  usual  anti-Macedonian  feelings  were  at  their  height.  Attalus 
was  received  with  enthusiasm ;  every  honour  which  words  could 
bestow  was  lavished  on  him,  his  name  being  even  given  to  a 
new  tribe,  as  though  he  were  one  of  the  eponymous  heroes.  An 
alliance  with  him  and  Rhodes  was  unanimously  voted,  and  full  civil 
rights  bestowed  on  all  Rhodians.  There  was  also  at  Athens  at  this 
time  some  legates  from  Rome,  who  took  advantage  of  the  enthusiasm 
of  the  hour  to  enrol  Athens  among  the  "friends  of  Rome,"  whom 
they  were  now  seeking  to  combine  against  the  king. 

For  by  this  time  it  had  been  resolved  at  Rome  that  war  must  be 
made  on  Philip.  As  early  as  204  legates  from  Alexandria  had 
come  to  Rome  denouncing  the  nefarious  schemes  of  Antiochus  and 
Philip,  and  begging  for  assistance.  The  Romans  had  experienced  the 
friendship  of  Egypt  during  the  Punic  war,  and  had  learnt  the  value 
of  its  corn  fields  ;  they  were  therefore  quite  ready  to  guarantee  its 
independence.  Three  legates  were  sent  to  order  the  two  kings  to 
abstain  from  attacking  Egypt  as  a  friend  of  Rome,  one  of  whom,  M. 
Aemilius  Lepidus,  remained  in  Alexandria  for  some  years  as  a 
guardian  of  the  young  king's  interest. 

But  other  complaints  also  had  been  pouring  in  from  the  allied 
states,  alleging  acts  of  aggression  on  the  part  of  Philip's  officers, 
almost  from  the  month  in  which  the  treaty  had  been  made.  These 
complaints  became  so  frequent  that  in  203  three  more  commissioners 
— C.  Terentius  Varro,  C.  Manilius,  M.  Aurelius  Cotta — were  sent  to 
Greece  to  investigate  the  matter  on  the  spot.  Philip  replied  by 
sending  ambassadors  to  Rome  in  the  course  of  the  year  201.  But 
though  they  offered  explanations  and  excuses  on  some  points,  they 
also  lodged  formal  complaints  as  to  acts  of  hostility,  of  which  they 
alleged  the  Roman  commissioners  had  themselves  been  guilty  ;  and 
finally  demanded  the  restoration  of  Sopater  and  the  other  Macedonians 
taken  prisoners  at  Zama,  whom  they  spoke  of  as  private  citizens 
serving  for  pay  in  Hannibal's  army. 

The  senators  listened  to  this  message  with  indignant  surprise. 
Aurelius  had  also  sent  an  agent  to  represent  the  case  of  the  com- 
missioners, who  assured  the  Senate  that  they  had  in  every  case 
acted  only  in  defence  of  an  allied  state  ;  and  that,  so  far  from  being 
a  mere  private  mercenary,  Sopater  was  a  man  high  in  the  king's 
confidence,  one  of  his  purpurati,  and  had  been  sent  by  the  king 
with  men  and  money  expressly  to  assist  Hannibal.  The  Senate 
therefore  answered  sternly  that  the  king  had  doubly  broken  his 
treaty,  first  in  assisting  the  enemies  of  the  Republic,  and  secondly 
by  injuring  its  allies  ;  Scipio  and  Aurelius  had  both  done  only  their 
duty,  the  former  in  taking  the  Macedonian  soldiers  prisoners,  the 
latter  in  defending  Roman  allies  from  the  hostile  acts  of  the  king's 


XXVIII  THE  ROMANS  INTERPOSE  IN  GREECE  427 

officers.      "It  was  plain,"  they  added,   " that  the  king  desired  war,   The 
and  he  should  speedily  have  it."     The  war,  however,  was  not  popular  Romans 
at  Rome.      The  people  had  but  just  emerged  from  the  long  agony  ''^  octant  y 
of  the  struggle  with  Carthage,  and  it  was  difficult  to  persuade  them  ^^^ 
to  enter  upon  another,  especially  where  the  interests  to  be  defended  200. 
were  not  those  of  Romans,  but  of  Greeks,  of  whom  they  knew  little  Coss.  P. 
that    did    not    inspire    contempt.       It    was    only    when    the    consul  ^^^/^"^^ 
Sulpicius  insisted  that,  if  they  wished  to  prevent  another  invasion  q  Aurel- 
of  Italy,  they  must  fight  the  king  of  Macedonia  in  his  own  lands,  ius  Cotta. 
that  they  were  induced  to  cancel  the  vote  forbidding  the  war.      But  Prepara- 
before  its  formal  declaration  the   Roman  commissioners  in   Greece  Honsfor 
had  warned  the  various  allied  states  of  what  was  coming.     We  have  organising 
seen  how  they  had  secured  the  alliance  of  Athens.      They  were  still  ^/J^p^Jl^l 
there  when  a  Macedonian  force  under  Nicanor  entered  Attica  and 
advanced  as  far  as  the  Academy.      They  sent  a  herald  to  him  for- 
bidding him  to  molest  that  or  any  other  city  allied  to  Rome  ;  and 
Nicanor  did  not   venture  to   disobey,   for  the  breach  between  his 
master   and  Rome    was   not   yet  openly   avowed.      They   then   left 
Athens   and  visited  the   other    allies, — the    Epirotes    at   Phoenice, 
Amynander  in  Athamania,  the  Aetolians    at    Naupactus,    and    the 
Achaeans  at  Aegium, — assuring  each  that  any  attack  by  Philip  upon 
them,    or  upon   any   state   allied   to    Rome,   would  be  followed  by 
instant  war.     About  the  same  time  a  Rhodian  fleet  sailed  among 
the  Cyclades  and   obtained  the  adhesion  of  all  but  three — Andros, 
Paros,  and  Cythnos,  in  which  there  were  still  Macedonian  garrisons. 

But    Philip   also  was   well   prepared,   and   even  before  war  was  Energy  and 
declared  sent  Philocles  with  2000  infantry  and  200  cavalry  to  invade  activity  of 
Attica  again  :  while  he  himself  marched  to  the  Thracian  Chersonese  ;  ^ji^^!^'. 
received  the  submission  of  nearly  every  town  on  his  way  and  in  the  A%do7^^^ 
Chersonese  itself;  and,  being  met  at  Maroneia  by  his  fleet,  crossed 
to  Asia   and  laid   siege   to   Abydos.     The   defence    was    long  and 
desperate,  though  the  citizens  received  little  help  from  outside ;  for 
only  a  small  garrison  and  a  single  quadrireme  was  supplied  by  the 
Rhodian  fleet  stationed  at  Tenedos  ;  whither  also  Attalus  came  on 
hearing  of  the  siege.      Diplomatic  interference  was  indeed  tried,  but 
Philip  contrived  to  allay  the  alarm  at  Rhodes  while  he  turned  a  deaf 
ear  to  all  remonstrances,  even  to  those  of  the  Roman  commissioners, 
who  on   hearing   at    Rhodes  of  the   siege   of  Abydos,   sent  one  of 
their  number,  M.  Aemilius  Lepidus,  to  deliver  to  the  king  in  person 
the  last  orders  of  the  Republic  :   "  He  must  abstain  from  attacking   The 
any  Greek   town,    leave   untouched   all   places   under  the  power  of  Roman 
king  Ptolemy,  and  submit  to  arbitration  the  indemnities  claimed  by  "^^^~ 
Attalus    and   the    Rhodians   for   injuries  done  by  him."     The  king  "^'^^""^• 
answered   that  the  Rhodians   had   been   the  aggressors.     Aemilius 


428 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


bluntly  interrupted  the  royal  speech  by  exclaiming  :  "  But  what  about 
the  Athenians  and  the  Cianians  ?  And  what  about  the  Abydenians 
at  this  moment?  Did  any  of  them  begin  hostilities?"  The  king 
kept  his  temper  at  this  unceremonious  address,  remarking  with 
ironical  courtesy  that  he  excused  Aemilius  for  three  reasons  :  "  he 
was  young  and  unused  to  conducting  such  business,  he  was  very 
handsome,  and  lastly  he  was  a  Roman."  He  added,  however,  that 
for  his  part  he  demanded  of  the  Romans  that  they  should  not  break 
the  treaty  and  make  war  on  him  ;  if  they  did,  he  would  by  God's 
help  defend  himself  as  best  he  could. 

The  king  had  his  barren  diplomatic  triumph  ;  and  presently  a 
more  substantial  advantage  in  the  fall  of  Abydos.  The  citizens 
resisted  to  the  last,  fighting  desperately  upon  the  ruins  of  the  walls 
which  his  battering  rams  had  thrown  down,  and  finally  killed  their 
wives  and  children,  and  then  themselves,  rather  than  fall  into 
his  hands.  But  though  he  had  thus  secured  his  passage  into 
Asia,  he  had  exasperated  his  enemies,  and  confirmed  them  in  their 
resolve  to  join  their  fortunes  with  those  of  Rome.  The  Rhodians, 
Attalus,  and  the  Athenians  at  once  warmly  espoused  the  Roman 
alliance,  and  were  preparing  in  their  several  ways  to  contribute 
active  assistance. 

Shortly  after  the  capture  of  Abydos  news  reached  the  king 
which  compelled  him  to  return  to  Greece.  The  consul  P.  Sulpicius 
with  his  army  and  fleet  had  crossed  to  Epirus  somewhat  late  in  the 
summer,  and  would  probably  not  make  any  important  movement 
that  year.  But  the  land  force  was  to  winter  at  Apollonia,  and  the 
fleet  under  L.  Apustius  at  Corcyra :  the  Romans,  therefore,  were 
preparing  to  carry  on  the  war  continuously,  and  the  king  must 
reckon  upon  an  invasion  of  his  western  frontier.  But  besides  that, 
when  Sulpicius  landed  at  Dyrrachium  he  was  met  by  envoys  from 
Athens,  announcing  the  invasion  of  Philocles,  and  begging  for  help. 
The  consul  had  at  once  detached  a  squadron  of  twenty  ships  and  a 
military  force  under  C.  Cornelius  Centho,  who  had  not  only  saved 
Athens,  but  had  also  made  a  descent  upon  Euboea ;  surprised 
the  king's  chief  stronghold,  the  town  of  Chalcis  ;  killed  the 
royal  commandant  Sopater  ;  burnt  the  royal  stores,  and  set  free  a 
number  of  captives  whom  the  king  had  deposited  there.  The 
Romans,  indeed,  had  not  been  in  sufficient  force  to  retain  Chalcis 
without  abandoning  Athens,  and  had  therefore  retired  after  doing 
all  the  harm  they  could  ;  but  the  king  was  eager  for  revenge,  and 
resolved  on  an  immediate  attack  upon  Athens.  Sailing  to  Chalcis 
he  crossed  the  Euripus  into  Boeotia,  and  marched  into  Attica, 
hoping  to  surprise  the  city. 

The   Athenians,  however,  had  had    timely   warning,   and   when 


i 


XXVIII    OPERATIONS  ON  THE  FRONTIER  OF  MACEDONIA    429 

the  king  arrived    he    found    the    gates    closed,    the  walls    manned,  Battle 
and    every   one   on   the   alert ;    while   on   the   road   leading    to    the  opposite 
gate   called   Dipylum  were   drawn    up   a   mixed  body  of  Athenians     !^AtT"^ 
and  Pergamenians.      These  he  attacked  with  great  fury,  and  drove  ^oo. 
them  with  heavy  loss  within  the  walls.      But  though  he  had  shown 
conspicuous  personal  gallantry  in  the  charge,  he  did  not  succeed 
in  effecting   an  entrance  ;    and  next  day,  finding  that  the  garrison 
had  been  reinforced  by  Roman  soldiers  and  more  troops  of  Attalus 
from  the    Peiraeus,  he  retired  towards  Eleusis,  wasting  the  country 
as    he    marched,    and    hoping    to    seize    the    fort    and    the    temple 
of  Demeter.      But  the  fleet  from  the  Peiraeus  appearing  off  Eleusis, 
he  abandoned  Attica  and  marched  by  Megara  to  Corinth,  and  thence 
to  Argos  to  attend  a  meeting  of  the  Achaean  League. 

He  was  anxious  to   retain  the   loyalty  of  the  Achaeans  and   to  phiiip  and 
induce  them  to  commit  themselves  to  his  side  against  Rome.     And  the 
the  moment  seemed  opportune,   for   he   found    them  consulting  on  Achaean 
measures  to  be  taken  for  defending  themselves  against  Nabis,  tyrant     ^'^S'^^^^ 
of  Sparta.     He  offered  to  undertake  this  business,  and  relieve  them  of  200. 
all  anxiety,  on  condition  of  their  supplying  a  sufficient  garrison  for 
Oreos,  Chalcis,  and  Corinth,       This  would  have  secured  the  double 
object  of  weakening  the  League  by  removing  the  flower  of  its  troops 
from  Peloponnesus,  and  committing  it  to  hostility  with  Rome,      But 
the  strategus   Cycliades  prudently  avoided  the  snare  by  alleging  the 
League  law,   which   prohibited   any  measure   being   brought  before 
an   assembly   other  than    that  for  which  it  was  summoned.      Thus  Destruc- 
baflied  Philip  returned  to  Attica,  where  he  was  joined  by  a  reinforce-  tion  of  the 
ment  under  Diodes;  and  though  he  failed  to  take  either  Peiraeus  ^''^^'^rbsof 
or  Athens,  he  made  terrible  havoc  of  the  temples,  tombs,  and  farms 
in  the  neighbourhood,  and   then,  as   the    season  was  growing   late, 
returned  to  Macedonia  through  Boeotia. 

Thus  in  the  first   year  of  the  war  the  king  had  been  by  far  the  Results  of 
most  active  and  apparently  the  most  successful.      But  he  had  not  the  first 
really  improved  his   position  in  Greece.      The  Achaeans,  his  natural  y^'^^  ^J     ^ 
allies,  had   avoided    committing   themselves.      The  fleets  of  Rhodes 
and   of  Attalus,    stationed    at    Aegina,   protected    the    islands    and 
threatened  his  movements  in  southern  Greece.      The  Romans  them- 
selves had  as  yet  done  little  beyond  protecting  Athens.      The  consul 
P.  Sulpicius  had  fallen  ill  and  was  unable  to  direct  any  great  move- 
ment, even  if  such  had  been  desired  at  so  late  a  period  of  the  season. 
Still  the  frontiers  of  south-west  Macedonia  had  been  devastated,  and 
some  border  fortresses  captured  which  commanded  the  passes  over 
the  mountains  ;  and  a  defeat  had  been  inflicted  upon  a  Macedonian 
force  under  Athenagoras,  who  attempted  to  cut  off  the  legatus   L. 
Apustius  while  he  was  crossing  a  stream. 


430 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


The  winter  of  200-199  "^^^  passed  by  the  consul  in  quarters 
between  Apollonia  and  Dyrrachium,  where  he  was  visited  by  envoys 
from  the  alHes  and  the  tribes  round  Macedonia  hostile  to  the  king. 
Pleuratus,  son  of  Scerdilaidas  from  Illyria,  Amynander,  king  of 
the  Athamanes,  and  Bato,  prince  of  the  Dardani,  all  came  for 
instructions  ;  while  legates  from  Attalus  anxiously  inquired  what 
help  their  master  was  to  expect  in  the  spring,  Pleuratus  and  Bato 
were  told  to  be  ready  to  assist  in  an  invasion  of  Macedonia  early 
the  following  year ;  Amynander  was  commissioned  to  rouse  the 
Aetolians  ;  the  legates  of  Attalus  were  promised  that  the  Roman 
fleet  should  join  their  master  at  Aegina  in  the  spring. 

But  the  king  was  also  taking  active  precautions.  The  islands  of 
Peparethos  and  Sciathos,  which  might  be  used  by  the  enemy  as  the 
.basis  of  an  attack  upon  Demetrias,  were  dismantled,  and  rendered 
useless  for  that  purpose.  The  king's  son  Perseus  was  despatched  to 
guard  the  north-west  frontier  against  the  Dardani ;  and  envoys  were 
sent  to  dissuade  the  Aetolians  from  breaking  their  treaty  with  Philip 
and  joining  the  Romans.  The  Aetolians  avoided  immediate  decision  ; 
the  issues  were  not  simple  in  their  eyes.  Philip  was  undoubtedly  a 
hindrance  to  Greek  freedom,  and  had  many  ideas  as  to  the  extent  of 


The 

Aetolians 
join  the 
Romans, 
igg. 


hand,  they  had  begun  already  to  fear  that  the  victory  of  Rome  would 
mean  a  greater  danger  still  to  freedom  and  to  their  own  ambition. 

In  spite  of  promises  and  preparations  nothing  effective  was  done. 
Sulpicius  moved  into  the  country  of  the  Dassareti  in  the  spring  of 
199,  and  later  on  into  Eordaea.  Philip  encamped  in  the  same 
neighbourhood,  cut  off  foraging  parties,  and  attempted  to  draw  the 
Romans  into  a  general  engagement.  It  was  his  first  experience  of 
a  regular  Roman  army,  and  he  is  said  to  have  been  deeply  impressed 
with  the  formidable  nature  of  the  camp  ;  while  his  soldiers  were 
dismayed  by  observing  in  the  frequent  skirmishes  how  much  more 
effective  than  their  own  spears  were  the  Roman  swords,  which  lopped 
off  limbs  and  made  horrible  gashes.  But  the  campaign  died  away 
in  indecisive  skirmishes, — in  one  of  which  indeed  the  king  had  a 
horse  killed  under  him,  and  was  himself  wounded  and  only  saved 
from  capture  by  the  devotion  of  a  soldier,  who  dismounted  and  gave 
up  his  horse  to  him,  falling  himself  under  the  swords  of  the  enemy. 

The  superiority  of  the  Romans  in  the  field,  however,  had  been 
sufficiently  demonstrated  to  convince  the  Aetolians  in  the  course  of 
the  year  that  they  had  better  take  part  against  Philip.  In  conjunc- 
tion with  Amynander  they  invaded  Thessaly  and  advanced  within  a 
short  distance  of  Demetrias.  But  the  king  surprised  them  near 
Gomphi,  as  they  were  returning  and  wasting  the  plain  of  Thessaly 
and    they    were    only    saved    from    annihilation    by    Amynander' 


XXVIII  T.  FLAMININUS  ARRIVES  IN  GREECE  431 

knowledge  of  the   mountain   passes  into  Athamania.     At  the  same  Repulse  of 
time  the   king's   general   Athenagoras   (who  accompanied    Perseus)  ^^^ 
repulsed   the    Dardani   in  the  North  and  compelled  them  to  retire      '^^  ^"^' 
with  considerable  loss. 

In  the  West  therefore  Philip  had  held  his  own  with  considerable 
success.     In  the  East  the  naval  war  had  been  of  a  similarly  desultory 
character,  but  on  the  whole  had  been  less  favourable  to  Philip.     The  Movements 
Roman  fleet  under  L.  Apustius,  after  wintering  at   Corcyra,  joined  of  the 
that  of  Attalus  at  Aegina,  and  attacked  such  of  the  Cyclades  as  were  '^^^^^^^ fleets 
still  held   by  Macedonian  garrisons, — Andros,  Cythnos,  and  Paros.  Aegean, 
At  Andros  they  were  successful,  at  Cythnos  they  failed.      Thence,  i()g. 
being  joined  by  twenty  Rhodian  ships,  they  coasted  as  far  as  the 
Chalcidic  peninsula  and  returned  to  Euboea  laden  with  spoil.      But 
such  piratical  expeditions  were  not  of  great  importance,  any  more 
than  the  violent  decrees   passed  at  Athens   against    Philip,   or  the 
destruction  of  his  statues  and  erasing  of  inscriptions  in  his  honour. 
The    most    useful    achievement    was    the    capture   of    the    strongly 
fortified  town   of  Oreos   in   the  north   of  Euboea,   which    fell   just 
before   the  Roman  fleet   had  to  return   for  the  winter  to  Corcyra. 
Nor  were  the  indecisive  movements  of  199  improved  by  the  advent  of  ^99- 
the  consul  P.  Villius,  who  superseded  Sulpicius  late  in  the  summer  Cornelius 
of  that  year ;   and,  like  his  predecessor,  seemed  intending  to  put  off  Lentulus, 
all  active  operations  till  his  second  year.  P.  Villius. 

It  was  not  destined,  however,  that  he  should  have  the  chance 
of  success  or  failure.     The  consul  for  198,  T.  QuintiusFlamininus, 
resolved  not  to  waste  his   year  of  office   by  staying  at  Rome  for 
ceremonial    observances,  but   to   go    at   once   to   the   seat   of  war.^   T. 
With   the   arrival   of  Flamininus  the  war  received   a  new  impetus.   Q^^^"^^^^ 
He  found  Villius  encamped  at  the  foot  of  the  Antigoneian   pass,  i^u^lakes 
which  led  from  Chaonia  into  Macedonia  by  the  valley  of  the  Aous.  over  the 
The  Roman  point  of  attack  had  therefore  been  changed  from  the  command 
north-west  to  the  south.      It  was  a  more  difficult  way  of  entering  ^"  ^"^^ 
Macedonia,    though   the    nearest  for  troops   coming    from   Corcyra.  ^^^^"^  ^J 
Philip  was  defending   the  upper  end  of  the   pass,  where  a  narrow 
gorge  —  the    Stena    Aoi — connected    it    with    the    valley    of    the 
Aous.       He  was   in  a  very  strong   position,   and   when   Flamininus 
arrived  with  8000  fresh  infantry  and  800  cavalry,  and  had  sent  Villius 
home,    he    found    himself   in    a    great    difficulty.        To    remove,  to 
the  old  point  of  attack  was  to  waste  the  whole  summer,  and  yet 
it  seemed  impossible   to   turn  the  king's  position.     For  forty  days 
the    two    armies    remained    within    sight    of    each    other    without 

^  Since  about  205  it  had  become  the  custom  of  the  consuls  not  to  leave  Rome 
till  after  the  games  of  Apollo  (July  6-13).  The  new  consul,  therefore,  was  generally 
too  late  to  do  much  till  the  next  season. 


432 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


A  fruitless 

conference. 


The  king' s 
position 
betrayed, 
ig8. 


Flight  of 
Philip  into 
Thessaly. 


moving,  and  some  of  the  leading  men  in  Epirus  even  suggested  a 
conference  with  a  view  to  peace,  A  meeting  actually  took  place 
between  the  consul  and  the  king,  but  led  to  no  result.  Flamininus 
demanded  as  a  preliminary  that  the  king  should  withdraw  his 
garrisons  from  all  Greek  towns,  without  any  distinction  between 
those  which  he  had  found  already  so  guarded  when  he  came  to 
the  throne  and  those  to  which  he  had  himself  sent  garrisons 
for  the  first  time.  When  asked  for  a  more  distinct  definition 
the  consul  began  by  naming  all  Thessalian  towns.  But  it  was  in 
Thessaly  that  the  king's  supremacy  had  been  the  most  complete 
and  unquestioned  :  with  some  exceptions  it  was  practically  a  part  of 
Macedonia.  He  at  once  broke  off  the  conference,  exclaiming 
indignantly,  "  What  harder  condition  could  you  have  imposed  if 
you  had  beaten  me  on  the  field  ?  " 

The  war  of  skirmishes  between  outposts  therefore  was  continued ; 
and  though  the  Romans  could  beat  the  enemy  in  the  open,  they  were 
always  foiled  when  they  tried  to  force  their  way  up  the  pass,  which 
had  been  strengthened  by  balistae  set  at  every  available  point.  But,  as 
usually  happened  in  mountain  warfare,  a  superior  knowledge  of  the 
ground  did  what  mere  force  could  not  do.  A  shepherd  offered  to 
show  Flamininus  a  track  which  would  enable  him  to  get  on  the  rear 
of  the  enemy.  With  some  hesitation,  and  on  the  assurance  of  the 
chief  men  of  Epirus,  he  despatched  a  picked  body  of  4000  infantry 
under  his  guidance,  supported  by  300  cavalry,  as  far  as  they  could 
go.  Their  movement  was  covered  by  extra  activity  on  the  part  of 
the  skirmishers.  On  the  morning  of  the  third  day  the  signal  that 
the  4000  had  reached  their  position  was  given  by  smoke ;  and 
Flamininus  at  once  ordered  a  general  advance.  The  king's  troops 
came  out  to  meet  them,  in  full  confidence  in  their  impregnable 
position.  On  this  occasion  the  Romans  advanced  so  far  up  the  pass 
that  the  Macedonians  believed  that  they  had  got  them  in  a  trap, 
when  a  shout  in  their  rear  showed  them  that  they  were  themselves 
being  attacked  on  both  sides.  In  sudden  panic  they  fled  in  every 
direction  :  while  those  who  could  find  no  escape  were  surrounded 
and  cut  to  pieces.  The  slaughter,  however,  does  not  appear  to  have 
been  great,  for  pursuit  in  the  unknown  mountain  ways  was  scarcely 
attempted  :  but  with  some  difficulty  the  royal  camp  was  reached  and 
occupied  by  the  Romans  for  the  night. 

The  king  at  first  fled  precipitately ;  but  finding  that  he  was  not 
pursued  he  recovered  his  presence  of  mind,  halted  on  an  eminence, 
and  collected  his  scattered  troops.  Only  2000  were  eventually  found 
to  be  missing  ;  and  thus  with  his  main  army  still  intact  he  marched 
up  the  valley  of  the  Aous,  Where  the  roads  branched  to  Macedonia 
and  Thessaly  he  halted  for  several  days,  unable  to  make  up  his  mind 


xxviii  FLAMININUS  ENTERS  GREECE  433 

which  route  to  take.  Eventually  he  determined  in  favour  of  the 
latter  :  and  descending  to  the  valley  of  the  upper  Peneius  arrived  at 
Larissa,  His  aim  was  Demetrias,  but,  being  refused  entrance  into 
Pherae,  he  turned  northward  again  and  finally  intrenched  himself  at 
Tempe. 

The   effect   of  this  victory  in  rousing   the   allies   to   action  was  Sufferings 
immediate,  and  the  war  fell  at  first  with  full  weight  on  the  unhappy  ^  *^^ 
Thessalians.       In   the   course   of  his    march    Philip    burnt    or    dis-    .        '^  " 
mantled  many  of  the   towns    through  which  he  passed  to  prevent 
their  affording  shelter  and  food  to  Flamininus  :   while  by  the  southern 
pass  the  Aetolians  and  Athamanians  again  poured  into  the  country, 
plundering  and  destroying  as  though  in  an  enemy's  land, 

Flamininus  seized  the  opportunity  of  showing  the  different  spirit  The  march 
in  which  he  meant  to  treat  Greeks.  Having  admitted  the  Epirotes,  ^  Flamm- 
whose  Macedonian  inclinations  had  been  changed  by  the  victory  in 
the  Antigoneian  pass,  to  friendship  and  alliance,  he  started  leisurely 
in  the  track  of  Philip.  But  he  refrained  from  pillage  or  even 
severe  exactions,  exhorting  his  soldiers  to  regard  the  country  as  their 
own,  and  was  received  almost  everywhere  with  signs  of  enthusiastic 
welcome.  He  furnished  himself  with  supplies  by  trains  of  carts 
from  his  fleet  of  transports  which  lay  at  anchor  in  the  Ambracian 
Gulf,  whence  the  stores  could  be  brought  through  the  pass  to 
Gomphi.  But  as  he  advanced  eastward,  until  brought  to  a  stand  by 
the  stout  resistance  of  Atrax,  about  ten  miles  west  of  Larissa,  he 
found  that  he  was  too  far  from  his  supplies,  and  that  the  Ambracian 
harbour  was  inadequate  for  the  number  of  transports  necessary. 
The  vessels  were  therefore  ordered  to  come  to  Anticyra  on  the 
Corinthian  Gulf;  and  having  abandoned  the  siege  of  Atrax  he 
marched  to  the  south.  Here  again  most  of  the  cities  opened  their 
gates  to  him,  or  were  easily  compelled  to  do  so,  and  found  that  the 
consul  was  always  ready  to  grant  them  full  freedom  on  condition  of 
expelling  their  Macedonian  garrisons.  In  some  indeed  the  Mace- 
donians were  able  to  offer  more  resistance.  Thus  Daulis,  strong  in 
its  lofty  position,  was  only  taken  by  a  stratagem  ;  and  Elateia  kept 
him  at  bay  for  a  considerable  time. 

While  he  lay  opposite   Elateia  he  received  the  adhesion  of  the   The 

Achaean   League — an   event   especially  welcome,  as  it  made  it  more  Achaean 

easy  than  ever  to  carry  out  his  policy  of  acting  as  champion  of  Greek  ^^^S^^ 
v-u     ^  T      1.1-  •  •    .       T^i  -I-      1      1    r  1  •  joins  the 

hberty.      In  the  previous  wmter  Philip  had  felt  great  anxiety  as  to  Romans 

the  attitude  of  the  Achaeans,  and  had  tried  to  propitiate  them  by  autumn  of 

restoring  certain  towns  which  had  been  held  by  his  troops.^     The  ^9^- 

Eleans  were  mollified  in  the  same  way  ;  and  his  own  subjects  gratified 

'  Orchomenus,  Heraea,  and  Triphylia.     The  Achaean  decree  for  the  admis- 
sion of  Orchomenus  is  extant  (Hicks,  p.  321). 

2  F 


434  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap. 

by  the  imprisonment  of  the  unpopular  Heracleides  of  Tarentum. 
These  measures,  however,  seem  to  have  been  regarded  rather  as 
evidences  of  his  fear  than  of  his  benevolence  ;  and  when  the  com- 
bined fleets  of  Rome,  king  Attalus,  and  Rhodes — after  taking  Eretria 
and  Carystus  in  Euboea,  and  making  prisoners  of  war  of  their 
Macedonian  garrisons — dropped  anchor  at  Cenchreae,  the  eastern 
port  of  Corinth,  and  began  making  preparations  for  the  siege  of 
Corinth  itself,  held  since  the  time  of  the  Cleomenic  war  (222)  by  a 
Macedonian  garrison,  the  time  seemed  to  have  come  when  the 
Achaean  League  must  decide  whether  to  stand  by  Philip  at  all  costs 
or  make  terms  with  the  stronger  party. 
The  debate  It  was  in  fact  an  important  crisis  in  the  fortunes  of  the  League 

^  ^^^  and  of  Greece  ;  and  the  manner  in  which  it  was  treated  in  the  open 

assembly.  assembly  of  the  people  is  interesting.  L.  Quintius  Flamininus, 
the  brother  and  legatus  of  the  consul,  was  in  command  of  the  Roman 
fleet  at  Cenchreae,  and  it  was  he  who  proposed  negotiation.  Aris- 
taenus,  the  strategus  of  the  year,  was  known  to  be  inclined  to  the 
Roman  side  ;  and  Cycliades,  the  leader  of  the  Macedonian  faction, 
had  lately  been  expelled  and  had  taken  refuge  with  Philip.  Accord- 
ingly Lucius  sent  L.  Calpurnius,  supported  by  legates  from  Attalus 
and  Rhodes  and  Athens,  to  the  meeting  at  Sicyon,  where  Philip  also 
Offer  of  the  was  represented  by  ambassadors.  The  envoys  of  the  various  allies 
allies.  spoke  first,  beginning  with  the  Roman  Calpurnius.     They  offered  the 

tempting  bait  of  entire  freedom  from  Macedonia  ;  and,  as  an  earnest 
of  that,  the  expulsion  of  the  Macedonian  garrison  from  Acrocorinthus, 
and  the  restoration  of  Corinth  to  the  Achaean  League.  Then  the 
Reply  of  legates  of  Philip  were  heard,  who  recalled  the  services  of  the 
Philip's  Macedonian  kings  to  the  Achaeans  in  their  struggles  with  the 
egates.  Aetolians  and  with  Sparta.  Lastly,  the  Athenians  replied  to  the 
y4«^wr  of  j-Qy^i  legate,  dwelling  on  the  king's  treachery  and  cruelty,  and  all 
ians.  ^^y  ^^^   suffered   at   his   hands.     These   speeches  lasted  all  day. 

The  whole  business  was  laid  before  the  people  in  the  best  way,  by 
hearing  the  advocates  of  all  the  parties  interested  put  their  own  case. 
The  next  day  was  to  be  devoted  to  a  debate  between  tlie  two  factions 
on  the  statements  thus  put  before  them. 
The  But  when  in  the  next  morning's  assembly  the  herald  made  the 

^IfTut ^^"^  usual  proclamation  inviting  any  one  who  wished  to  speak,  instead  of 
the  usual  orators  coming  forward  eager  to  get  the  ear  of  the  assembly, 
there  was  a  profound  silence — a  silence  of  perplexity  and  fear.  On 
the  one  hand  the  Lacedaemonian  tyrant,  their  constant  enemy,  was 
a  friend  of  the  Roman  ;  on  the  other,  if  they  resisted  Rome,  they  had 
too  much  reason  to  fear  that  her  arms  would  prove  too  strong  both 
for  them  and  Macedonia.  To  the  Macedonians  they  were  bound  by 
many  obligations,  by  gratitude  for  protection  in  the  past  as  well  as 


of  the 
meeting. 


XXVIII  ASSEMBLY  OF  THE  ACHAEAN  LEAGUE  435 

the  present ;  yet  the  actual  wearer  of  the  Macedonian  crown  had 
lost  their  confidence  by  his  treachery  to  the  Messenians,  and  by  his 
suspected  complicity  in  the  murder  of  both  Aratus  the  father  and 
Aratus  the  son.  The  conflict  of  feelings  was  too  strong ;  no  one 
was  found  bold  or  decided  enough  to  come  forward  with  advice. 

At  length  Aristaenus,  after  vainly  attempting  to  rouse  them  by  speech  of 
taunting  allusions  to  the  contrast  between  the  violent  language  heard  Aris- 
every  day  in  their  social  or  political  gatherings  and  their  silence  ^^^««-y- 
now,  delivered  a  set  speech.  He  pointed  out  that  the  Romans,  with 
Attains  and  the  Rhodians,  were  asking  their  active  alliance,  while 
Philip  only  asked  for  their  neutrality.  The  reason  of  this  difference 
was  that  Philip  was  diffident  of  being  able  to  return  their  services  by 
protecting  them  against  Sparta  and  Rome  ;  while  the  allies,  con- 
fident in  their  position  and  in  their  power  to  resist  the  Macedonians, 
felt  themselves  competent  to  repay  them  for  their  support.  The 
Romans  in  the  former  war  with  Philip  had  been  hampered  by  their 
struggle  with  Carthage  ;  from  that  they  were  now  relieved,  and  the 
successes  of  Titus  Flamininus  had  conclusively  proved  how  much 
they  were  the  stronger.  Putting  aside  therefore  all  question  of 
Philip's  own  conduct  at  Athens  and  in  Messenia,  at  Cius,  and  Abydos, 
it  was  plain  that  he  was  not  able  to  defend  them  from  the  depreda- 
tions of  the  allied  fleet,  or  the  hostility  of  Nabis,  much  less  from  the 
two  combined.  No  less  evident  was  it  that  they  were  unable  to 
defend  themselves  against  these  enemies.  Therefore,  though  the 
Romans  asked  for  their  alliance,  they  could  really  compel  it :  they 
had  better  therefore  grant  it  at  once,  and  avoid  the  discredit  of 
merely  waiting  on  fortune.  The  opportunity  of  doing  so  with  grace 
would  not  recur  ;  they  might  now  be  free  from  Philip  ;  but  they 
must  decide  now  once  for  all  whether  the  Romans  should  be  their 
friends  or  their  enemies. 

The  speech  was  received  with  mingled  shouts  of  approbation  and  The 
disapproval.  A  motion  had  to  be  brought  forward  by  a  board  of  ten 
magistrates  called  Demiurgi ;  and  they  were  divided  as  to  the  legality 
of  putting  this  question,  for  a  decree  had  been  passed  rendering  it 
unlawful,  not  only  to  vote,  but  to  put  to  the  vote  any  motion  hostile 
to  Philip.  When  the  third  day,  however,  came,  the  Demiurgi  had 
decided  to  put  the  vote.  The  voting  was  by  nations,  and  by  common 
consent  the  Dymaeans,  Megalopolitans,  and  Argives  abstained. 
The  Argives,  partly  from  the  traditional  sentiment  in  favour  of  a 
dynasty,  whose  founder  was  believed  to  have  come  from  Argos,  had 
always  had  peculiarly  intimate  relations  with  Philip  ;  the  Dymaeans 
owed  the  restoration  of  their  citizens,  who  had  been  made  prisoners  by 
the  Romans  three  years  before,  to  the  generosity  of  the  king  ;  while 
the  people  of  Megalopolis  could  not  forget  the  services  of  Antigonus 


decision. 


436 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Flamin- 
hius 

winters  in 
Greece, 
igS-igj. 

Philip 
wishes  to 
treat. 


Doson  in  restoring  them  to  their  city,  from  which  Cleomenes  had  ex- 
pelled them.  The  rest  of  the  assembly  voted  in  favour  of  an  alliance 
with  Attains  and  the  Rhodians.  The  question  of  an  alliance  with  Rome 
was  left  undecided  until  a  confirmation  should  arrive  from  the  Senate. 
The  accession  of  the  forces  of  the  Achaean  League  to  those 
already  investing  Corinth  did  not  bring  about  the  downfall  of  that 
place.  Nor  were  the  hopes  of  help  from  the  Corinthians  themselves 
fulfilled.  The  Macedonian  garrison  was  apparently  popular  there, 
and  its  commander,  Androsthenes,  had  been  made  a  citizen  and 
elected  chief  magistrate.  Moreover,  there  was  a  large  number  of 
deserters  from  the  Roman  fleet  within  the  walls,  who  knew  that  they 
could  expect  no  mercy  if  it  were  surrendered  to  the  allies.  There- 
fore, when  a  reinforcement  was  successfully  thrown  into  the  town  by 
Philocles,  the  Macedonian  commander  of  Chalcis,  the  siege  on  the 
advice  of  Attains  was  abandoned.  Having  saved  Corinth  Philocles 
proceeded  to  Argos.  The  breach  with  Philip  was  exceedingly 
unpopular  there,  as  had  been  shown  since.  It  had  been  the  custom 
at  the  ordinary  assemblies  for  the  herald  to  join  the  name  of  Philip 
with  the  names  of  the  protecting  gods  of  the  city.  But  the  omission 
of  his  name  in  consequence  of  the  decree  of  Sicyon  caused  such  a 
storm  of  indignation,  that  the  herald  was  obliged  to  repeat  the 
formula  with  the  name  of  Philip  restored  to  its  place  of  honour. 
Satisfied,  therefore,  of  popular  support,  some  of  the  leading  men 
arranged  to  put  the  town  into  the  hands  of  Philocles,  the  Achaean 
garrison  being  allowed  to  depart  unharmed.  Thus,  though  the 
Achaean  League  had  formally  joined  the  allies,  Argos  and  Corinth 
still  remained  Macedonian. 

Meanwhile,  having  taken  Elateia,  Flamininus  put  his  army  into 
winter  quarters  in  various  towns  of  Locris  and  Phocis,  within  reach 
of  his  supplies  at  Anticyra  ;  while  the  fleet  under  his  brother  Lucius 
retired  as  usual  to  Corcyra.  Philip  was  not  yet  beaten,  and  still 
held  the  "  fetters  of  Greece  " — Demetrias,  Chalcis,  and  Acrocorinthus 
— yet  it  was  evident  that  Roman  influence  was  growing  to  be  para- 
mount, not  only  in  Greece,  but  in  Asia  also.  In  the  course  of  this 
year  Roman  legates  had  demanded  from  Antiochus  that  he  should 
abstain  from  attacking  the  territories  of  Attains,  and  had  been 
obeyed,  though  the  king  was  fresh  from  a  conquest  of  Coele-Syria. 
In  other  ways  Rome  was  finding  the  profit  of  her  extended  empire. 
Masannasa  had  shown  his  gratitude  by  the  despatch  of  Numidian 
cavalry,  elephants,  and  corn  to  the  seat  of  war ;  while  Sicily  and 
Sardinia  supplied  in  abundance  the  food  and  clothing  required  for 
the  army.  A  desultory  war  had  been  going  on  with  the  Boii  and 
the  Ligurians  ;  but  it  had  not  required  more  than  the  normal  con-'' 
sular  armies,  and  had  not  weighed  heavily  on  the  people,  and  had 


XXVIII  CONGRESS  AT  NICAEA  437 

often  indeed  added  to  the  wealth  poured  into  the  treasury  from 
Africa  and  Spain,  Philip  must  have  felt  conscious  that  he  was 
engaged  in  resisting  a  power  of  almost  inexhaustible  resources.  At 
any  rate  in  the  course  of  the  winter  (198-197)  he  sent  a  herald  to 
Flamininus,  inviting  him  to  attend  a  congress  of  the  several  states 
concerned  with  a  view  to  a  peaceful  settlement. 

To  Flamininus  the  suggestion  of  a  congress  was  welcome.      It  Flamin- 
need  commit  him  to  nothing;  and  if  he  were  superseded  in  197  he  ''-^^^ 
might  return  to  Rome  with  the  credit  of  having  finished  the  war.   '^^^^^^^*^' 
If  his  imperium  were  prolonged,  he  might  renew  operations,  should 
the  king  prove  unreasonable,  without  any  additional  difficulty.      He, 
however,  granted  as  a  favour  what  in  fact  he  desired,  in  order  that 
the  king  might  not  feel  himself  at  an  advantage. 

The   place   of  meeting  was    fixed    at    Nicaea,    on    the    Malian   The 
gulf,    between    Phocis    and    Thessaly.       The    king    came    by    sea  congress  of 
from  Demetrias,  with    the   Boeotian    Brachylles    and    the  Achaean  ^f^«^«. 
Cycliades.      Flamininus  was  accompanied  by  king  Amynander,  and  ^^o  ^^  ^^ 
there    were    legates    from    Achaia,    Rhodes,    and    Aetolia.       Philip 
declined  to  leave  his  ship,  and  on  Flamininus  asking  of  what  he  was 
afraid,  answered  proudly  that  he  feared  nothing  except  the  gods,  but 
that  he  distrusted  the  Aetolians.     "  If  there  is  a  chance  of  treachery," 
said  Flamininus,  "  the  danger  is  common  to  us  all."      ''  There  you 
are   wrong,"    replied   the   king ;    "  the    risk   is    not    the    same.        If 
Phaeneas  perished  there  are  many  Aetolians  who  could  be  strategus  ; 
if  I  fell  there  is  no  one  to  be  king  of  the  Macedonians." 

Flamininus  waived  the  point,  and  at  once  asked  for  the  king's 
demands.  Philip,  however,  professed  that  it  was  rather  the  part  of 
the  consul  to  state  on  what  terms  the  Romans  would  cease  to  attack 
him.  Thereupon  Flamininus  declared  that  the  king  must  evacuate  all 
Greek  towns  :  must  restore  prisoners  and  deserters  to  their  several 
states  :  hand  over  to  Rome  all  parts  of  Illyria  seized  since  the  peace 
of  Phoenice  (205),  and  to  Ptolemy  all  cities  taken  since  the  death  of 
Philopator.  To  these  demands  the  envoys  of  Attains  added  the 
restoration  of  ships  taken  in  the  battle  of  Chios,  and  the  repair  of 
temples  round  Pergamus.  The  Rhodians  asked  for  the  evacuation 
of  the  Peraea  and  certain  other  towns  in  Caria,  the  restoration  of 
Perinthus  to  Byzantium,  and  the  withdrawal  of  Macedonian  garrisons 
from  Sestos,  Abydos,  and  all  ports  and  harbours  in  Asia.  The 
Achaeans  demanded  Argos  and  Corinth  ;  the  Aetolians  that  Philip 
should  evacuate  Greece,  and  especially  should  restore  to  them  the 
cities  which  had  belonged  to  their  League.^ 

^  The  principal  cities  meant  are  Cius  and  Calchedon  in  Asia  ;  Lysimacheia  in 
the  Thracian  Chersonese  (Polyb.  xv.  23)  ;  Pharsalus,  Larissa  Cremaste,  Echinus, 
and  Phthiotid  Thebes  in  Thessaly  (Polyb.  xviii.  3). 


438 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Three 
months 
truce  to 
cotisult  the 
Senate. 

Stern 
answer  of 
the  Senate. 


J98-1Q7. 
The  war  is 
continued. 

Duplicity 
of  Nabis. 


PhiUfs 
difficulties. 


The  king  replied  to  these  demands — summed  up  by  Alexander 
Issius,  an  Aetolian — in  a  clever  and  sarcastic  speech,  which  seems  to 
have  amused  and  interested  Flamininus,  and  roused  some  sympathy 
with  the  king  in  his  mind.  He  promised  to  satisfy  some  of  the 
demands  of  Attalus  and  the  Rhodians,  but  he  refuted  with  pride  the 
arguments  of  the  Aetolians,  and  bitterly  reproached  the  Achaeans 
with  ingratitude,  though  he  offered  to  restore  Argos  to  them.  Finally 
he  announced  his  intention  of  dealing  with  Flamininus  alone,  and 
demanded  that  the  several  claims  should  be  handed  to  him  in  writ- 
ing. "  He  was  alone,  and  must  have  time  to  consider  them."  "  Of 
course  you  are  alone,"  said  Flamininus:  "you  have  put  all  your 
friends  worth  consulting  to  death."  The  king  only  replied  by  a  grim 
smile  to  this  sarcasm,  and  the  conference  broke  up  for  the  day.  On 
the  second  day  he  came  designedly  late,  and  demanded  a  private 
interview  with  Flamininus.  The  result  was  a  proposition  which 
failed  to  satisfy  fully  any  of  the  claims,  except  that  of  the  Achaeans, 
to  whom  he  offered  Argos  and  Corinth  ;  and,  finally,  on  the  third 
day  he  proposed  that  the  whole  matter  should  be  referred  to 
the  Senate — a  proposition  which  Flamininus,  with  some  difficulty, 
prevailed  upon  the  allies  to  accept.  A  truce  for  three  months 
was  arranged  on  the  king  consenting  to  withdraw  all  garrisons 
from  Locris  and  Phocis,  and  giving  a  written  undertaking  to  make 
no  attack  meanwhile  upon  any  state  allied  to  Rome. 

The  tone  of  the  Senate,  however,  was  uncompromising.  They 
listened  to  all  the  deputations  with  patience,  but  to  the  king's  envoys 
they  simply  put  the  question,  "  Would  Philip  surrender  the  three 
towns  ?  "  1  And  when  the  envoys  replied  that  they  had  no  authority 
to  make  such  a  promise,  they  were  at  once  dismissed.  The  imperiuDi 
of  Flamininus  was  continued,  with  full  discretion  as  to  making  peace  : 
no  embassy  was  to  be  again  received  from  Philip  unless  charged  with 
the  promise  of  evacuating  all  Greece. 

War  was  therefore  to  be  continued,  and  Philip  exerted  himself  to 
strengthen  his  army  and  secure  allies.  Abandoned  by  the  Achaeans 
he  turned  to  their  bitterest  enemy,  Nabis  of  Sparta,  offering  him 
Argos  as  the  price  of  his  alliance.  After  some  show  of  scruple  Nabis 
occupied  Argos,  from  which  he  and  his  wife  exacted  money  with  more 
than  their  usual  cruelty,  but  immediately  opened  communications^ 
with  Flamininus,  and  even  supplied  him  with  some  Cretan  archers,  ' 
at  the  same  time  making  a  four  months'  truce  with  the  Achaeans. 
In  recruiting  his  army  Philip  found  increased  difficulty.  His 
numerous  wars  had  drained  the  country,  and  he  had  to  enrol  men 
under  and  over  the  military  age  to  fill  up  his  thinned  ranks.      How- 


^  That  is,  Demetrias,  Chalcis,  and  Acrocorinthus. 


i 


XXVIII        FINAL  COMBAT  BETWEEN  PHILIP  AND  ROME        439 

ever,  by  the  end  of  March  he  was  at  Dium,  on  the  south-eastern 
coast  of  Macedonia,  and  there  set  vigorously  to  work  to  train  and 
drill  his  troops. 

Flamininus,  too,  was  early  on  the  move.     At  the  beginning  of  First 
spring  he  broke  up  his  quarters  at  Anticyra  and  entered   Boeotia.  -movements 
The    Macedonian    inclinations    of    the    Boeotians    were    notorious  ;  v       amin 
but   still   their   fears  caused   the  Thebans  to  meet   him  in   a   com- 
plimentary procession,  by  which   they   hoped    to    avoid    an    actual 
visit  to  their  town.     But  ignoring  their  real  wishes  Flamininus,  who 
had  a  considerable  body  of  troops  close  behind,  entered  the  gates 
with  the  deputation,  and,   accompanied  by  king  Attalus,   attended 
there  a  meeting  of  the  Boeotian  League.      The  arguments  which  he 
brought   forward   silenced,  if  they  did   not   convince,   the    Boeotian 
deputies,  and  in  a  few  days  he  was  able  to  set  out  to  join  his  main 
army  at  Elateia,  feeling  that  he  left  no  enemy  on  his  rear.i 

Philip,  too,  had  by  this  time  entered  Thessaly,  and  was  encamped 
at  Larissa.  The  two  armies  were  not  ill-matched  in  point  of  num- 
bers, though  the  Romans  were  somewhat  stronger  in  cavalry.  The 
flower  of  the  king's  army  was  a  body  of  1 6,000  heavy-armed  men, 
who  were  to  be  drawn  up  in  the  famous  Macedonian  phalanx,  sup- 
ported by  about  7000  light-armed  troops  of  various  nationality,  and 
2000  cavalry.  The  Roman  army  of  two  legions  with  their  usual  allies 
was  increased  by  about  6000  Aetolians,  infantry  and  cavalry,  who 
joined  at  Heracleia,  just  north  of  Thermopylae,  whither  Flamininus 
had  come  to  attend  a  meeting  of  the  Aetolian  League.  His  army 
was  farther  swollen  by  800  Cretan  bowmen  (procured  apparently 
by  Nabis)  and  1200  Athamanians  under  king  Amynander. 

The  two  armies  were  marching  by  different  roads,  and  for  some 
time  did  not  get  information  of  each  other's  whereabouts.  Philip  at 
Larissa  was  on  the  inland  road  leading  through  Pharsalus  ;  Flamininus, 
advancing  from  the  south,  was  on  the  coast  road  leading  by  Phthiotid 
Thebes  to  Pherae.  At  length,  hearing  that  Flamininus  was  between 
Phthiotid  Thebes  and  Pherae,  Philip  took  the  left-hand  road  from  Larissa 
leading  to  Pherae,  and  encamped  about  four  miles  north  of  it.  The 
two  armies  were  separated  by  a  low  range  of  hills  {Mons  Chalcodojiios\ 
which  concealed  them  from  each  other.  Their  cavalry,  sent  out  to  make 
reconnaissances,  came  into  collision  from  time  to  time,  the  advantage 

1  It  was  at  this  meeting  that  king  Attalus  was  struck  with  paralysis  as  he 
was  beginning  his  speech.  He  lingered  for  a  few  months,  and  was  taken  home 
to  Pergamus  to  die,  and  was  succeeded  by  his  son  Eumenes  II.  The  character 
of  this  "burgess  sovereign,"  as  Mommsen  calls  him,  is  presented  to  us  in  most 
attractive  colours  by  Polybius  and  Livy.  The  good  faith  to  his  public  engage- 
ments was  united  to  a  homely  affection  in  the  character  of  husband  and  father 
unusual  in  the  history  of  royal  families  of  the  age. 


440 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


generally  remaining  with  the  allies,  chiefly  owing  to  the  valour  of 
the  Aetolians.  But  neither  general  was  satisfied  with  his  position. 
Philip  presently  moved  to  the  west,  wishing  to  get  into  the  plain 
of   Scotussa,  both  as   being  better  suited  to  the  phalanx,   and  as 


THESSALY  &  SOUTHERN  MACEDONIA 


Walker  &•  Boxctall  sc. 
ENGLISH      MILES 
20 ^ 40 


supplied  with  abundance  of  corn.  Flamininus  divined  his  intention, 
and  moved  in  the  same  direction,  but  on  a  line  considerably 
south  of  the  king.  Thus  Philip  came  down  into  the  plain  of 
Scotussa  from  the  north,  round  the  foot  of  a  range  of  hills  called,  from 


1 


XXVIII  BATTLE  OF  CYNOSCEPHALAE  441 

their  shape,  the  Dogsheads  {Cynoscephalae)^  to  a  spot  called  Melan- 
tium  ;  Flamininus  entered  the  same  plain  by  the  south,  and  encamped 
on  the  road  to  Pharsalus,  near  a  temple  of  Thetis,  Philip  being  , 
anxious  to  reach  Scotussa  left  the  hills,  and,  in  spite  of  violent  rain, 
continued  his  advance  and  pitched  his  camp  in  the  plain,  sending 
back  a  reserve  to  occupy  the  ridge  of  Cynoscephalae. 

These  operations   had  taken   three  days.      The  next  morning  a  An 
thick  mist  following  the  rain  obscured  the  view,  and  Flamininus  sent  engagement 
out  some  cavalry  and  light  infantry  to  reconnoitre  the  enemy's  posi-  ^^  "  ^" ' 
tion.      These  men  came  unexpectedly  upon  the  Macedonian  reserves 
on  the  slopes,  the  mist  having  effectually  concealed  both  from  each 
other.      Reinforcements  were  sent  for  in  haste  by  both  to  their  re- 
spective camps,  the   Macedonians  at  first  getting  the  better  of  the 
encounter,    owing   to   their-  position   on    higher   ground  ;    while   the 
Romans  were  at  one  time  only  saved  from  decisive  disaster  by  the 
gallantry  of  the  Aetolian  cavalry. 

Phihp  had   not   expected   battle  on  that  day,  and  had,  in  fact,    The  battle 
detached  a  large  force  to  forage.      Moreover,  it  was  not  a  ground  rf  Cynos- 
favourable   to  the   phalanx :    they  were   too   near    the    hills,   which  ^^ ^^g    ' 
were   rough,  and  in   places  precipitous.      The  phalanx  required  an  autumn 
open  country,  and  it  was  chiefly  because  of  the  obstacles  presented  of  xgj. 
by  walls  and  gardens  and  streams  that  he  had  abandoned  his  posi- 
tion near   Pherae.      To  accept  battle  on  the  mountainous  ground, 
where  the  fighting  was  now  going  on,  would  be  even  worse. 

It  was  the  first  time,  at  any  rate  since  the  days  of  Pyrrhus,  The 
that  the  Romans  had  encountered  the  much-dreaded  Macedonian  phalanx. 
phalanx ;  and  though  they  presently  learnt  how  to  dislocate 
and  defeat  it,  the  alarm  which  it  inspired  was  long  in  dying 
out.  Thirty  years  later  L.  Aemilius,  the  victor  at  Pydna,  con- 
fessed that  he  had  never  beheld  anything  more  terrible.  The 
numbers  forming  the  phalanx  of  course  varied  according  to  circum- 
stances ;  but  its  normal  arrangement  consisted  in  massing  16,000 
men  in  close  order,  sixteen  deep,  involving  a  space  of  open  ground  at 
least  1000  yards  in  breadth.  They  were  armed  with  long  spears 
called  sarissae,  of  length  varying  from  sixteen  to  fourteen  cubits,  held 
in  such  a  manner  that  those  of  the  first  five  ranks  projected  in  front, 
and  presented  a  bristling  wall  of  steel.  The  sarissae  of  the  remaining 
eleven  ranks  were  held  in  a  slanting  direction  over  the  heads  of  the 
ranks  in  front,  and  formed  some  protection  against  missiles.  These 
eleven  ranks,  though  they  did  not  add  to  the  number  of  spears  pre- 
sented to  the  enemy,  added  enormously  to  the  weight  of  the  charge. 
Such  a  body  of  men,  moving  in  a  compact  mass,  would  come  with 
irresistible  force  upon  anything  opposed  to  it.  The  disadvantages 
were,  in  the  first  place,  the  difficulty  of  finding  sufficient  extent  of 


442 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


perfectly  unimpeded  ground  on  which  it  could  act ;  for  ditches,  banks, 
or  other  obstacles  dislocated  it  at  once.  In  the  next  place,  it  was 
effective  only  in  front.  The  men  were  so  closely  locked  together 
that  they  could  not  turn  either  to  flank  or  rear,  and  the  unwieldy 
length  of  the  sarissae  made  them  useless  except  for  the  one  move- 
ment. It  was  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  the  Romans,  with  their 
more  flexible  order  and  more  convenient  arms,  soon  found  how  to 
harass  and  defeat  the  phalanx.  When  it  charged  through  their  lines 
the  Roman  maniples  learnt  to  open  out  and  let  it  pass,  and,  unless  it 
was  supported  by  cavalry  or  light -armed  troops,  could  attack  it  on 
flank  or  rear,  when  their  short  strong  swords  could  be  used  with 
deadly  effect  on  men  encumbered  with  the  huge  and  burdensome 
sarissae. 

Philip  was  quite  aware  of  the  disadvantage  of  accepting  battle 
on  this  ground,  but  was  over -borne  by  repeated  messages  from 
the  field,  describing  in  exaggerated  terms  the  repulse  which 
the  Romans  had  sustained,  and  urging  him  to  strike  at  once. 
Reluctantly  he  got  his  men  out  of  camp,  and  occupied  the 
ground  from  which  the  advanced  guard  of  the  Romans  had  been 
driven,  and  there  massed  as  much  of  his  phalanx  as  there  was 
room  for.  This  was  his  right  wing,  which  he  commanded  in 
person,  and  it  proved  strong  enough  by  charging  downhill  to  scatter 
the  Roman  left.  But  his  left  wing  could  not  keep  together,  or  form 
up  in  time.  The  Roman  right  was  upon  them  while  still  dislocated 
by  the  nature  of  the  ground.  A  rapid  charge,  led  by  Flamininus 
and  preceded  by  the  elephants,  at  once  put  them  to  flight ;  and  the 
Roman  right  being  thus  victorious,  one  of  the  military  tribunes  by  a 
brilliant  manoeuvre  settled  the  result  of  the  whole  battle.  Instead  of 
joining  in  the  pursuit  he  led  his  division  to  the  rear  of  Philip's  right 
wing,  which  had  defeated  the  Roman  left,  and  charged.  The  king 
was  surprised  to  see  his  men,  when  apparently  victorious,  suddenly 
throwing  away  their  arms  and  turning  to  flight,  and  the  lately  defeated 
Romans  facing  round.  Gaining  some  high  ground  he  saw  that  they 
were  being  attacked  on  both  sides,  and  knew  that  all  was  lost.  He 
rallied  some  Thracian  and  Macedonian  cavalry,  and  fled  at  full  speed 
along  the  road  to  Tempe. 

The  immediate  effect  of  the  battle  was  to  put  an  end  to  Mace- 
donian influence  in  Greece.  Henceforward  it  would  be  to  Rome 
and  not  to  Pella  that  controversies  would  be  referred  and  applications 
for  help  made.  And  to  this  Philip  seems  at  once  to  have  made  up 
his  mind.  He  had  collected  the  remains  of  his  army,  and  effected 
his  retreat  within  his  frontiers.  The  loss  had  not  been  numerically 
great  in  comparison  with  other  important  battles,  but  the  moral  effect 
he  knew  would  be  overwhelming;   he  therefore  immediately  sent  a 


XXVIII  TERMS  SETTLED  AT  TEMPE  443 

herald  asking  for  a  truce  to  bury  his  dead  and  for  a  personal  inter- 
view with  the  proconsul.  Flamininus,  scorning  the  insinuation  of  the 
Aetolians  that  he  was  influenced  by  royal  gold,  granted  an  armistice 
of  fifteen  days,  and  agreed  to  meet  the  king  at  Tempe. 

The  king  came  to  this  meeting  with  the  knowledge  of  other  reverses  Other 
to  his  arms  and  allies.     In  Peloponnesus  Androsthenes,  commandant  reverses  of 
at  Corinth,  had  sustained  a  severe  defeat  from  the  Achaeans  stationed  f^^^l^f^ 
at  Sicyon ;  in  Asia  the  Rhodians  had  recovered  the  Peraea  in  Caria  Peiopon- 
and  other  cities  close  by ;  and  lastly  the  Acarnanians,  who  still  clung  nesus, 
to  him — partly  from  loyalty  and  partly  from  hatred  to  the  Aetolians  Carta, 
— had  been  forced  to  submit  to  the  fleet  under  Lucius  Flamininus.   ^^carnania 
On  all  sides  therefore  Philip  found  his  cause  depressed  and  that  of  j(^y 
Rome  triumphant,  and  he  must  have  felt  that  the  very  existence  of 
his  dynasty  now  hung  on  the  moderation  of  the  proconsul. 

Flamininus  had  no  disposition,  however,  to  push  the  king  to  ex-  Moder- 
tremity,    or  to  destroy  Macedonia.       He   represents   the  best   and  ation  of 
most    honourable    phase    of   Roman   policy  towards    Greece.       He  f^^^^«- 
seems  really  to  have  wished  for  its  liberty  and  prosperity  ;  and,  like  fQ^ards 
some  of  the  wisest  Greeks  themselves,  regarded  a  strong  Macedonia  Philip^ 
as  a  necessary  bulwark  against  the  northern  barbarians.      Nor  did  and  his 
he   intend   that    Philip's   place   in  Greece   should   be   taken   by  the  ^^^.fj^^^fj'^' 
Aetolians,  who  were  likely  to  be  equally  oppressive  to  other  Greeks  Aetolians. 
and  more  dangerous  to  trade  on  the  seas.      He  had  been  annoyed 
by  the  arrogance  with  which  they  claimed  the  credit  for  the  victory 
at  Cynoscephalae,  and  still  more  by  their  cupidity  in  plundering  the 
king's  camp  before  any  Roman  troops  arrived,  and  he  did  not  dis- 
guise his  resentment.      He  refrained  from  consulting  Aetolian  officers, 
and  declined  to  admit   their  claim   under  the  treaty  of  2 ii  to  the 
possession  of  all  towns  taken,  since  they  had  forfeited  it  by  making 
a  separate  treaty  with  PhiHp  in  205.      And  now  to  their  disgust  he 
showed  every  intention  of  treating  Philip  with  moderation. 

Philip  did  not  appear  at  the  conference  of  Tempe  till  the  third  Conference 
day,  when  the  allies  had  already  discussed  the  terms  to  be  offered  at  Teinpe. 
him.  Flamininus  declared  his  intention  of  enforcing  nothing  more 
than  had  been  demanded  before — the  evacuation  of  all  Greek  towns ; 
and  this  had  been  approved  by  all  except  the  Aetolians,  who  main- 
tained that  the  freedom  of  Greece  could  only  be  secured  by  his 
deposition.  When  Philip  arrived  he  anticipated  all  demands  by  at 
once  offering  this  evacuation.  Thereupon  the  Aetolian  Phaeneas 
somewhat  roughly  asked  why  the  Thessalian  towns — Pharsalus, 
Larissa  Cremaste,  Echinus,  and  Phthiotid  Thebes — were  not  at 
once  restored  to  the  Aetolian  League.  Philip  replied  that  they  were 
welcome  to  take  them.  But  here  Flamininus  interposed.  These 
towns,   except  Thebes,  had  voluntarily  submitted  to  Rome  :    their 


444 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


position  would  have  to  be  decided  by  the  Senate.  Thebes  had 
resisted  and  been  captured,  and  the  Aetolians  might  therefore  take 
that,  but  only  that.  The  Aetolians,  who  had  hoped  to  regain  all 
they  had  lost,  exclaimed,  that  by  the  fall  of  Philip  Greece  had  only 
got  a  change  of  masters.  In  spite,  however,  of  their  discontent, 
a  four  months'  truce  was  arranged,  to  allow  of  the  necessary 
reference  to  Rome,  and  the  king  having  paid  200  talents  and 
given  his  son  Demetrius  and  others  as  hostages  (to  be  restored  should 
the  senate  refuse  ratification),  Flamininus  went  into  winter  quarters 
at  Elateia,  sending  delegates  to  Rome  along  with  the  ambassadors 
of  the  king. 

The  news  of  the  victory  of  Cynoscephalae  caused  great  joy  at 
Rome,  and  the  peace  was  exceedingly  welcome.  Flamininus  was 
continued  in  his  command  for  another  year  (196) — though  the  new 
consuls  both  desired  the  province — and  ten  commissioners  were 
named  to  proceed  to  Greece  and  settle  the  details  of  the  new  arrange- 
ment in  consultation  with  him. 

The  Senate,  however,  laid  down  general  principles.  Greek  cities 
in  Europe  and  Asia  were  to  be  free  and  autonomous  ;  but  those  at 
present  under  the  authority  of  the  king,  or  in  which  there  was  a 
Macedonian  garrison,  were  to  be  surrendered  to  the  commissioners 
before  the  next  Isthmian  games  (July),  to  be  dealt  with  separately. 
The  Greek  states  in  Asia,  which  had  been  occupied  by  Philip,^  were 
to  be  set  free  at  once,  and  the  restitution  of  Cius  demanded  from 
Prusias.  Farther,  the  king  was  to  restore  all  captives  and  deserters, 
surrender  all  but  three  war-vessels, — besides  his  own  sixteen-banked 
galley, — and  pay  1000  talents  (about  ;!{^24o,ooo),  half  at  once,  and  the 
rest  in  ten  annual  instalments.  The  object  of  the  distinction  between 
the  Greek  towns  in  Asia  (which  were  at  once  to  be  set  free)  and 
those  in  Europe  seems  to  have  been  that  the  case  of  Demetrias, 
Chalcis,  and  Acrocorinthus  might  be  reserved.  It  was  not  clear 
whether  these  "fetters  of  Greece"  could  as  yet  be  safely  abandoned. 
This  was  a  point  that  Flamininus  and  the  commissioners  would  have 
to  decide. 

The  Roman  commission  opened  its  session  at  Corinth  in  the 
spring  of  196.  In  spite  of  the  loud  remonstrances  of  the  Aetolians, 
and,  as  it  seems,  against  the  advice  of  Flamininus,  the  commissioners 
resolved  for  the  present  to  retain  the  three  towns.  They  had  been 
warned  before  leaving  Rome  of  the  danger  threatening  from  the 
possible  interference  of  Antiochus  in  the  affairs  of  Greece.  He  had 
taken  Coele-Syria  from  the  king  of  Egypt,  had  secured  Ephesus,  and 
had  only  been  prevented  from  giving  active  aid  to  Philip  in  Europe 

^  Euromus,  Bargylia,   lasus,   Abydos,  Myrina,    Perinthus,  and  the  island  of 
Thasos. 


XXVIII        PROCLAMATION  AT  THE  ISTHMIAN  GAMES  445 

by  the  threatening  attitude  of  the  powerful  Rhodian  fleet ;  and  m 
197  had  crossed  to  the  Thracian  Chersonese  and  taken  possession 
of  the  nearly  abandoned  town  of  Lysimacheia.  At  any  moment 
intrigues  in  Greece  might  invite  him  farther  south.  The  com- 
missioners therefore  could  only  be  induced  to  grant  the  town  of 
Corinth  to  the  Achaean  League.  Acrocorinthus,  Chalcis,  and 
Demetrias  were  still  to  have  Roman  garrisons. 

As  the  time  for  the  Isthmian  games  approached  the  excitement  Prodama- 
throughout  Greece  as  to  the  decision  of  the  commissioners  rose  high,  ^^^^  ^f  ^^ 
and  drew  an  unusually  large  number  of  spectators  to  Corinth.      The  ^^^"-^^^^ 
most  various  and  contradictory  rumours   had  been  spread  abroad,  j^iy  jg(,, 
and  the  announcement  from   Flamininus  was  awaited  by  the  crowd 
in   the   stadium  with  the  greatest   anxiety.       The   herald's  trumpet 
suddenly  sounded,  and  his  voice  was  heard  proclaiming  silence.     He 
then  read  the  decree  :    "  The  Senate  of  Rome  and  T.  Quinctius,  pro- 
consul and  imperator,  having  conquered  king  Philip  and  the  Mace- 
donians,   declare    the   following    peoples   free,    without    garrison    or 
tribute,  in  full  enjoyment  of  the  laws  of  their  respective  countries, 
namely,    Corinthians,    Phocians,    Locrians,  Euboeans,    Achaeans   of 
Phthiotis,  Magnesians,  Thessalians,  Perrhaebians." 

These  included  the  districts  and  towns  which  had  been  more  or  Feelings 
less  under  control  of  Philip,  and  as  to  which  it  had  not  hitherto  been  excited  by 
known  whether  the  Romans  meant  to  retain  rule  over  them  or  to  set  ^^' 
them  free.      The  sentence  therefore  which  announced  their  freedom 
was  received  with  such  a  storm  of  applause  that  the  full  list  of  names 
was    not    heard,    and   the    herald   was   compelled    to  repeat    them. 
In  the  wild  outburst  of  joy  at  what  seemed  the  realisation  of  their 
best  hopes,  the  people  overwhelmed  Flamininus  with  the  expression 
of  gratitude.      He  was  almost  crushed  to  death  by  the  crowds  that 
pressed  round  him  to  touch  his  hand,  and  almost  smothered  under 
the  garlands  and  flowers  which  they  showered  upon  him.i 

It  was  a  great  work  done  effectively  and  with  honest  intention.  Full  effects 
and  it  was  not  Rome  but  the  Aetolians  who  afterwards  brought  its  ^f  ^^^ 
results  into  jeopardy.      No  doubt,  when  the  first  flush  of  enthusiasm  ^^^^^^^^• 
was  over,  there  seemed  something  in  what  the  Aetolians  were  always 
saying,  that  Greece  could  not  be  free  with  foreign  garrisons   at  the 
three  "fetters."     But  even  this  pretext  for  discontent  was  before  long 
removed  by  Flamininus.      Nor  did  his  settlement  show  any  jealousy 
of  Greek  confederations.     Phocis  and  Locris  were  joined  again  to  the 
Aetolian   League,  and  Corinth  with  some  other  towns  was  adjudged 

^  This  famous  scene  is  often  alluded  to  as  a  proclamation  of  the  freedom  of 

Greece.      It  will  be  observed   that   its   application   is   limited   to  those   parts  of 

Greece  which  had  been  in  the  hands  of  the  king  of  Macedonia.  Of  the  rest  of 
Greece  there  was  no  question. 


446 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


to  the  Achaean  League.  The  outlying  towns  indeed,  which  had  once 
been  in  pohtical  union  with  AetoHa,  were  to  be  free  and  autonomous,  and 
the  Aetohans  were  specially  annoyed  at  not  being  allowed  to  have 
Division  of  Pharsalus  and  Leucas,  But  it  was  in  Thessaly  that  the  commissioners 
Thessaly.  had  most  to  do,  for  it  had  more  than  any  other  part  of  Greece  been 
absorbed  in  Macedonia.  Four  communities  were  erected  or  restored 
which  had  been  loosely  included  under  that  designation — Perrhae- 
bians,  Dolopes,  Magnesians,  and  the  remainder  to  be  called  Thessaly. 
Each  of  these  four  were  to  be  autonomous.  The  wishes  or  claims  of 
particular  towns  within  these  districts  had  to  be  considered  separately, 
and  we  find  traces  of  disputes  and  arbitrations  in  such  cases  extending 
for  some  years  onwards.^  In  Euboea  it  was  proposed  to  give  Oreus, 
Eretria,  and  Carystus  to  the  king  of  Pergamus  ;  but  finally  they  too 
were  declared  free.  Some  rectifications  of  the  Macedonian  frontier 
toward  Epirus  and  Illyria  were  also  made.  Thus  the  Orestae  were 
declared  autonomous  ;  the  Illyrian  towns  Lychnis  and  Parthus  were 
given  to  Pleuratus  ;  and  others  to  Amynander.  The  general  tend- 
ency was  to  consolidate  nationalities,  and  to  discourage  distant  pos- 
sessions, or  the  holding  of  isolated  towns  in  one  district  by  the  people 
of  another.  When  the  awards  were  completed,  the  commissioners 
separated  to  the  several  districts  assigned  to  them,  to  see  that  the 
arrangements  were  carried  out,  both  in  Europe  and  Asia  Minor. 

Those  who  had  undertaken  Caria  afterwards  visited  Antiochus  at 
Lysimacheia,  in  the  Thracian  Chersonese,  where  they  were  met  by 
some  of  the  other  commissioners  who  had  already  been  in  Egypt. 
They  expressed  their  surprise  that  he  should  have  crossed  to  Europe 
with  so  large  an  army  and  fleet,  and  demanded  that  he  should  evacuate 
all  Greek  towns  taken  from  Ptolemy,  or  which  had  been  subject  to 
Philip,  and  attack  none  already  autonomous.  The  king  declined  to 
admit  the  right  of  Rome  to  interfere  in  Asia  ;  and  maintained  that  he 
was  in  the  Chersonese  to  recover  what  was  rightfully  his,  and  was  at 
that  moment  engaged  in  restoring  Lysimacheia,  left  to  the  mercy  of 
surrounding  barbarians,  who  had  plundered  and  depopulated  it.  As 
to  Ptolemy,  he  had  already  made  peace  with  him,  and  confirmed  it  by 
a  matrimonial  alliance.  The  embassy  led  to  no  result,  and  was 
presently  interrupted  by  a  false  report  of  the  death  of  Ptolemy, 
in  consequence  of  which  Antiochus  dismissed  the  ambassadors 
and  hurried  off  to  Cyprus,  leaving  his  son  Seleucus  in  charge  of 
Lysimacheia. 


^  For  instance,  in  an  inscription  lately  discovered  containing  the  final  decree 
of  the  Senate  in  a  dispute  between  Narthakion  and  Melite  in  Thessaly,  which 
had  been  decided  by  Flanuninus,  then  referred  to  the  arbitration  of  the  Samians 
and  other  states,  and  finally  laid  before  the  Senate. — Bulletin  de  Correspondance 
Helldnique,  vi.  364. 


XXVIII  CONFEDERACY  AGAINST  NABIS  447 

For  the  present  no  farther  step  was  taken.     A  nearer  if  not  a  Flamin- 
greater  danger  threatened  the  tranquilHty  of  Greece  in  the  person  of  inus  still 
Nabis  tyrant  of  Sparta.      The  imperium  of  Flamininus  was  again  ex-  ^"-  ^^^^^^^' 
tended  for  the  year  195  :  for  though  Philip  had  not  only  submitted,     ^ 
but  had  asked  to  become  a  "  friend  and  ally "  of  Rome,  there  was 
still  business  to  be  done  in   Greece,  and  the  army  was  still  there. 
The  commissioners  in  their  report,  while  warning  the  Senate  of  the 
danger    impending   from   Antiochus,    had    declared    the    pretensions 
and  conduct  of  Nabis  to  be  the  most  immediate  peril.     The  question 
of  peace  or  war  with  Nabis  therefore  had  been  committed  to  the 
discretion  of  Flamininus.       Early  in    195   he  proceeded  to   Corinth 
and  summoned  a  conference  of  Greek  states  and  allies.      They  were 
unanimous  in  favour  of  war  with  the  tyrant,  who,  besides  his  other 
numerous  acts  of  aggression,  was  in  occupation  of  Argos, — a  city  of 
the  Achaean  League.       The   only  discordant   note   came   from  the 
Aetolians,  who  wished  the  war  to  be  left  to  themselves,  and  that  the 
Roman  troops  should  be  immediately  withdrawn  from  Greece.     The 
rest,  however,  were  ready  to  co-operate  with  Flamininus  :  Eumenes,   Confed- 
the  Rhodians,  and  king  Philip  all  sent  ships  or  men,  and  cavalry  ^''^O' 
was  raised  in  Thessaly.      L.  Quintius  brought  the  Roman  fleet  from  ^^^J"^^ 
Corcyra  and  blockaded  Gythium,   the  chief  port  of  Laconia,   while  spuria, 
Titus  himself  proceeded  to  attack  Argos  ;  and  when  Argos  showed  iqs- 
no  signs  of  wishing  to  get  rid  of  its  Spartan  garrison,  he  transferred 
the  attack  to  Sparta  itself.      Sparta  was  no  longer,  as  in  old  times, 
an  open  town  ;  it  had  been  recently  strengthened  by  a  wall  and  ditch 
by  Nabis  himself,  who  had  now  a  strong  force  of  Cretans,  guarding 
the  walls.     Yet  he  was  soon  reduced  to  negotiate  ;  and  could  urge  that  Siege  of 
he  was  no  worse  than  when  the  Roman  proconsul  had  accepted  his  Sparta. 
alliance  against  Philip.     But  Flamininus  replied  by  pointing  to  his  sub- 
sequent cruelties  at  Argos  and  the  piracies  of  his  fleet ;  and  declared  that, 
the  Romans  being  determined  to  complete  their  task  of  freeing  Greece, 
he  must  submit  or  stand  a  siege  :  he  might,  however,  have  a  truce 
in  order  to  send  ambassadors  to  Rome,  on  condition  of  immediately 
evacuating  Argos  and  other  towns  in  Argolis  ;    restoring   all  ships 
taken  from  maritime  towns  ;  surrendering  all  his  own  ships  except 
two  galleys  ;  restoring  exiles  to  their  property  and  civil  rights  ;  dis- 
missing his  mercenaries  ;  abandoning  all  possessions  in   Crete,  and 
refraining  from  external  alliances  and  wars  ;  withdrawing  garrisons 
from  all  towns  which  sought  the  protection  of  Rome  ;  building  no 
more  forts  either  in  his  own  or  other  territory  ;  and,  lastly,  on  pay- 
ing 150  talents.      Nabis  naturally  wished  to  reject  such  terms,  which 
would  reduce  him  to  the  position  of  a  petty  inland  prince  surrounded 
by  enemies.     The  allies,  on  the  other  hand,  were  against  allowing 
him  even  that  alternative  :    and  were  only  persuaded  by  Flamininus 


CHAPTER    XXIX 

WARS    WITH    THE    BOH    AND    LIGURES,    AND    IN    SPAIN 
200-178 


PROVINCES 

COLONIES- 

-continued 

[Hispania,  Citerior  and  Ulterior] 

Parma     "j 

B.C. 

197 

Mutina      >- 

.       B.C. 

183 

Gallia  Cisalpina           .         .B.C. 

181 

Saturnia  j 

Graviscae  . 

.       B.C. 

181 

COLONIES 

Aquileia    . 

.       B.C. 

181 

Bononia    .          .          .          .B.C. 

189 

Luna        \ 
Pisae        J 
Luca 

Pollentia  \                                  ^  ^ 
PisaurumJ 

184 

.      B.C. 
.       B.C. 

180 
177 

I.  The  Boil — The  importance  of  the  struggle  with  them  and  the  Ligures — The 
Boil  attack  Cremona  and  Placentia  (199) — The  Insubres  help  the  Boil,  and 
are  defeated  by  C.  Cornelius  Cethegus  (197) — Marcellus  takes  Felsina  (196) 
— L.  Cornelius  Merula  defeats  the  Boii,  but  is  refused  a  triumph  (193) — Scipio 
Nasica  finally  conquers  the  Boii  (191) — The  province  of  Gaul  informal  from 
191,  formal  from  181  —  Road  made  from  Bononia  to  Arretium,  and  the 
construction  of  the  via  Aemilia  (187) — Colonies  at  Pollentia,  Pisaurum, 
BoNONiA,  Parma,  Mutina,  and  Aquileia  (189-183)  —  Ligures:  The 
Friniates  and  Apuani  threaten  Pisae  and  Bononia  (187),  defeat  Q.  Marcius 
(186),  but  are  defeated  by  M.  Sempronius  Tuditanus  (186),  and  finally 
crushed  by  L.  Aemilius  Paullus  (181),  and  are  transferred  by  M.  Baebius  to 
Samnium  (180) — Colonies  at  Pisae  and  Luna.  H.  Spain — Extent  of  Roman 
power  in  Spain — The  limits  of  the  provinces  of  Hispania  Citerior  and  Ulterior — 
Hostility  of  the  Celtiberi  (205-198) — Appointment  of  two  additional  praetors 
for  Spain  (197) — Serious  risings  (197-196) — Cato  comes  to  Spain  as  consul, 
defeats  the  Spaniards  near  Emporiae,  and  advances  to  Tarraco — Causes  the 
towns  to  throw  down  their  walls — Assists  the  praetor  of  Hispania  Ulterior — 
Takes  Vergium  Castrum  (195-194) — Reverses  of  Sex.  Digitius  (194-193) — P. 
Cornelius  Scipio  Cn.  f.  conquers  the  Lusitani — C.  Flaminius  the  Oretani 
(193-192)  —  Twelve  years  comparative  peace  in  Spain  (191-179)  —  Great 
Celtiberian  rising  (181-179; — Victories  of  Tib.  Sempronius  Gracchus  and  his 
settlement  (179-178). 

The  wars  with  Philip  and  the  settlement  of  Greece  by  Flamininus 
were  followed  closely  by  the  struggle  with  Antiochus  (193-190)  ; 
and  these  led  by  slow  but  inevitable  steps  to   the   formation  of  a 


CH.  XXIX  SUBJECTION  OF  SPAIN,  THE  BOII  AND  LIGURIANS  451 

Roman  empire  in  the  East.      But  meanwhile  in  the  West  also  the  The 

Romans    were    making    steady    progress,   were    consolidating    their  consoli- 

power  in    Italy,  and  laying   the   foundation    of  a    new  Romanised  J^   Jlr  . 

Spain  ;  though  it  was  not  till  the  end  of  the  Numantine  war  (133)  200-181! 

that  the  Spanish  provinces  were  fully  established ;    and  even  then 

the  Lusitani  still  gave  trouble,  and  the  Cantabri  and  Astures  remained 

a  constant  source  of  danger  till  their  defeat  in  the  time  of  Augustus 

(20).      In  Italy  the  Ligurians  on  the  north-west,  and  the  Boii  in 

the  Cispadane  valley,  often  assisted  by  the  Insubres  on  the  north  of 

the   Po,  had  caused  frequent  alarms  during  the  Hannibalian  war ; 

and  their  hostility  continued  when  that  war  was  at  an  end.      If  the 

Romans  were  to  be  masters  of  the  whole  of  Italy  south  of  the  Alps, 

and  to  command  the  Riviera  as  an  approach  to  Spain,  it  was  necessary 

to  pacify  or  crush  these  tribes.      It  was  therefore  in  Spain  and  in 

North   Italy  that  during  this  period,  and  for  many  years  afterwards, 

the  most  persistent  efforts  of  Rome  were  maintained.     Making  less 

noise  in  the  world  than  the  more  sensational  victories  in  Macedonia, 

Greece,  or  Asia,  the  Spanish  and  Italian  campaigns,  renewed  year 

after  year,  now  with  conspicuous  success  and  now  with  disheartening 

failure,  not  only  best  illustrate  the  dogged  persistence  of  the  Roman 

character,  but  also  resulted  eventually  in  forming  the  most  permanent 

and  solid  basis  of  the  empire. 

The  nucleus  of  the  Roman  power  in  the  valley  of  the  Po  was   The  Boii 

formed  by  the  colonies  of  Cremona  and  Placentia,  established  in  <^nd 

218  after  the  great   Gallic  war  of  224-222.     These   colonies   had  ^^1^^^^ 

been  the  chief  object  of  attack  in  the  rising  of  the  Boii  and  Insubres  Cremona 

in  200,  which  had  been  promoted  by  the  Carthaginian  Hamilcar,  a  and 

survivor  of  the  forces  of  Hasdrubal  or  Mago.      Prompt  orders  were  Placentia, 

sent  to  Carthage  to  recall  Hamilcar  ;  and  though  the  Carthaginian  ^^/  ^''^  ^ 

,      ,  ,        ,  •         ,  1  1  defeated  by 

government   had  no   power   to   do   this,    they  endeavoured  to  save  j^  Furius 

themselves  from  Roman  vengeance  by  declaring  him  an  exile  and  Purpurea, 
confiscating  his  property.      The  question,  however,  was  settled  by  a  200. 
decisive  victory  gained  over  the   Gauls  by  L.   Furius  Purpureo,  in 
which   Hamilcar  perished.       From  that  time  forward  year  by  year 
a  praetor  or  a  consul,   or  sometimes  both  consuls,  had   the   duty 
allotted  to  them  of  continuing  the  struggle. 

And  side  by  side  with  this  was  the  struggle  with  the  Li-  The 
gurians,  —  hardy  mountaineers  of  the  rugged  Apennines  or  Ligurians. 
audacious  pirates  on  the  seas, — who  had  also  during  the  Hanni- 
balian war  remained  faithful  to  Carthage,  and  were  now  always 
ready  to  help  the  Boii.  They  had  joined  in  the  attack  upon 
Cremona  and  Placentia  in  200,  and  were  continually  invading 
or  threatening  the  territory  of  Pisae,  which  for  some  period 
previous   to    225   had  been  closely  allied  with   Rome — the  port  for 


452 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


i()j.    The 

Ligurian 

llvates, 

and  the 

Boii. 

Coss.  C. 

Cornelius 

Cethegus,  Q 

Minucius 

Rufus. 


her  shiJDS  sailing  to  Spain,  and  the  bdse  for  her  military  operations 
in  north-west  Italy.  There  was,  therefore,  every  motive  on  the 
part  of  the  Romans  to  force  the  Ligurians  to  submit  or  at  least  to 
remain  passive  within  their  frontiers.  Wfe  find  accordingly  that 
during  this  period  the  consular  armies  are  almost  constantly  divided 
between  them  and  the  Boii.  The  two  wars  go  on  side  by  side  : 
when  the  Ligurians  are  quiescent  or  sustain  a  heavy  defeat,  the 
Rbman  legions  are  led  off  to  assist  those  engaged  with  the  Boii : 
when  the  Boii  are  forced  to  hide  themselves  in  their  villages  or 
woods,  the  legions  engaged  with  the  Ligurians  are  reinforced  by 
those  from  the  valley  of  the  Po.  The  consuls  had,  as  the  phrase 
went,  the  "  province  of  Italy,"  and  their  duties  were  not  always 
defined  more  closely. 

In  the  year  after  the  repulse  of  the  attack  upon  Cremona  and 
Placentia  (199)  the  praetor  Gnaeus  Baebius  Tamphilus  sustained  a 
severe  defeat  at  the  hands  of  the  Insubres,  then  in  alliance  with  the 
Boii ;  nor  did  the  consul  Lentulus,  who  took  over  his  command, 
contrive  to  wipe  out  the  disgrace  by  any  brilliant  exploit ;  nor  the 
consul  of  the  following  year  (198),  Sextus  Aelius  Paetus,  though 
supported  by  the  army  of  the  previous  year  in  addition  to  his  own, 
under  the  praetor  Gaius  Helvius.  The  presence  of  the  two  armies, 
however,  overawed  the  Boii  and  their  allies,  and  the  consul  had  only 
to  continue  the  measures  of  his  predecessors  for  the  restoration  of 
Cremona  and  Placentia.  There  seemed  profound  peace  throughout 
Italy,  broken  only  by  a  servile  outbreak  at  Setia,  which,  though 
causing  great  alarm  at  Rome,  was  easily  suppressed. 

Yet  in  197  both  consuls,  with  full  consular  armies,  were 
employed  in  North  Italy  ;  for  fresh  outbreaks  were  threatened  both 
in  Liguria  and  the  valley  of  the  Po,  and  the  Insubres  were  preparing 
to  cross  the  river,  in  conjunction  with  the  Cenomani,  to  assist  the 
Boii.  But  the  Cenomani  had  long  been  faithful  allies  of  thfe 
Romans,  and  in  the  battle  with  C.  Cornelius  which  now  took  place 
on  the  Mincius,  deserted  their  kinsfolk  and  joined  the  consul,  who 
entirely  defeated  and  scattered  the  Insubrian  forces.  The  othfer 
consul,  Minucius,  failed  to  bring  the  Boii  to  a  pitched  battle  ;  but 
finding  them  dismayed  by  the  defeat  of  their  allies,  and  therefore 
abstaining  for  the  present  from  any  hostile  demonstration,  he  was 
able  to  lead  his  forces  against  the  llvates,  the  only  Ligurian  tribe  at 
the  moment  in  arms.  The  llvates  submitted  ;  and  these  operations^ 
the  details  of  which  are  very  obscure,  were  considered  to  justify  a 
four  days'  suppHcatio  at  Rome. 

Yet  how  little  had  been  really  accompHshed  was  shown  next  year 
when  both  consuls  were  sent  agdinst  the  Boil  who  inflicted  a  some- 
what severe  defeat  upon  Marcellus  (son  of  the  famous  opponent  of 


XXIX  WARS  IN  NORTH  ITALY  453 

Hannibal),  forcing  him  to  remain  for  some  time  within  his  entrenched  Tg6.  Coss. 
camp.      They  had  not,  however,  sufficient  endurance  to  persevere  in  ^-  Purius 
beleaguering  a  camp,  and  soon  dispersed.     Whereupon  Marcellus    _^^P^^^°^ 
crossed  the  Po,  entered  the  district  of  Comum,  and  gained  a  great  Claudius 
victory  over  the  Insubres.      He  took  the  town  of  Comum,  and  forced  Marcellus. 
the  Insubres  to  scatter  into  their  villages,  and  then  being  joined  by  After  some 
his  colleague  L.  Furius,  the  two  returned  to  the  territory  of  the  Boii  ^^^^^% 
and    received    the    submission    of   Felsina   (Bononia).      Thence   he  f^kes 
marched  against  the  Ligurian  tribes,  the  Laevi  and  Libici,  who  were  Felsina 
again   in   arms.      But   the   Boii  hung  upon  the  rear  of  the  Roman  <^^d  defeats 
army,   and   as    it  was    retiring   from   Liguria  ventured  to  attack  it.      ^ 
They  were  repulsed  with  great  slaughter,  and  Marcellus  was  allowed 
a  triumph  over  them  and  the  Comenses. 

The  next  year  was  not  marked  by  any  great  event.     One  of  the  igs-  Coss. 
consuls  (Cato)  went  to  Spain.      The  other  (Valerius  Flaccus)  fought  ^-  Valerius 
a    successful    battle    with    the    Boii    at   the  silva  Litana,    between  ^  porcius 
Bononia    and    Placentia,    the    scene    of    the    defeat    and    death    of  Cato. 
Postumius  in  216.      It  seems  not  to  have  been  till  the  spring  of  the  ig4.  Coss. 
next  year  (194)  that  he  crossed  the  Po  and  met  another  combined  ^-  ^f^P^o 
army  of  Boii   and  Insubres  near  Mediolanum.     When  he  had  de-  jjxl^^ 
feated  them  he  was  summoned  south  of  the  Po  again  to  join  the  new  Sempron- 
consul   Sempronius   Longus,   his   own    imperium   having  been  pro-  ius  Longus. 
longed   for  a  year.      Before   he   could   effect   a  junction  with  him, 
Sempronius  had  been  attacked  by  the  Boii,  and  had  retired   with 
considerable    loss    to    Placentia.       According    to    some    authorities 
he  was  relieved  by  his  colleague  Scipio  ;  but  the  fact  seems  to  be 
that  nothing  of  importance  occurred  during    the  rest   of  the  year, 
and  that  when  his  imperium  as   proconsul   was  extended   for  the 
year    193   Sempronius  was  still  at  Placentia  and  unable   to   make 
any   farther  movement ;    and    that,  as   a    result    of  this    failure,  a 
great  rising  for  the  year  of  193  both  of  Ligurians  and  Boii  appeared 
irnminent. 

A  force  had  been  sent  to  Pisae  in  195  under  P.  Porcius  Laeca,  igj. 
and  was  still  there  under  the  command  of  M.  Cincius.      From  the  ^°^^-  ■^; 
latter  came  a  despatch  in  the  spring  of  193  which  dissipated  any  j^^J^l^i^^n 
hopes  of  peace  which  might  have  been  entertained.      It  announced  Minucius  ' 
that  "  meetings  of  the  Ligurian  confederation  were  being  held  ;  that   Thermus. 
the   territory  of   Luna    had    been    ravaged ;    the   territory  of  Pisae  Great 
entered  ;  and  the  whole  coast  was  being  plundered."     The  alarm  was  ^^^-^  j 
farther  increased    by  a   despatch   from   the  proconsul    Sempronius  Ligurians. 
Longus,  announcing  that  i  5,000  Ligures  were  all  but  at  the  gates  of 
Placentia,  and  that  the  Boii  were  on  the  point  of  rising.      The  Senate 
declared  a  tumultus  in  Gaul.      Minucius,   who   had  appointed   his 
levy  to  meet  at  Arretium,  was  ordered  to  his  '  province '  of  Liguria 


454 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Minucius 
at  Pisae, 
193-192- 


Victory 
over  the 
Ligures. 


L. 

Cornelius 
overcomes 
the  Boii, 
192. 


Cornelius 
refused  a 
triumph. 


at  once.  Two  of  the  praetors  were  to  have  an  additional  army 
of  3000  foot  and  100  horse,  together  with  5000  foot  of  Socii  and 
200  horse.  All  applications  for  furlough  were  postponed  ;  and  the 
other  consul,  Cornelius,  was  directed  to  relieve  Placentia. 

Minucius  met  his  army  at  Arretium,  and  marched  down  the 
valley  of  the  Arno  to  Pisae.  He  found  that  city  surrounded 
by  a  great  host  of  Ligurians,  which  was  daily  being  increased  by 
fresh  arrivals  attracted  by  the  hopes  of  plunder.  He  succeeded  in 
crossing  the  river  and  entering  the  town  ;  but  does  not  seem  to  have 
done  more  than  barely  hold  his  own  for  the  rest  of  the  summer, 
having  been  indeed  on  one  occasion  only  saved  from  absolute 
disaster  by  the  gallantry  of  his  Numidian  cavalry ;  and  when  the 
time  for  holding  the  comztia  came,  a  duty  which  had  been  allotted 
to  him,  he  urged  the  Senate  by  letter  to  transfer  the  task  to  his 
colleague,  who  had  by  this  time  practically  finished  the  war  with 
the  Boii.  It  was  not  till  towards  the  end  of  his  year  of  office,  the 
spring  of  192,  that  he  brought  the  enemy  to  a  pitched  battle,  in 
which  he  defeated  them  with  considerable  slaughter,  occupied  their 
abandoned  camp,  and  was  able  to  enter  southern  Liguria  and 
storm  villages  and  strongholds,  which  he  found  filled  with  the  plunder 
of  Etruria. 

L.  Cornelius  had  meanwhile  been  more  quickly  successful  against 
the  Boii.  He  had  begun  the  campaign  by  laying  waste  their 
territory  with  fire  and  sword,  without  being  able  to  induce  the  enemy 
to  leave  their  strongholds  and  give  him  battle.  At  length,  laden 
with  booty,  he  was  retiring  upon  Mutina,  marching  somewhat  care- 
lessly as  though  through  a  country  now  thoroughly  subdued.  Taking 
advantage  of  this,  the  Boii  passed  his  position  by  night  and  occupied 
some  narrow  ground  in  front  of  him,  closed  in  by  marsh  or  forest. 
The  consul,  however,  gained  intelligence  of  the  movement,  and 
ascertained  their  position  by  sending  out  his  cavalry  to  reconnoitre. 
Leaving  the  triarii  in  charge  of  his  baggage  and  booty,  with  directions 
to  strengthen  the  camp,  he  marched  in  battle  order  upon  the  Gauls, 
who  were  thus  by  the  failure  of  their  own  stratagem  forced  to  fight. 
The  Romans  won  the  battle,  but  lost  heavily  themselves,  and  did  not 
effectively  pursue  and  annihilate  the  enemy  ;  so  that  when  the  consul, 
on  his  return  to  Rome  to  hold  the  comitia,  demanded  a  triumph,  he 
found  the  senators  prejudiced  against  him  by  a  letter  sent  to  many 
of  them  by  his  legatus,  M.  Claudius.  In  this  letter  the  large  losses 
were  ascribed  to  the  incapacity  of  Cornelius,  who  had  only  been  ' 
saved  from  disaster  by  the  extraordinary  valour  of  the  soldiers. 
Whether  these  criticisms  were  deserved  or  not,  they  sufficed  to 
induce  the  Senate  to  refuse  Cornelius  a  triumph  ;  though,  without 
judging    of  the    facts,    it    based    its    refusal    on    the    ground    that 


XXIX  REDUCTION  OF  CISALPINE  GAUL  455 

Cornelius  had  not  brought  Marcellus  with  him  to  Rome  to  sub- 
stantiate the  charge,  but  had  preferred  to  leave  him  in  command 
of  the  army,  whereas  his  legate  Sempronius  still  enjoying  imperium, 
it  would  have  been  more  natural  to  have  entrusted  the  command 
to  him. 

The  next  consuls  did  little  :  but  in  1 9 1  the  Boii  were  crushed  by  '^^- 
the  consul  Scipio  Nasica,  whose  colleague  Glabrio  was  engaged  in  Cornelius 
Greece.      Scipio    inflicted  an  immense  slaughter  upon   the   enemy,  Scipio 
boasting  that  he  had  left  only  old  men  and  boys  alive.      The  whole  Nasica, 
tribe   were    forced    to    become   Roman    subjects,    and    to    see    half  ^  • 
their  territory  become  domain  land  open  to  colonisation  and  division  Qi^irio 
at    the   will   of  the   Roman   government.       The   magnitude   of  the  Final 
destruction  inflicted  upon  the  Boii  was  testified  by  the  number  of  subjugation 
captives  and  horses,  arms,  standards,  and  every  kind  of  spoil  which  of  the  Bon. 
adorned  the  conqueror's  triumph.     Among  other  things,   Scipio   is 
said  to  have   caused    1470  gold   bracelets   or  chains,  such  as  the 
wealthier  of  the  Gauls  wore  on  neck  or  arm,  to  be  carried  in  the 
procession,  witnessing  to  the  number  which  had   fallen  ;  while  the 
treasury  was  enriched  by  vast  quantities  of  gold  and  silver,  worked 
and  unworked,  and  the  soldiers  rewarded  by  large  prize-money. 

It  has  been  usual  to  date  the  formation  of  the  province  of  Cisalpine  The 
Gaul  from  this  year.      But   this  requires    some   qualification.      The  Province 
word  province  in  its  original  application   (whatever  its  derivation),  ^ 
denoted,  as  we  have  often  had  occasion  to  see,  the  sphere  of  duty  of 
a  magistrate.      Thus  it  applied  equally  to  the  praetor  urbanus,  the 
praetor  peregrinus,  and  the  praetors  who  went  to  Sicily  or  Sardinia 
or  Spain.     Thus  too  the  consuls,  who  year  by  year  had  been  sent 
against  the   Ligures   or  the  Boii,  were  said  to  have  Italy  as  their 
'province';    and    during    the    late    wars    we    hear    of    consuls    or  Use  of  the 
praetors  having  Macedonia  or  Greece  or  the  fleet  as  their  "  province."  "^ord 
When    foreign    countries    fell    under    the    power    of    the    Roman  P^^^"^^^' 
people,    and    were    regularly    administered    by   Roman    magistrates 
according  to  a  constitution  or  formula  settled  by  a  decree  of  the 
Senate  or  a  plebiscitum,  they  naturally  retained  the  name  used  to 
express   the   sphere  of  duty  of  a  magistrate  ;    and  thus  arose  the 
more  technical  and  restricted  use  of  the  word  most  familiar  to  us. 
Of  such  provinces,  the  first  two  were   Sicily  and   Sardinia,  and  for 
their  administration  two  additional  praetors  had  been  annually  elected 
since   227  ;    although,   if  it   seemed  necessary,   one   or  both  of  the 
consuls  might  also  have  their  sphere  of  duty  assigned  to  them  in 
these    countries,   and  would  be,  at  any  rate  for  military  purposes, 
superior  to  the  praetors  for  the  time  being.      But  in  an  empire  built 
up  gradually  by  successive  conquests,  there  was  naturally  an  inter- 
mediate  stage  between   more   or    less   continuous    occupation    and 


456 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


complete  provincial  organisation.  Such  was  the  case  in  Spain. 
Since  205  it  had  been  divided  into  two  provinces,  to  which  each 
year  two  proconsuls  elected  specially — extra  ordinein — were  sent, 
with  two  legions  for  each.  But  it  was  not  until  197,  when  two 
additional  praetors  began  to  be  yearly  elected  for  governing  the  two 
Spanish  provinces,  that  its  regular  provincial  administration  may  be 
said  to  have  begun  :  nor  even  then  was  the  organisation  complete  till 
the  end  of  the  Numantine  war  (133).  We  shall  find  hereafter  4  still 
longer  interval  in  the  case  of  Achaia  between  its  practical  ^nd 
formal  reduction  to  the  status  of  a  province  ;  and  thus  in  the  case 
of  Cisalpine  Gaul  we  cannot  doubt  that  from  191  onwards  some 
provision  was  annually  made  for  holding  and  administering  the 
country,  though  we  have  not  the  names  of  the  magistrates  so  em- 
ployed every  year  from  that  period.  In  190  one  of  the  consuls, 
Gaius  Laelius,  was  assigned  the  '  province '  of  Italy,  and  his  ini- 
perium  there  was  extended  to  the  following  year  (189),  in  the  course 
of  which  he  strengthened  the  colonies  of  Cremona  and  Placentia, 
and  secured  a  senatus  consultum  for  the  foundation  of  a  Latin  colony 
at  Felsina,  under  the  name  of  Bononia.  In  188  one  of  the  consuls, 
Gaius  Livius  Salinator,  has  Gaul  as  his  '  province,'  but  no  recprd  of 
what  he  did  there  remains.  In  187,  after  the  suppression  of  a  rising 
in  Liguria,  one  of  the  consuls,  Gaius  Flaminius,  employed  his  men 
in  constructing  a  road  from  Bononia  to  Arretium  ;  while  the  other, 
M.  Aemihus  Lepidus,  constructed  a  road  from  Placentia  to  Ariminum, 
where  it  joined  the  via  Flaminia.  This  was  the  famous  via  Aemilia 
which  traverses  the  whole  of  Cispadane  Gaul  to  this  day,  and  along 
which  all  places  of  importance  in  the  district  are  found.  But  though 
the  country  was  thus  being  organised  and  secured,  it  is  not  till  1 8  \ 
that  we  hear  of  a  praetor  having  Gaul  assigned  as  a  '  province.'  Q. 
Fabius  Buteo,  who  is  thus  mentioned  in  181,  had  his  office  extended 
for  a  second  year,  and  probably  for  a  third  (179)  ;  and  in  177  two 
praetors  go  to  Gaul,  which  is  now  divided  into  two  '  provinces.' 
By  the  system  of  extending  when  necessary  the  imperiurn  to  a  seqond 
or  even  a  third  year,  and  electing  six  praetors  each  year,  there  were 
always  magistrates  sufficient  for  extra  provinces  ;  and  as  yet  no 
danger  was  apprehended  from  leaving  a  capable  magistrate  for 
several  years  in  the  same  province.  We  may  regard  Gallia  Cisalpina, 
therefore,  from  at  least  181,  as  a  regular  province,  though  we  have 
no  record  of  the  succession  of  governors. 

The  hold  of  Rome  upon  it  was,  as  in  other  parts  of  Italy,  con- 
firmed by  the  establishment  of  a  number  of  colonies.  Pollentia 
in  Picenum  and  Pisaurum  in  Umbria  (184)  helped  to  secure  the 
great  north  road  to  Gaul;  while  Bononia  (189),  MuTiNA,  apd 
Parma  (183)  along  the  via  Aemilia  were  established  in  the  very 


XXIX  LAST  STRUGGLES  OF  THE  LIGURIANS  457 

heart  of  the  territory  of  the   Boii.      The   Roman   power  w^?   4I50  Colonies : 

asserted    in    the    north-east.        Some    transalpine    Gauls    i|i    |86  PoUentia, 

made  their  way  over  into  Venetia  and  began  founding  a  town,  but  "^"^'^^^• 
r.  „    1    ,        ,  r  ^  ■  r  >  Bonoma, 

were  m  183  compelled  by  threats  of  Ropian  mterference  to  return,  MuHna, 

and  a  Latin  colony  was  planned  and  shortly  afterwards  established  Parma, 
on  the  site  of  this  new  Gallic  town,  under  the  name  of  Aquileia.  Aquileia. 
Moreover,  Marcellus  asked  and  obtained  permission  in  183  tq  extend 
his  expedition  to  I  stria,  the  inhabitants   of  which   had   long  been 
troublesome  by  their  piracies.      It  was  their  opposition,  however,  to  The  Istri. 
the    foundation   of  Aquileia  that    led   to   their    ultimate   subjection 
in  177. 

Meanwhile  the  struggle  with  the   Ligurians  had  been  continued   The 
from  year  to  year.      The  year  which  had  witnessed  the  final  sub-  Ligurians. 
mission  of  the  Boii  (191)  had  been  marked  also  by  a  victory  of  the 
proconsul  Minucius  over  the  Ligurians  ;  and  for  a  few  years  we  hear 
no  more  of  general  risings  on  their  part,  or  of  conspicuous  victories 
on  the  part  of  the  Roman  generals.      But  that  the  nation  was  by  no 
means  subdued  became  evident  again  towards  the  end  of  188  or  the 
beginning  of  187,  when  a  rumour  of  a  movement  on  a  great  scale  187. 
in  Liguria  caused  both  the  consuls  to  be  sent  there.      The  Friniates  Coss.  M. 
(on   the   north   slope   of   the  Apennines)  and   the  Apuani  (on  the  -^^"^^j^^^ 
border   of  Etruria)   were    threatening    Bononia    and    Pisae,    and  it  q^Ius   ' 
required  the  full  force  of  two  consular  armies  to  disperse  them.     The  Flaminius. 
Friniates  seem  to  have  been   effectually  subdued  and  compelled  to  Great 
surrender   arms  ;    but  the  Apuani   only  dispersed  into  their  villages  ^"^^.^  ^« 
and    the    mountain   fastnesses   on   the   borders   of  Etruria,  and  in     ^S^^^^- 
186  inflicted  a  severe  defeat  on  the  consul  Q.  Marcius  with  a  loss  186-183. 
of  4000  men  and   three  standards.      The   consul    M.    Sempronius   The 
Tuditanus  again  dispersed  them  in  185,  while  his  colleague  Appius  ^P^^"-^ 
Claudius  won  a  victory  over  the  warlike  tribe  of  the  Ingauni,  who  jngauni. 
inhabited  the  west  coast  of  the  gulf  of  Genoa,  putting  the  leaders 
of  the   rising   to   death   and   capturing   some  of  their  strongholds. 
Neither  tribe,  however,  were  completely  subdued  ;  and  in  the  succeed- 
ing year  both  consuls  are  engaged  in   Liguria.      In  his  consulship 
he  had  some  successes,  but   it  was  not  till    181    that  the  proconsul 
L.    Aemilius    Paullus    finally  crushed   the   Ingauni   in  a  great  and 
bloody  battle,  after  having   been   in  extreme   peril  himself       This 
was  followed    by  the   submission   of  most   of  the    Ligurian  tribes. 
They  were  forced  to  surrender  their  piratical  vessels,  and  in  many 
cases   to   throw   down  the  walls   of  their    towns.       But   their  con- 
tinued existence  in  a  certq,in  degree  of  strength  was  desired  as  a 
bulwark  against  invasions  frorn  Gaul,  and  therefore  the  people  were 
not  generally  treated  with  severity.      The  Apuani,  however,  wpre  stiU 
objects  of  alarm,  until  in  the  following  year  (180)  the  proconsul  M. 


458 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Trans- 
ference of 
the  Apuani 
to 
Samnium. 


Colonies  of 
Pisae  and 
Luca. 


The  long 
resistance 
of  the 
Ligurian 
tribes. 


Via 

Aemilia 

Scauri. 


Spain, 
20S-I77- 


Baebius  transferred  them,  to  the  number  of  40,000,  to  a  lowland 
district  in  Samnium,  the  vacant  plains  round  Taurasia,  which  had 
been  confiscated  and  made  ager  publicus  during  the  third  Samnite 
war.  This  was  a  policy  which  had  already  been  adopted  in  regard 
to  a  portion  of  the  Piceni,  who  had  been  transferred  to  the  south- 
western corner  of  Campania,  and  had  become  under  the  name  of 
Picentini  a  flourishing  community.  In  like  manner  the  transferred 
Apuani,  reinforced  next  year  by  7000  more  who  had  at  first  been 
allowed  to  remain  in  Liguria,  settled  down  peacefully  in  their  new 
homes,  and  became  prosperous  and  contented, — known  until  late 
times  among  the  communities  of  Samnium  as  Ligures  Corneliani 
et  Baebiani. 

The  hold  on  Liguria,  thus  deprived  of  a  disturbing  element,  was 
confirmed  by  the  foundation  of  the  colonies  of  Pisae  and  Luca  in 
180,  the  latter  being  renewed  in  177.  Still  there  were  tribes  not 
yet  fully  subdued.  Almost  yearly  wars  are  recorded  by  Livy  up  to 
the  time  to  which  his  history  remains  (167),  and  afterwards  in  the 
epitomes  of  the  lost  books,  as  in  166-164  and  154.  We  can  see 
that  it  was  only  with  immense  difficulty  that  the  Roman  arms  sub- 
dued tribe  after  tribe  —  Statielli,  Decietae,  and  Salluvii  —  all  of 
which  are  mentioned  at  different  times  as  affording  subjects  for 
Roman  triumphs.  The  last  recorded  was  in  117;  but  even  after 
that  desultory  wars  seem  to  have  gone  on.  The  final  subjugation 
and  organisation  of  the  country  may  perhaps  be  dated  from  109, 
when  M.  Aemilius  Scaurus  made  the  road  from  Pisa  to  Vada 
Sabbata  {via  Aemilia  Scauri),  and  thence  across  the  Apennines  by  way 
of  Aquae  Statiellae  to  Dertona,  thus  connecting  the  via  Aurelia, 
along  the  western  shore  of  Italy  to  Pisa,  with  the  great  via  Aemilia 
Lepidi  which  joined  Ariminum  to  Placentia,  whence  there  was 
a  road  to  Dertona.  This  established  a  military  connexion  between 
the  plains  of  the  Po  and  the  highlands  and  coast  of  Liguria,  which 
made  that  district  effectively  a  part  of  Italy. 

While  the  Roman  hold  on  northern  Italy  was  thus  being  pain- 
fully and  laboriously  maintained,  that  on  Spain  was  costing  hardly 
less  continuous  efTort.  The  retirement  of  Scipio  in  205  was  followed, 
as  we  have  seen,  by  the  revolt  of  Indibilis  and  Mandonius,  and  their 
suppression  and  death  at  the  hands  of  his  successors,  L.  Cornelius 
Lentulus  and  L.  Manlius  Acidinus.  These  two  officers  were  con- 
tinued in  the  command  until  201,  when  Lentulus  returned  to  Rome, 
and  was  allowed  an  ovation,  Acidinus  apparently  remaining  another 
year  with  C.  Cornelius  Cethegus  as  his  colleague.  In  199  they 
were  relieved  by  Cn.  Cornelius  Lentulus  and  L.  Stertinius  in 
Hispania  citerior  and  ulterior  respectively.  Lentulus  was  allowed  an 
ovation  on  his  return,  and  though  Stertinius  did  not  seek  a  triumph 


XXIX  GRADUAL  ORGANISATION  OF  SPAIN  459 

or  ovation  he  is  said  to  have  paid  large  sums  into  the  treasury.      Of 

the  details  of  the  actions  of  these  successive  commanders  we  have  Period  of 

really  no  knowledge.      From  205  to  198  there  appears  to  have  been  compara- 

no  general  rising  against  the  Roman  power,  though  the  Celtiberian  ^o^^^ioS  ' 

tribes  in  the  centre  were  unsubdued,  and  were  constantly  making 

attacks   upon   the  towns  and  districts   allied  to   or  settled  by   the 

Romans,  which  consisted  generally  of  the  country  between  the  great 

central  range  of  mountains  and  the  eastern  coast,  and  that  between 

the  Sierra  Morena  and  the  southern  coast.     The  division  between  the 

'  provinces '  of  the  two  Roman  magistrates  was  at  first  at  any  rate 

the  Ebro ;  later  on  it  seems  to  have  been  the  Saltus  Castulonensis, 

forming  the  northern  barrier  of  the  valley  of  the  Baetis.      In  these 

'  provinces '  the   proconsuls  were   practically  military  governors   or 

despots :  there  was  as  yet  no  provincial  constitution,  and  they  had 

to  conduct  the  business  of  defence  and  government  as   best  they  Roman 

could,  each  having  a  Roman  legion  serving  continuously  for  the  full  soldiers 

number  of  years  which   men  were   bound  to  serve,   and   "  supple-  -^^^^"^f  ^'^ 

mented  "  from  time  to  time  by  fresh  drafts  of  men  to  take  the  place    ■^^  ^' 

of  the  veterans  who  had  served  their  full  time — a  system  which  in 

the  end  did  much  towards  Romanising  Spain  ;   for  many  of  these 

men  had  become  used  to  the  country,  had  married  Spanish  wives, 

and  preferred  to  settle  in  Spain  when  their  service  was  over. 

It  was  not  till  197  that  a  regular  provision  for  the  government  of  igy.  Two 
the  two  Spains  was  made.       In  that   year  for  the   first   time  two  praetors 
additional  praetors  were  elected   (raising  the  number  to   six),  and  ^^^     /^ 
Nearer  and  Farther  Spain  became  regularly  two  of  the  '  provinces,'  r^^  Spain. 
for  which  the  praetors  drew  lots.      In  some  cases,  when  the  praetors 
were  wanted  for  other  duties,  those  already  in  Spain  were  continued 
for  one  or  more  years  ;  but  as  a  rule  from  this  time  two  of  the  six 
annually  elected  proceeded  to  the  Spanish  provinces.     The  two  first 
years  of  this  arrangement  (197,  196)  were  marked  by  a  more  than 
usually  serious  rising  in  farther  Spain.      Additional  troops  were  sent 
to  the  praetors,  and  for  the  first  time  there  was  a  "  Spanish  war,"  as 
distinguished  from  a  war  against  the  Carthaginians  in  Spain. 

Affairs   seemed   so   serious   that  in    195  one  of  the  consuls,  M.  jg^,  m. 
Porcius  Cato,  was  sent  with  a  consular  army  in  addition  to  the  two  Porcius 
praetors    and    their    regular    establishment    of    two  legions.      Cato  Cato  in 
had    already    distinguished    himself  for   his  administration    of    the   '^^l"" 
province   of  Sardinia   as   praetor.      He   had    shown    himself   there,  praetor  Ap, 
though   somewhat  stern   and   unsympathetic,   to  be  in   the  highest  Claudius 
degree  just   and  incorruptible.       His   personal  habits   were  simple  ^^J'°  ^"-^ 
and  economical,  and  he  avoided  imposing  upon  the  provincials  even  J^tf^^^^ 
the  ordinary  expenses  which  the  Roman  magistrates  could  by  law  or 
custom    exact.       Now   that    he   was    consul    he    did  not   alter    his 


460 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


frugal  habits.  His  retinue  of  slaves  was  small  beyond  example, 
and  he  shared  the  rations  and  thin  wine  served  out  to  the  soldiers. 
Hither  Spain,  however,  was  not  a  peaceful  province,  in  which  he 
had  only  to  show  the  virtues  of  a  disinterested  magistrate.  It  was 
in  open  and  almost  universal  rebellion,  and  he  seems  to  have 
regarded  himself  as  entering  an  enemy's  country ;  on  landing  at 
Emporiae,  after  expelling  a  Spanish  force  from  Rhoda  {Rosas),  he 
sent  home  the  contractors,  who  had  followed  him  with  the 
view  of  making  their  profit  by  supplying  the  army  with  corn  pur- 
chased in  the  country,  and  declared  that  the  war  should  support  itself 
The  name  Emporiae  included  two  towns,  one  close  to  the  sea,  which 
was  mainly  Greek — a  colony  from  Massilia, — and  had  long  been 
closely  allied  with  the  Romans  ;  the  other,  some  three  miles  farther 
inland,  which  was  wholly  Spanish,  and  was  now  in  the  possession 
of  the  enemy.  Cato  at  once  entered  the  Greek  town,  and  evading 
the  necessity  of  dividing  his  forces  in  answer  to  a  request  for  help 
from  the  Ilergetes,  spent  the  first  month  after  landing  in  collecting 
the  corn  stored  in  the  granaries  in  the  country  round.  The  enemy 
shut  themselves  up  in  fortified  towns  or  castles,  and  did  not  venture 
out  to  oppose  him  or  to  attack  his  entrenchments  near  Emporiae.  After 
a  while,  however,  they  mustered  in  large  numbers  and  encamped  in 
the  neighbourhood.  Resolving  to  force  them  to  give  him  battle,  Cato 
marched  past  the  Spanish  camp  by  night  and  seized  some  advan- 
tageous ground  in  the  enemy's  rear.  The  Spaniards  fell  into  the 
snare ;  they  issued  out  of  their  camp,  thinking  to  bar  him  from  return- 
ing to  his  entrenchments,  and  were  beaten  with  great  loss.  The 
Romans  plundered  the  Spanish  camp ;  and  Cato,  released,  as  it  appears, 
from  a  position  of  some  danger,  advanced  to  Tarraco,  receiving  the 
submission  of  nearly  all  the  tribes  north  of  the  Ebro.  But  he  was  not 
content  with  simple  submission  which,  as  he  well  knew,  was  not  security 
against  a  renewal  of  war  by  all  or  any  of  the  tribes  as  soon  as  they 
saw  an  opportunity.  He  determined  that  the  towns  should  no 
longer  offer  security  to  rebels  and  robbers.  He  sent  an  order,  there- 
fore, to  each  of  the  towns  to  pull  down  its  walls.  The  despatch  of 
the  messengers  was  so  arranged  that  each  town  received  the  order 
on  the  same  day,  and  believing  or  fearing  that  it  would  be  alone  in 
resisting  the  command,  proceeded  to  carry  out  the  instructions. 
The  northern  province  was  thus  within  a  short  space  of  time  reduced 
to  obedience.  But  Cato's  work  was  far  from  being  done.  Seldom 
successful  in  pitched  battles,  the  Spaniards  then,  as  in  their  subse- 
quent history,  were  extraordinarily  pertinacious  in  detailed  re- 
sistance ;  and  Cato's  task  after  the  pacification  of  the  north  was  to 
suppress  petty  or  local  outbreaks,  which  often  amounted  to  little 
more  than  brigandage.      He  had  also  to  support  the  forces  in  the 


XXIX  CONTINUED  STRUGGLES  IN  SPAIN  461 

south  Under  tHb  praetors  Xvho  Were  etigaged  in  a  struggle  with  the 
Turdetani,  in  the  extreme  south-west  of  the  pJenirisula,  supported  by 
a  large  mercfehary  force  of  the  Celtiberian  inhabitants  of  the  centre. 
This  was  perhaps  the  least  successful  part  of  his  campaign  ;  but  i^o^der 
though  he  did  not  succeed  entirely  in  compelling  the  Turdetani  to  castles, 
disband  their  forces,  he  enriched  his  army  with  abUndant  spoil  and 
took  a  great  number  of  fortified  towns  and  castles  in  the  country 
through  which  he  passed, — boasting  at  the  end  of  his  year  of  office 
that  he  had  taketi  more  towns  than  he  had  been  days  in  Spain. 
The  inhabitants  ivfere  not  usually  treated  with  severity  or  deprived 
of  liberty  ;  but  a  heavy  yearly  tax  was  laid  upon  the  produce  of  the 
iron  and  silver  mines,  to  the  development  of  which  Cato  is  said  to 
have  largely  contributed.  Towards  the  end  of  his  government, 
however,  he  struck  a  blow  at  the  brigandage  which  disturbed  his 
province  by  the  capture  of  its  principal  seat,  called  Vergium  Castrum^  . 
identified  by  some  with  the  modern  Berga.  In  this  case  no  mercy 
was  shown.  With  the  exception  of  some  few  of  the  chiefs  and  people 
who  had  helped  to  deliver  the  place  to  him,  the  inhabitants  were 
sold  as  slaves  and  the  i-obbers  or  bandits  themselves  put  to  death. 

Cato's    command    in    Spain    was    not  continued    for    a    second  ig^.jgj, 
year,   owing  it  is  said  to  the  opposition  of  Africanus,  but  he  was  Farther 
awarded  a  triumph,  and  paid  large  sums  into  the  treasury.      That  troubles  in 
the   pacification    of  Spain,  however,   which    he   believed  himself  to     P'^'''^- 
have   secured,    was   far  from    perfect,   was  shown    by  the  troubles 
which  awaited  his  successor  Sex.  Digitius,  who  lost  so  many  ineh 
that  he  had  a  merfe  fragment  of  an  army  to  hand  over  to  his  suc- 
cessor  Gaius    Flaminius.      His   colleague   in    Hispania  ulterior,  P. 
Cornelius  Scipio,  son  of  the  GnaeUs  Scipio  who  had  fallen  in  Spain 
in  212,  was  eventually  Inore  successful.      He  won  a  great  victory 
over  the  Liisitarii,  in  which  with  a  small  loss  to  himself  he  inflicted 
a  very  sevei-e  sMUghter  on  the  enemy :  while  Gaius  Flaminius  in 
193,  with  troops  collected  froin  Sicily  arid  Africa,  also  had  some 
successes  against  the  Oretani,  who  lived  just  north  of  the  Saltus 
Castulonensis,    as    well    as    against    the    inore    important   tribes   of 
the   centre,  the   Vaccaei,  Vectones,  and    Celtiberians.       Next   year 
(192)    he    arid    M.    Fulvius,    as    propraetors,    followed     up    these 
successes   by  the  capture  oif  isolated   castles   or  towns.       But    no 
gi-eat   or  decisive  battle  was  fought.     Year  after  year  the  Romah 
generals    are  said  to  have  won  one  or  more  battles,  or  sustained 
more   or  less   serious   reverses.      But  riothing  occuri-ed  seriously  to  Period  of 
increase  dr  dimitiish  the  Roman  hold  in  Spain,  or  to  interest  Roman  indecisive 
feelings   at  home.      The   personal  character  of  the   praetor  for  the  ^^^^ggl^^> 
time   being   seems  to   have   had  grfeat  influence  in  diminishing  or     ^^'^'^^' 
exasperating  resistance  ;  biit  oh  the  whole  the  result  was  progress 


462 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


i8i-i7g. 

Fulvius 

Flaccus. 

Great 

Celti- 

berian 

rising. 


The 

victories  of 
Tib,  Sem- 
pronius 
Gracchus, 
179-178. 


The 
settlement 

of 

Gracchus, 

178. 


rather  than  the  reverse  for  the  Roman  power.  Yet  in  the  southern 
province  there  were  continual  struggles  with  the  Lusitani  ;  and  in 
the  north  any  tribe  which,  impelled  by  restlessness  or  a  sense  of 
wrong  or  a  desire  for  better  territory,  ventured  to  break  away  from 
the  Roman  supremacy,  could  reckon  on  the  aid  of  the  warlike 
Celtiberians  of  the  centre. 

Movements  of  this  sort  culminated  in  the  year  181.  The 
praetor  Q.  Fulvius  Flaccus,  on  arriving  in  farther  Spain,  found 
himself  confronted  by  a  serious  rising  of  the  Celtiberians,  Vaccaei, 
and  Vectones,  who  mustered  in  great  force  in  the  territory  of  the 
Carpetani  (round  Toledo),  and  were  defeated  by  him  with  great 
slaughter  near  a  town  named  Aebusa  or  Lipara,  some  few  miles 
south  of  the  upper  Tagus,  and  again  near  the  town  of  Contrebia,  in 
the  vicinity  of  the  modern  Albarracin. 

In  spite  of  these  victories  the  next  praetors,  L.  Postumius 
Albinus  and  Tib.  Sempronius  Gracchus,  found  the  Celtiberians  still 
in  arms,  and  besieging  the  town  of  Cararis  on  the  Ebro.  Gracchus 
succeeded  in  relieving  this  town ;  but  it  was  not  until  the  next 
year  (178)  that,  having  made  an  arrangement  with  Albinus,  the 
propraetor  of  the  farther  province,  to  go  against  the  Vaccaei  and 
Lusitani,  Gracchus  penetrated  to  the  extreme  south,  took  Munda, 
Certima,  and  Alces,  and  for  a  time  subdued  the  Celtiberians, — one 
of  their  most  powerful  princes  even  taking  service  in  the  Roman 
army.  His  victories  and  the  number  of  towns  and  castles  which 
surrendered  to  him,  or  fell  before  his  assault,  gained  him  a  well- 
deserved  triumph ;  and  his  victories  were  rendered  more  com- 
plete by  those  of  his  colleague  Albinus  over  the  Vaccaei  and 
Lusitani.  But  it  was  as  an  organiser  rather  than  as  a  conqueror 
that  he  earned  a  permanent  reputation  in  Spain.  With  the  instinct 
of  a  statesman  he  perceived  that,  if  the  Romans  were  to  continue 
to  hold  Spain,  their  rule  must  in  some  way  be  brought  into  harmony 
with  the  feelings  and  interests  of  the  subject  peoples.  There  was 
a  land  question  to  be  settled  there  ;  and  he  set  himself  to  redress 
the  grievances  of  those  whose  poverty  and  want  of  land  had  been 
the  origin  of  their  restlessness  and  revolt.  When  he  had  settled 
these  landless  men  in  communities  with  a  fair  share  of  the  soil,  he 
next  arranged  with  the  several  tribes  and  cities  the  terms  on  which 
they  were  to  enjoy  their  local  independence,  as  friends  and  allies  of 
Rome,  in  a  spirit  of  such  liberality  and  equity,  that  the  "  settlement 
of  Gracchus "  was  long  looked  back  to  during  subsequent  troubles 
with  respect,  aftd  its  full  application  or  restoration  demanded  as 
the  best  charter  of  their  liberties.  Forty  years  afterwards  the 
honour  in  which  his  father's  name  was  still  held  gave  the  more 
famous  Tiberius  Gracchus  such  credit  with  the  people  of  Numantia 


i 


XXIX  THE  SETTLEMENT  OF  GRACCHUS  IN  SPAIN  463 

that  he  was  able  to  obtain  from  them  the  safety  of  a  Roman  army. 
A   fixed  tribute  and    a    regular    obligation    as    to    military   service 
formed  part  of  all  these   agreements  ;    but  above  all  the  building 
of  castles    and  fortified   towns    was   forbidden.      By   long  and   sad 
experience  the  Romans  had  discovered  that  the  winning  of  battles, 
however  bloody,  did  little  towards  securing  Spain,  as  long  as  every  Twenty 
petty  prince  or  captain  of  banditti  could  ensconce  himself  and  his  y^^'''^  °f 
followers  behind  the  walls  of  a  fortress  or  strong  town.      It  was  a  -^^^^^^ 
policy   which  Cato   had   enforced,  but  which   his   successors   seem 
to   have   been    unable    to    maintain.       The    "  thorough "   policy   of 
Gracchus,  joined   to    the   equity  of  his   settlement,   was    rewarded 
by  twenty   years   of  comparative   peace   at   least   in   northern   and 
central  Spain,  and  forms  a  natural  epoch  in  the  dealings  of  Rome 
with  the  Spanish  people. 

Authorities. — We  have  little  to  guide  us  in  these  obscure  struggles  but  the 
narrative  which  Livy  has  interwoven  with  the  general  course  of  his  history, 
xxxii-xxxv.  For  the  Spanish  wars  something  is  to  be  got  from  Appian,  Res 
Hisp.  38-44,  from  Plutarch's  Life  of  Cato,  and  from  Zonaras,  x.  17.  For  the 
Gallic  wars  practically  the  only  source  is  Livy,  with  occasional  lights  from 
Strabo  (v.),  and  Plutarch's  Life  of  Aemilius  Paulhis,  c.  vi. 


CHAPTER   XXX 

ANTIOCHUS   THE   GREAT   AND   THE   AETOLIANS 
193-188 

Greece  after  the  settlement  of  Flamininus  (194-3) — Discontent  of  the  Aetohans — 
They  resolve  to  call  in  Antiochus — The  kingdom  and  early  reign  of  Antiochus 
— His  confederacy  with  Phihp  for  the  partition  of  Egypt — He  occupies  the 
Thracian  Chersonese — His  haughty  answer  to  the  Roman  envoys — Hannibal 
at  his  court — Hannibal's  plan  rejected — Nabis  of  Sparta  breaks  the  terms  of 
his  treaty,  and  the  Roman  fleet  come  to  Peloponnesus — Death  of  Nabis  (192): — 
Preparations  in  Rome — The  Aetohans  occupy  Demetrias  and  invite  Antiochus 
to  liberate  Greece — Antiochus  arrives  in  Phthiotis  and  is  proclaimed  strategus 
of  the  Aetohans  at  the  congress  at  Lamia — He  takes  Chalcis  (192) — He 
attempts  to  form  a  Greek  confederation — Decay  of  his  forces  in  the  winter  of 
192-191 — M'.  Acihus  Glabrio  comes  to  Thessaly  in  190 — Defeat  of  Antiochus 
at  Thermopylae,  who  returns  to  Asia — L.  Cornelius  Scipio  with  his  brother 
Africanus  come  to  Greece  in  July  189,  grant  six  months'  truce  to  the  Aetolians 
and  march  to  the  Hellespont — Meanwhile  the  Roman  fleet  had  taken  Sestos, 
and  sailing  to  Samos  shut  up  the  king's  fleet  at  Ephesus — Reduction  of  towns 
in  Caria — Failure  at  Patara — Great  defeat  of  the  king's  fleet  in  the  bay  of  Teos 
— In  October  190  the  consul  Scipio  crosses  the  Hellespont,  and  in  November 
conquers  the  king  at  Magnesia,  who  is  forced  to  evacuate  Asia  Minor — Settle- 
ment of  Asia  and  victories  over  Pisidians  and  Gauls  by  Cn.  Manlius  Vulso 
(189-188) — End  of  the  Aetohan  war  and  capture  of  Ambracia  by  M.  Fulvius 
Nobilior  (189-188). 

Elements  of  THOUGH  the  settlement  of  Flamininus  had  been  favourably  received 
trouble  in  ^y  a  large  part  of  Greece,  there  were  several  centres  of  dissatisfaction 
Greece  ixovci  which  trouble  might   at  any  time  arise.      The  Aetolians  had 

Aetolians     never  ceased  to  protest  that  Greece  had  only  gained  a  change  of 
Boeotians,     masters  by  the  Roman  victory  over  Philip  ;  and  they  had  a  special 
and  Nabis    grievance  of  their  own  in  the  fact  that  the  Senate  had  declined  to 
of  Sparta,     j-ggtore  to  their  League  certain  towns  which  had  once  belonged  to  it, 
particularly  Pharsalus  and  the  island  of  Leucas.      The  Boeotians  had 
retained  their  Macedonian  sympathies,  exasperated  by  the  assassina- 
tion of  the  Boeotarch  Brachylles,  the  leader  of  the  Macedonian  party, 


CHAP.  XXX       CAREER  OF  ANTIOCHUS  THE  GREAT  465 

with  the  connivance,  as  they  believed,  of  Flamininus.    These  feelings 
had  shown  themselves  in  the  winter  of  196-195  by  frequent  murders 
of  Roman  soldiers  or  citizens  in  soHtary  places  in  Boeotia.      As  many 
as  500  are  said  to  have  perished  in  this  way,  until  Flamininus  de-  Murder  of 
manded  satisfaction   of  the   Boeotian  community,   and  when  it  was  Roman 
refused,  on  the  ground  that  the  murders  were  mere  private  crimes,  soldiers 
entered  Boeotia  with  an  army  and  laid  waste  the  country  :  only  con-  ^qAjqc^' 
senting  to  hold  his  hand  on  the  intercession  of  the  Achaeans  and 
Athenians,  the  surrender  of  the  criminals,  and  the  payment  of  thirty 
talents.      Lastly,  as  long  as  his  enemies  the  Achaeans  could  count 
on  Roman  support,  Nabis  of  Sparta  had  no  hope  of  recovering  his 
seaports,  or  freeing  himself  from  the  humiliating  terms  which  had 
been  forced  upon  him. 

The  Aeotolians  were  the  first  to  stir.     Their  new  idea  for  the   The 
salvation  of  Greece  was,  in  fact,  a  very  old  one.      It  was  to  call  in  AetoUans 
the  aid  of  another   foreign  power.      As  of  old   the  king  of  Persia,  '^^^^^^  ^^^ 
and  in  later  times  the  king  of  Macedonia,  had  been  invoked  to  aid  -^^^ 
parties  in  Greece,  so  now  the  Aetolians  proposed  to  call  for  help 
upon  Antiochus,  king  of  Syria. 

Antiochus  III.,  called  the  Great,  had  been  king  of  Syria  for  more  Antiochus 
than  a  quarter  of  a  century,  with  various  fortunes.      Besides  Syria  he  king  of 
claimed  to  be  lord  of  a  great  part  of  Upper  Asia  and  Asia  Minor ;  Syria  from 
but  at  the  beginning  of  his  reign  he  had  had  to  meet  an  insurrection  ^^-^'^  '^' 
of  his  satraps  in  Persis  and  Media ;  had  engaged  in  an  unsuccessful 
war  with  Ptolemy  IV.  for  the  possession  of  Palestine  ;  and,  though 
his  cousin  Achaeus  recovered  in  his  name  the  parts  of  Asia  Minor 
which  Attains  had  taken,  he  had  immediately  set  up  as  an  independent 
sovereign  himself      By  the  fall  of  Achaeus  in  214,  however,  Antiochus 
recovered   Asia   Minor ;    and    a    seven    years'   expedition   in    Upper 
Asia  (212-205)  added  to  his  reputation,  and  extended  his  alliances 
as  far  as  India.      In  205  he  began,  in  conjunction  with  Philip  V.  of  His  attack 
Macedonia,  that   attack   upon   the   young  king   of  Egypt,  of  which  upon 
we  have  already  heard  as   involving    Philip  in  hostility  with   Rome.   Ptolemy  V.^ 
Antiochus  began  his  share  of  the  enterprise  by  an  invasion  of  Coele-      *^' 
Syria,  of  which  he  gained  possession,  after  a  victory  over  Ptolemy's 
general  (the  Aetolian  Scopas)  at   Panium,  near  the  sources  of  the 
Jordan,  in  201.    In  this  enterprise  he  had  shown  some  of  the  qualities  His 
of  a  statesman  as  well  as  of  a  soldier,  particularly  in  his  treatment  of  treatment 
the  Jews,  whom  he  conciliated  by  the  grant  of  privileges,  and  by  of  the  Jews, 
respecting  their  law  and  customs.      This  was  followed  by  an  attempt 
upon  some  of  the  outlying  possessions  of  the  Egyptian  king  in  Caria 
and  in  the  Thracian  Chersonese  ;  and  it  was  this  that  brought  him 
into  collision  with  the  Romans,  who  had  undertaken  the  defence  of 
Egypt  as  well  as  the  cause  of  Greek  freedom.     Before  actually  enter- 

2  H 


466 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


ing  upon  the  reduction  of  Caria  and  the  Chersonese  he  had  made 
terms  with  Ptolemy,  and  had  given  him  his  daughter  Cleopatra  in 
marriage,  with  Palestine  and  Coele-Syria  as  her  marriage  portion. 
He  would  therefore  claim  the  cities  of  Asia  Minor  and  of  the  Cher- 
sonese with  some  show  of  right,  and  could  confront  Rome  without  the 
fear  of  the  hostility  of  Egypt  in  the  background. 

As  to  his  personal  qualification  for  the  task  of  resisting  Roman 
supremacy,  upon  which  he  was  now  entering,  it  was  not  easy  for  the 
Greeks  to  judge.  He  had  on  several  occasions,  during  his  great 
expedition  into  Upper  Asia,  shown  conspicuous  personal  courage,  not 
unmixed  with  the  cunning  and  occasional  cruelty  which  appear  to 
mark  the  oriental  despot.  Nevertheless  he  had  proved,  as  in  the  case 
of  the  Jews,  that  he  was  able  to  treat  those  over  whom  he  obtained 
power  with  prudence  and  magnanimity  ;  and  the  name  of  Great 
seems  to  have  been  as  much  a  tribute  to  the  ruler  as  to  the  soldier.^ 
The  character  of  his  policy,  as  well  as  the  reputation  of  his  power 
and  great  resources,  had  no  doubt  its  influence  in  suggesting  to  the 
Aetolians  the  idea  of  asking  for  his  aid.  On  the  other  hand,  he  had 
never  as  yet  measured  swords  with  a  great  military  power  like  that 
of  Rome.  His  triumphs  had  been  over  the  difficulties  of  nature 
rather  than  over  disciplined  armies  ;  for  even  at  Panium,  though  his 
enemies  were  commanded  by  an  AetoHan,  the  mass  of  the  army  con- 
sisted of  unwarlike  Egyptians.  Moreover,  he  was  now  no  longer 
young,  and  was  surrounded  by  flatterers  and  intriguing  courtiers,  who 
closed  his  ears  to  the  sound  of  wholesome  but  unwelcome  truths,  and 
caused  him  to  view  with  suspicion  signs  of  energy  and  honesty  as 
dangerous  to  himself  The  peoples  also  over  whom  he  ruled  were 
heterogeneous  and  loosely  united.  He  could  command  considerable 
levies  from  his  distant  satrapies,  and  could  summon  a  fleet  from 
Phoenicia  ;  but  these  armies  were  inspired  by  no  united  feeling  of 
patriotism  and  no  mutual  confidence.  The  first  sign  of  failure  would 
be  the  signal  for  immediate  dispersion. 

Though  in  196  Antiochus  answered  the  Roman  envoys  at  Lysi- 
macheia  with  haughty  indifl'erence,  he  does  not  appear  to  have  felt 
entire  confidence  in  his  position  ;  for  in  the  next  year  legates  from 
him  visited  Flamininus  at  Corinth  with  propositions  for  an  aUiance. 
They  were  referred  to  the  Senate.  The  king  accordingly,  after 
strengthening  himself  by  a  renewed  alliance  with  Egypt  and  by  a 
treaty  with  Ariarathes  of  Cappadocia,  sent  ambassadors  to  Rome 
(193).  They  were  answered  that  unless  the  king  abstained  from 
entering  Europe,  the  Romans  would  free  the  Greek  cities  in  Asia  from 

1  Plutarch  [Apophthegm.)  says  that  he  wrote  to  the  Greek  cities  that,  if  they  re- 
ceived any  orders  from  him  which  were  contrary  to  their  laws,  they  were  to  neglect 
them,  in  the  assurance  that  they  had  been  given  in  ignorance. 


XXX  HANNIBAL  AT  THE  COURT  OF  ANTIOCHUS  467 

him.      The  ambassadors  exclaimed  against  an  answer  which  must  Antiochus 

disturb  the  peace  of  the  world  ;  and,  as  a  compromise,  three  com-  <^^'^  ^^e 

missioners — P.  Sulpicius,  P.  Villius,  P.  Aelius — were  sent  to  nego-   J'^^^ 
.  ,      ,      ,  .        r  ^       .         ,     .  Senate, 

tiate  with  the  kmg  m  person  af  Lysimacheia.  ^gj 

They  found  him  in  no  mood  for  yielding.      He  had  already  been  Antiochus, 
appealed  to  by  the  Aetolians,  who  promised  that  Nabis  would  make  influenced 
a  movement  in  Peloponnese,  and  hoped  that  they  would  be  able  to  ^       . 
stir  up  Philip   of  Macedon  to  strike  another  blow   against  Roman  and  the 
supremacy.      But  he  had  also  at  his  court  the  most  famous  general  Aetolians, 
of  that  or  perhaps  any  time,  the  implacable  foe  of  the  Romans,  the  w?7/  resist, 
great    Hannibal   himself       He   had  been  driven   into   exile   by   the  ^93-^9^- 
malignity  of  the  oligarchical  party  in  Carthage,  of  which  the  Roman 
government,  contrary  to  the  advice  of  Africanus,  had  availed  itself  to 
consummate  the  ruin  of  their   great   enemy.      As  early  as  200  the 
Senate  had  protested  against  Hannibal  being  employed  as  a  military 
commander.      But  though  the  Romanising  oligarchs  had  obediently 
recalled  him,  the  people  had  been  faithful,  and  had  elected  him  as 
one  of  the  Shophetim  or  "  kings."     He  strove  in  that  position  to  break 
up  the  tyranny  of  the  oligarchical  body  of  Judices  ;    to  restore  the 
national  finances  to  a  sound  position  ;  and  to  prevent  the  malversation 
of  public  money  by  which  these  men  lived  in  luxury.      This  made 
him  enemies  at  home   who  were   ready  to  sacrifice  him  to  Roman 
hatred,  and  who  now  (196)  denounced  him  at  Rome  as  having  entered 
into    correspondence   with    king   Antiochus.        The  Senate  promptly  i9^'^95- 
fastened  on  the  excuse,  although  Scipio  protested  against  the  weight  ^(^^^tbal 
of  Roman   authority   being   thrown   into  the   scale  of  Carthaginian   j-yre,  and 
party  quarrels,  and  three  commissioners  were  at  once  sent  to  Carthage,  thence  to 
Their  professed  purpose  was  to  adjudicate  on  some  of  the  quarrels  Antioch. 
perpetually  arising  between  Masannasa  and  the  Carthaginians  ;  but, 
on    their  arrival  they  put   themselves  into   communication   with  the 
political  enemies  of  Hannibal,  who   well  understood  the  object  of 
their  mission.      He  had  made   provision   for  flight,  and  during  the 
night  following  the  arrival  of  the   Roman  commissioners  made  his 
way  from  the  city  to  a  point  on  the  coast  near  Thapsus,  where  a  ship 
was   in   readiness   to   receive   him.      Thence  he  sailed  to  Tyre,  the 
mother  city  of  Carthage,  where  he  was  received  with  all  honour  as 
the  most  illustrious  of  Phoenicians.      He  stayed  there,  however,  only 
a  few  days.      King  Antiochus  was  said  to  be  at  Antioch,  and  it  was 
to  him  that  he  was   now  determined  to  attach  himself      When  he 
arrived  at  Antioch  the  king  was  gone  to  Ephcsus  ;  and  after  being 
entertained  with    honour    at    Antioch   by  his  son,   he  followed    the 
king  himself  to  Ephesus. 

Antiochus  during  the  winter  of  195  was  fluctuating  in  his  mind 
between  a  desire  to  answer  Roman  pride  with  equal  pride,  and  doubt 


468 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


The  story 
of  the  con- 
versation of 
Hannibal 
and 
Africanus. 


as  to  his  ability  to  meet  the  forces  of  the  Republic.  The  Aetolians 
were  making  much  of  their  grievance  as  to  Pharsalus  and  Leucas,  and 
their  ambassadors  were  urging  the  king  to  interfere  in  Greece.  The 
arrival  of  Hannibal  seemed  likely  to  turn  the  scale.  But  Antiochus 
had  not  the  courage,  or  perhaps  the  imprudence,  to  embark  upon  the 
plan  which  Hannibal  proposed.  He  asked  for  loo  ships,  10,000 
infantry,  and  1 000  cavalry,  that  he  might  sail  to  Carthage  and  induce 
the  Carthaginians  to  renew  the  war  by  a  fresh  invasion  of  Italy. 
Meanwhile  the  king  was  to  enter  Greece  with  his  army,  prepared,  if 
necessary,  to  cross  even  to  Italy.  The  plan  was  soon  known  or 
suspected  by  the  Romans  ;  for  Hannibal  had  sent  a  Tyrian  named 
Aristo,  whose  acquaintance  he  made  at  Ephesus,  to  Carthage,  charged 
with  the  task  of  ascertaining  the  feelings  of  the  Barcine  party  there  ; 
and  the  purpose  of  his  visit,  though  he  carried  no  letters,  was  at  once 
divined  by  Hannibal's  enemies,  and  duly  reported  at  Rome  (193). 

It  was  with  the  knowledge  of  this  intrigue,  therefore,  that  the 
Roman  commissioners  were  sent  to  Antiochus,  while  the  Cartha- 
ginians were  prevented  from  making  any  movement  by  the  threaten- 
ing attitude  of  Masannasa,  whose  dispute  with  them  was  intentionally 
left  undecided  by  Africanus  and  his  colleagues. 

It  was  not  with  any  hope,  or  perhaps  desire,  of  peace  that  the 
ambassadors  visited  Antiochus.  Their  charge  was  rather  to  observe 
and  report  upon  the  king's  position  and  forces.  Various  accidental 
circumstances  delayed  the  interview  :  and  when  the  earliest  to  arrive, 
P.  Villius,  did  obtain  an  audience,  it  was  interrupted  by  the  news  of 
the  death  of  the  king's  son.  But  though  the  king  was  at  first  absent, 
the  Romans  found  Hannibal  at  the  court,  and  the  friendly  inter- 
course they  maintained  with  him  furnished  the  jealous  courtiers  with 
materials  for  rousing  the  suspicions  of  Antiochus  as  to  the  good 
faith  of  his  famous  guest.  It  was  to  allay  these  suspicions  that 
Hannibal  told  the  story  of  the  early  vow  of  undying  hostility  to  Rome 
exacted  from  him  by  his  father,  and  assured  the  king  that  as  long  as 
he  was  at  enmity  with  Rome  he  might  count  upon  his  good  service. 

There  was  a  tradition — which  Livy  seems  to  disbelieve — that 
Africanus  himself  was  a  member  of  this  commission  and  conversed 
in  a  friendly  manner  with  Hannibal.  Among  other  things  Scipio 
asked  him  who  in  his  opinion  was  the  greatest  general  that  ever 
lived.  "Alexander,"  said  Hannibal.  "Who  next?"  "  Pyrrhus." 
Who  third  ?  "  Myself"  "  What  would  you  have  said  then,"  asked 
Scipio,  "If  you  had  conquered  me?"  "I  should  have  said  that  I 
was  greater  than  either  Alexander  or  Pyrrhus."  ^ 


^  The  answer  is  rather  too  obvious  and  fulsome,  and  had  it  been  really  given 
would   surely   have   been   retailed   by   Polybius.     We   have   only  fragments  of 


XXX  PREPARATIONS  FOR  WAR  WITH  ANTIOCHUS  469 

But  whatever  were  the  circumstances  in  which  the  envoys  spent  The  king 
their  time  during  the  king's  retirement  in  mourning  for  his  son,  they  ""^^^^ 
got  no  satisfactory  answer  at  the  end.  Antiochus  had  been  shut  up  /''^^."^ 
with  his  most  intimate  friends,  who  knew  Httle  of  the  world  beyond 
Asia,  and  beHeving,  or  affecting  to  beheve,  that  the  great  king 
was  the  most  powerful  monarch  upon  earth,  urged  him  to  undertake 
the  protection  of  Greece  against  Rome.  Accordingly  when  the 
Roman  envoys  went  to  Ephesus  (early  in  the  spring  of  192)  they 
found  that  there  was  still  less  disposition  on  his  part  to  yield.  He 
did  not  personally  appear ;  but  Minio,  one  of  his  ministers,  was 
instructed  to  deliver  a  long  and  somewhat  provocative  argument. 
The  application  of  two  Greek  towns,  Lampsacus  and  Smyrna,  to  be 
delivered  from  Antiochus,  had  formed  the  basis  of  the  Roman 
demand.  Minio  ridiculed  their  anxiety  for  the  freedom  of  these 
towns  in  face  of  their  own  treatment  of  Naples,  Rhegium,  Tarentum, 
and  Syracuse,  over  which  they  had  the  same  right  as  Antiochus 
over  the  Asiatic  cities, — the  right  of  conquest.  The  upshot  of  the 
speech  was  a  rejection  of  the  Roman  demand.  The  Roman  envoys 
indeed  answered  the  arguments  :  but  the  matter  had  passed  beyond 
discussion.  The  king  was  urged  on  all  sides, — by  his  own  council, 
by  Alexander  of  Acarnania,  by  messages  from  Aetolia,  and  by 
Hannibal,  when  admitted  to  an  audience.  A  full  belief  in  his 
own  resources,  joined  to  a  confident  expectation  of  welcome  and 
support  in  Greece,  as  soon  as  he  moved,  combined  to  make  him 
turn  a  deaf  ear  to  all  counsels  of  prudence  ;  and  the  Roman  com- 
missioners were  allowed  to  retire  without  a  word  of  concession. 

The  commissioners  had   not  reached   Rome,  it  seems,  when  the  ig2.   The 
consuls  and  the  praetors  for  the  year  192  had  already  drawn  lots  for  Romans 
their  provinces.      But  the  unfavourable  nature  of  their  report   was  ^^P^J^^  ^^^' 
anticipated,  and  it  was  determined  that  measures  must  be  taken  to  ^^^^^^_ 
prepare    for    the    now    inevitable    war.      Two    of   the   praetors,    M.   ations. 
Baebius  Tamphilus   and  A.  Atilius    Serranus,   had   drawn  the   two 
Spanish  provinces.    The  allotment  was  annulled,  the  praetors  already 
in   Spain  continued  in  their  office,  and    Baebius  was  sent  with  two 
legions,     and     their    usual     contingent     of    allies,     into     Bruttium. 
Atilius  was  put  in  command  of  the  fleet,  for  which  he  was  to  build  thirty 
quinqueremes,  to  enrol  the  necessary  number  of  socii  navales,  and 
to  receive   1000  infantry  of  allies  and   1000  Roman  soldiers  from 

Polybius  for  this  period,  but  that  the  story  was  not  in  his  books  seems  clear  from 
the  fact  that  Livy — who  follows  him  closely — expressly  attributes  it  to  the  Greek 
history  of  C.  Acilius  (Livy,  xxxv.  14), — which  he  quotes  at  second  hand  from  Q. 
Claudius  Quadrigarius.  It  is  repeated  with  some  variation  by  Appian  Syr.  and 
Plutarch  Tiius  Flam.  xxi.  Zonaras  (ix.  18)  says  that  Scipio  went  from  Carthage 
to  Ephesus,  but  says  nothing  of  the  conversation. 


470 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


one  of  the  consuls,  who  was  ordered  not  to  leave  Rome  till  the 
commissioners  returned. 

The  report  of  the  commissioners  however  did  not  announce  any 
overt  act  of  hostility  on  the  part  of  Antiochus,  and  war  was  not  yet 
therefore  openly  declared.  It  was  the  action  of  Nabis  of  Sparta  that 
brought  the  Romans  again  into  Greece.  Envoys  from  the  Achaean 
League  announced  that  he  had  broken  the  terms  imposed  upon  him 
by  the  Romans,  and  was  already  endeavouring  to  recover  Gythium 
and  other  maritime  towns.  An  addition  of  loo  quinqueremes  was 
ordered  for  the  fleet ;  and  Atilius  was  directed  to  cross  to 
Peloponnesus  to  defend  the  Roman  allies.  The  rumours  in  Rome 
became  more  and  more  alarming :  Antiochus  was  coming  to 
Aetolia,  and  from  thence  would  attack  Sicily ;  the  Aetolians  were  in 
arms  ;  all  Greece  might  soon  be  in  revolt. 

To  meet  these  dangers  immediate  steps  were  taken.  A 
squadron  was  sent  to  guard  Sicily.  A  fresh  commission  was  sent  to 
Greece  headed  by  T,  Quintius  Flamininus,  whose  influence  there 
was  still  believed  to  be  paramount ;  and  M.  Baebius  was  ordered  at 
once  to  proceed  to  Brundisium.  The  alarm  was  completed  when 
Attains,  brother  of  king  Eumenes  of  Pergamus,  arrived  with  the 
intelligence  that  Antiochus  had  already  crossed  the  Hellespont  and 
was  with  his  army  in  Europe.  It  was  now  late  in  the  year.  The 
elections  of  the  new  consuls  and  praetors  were  hastened,  and  Baebius 
ordered  to  cross  to  Apollonia. 

In  Peloponnesus  indeed  things  had  not  gone  unfavourably. 
The  attempt  of  Nabis  to  recover  his  seaports,  and  his  incursions  on 
Achaean  territory,  had  been  answered  by  immediate  proclamation  of 
war  upon  him  by  the  Achaean  League.  Under  the  able  Philopoe- 
men  the  Achaeans,  after  losing  an  important  naval  battle,  decisively 
defeated  him,  and  shut  him  up  once  more  in  Sparta  and  its 
immediate  territory.  He  made  an  urgent  appeal  to  the  Aetolians 
for  help,  as  it  was  at  their  instigation  he  had  moved.  But  the 
Aetolians  appear  to  have  decided  that  he  was  no  more  to  be  trusted, 
and  to  have  thought  that  they  could  best  secure  the  alliance  of 
Sparta  by  taking  the  credit  of  freeing  her  from  her  odious  tyrant. 
Accordingly  a  force  was  sent  there  ostensibly  to  support  him,  but 
with  secret  orders  to  kill  him.  This  was  accomplished  by  a  ruse 
when  he  was  actually  at  the  head  of  his  own  troops :  but  love 
of  plunder  overcame  all  considerations  of  prudence,  and  the  Aetolians 
began  to  loot  the  city.  The  people  rose  in  self-defence  and 
massacred  large  numbers  of  them  :  and  Philopoemen,  hearing  of  what 
had  happened,  hastened  by  the  help  of  the  Roman  fleet  at  Gythium 
to  annex  Sparta  to  the  League. 

But  though  the  Aetolians   had   by  their  own   greediness  missed 


ANTIOCHUS  COMES  TO  GREECE  471 


taking  possession  of  Sparta,  they  were  resolved  on   getting  rid  of  The 

the   Roman  supremacy  ;  and  in  full  assembly,  in  spite  of  the  advice  AetoUans 

of  the  Athenian  envoys,  and  the  presence  and  authority  of  Flamin-  ^^^^^"^^ J'^ 

.     ,,         .      /         .      .      ,    ^  ...  ^  „         A  break  from 

mus,    voted    "  to    mvite    Antiochus    to    liberate     Greece."       As    a  ^^„^/  ^g^, 

preliminary  to  this  they  determined  to  get  possession  of  Demetrias 
and    Chalcis.      Demetrias   had   by  the  award  of  Flamininus,  at  the  They 
end  of  the   Macedonian  war,  been  declared  free  and  the  chief  town  occupy 
of  the  community  (to  koivov)  of  the  Magnetes.     But  a  rumour  had  got  ^^^^^^i^^- 
about  that  the  Romans  meant  to  restore  it  to  Philip.      The  indigna- 
tion   of   the    people    found   expression   by   the   mouth    of   the    chief 
magistrate  Eurylochus,  who  in  the  presence  of  Flamininus  declared 
that  "  Demetrias  was  only  nominally  free,  in  reality  was  enslaved  to 
Rome."     The  slur  upon  Roman  good  faith  was  prudently  repudiated 
by  the  majority  of  the  meeting,  and    Eurylochus  found   it  necessary 
to  escape  to  Aetolia.      But  there  were  many  who  sympathised  with 
him  ;  and  the  Aetolians  took    advantage  of  this  feeling  and  of  the 
popularity  of  Eurylochus  to  gain  admittance  into   Demetrias  for  their 
troops  under  pretence  of  restoring  him. 

They  failed,  however,  at  Chalcis.  There  too  they  had  the  help  But  fail  at 
of  exiles  of  the  anti-Roman  party.  But  the  townsfolk  were  on  the  Chalcis. 
alert,  and  were  deaf  to  the  profession  of  the  Aetolian  leader  Thoas, 
that  he  had  come  to  free  them  from  servitude  to  Rome.  "  We  are 
not  slaves  to  any  one,"  they  said,  "and  we  have  no  need  of  an 
Aetolian  or  any  other  garrison."  And  Thoas,  who  hoped  to 
surprise  them,  or  to  find  a  strong  enough  party  to  admit  him,  but 
was  not  prepared  to  besiege  a  powerful  city,  retired  baffled. 

But  the  open  revolt  of  the  Aetolians  from  the   Roman  alliance  Antiochus 
decided  the  wavering  determination  of  Antiochus.      Three  towns  in  crosses  to 
Asia,  which  had  appealed  to  Rome,  and  which  he  did  not  wish  to  Greece. 
leave    behind    him    as    enemies,    caused    him    to    pause — Smyrna, 
Alexandria   Troas,    and    Lampsacus.       Moreover,  he  had  not  made 
up  his  mind  to  adopt  or  reject   Hannibal's  bolder  and  more  hopeful 
plan.     But  now  the  Aetolian  Thoas  insinuated  that,  if  he  followed  it, 
the  glory   Avould   all  be  Hannibal's   and   not    the   king's  :    while,   if 
Hannibal   failed,   his    fleet   and   army   would    be   fatally   weakened. 
"  Hannibal,"   he  said,  "  was  a  soldier  of  fortune,  who  might  usefully 
be    employed   as    a    subordinate :    but    would    be    intolerable  in  a 
position    of  supremacy."       The   king  listened   and   was    convinced. 
Demetrias  in  hand  was  more  tempting  than  a  prospective  invasion 
of  Italy.      Leaving   therefore   the   rebellious  cities  in  Asia  for  future  Arrives  at 
consideration,    he   sailed    to    Pteleus    in    Achaia    Phthiotis    on    the  Demetrias. 
Pagasaean    Gulf,  where  he  was  met   by  Eurylochus  and   the  chief 
Magnesians,  and  accompanied   by   them  sailed  next  day   into  the 
harbour  of  Demetrias. 


472 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


The  Aetolians,  on  hearing  of  the  arrival  of  Antiochus  in 
Demetrias,  immediately  summoned  a  meeting  and  passed  a  decree 
welcoming  him  as  a  deliverer,  and  appointing  a  conference  to  be  held 
at  Lamia  in  Malis.  At  Lamia  he  was  received  with  extraordinary 
enthusiasm.  In  a  crowded  meeting  he  explained  that,  though  he 
had  come  with  small  forces  at  that  time  (for  he  had  but  10,000 
men)  he  was  prepared,  directly  spring  made  the  seas  navigable,  to 
flood  Greece  with  troops,  and  to  spare  no  exertions  till  he  had  shaken 
the  Roman  yoke  from  their  necks.  But  when  the  king  retired  it 
became  manifest  that  there  were  two  parties  in  the  meeting,  headed 
by  Phaeneas  and  Thoas.  The  former  wished  to  regard  Antiochus 
as  a  mediator  in  the  controversies  between  themselves  and  the 
Romans  :  the  latter  as  a  general  in  a  now  acknowledged  war.  The 
opinion  of  Thoas  prevailed  ;  for  it  was  idle  to  expect  the  Romans  to 
submit  their  case  to  the  arbitration  of  a  foreign  king.  Antiochus 
was  declared  "  strategus  "  or  general  of  the  Aetolian  League,  to  act 
in  consultation  with  the  thirty  regular  counsellors,  who  in  the 
League  constitution  were  known  as  Apocleti. 

The  only  subject  left  for  discussion  was  not  whether  war  should 
be  begun,  but  how  best  to  begin  it.  The  result  of  the  deliberation 
was  that  the  first  point  of  attack  should  be  Chalcis,  which  the 
Aetolians  had  lately  vainly  attempted.  Antiochus  acted  with 
promptness.  He  marched  through  the  pass  of  Thermopylae  with 
1000  infantry,  met  the  Aetolian  levy  at  Chaeroneia,  pitched  his 
camp  at  Salganeus,  which  commands  the  northern  entrance  of  the 
Euripus,  and  at  once  crossed  over  by  sea  into  Euboea.  The 
Aetolian  commanders  were  met  by  some  of  the  chief  men  of  Chalcis, 
headed  by  Mictio,  who  in  answer  to  their  request  that,  without 
renouncing  their  friendship  with  Rome,  they  would  receive  Antiochus 
as  an  ally  and  friend  who  had  come  to  liberate  Greece,  replied  that 
they  knew  of  no  Greek  city  which  had  either  a  Roman  garrison  or 
paid  tribute  to  Rome,  and  therefore  were  at  a  loss  to  understand 
whom  the  king  was  come  to  liberate,  or  from  whom.  They  declined 
to  receive  him  within  their  walls  and  would  make  no  terms  with  them 
or  him  unless  they  left  the  island.  Once  more  the  Aetolians  were 
fain  to  abandon  Chalcis  :  and  the  king,  who  had  remained  by  his 
ships,  resolved  to  return  to  Demetrias,  and  to  pave  the  way  for  future 
movements  by  attempting  to  secure  allies. 

The  Achaeans  received  his  envoys  at  their  meeting  at  Aegium, 
at  which  Flamininus  was  present.  Hopes  had  been  entertained  of 
divided  counsels  in  Achaia  from  a  supposed  jealousy  between 
Philopoemen  and  Flamininus.  But  the  vain  braggings  of  the  royal 
envoys,  backed  by  the  invectives  of  the  Aetolians,  who  claimed  the 
credit  of  the   defeat  of   Philip,  were  met   by  a  scornful   speech  of 


XXX  ANTIOCHUS  AT  CHALCIS  473 

Flamininus,  who  pointed  to  the  weakness  of  the  king's  forces  when 
compared  to  the  high  talk  of  covering  the  sea  with  his  ships  and 
flooding  the  land  with  his  soldiers  :  and  appealed  to  the  meeting  to 
decide  between  these  vain  boasts  and  the  tried  faith  and  power  of 
Rome.  The  decision  was  unanimously  in  favour  of  the  Roman 
alliance  and  of  proclaiming  war  with  the  Aetolians  and  Antiochus. 

Elsewhere  the    king's   legates  were  more    favourably  received.    The 
The    Boeotians,  who   had   not   forgiven   the   punishment   their   own  Boeotians 
treachery  had  brought  upon  them  two  years  before  at  the  hands  of  "^^^^^^^• 
Flamininus,  did  not,  indeed,  give  a  definite  answer,  but  promised  to 
give  it  to  Antiochus  in  person  when  he  came  to  them  ;  and  it  was 
evident  that  they  were  ready  to  join  him  if  they  could  feel  a  reason- 
able hope  of  his  success. 

Amynander,   king   of  the  Athamanes,    was    another  whom    the  Amynan- 
machinations  of  the  king's  envoys  drew  into  his  alliance.      He  owed  der  joins 
much  to  Roman  protection  at  the  time  of  the  Macedonian  war ;  but  Antiochus. 
he  was   under  the   influence  of  his   wife  Apamia  and   her  brother 
Philip,  who  claimed  to  be  descended  from  Alexander  the  Great,  and 
were  beguiled  by  a  hint  that,  if  they  could  persuade  Amynander  to 
join  Antiochus,  they  should  be  rewarded  by  Philip  being  made  king 
of  Macedonia. 

But    while    these    negotiations   were    going    on,  Antiochus    was  Chalcis 
preparing    for    a   blow    which    was    rendered    effective    almost    by  occupied  by 
accident.      On  his  return  to  Lamia  and  Demetrias  he  sent   off  his  -^"-t^ochus 
general  Menippus  with  about  3000  men,  and  his  admiral  Polyxenidas  autumn  of 
with  his  ships,  to  make  one  more  attempt  on  Chalcis,  before  the  place  1^2. 
had  been  strengthened  by  the  reinforcements  which  he  heard  were 
to   be   thrown   into   it   by  king   Eumenes   and  the   Achaeans.      He 
followed  in  person  some  few  days  afterwards  with  6000  men  and  a 
few  Aetolians  who  meanwhile  had  mustered  at  Lamia.     They  were 
too  late  to  prevent  the  passage  of  the  reinforcements  from  Eumenes 
and  Achaia;  but  while  Menippus  was  encamped  at  Salganeus,  500  Destruction 
Roman    soldiers    sent    by    Flamininus,    and    accompanied    by    the  of « body  of 
Chalcidian  Mictio  (who  had  gone  to  ask  for  them),  came  in   sight.  ^^J".^^^ 
Finding  their  road  to  Aulis  blocked,  these  men  returned  to  Delium 
and  encamped  near  the   temple  of  Apollo  on  the  coast ;  and  not 
expecting  to  be   attacked,  as  war  had  not   been  declared,  strayed 
about  the  country  in  search  of  food  and  firing  without  any  precautions, 
Menippus  took  advantage  of  this  to  attack  and  cut  them  off,  and 
only   a   small   part    of  them  escaped.      Thus    the    first   blood    had 
been  shed  by  the  king.     War  would  doubtless  have  been  proclaimed 
in  any  case  :  but  it  was  important  in  a  religious  point  of  view  that     ~ 
the  Romans   should  have   such  definite   ground  for  proclaiming  it. 
This  was  rendered  still   more  valid  by   the  fact  that  many  of  the 


474 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Winter  of 

The  Greek 
states  and 
king 
Antiochus. 


Hannibal 
advises 
that  the 
king  of 
Macedonia 
should  be 
won  over. 


The 

unburied 
bodies  at 
Cynos- 
cephalae. 


Romans  had  been  killed  within  the  precincts  of  the  temple  of  Apollo 
at  Delium ;  for  the  profanation  of  this  asylum  would  entail  the 
wrath  and  vengeance  of  the  gods. 

But  its  immediate  effect  was  the  admission  of  Antiochus  to 
Chalcis.  He  had  arrived  at  Aulis  with  his  main  army,  just  as 
the  success  of  Menippus  silenced  the  Romanising  party  at  Chalcis, 
the  leaders  of  which  effected  their  escape.  The  soldiers  of  Achaia 
and  Eumenes  occupied  for  a  short  time  the  town  of  Salganeus,  and 
the  remains  of  the  Roman  force  a  castle  on  the  Euripus  :  but  both 
had  eventually  to  evacuate  these  places  ;  and  Antiochus  took  un- 
disputed possession  of  Chalcis  and  with  it  the  whole  of  Euboea. 

The  king  had  made  up  his  mind  to  winter  at  Chalcis  ;  and  he 
was  soon  actively  employed  in  negotiations  with  various  Greek  states, 
Hannibal  had  warned  him  that  a  combination  of  these  states  formed 
but  a  rotten  foundation  on  which  to  rest.  But  Hannibal's  policy 
had  been  rejected,  and  the  king  was  eager  to  enroll  allies.  To  the 
Eleans,  who  complained  that  their  opposition  to  the  Achaean  pro- 
clamation of  war  had  put  them  in  danger  of  invasion,  he  sent  looo 
men.  To  the  Epirotes,  who  expressed  affection  for  him,  but  urged 
that  they  were  too  much  exposed  to  invasion  from  Italy  to  move, 
he  promised  to  send  relief.  Boeotia  he  visited  in  person,  and  was 
welcomed  in  Thebes  with  the  utmost  enthusiasm.  Some  flimsy 
pretence  indeed  was  kept  up  of  disclaiming  hostility  to  Rome,  but  in 
fact  the  Boeotians  voted  to  join  the  king  against  her.  In  Thessaly 
he  held  a  conference  at  Demetrias  :  some  of  the  towns  were  ready 
to  join  at  once,  some  were  hostile,  some  temporised. 

Hannibal,  who  was  present,  urged  that,  as  his  own  plan  had 
been  rejected,  it  was  supremely  necessary  for  the  success  of  the 
present  policy  that  the  friendship,  or  at  least  the  neutrality,  of  the 
king  of  Macedonia  should  be  secured.  The  former  might  be 
obtained  by  working  on  his  secret  feelings  of  anger  at  his  subordin- 
ation to  Rome  ;  the  latter  by  directing  Seleucus,  son  of  Antiochus, 
to  invade  Macedonia  from  Lysimacheia,  and  so  give  Philip  enough 
to  do  in  his  own  country.  His  advice,  as  before,  was  rejected,  and 
Philip  was  even  needlessly  provoked.  In  the  course  of  his  progress 
through  Thessaly  it  occurred  to  Antiochus  to  show  his  goodwill  to 
the  Macedonians  by  collecting  for  burial  the  bones  of  those  of  them 
who  had  fallen  at  Cynoscephalae,  and  had  been  left  unburied.  This 
in  itself  was  a  reflection  on  Philip,  and  to  make  that  reflection  more 
pointed  he  employed  for  the  business  the  new  pretender  to  the 
Macedonian  kingdom,  Philip  of  Megalopolis.  Having  taken  over  a 
considerable  number  of  Thessalian  towns,  of  which  Pherae  alone 
made  serious  resistance  until  he  came  to  Larissa,  he  found  his 
position   near  the   latter  town   threatened   by  a  combined   force  of 


XXX  ARRIVAL  OF  A  CONSULAR  ARMY  IN  GREECE  475 

Romans  under  the  praetor  Baebius  and  Macedonians  under  king 
Philip  5  and  therefore,  dismissing  his  Aetolian  and  Athamanian  alHes 
for  the  winter,  he  retired  to  Chalcis. 

Chalcis  proved  to  be  the  king's  Capua.      He  had  fallen  in  love  Antiochus 
with  a  young  Greek  lady  there,  and  now  celebrated  his  nuptials  with  at  Chalets, 
great  pomp,  followed  by  a  round  of  festivities  and  gaieties.      While  ^^'^^^^  v 
thus  occupied  he  neglected  business   of  all  kinds  ;    and  his  army, 
sharing  in  the  dissipations  of  its  leader,  degenerated  both  in  discipline 
and  physical  condition.     To  the  original  error  therefore  of  the  plan 
of  the  war  was   now  added  a  fatal  slackness   in   the   preparations 
for  it,  which  affected  his  allies  no  less  than  his  own  troops.      The 
spring    saw    his    army    disorganised    and  no    appearance    of    the 
promised  forces  from  Greece.      On  going  to  Acarnania,  to  secure  the  Antiochus 
adherence  of  the  Acarnanians,  he  found  the  same  division  of  opinion  ^^  Acar- 
and   interests  as   elsewhere.      Some  of  the  leading  men  were  in  his  ^^'"''''^• 
favour,  and  some  of  the  towns,  such  as  Stratus  and  Medion,  fell  into 
his  hands  :  but  Thyreum  closed  its  gates  and  refused  to  make  any 
alliance    without    the    sanction    of    Rome ;    and    the    Leucadians, 
encouraged    or    overawed    by    the    proximity   of  the    Roman    fleet, 
declined  to  commit  themselves.      The  king  everywhere  professed  to 
be  wholly  disinterested,  and  that  he  had  come  not  to  annex,  but  to 
set  free.      He  was  soon  recalled  by  graver  news. 

The  early  spring  of  191  had  been  spent  by  the  praetor  Baebius,  igi.  M . 
in  conjunction  with  king  Philip,  in  securing  or  recovering  numerous  Acilius 
cities    in    Thessaly.      He    was    besieging    the    pretender    Philip    of  ^^^y^^^' 
Magalopolis  in  Pelinnaeum,  on  the  upper  Peneius,  and  king  PhiHp  arrives  in 
was    investing    Limnaeum,    a    few    miles    to    the    north,    when    the   Thessaly. 
consul   M'.  Acilius  arrived  with  a  fresh  army  of  above  22,000  men. 
The  two  towns  quickly  surrendered  ;  and  the  pretender  Philip  was 
sent  in  chains  to  Rome,  after  having  been   saluted  in  mockery  as 
king  by  the  Macedonian  troops,  and  as  "  cousin  "  by  Philip. 

This  was  followed   by  the  surrender  of  many  other  towns  with  Sudden 
the  garrisons  placed  in  them  by  Antiochus.      Almost  at  a  blow  the  collapse 
whole  work  of  the  previous   autumn   and  winter  was   undone  ;  and  ^^^^  ^f 
Antiochus  hurried  back  to  his  army  at  Chalcis,  to  meet  his  enemies,  Antiochus 
no   longer   as   the   acknowledged  champion    of  Greece,   but   as   an  in  Greece. 
invader  driven  to  his  last  hold.      Town  after  town  between  him  and 
Larissa    opened    its    gates    to    the    consul,  —  Pharsalus,    Scotussa, 
Pherae,   Crannon, — and   their  garrisons    either  enlisted  under  king 
Philip  or  were  allowed  to  depart  disarmed  to  Demetrias.     Hannibal's 
warning    was    amply    justified :     at    the   first    touch   of  danger  the 
imaginary  Greek  alliance  had  melted  into  air. 

The    king    sent    urgent    messages    to    the    Aetolians     for    their 
promised  contingent.    Slowly  and  reluctantly  4000  of  them  mustered 


476 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


The 

Aetolians 
at 

Heracleia. 
Antiochus 
at  Ther- 
mopylae, 
igr. 


Battle  at 
Ther- 
mopylae. 


Retreat  of 
Antiochus. 


at  Hypata  and  Heracleia,  while  the  king  found  that  even  his 
reinforcements  from  Asia  were  delayed,  and  that  his  whole  army 
amounted  only  to  10,000  men.  With  these  he  entrenched  himself  to 
the  south  of  the  pass  of  Thermopylae,  which  he  strengthened  by  a 
trench,  a  double  stockade,  and  in  parts  by  a  wall.  On  the  Aetolians 
he  enjoined  the  task  of  guarding  the  mountain  paths  by  which  the 
Persians  had  in  old  times  got  to  the  rear  of  Leonidas.  By  this  time 
they  had  abandoned  Hypata  and  were  concentrated  in  Heracleia, 
and  disliked  the  idea  of  dividing  their  forces  :  for  if  the  king  won 
the  victory,  they  were  looking  forward  to  join  in  the  pursuit  and 
plunder  ;  if  he  lost,  they  desired  to  keep  together  for  defence.  How- 
ever 2000  of  them  were  eventually  told  off  to  guard  three  points 
at  which  the  mountains  were  passable.  The  loftiest  was  called 
Callidromus,  and  here  600  Aetolians  were  stationed,  but  seem  to 
have  felt  so  secure  that  they  kept  but  careless  guard. 

Meanwhile  the  Roman  army  had  arrived  at  the  entrance  of  the 
pass  after  laying  waste  the  country  round  Hypata  and  Heracleia. 
The  defences  raised  by  Antiochus  were  sufficiently  strong  to  be 
held  by  his  light-armed  troops,  while  his  heavy-armed  remained  in 
reserve  drawn  up  in  phalanx.  But  Acilius  knew  of  the  possi- 
bility of  outflanking  him  by  means  of  the  mountain  passes.  Two 
of  his  legates,  M.  Porcius  Cato  and  L.  Valerius  Flaccus,  with  2000 
men  apiece,  were  despatched  to  make  the  attempt.  Flaccus 
apparently  failed  to  arrive  at  the  point  at  which  he  aimed,  but  Cato 
was  more  successful.  Having  obtained  a  countryman  as  guide  he 
began  the  ascent  of  Callidromus,  until,  as  darkness  was  coming  on, 
it  was  discovered  that  the  guide  had  lost  his  way.  But  Cato, 
accompanied  by  one  L.  Maelius,  who  was  a  good  mountaineer,  set 
out  in  quest  of  the  path.  In  spite  of  the  darkness  of  the  moonless 
night  these  two  hit  the  track  and  placed  landmarks  to  guide  them. 
They  thus  led  their  men  towards  the  summit,  and  as  they  neared  it 
found  themselves  in  the  presence  of  an  enemy,  of  whose  numbers  they 
were  ignorant.  Some  of  the  cohors  Firmana  (veterans  from  the 
colony  of  Firmum)  made  a  rush  to  the  front,  captured  one  of  the 
enemy,  and  learnt  that  they  were  600  Aetolians.  Reassured  as  to 
the  number  opposed  to  them  they  continued  their  advance.  The 
Aetolians  fled  almost  without  a  blow,  or  were  surprised  and  killed, 
and  Cato  on  descending  found  himself  above  the  rear  of  Antiochus's 
position. 

Meanwhile  the  main  Roman  army,  with  great  exertion  and  some 
loss,  had  carried  the  first  stockade,  but  were  unable  to  make  their 
way  over  the  second  in  face  of  the  sarissae  of  the  phalanx,  and  under 
fire  of  the  ballistae  and  other  artillery  placed  at  the  various  points  of 
vantage.      But  Antiochus  himself  had  been  wounded  in  the  face  by 


XXX  ANTIOCPIUS  RETIRES  FROM  GREECE  477 

a  stone  and  had  retired  to  the  rear  and  when  Cato's  force  appeared  The  king's 
above  them,  his  men  at  first  believed  it  to  be  an  Aetolian  reinforce-  bosses,  igi. 
ment ;  but  were  seized  with  panic,  as  soon  as  they  discovered  the 
truth,  and  turned  to  flight.  Though  the  various  hindrances  which 
had  been  placed  across  the  pass  prevented  a  rapid  or  general 
pursuit,  many  were  killed  by  the  cavalry  and  Cato's  contingent,  who 
pursued  as  far  as  Scarpheia.  The  king  did  not  halt  until  he 
reached  Elateia,  where  he  collected  the  remains  of  his  army,  and 
made  the  best  of  his  way  back  to  Chalcis.  Only  500  are  said  to 
have  remained  of  the  10,000  which  he  had  brought  with  him  :  the 
rest  had  perished  in  the  battle,  or  had  been  cut  off  by  the  cavalry 
as  they  wandered  helplessly  through  the  country,  or  had  been  made 
prisoners. 

There  was,  of  course,  an  end  of  any  farther  resistance  in  Greece.  Boeotia 
The  Boeotian  cities,  conscious  of  their  defection  and  of  their  help-  submits, 
lessness,  sent  out  deputations  from  all  directions  with  suppliant 
wreaths  and  every  sign  of  humiliation.  Acilius  treated  them  with 
contemptuous  lenity, — only  at  one  spot,  the  temple  of  Itonian  Pallas 
in  the  territory  of  Coroneia, — was  he  irritated  by  the  sight  of  a  statue 
of  Antiochus  into  giving  permission  to  his  men  to  pillage,  but  even 
that  permission  was  soon  withdrawn,  and  the  Boeotians  were  made  to 
suffer  nothing  more  than  a  severe  rebuke. 

Immediately   after  the  battle   of  Thermopylae,  Atilius,   in   com-   The 
mand  of  a  Roman  squadron  in  the  Peiraeus  had  intercepted  a  large  provision 
fleet  of  provision   ships   from  Asia  off  the  island  of  Andros,  sinking  -^^^^  y 
some  and  capturing  others  ;  while  ten  war  vessels  which  had  arrived  intercepted. 
at  Thronium,  on  hearing  of  the  disaster,  at  once  departed,  some  going 
to  Asia  and  some  to  Demetrias,  in  case  the  king  should  be  there. 
But  Antiochus  had  not  ventured  to  remain  in  Greece.     Taking  his  Antiochus 
young  wife  with   him   he  embarked   at   once,  and  arrived  safely  at  goes  to 
Ephesus,  having  eluded  the  Roman  squadron.  Ephesus. 

The  consul  was  at  once   admitted   into  Chalcis,  the  royal  com-  Acilius 
mander  having  escaped  before  his  arrival,  and  the  whole  of  Euboea  occupies 
quietly  submitted.      Acilius,   having  thus   secured   Euboea,   returned  ^'^^^^"• 
to  his  position  at  Thermopylae.      L.  Scipio  and  Cato  were  sent  to 
announce  his  success  at  Rome,  where  a  three  days'  supplicatio  was 
decreed,  made  the  more  joyful  by  the  ovaiio  of  Fulvius   Nobilior  on   The 
his   return   from    Spain.      Meanwhile  Acilius   had   to  deal  with  the  -^^iohans. 
Aetolians.      Their  army  was  still  at  Heracleia  immediately  north  of 
the  pass  of  Thermopylae.      He  sent  them  a  message,   pointing  out 
that    Greece   was   pacified,  and   they  isolated,   and   urging   them  to  Fall  op 
submit  and  obtain  pardon  for  their  infatuated  conduct.      Receiving  Heracleia. 
no  indication  of  submission  in  response  to  this  appeal,  he  laid  siege 
to  Heracleia.      The  Aetolians,  though  in  such  inadequate  numbers. 


47S 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


The 

Aetolians 
seek  peace. 


Feelings 
of  king 
Philip. 


He  wishes 
the 

Aetolians 
to  join  him. 


made  a  desperate  and  even  heroic  defence  ;  and  it  was  not  till  worn 
out  with  fatigue  and  constant  sleeplessness — 

Ever  the  labour  of  fifty  that  had  to  be  done  by  five — 

at  the  end  of  nearly  a  month,  that  they  at  last  surrendered  the 
citadel,  when  the  town  was  already  in  Roman  hands.  Among  the 
prisoners  was  Damocritus,  who  had  haughtily  answered  Flamininus, 
when  he  demanded  the  text  of  the  decree  passed  by  the  Aetolian 
assembly  to  invite  Antiochus,  that  "  he  would  give  it  him  in  Italy, 
when  the  Aetolians  had  encamped  there." 

The  fall  of  Heracleia  seems  to  have  convinced  the  Aetolian 
League  that  they  were  in  grave  danger,  and  envoys  were  sent  to 
Acilius  to  ask  for  a  truce  and  to  make  a  treaty  of  peace.  They 
were  indeed  in  a  peculiar  position.  Philip  of  Macedon  had  not  been 
present  at  Thermopylae,  but  had  met  the  consul  soon  afterwards, 
excused  his  absence  on  the  score  of  illness,  and,  while  he  was 
engaged  at  Heracleia,  had  undertaken  for  him  the  siege  of  Lamia. 
But  that  he  was  not  whole-hearted  in  promoting  the  Roman  cause 
might  naturally  have  been  expected,  and  was  in  fact  shown  by  a 
curious  incident.  The  AetoHans  had  not  wholly  despaired  of  their 
cause  after  Thermopylae,  encouraged  by  the  obstinate  defence  of 
Heracleia :  and  had  in  fact  despatched  envoys  to  Antiochus  at 
Ephesus,  urging  him  to  renew  the  attempt  on  Greece,  and  at  any 
rate  to  send  them  money  to  support  the  war.  The  king  was 
lavish  in  promises  of  a  second  expedition,  and  gave  the  money 
asked,  but  retained  Thoas,  one  of  the  ambassadors,  under  some 
honourable  pretext,  sending  Nicander  home  with  his  gracious 
message.  Nicander  found  the  Romans  in  possession  of  Heracleia, 
but  Lamia  freed  from  its  siege.  This  had  come  about  by  the 
jealousy  of  the  Romans,  who  had  not  wished  Philip  to  have  the 
prestige  of  its  capture,  or  the  credit  of  sparing  it  when  taken ; 
and  the  consul  had  accordingly  bidden  him  desist  from  the  siege. 
Philip  had  obeyed  and  transferred  his  camp  to  some  distance  from 
Lamia,  but  no  doubt  with  some  bitter  feelings  as  to  his  subjection  to 
Rome.  At  any  rate  when  Nicander,  leaving  the  money  at  Lamia, 
tried  to  make  his  way  home  between  the  camps,  he  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  Macedonian  pickets,  and  was  taken  to  the  king.  He 
expected  to  be  treated  as  a  prisoner  ;  but  to  his  surprise  was  honour- 
ably entertained,  and  had  an  interview  with  Philip  in  which  that 
monarch  pointed  out  to  him  the  mischief  which  the  Aetolians  had 
done  by  bringing  first  the  Romans,  and  then  Antiochus,  into  Greece ; 
and  urged  that  "  they  should  forget  the  past,  adhere  loyally  to 
himself,  and  not  look  out  to  take  advantage  of  each  other's 
difficulties."        He    bade    him    take    this  message    to   the   Aetolian 


XXX  THE  SUBJECTION  OF  THE  AETOLIANS  479 

government,  and  sent  him  ofif  under  safe  escort.  This  was  no 
obscure  hint  that  Philip  had  still  hopes  of  a  revival  of  Macedonian 
influence,  at  the  expense  of  Roman  supremacy,  and  it  no  doubt 
helped  to  encourage  the  obstinacy  of  the  Aetolians. 

For  all   negotiations  failed.       When   the   fall    of   Heracleia   in-  The 
duced   Phaeneas,  the  Aetolian  strategus,  to  send  envoys  to  Acilius,  Aetolians 
the  consul  treated  them  with  haughtiness,   and  refused  to  listen  to  '*'^^^^ 
their  arguments,  but  granted  a  ten  days'  truce  while  he  was  engaged  ter^ns 
in  distributing  the  spoil  of  Heracleia,  sending  L.  Valerius  Flaccus  to  igi. 
them  at  Hypata  with  his  ultimatum,  who  refused  to    enter  into  argu- 
ment,  and  demanded  unconditional  submission.       This  after  some 
hesitation  they  agreed  to  make  to  Acilius  in  person.       On  accepting 
their  submission  Acilius  told  Phaeneas  and  his  colleagues  what  the 
Romans  required  of  them  :  they  must  undertake  not  to  go  to  Asia 
either    as    an    army   or    individually ;    must    surrender  the    Epirote 
Menestratus,    in     command    of  their    troops    at    Naupactus,    and 
king    Amynander  of  Athamania.       Upon   their   demurring   to    this 
abandonment  of  their  allies,  Acilius  roughly  informed  them  that  they 
were  dediticii  and  must   do  what   they  were  told.     They  were  no 
longer  ambassadors,  but  subjects,  and  he  could  even  put  them  in 
chains.      He  went  so  far  as  actually  to  cause  them  to  be  fettered. 
Though  he  immediately  countermanded  this,  Phaeneas  was  so  com- 
pletely cowed  that  he  assented   to  all  demands,   only  asking  time 
to    obtain    the    ratification    of  the    Aetolian    assembly.       But    the 
Aetolian  assembly  at  Hypata  indignantly  rejected  the  peace,  furious 
at  the  treatment  of  their  strategus,  and  encouraged  by  Nicanders 
report  of  the  promises  of  Antiochus,  and  of  the  words  of  king  Philip. 

Acilius  therefore  was  obliged  to  continue  the  war.     The  Aetolian   The  war 
forces  were  concentrated  at  Naupactus,  and  to  that  place  he  now  ^^ith  the 
directed  his  attack.     For  two  months  in  the  autumn  of  191  the  siege  Aetolians 
of  Naupactus  went  on.      It  seemed  on  the  point  of  falling,  and  with  ^s^autactus 
its  fall  Aetolia  as  a  nation  would,  it  was  believed,  cease  to  exist.      In  igr 
their  despair  the  League  government  turned  to  Flamininus,  who  had  {autumn). 
been  engaged  all  this  summer  in  composing  the  disturbances  in  Pelo- 
ponnesus caused  by  the  refusal  of  Elis  and  Messenia  to  be  enrolled  in 
the  Achaean  League,  and  had  just  arrived  at  the  Roman  camp  at 
Naupactus,      Though  they  had  in  former  times  rejected  his  counsel 
and   insulted  his  person,  they  knew  that  his   policy  in   Greece  had 
ever  been  to  preserve  nationalities,  and  that  he  had  already  saved 
Chalcis  from  punishment  at  the  hands    of  Acilius  ;    and  as  a   last 
chance  they  begged  his  interposition  in  their  behalf. 

Flamininus  did  not  give  them  any  hopes  at  first :  but  he  actually 
obtained  for  them  what  they  wanted.  His  view,  which  he  con- 
trived  to   impress   upon   the   consul,  was   founded  on  the  desire  to 


48o 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Antiochus 
not  safe 
in  Asia. 


preserve  north-western  Greece  as  a  counterpoise  to  Philip  of 
Macedon,  who  had  been  recovering  considerable  power,  nominally 
indeed  by  the  permission  of  the  consul  and  in  the  service  of  Rome,  but, 
as  was  known  perhaps  to  Flamininus,  with  secret  hopes  of  a  more 
independent  position  in  the  future.  He  pointed  out  to  Acilius  that 
he  would  not  do  well  to  spend  his  whole  year  of  ofifice  (now  drawing 
to  a  close)  in  the  capture  of  two  cities,  while  he  left  Philip  the  credit 
and  material  advantage  of  his  conquests  of  Demetrias,  and  in 
Dolopia,  Aperantia,  and  Perrhaebia,  which  would  in  effect  become 
again  provinces  of  the  Macedonian  kingdom,  Acilius,  who  does  not 
seem  to  have  been  a  strong  man,  and  perhaps  was  a  corrupt  one, 
listened  to  these  representations.  He  had  obtained  ample  wealth 
to  adorn  a  triumph,  and  he  was  willing  to  leave  the  rest  to 
Flamininus,  even  at  the  cost  of  desisting  from  what  was  almost 
a  successful  siege.  Flamininus  therefore  suggested  to  the  besieged 
Aetolians  that  they  should  ask  for  a  truce  to  enable  them  to 
send  ambassadors  to  Rome.  This  was  granted,  and  an  embassy 
from  the  Epirotes,  who  had  assisted  Antiochus  with  money  though 
not  with  men,  was  also  referred  to  Rome.  Finally  Philip  of  Mace- 
don —  who  had  been  engaged  during  the  siege  of  Naupactus  in 
taking  over  Demetrias  and  recovering  the  districts  lately  occupied 
by  the  Aetolians — still  took  care  to  openly  identify  himself  with  the 
Roman  success  :  he  sent  ambassadors  to  congratulate  the  Senate, 
and  begged  leave  to  offer  sacrifice  to  Jupiter  on  the  Capitol  and 
present  an  oblation  of  gold.  Whatever  bitterness  there  was  in  his 
heart,  and  whatever  suspicions  were  entertained  at  Rome,  were 
carefully  concealed.  The  Senate  gave  a  gracious  answer,  remitted 
the  remainder  of  his  war  indemnity,  and  sent  back  his  son  Demetrius, 
who  was  residing  as  a  hostage  at  Rome. 

This  was  the  end  of  the  first  year's  war  with  Antiochus,  in  which 
it  was  settled  definitely  that  in  European  Greece  at  any  rate  he  was 
to  have  no  concern.  But  he  was  slow  to  appreciate  his  position. 
His  promises  of  a  return  in  the  next  year  with  greater  forces,  his 
immediate  calling  out  of  troops  from  his  distant  satrapies  for  the 
next  campaign,  showed  that  the  voices  of  flatterers  could  still  close 
his  ears  to  the  truth.  The  Romans  might  be  fought  again  in 
Greece  :  but  what  if  they  attacked  him  in  Asia  ?  ■  His  courtiers 
told  him  that  that  was  impossible.  Only  Hannibal  was  more  clear- 
sighted or  more  honest  than  the  rest,  and  ventured  to  say  "  he  was 
rather  surprised  at  their  not  being  there  already  than  doubtful  of 
their  coming :  the  king  must  prepare  to  fight  for  Asia  itself." 
Roused  by  these  faithful  words  to  a  sense  of  danger,  the  king 
proceeded  to  strengthen  his  posts  in  the  Chersonese,  that  they 
might   be   capable   of  blocking   the   Roman  march.      But  that  was 


XXX  THE  SCIPIOS  COME  TO  GREECE  481 

only  one  narrow  gate.     The  sea  was  open,  and  the  Roman  fleet  was  The 
on  the  move.     It  was  now  under  the  command  of  C.  Livius  Salinator.  Roman 
He    had    been   acting   with   vigour    from    the   first ;    had    punished  •^^^^'  ^^^' 
Cephallenia  and  Zakynthus  for  their  participation  in  the  cause  of  the 
Aetolians ;    and   then,    taking    over    the    old   fleet    from  Atilius   at 
the   Peiraeus,  crossed   to   Delos,  and   thence   to  the  coast  of  Asia 
Minor.     The  king  hurried  back  to  Ephesus,  and  allowed  his  admiral 
Polyxenidas  to  engage  the  enemy,  while  he  was  himself  busied  in 
collecting  land  forces.      Polyxenidas  was  anxious  to  attack  the  Roman 
fleet  at  once,  before  they  could  be  joined  by  the   ships  of  Eumenes 
and  Rhodes  ;  and  in  the  engagement  off  Phocaea  Eumenes  arrived 
almost  in  the  moment  of  the  Roman  victory,  and  the  Rhodians  only 
joined  the  next  day,  as  the   Romans  were  pursuing  the   royal  fleet  Defeat  of 
towards  Ephesus.       But  it  was  too  late   in   the  season   for  farther  ^^^,  kin^s 
operations.     The  Roman  ships  were  hauled  up  at  Canae,  opposite  the  pj^^^^ 
south  coast  of  Lesbos,  and  protected  by  a  ditch  and  stockade.      The 
retaliation  was  begun  :  for  the  first  time  a  Roman  force  was  wintering 
in  Asia, 

It  is   true   that  the  Roman  difficulties  in  Greece,  which  might   The 
interfere   with  an   attack  on  Asia,  were   not   yet  at  an   end.      The  Aetohan 
Aetolian  embassy  had  failed,  and  the  Aetolians  were  still  at  war  with  ^^  ^^^^r  y 
Rome.     Before  their  audience  with  the  Senate  the  news  of  the  victory 
off  Phocaea  had  reached  Rome,  and  the  senators  were  not  disposed 
to  make  any  concessions.      They  were  required  to  submit  to  the  will 
of  the  Roman  people,  to  pay  1000  talents,  and  to  make  a  treaty  of 
offensive  and  defensive  alliance  ;  and  upon  the  legates  desiring  to 
know  on  what  points  they  were  to  submit  to  the  will  of  Rome,  they 
were  refused  an  answer,  and  ordered  to  quit  Rome  the  same  day, 
and  Italy  within  fifteen.       But  this  afforded  Antiochus  no  foothold  in 
Greece.       The  Aetolians  found  their  southern  seaboard  ravaged  by 
the  Achaeans,  and  could  do  nothing  but  occupy  Corax,  the  heights 
over  Naupactus,  in  the  expectation  that  this  town  would  be  the  first 
point  of  the   Roman   attack  in   the   spring.      Acilius,  however,  who  igo. 
began   the   campaign    of    190   before   the   arrival   of  his    successor,  Acilius 
preferred   to   secure   the   towns   on    the   road   to    Naupactus   before    f  ^^ . 
attacking  Naupactus  itself.       He  besieged  and  took  Lamia,   which  ^gsieges 
had  all  but  fallen  to  Philip  in  the  previous  year  ;  and  then  proceeded  Amphissa. 
to  invest  Amphissa,  which  promised  to  make  a  stout  resistance. 

His   successor,    L.    Cornelius    Scipio,   to   whom   the   province    of  Arrival  oj 
Greece  had  been  assigned  without  lot,  on  the  promise  of  his  brother  ^^^  Scipios 
Africanus  to  accompany  him  as  a  legatus,  arrived  towards  the  end  of    "  ^  ^^^' 
July  with  a  consular  army  at  Apollonia,  and  marched  across  Epirus 
and  Thessaly  to  the  head  of  the  Malian  gulf.      The  Aetolians  were 
to  be  attacked  at  every  point,  and  Hypata,  their  chief  town  in  that 

2  I 


482 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


The  pre- 
parations of 
Antiochus 
in  the 
winter  of 


district,  was  summoned  to  surrender,  but  refused  to  do  so  without  orders 
from  the  League  government.  The  consul  would  not  stay  to  besiege 
it,  but  sending  on  Africanus  towards  Amphissa  with  a  contingent, 
followed  more  slowly  with  his  main  army.  Africanus  was  met  by  a 
deputation  from  Athens  pleading  for  mercy  to  the  Aetolians.  He 
gave  them  hopes  of  liberal  treatment ;  but  when  the  consul  arrived  he 
reiterated  the  terms  of  the  Senate, — unconditional  submission  to  the 
will  of  the  Roman  people,  and  payment  of  1000  talents.  The  first 
might  be  admitted,  at  any  rate  in  words  :  for  the  latter  they  had 
not  the  means.  After  consultation  a  fresh  embassy  was  sent  from 
Hypata  asking  that  the  sum  demanded  should  be  lessened,  and  that 
the  submission  should  exclude  the  personal  slavery  of  any  Aetolian. 
That  was  rejected.  But  the  Athenians  at  length  obtained  for  them 
an  armistice  for  six  months  to  allow  of  fresh  embassies  to  Rome. 
Thereupon  the  siege  of  Amphissa  was  broken  up,  Acilius  departed 
for  Italy,  and  the  consul  proceeded  to  make  arrangements  for  his 
march  towards  the  Hellespont,  with  all  anxiety  as  to  movements  in 
Greece  at  an  end.  In  fact  the  six  months'  armistice,  though  granted 
with  difficulty,  and  as  an  extreme  favour  to  the  Aetolians,  exactly 
suited  his  plans.  It  left  him  free  to  act  without  thought  of  immediate 
danger  in  Greece,  and  it  committed  him  to  nothing.  The  terms  to 
be  imposed  on  the  Aetolians  might  be  aggravated  or  alleviated 
hereafter,  according  to  circumstances. 

Before  starting  on  his  northward  march  the  consul  ascertained, 
by  sending  Gracchus  to  Pella,  that  Philip  was  prepared  to  give  the 
Roman  army  every  facility  and  liberal  supplies  on  their  way 
through  his  dominions  ;  and  that  the  roads  and  bridges  were  in  a 
state  to  admit  the  passage  of  an  army.  In  fact  the  king  met  them 
personally,  saw  that  everything  was  in  readiness  for  them,  and 
accompanied  them  to  the  Hellespont.  Like  others  he  was  charmed 
by  the  character  and  manners  of  Africanus,  on  whom  also  his  own 
facile  temper  and  good  breeding  made  a  favourable  impression. 

The  campaign  of  190,  however,  was  destined  to  be  fought 
principally  at  sea.  The  winter  of  1 91-190  had  been  spent  by 
Antiochus  in  active  preparations.  The  defeat  of  his  ships  in  the 
autumn  by  the  Romans,  unsupported  by  the  Rhodians,  convinced  him 
that  he  must  materially  strengthen  his  fleet.  While,  therefore, 
he  remained  himself  in  Phrygia  to  superintend  the  mustering  of  his 
land  forces,  he  sent  Hannibal  to  Phoenicia  to  secure  fresh  vessels 
and  men  from  these  famous  seamen,  leaving  the  defeated  Polyxenidas 
to  repair  the  old  ships  and  build  others.  He  looked  out  every- 
where for  allies, — offering  Eumenes  his  daughter  and  large  con- 
cessions of  territory,  and  sending  even  to  the  Galatians,  who  retained 
some  of  the  warlike  qualities  of  their  original  stock.      Meanwhile  his 


I 


XXX  NAVAL  WAR  IN  THE  AEGEAN  483 

son  Seleucus  was  in  charge  of  the  cities  on  the  sea-coast  of  Asia,  Division 
whose    loyalty  to    him   was    in    danger   from    the  machinations   oi  feeling  in 
Eumenes    and   Rome.       He    found    the    feelings    of    the    country  ^/-^^^ 
favourable  to  him.     The  wintering  of  the  Roman  fleet  at  Canae  had 
given    the    towns    a    taste    of    what    a    Roman    occupation    would 
mean.      Complaints  were  beginning   to   be   heard,  as    at   Phocaea, 
where  the  citizens  had  had  Roman  soldiers  billeted  upon  them,  and 
had  been  required  to  supply  them  with  clothes.      There  was  there- 
fore a  division  of  feeling  in  that  and  other  towns,  the  upper  classes 
being  generally  for  the   Roman,  the  lower  for  the   Syrian  alliance. 
All  that  the  magistrates  of  Phocaea  could  do  was  to  give  notice  to 
Seleucus   that   they  meant  to  be  neutral.      But  he  was  aware  of  the 
popular  feeling,  and  promptly  advanced  to  occupy  the  town. 

Meanwhile,  the  first  care  of  the  Roman  admiral  Livius  was  to  secure  Movemem 
the  passage  of  the  Hellespont.      Early  in  the  spring,  accompanied  of  the 
by  some   Rhodian  ships,  he  sailed  to  Sestos.     The  people  of  that  ^omanjle 
town  were  greatly  alarmed,  and  sent  out  the  priests  of  Cybele  or  ^^^^^  ' 
Galli,  in  solemn  procession  and  clothed  in  their  religious  vestments,  surrender 
to  beg  for  mercy.      No  harm,   however,    was   intended  them,  and  Abydos 
they  at   once  submitted  to  Roman   orders.      But  Abydos  was   not  ^^-^"^-y- 
so  peacefully  inclined  ;  and  Livius  accordingly  blockaded  it,  and  was 
on  the  point  of  receiving  its  submission,  when  he  was  called  south  Poly- 
by  the  news  of  a  severe  defeat  inflicted  on  the  main  Rhodian  fleet  in  xenidas 
the  bay  of  Ephesus  by  the  king's   admiral   Polyxenidas,  himself  an  ^^^"'j.^.  ^^^ 
exiled  Rhodian.      The  point  of  danger  was  changed  by  this  disaster.  ^^^^  ^'^^ 
The   king's  fleet  would  command  not   only  the   southern  coasts  of 
Asia  Minor,  but  the  Cyclades  and  the  passage  into  Greece.      Livius   The 
therefore  hastily  returned  to  Canae,  got  the  rest  of  his  ships  afloat,  Roman 
and  proceeded  southward.      He  found  Seleucus  already  in  possession  f-^et goes 
of  Phocaea,  Cyme,  and  other  towns  ;  and  therefore,  waiting  only  to  ^^^^^^j. 
be    caught  up  by    the   ships   of  Eumenes,  he   steered   straight   for 
Samos.      He  met  with  rough  weather  off  the  headland  of  Corycus  ; 
but    the    wind    was    north    and   eventually   brought    him    safe    into 
harbour  at  Samos,  while  it  prevented  Polyxenidas  from  intercepting 
him,  as   he  was   trying  to  do.      Here,  after  demonstrations   at  the 
mouth   of   the   harbour   of  Ephesus,  and  some  not  very  successful 
descents  upon   the   Ephesian  territory,  the  command  of  the  Roman  L. 
fleet  was  taken  over  by  L.  Aemilius   Regillus,  who  had  just  arrived  Aemilius 

to  succeed  Livius.      A   council   of  war  was  held  to   decide   on  the  ^^f^^^^^ 

r  •  r^-i  -i  ■  1  1        1  •       1     n      ,  ta^es  over 

course  of  action.      The  object  was  to  destroy  the  kmg's  fleet,  or  so  ^^ 

to  occupy  it  as  to  prevent  it  from  rendering   any  assistance  either  in  command. 

the  Hellespont,  or  among  the   Islands,  or  by  keeping  the  allied  fleet 

employed.      Livius  suggested  blocking  up  the  harbour  of  Ephesus 

by  sinking  vessels  at  its  entrance.      But  Eumenes  objected  that  they 


484 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


T()0. 


Livius 
takes  over 
some 

important 
towns,  but 
fails  at 
Patara. 


The  allied 
fleet  returns 
north. 


The 

successes  of 
Seleucus 
in  Aeolis. 


Antiochus 
wishes  to 
treat  with 
Aemilius. 


would  still  be  obliged  to  keep  watch  ;  for  directly  they  departed,  the 
Ephesians  would  haul  up  the  sunken,  vessels.  It  was  finally  decided, 
on  the  advice  of  the  Rhodian  Epicrates,  who  had  joined  with  ten 
vessels  to  supply  the  place  of  those  lost  in  the  recent  disaster,  to 
secure  the  coast  of  Lycia.  This  district  had  once  belonged  to  the 
king  of  Egypt,  at  another  time  to  the  Seleucidae,  and  though  it  was 
now  nominally  free,  Antiochus  had  garrisons  in  several  of  its  towns. 
The  people  dishked  being  connected  with  Rhodes,  and  would  be 
inclined  to  side  with  Antiochus ;  and  it  was  therefore  important  to 
reduce  it  to  obedience. 

L.  Aemilius  remained  with  the  main  fleet  at  Samos,  but  he  sent 
Livius  with  a  small  squadron  of  Roman  and  Rhodian  ships  to  visit 
Rhodes,  and  to  act  in  regard  to  Lycia  in  accordance  with  the  wish 
of  the  Rhodian  government.  As  he  sailed  down  the  coast,  some  of 
the  chief  states  gave  in  their  adhesion — Miletus,  Myndus,  Hali- 
carnassus,  Cnidus,  and  Cos  ;  but  he  failed  to  take  Patara,  and  after 
dismissing  his  Rhodian  allies  sailed  home.  Aemilius,  on  hearing 
of  this  failure,  started  with  the  main  fleet  for  Patara.  But  a  strong 
feeling  was  entertained  by  his  officers  that  they  were  neglecting 
their  proper  sphere  of  duty,  and  merely  serving  the  interests  of 
Rhodes  ;  and  yielding  to  this  he  returned  to  Samos.  Nor  had  he 
been  there  long  before  important  events  called  the  combined  fleet 
farther  north  still  to  Elaea,  the  harbour  town  of  Pergamus. 

For  while  the  alHed  fleet  was  thus  employed  in  the  southern 
Aegean,  Seleucus  had  been  carrying  all  before  him  in  Aeolis.  Partly 
by  liberality  and  partly  by  severity  he  had  secured  the  loyalty  of  the 
cities  of  that  district,  and  was  now  actually  invading  the  territories 
of  Eumenes.  He  was  already  devastating  the  country  round  Elaea, 
and  was  approaching  Pergamus.  There  he  was  joined  by  his  father 
Antiochus  with  a  large  army,  which  was  opposed  without  much 
success  by  sallies  from  the  town  led  by  Attains  the  brother  of  king 
Eumenes. 

These  events  naturally  caused  Eumenes  to  hurry  to  Elaea. 
He  was  presently  followed  thither  by  the  combined  Roman  and 
Rhodian  fleet ;  for  Aemilius  had  also  received  a  despatch  from  L. 
Scipio  announcing  the  submission  of  the  Aetolians  and  his  approach 
to  the  Hellespont.  The  arrival  of  this  formidable  fleet  at  Elaea, 
combined  with  the  news  of  the  Aetolian  failure  and  the  approach  of 
the  Scipios,  induced  Antiochus  to  send  a  herald  offering  to  treat 
with  Aemilius,  encamping  meanwhile  in  great  strength  close  under 
the  walls  of  Elaea.  The  Rhodian  admirals  were  inclined  to  accept 
the  proposal,  but  Eumenes  urged  upon  the  praetor  that  he  could  not 
with  propriety  give  terms  to  the  king  when  the  consul  was  so  near  ; 
or  treat  on  a  good  footing  when  the  king  was  in  such  force   and 


XXX  LAST  ATTEMPT  OF  ANTIOCHUS  AT  SEA  485 

practically  beleaguering    Pergamus.      These    arguments   were    irre-  igo. 
sistible,  and  Aemilius  briefly  answered  the  king  that  no  negotiation 
was  possible  before  the  arrival  of  the  consul. 

Then  followed  a  kind  of  pause,  as  if  every  one  were  waiting  for  Waiting 
what  the  coming  of  the  consul  would  bring.  Antiochus,  before  fo^  Scipio. 
returning  to  Ephesus,  remained  in  Mysia  with  his  army  for  a  time, 
seeking  to  overawe  the  country,  and  sending  messages  to  induce 
Prusias  of  Bithynia  to  join  him,  who,  however,  had  already  received 
a  despatch  from  Scipio,  and  had  determined  that  it  was  safest  to 
stand  by  the  Romans.  Seleucus  was  driven  from  before  Perga- 
mus by  some  Achaean  allies,  whose  help  Eumenes  had  secured 
earlier  in  the  year,  and  retired  to  Phocaea.  Eumenes  remained 
in  Pergamus  :  the  Roman  and  Rhodian  fleets  were  back  at  Samos 
to  prevent  Polyxenidas  from  moving  out  of  Ephesus. 

The  first  event  to  break  this  temporary  calm  was  the  defeat  by  Defeat  of 
the  Rhodians  of  the  Phoenician  fleet  for  which  Hannibal  had  been  Hannibal 
sent  to  Tyre.     The  Rhodians  had  been  lying  in  wait  at  the  mouth  ^'    ^  —  , 
of  the   Eurymedon ;  and  had    at  last  sighted  the   Phoenicians  and  ^fiip^^ 
forced  them  to  fight.     In  numbers  they  were  not  unequally  matched  ; 
but  the  superior  seamanship  of  the   Rhodians  had  given  them  the 
victory.     Yet  the  loss   they  inflicted  on  the  Phoenician  ships  does 
not  seem  to  have  been  great.      They  only  secured  one  prize,  and 
Hannibal  himself  escaped  into  the  harbour  of  Ephesus. 

In  spite  of  this  reverse  Antiochus  resolved  that  his  fleet  should  Antiochus 
make    one    more   attempt  to    conquer   the   enemy.      He   could    not  ^^^olves 
prevent    the    march  of  the  Scipios  ;  but   he  hoped   that  he  might  ^^^^^^^ 
embarrass  them  seriously,  if  they  arrived  on  the  Hellespont  to  find  naval 
their  fleet  shattered  and  the  strait  perhaps  in  possession  of  his  ships,  battle. 
The  Roman  ships  also  were  for  the  time  almost  alone  at  Samos. 
Many    of   the   Rhodians   were    refitting    at    Patara,    and    Eumenes 
had  gone  to  the  Hellespont  to  assist  the  transport  of  Scipio's  army. 
The    king    reviewed    his    fleet    in    the    harbour    of   Ephesus,    and 
conceived  a  plan  for  extricating  it  from  the  blockade.      He  marched 
with  his  army  to  Notium,  the  harbour  town  of  the  ruined  Colophon, 
a  few  miles  north  of  Ephesus,  and  laid  siege  to  it,  ordering  his  fleet 
to  proceed  to  the  same  place.      What  he  had  anticipated  took  place. 
The   Colophonii,  as  the  people  of  Notium  called  themselves,  sent 
urgent  messages  for  help  to  the  Roman  fleet,  which  Aemilius,  tired  of 
a  long  inactivity,  was  glad  to  give. 

But  first  it  was  necessary  to  sail  to   Chios  for  provisions,  that  Roman 
island  having  been  selected  as  a  magazine  of  stores  from  Italy.      On  ^ff-ip^  enter 
his  way  Aemilius  learnt  that  the  king  had  a  large  quantity  of  stores    ^^^^^^ 
collected  at  Teos  on  the  Lydian  coast.      He  determined  to  capture 
them ;  and  after  a  false  alarm  caused  by  the  sight  of  a  squadron  of 


486 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


pirate  vessels  in  the  bay  he  entered  the  harbour  of  Teos.  It  con- 
sisted of  two  basins,  an  outer  one  in  front  of  the  town,  and  an  inner 
one  called  Garaesticum.  This  last  had  an  entrance  so  narrow  that 
two  ships  found  it  difficult  to  enter  abreast  without  breaking  their 
oars.  The  Romans  rowed  into  the  inner  harbour  and  disembarked 
the  soldiers  in  search  of  plunder.  The  Teian  magistrates  came  as 
suppliants  to  Aemilius,  but  were  told  that  they  had  acted  as 
enemies  in  supplying  Antiochus,  and  that  the  raid  would  be  continued 
until  they  supplied  an  equal  amount  to  the  Romans.  Polyxenidas, 
the  king's  admiral,  got  information  of  the  position  of  the  Roman 
ships,  perhaps  from  the  pirates  ;  and  thinking  that  he  had  them 
in  a  trap,  moved  to  the  small  island  called  Macris,  near  the 
southern  promontory  of  the  bay,  and  dropped  anchor  just  out 
of  sight,  intending  under  cover  of  the  next  night  to  block  up  the 
passage  into  the  inner  harbour,  for  which  twenty  ships  would  be 
sufficient,  and  line  the  shores  and  quays  with  soldiers.  Happily  for 
the  Romans  the  Rhodian  Eudamus  had  warned  them  of  their 
dangerous  position,  and  Aemilius  had  removed  the  ships  to  the  outer 
harbour.  But  once  there,  both  soldiers  and  sailors  again  disem- 
barked, some  to  bring  wine  and  provisions  from  the  town,  and  some 
to  scour  the  country  in  search  of  what  they  could  get.  This  had 
been  going  on  for  some  days,  when  a  rustic  informed  AemiUus  that 
the  enemy's  fleet  had  been  lying  at  anchor  for  two  days  at  Macris 
and  seemed  to  be  on  the  point  of  making  for  Teos.  Immediately 
the  bugles  sounded  the  recall,  and  the  military  tribunes  hurried  to 
the  town  to  force  the  men  on  board,  and  to  send  out  parties  into  the 
country  to  bring  back  the  foragers.  Town  and  fleet  were  in  a 
sudden  bustle  of  preparation  ;  and  the  excitement  and  hurry  were  so 
great  that  it  was  with  difficulty  that  the  men  could  find  their  proper 
ships.  At  length,  however,  Aemilius  was  able  to  get  his  ships  out 
of  the  harbour  and  into  line.  Arrived  at  the  open  bay  they  sighted 
the  enemy  coming  towards  them  in  a  double  line  of  much  greater 
length  than  their  own.  The  Rhodian  ships,  however,  corrected  this 
by  their  superior  speed.  They  rowed  into  line  on  the  Roman  right 
and  so  faced  the  extended  left  of  the  enemy.  The  numbers  were  not 
very  unequal.  The  king's  fleet  consisted  of  eighty-nine,  the  Roman 
and  Rhodian  of  eighty  vessels.  But  those  of  the  Romans  were  of 
stronger  build,  and  when  the  ships  ran  alongside  of  each  other 
their  fighting  men  proved  infinitely  superior  to  those  of  the  enemy. 
The  Rhodian  vessels  not  only  excelled  in  flexibility  of  movement, 
but  they  were  also  furnished  with  scoops  or  baskets  of  burning 
materials  at  the  end  of  long  poles  fitted  to  their  prows.  By  means 
of  chains  these  could  be  dropped  on  an  enemy's  ship  with  fatal 
effect ;  and  made  them  so  dread  a  charge,  that,  in  avoiding  it,  they 


XXX  THE  ROMANS  CROSS  THE  HELLESPONT  487 

frequently  presented  their  broadside  to  the  Rhodian  prows,  and  so  igo. 
were  more  easily  staved  in.  A  sea-fight  in  these  circumstances 
becomes  a  series  of  single  combats  impossible  to  describe.  Before 
long  the  ship  of  the  king's  admiral  was  seen  to  be  hoisting  her  sails 
for  flight,  and,  the  wind  setting  fair  for  Ephesus,  all  the  rest  which 
could  followed  the  example.  Forty-two  ships  of  the  king's  fleet  were 
either  sunk  or  so  water-logged,  burnt  or  battered,  that  they  fell  into 
the  enemy's  hands.  Of  the  Roman  fleet  only  two  were  destroyed, 
though  many  had  received  more  or  less  serious  damage.  One  only 
of  the  Rhodians  was  captured. 

The  Romans  and  their  Rhodian  allies  were  now  masters  of  the  Antiochu. 
sea  :   there  was  no  longer  any  hope  of  intercepting  the  Scipios  :   the  driven 
Hellespont  was  in  the  hands  of  the  ships  of  Eumenes,  and  Antiochus  f^^^^ 
could  do  nothing  to  prevent  the  Romans  crossing.      He  was  obliged     ndfrom 
to   concentrate   all   his   forces   with   the   hope  of  defeating  them  in  Europe. 
Asia.       Accordingly   he    withdrew   his   garrison    from    Lysimacheia, 
in  the  Thracian  Chersonese,  desisted  from  the  attack  on   Colophon 
(Notium),  retired  to  Sardis,  and  then  collected  all  his  troops,  sending 
to  Ariarathes  of  Cappadocia  and  elsewhere  for  reinforcements.      In 
fact   he  was   thoroughly   disheartened,   and   could   form  no  plan  of 
operations.      The  withdrawal  of  his  garrison  from  Lysimacheia  was 
a  mistake,  which  only  despair  would  have  suggested.      He  could  not 
indeed  hope  to  assist  so  distant  a  possession  ;    but  it  might   have 
detained  the  Romans    through  the   winter,    and  time   was    urgently 
needed  for  the  collection  of  his  army. 

Meanwhile  Aemilius,  after  a  demonstration  in  front  of  the  harbour  Capture  c 
of  Ephesus,  which  set  the  seal  on  the  abandonment  of  the  sea  by  the  Phocaea. 
royal  fleet,  put  in  at  Chios  to  refit ;  and  sending  the  Rhodians  to  assist 
the  crossing  of  the  army  at  the  Hellespont,  directed  his  course  to 
Phocaea,  still  in  the  hands  of  the  king's  soldiers.  The  town  held 
out  obstinately  for  some  time  ;  but,  finding  all  hope  of  relief  from 
Antiochus  at  an  end,  surrendered.  The  soldiers  were  so  angry  at 
the  treachery  of  the  people  and  the  obstinacy  of  their  resistance, 
that  Aemilius  was  unable  to  prevent  the  pillaging  of  the  town,  and 
was  only  with  difficulty  able  to  save  the  inhabitants  from  massacre. 
When  order  was  at  length  restored,  he  took  measures  for  the  repair 
of  the  town  and  the  re-establishment  of  the  people,  while  he  selected 
its  harbour  as  the  winter  quarters  of  the  fleet. 

While  the  fleet  was  thus  everywhere  successful,  destroying  the  The  cons 
last  hopes  of  Antiochus  by  sea,  the  consul  L.  Scipio  and  his  brother  crosses  ti 
Africanus  arrived  with  the  army  at  the  Hellespont,  where  they  found  ^^f^f^^" 
everything  prepared  for  their  passage  by  the  care  of  Eumenes.  The 
last  part  of  their  march  had  been  easy  beyond  their  hopes.  They 
had  expected  to  have  to  capture  Lysimacheia,  but  found  it  abandoned 


488 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


by  the  royal  garrison,  and  full  of  supplies,  so  that  they  were  able  to 
await  those  stragglers  who  had  fallen  out  during  their  march,  as  well 
as  their  convoys  of  provisions.  They  had  expected  that  the  passage 
of  the  Hellespont  would  have  been  resisted,  but  it  was  as  peaceably 
accomplished  as  though  they  were  crossing  the  Tiber.  But  on  the 
Asiatic  side  they  had  to  wait  some  days  for  Africanus,  who,  being  a 
member  of  the  College  of  Salii,  was  unable  to  travel  at  that  particular 
time,  which  happened  to  be  that  on  which  the  sacred  Ancilia  at 
Rome  were  carried  in  solemn  procession. ^ 

The  king  took  advantage  of  this  delay  to  attempt  negotiation. 
He  sent  a  Byzantine  Greek  named  Heracleides  to  the  Roman  camp, 
charged  not  only  with  an  open  message  to  the  consul,  but  also  with 
a  secret  communication  to  Africanus.  To  the  consul  he  declared  that 
the  king  was  ready  to  abandon  Lampsacus,  Smyrna,  Alexandria 
Troas,  and  the  towns  of  Aeolis  and  Ionia,  which  had  declared  for 
Rome,  and  to  pay  half  the  expenses  of  the  war.  The  answer  of  the 
consul  to  the  eloquent  commonplaces  of  Heracleides  was  short 
and  stern  :  "  Antiochus  must  pay  the  whole  expenses  of  the  war, 
and  must  abandon  the  whole  of  Asia  on  this  side  Mount  Taurus." 

Nor  had  the  private  message  to  Africanus  brought  more  satis- 
factory results.  Earlier  in  the  year  a  son  of  Africanus  had  fallen  into 
the  king's  hands,  and  had  been  liberally  and  kindly  treated  by  him.^ 
He  now  offered  to  restore  the  young  man  free  of  ransom,  and  to  pay 
Africanus  himself  almost  any  sum  he  chose  if  he  would  secure  the 
acceptance  of  the  terms.  Scipio  accepted  the  restoration  of  his 
son,  while  declining  the  offer  of  money  ;  and  sent  back  in  return  a 
courteous  message,  which  yet  plainly  pointed  out  to  him  his  miscon- 
ception of  his  position.  "  The  king  had  no  longer  anything  to  offer  the 
Romans.  By  the  abandonment  of  Lysimacheia  he  had  given  up  the 
chance  of  hindering  their  advance  :  by  the  loss  of  Phocaea  he  had 


1  This  appears  to  date  the  crossing  as  taking  place  on  19th  October.  Polybius 
(xxi.  13)  says  that  Scipio  was  unable  to  travel  for  thirty  days  after  that.  The  best 
known  festival  of  Mars  was  in  March.  Of  the  October  festival  little  seems  to  be 
known  (see  Marquardt,  xii.  170).  The  crossing  must  have  taken  place  at  least 
as  late  as  this,  for  Scipio  did  not  leave  Brundisium  until  after  the  ludi  Apollinares 
(July  6-12),  Livy  xxxvii.  4,  Seut.  Otho.  8. 

2  Appian  (5yr.  xxix. )  supposed  this  to  have  been  Scipio  Aemilianus,  the 
younger  Africanus,  who,  however,  was  not  son  to  Africanus,  but  adopted  son  of 
his  eldest  son,  and  moreover  was  not  born  till  five  years  after  this.  The  person 
meant  is  probably  Africanus 's  younger  and  less  worthy  son,  Lucius  or  Gnaeus 
(Livy  xli.  27).  The  particular  circumstances  of  his  capture  Livy  had  not  been 
able  to  ascertain.  It  was  probably  during  the  manoeuvres  of  the  fleet  on  the  coast 
of  Lycia  early  in  the  year  :  for  we  find  that  a  legatus  of  the  consul  L.  Apustius 
was  there,  and  that  after  his  ill  success  at  Patara  Livius  did  not  go  straight  home, 
but  went  to  visit  the  Scipios  first  in  Thessaly,  perhaps  to  communicate  the  loss  of 
his  son  to  Africanus  (Livy  x.xxvii.  16). 


XXX  THE  ARMIES  OF  ROME  AND  THE  KING  489 

practically  been  deprived  of  the  command  of  Aeolis.      He  had  taken  790. 
the  bridle,  and  must  now  submit  to  be  mounted.      In  return  for  the 
king's  kindness  to  his  son,  Scipio  could  only  urge  him  not  to  fight  a 
battle,  but  to  make  peace  at  all  costs." 

The    result   of   the    embassy   determined   Antiochus   to   risk   an  Antiochus 
engagement ;  for  defeat  could  scarcely  impose  harder  terms  on  him  resolves  to 
than  were  already  demanded.       It   was  late  in   the  year,   and  the  fiS^^- 
ships  were  all  being  laid  up  for  the  winter,  but  it  was  still  possible  in    „  ^ 
that  climate  to  continue  military  operations  for  a  time.     The  Roman  occupy  the 
army  moved  from  town  to  town  in  the  Troad,  finding  no  opposition   Troad. 
anywhere,    and   at   Ilium  being  welcomed  as   friends   and   kinsfolk. 
From  Ilium  six  days'  march  brought  them  to  the  mouth  of  the  Caicus, 
where  they  were  met  by  Eumenes. 

Antiochus,  with  70,000  infantry  and  1 2,000  cavalry,  was  encamped  Antiochus 

near  Thyatira,  on  the  road  between  Pergamus  and  Sardis.    Africanus  shifts  his 

was  lying  ill  at  Elaea,  and,  when  sending  thanks  to  the  king  for  the  quarters 

restoration  of  his  son,  had  urged  him  not  to  fight  until  he  himself  was  ^^I"'    . 

well  enough  to  rejoin  the  army.      It  may  have  been  this  advice  which  ^^  ^^^ 

influenced  the  king  to  shift  his  quarters  to  the  vicinity  of  Magnesia  district  of 

ad  Sipylum  ;  but  it  was   also  no  doubt  from  a  desire  to  reach  the  Magnesia 

plains  of  the  Hermus,  where  his  phalanx  and  his  numerous  cavalry  'i.^  , 

11111         r  •  rr^i  1  111-         11-  Stpylum. 

would  both  be  of  greater  service.       There   he   entrenched  himself 

strongly,  and  awaited  the  approach  of  his  enemy. 

The  consul  followed  him,  having  found  the  camp  at  Thyatira  The  two 
deserted,  and  encamped  about  four  miles  from  the  king,  with  a  tribu-  armies  in 
tary  of  the  Hermus  between  them.  There  the  two  armies  remained  position. 
for  three  days  without  farther  movement  beyond  a  skirmishing  attack 
of  the  king's  Galatian  mounted  archers  upon  the  Roman  outposts, 
which  was  repulsed  with  some  loss  as  they  were  recrossing  the 
river.  On  the  fourth  day  the  Romans  themselves  crossed  the  river, 
and  repulsed  another  cavalry  attack  whilst  engaged  in  making  their 
new  camp.  For  four  days  the  two  armies  were  drawn  out  in  front 
of  their  camps  in  fighting  order,  without  either  advancing  to  offer 
battle.  On  the  fifth  the  Romans  advanced  into  the  middle  of  the 
plain  between  the  camps.  Still  Antiochus  did  not  move.  The  consul 
determined  to  force  a  battle  by  attacking  his  camp  ;  and  accordingly 
removed  his  own  quarters  nearer  those  of  the  king,  and  again  drew 
up  in  battle  order.  At  last,  fearing  that  delay  would  discourage  and 
perhaps  disperse  his  army,  the  king  resolved  to  fight. 

The  Roman  army  consisted  of  two  legions  of  citizens  with  corre-  The  forces 
sponding   numbers  of  socii,   together  about   21,600  men,  and  were  on  either 
supported  by  about   6800   auxiliaries,  composed  of   Achaean,  Perga-  "^^/'d 
mene,    Trallian,    and    Cretan    troops,    with    some    Macedonian    and  order. 
Thracian  volunteers.     The  Roman  soldiers  and  socii  were  drawn  up 


I 


490  HISTORY  OF  ROME 


igo.  in  the  usual  triple  line  of  hastati,  principes,  and  triarii,  their  right 

being  supported  by  the  cavalry  and  auxiliaries.  Their  left  rested  on 
the  river,  and  only  required  the  support  of  four  squadrons  of  horse. 
On  their  rear  sixteen  elephants  were  kept  in  reserve,  for  they  were 
not  able  to  meet  the  fifty-four  larger  Indian  elephants  of  the  king, 
while  the  charge  of  the  camp  was  committed  to  the  Macedonian  and 
Thracian  volunteers. 
The  king's  The  Roman  army  had  the  advantage  of  homogeneousness.      The 

order.  j^^j^  ^f  j^.  consisted  of  men  armed  alike,  used  to  drill  together,  taught 

the  same  movements,  and  accustomed  to  the  same  tactics.  The 
king's  army — numbering  80,000  infantry  and  12,000  cavalry — was 
a  miscellaneous  collection  of  different  and  often  widely  separated 
nations :  using  different  arms,  different  tactics,  and  different  lan- 
guages. The  flower  and  chief  strength  of  it  were  the  16,000  men 
trained  to  form  the  Macedonian  phalanx.  These  were  drawn  up  in 
ten  divisions,  thirty-two  deep,  each  division  containing  1600  men, 
and  having  a  front  of  fifty — a  variation  from  the  usual  massing  of  the 
Xhe  whole  phalanx  together,  caused  probably  by  want  of  space.     Between 

phalanx.  each  of  the  divisions  were  two  elephants,  their  foreheads  protected 
with  armour,  and  carrying  towers  with  armed  men  on  their  backs. 
On  the  right  of  the  phalanx  were  1500  Galatian  light  horsemen, 
3000  heavy-armed  horsemen  {cataphractae\  and  1000  cavalry  of 
the  guard  or  agejfta,  consisting  of  picked  men  from  Media.  Then 
came  a  motley  throng  of  various  nations.  The  whole  was  sup- 
ported by  sixteen  elephants  ;  and  the  line  farther  extended  by  more 
mounted  archers  of  the  nomad  Dahae,  with  Cretan  and  Mysian  archers 
and  slingers.  On  his  left  wing  1500  light  Galatian  horsemen  were 
supported  by  2000  Cappadocians  sent  by  Ariarathes,  2700  auxiliaries 
of  various  nations,  3000  cataphractae,  and  1000  ordinary  cavalry 
from  Syria  and  Phrygia.  In  front  of  these  horsemen  chariots  also 
were  stationed  armed  with  scythes,  and  dromedaries  carrying  archers. 
Farther  to  the  left  came  Tarentine  horsemen,  Gallic  cavalry,  Cretan 
mercenaries,  Carian  and  Cilician  infantry,  and  cetrati  from  Pisidia, 
Pamphylia,  and  Lycia,  supported,  as  was  the  right  wing,  by  archers, 
slingers,  and  sixteen  elephants. 
Battle  of  Scipio  Africanus  was  still  at  Elymaea  ill.      His  place,  as  chief 

Magnesia  adviser  to  his  brother,  was  taken  by  Cn.  Domitius  Ahenobarbus  ; 
\  ecem  er).  ^^^  -^  ^^^  j^^  ^j^^  seems  to  have  decided  when  to  give  the  king 
battle,  and  to  have  taken  the  actual  command  on  the  field.  The 
morning  of  the  day  was  wet  and  thick  with  mist,  which  proved  to  be 
of  greater  detriment  to  the  king's  army  than  to  the  Romans.  The 
latter  were  less  numerous  and  more  compact,  and  the  fog  did  not 
make  their  movements  wholly  unintelligible  to  each  other  ;  while  it 
created  great  confusion  in  the  more  widely  spread  and  worse  dis- 


XXX  SUBMISSION  OF  ANTIOCHUS  491 

ciplined  masses  of  the  king's  army.     The  damp  also  damaged  the  igo. 
bow-strings,  sHngs,  and  thongs  of  the  spears,  but  had  no  effect  on  Effects  of 
the  Roman  swords  and  pila.     The  scythed  chariots  were  especially  *^^  ^"^• 
difficult  to  work  in  the  mist,  for  when  the  horses  were  frightened  or 
wounded  they  dashed  wildly  about,  and  often  did  as  much  damage 
to  friends  as  foes.    When  these  had  been  got  out  of  the  way  the  ground 
was  cleared  for  action  ;  but  the  confusion  which  had  been  caused  in 
these  preliminary  difficulties  not  only  threw  the  auxiliaries  on  the  king's 
left  wing  into  disorder,  but  also  affected  the  steadiness  of  the  phalanx, 
so  that  it  failed  to  hold  its  ground  before  the  charge  of  the  Roman 
heavy  armed  troops.      The  men  were  so  hampered  by  the  crowding  Defeat 
in  of  their  beaten  auxiliaries  that  they  could  not  properly  use  their  of  the 
huge  sarissae,  and  before  long  the  left  and  centre  were  driven  in  upon  phalanx. 
their  camp.      On  the  right,  however,  where  Antiochus  was  command- 
ing in  person,  it  was  the  Romans  who  were  forced  back  towards  the 
camp.      But   M.  Aemilius   Lepidus,  who  was  in  charge  of  the  camp, 
met  the  retreating  troops,  and  induced  them  by  exhortations,  threats, 
and  even  blows  to  turn  and  face  the  enemy.     Antiochus,  therefore, 
suddenly   found    his   pursuit  checked  ;    and  at  the  same  time   per- 
ceived that  he  was  being  charged  on  the  rear  by  some  cavalry  led  by 
Attains,  who,  having  noticed  the  disaster  which  was  happening  to 
the  left  wing,  came  to  the  rescue  from  the  now  victorious  right. 

This  settled  the  issue  of  the  battle.      The  rout  speedily  became  Defeat  and 
general,    and,  as   was  usually  the  case  with   such  huge  masses  of  flight  of 
orientals,  all  idea  of  resistance  or  rally  seemed  at  once  out  of  the  ^^^^ochus. 
question.      The  slaughter  both  on  the  field,  in  the  camp,  and  in  the 
pursuit  was  very  great,  even  if  we  cannot  trust  our  authorities,  who 
place  it  at  50,000  infantry  and  4000  cavalry.     The  Romans  had  a 
large  number  wounded,  but  only  300  infantry  killed  and  24  cavalry. 
Antiochus  escaped  to  Sardis,  and  thence  to  Apameia,  whither  his  son 
Seleucus  and  his  nephew  Antipater  had  preceded  him. 

The  results  of  the  victory  were  immediately  manifested  in  the  Results  of 
deputations  from  the  Asiatic  cities  which  thronged  the  Roman  camp  ^he  victory. 
and  offered  their  submission.  Thyatira  and  Magnesia  ad  Sipylum 
were  the  first ;  and  they  were  quickly  followed  by  similar  envoys 
from  Ephesus  (abandoned  by  Polyxenidas  when  he  heard  of  the 
battle),  Tralles,  and  Magnesia  on  the  Maeander.  Sardis  opened 
her  gates,  and  there  the  consul  took  up  his  quarters  for  the  winter. 

Before  many  days  a  herald  arrived  asking  that  envoys  from  the  Antiochus 
king  should  be  received.      Leave  being  given,   Zeuxis,  governor  of  submits  to 
Lydia,  and  Antipater,  the  king's  nephew,  came  with  full  powers  to  ^    oman 
offer  an  unconditional   submission,   and   to    ask   on  what  terms   he 
would  be  admitted  to  the   friendship    of  Rome.      The  answer   was 
given  by  Africanus,  who  had  now  recovered  from  his   illness   and 


492 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


igo. 

The  terms. 


The 

Senate' s 
decision, 
February 
i8g. 


i8g.    Coss. 
M.  Fulvius 
Nobilior, 
Cn. 

Man  litis 
Vulso. 


had  rejoined  the  camp.  The  former  demand  that  Antiochus  should 
abandon  all  Asia  west  of  Mount  Taurus  was  of  course  repeated,  and 
to  it  was  now  added  that  he  must  pay  15,000  Euboic  talents 
(^3,600,000), — 500  at  once,  2500  on  the  ratification  of  the  treaty, 
and  the  rest  in  twelve  yearly  instalments  of  1000  talents;  must 
surrender  all  elephants,  and  such  ships  of  war  as  the  Senate  might 
demand  ;  give  up  prisoners  and  deserters  and  certain  Greek  officers 
serving  with  him,  and  above  all  Hannibal  the  Carthaginian  ;  and 
finally  must  repay  Eumenes  400  talents,  the  balance  of  the  sum 
lent  him  by  Attains,  and  give  twenty  hostages  at  once.  The  envoys 
could  only  consent,  and  legates  were  despatched  to  Rome  to  obtain 
the  ratification  of  the  treaty,  accompanied  by  envoys  from  various 
states  interested,  and  by  king  Eumenes  in  person. 

No  special  difficulty  embarrassed  the  senators  in  regard  to 
Antiochus.  They  were  content  with  the  terms  exacted  by  the 
Scipios,  and  the  treaty  was  confirmed.  The  real  difficulty  was  the 
settlement  of  the  country  thus  evacuated  by  the  king.  The 
general  principle  on  which  they  wished  to  act  was  that  all  Greek 
states  should  be  free  ;  but  they  also  had  to  satisfy  the  claims  of  their 
allies  Eumenes  and  the  Rhodians — claims  which  covered  not  only 
districts  inhabited  by  Asiatics,  but  also  those  held  by  Greeks.  It 
was  impossible  that  they  should  have  the  local  knowledge  required 
for  the  settlement  of  these  matters,  and  for  answering  the  claims 
urged  by  the  several  deputations  then  in  Rome.  They  therefore 
naturally  followed  the  precedent  in  such  cases  by  nominating  ten 
commissioners  to  proceed  to  Asia  and  make  the  different  awards  on 
the  spot.  Still  the  speeches  of  Eumenes  and  of  the  Rhodian 
ambassadors, — the  first  submitting  that  unless  the  Romans  meant 
to  keep  the  parts  of  Asia  which  they  had  taken  for  themselves,  he 
had  the  best  right  to  expect  them  ;  the  Rhodians  pleading  for  the 
liberation  of  all  Greek  cities, — suggested  to  them  some  general 
principles  on  which  the  settlement  was  to  proceed.  I.  In  Asia,  west 
of  Mount  Taurus,  what  had  been  subject  to  king  Antiochus 
was  now  to  be  subject  to  king  Eumenes,  except  Lycia  and  Caria 
south  of  the  Maeander,  which  were  to  belong  to  Rhodes.  II.  Of 
Greek  cities,  those  which  had  paid  tribute  to  Attains  were  to  continue 
to  pay  it  to  Eumenes  ;  those  which  had  been  subjected  to  tribute 
by  Antiochus  were  to  be  relieved  entirely  ;  those  which  had  been 
free  throughout  from  either  king  were  to  continue  free. 

To  Cn.  Manlius  Vulso,  one  of  the  consuls  for  189,  was  en- 
trusted the  task  of  carrying  out  this  settlement  in  conjunction  with 
the  ten  commissioners.  But  Manlius  found  that  his  first  task  must 
be  to  secure  the  peace  of  the  country  from  barbaric  and  warlike 
tribes   in   the   south,  inhabiting   the  highlands  of  Pisidia,   and   the 


XXX  THE  GAULS  IN  ASIA  493 

marauding  Gauls  in  the  centre.      Thus  MoagStes,  tyrant  of  Cibyra   The 
and  a  district  round  it,  was  forced  to  pay  a  fine  of  100  talents  and  settlement 
I  GO  medimni  of  corn  ;  the  people  of  Telmessus,  on  the  complaint  ^    /■'^  -^ 
of    their    neighbours    the    Sindians,    were   fined    50   talents ;    while  180-188. 
Aspendus  and  other  towns  were  taken,  plundered,  or  fined.      Having 
partially  at  any  rate  pacified  this  dangerous  part  of  the  country,  he 
marched  towards  Galatia  ;  and  at  Pessinus  was  met  by  a  procession 
of  the   priests   of  Cybele,  in  their  sacred  vestments,  who  promised 
him  success, — which  indicated  the  feelings,  if  not  the  foreknowledge, 
of  those  who  had  the  misfortune  to  be  neighbours  to  the  Gauls. 

The  Gauls  had  been  in  Asia  since  the  beginning  of  the  third  Asiatic 
century.  Like  the  Northmen  of  later  times,  they  had  made  them-  Gauls. 
selves  the  terror  of  all  peaceful  and  un warlike  folk,  and  forced  cities 
and  kings  to  pay  them  tribute.  Even  when  they  at  length  got  a 
Normandy  of  their  own,  and  settled  in  permanent  homes  in  the 
district  called  afterwards  Galatia,  they  still  made  open  profession 
of  universal  robbery.  The  three  tribes — the  Tolistoboii,  Trocmi, 
and  Tectosages  —  mapped  out  the  whole  of  Asia  into  districts 
in  which  they  should  respectively  exercise  their  right  of  pillage  ;  the 
Trocmi  taking  the  shores  of  the  Hellespont,  the  Tolistoboii  Aeolis  and 
Ionia,  the  Tectosages  the  inland  parts  of  Asia  Minor.  Such  people 
were  naturally  regarded  as  common  enemies,  to  be  beaten  back  by 
whoever  aspired  to  be  supreme  in  Asia.  Thus  Attains  earned  his 
kingdom  by  his  victory  over  one  great  horde  of  them  (about  241)  ; 
and  Prusias  of  Bithynia  (about  220-218)  won  great  glory  by  cutting 
to  pieces  another  in  the  vicinity  of  Abydos ;  and  Antiochus  L 
(281-261)  gained  his  title  of  Soter,  or  Saviour,  from  the  grateful 
Greeks  for  a  victory  over  them,  and  lost  his  life  in  a  second 
great  battle  with  them.  Almost  alone  among  the  rulers  Attains 
had  ventured  to  refuse  them  their  blackmail ;  and  all  alike  employed 
them  as  mercenaries  when  need  arose.  It  was  their  service  in  that 
capacity  in  the  army  of  Antiochus  that  now  gave  the  consul  the 
pretext  for  invading  them.  The  real  reason,  however,  was  a  better 
one.  If  Rome  was  to  deprive  Asia  of  such  protection  against  the  The  need 
barbarians  as  the  power  of  Antiochus,  however  imperfectly,  had  Z^'' 
supplied,  she  was  bound  to  see  that  the  Greeks  and  other  peaceful  ^ffi^j,^^"^ 
folk  were  secured  against  such  a  scourge.  Manlius  had  already 
done  this  in  regard  to  the  Pisidians,  he  was  now  to  do  the  same 
in  regard  to  the  Gauls  ;  and  it  was  his  success,  more  than  the 
victory  over  Antiochus,  that  reconciled  the  feelings  of  the  Asiatic 
Greeks  to  the  new  supremacy.  The  burden  of  the  royal  exactions 
was  within  limits  and  could  be  borne,  the  plunderings  of  the 
Gauls  were  incalculable  and  intolerable. 

The  work  was  done  with  fair  completeness.     The  Tolistoboii  were 


494  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chai>. 

Manliui       defeated  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Mount  Olympus,  whither  they  had 

subdues  the  conveyed  their  families  and  goods  for  protection  ;    and  the  Tecto- 

Astatic         sages  in  the  vicinity  of  Ancyra.     The  Trocmi  had    perhaps    been 
Gatils.  Ill  j/  .ij. 

weakened  by  some  recent  defeats,  at  any  rate  they  do  not  appear  as 

offering  any  resistance  to  Manlius.      The  Gallic  envoys  who  after 

these  battles  visited  the  Roman  camp,  desiring  peace,  were  ordered 

to  follow  the  consul  to  Ephesus,  where  he  meant  to  winter.     When 

there,  however,   he  refused  to  make  a    treaty  until  king  Eumenes 

should  be  present — who  had  suffered  most  from  them — and  it  was 

not  concluded  till  the  end  of  the  next  year  (i88),  just  as  the  consul 

was  about  to  cross  the   Hellespont  on  his  way  home.      Here  they 

were  granted  peace  on  condition  of  remaining  strictly  within  their 

own  territories,   and  avoiding  all  incursions  upon  the  dominions  of 

Eumenes,  and  of  paying  tribute  to  Rome.^ 

Final  Manlius,  after  wintering  at  Ephesus,  went  to  Apameia  to  meet 

treaty  with  ^-^g    commissioners   and   Eumenes.      He  found  that  Antiochus  had 

^  moc  us    i^ggj^  honourably  fulfilling  his  engagements,  and  had  withdrawn  his 

settlement     garrisons  from  the   towns.      The   commandant  of  Perga  alone  still 

of  Asia,        retained  the  post  assigned  to  him,  and  with  a  sense  of  military  duty 

i88.  and  loyalty  which  deserves  record,  refused  to  give  it  up  without  the 

king's  orders,  which  however  he  shortly  afterwards  received.      The 

business  remaining  to  be  done,  therefore,  was  to  send  the  treaty  as 

confirmed  by  the  Senate  to  the  king,  to  see  to  the  destruction  of  the 

ships  at   Patara,  and   to   publish   the  award  of  the  commissioners 

as    to  the  future  condition  of  Asia.      It  carried  out  in  its  general 

principles  the  orders  of  the  Senate.      Autonomous  cities  which  had 

stood  by  Rome  were  to  remain  autonomous  ;  those  that  had  made 

terms  with  Antiochus  or  paid  him  tribute  were  now  to  pay  the  same 

to   Eumenes.     The   Greek  cities  on  the  coast — Miletus,   Colophon 

and  Notium,   Cyme,    Mylae,    Clazomenae  with  the   island   of   Dry- 

mussa.  Ilium  with  Rhoeteum  and  Gergithum  annexed,  Chios,  Smyrna, 

and  Erythrae — were  all  to  be  free  and  autonomous.      Rhodes  was 

to  have  Lycia  and  Caria  south  of  the   Maeander  except  Telmessus. 

Ariarathes  of   Cappadocia  was    admitted   to  friendship  with   Rome 

on  the  payment  of  a  fine  of  200  talents,  and   Prusias  of  Bithynia 

was  deprived  of  Mysia.      The  flaw  in  these  arrangements  was  the 

assignment  of  Lycia  to  Rhodes  in  full  sovereignty,  and  not,  as  the 

Lycians  at  first  understood  it,  as  equal  allies.      This  was  contrary  to 

the   strong  feeling  of  the    Lycians   themselves ;    and    the    Romans 

twenty  years  later  saw  reason  to  revoke  the  gift. 

But  it  was  Eumenes  of  Pergamus  who  was  the  gfeatest  gainer 

Not    only    had    he   been   guaranteed   the   payment   of  the   debt  of 

1   I  Maccabees  viii.  2.      -i^yayov  avroi/s  vTrb  cfwpop. 


XXX  CONCLUSION  OF  THE  AETOLIAN  WAR  495 

Antiochus   to  him,  and  secured  by  treaty  from  both  him  and  the   The 
Gauls,  but  he  now  received  an  enormous  extension  of  territory.      In  position  of 
Europe  Lysimacheia  and  the  Thracian  Chersonese  were  assigned  to  ^"'"^'^^•^• 
him ;  and    in    Asia    the    whole    of   Phrygia    and  Mysia,   Lycaonia, 
Milyas,  Lydia,  and  the  cities  of  Tralles,  Ephesus,  and  Telmessus. 
The  case  of  Pamphylia  was  reserved  for  the  decision  of  the  Senate, 
as  being  partly  on  one  side  of  Taurus   and  partly  on    the  other. 
He  was  therefore  to  be  the   chief  power  in   Asia,  instead   of  the 
wealthy  king  of  a  single  city  and  small  territory  ;  and  in  this  position 
he   soon   incurred    the   jealousy    of   Rome,   whither  henceforth    all 
complaints  from  Asia  found  their  way. 

Meanwhile  the  Aetolians  had  also  been  forced  to  submit.      In   The 
the  summer  of  190  Scipio  had  granted  a  six  months'  truce  to  enable  Aetolians, 
them  to  negotiate  with  Rome.     Though  they  did  not  violate  this  ^9o-^^9- 
truce  in  the  letter,  yet  circumstances  led  to  actions  on  their  part 
which  caused  the  Roman  government  to  resolve  on  continuing  the 
war.      It  was  brought  about  by  Amynander,  king  of  the  Athamanes. 
This  prince  had  been  deeply  involved  in  the  intrigue  which  brought 
Antiochus    into    Greece,    and    in    191    helped    with   a  body  of  his 
countrymen  to  hold  Pellinnaeum  in  Thessaly  for  Antiochus.     At  the 
approach  of  Acilius   the    Athamanian  garrison    surrendered    them- 
selves into  the  hands  of  king  Philip,  who,  being  anxious  to  regain 
Athamania,   treated   them   with   special   consideration  ;    but  Amyn- 
ander, fearing  the  anger  of  the  Romans  and  Philip  alike,  fled  with 
his  wife  and  children  to  Ambracia.      The  district  of  Athamania,  thus 
deprived   of  its   king,    was   administered  by  officers  of  Philip,  who 
behaved  with  such  harshness  that  the  Athamanians  were  eager  for 
the  return  of  Amynander.     It  was  during  the  six  months'  truce  granted   The 
by  Scipio  in  1 90  that  the  Aetolians  undertook  the  cause  of  their  guest,  Aetolians 
and  supplied  him  with  troops   with  the  assistance  of  which,  joined  ^^^P ^^y- 
to  the  exertions  of  the  anti- Macedonian  party  in  the  Athamanian  ^.^turn  to 
towns,   he   regained   possession    of  his   kingdom  and   expelled    the  Atha- 
Macedonian  garrisons.      Philip  made  some  vain  attempts  to  recover  mania. 
the  country ;    and  Amynander  tried  to    propitiate  the  Romans  by 
sending  envoys  to  Rome  and  to  the  Scipios  in  Asia,  excusing  himself 
for  having  used  the  help  of  the  Aetolians,  and  explaining  that  he 
had  taken  nothing  but  his  ancestral  dominions. 

But  being  thus  in  arms  the  Aetolians  took  the  opportunity  of  re-   They 
covering  certain  districts  which  had  once  been  theirs,  but  of  which   ^^^over 
they  had  been  deprived    by   Philip, — Aperantia,  Amphilochia,  and  ^^2^/^"^' 
Dolopia,  constant  subjects  of  dispute  between  them  and  Macedonia,   lochia,  and 
The  government  of  the  League  was  preferred  by  the  people  of  these  Dolopia, 
districts,  and  their  troops  were  welcomed.      But  their  action  involved  (autumn  of 
an  innovation  on  the  arrangement  sanctioned  by  Rome  at  the  end  of  ^^^' 


496  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap. 

the  Macedonian  war  (196),  and  the  Aetolians  could  only  hope  that 
it  would  be  passed  over  in  case  of  some  disaster  in  Asia  inducing  the 
Romans  to  wish  to  make  peace  with  them.  But  towards  the  end  of 
190,  in  the  midst  of  their  triumph,  the  result  of  the  battle  of 
Magnesia  became  known,  and  the  Aetolians  learnt  that  the  Romans, 
on  the  complaint  of  Philip,  intended  to  prosecute  the  war  against 
themselves  at  the  expiration  of  the  truce. 
j8g.  The  war  had  been  assigned  to  the  consul   M.  Fulvius  Nobilior, 

M.Fulvius  who  in  the  spring  of  189  crossed  to  Apollonia.      There  some  of  the 
z^^       leading  men  of   Epirus   met  him  and   advised   that   the  campaign 
Apollonia.    should  be  begun  by  an  attack  upon  Ambracia,  the   old   capital   of 
Pyrrhus,    enriched    by    him    with    noble    buildings    and    numerous 
works  of  art,  and  for  some  generations  an  important  city  of  the 
Aetolian  League.      Fulvius  accepted  the  advice,  and  the  Aetolians  in 
Ambracia     Ambracia  stood  a  siege  memorable  for  the  extraordinary  fertility  of 
is  besieged    device  shown  on  both  sides,  in  mine  and  countermine,  in  sally  and 
^^  ^  assault,    and   every  art   of  attack  and   defence.       Nevertheless   its 

surrenders,  ultimate  fall  seemed  certain,  and  its  impending  fate  caused  much 
feeling  in  Greece.  In  answer  to  urgent  messages  sent  by  the 
Aetolians,  when  they  first  knew  that  they  were  to  be  attacked,  envoys 
from  Rhodes  and  Athens  had  arrived  at  the  Roman  camp  ;  and 
now  Amynander  obtained  a  safe  conduct  from  the  consul,  that 
he  might  appeal  to  the  citizens,  among  whom  he  had  lived  during 
his  year's  exile,  to  save  themselves  by  a  timely  accommodation. 
Other  towns  in  Acarnania  joined  in  the  chorus  of  appeal.  Fulvius 
himself  seemed  unwilling  to  reduce  the  Aetolians  to  extremities, 
influenced  in  their  favour  by  his  half-brother,  son  of  M.  Valerius 
Laevinus,  who  had  in  2 1 1  made  the  first  treaty  with  them. 
Terms  At  length  the  Ambraciots  submitted,  though  with  the  condition 

given  to  the  ^j^^^  the  Aetolian  garrison  should  be  allowed  to  depart  unharmed, 
and  the  Aetolian  League  agreed  to  the  terms  imposed  by  Fulvius. 
They  were  to  pay  200  Euboic  talents,  restore  deserters  and  captives, 
surrender  every  city  annexed  by  them  since  the  consulship  of  Lucius 
Flamininus  (192),  and  not  to  attach  any  other  to  their  League. 
Cephallenia  was  expressly  excluded  from  the  treaty,  and  was  after- 
wards reduced  separately  by  Fulvius,  and  made  a  libera  civitas  under 
the  protection  of  Rome.  Fulvius  then  took  over  Ambracia,  and 
removed  to  Rome  the  collection  of  statues  and  pictures  made  by 
Pyrrhus,  but  otherwise  did  no  harm  to  the  town,  and  was  rewarded 
by  the  terrified  Ambraciots  with  a  crown  of  gold,  as  a  liberator  and 
benefactor.  The  terms,  which  the  Aetolians  regarded  as  oppressive 
and  had  with  difficulty  been  induced  to  accept,  were  not  confirmed  at 
Rome  without  demur.  Philip's  envoys  complained  of  the  interference 
in  Athamania  and  the  annexation  of  Dolopia,  and  earnestly  pleaded 


XXX  TREATMENT  OF  AMBRACIA  497 

for  the  rejection  of  the  treaty.  The  pleading  of  the  Athenian  and 
Rhodian  deputies,  however,  prevailed,  and  the  treaty  was  sworn  to, 
with  the  additional  proviso  that  the  Aetolians  were  strictly  bound  to 
follow  Rome  in  war  and  peace.  The  interests  of  Philip  were  guarded 
by  the  clause  requiring  the  Aetolians  to  abandon  all  conquests  since 
192  ;  and  the  Achelous  was  fixed  as  the  frontier  between  Acarnania 
and  Aetolia.  The  Acarnanians  had  always  been  on  bad  terms  with 
the  Aetolians,  but  had  hitherto  been  accustomed  to  look  for  support 
to  Macedonia  ;  henceforth  their  territory  was  under  the  guarantee  of 
Rome. 

Though  the  Ambraciots  had  treated    Fulvius   with    honour    as  Ambracia 
their  liberator,  their  envoys  at   Rome  told  a  different  tale  in  187.   made  a  free 
Encouraged    by    the  consul    M.    Aemilius  they  complained    of  the  •^^^^^'  ^^'^' 
hardships  inflicted  upon    their   citizens,   the  plunder  of  their  town, 
the  selling  of  wives  and  children  into  slavery,   and  the  stripping  of 
ornaments   from   their   temples.      Whether   it  was  the    influence  of 
party  spirit  or  a  tardy  awakening  of  conscience,  the  Senate  were  so 
far  moved  by  these  appeals  as  to  pass  a  decree  restoring  full  liberty  to 
the  Ambraciots,  with  the  one  condition  that   in  its  harbour  Roman 
citizens  should  be  exempt  from  tolls  and  dues.      The  question  of  the 
restoration  of  the  pictures  and  statues  was  referred  to  the  pontifices. 
They  do  not  appear,   however,   to  have    been   restored  ;    and  thus 
another  step  was  taken  in  the  process  of  filling  Rome  with  the  pro- 
ducts of  Greek  genius,  which  had  begun  for  the  first  time  on  a  large 
scale  with  the  sack  of  Syracuse  a  quarter  of  a  century  before. 

Authorities. — For  the  war  with  Antiochus  we  still  have  the  most  connected 
narrative  in  Livy,  xxxv. -xxxviii.  ;  but  the  fragments  of  Polybius  (xviii.-xxi.), 
whom  Livy  chiefly  follows,  are  also  full  and  valuable.  Appian  [Syriacae,  6-21) 
gives  us  a  fresh  and  instructive  account  of  the  campaigns  ;  and  much  is  to  be 
learnt  in  various  ways  from  'Phxtaxch's  Lives  of  Flamininus,  Cato,  ?Lr\d.  Philopoemen. 
Trogus  (Justin,  xxxi.  3  sq.)\  Josephus  {Antiq.  xii.  3,  3-4,  for  the  conduct  of 
Antiochus  to  the  Jews) ;  Zonaras,  ix.  18-21  ;  Orosius,  iv.  20.  Of  Diodorus 
Siculus  (xxix.)  there  are  a  few  fragments  relating  to  the  war. 


2  K 


CHAPTER   XXXI 

FROM   THE   END    OF    THE    WAR    WITH    ANTIOCHUS    TO    THE   END    OF 
THE    THIRD    MACEDONIAN    WAR,    190-166 

Last  days  of  Antiochus,  Hannibal,  and  Scipio — The  anti-Roman  policy  of  Philip  V. 
in  the  last  years  of  his  life — Death  of  his  son  Demetrius — Death  of  Philip  and 
succession  of  Perseus  (179) — Character  of  Perseus — His  activity  and  schemes 
for  asserting  the  independence  of  Macedonia  and  regaining  supremacy  in 
Greece — The  jealousy  of  Rome  and  the  complaints  against  Perseus  made  by 
Eumenes — The  Senate  decide  to  go  to  war  (172) — The  first  campaign  in 
Thessaly  and  defeat  of  Licinius — Reduction  of  Boeotia  (171) — The  second 
campaign  in  Thessaly  also  abortive — Rising  in  Epirus(i7o) — Third  campaign  : 
Marcius  Philippus  enters  Macedonia  —  Perseus  intrigues  with  Genthius, 
Rhodes,  and  Eumenes,  but  is  only  helped  materially  by  Cotys  (169) — Fourth 
campaign — Aemilius  Paulus  defeats  Perseus  at  Pydna,  who  is  captured  in 
Samothrace  (168) — Division  and  settlement  of  Macedonia — Punishment  of 
Epirus,  Aetolia,  and  the  Macedonian  party  in  Greek  states — Deportation  of 
Achaean  statesmen  —  Supremacy  of  Rome  —  Antiochus  and  Popilius  at 
Pelusium. 


In  the  period  immediately  succeeding  the  defeat  of  Antiochus  the 
Great  the  stage  was  being  cleared  of  its  old  actors.  Antiochus  lost 
his  life  in  187  ;  Hannibal  and  Scipio  both  died  in  183  ;  and  though 
Philip  V.  survived  nearly  four  years  more  (179),  they  were  years  of 
domestic  unhappiness  and  public  failure  and  mortification.  An  evil 
destiny  seemed  to  pursue  all  the  men  of  chief  note  in  the  late  wars. 
After  the  battle  of  Magnesia  (190)  Hannibal  fled  to  Crete,  knowing 
that  his  surrender  would  be  demanded  by  the  Romans.  Eluding  the 
cupidity  of  the  Cretans,  by  concealing  his  gold  in  bronze  figures  of 
his  gods,  he  presently  returned  to  Asia  ;  and,  after  some  obscure 
wanderings,  found  concealment  for  a  time  in  the  court  of  Prusias, 
king  of  Bithynia,  who  was  engaged  in  one  of  his  frequent  quarrels 
with  Eumenes  of  Pergamus.  His  presence  was  betrayed  by  the 
new  vigour  manifested  in  the  counsels  of  Prusias,  whose  fleet  won  an 
important  victory  over  that  of  Eumenes.  But  the  Romans  were  on 
the  watch,  and  Flamininus,  who  happened  to  be  near  at  hand  on  one 


CHAP.  XXXI  HANNIBAL  AND  SCIPIO  499 

of  the  numerous  commissions  in  Greece  or  Asia,  at  once  demanded 
his  surrender.  The  king  was  too  weak  to  resist  such  an  order,  and 
Hannibal  anticipated  the  fate  awaiting  him  by  putting  an  end  to  his 
own  hfe  by  means,  it  is  said,  of  a  poison  which  he  carried  on  his 
person  concealed  in  a  ring.  The  place  of  his  death  was  Libyssa, 
loetween  Chalcedon  and  Nicaea,  thus  fulfilling  an  oracle  which  had 
declared  that  "  Libyan  "  soil  should  cover  his  body.i 

Whatever  may  be  thought  of  the  Roman  policy  which  drove  The 
Hannibal  from  Carthage,  it  could  not  be  expected  that  the  govern-  Romans 
ment  should  view  his  presence  in  Asia  Minor  with  indifference.  The  jjanniba 
Romans  were  pledged  to  support  Eumenes,  and  Hannibal  had  shown 
no  intention  of  living  a  private  life.  On  the  contrary,  he  had  all 
along  professed  that  active  enmity  to  Rome  was  the  undying  motive 
of  his  actions.  The  Romans  were  forced  in  common  prudence  to 
demand  his  surrender.  It  is  fortunate  for  their  credit  that  his 
suicide  spared  them  the  shame  of  doing  with  him  what  they  almost 
certainly  would  have  done.  His  character  as  a  leader  has  been 
sufficiently  displayed  in  the  wonderful  campaigns  in  Italy.  As  a 
statesman  he  is  conspicuous  for  honesty  and  good  sense.  A  rough 
humour  marks  some  of  the  anecdotes  preserved  of  him,  and  the 
vigorous  directness  of  his  language  made  him  but  a  half-welcome 
guest  at  the  court  of  Antiochus,  who,  despite  of  some  brilliant 
qualities,  had  neither  the  clear  sight  nor  boldness  to  perceive  or  carry 
out  the  only  policy  which  had  a  chance  of  success.  The  Roman 
verdict,  on  the  other  hand,  which  stamped  him  as  crudelis,  was  not 
without  some  justification  ;  and  though  it  is  possible  to  feel  admira- 
tion for  the  patriotic  soldier  and  the  champion  of  a  ruined  cause,  it 
is  difficult  to  sympathise  strongly  with  an  adventurer  ready  to  give 
his  services  to  any  petty  Asiatic  prince,  if  only  he  might  annoy  the 
old  enemies  whom  he  could  have  no  hope  of  defeating. 

The  duties  and  activities  of  his  conqueror  Scipio  had  fallen  on  Scipio 
lines  more  favourable  to  his  reputation.  His  sword  was  only  drawn  Af^^^^"'^ 
in  the  service  of  his  own  land.  In  his  first  campaign  he  had  saved 
his  father's  life  ;  in  the  darkest  hour  of  his  country's  fortunes  he  had 
been  true  to  her.  In  Spain,  from  which  others  shrank,  he  had 
avenged  his  father's  death  and  restored  the  fortunes  of  Rome.  If 
he  had  failed  to  keep  Hasdrubal  back  from  Italy,  the  failure  had 
been  amply  atoned  for  at  Zama  ;  and  the  conqueror  of  Hannibal 
had  generally  been  credited  with  the  defeat  of  Antiochus  rather 
than  the  brother  on  whose  staff  he  was  serving.  Still  the  last 
five  years  of  his  life  were  full  of  difficulty  and  mortification. 

There  does  not  seem  to  have  been  any  loss  of  popularity  among 


500 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


the  citizens  at  large  ;  but  in  the  Senate  he  was  a  member  of  the 
minority,  and  the  opposite  party,  which  had  all  along  been  annoyed 
at  his  early  exercise  of  those  powers  which  they  themselves  had  only 
attained  at  mature  years  and  after  a  regular  gradation  of  official  life, 
had  of  late  been  particularly  active  in  attacking  the  magistrates  en- 
gaged in  foreign  commands.  Thus  a  prosecution  had  been  com- 
menced against  M.'Acilius  in  190,  on  which  Cato  offered  to  give 
evidence,  and  was  only  withdrawn  on  Acilius  ceasing  to  be  a  candi- 
date for  the  censorship.  The  "acts"  of  Fulvius  Nobilior  in 
Ambracia  were  rescinded  on  the  proposal  of  the  consul  M.  Aemilius, 
in  187.  In  the  same  year  the  triumph  of  Cn.  Manlius  was  opposed 
by  a  majority  of  the  commissioners  sent  to  Asia,  on  the  ground  of 
his  unauthorised  pursuit  of  Antiochus  over  Mount  Taurus,  and  his 
equally  unauthorised  invasion  of  Galatia.  And  now  Scipio  himself 
was  attacked.  The  accusers,  as  to  whose  names  there  was  doubt  in 
Livy's  time,  acted  as  the  mouthpiece  of  a  party  in  the  Senate  led  by 
Cato,  whose  opposition  to  Scipio  had  not  relaxed  since  his  service 
under  him  as  quaestor  in  205.  Old  scandals  were  raked  up  :  the 
alleged  neglect  and  extravagance  in  Sicily ;  the  mismanagement  at 
Locri ;  his  salutation  as  king  by  the  Spaniards  ;  the  court  paid  to 
hirn  by  Antiochus  in  restoring  his  son  :  all  pointing,  as  they  alleged, 
to  corruption  or  unconstitutional  ambition. 

Scipio  had  indeed  on  his  return  from  Africa  shown  his  modera- 
tion in  avoiding  the  honour  of  perpetual  consul  and  dictator ; 
yet  he  sometimes  displayed  an  imprudent  contempt  for  legal  forms. 
On  one  occasion,  it  was  said,  when  the  quaestors  had  some 
scruple  as  to  opening  the  money  chests  in  the  treasury,  he  called 
for  the  keys  and  opened  them  on  his  own  authority,  remarking 
that  no  one  had  a  better  right  to  unlock  them  than  the  man 
to  whom  it  was  owing  that  there  was  anything  to  lock  up.  And 
when  his  brother  Lucius  was  called  upon  for  his  accounts 
of  money  received  in  the  campaign  of  190-189,  Publius  took  the 
books  from  his  hands  and  tore  them  to  pieces  before  the  Senate, 
exclaiming  that  it  was  unworthy  to  demand  an  account  of  4000 
sestertia  (about  ^28,000)  from  a  man  who  had  paid  200,000 
(about  ^1,400,000)  into  the  treasury.  Lucius  and  his  legates, 
however,  were  condemned,  and,  on  refusing  to  make  good  the 
sum  of  money  demanded,  he  was  arrested  by  the  praetor,  the  tribunes 
deciding  to  refuse  their  auxilium.  Publius  rescued  him  by  force, 
and  was  then  himself  impeached  before  the  centuriate  assembly 
by  two  of  the  tribunes.  He  came  into  the  comitiym,  escorted  by  a 
large  number  of  friends  and  clients,  and  advanced  to  the  foot  of  the 
Rostra,  where  it  was  the  custom  of  accused  persons  to  stand.  When 
it  came  to  his  turn  to  speak,  he  mounted  the  platform  and,  without 


XXXI  DIFFICULTIES  IN  GREECE  AND  ASIA  501 

alluding  to  the  charges  against  him,  reminded  his  hearers  that  it  was 
thfe  day  on  which  he  had  conquered  Hannibal  at  Zama,  and  bade 
them  follow  him  to  the  temple  of  Jupiter  on  the  Capitol  to  offer 
thanks  to  the  gods  and  to  pray  for  more  citizens  like  himself.  Then 
he  left  the  Rostra  and  walked  towards  the  Capitol,  followed  by  the 
whole  assembly,  so  that  the  tribunes  and  their  officers  were  left 
alone.  But  his  pride  was  deeply  wounded  :  he  retired  to  his 
estate  at  Liternum,  where  he  passed  the  rest  of  his  days,  and  where 
his  ashes  were  buried  at  a  spot  marked  by  a  statue  that  existed  in 
Livy's  time.  His  absence  from  Rome  gave  his  enemies  courage. 
His  impeachment  was  renewed,  and  when  his  brother  Lucius  pleaded 
illness  as  an  excuse  for  his  not  obeying  the  summons  to  attend,  the 
tribunes  would  have  forced  him  to  come,  had  not  one  of  them, 
Tiberius  Gracchus,  a  political  opponent,  though  afterwards  if  not 
then  his  son-in-law,  resisted  the  desire  of  his  colleagues.  He  was 
allowed  to  die  in  peace,  leaving  it  as  an  injunction  to  his  heirs  that  the 
ungrateful  city  should  not  have  his  ashes. 

Though  the  Romans  had  declared  the  European  and  Asiatic 
Greeks  free,  and  had  committed  the  rule  of  Asia  to  native  govern- 
ments, they  were  by  no  means  quit  of  them.  Constant  appeals 
reached  Rome,  answered  by  frequent  missions  of  legates,  and  it  was 
plain  that  before  long  an  active  intervention  would  be  demanded 
which  would  not  again  be  withdrawn.  In  neither  country,  indeed, 
had  the  settlement  been  one  likely  to  last.  In  Asia  Eumenes  of 
Pergamus  was  intended  to  be  the  chief  power  :  but  his  quarrels  with 
Prusias  on  the  one  hand,  and  with  Philip  on  the  other,  were  con- 
stant sources  of  difficulty  ;  while  his  relations  with  Greece  roused 
suspicion  against  him  at  Rome,  where  there  was  a  disposition  to 
checkmate  him  by  showing  special  honours  to  his  brother  Attalus. 

Another    difficulty    was    Rhodes.       The    Lycians    disliked    the  Rhodes. 
Rhodian   government,  to  which  they  had  been  assigned,  and   were 
ready  with  complaints  ;  and  the  naval  supremacy  which  the  Rhodians 
aimed  at   in   the  Aegean  was   not    long  in    attracting    the    jealous 
observation  of  the  Romans. 

Aetolia  since  189  had  been  a  vassal  of  Rome  ;  but  its  turbulent  Aetolia. 
people,  shut  off  from  their  old  habits  of  piracy,  had  turned  upon  each 
other,  and  the  country  was  the  scene  of  frequent  sanguinary  affrays 
and  massacres.  In  Peloponnesus  the  forcible  addition  of  Sparta  to  Pelopon- 
the  Achaean  League  had  been  a  fruitful  source  of  quarrel :  and  both 
Sparta  and  Elis,  unwilling  members  of  the  League,  were  encouraged 
to  lay  their  complaints  before  the  Senate.  Even  in  the  more  con- 
tented part  of  the  League  there  was  a  sharp  division  between  those 
who  hated  and  those  who  wished  well  to  Roman  influence.  A  third 
party,  prepared  to  respect  the  terms  made  with  Rome  and  yet  to  resist 


nesus. 


502 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


encroachment  upon  them,  had  been  led  by  Philopoemen  ;  but  since 
his  death  (183)  the  Romanising  party  had  become  more  active,  and 
assisted  the  Senate  in  dividing  and  distracting  the  League. 

With  PhiHp  of  Macedonia  questions  soon  arose  threatening  that 
renewal  of  war,  which  actually  took  place  under  his  successor. 
He  had  been  rewarded  for  his  assistance  in  the  war  against  Antiochus 
with  cities  in  Thessaly  and  Athamania,  as  well  as  Magnesia,  including 
the  important  town  of  Demetrias, — one  of  the  three  "  fetters  of 
Greece."  Not  contented  with  this  he  pushed  his  authority  in  the 
Thracian  Chersonese,  claiming  to  occupy  Aenus  and  Maroneia,  on 
the  ground  that  he  had  taken  them  during  the  war,  and  that  they 
had  not  been  mentioned  in  the  settlement  of  the  Roman  com- 
missioners. The  Romans  were  jealous  of  any  encroachment  in  the 
Chersonese,  as  commanding  the  shortest  passage  into  Asia,  and  had 
assigned  it  to  the  friendly  Eumenes.  The  Senate,  therefore,  when 
approached  by  emissaries  from  the  Thessalian  towns  and  from 
Eumenes,  sent  three  commissioners  in  185,  headed  by  Caecilius 
Metellus.  Their  decisions  in  favour  of  the  withdrawal  of  Macedonian 
garrisons  from  Thessaly,  as  well  as  from  Aenus  and  Maroneia,  were 
received  with  great  anger  by  the  king,  who  hinted  that  the  present 
state  of  things  was  not  destined  to  last  for  ever — "  the  last  sun  had 
not  set."  He  conformed,  however,  for  the  present,  but  from  this 
time  forward  nursed  a  settled  purpose  of  one  day  renewing  the  war, 
and  shaking  off  the  intolerable  yoke  of  Rome. 

He  paid  great  attention  to  the  training  and  efficiency  of  his 
army  ;  collected  stores  of  arms  and  war  material  in  the  towns,  and 
on  various  pretexts  or  by  acts  of  violence  removed  from  the  coast 
towns  those  whom  he  believed  to  be  disaffected  to  himself,  filling 
up  their  places  with  Thracians  and  other  barbarians,  on  whom  he 
thought  he  could  rely  (182).  But  these  transactions  had  not  been 
allowed  to  pass  unobserved.  Immediately  after  the  mission  of 
Caecilius  in  185  complaints  had  poured  in  against  Philip  from  every 
side,  and  he  had  sent  his  younger  son  Demetrius  to  defend  him 
before  the  Senate.  Demetrius  was  known  at  Rome,  where  he  had 
been  for  some  years  as  a  hostage  ;  and  the  Senate  now  sought  to 
introduce  division  in  Macedonia  by  treating  the  young  prince  with 
special  honour,  and  Flamininus  appears  to  have  told  him  outright 
that  it  was  intended  that  he  should  succeed  to  the  Macedonian 
crown  :  while  a  fresh  commission  was  sent  to  insist  on  the  king 
obeying  the  orders  of  the  Senate  and  evacuating  the  towns  named  by 
them.  Philip  was  forced  to  obey,  but  the  favour  shown  to  Demetrius 
proved  fatal  to  him.  Perseus,  the  king's  elder  son,  worked  on  his 
father's  jealousy,  continually  representing  Demetrius  as  engaged  in 
treasonable  correspondence  with   Rome,  and  at  length  induced  him 


1 


xxxT  PERSEUS  KING  OF  MACEDONIA  503 

to  consent  to  his  son's  death  by  producing,  it  is  said,  a  letter  of 
Flamininus  to  Demetrius,  referring  to  a  plan  for  destroying  his 
father  and  brother  and  securing  the  crown  for  himself  (181). 

Philip  never  held  up  his  head  again.      He  found  power  slipping  Death  of 
from  his  hands,  and  the  courtiers   crowding  round  the  young  heir  :  Philip, 
while  before  long  he  learnt  that  the  letter,  on  the  strength  of  which  ^79- 
he  had  consented  to  his  son's  death,  was  a  forgery.      Worn  out  with 
sorrow  and  the  infirmities  of  premature  age,  haunted  with  the  furies 
of  a  conscience  stained  by  cruelty  and  intemperance,  he  sank  into  a 
dishonoured  grave  at  Amphipolis  within  two  years  of  the  death  of 
Demetrius.      He  had  wished,  it  is  said,  to  have  named  Antigonus, 
nephew  of  Antigonus  Doson,  as  his  heir.      But  death  came  on  him 
suddenly  ;  his  physician  contrived  to  let  Perseus  know  of  it  promptly, 
and    the    succession    was    secured,    Antigonus    put    to    death,   and  perseus 
ambassadors  sent  to  Rome  to  ask  for  the  continuance  of  the  friend-  king,  ijg- 
ship  and  alliance  made  with  his  father.  ^^'^• 

For  the  first  two  years  of  the  new  reign  this  friendship  was  at 
least  in  appearance  maintained.  The  only  immediate  difficulty  was 
one  created  by  the  late  king,  who  had  instigated  the  Bastarnae, 
a  wandering  tribe  from  the  Dniester,  to  invade  the  Dardani,  hoping 
to  divert  the  attention  of  the  Romans  from  his  own  intrigues.  But 
for  the  present  the  Dardani  succeeded  in  driving  back  the  invaders, 
and  the  Roman  government  contented  itself  with  a  warning.  Other 
sources  of  uneasiness,  however,  presently  arose.  The  new  king  was  character 
possessed  of  many  attractive  qualities.  Noble  and  royal  in  figure  of  Perseus. 
and  appearance ;  dignified  in  his  manner ;  sober,  chaste,  and 
temperate  in  the  enjoyments  of  life,  he  set  an  example  which  the 
court  was  quick  to  follow.  Public  business  seemed  likely  to  be 
conducted  with  steadiness  and  ability,  and  it  only  required  such  a 
change  in  the  Macedonian  government  to  turn  the  eyes  of  the  Greeks 
once  more  to  it.  Perseus  from  the  first  was  believed  to  be  intent  His  policy. 
upon  recovering  the  influence  once  exercised  in  Greece  by  Macedonia. 
He  began,  as  his  father  did,  by  strengthening  his  hold  in  Thrace.  He 
expelled  a  prince  named  Abrupolis  on  the  plea  of  some  unfair 
dealings  as  to  the  mines  of  Pangaeum  ;  and  when  the  Dolopians, 
who  had  a  controversy  with  him,  appealed  to  Rome,  he  invaded  their 
country  and  forced  them  to  submit  to  his  authority.  He  made  a 
progress  in  Greece  to  Delphi,  under  pretext  of  consulting  the  oracle,  and 
though  he  only  remained  there  three  days,  his  presence  made  a  great 
sensation.  He  was  said  also  to  have  taken  pains  to  conciliate  towns 
on  his  road,  and  to  have  invited  the  renewal  of  friendly  relations. 
He  even  offered  terms  to  the  Achaean  League.  An  order  of  the 
League  Assembly  had  closed  its  territory  to  Macedonians  or  to 
kings ;  consequently  Macedonian  territory  was  also  closed  to  Achaeans, 


504 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


and  served  as  a  refuge  for  their  runaway  slaves.  These  Perseus  offered 
to  restore,  if  the  Achaeans  would  renew  their  friendship.  Though 
a  majority  of  the  League  declined  the  offer,  a  considerable  minority 
wished  to  accept  it,  and  the  jealousy  of  Rome  was  roused.  It  was 
a  primary  object  of  Roman  policy  to  keep  Macedonia  and  Greece  at 
variance.  Only  so  could  the  Roman  interference  in  Greek  quarrels, 
which  was  continually  being  invoked,  be  exercised  with  security  ; 
and  the  policy  of  Perseus  was  offensive  to  Rome  in  proportion  as  it 
was  acceptable  in  Greece.  There  was  a  general  feeling  that  an 
outbreak  was  at  hand  ;  and  many  states  in  Greece  were  inclined  to 
rest  their  hopes  on  Perseus.  Eumenes  of  Pergamus  was  unpopular  : 
the  benefactions  by  which  he  tried  to  gain  favour  in  Achaia  and  else- 
where seemed  vulgar  and  ostentatious  ;  while  Macedonia  was  under- 
stood and  had  a  long  established  prestige.  Who  could  tell  whether 
Perseus  might  not,  in  the  end,  prove  a  match  for  the  great  Republic, 
when  it  would  be  well  for  those  states  which  had  been  loyal  to  him  ? 
The  Romans  were  aware  of  the  state  of  things.  Frequent  com- 
missions were  sent  into  Greece  and  Macedonia,  which  Perseus 
studiously  ignored.  In  Thessaly  there  was  a  commercial  crisis, 
giving  rise  to  intestine  quarrels  which  App.  Claudius  was  sent  to 
allay;  while  the  control  of  a  similar  disturbance  in  Aetolia  was  entrusted 
to  Marcellus,  with  orders  to  proceed  to  Achaia  and  keep  alive  the 
hostility  to  Macedonia.  A  commission  of  five,  headed  by  C. 
Valerius,  was  also  sent  to  Macedonia  to  investigate  what  was  going 
on  there,  and  afterwards  to  cross  to  Egypt  to  renew  the  alliance  with 
the  king  (173-172). 

It  was  while  this  commission  was  still  at  work  that  the  resolution 
was  come  to  at  Rome,  to  go  to  war  with  Macedonia.  Early  in  172 
king  Eumenes  in  person  laid  before  the  Senate  the  proofs  of  the 
hostile  intentions  of  Perseus.  He  pointed  out  the  hold  already 
obtained  by  him  in  Boeotia  and  Aetolia  ;  the  increase  in  his  military 
power  by  the  inexhaustible  recruiting  ground  obtained  in  Thrace, 
and  the  replenishment  of  his  ranks  during  a  long  peace.  Every 
step  taken  by  him  was  attributed  to  deliberate  hostility  to  Rome  : 
his  expulsion  of  the  Thracian  prince  Abrupolis  ;  his  intrigues  in 
Boeotia,  which  had  caused  the  death  of  the  leaders  of  the  Romanising 
party  ;  his  invasion  of  the  Dolopes  ;  his  visit  to  Delphi  ;  his  inter- 
ference in  the  financial  affairs  of  Thessaly  and  Perrhaebia. 

The  impression  made  on  the  Senate  was  increased  by  the 
defiant  tone  of  the  Macedonian  emissary  Harpalus,  who  answered 
Eumenes,  and  by  the  advocacy  of  the  Rhodian  ambassadors, — them- 
selves under  grievous  suspicion, — who  retorted  upon  Eumenes  that 
he  was  pursuing  an  exactly  similar  policy  in  Asia.  It  was  farther 
deepened,    when,    after    Eumenes    had    been   dismissed   with   large 


1 


XXXI  WAR  WITH  PERSEUS  INEVITABLE  5^5 

presents  and  every  mark  of  honour,  it  became  known  that  his  Hfe  had 
been  attempted  at  Delphi,  which  he  visited  on  his  way  home,  and 
that  the  would-be  assassins,  though  they  had  not  been  ari-ested,  were 
believed  to  have  been  in  the  pay  of  Perseus,  And  when  Valerius  and 
his  fellow-commissioners  returned  to  Rome  with  a  report  confirming 
the  statements  of  Eumenes,  and  bringing  with  them  a  Delphian  named 
Praxo,  at  whose  house  the  assassins  of  Eumenes  had  lodged  ;  and 
farther,  when  a  certain  L.  Rammius  of  Brundisium  was  produced, 
asserting  that  Perseus  had  instigated  him  to  poison  the  Roman 
legates  who  usually  lodged  at  his  house  on  their  way  to  Greece,  it 
was  decided  that  war  should  be  begun  in  the  next  consular  year. 
The  praetor  Cn.  Sicinius  was  ordered  to  enrol  an  army  to  muster  at  Prepar- 
Brundisium.  A  request  from  Ariarathes,  king  of  Cappadocia,  to  be  ationsfor 
allowed  to  send  his  son  for  education  at  Rome  was  gladly  accepted  ;  '^^^'  ^7^- 
friendship  and  alliance  were  made  with  certain  Thracian  tribes  who 
asked  for  it ;  commissioners  were  sent  to  Asia,  the  Aegean  Islands, 
and  to  Crete  and  Rhodes,  to  secure  their  adhesion  ;  and  Eumenes, 
now  recovered  from  his  wound,  hastened  home  to  make  preparations. 
War  was  not  yet  formally  declared,  but  three  legates  were  sent  to 
Macedonia  to  demand  satisfaction  on  pain  of  the  renunciation  of 
"friendship"  with  Perseus.  The  king,  being  with  difficulty  induced 
to  give  them  audience,  spoke  with  the  greatest  bitterness  of  the 
constant  visits  of  Roman  commissioners  to  spy  upon  him,  and  of  his 
state  of  dependence.  He  ended  by  handing  in  a  written  reply,  in  Perseus 
which  he  denied  being  bound  by  his  father's  treaty,  only  renewed  at  ^^fi'^^^- 
the  beginning  of  his  reign  as  a  formality,  and  demanded  that,  if  the 
Romans  desired  a  new  treaty,  the  whole  of  its  conditions  should  be 
discussed  afresh.  The  legates  answered  by  renouncing  his  friend- 
ship ;  to  which  the  king  stopped  to  reply,  as  he  was  leaving  the 
room,  by  ordering  them  to  quit  the  country  within  three  days. 

The    war   was    thus    made  inevitable ;    and    the   Romans   were  The 
encouraged  in  entering  upon  it  by  the  reports  of  the  various  com-  isolation 
missions.       The    only  allies   which   Perseus   seemed   to   have  were  '^    ^^-j^"-^- 
Genthius,    son    of   Pleuratus,    of    Illyria,    and    Cotys,    king    of   the 
Thracian   Odrysae.      Eumenes,   Antiochus,  and    Ptolemy  had    been 
approached   by   Macedonian  envoys,   but  were   reported  to  be   still 
hostile  to  him  ;  and  though  the  Rhodians  were  said  to  be  wavering, 
ambassadors  from  the  island,  then  at  Rome,  tried  to  persuade  the 
Senate  that  their  loyalty  was  beyond  suspicion.      Prusias  of  Bithynia 
had  married  a  sister  of  Perseus,  yet  he  resolved  to  stand  aloof  and 
watch   the   result   of  the   contest ;   while  Antiochus  did  not  wish  to 
interfere,  but  yet  saw  with  satisfaction  the  Romans  engaged  in  war 
with    Macedonia,    as    offering    facilities    for    his    designs    upon    the 
dominions  of  Egypt.      It  was  well  known  that  in  Greece  feelings 


5o6 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


lyi.   Coss. 
P.  Licinius 
Crassus,  C. 
Cassius 
Longinus. 
The  war  is 
begun. 


The 

campaign 

in 

Thessaly, 

171. 


Victory  of 
Perseus 
near 
Larissa. 


were  divided,  and  that  in  each  state  there  was  a  party  sympathising 
with  Macedonia.  At  the  end  of  the  war  the  vengeance  of  Rome  con- 
founded with  these  the  moderate  party  who  wished  to  stand  aloof 
from  either  side  and  maintain  a  position  of  strict  adherence  to 
treaties.  For  the  present  active  participation  with  Perseus,  except 
in  a  small  part  of  Boeotia,  was  prevented  by  a  Roman  commis- 
sion of  five,  who  between  them  visited  every  part  of  the  country. 

Perseus  affected  surprise  when  an  army  under  Cn.  Sicinius 
landed  at  Apollonia  early  in  171,  and  sent  legates  to  Rome  to  ask 
the  reason.  They  were  received  in  the  temple  of  Bellona  without 
being  allowed  to  enter  the  city,  and  were  only  answered  that  the 
consul  would  presently  be  in  Macedonia  to  hear  any  complaint  which 
might  be  made,  but  that  they  were  not  to  return.  Meanwhile  one 
of  the  commissioners,  Q.  Marcius  Philippus,  had  met  Perseus  on  the 
Peneus,  and  had  granted  a  truce  to  enable  the  king  to  once  more 
send  ambassadors  to  Rome,  though  he  knew  that  it  was  useless,  and 
that  the  war  was  resolved  upon  ;  but  he  knew  also  that  the  prepara- 
tions were  not  well  advanced,  and  that  delay  would  be  an  advantage 
to  Rome, — a  piece  of  double  dealing  afterwards  reprobated  by  a 
minority  of  the  Senate. 

It  was  not,  in  fact,  till  the  middle  of  July  that  the  consul  crossed 
to  Apollonia  and  took  over  the  command  of  the  four  legions  (16,000 
men),  with  their  complement  of  800  cavalry,  15,000  infantry  and 
1200  cavalry  of  the  allies,  auxiliaries  from  Liguria,  Crete,  and 
Numidia,  and  elephants.  Perseus,  whose  council  had  decided 
against  farther  efforts  at  conciliation,  had  already  moved  his  army 
of  39,000  infantry  and  4000  cavalry  from  its  camp  at  Citium,  between 
Pella  and  Beroea,  into  Thessaly,  and  taken  up  a  position  at  the  foot 
of  Mount  Ossa.  About  half  were  Macedonians  trained  to  fight 
in  the  phalanx  ;  the  rest  were  of  various  nationality.  The  troops 
seem  to  have  been  in  a  state  of  great  efficiency  and  confidence  ; 
while  the  cities  of  Macedonia  vied  with  each  other  in  supplying 
provisions  and  money.  Licinius  also  entered  Thessaly,  and  en- 
camped on  the  Peneus,  near  Larissa,  where  he  was  joined  by 
Eumenes  and  some  Greek  allies.  Part  of  the  fleet  under  the  praetor 
C.  Lucretius  sailed  up  the  Gulf  of  Corinth  to  the  southern  coast  of 
Boeotia,  while  the  rest,  under  his  brother  Marcus,  went  to  Chalcis — 
where  squadrons  from  Rhodes  and  other  places  mustered  —  and 
landed  troops  to  besiege  Haliartus. 

The  consul  was  unsuccessful  in  Thessaly,  and  sustained  a  some- 
what severe  defeat  in  a  cavalry  engagement  near  Larissa ;  and 
though  Perseus  failed  to  follow  up  his  advantage,  and  indeed  suffered 
a  reverse  later  on  near  Crannon,  the  first  year's  campaign  had  done 
nothing  towards  crushing  him,  and  had  called  forth  warm  enthusiasm 


J 


XXXI  DILATORY  CONDUCT  OF  THE  WAR  507 

for  the  king  in  many  parts  of  Greece.  The  net  result  to  the  Romans 
was  the  capture  of  some  Thessalian  towns,  and  the  reduction  of 
the  three  towns  in  Boeotia  which  had  sided  with  Perseus.  Haliartus 
was  taken  by  M.  Lucretius  after  a  long  siege,  its  inhabitants  sold, 
and  its  walls  levelled  with  the  ground  ;  Thisbe  surrendered  to  the 
praetor  C.  Lucretius  without  a  struggle  ;  and  Coronea  was  taken  by 
the  consul  in  the  autumn.  The  other  consul,  Cassius,  who  had  been 
sent  to  Gaul,  attempted  to  enter  Macedonia  through  Illyricum,  but 
appears  to  have  been  stopped  by  Perseus  himself,  or  a  detachment 
of  his  army. 

After  his  victory  in  the  first  cavalry  engagement,   Perseus   had  no. 
been  induced  by  the  wiser  members  of  his  council  to  offer  peace  on  Coss.  A. 
the  same  terms  as  his  father.     The  answer  showed  the  implacable  J'^^fji^^^ 
determination    of   Rome.      Perseus,    Licinius    had    answered,    must 
submit  unconditionally,   and   the   future   government  of  Macedonia 
must    be    left    to   the   discretion   of  the   Senate.       But   though   the  A  futile 
Senate's  tone  was  thus  haughty,   it  was  not  supported  by  a  corre-  campaign. 
sponding  energy.     The  consul  of  the  next  year  (A.  Hostilius)  failed 
to  enter  Macedonia  from  Thessaly,  and  suffered  at  least  one  defeat ; 
Cephalus  had  been  goaded  into  rousing  a  somewhat  violent  insur- 
rection  in  favour  of  Perseus    in  Epirus  ;    L.    Hortensius  succeeded  Mis- 
Lucretius  in  command  of  the  fleet,  and    outdid    him    in    extortion  conduct  of 
upon   the  coast  towns,  without  performing  any  exploit  of  importance     .   ■^'^''^^'^" 
to  atone  for  it  ;^  and  lastly,    App.  Claudius   suffered   a  mortifying 
defeat  in  an  attempt  upon  Uscana  in  Illyricum. 

The  complaint  of  plundered  temples,  and  of  works  of  art  shipped  i6g.  Coss. 
to   Italy  from  a  friendly   city   like  Chalcis,  is  a  forerunner  of  the  Q-  Marcius 
corruption  that  was  soon  to  mark  the  steps  of  many  Roman  magis-    , ,  ^  ^^""^ 
trates   in   their  dealing  with   extra- Italian   states,   and  is  a  striking  Se'ruilius. 
commentary  on  the  ineffectiveness  of  the  conduct  of  the  war  up  to 
this  time.      The  consul  of  the  next  year,  Q.  Marcius   Philippus,  did, 
however,  advance  matters  somewhat.      Perseus,  with  ill-timed  parsi- 
mony, had  failed   to   obtain   active   co-operation   from   Genthius  of 
Illyricum  or  from  the  other  states,  which  at  this  crisis  might  have 
been  easily  won  over  by  a  display  of  liberality,  and  was  therefore 
unsupported.      He  was  encamped  at  Dium,  which  commanded  the 
coast  road  from  Perrhaebia  into  Macedonia,  whilst  his  general  Hip-  Macedonia 
pias   held   the   passes   over  the    Cambunian  mountains.      Philippus,  <^t  length 
however,    baffled    Hippias,    crossed   the   mountains,    and   descended  ^^  ^^^  ' 
upon  Dium.^     Perseus,  taken  by  surprise,  retired  upon  Pydna,  order- 
ing his  treasure  to  be  thrown  into  the  sea,  and  recalling  his  garrison 

1  An  inscription  exists  containing  an  Athenian  decree  bestowing  citizenship 
upon  Hortensius  as  a  "  benefactor."  Such  were  the  pitiful  means  taken  to  avert 
liis  depredations  (Hicks,  p.  338,  C.  I.  A.,  ii.  423).  -  See  Map,  p.  440. 


5o8 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Q.  Marcius 

Philippus 

encamped 

at 

Heracleum, 

i6g. 


i68.   L. 
Aemilius 
Paulus  II. , 
C.  Licin- 
ius 
Crassus. 

Aemilius 
Paulus 
selected  for 
the  com- 
mand in 
Macedonia. 


Paulus 
takes  the 
command, 
April  i68. 


at  Tempe.  Philippus  entered  Dium,  but  did  not  stay  there.  He 
retirisd  along  the  coast  road  to  Phila,  in  order  to  secure  the  con- 
nexion with  his  supplies  on  his  rear.  Perseus  thereupon  reoccupied 
Dium,  which  PhilipjDUs  answered  by  taking  Heracleum,  some  miles 
north  of  Phila.  Nothing  more  was  done  that  year :  and  if  Persieus 
was  angry  with  Hippias  for  allowing  Philippus  to  cross  the  moun- 
tains, the  Romans  were  equally  discontented  with  Philippus  for 
making  ho  more  use  of  his  success.  Nor  were  the  movements  of 
the  fleet  of  importance  ;  and  Eumenes,  after  visiting  the  consul  at 
Heracleum,  to  congratulate  him  on  having  effected  an  entrance  into 
Macedonia,  returned  home  for  the  winter,  and  was  rumoured  to  have 
been  in  friendly  communication  with  Perseus.  Still  the  fact  of  the 
Romans  having  actually  entered  Macedonia  had  a  considerable  effect 
in  Greece.  The  Achaeans  sent  Polybius  to  offer  the  assistance  of  a 
League  army  in  Thessaly,  and  the  Romanising  party  in  each  state 
was  encouraged.  The  Senate  felt  strong  enough  to  reject  the 
request  of  an  envoy  of  Prusias  to  make  peace  with  Perseus,  and  to 
show  its  indignation  at  a  similar  demand  from  Rhodes  by  declaring 
those  Carians  and  Lycians  who  were  under  Rhodian  government  to 
be  free.  A  commission,  however,  was  sent  to  investigate  the  state 
of  things  in  the  camp  at  Heracleum,  when  Philippus  asked  for 
farther  supplies  ;  and  their  report  was  disquieting.  The  position  of 
the  Roman  camp,  they  said,  was  dangerously  near  the  enemy ; 
provisions  were  running  short ;  App.  Claudius  at  Lychnis  was  not 
strong  enough  to  effect  a  diversion,  and  had,  in  fact,  been  obliged 
to  beg  help  from  Achaia, — which  thie  Achaeans  were  prevented  from 
giving  by  the  regulation  against  answering  such  demands  unless  sanc- 
tioned by  the  Senate  ;  lastly,  Eumenes'  loyalty  was  doubtful. 

It  was  felt  that  the  crisis  demanded  a  man  of  military  experience, 
and  L.  Aemilius  Paulus,  who  had  already  seen  much  fighting  in 
Spain,  and  had  celebrated  a  triumph  over  the  Ligurians,  was  induced 
once  more  to  stand  for  the  consulship.  He  was  sixty  years  old,  a 
brother-in-law  of  Africanus,  and  had  on  more  than  one  occasion  been 
rejected  as  a  candidate  for  office.  Now,  however,  he  was  felt  to  be 
the  right  man,  and  somewhat  against  his  will  was  elected  consul. 
He  was  to  take  two  fresh  legions  with  him,  and  to  be  followed  by 
600  cavalry  enlisted  in  Gaul ;  while  the  praetor  L.  Anicius  was  to 
relieve  App.  Claudius  at  Lychnis,  the  chief  town  of  the  Dassaretae,  in 
order  to  crush  Genthius,  who  had  now  definitely  declared  for 
Perseus,  and  had  even  imprisoned  some  Roman  legates. 

Paulus  was  to  start  immediately  after  Xh&  feriae  Latinae  (31st 
March),  and  not  wait,  as  had  of  late  become  the  custom,  for  the 
games  of  Apollo  in  July.  The  story  was  often  told  that,  on  returning 
from  the  meeting  of  the  Senate,  his  daughter  met  him  with  the  cry, 


XXXI  AEMILIUS  PAULUS  IN  COMMAND  509 

"  Perse  is  dead,"  referring  to  a  favourite  dog,  and  that  he  took  it  as  j68. 
an   omen   of  success.     A  better  omen  was   his   own   energetic  and 
honourable  character.      He  found  the  Roman  camp,  between  Phila 
and  Heracleum,  somewhat  demoralised  from  the   apparent   impos- 
sibility of  attacking  the  position  of  Perseus,  and  suffering  from  want 
of  water.      He  took  immediate  steps  for  the  restoration  of  discipline, 
and  relieved  the  latter  distress  by  showing  how  to  open  the  springs 
in  the  neighbouring  mountain  slopes.      Still  the  position  of  Perseus  Perseus  on 
was  a  very  strong  one.      He  had  fortified  himself  on  the  north  bank  the  Eni- 
of  the  Enipeus.      His  left  rested  on  the  sea,  his  right  on  the  range  i^^"-^- 
of  Mount  Olympus.     Though  the  Enipeus  was   nearly   dry   in   the 
summer,  he  had  availed  himself  of  wood  from  the  forests  to  erect 
such  a  formidable  fortification  along  its   bank,  that  it  was  clear  to 
Aemilius  that  the  position  could  not  be  carried  in  front.     The  king's 
army  was  considerable  also  in  number,  although  his  parsimony  had 
deprived  him  of  the  help  of  the  10,000  Gallic  horsemen  who  had 
come  at  his  invitation,  but  had  insisted  on  having  a  large  sum  of 
money  paid  in  advance.     Yet  he  must  have  felt  that  he  was  almost 
alone  and  was  playing  his  last  card.      Genthius,  whom  he  had  also  Perseus 
treated  with  curious  meanness,  had  already  surrendered  to  the  praetor  g^t^  no 
L.  Anicius.      Though  the  Rhodians  had  almost  openly  declared  for  ^^^V  from 
him,  they  could  give  him  no  effective  aid  while  a  powerful  Roman  j^kodes  or 
fleet  was  in  the  Aegean,  and  their  attempted  negotiation  with  Paulus  Eumenes. 
utterly  failed.      Eumenes  had  been  secretly  offering  his  intervention 
to  secure  peace  with  Rome  ;  but  he  too  had  demanded  a  large  sum, 
which  Perseus  was  unwilling  to  pay  ;  and,  even  if  he  had  been  will- 
ing, Eumenes  was  now  under  such  suspicion  at  Rome  that  the  value  of 
his  intervention  was  more  than  doubtful.       The  king's  one  ally  was 
the  Thracian  Cotys. 

After    some    weeks'    delay    the    consul    was    relieved    from    his   The 
difficulty  by  the  gallantry  of  Scipio  Nasica  and  his  own  son   Fabius  position  of 
Maximus,  who  volunteered   to  turn   the  position  by  a   pass  leading  ^^^^^^J , 
over  the  chain  of  Olympus  past  Pythium  and  Petra,  of  which  they  Scipio 
had  learnt  from  native  traders.      While  they  were  on  their  way  with  Nasica  and 
8000    infantry    and    200    Cretan    archers,    Paulus    distracted    the  Eabius 
attention    of  the   enemy  by  an   attack  upon   his    outposts    on   the  ^'^■^^'"^•f- 
Enipeus,  in  which  for  two.  days  his  men  suffered  severely.      On  the 
third    he    made    a    feint    of  moving    towards    the    sea,    as    though 
intending  to  get  on  the  king's  rear  by  help  of  the  fleet.      Perseus 
was    thus    put    off  his    guard,  and  was   only  informed   at  the   last 
moment    of   Nasica's    movement    by    a    Cretan    deserter,  who  had 
managed  to  outstrip  the  Roman  troops.      He  at  once  sent  a  detach- 
ment   under    Milo    to  hold    the    pass.      But    it    was   too   late :    the 
Romans  had  already  surprised  the  weak  outpost,  and  now  defeated 


5IO 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Milo  after  a  sharp  struggle.  The  king  in  alarm  broke  up  his  camp 
and  retired  on  Pydna.  Paulas  thereupon  crossed  the  Enipeus,  and 
having  effected  a  junction  with  Nasica,  advanced  within  sight  of  the 
king's  new  position, — a  plain  traversed  by  a  small  stream  and 
bordered  by  low  hills. 

Nasica  wished  to  attack  at  once ;  but  the  more  experienced 
Aemilius  refused  to  begin  a  battle  immediately  after  a  march  with 
an  enemy  who  had  had  some  days  to  rest,  and  insisted  on  first 
securing  their  camp.  An  eclipse  of  the  moon  terrified  the  Mace- 
donians, as  foreboding  the  fall  of  the  king ;  but  the  Romans  were 
saved  from  alarm  by  the  presence  of  the  learned  Sulpicius  Gallus, 
who  was  able  to  foretell  and  explain  it.  The  battle  next  day  was 
brought  on  almost  by  accident,  a  contest  between  the  watering 
parties  of  the  two  armies  gradually  bringing  out  the  full  forces  on 
either  side.  Here,  for  the  first  time,  Paulus  saw  the  famous  Mace- 
donian phalanx  in  action,  and  afterwards  confessed  the  terror  with 
which  it  inspired  him.  At  first  it  carried  all  before  it  and  forced 
the  Roman  line  to  give  way.  But  its  very  success  was  its  ruin. 
As  it  advanced  it  gradually  became  more  and  more  dislocated : 
gaps  appeared  in  the  dense  mass  of  spears,  of  which  the  Roman 
soldiers  were  quick  to  avail  themselves.  At  close  quarters  the  men 
had  to  drop  their  sarissae  and  trust  to  a  light  dagger  and  small 
shield,  which  proved  useless  against  the  sharp  strong  sword  of  the 
Roman.  The  struggle  seems  to  have  lasted  little  more  than  an 
hour ;  the  rest  of  the  afternoon  was  occupied  in  the  pursuit  of  the 
now  disordered  mass. 

The  king,  who  had  been  disabled  early  in  the  day  by  a  kick  of 
a  horse,  fled  with  his  bodyguard  and  some  cavalry  to  Pella.  On  his 
way  most  of  the  cavalry  deserted  ;  and  when  he  reached  his  palace, 
he  found  the  leading  men  in  Pella  unwilling  to  come  in  answer  to 
his  summons.  Early  the  next  morning  therefore  he  continued  his 
flight  towards  Amphipolis,  accompanied  by  about  fifty  Cretans  and 
two  officers,  hoping  that  the  river  Axius  would  effectually  delay 
pursuit.  From  Amphipolis,  which  he  reached  on  the  third  day,  he 
sent  legates  with  a  letter  to  the  consul,  who  was  engaged  in  rapidly 
reducing  the  cities  in  north-eastern  Macedonia.  Aemilius  refused 
to  answer  the  letter  because  Perseus  still  styled  himself  king  ;  and 
the  people  of  Amphipolis,  in  alarm  for  their  own  safety,  were  eager 
that  he  should' leave.  He  obtained  shipping  in  the  Strymon,  and 
still  accompanied  by  the  Cretans,  who  were  kept  faithful  by  the 
treasures  which  he  was  carrying  with  him,  he  arrived  at  Samothrace, 
the  island  of  the  mysterious  Kabiri,  whose  shrine  gave  it  the 
privilege  of  sanctuary, — a  privilege  which  Cn.  Octavius,  who 
presently  arrived  with  the  Roman  fleet,  did  not  venture  openly  to 


XXXI  RESULTS  OF  THE  BATTLE  OF  PYDNA  511 

violate.      He  endeavoured,  however,  to  work  on  the  scruples  of  the  168. 
Samothracians,  reproaching  them  with  giving  harbour  to  the  would- 
be  murderer  of  Eumenes  and  Demetrius,  and  to  his  minister  Evander. 
After  endeavouring  to  save  himself  first  by  sacrificing  Evander,  and 
then   by  escaping  to   the  dominions   of  Cotys,  the  king  eventually 
surrendered  himself  and   his   elder  son  Philip   to   Octavius.       They 
were  taken  at  once  to  the  camp  of  the  consul  Aemilius,  who  received  He 
him  with  severe  reproaches,  to   which   the  king   made    no   answer,  surrenders 
He  was  nevertheless  profoundly  moved  by  the  humiliation  of  a  king  ^"^^  " 
lately  so  powerful,  and  entertained  him  not  unkindly.      Perseus  was  ^p^^^^. 
kept  for  the  present   in  easy  captivity  at  Amphipolis,  until  in  the  polis. 
following   year  he  was   taken  with  his   children,  and   the   children 
of  Cotys,  to  adorn   the   triumph  of  Aemilius   at   Rome.       On   the 
intervention  of  his  conqueror  he  was,  however,  freed  from   prison.  End  of 
and   with  his   sons   allowed  to    live    in    a    private    station   at  Alba  Perseus. 
Fucentia.      But  his  wealth,    which  he   had  so  carefully  husbanded, 
was  all  gone,  and  his  second  son  is  said  to  have  been  apprenticed 
to  the  trade  of  a  worker  in  bronze. 

This  was  the  end  of  a  kingdom  which  had  given  Philip  H.  Effects  of 
and  Alexander  the  Great  to  history.  It  was  to  be  the  end  of  ^^^  battle 
Macedonian   national   identity  also.      But   the  victory  of  Pydna  had  "^    ■^„  "'^ 

o?t  OtflCf 

still  wider  consequences  affecting  not  only  Greece  and  the   Islands,  states. 
but  Asia  and   Egypt  also.      The  various   states  hastened   to   send 
envoys  to  the  consul's  camp,  or  to  Rome,  to  offer  congratulations  and 
make  their  court ;  and  those  who  were  conscious  of  secret  wishes 
for  the    success   of   Perseus,  or  of  overt    acts  in  his  favour,  were 
forwardest  of  all.      Legates  from  Rhodes  were  already  at  Rome  to   The 
offer  their  services  in  effecting  a  reconciliation  with  Perseus.     They  Rhodians. 
at  once  substituted  a  fulsome  compliment  and  congratulation  ;   but 
were  plainly  told  that  the  Senate  fully  understood  that  their  object  Eumenes. 
had   been   to  save  Perseus,  and  would  know  how  to  requite   their 
hostility.      King  Eumenes,  conscious  of  his  secret  intrigues,  sent  his 
brother  Attalus  to  Rome  with  congratulations,  and  later  on  arrived 
himself  in  Italy.      Prusias  of  Bithynia,  with  his  son  Nicomedes,  came  Prusias. 
begging  to  be  allowed  to  sacrifice  on   the  Capitol  in  honour  of  the 
victory,  having  previously  mollified  the  commissioners  sent  to  his 
kingdom  by  the  most  abject  humiliation,  appearing  in  the  dress  and 
cap  of  a  manumitted  slave,  as  though  a  freedman  of  Rome.      His    Visit  of 
humility  gained  its  object,  and  afforded  the  Senate  the  means  of  in-  ^^m^nes 
flicting  a  marked  slight  on  Eumenes.     For  when,  next  year,  the  latter  ^^J'"'^  ' 
arrived  in  Italy,  a  decree  was  at  once  passed,  forbidding  the  visits  of 
kings  to  Rome  in  person.      A  quaestor  met  Eumenes  at  Brundisium, 
and   communicating   to   him    the   order    of  the   Senate,   asked   him 
whether  he  wanted  anything.      Quite  aware  of  the  meaning  of  this 


512 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


rebuff,  Eumenes  answered  shortly  that  he  wanted  nothing,  and 
returned  to  his  own  dominions.  Rome,  in  fact,  was  crowded  with 
emissaries  from  every  direction  ;  and  whether  it  wished  it  or  no,  the 
Senate  found  itself  compelled  to  act  as  arbitrator  in  a  hundred 
disputes,  and  to  have  a  distinct  foreign  policy.  The  idea  of 
establishing  provinces,  in  the  technical  sense,  to  the  east  of  the 
Adriatic,  was  not  yet  definitely  recognised.  The  poHcy  adopted  was 
rather  that  of  leaving  all  states  internal  freedom,  but  so  isolating 
and  weakening  them,  that  all  alike  would  be  practically  in  the  power 
of  Rome ;  while  the  domain  lands  of  the  sovereign  princes  or 
towns  became  the  property  of  the  Roman  people.  Tribute  or  tax 
paid  before  to  native  princes  or  central  governments  was  now  to  go, 
though  generally  on  a  reduced  scale,  to  the  Roman  exchequer  in 
return  for  the  military  protection  which  the  Republic  undertook.  Thus 
the  Illyrians  were  to  be  "free,"  their  cities  and  strongholds  were 
not  to  iDe  garrisoned  by  Roman  soldiers,  nor  were  Roman  magistrates 
to  administer  justice  ;  yet,  with  the  exception  of  certain  towns  which 
had  been  eminently  loyal,  they  were  to  pay  a  vectigal  to  Rome  of 
half  the  amount  formerly  paid  to  their  kings  ;  and  they  lost  the 
right  of  military  organisation,  or  national  combination. 

A  still  more  illusory  "  freedom  "  was  given  to  the  Macedonians. 
The  whole  country  was  to  be  divided  into  four  regions,  with  the 
capital  cities  of  Amphipolis,  Thessalonica,  Pella,  Pelagonia.  Be- 
tween these  regions  there  were  to  be  no  rights  of  intermarriage  or 
ownership  of  land  and  houses  ;  and  each  was  to  have  its  own 
council  and  magistrates.  Only  in  those  parts  which  bordered  on 
warlike  barbarians  were  armed  garrisons  to  be  permitted,  and 
certain  regulations  were  to  be  observed  through  all  the  districts 
alike.i  No  timber  was  to  be  cut  or  sold  for  shipbuilding ;  the 
working  of  gold  and  silver  mines  was  prohibited,  on  the  ground  that 
they  would  require  a  service  of  Roman  publicani^  though  the  iron 
and  copper  mines  were  still  kept  open,  paying  to  the  Roman  exchequer 
half  the  royalty  which  they  had  paid  to  the  king.  The  salt  industry 
was  protected  by  a  prohibition  of  the  use  of  imported  salt,  but  at  the 
same  time  restricted  by  its  exportation  being  confined  to  the  Dardani, 
who  were  allowed  to  buy  it  at  Stobi,  as  the  staple  town.  A  hundred 
talents,  half  the  amount  payable  to  the  king,  was  to  be  returned  yearly 
to  the  Roman  exchequer.  The  Macedonians  quite  understood  that 
they  were   reduced  to  political  nullity  :   but   they  had  feared  some- 


1  There  was  certainly  to  be  no  central  government,  yet  Livy  (xlv.  32)  seems 
to  imply  that  a  council  of  synedrl  was  chosen  for  business  affecting  the  whole 
country,  perhaps  chiefly  to  arrange  for  the  incidence  of  the  tax  due  to  Rome, 
At  any  rate,  they  would  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  internal  administration  of 
the  regions  or  any  truly  national  functions. 


XXXI  SPOLIATION  OF  MACEDONIA  AND  EPIRUS  513 

thing  still  worse,  and  the  order  which  compelled  the  removal  to  168. 
Italy  of  all  the  late  king's  courtiers,  military  and  naval  commanders, 
and  officials  of  every  description,  may  have  been  felt  as  a  relief  at 
first ;  while  the  reduction  of  the  royal  tax  by  one-half  seemed  a 
boon,  even  if,  as  has  been  thought,  the  extra  expense  of  a  quadruple 
administration  was  afterwards  found  to  nullify  it.  Moreover,  the 
laws  now  drawn  up  by  Paulus,  in  conjunction  with  the  ten  com- 
missioners, who  had  brought  the  Settatus  Co7tsultui7i  containing 
the  general  principles  of  this  arrangement,  proved  to  have 
some  permanent  advantages.  Yet  Macedonia  was  not  only  left 
politically  impotent,  but  stripped  of  the  accumulated  treasures  and 
wealth  of  centuries.  The  crowd  which  came  from  Greece  and  spoils  of 
Asia  to  attend  the  games  held  by  Aemilius  at  Amphipolis  were  Mace- 
treated  to  a  sight  of  the  spoil  of  Macedonian  cities,  now  ready  for  donia. 
transport  to  Rome.  Pictures,  statues,  gold  and  silver  plate, 
furniture  adorned  with  ivory,  and  all  the  richest  product  of 
Macedonian  looms,  were  spread  out  for  the  inspection  of  the  curious, 
before  being  shipped  in  readiness  for  the  proconsul's  triumph.  To 
crown  all,  a  huge  pile  of  arms  of  the  conquered  army  was  fired  by 
the  proconsul's  own  hand.  Macedonia  was  not  only  to  be  robbed, 
but  to  be  made  a  show  and  a  warning  to  the  world. 

Still     greater    severity    was    exercised    in     Epirus,     of    which  Epirus, 
Aemilius  was  made  the  instrument.     The  rising  in  favour  of  Perseus,  J68-167. 
into  which  Cephalus  had  been  goaded^  was  to  be  sternly  punished  ; 
and  the  Senate  briefly  ordered  that  the  spoil  of  the  cities  of  Epirus 
should  be  given  to  the  soldiers,  who  had  been  greatly  discontented 
with    their    share    of    Macedonian     plunder.       Accordingly,    when 
Aemilius,  on  his  way  home,  arrived  at  Passaron  on  the  coast,  he  sent 
for  ten  leading  men  from  each  of  the  seventy  cities,  chiefly  of  the  Seventy 
Molossi,  and   ordered  them   to   collect   the  gold  and  silver  of  their  ^^^^^^  ^"- 

several  towns  into  some  public  place,  a  detachment  of  soldiers  being  ^^^J^j^<^i 
1  1-111  ■,  ■,  ,  ,.?   (ifid  their 

sent  to  each  to  see  that  the  work  was  done  thoroughly  and  simul-  inhabi- 

taneously.      The   unhappy   people  believed   that,  if  this  were   done  tants  sold. 

properly,  they  would  be  spared.     They  were  bitterly  mistaken.     The 

towns  were  given  up  to  pillage,  the  walls  thrown  down,  and  150,000 

persons   sold   into   slavery.     The   blame  for  this  abomination  rests 

almost  wholly  with  the    Senate,   though  Aemilius'    share  in  it  can 

hardly  be  altogether  excused. 

But  it  was  not  only  in  Illyricum,  Epirus,  and  Macedonia  that  the  Rhodes. 

Roman  ascendency  was  now  asserted.     The  hand  of  the  victorious 

Republic  fell  heavily  on  all  who  had  assisted  Perseus  or  maintained 

what   was   regarded  as  a  malevolent    neutrality.       For  nearly  two 

centuries    friendly    intercourse,    without    formal    treaty,    had    been 

maintained   with  Rhodes.      The   islanders   now  tried   to   avert   the 

2  L 


514  HISTORY  OF  ROME 


i6S-z6j.  consequences  of  their  doubtful  policy  during  the  war  by  applying  for 
an  alliance.  But  the  Senate  had  resolved  on  punishing  Rhodes  by 
destroying  the  naval  supremacy  she  had  so  long  exercised  in  the 
Aegean.  She  was  ordered  to  withdraw  her  garrisons  from  the 
Peraea, — the  district  of  Caria  and  Lycia  which  had  been  already 
declared  free ;   and  a  severe  blow  was   struck  at  her  commercial 

Delos  a         prosperity    by   handing    over    Delos    to    Athens   and    declaring    its 

free  port.  harbour  a  free  port.  This  at  once  diverted  much  of  the  traffic  of 
the  Levant  from  Rhodes  to  the  old  Island  route,  in  which  Delos  was  a 
convenient  place  of  call,  and  in  a  single  year  diminished  the  harbour 
dues  at  Rhodes  by  a  sixth.  ^  The  Rhodians  were  finally  admitted 
to  alliance,  but  nothing  was  done  to  restore  their  crippled  commerce. 
Nor  were  the  Romans  content  with  the  slight  already  put  upon 

Eumefies.  Eumenes.  His  brother  Attalus  was  ostentatiously  patronised,  and 
king  Prusias  encouraged  to  lay  every  kind  of  information  against 
his  old  enemy  and  rival.  The  commission  sent  under  C.  Sulpicius 
Gallus  to  Asia  even  posted  up  notices  inviting  complaints  against 
him,  which  brought  a  host  of  angry  informers  to  their  court  at 
Sardis  ;  while  the  hostility  of  the  Asiatic  Gauls,  who  had  invaded 
his  territories,  was  openly  or  covertly  encouraged. 

Greece.  Every  part  of  Greece  was  to  be  subjected  to  the  same  inquisition  of 

the  Macedonian  commissioners.  There  was  no  idea  as  yet,  any  more 
than  in  Macedonia,  of  introducing  a  provincial  administration  ;  but 
it  was  to  be  shown  clearly  that  Rome  would  not  tolerate  any  state 
or  party  hostile  to  herself.  The  three  rebellious  cities  in  Boeotia 
had  long  ago  suffered  for  their  mistake,  and  no  farther  severity  was 
exercised  there  beyond  the  execution  of  Neon  of  Thebes.  But  in  all 
parts  of  Greece  the  same  decree  was  enforced, — conspicuous  members 
of  the  Macedonising  party  were  to  go  to  Italy  and  stand  their  trial. 

Deporta-       There  was  little  difficulty  in  selecting  them.      In  every  city  traitors 

Hon  of         were  eager  to  curry  favour  by  denouncing  their  political  opponents. 

^afr^.f^^  ^^  Aetolia  had  lately  been  the  scene  of  civil  violence  and  bloodshed  ; 
yet  the  advisers  of  the  commissioners  were  Lyciscus  and  Tisippus, 
themselves  the  authors  of  the  massacre.  In  Epirus  Charops  had 
become  infamous  for  every  vice ;  yet  he  was  one  of  the  two  who 
advised  the  commissioners  as  to  that  country,  with  what  result  we 
have  seen.  The  decision  was  the  same  in  every  case.  No  other 
circumstance  was  taken  into  account ;  the  one  question  was  as  to 
fidelity  to  Rome.  The  persons  denounced  by  the  several  informers 
were  to  go  to  Italy  with  their  families, — that  was  the  simple  and 
uniform  order  enforced  in  Aetolia,  Acarnania,  and  Boeotia. 

^  This  is  the  statement  of  Polybius  (xxxi.  7,  25),  if  we  read  atprip-qKare  for 
evp^Kare.  If  the  latter  stands  the  sentence  means,  if  it  means  anything,  that  the 
harbour  dues  had  been  reduced  to  a  sixth,  which  seems  incredible. 


lialy. 


XXXI  ANTIOCHUS  IV.  WARNED  OUT  OF  EGYPT  515 

In  Achaia,  where  possible  resistance  was  feared,  rather  more  care  The 
was   taken.      No    documents    impHcating    the    Achaeans    had    been  Achaean 
found  in  the  Macedonian  archives,  and  AemiHus  was  inchned  there-  ^^Jf^'^' 
fore  not  to  act  on  the  partizan   representations  of  the  Romanising 
CaUicrates.      But  he  was  overruled,  and  two  of  the  commissioners, 
C.  Claudius   and  Cn.  Domitius,   were   sent  to   Peloponnese.      In  an 
assembly  of  the  League  they  declared  that  certain  leading  men  had 
helped  Perseus,  and  demanded  that  the  assembly  should  proceed  to 
pass  sentence  of  death  against  them  :  when  the  vote  was  carried 
they  would  reveal   the  names.     The   assembly  refused  to   commit 
such  a  flagrant  injustice  ;  whereupon  the  commissioners  named  all  The 
who  had  borne  office  during  the  war.      One  of  these,  named  Xeno,  Achaeans 
asserted  his  innocence,  and  offered  to  stand  his  trial  either  in  Greece  ^^^J  ^^ 
or  Italy;    and   eventually  a  list    of   about   a  thousand  was   drawn      ^^' 
up,  on  the  information  of  CaUicrates,  all  of  whom  were  ordered  to 
proceed    to    Italy.       They    were    distributed    among    the    cities    of 
Etruria  ;  and  when  no  sign  of  the  promised  trial  was  given,  frequent 
embassies  were  sent  to  Rome,  begging  that  they  might  return  or 
have  a  chance  of  establishing  their  innocence.      But  the  senators, 
after  several    ambiguous   replies,  at   length   settled  the  question  by 
saying  briefly  that  they  considered  it  undesirable  that  they  should 
return.       Among  them  was  the  historian    Polybius,    who   used  his 
credit  among  the  nobility  at  Rome  in  their  behalf.      But  sixteen  years 
had  passed  before  the  poor  remains  of  these  detenus^  amounting  to 
about  300,  were  contemptuously  granted  leave  to  return. 

Throughout  Greece  there  was  henceforward  no  state  which  could  Antiochus 
venture  to  resist  an  order  from  Rome.  How  completely  the  same  Epi^ianes 
ascendency  was  established  outside  Greece  also  is  strikingly  ^'^^.f^^' 
illustrated  by  the  scene  between  Antiochus  and  the  Roman  envoy  in 
Egypt.  The  connexion  between  Rome  and  Egypt  had  been  growing 
ever  closer  since  the  early  days  of  the  Hannibalian  war.  The 
Egyptian  sovereign  had  become  used  to  look  for  Roman  protection, 
and  for  some  time,  at  the  beginning  of  the  last  war,  a  Roman 
commissioner  had  remained  at  Alexandria.  Farther  help  was  now 
needed.  Ptolemy  V.  died  in  181  and  left  two  sons,  Philometor 
and  Physcon,  by  Cleopatra,  sister  of  Antiochus  the  Great.  Philo- 
metor succeeded  his  father  and  engaged  in  a  war  with  his  cousin 
Antiochus  Epiphanes  1  for  the  recovery  of  Coele-Syria,  alleged  to 
have  been  assigned  as  the  dower  of  Cleopatra.  Antiochus  in- 
vaded Egypt,  defeated  Philometor,  took  him  prisoner  at  Pelusium, 
and  advanced  to  Memphis.  Whereupon  the  other  Ptolemy — Physcon 
— assumed  the  diadem  at  Alexandria,  calling  himself  Euergetes  II. 
But  Antiochus  adopted  the  cause  of  his  prisoner  Philometor, 
1  Antiochus  IV.,  son  of  Antiochus  the  Great  (175-164). 


5i6 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP.   XXXI 


C. 

Popilius 

Laenas 

meets 

Antiochus 

IV.  at 

Pelusium, 

i68. 


The  Jews, 
162. 


established  him  as  king  at  Memphis,  and  proceeded  to  besiege 
Physcon  in  Alexandria.  He  refused  to  listen  to  remonstrances  from 
Rhodes  and  other  Greek  states  ;  but  on  orders  coming  from  Rome, 
broke  up  the  siege,  and  consented  to  take  a  sum  of  money  (169). 
The  two  Ptolemies  then  made  terms  with  each  other,  and  with  their 
sister  Cleopatra  were  reigning  jointly  in  Alexandria.  But  Antiochus, 
seeing  that  his  policy  of  weakening  and  dividing  Egypt,  and  thereby 
securing  Coele-Syria,  was  defeated,  took  advantage  of  the  Romans 
being  engaged  in  the  Macedonian  war  to  invade  Egypt  once  more. 
Appeals  were  promptly  sent  to  Rome  by  the  Ptolemies,  and  in  168 
C.  Popilius  Laenas  was  despatched  to  Egypt.  He  found  Antiochus 
four  miles  from  Alexandria  :  and  when  the  king  advanced  to  meet 
him,  with  outstretched  hand,  he  ignored  the  greeting,  and  only  held 
out  the  tablet  containing  the  Senate's  decree  forbidding  him  to 
attack  Egypt.  Antiochus  read  the  tablet  and  answered  that  he 
must  consult  his  council.  Popilius  thereupon  drew  a  circle  in  the 
dust  round  the  king  with  a  vine  staff  which  he  carried  in  his  hand, 
and  bade  him  give  his  answer  before  he  stepped  out  of  it.  The 
haughty  assurance  of  the  Roman,  supported  by  the  news  of  Pydna, 
already  received,  overpowered  the  king's  courage  or  pride.  He 
signified  that  he  was  ready  to  obey  the  Senate,  and  was  then  greeted 
politely  by  Popilius  and  allowed  to  arrange  the  day  for  the  with- 
drawal of  his  troops  into  Syria.  Six  years  later,  when  the  Jews 
had  again  suffered  from  the  cruelty  of  Epiphanes,  and  feared  the 
same  under  Demetrius,  the  patriotic  Judas  Maccabaeus  looked  to  an 
alliance  with  the  Roman  Republic  (162)  as  the  best  security  for  his 
country.  Thus  free  states  and  sovereigns  had  alike  become  the 
clients  of  the  city  of  the  Tiber. 


Authorities. — Livy,  xxviii.  42-xlv.  Polybius,  xxii.  8,  9,  15-18  ;  xxiii,  1-4, 
7-11,  14;  xxiv.  I,  3,  4;  xxvii.  1-18  ;  xxviii. -xxx.  Plutarch,  Philopoemen, 
Aetnilius  Paulus.  Appian,  Macedonicae,  Syriacae  (45),  Illyricae.  Diodorus, 
fr.  of  xxix. -xxxi.  Eutropius,  iv.  2-4.  Justin,  xxxii.  2-33.  Florus,  ii.  12-14.  Zonaras, 
ix.  21-23.  Orosius,  iv.  20.  Valerius  Maximus,  ii.  i,  2,  7,  14  ;  iii.  3,  2.  For 
the  Jewish  alliance,  Joseph,   Ant.  xii.  10  ;   i  Maccab.  viii. 


I 


CENSUS 

i67 

B.C.  173 

.   269,015 

146 

B.C.  164 

327,022 

146 

B.C.  159 

. 

•   328,314 

146 

B.C.  154 

324,000 

CHAPTER   XXXII 

MACEDONIA,  GREECE,  AND  CARTHAGE,  1 6  8- 1 46 

PROVINCES 
\Illyricum  ^] . 
Macedonia    . 
Africa  .... 
\_Achaia  ^]     . 

COLONY 

Auximum  in  Picenum     .         .      157 

Suspension  of  the  tributum,  growing  luxury  and  consequent  cases  of  peculation 
and  embezzlement — Laws,  Calpurnia  de  repetundis  (149) — Sumptuary :  Orchia 
(182),  Fannia  (161),  Didia  (143) — Greek  literature  and  teachers — Writers 
imitating  Greek  literature — Terence,  Pacuvius,  Statius  Caecilius — Cato's 
opposition — Expulsion  of  Greek  rhetors  (161) — Visit  of  the  philosophers  {155) 
— Demolition  of  stone  theatre  (151) — The  Bacchanalia  (186) — I^aws  against 
bribery,  Aemilia  Baebia  (182),  Cornelia  Ftilvia  (159) — Ballot  laws,  Gabinia 
(139),  Cassia  (137) — MACEDONIA  between  167-146,  the  discontents  arising 
from  the  Roman  settlement  :  war  with  the  pseudo-Philippus,  and  formation 
of  the  province  (148-146) — Destruction  of  Corinth  and  settlement  of  Greece 
(146) — Carthage,  the  Roman  policy  in  favouring  Masannasa — Immediate 
causes  of  the  third  Punic  war — Consuls  land  at  Utica  (149) — Inefficient 
conduct  of  the  war  (149-148) — Rising  reputation  of  Scipio  the  younger 
Africanus  (147) — Destruction  of  Carthage — The  province  of  Africa  (146). 

The  victories  of  the  last  half-century  seemed  to  promise  ease  and  Effects  of 
wealth  to  Rome.  She  was  to  live  on  the  spoils  and  revenue  from  t^^  ^^^-^ 
the  conquered  countries.  Not  only  did  they  pay  a  fixed  tax  to  her 
exchequer,  but  the  rich  lands  of  Capua,  the  royal  domain  lands  of 
the  kings  of  Syracuse  and  of  Macedonia,  became  public  property, 
and  produced  a  large  annual  rent.  It  was  found  possible  in  167  to 
relieve  citizens  from  the  property  tax  or  tributum^  which  was  not 
collected  again  until  the  year  after  the  death  of  lulius  Caesar.  But 
the  sudden  influx  of  wealth  had  the  usual  effect  of  raising  the 
standard  of  expense  ;  and  new  tastes  and  desires  required  increased 
means  for  their  gratification.     All  manner  of  luxuries  were  finding 

1  No  yearly  governor  was  yet  appointed  to  these,  and  though  practically 
Roman  provinces,  they  were  not  completely  so  in  form. 


on  Rome. 


5i8 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


186-146. 


Lex 

Calpurnia 

de 

repetundis, 

149- 


Leges 

su7nptji- 

ariae. 


Greek 
teachers 
and 
literature 


their  way  into  the  city  from  the  East.  Splendid  furniture,  costly 
ornaments,  wanton  dances  and  music  for  their  banquets,  became  the 
fashion  among  the  Roman  nobles  ;  and  the  younger  men  went  to 
lengths  of  debauchery  and  extravagance  hitherto  unknown.^  The 
result  to  many  was  financial  embarrassment,  from  which  relief  was 
sought  in  malversation  and  extortion.  The  old  standard  of  honour 
in  regard  to  public  money  was  distinctly  lowered,^  and  cases  of 
misconduct  and  oppression  were  becoming  more  common  and  less 
reprobated.  All  were  in  haste  to  get  rich,  and  the  opportunities 
afforded  by  service  amidst  conquered  or  weak  peoples  was  too 
tempting  to  be  resisted.  A  commander  who  opposed  this  passion 
did  so  at  his  peril,  and  the  triumph  of  Aemilius  Paulus  in  167  was 
opposed  at  the  instigation  of  some  of  his  own  officers,  because  he  had 
insisted  on  paying  the  greater  part  of  the  Macedonian  spoil  into  the 
treasury.  The  fashionable  taste  for  Greek  works  of  art,  in  the  adorn- 
ment of  private  houses,  was  another  incentive  to  plunder,  and  in  149 
it  was  for  the  first  time  found  necessary  to  establish  a  permanent 
court  or  quaestio  for  cases  of  malversation  in  the  provinces. 

Attempts  were  indeed  made  to  restrain  the  extravagance  which 
was  at  the  root  of  the  evil.  In  184  Cato,  as  censor,  had  imposed  a 
tax  on  the  sale  of  slaves  under  twenty  above  a  certain  price,  and  on 
personal  ornaments  above  a  certain  value  ;  and  though  the  lex  Oppia^ 
limiting  the  amount  of  women's  jewelry,  had  been  repealed  in  spite 
of  him  in  195,  other  sumptuary  laws  were  passed.  A  lex  Orchia  in 
182  limited  the  number  of  guests,  a  lex  Fannia  in  161  the  amount 
to  be  spent  on  banquets;  while  a  lex  Didia  in  143  extended  the 
operation  of  the  law  to  all  Italy.  And  though  such  laws,  even  if 
enforced,  could  not  really  remedy  the  evil,  they  perhaps  had  a  certain 
effect  in  producing  a  sentiment ;  for  long  afterwards  we  find  over- 
crowded dinners  regarded  as  indecorous  and  vulgar.^ 

Another  cause,  believed  by  some  to  be  unfavourably  affecting 
Roman  character,  was  the  growing  influence  of  Greek  culture  and 
Greek  teachers.  For  many  years  the  education  of  the  young, 
once  regarded  as  the  special  business  of  the  parents,  had  been 
passing  into  the  hands  of  Greek  slaves  or  freedmen.  The 
children  of  Livius  Salinator  (consul  in  219)  had  been  instructed 
by  the  Tarentine  Andronicus,  who  had  many  other  pupils.  The 
Athenian  Metrodorus  was  the  resident  tutor  of  the  sons  of  Aemilius 
Paulus ;  and  the  schools  for  boys  of  a  less  exalted  rank  seem 
usually  to  have  been   kept   by   Greeks.      The  laws  of  the  Twelve 

^  Livy,  xxxix.  6;    Polyb.  xxxii.  11.  '^  Polyb.  vi.  56;   xviii.  35. 

^  Cicero,  in  Pis.  §  67.  Thus  the  statute  imposing  a  fine  for  non-attendance 
at  church,  though  long  fallen  into  desuetude,  has  perhaps  helped  to  attach  the 
idea  of  respectability  to  a  custom. 


XXXII  CATO'S  OPPOSITION  TO  GREEK  CULTURE  519 

Tables  are  said  to  have  been  used  as  an  elementary  reading  book,  186-146. 

yet  all  who  went  beyond  such  elements  seem  to  have  learnt  Greek, 

which  was  more  commonly  spoken  by  the  upper  classes  than  French 

among  ourselves.      Most  of  the  legates  employed  abroad  seem  to 

have  been  able  to  speak  it ;    and  though  the  Tarentines  laughed  at 

the    pronunciation   of   the    Romans    (282),    yet    they   were   at   least 

able  to  make  themselves  understood.      On  the  superiority  of  Greek  patron- 

culture   there  was   a   division  of  opinion.       The  Scipios   and   their  isedby 

party  patronised  Greek  philosophy  and  literature.      Their  friend  and  ^(^^P^o  and 

protege  Terence  (193-168)  only  continued,  indeed,  the  work  of  his  f  4^^^^ 

predecessors  in  translating  Greek  comedies  ;  but  his  translations  were 

more  exclusively  Greek  in  spirit  than  the  adaptations  of  Plautus  ;  and 

his  example  was  followed  by  Statins  Caecilius,  who  died  about  169, 

at  any  rate   in   his  later  work ;    while    M.   Pacuvius,   a  nephew   of 

Ennius,  seems  to  have  dealt  almost  exclusively  with  Greek  tragedy. 

This  tendency,  which  went  far  beyond  a  mere  question  of  literary  opposed  by 
taste,   was  opposed  by  a  party  of  which  M.    Porcius  Cato  was   the  the  conser- 
most  striking  member.     Born  about  sixteen  years  before  the  beginning  '^^^^'"^ 
of  the  second  Punic  war,  he  Hved  to  see  the  commencement  of  the  '^^^ 
third.      His  public  career  had  been  honourable.     As  praetor  in  Sar- 
dinia (199),  as  consul  in  Spain  (195),  he  had  shown  inflexible  honesty, 
strict  justice,  and  personal  frugality.      As  censor  (184)  he  had  made 
his  name  a  synonym  for  severity.      The  influence  of  his  really  great  Character 
virtues  was  marred,  not  only  by  the  caustic  bitterness  of  his  speech,  and  views 
but  also  by  a  certain  hardness  and   inhumanity,  and  a  more  than  9f  ^<^to, 
Roman  contempt  for  the  provincials,  whom  he  would  nevertheless 
protect  from  injustice.      He  regarded  his   slaves  as  mere  chattels, 
treated  them  with  cold  severity,  and  sold  them  when  they  were  aged 
or  infirm,  to  avoid  the  expense  of  their  maintenance.       His  social 
views  also  were  deeply  tinged  by  political  prejudice  against  Scipio 
and  his  party,  to  whom  he  had  been  in  violent  opposition  ever  since 
serving  under  him   as   quaestor  in    Sicily  (205) ;    and  in  spite  of 
undoubted  integrity  he  made  his  virtue  so  offensive  that  he  is  said  to 
have  been  a  defendant  in  fifty  lawsuits.      In  Cato's  view  the  reform 
needed  was  a  return  to  the  old  ways,  before  Rome  was  infected  by 
Greece.     The  best  life  was  that  of  the  old  citizen-farmer,  who  left 
the  plough  for  office  or  service  in  the  army,  and  returned  to  it  when 
his  duty  was  done.      Slaves  were  to  be  kept  for  working  on  the  farm, 
not  for  personal  luxury.      Children  should  not  be  entrusted  to  them, 
but   should  be  taught  by  their  parents,  and  not   Greek  but   Latin. 
Religion  was  to  be  the  worship  of  the  Lares,  conducted  by  the  head 
of  the  family  according  to  the  old  Latin  rites.      If  men  would  write, 
they  should  write  in  Latin,  and  on  the  history  of  their  own  country. 
He  hated  to  see  the  young  Roman  dandies  lounging  in  the  Forum, 


520 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


or  loitering  in  the  rhetorician's  lecture-room,  when  they  should  have 
been  looking  after  their  farms,  doing  civil  business,  or  training  them- 
selves on  the  Campus.  He  wished  the  Forum  had  been  paved  with 
sharp  cobbles  for  their  benefit.  He  set  an  example  in  these  points 
himself:  took  the  minimum  number  of  slaves  possible  with  him 
to  his  provinces  ;  diligently  superintended  his  farm,  and  was  seen 
riding  into  town  in  shabby  clothes  and  bringing  his  country  pro- 
duce for  sale.  He  wrote  a  history  from  which  to  teach  his  son 
reading  ;  composed  a  treatise  on  farming,  and  a  chronicle  of  Rome 
from  the  earliest  times ;  cultivated  eloquence  only  for  practical 
purposes,  and  long  refused  to  study  the  literature  of  Greece  at 
all.  But  he  could  not  stem  the  current  any  more  than  he  could 
make  himself  rich  with  his  old-world  notions  of  economics.  The 
influence  of  his  party  may  be  traced  perhaps  in  the  senatorial  decree 
of  1 6 1  against  the  Greek  rhetors,  and  in  the  sumptuary  laws,  as  well  as 
that  of  I  5  I  for  the  demolition  of  the  stone  theatre  begun  by  the  cen- 
sors ;  and  four  years  earlier  he  had  successfully  urged  that  the  philo- 
sophers who  had  come  on  a  mission  from  Athens,  should  receive  their 
answer  promptly  and  be  dismissed,  when  he  saw  Roman  youths 
crowding  to  hear  them  lecture.  Still  all  that  he  most  disliked 
was  daily  becoming  more  universal.  Greek  doctors,  Greek  school- 
masters and  pedagogues — half  tutor  and  half  servant — multiplied. 
There  was  a  great  influx  of  them  after  the  fall  of  Macedonia ;  ^  and 
the  decree  of  the  Senate  against  Greek  rhetors  seems  to  have  failed 
in  its  object,  for  they  became  well  established  ;  and  in  92  it  was  the 
Latin  rhetors,  who  set  up  in  opposition  to  them,  that  were  silenced.^ 
Not  more  successful  was  the  conservative  party  in  maintaining 
the  ancient  religion.  New  objects  of  worship  were  readily  admitted 
in  Rome.  The  cult  of  Cybele  or  the  Magna  Mater,  introduced  in  204, 
when  Scipio  Nasica  had  been  selected  as  the  "  best  man  "  to  receive 
the  sacred  image  from  Pessinus,  had  become  quickly  popular,  and 
had  been  incorporated  without  difficulty  in  the  state  religion.  But 
the  Hellenisation  of  that  religion  was  becoming  complete.  The  fact 
of  the  earliest  Roman  literature  being  based  on  Greek  had  helped  to 
identify  Greek  and  Latin  divinities,  and  to  assign  the  legends  belong- 
ing to  the  one  to  the  other.  Now  Greek  philosophy  was  introducing 
an  easy  scepticism  as  to  all  alike  ;  and  in  the  place  of  an  ordered  and 
decorous  national  worship,  many  were  seeking  the  excitement  of 
secret  and  mystic  rites,  subversive,  it  was  believed,  of  morals  and 
loyalty  alike.  In  186  great  scandal  was  caused  by  the  discovery  that 
nightly  orgies  were  being  held  in  Rome  and  Italy.  The  young  of 
both  sexes  were  initiated  in  these  Bacchanalia,  which  were  said  to  be 
at  once  obscene  and  treasonable.      Information  reached  the  consul 


Polyb.  xxxii.  10  ;   Pliny,  N.  H.  19,  §  24. 


-  Gellius  XV.  I J 


XXXII  LAWS  AGAINST  AMBITUS  521 

Postumius  through  a  certain  freedwoman  named  Hispala,  whose  lover 

Aebutius  was  about  to  be   initiated.      The   consul  laid  the  matter  Senatus 

before  the  Senate,  and  the  immorality  of  the  initiations,  as  well  as  the  Consultum 

seditious  nature  of  the  assembhes,  was  regarded  as  estabhshed.    More   „     /. 
1  ,  .,,.,.,  ,10  Bacchan- 

than  7000  men  and  women  were  said  to  be  implicated;  and  the  Senate  alibus, 

issued  a  stringent  decree  forbidding  the  Bacchanalia,  or  the  assembly  186. 
of  more  than  five  persons  for  any  secret  rites.  1    The  ringleaders  were 
arrested,  and  for  the  most  part  anticipated  their  fate  by  suicide.      It 
was  the  same  idea,  identifying  novelty  in  religion  with  political  inno- 
vation, which  in  1 8 1  caused  the  order  for  the  destruction  of  the  rolls 
found  in  a  stone   coffin   in   the  Janiculum,  and    said  to  contain  com-  Expulsion 
mentaries  of  king  Numa  and  certain  Pythagorean  writings, — a  fraud  of 
which,  rightly  or  wrongly,  was  regarded  as  an  attempt  to  introduce  ^^^^^logers 
novel  doctrines  dangerous   to   the  State.     These  measures  did  not,  -jj^orship- 
however,  repress  the  tendency.      Soothsayers  and  astrologers  found  pers  of 
their  way  into  Rome,  as  well  as  the  votaries   of  the  mystic  rites  of  Sabazius. 
Sabazius,  both  of  whom  were  expelled  in  137.^ 

This  restless  yearning  for  excitement,  and  this  hunger  for  wealth 
to  satisfy  new  cravings,  were  dangerous  symptoms  in   those  whose 
task  it  was  to  be  to   govern   other  nations.     The  money  value  of 
office,  from    the   opportunities   which  it  gave  abroad,  is  shown  by 
what  candidates  were  willing  to  pay  for  it ;  and  it  is  now  that  the  Laws 
series  of  laws  against  bribery  began  to  be  passed,  which,  with  ever-  ^g^^^^^ 
increasing  severity,  vainly  attempted  to  repress  this  form  of  corrup-    ^^  ^^^' 
tion.      The  lex  ALinilia  Baebia  (182)  forbade  distribution  of  money  Leges 
by  candidates  ;  the  lex  Cornelia  Fulvia  (159)  assigned  exile  as  the  tabellariae. 
punishment  of  the  offence  ;  and  when  neither  had  the  desired  effect.  Lex 
a  remedy  was  sought  in  secret  voting.     The  first  lex  tabellaria  (139)   ^^^^'^^<^' 
established  the  ballot  in   elections;    the   second  (137)  in  all  trials  Lex  Cassia. 
before  the  people  except  for  perdiiellio.      But  all  alike  failed  to  beat 
back  the  rising  tide  of  corruption  to  which  they  bear  witness. 

Meanwhile  events  were  developing  the  power  of  Rome  abroad, —  Greece  and 
in  Macedonia,  Greece,  Asia,  and  Africa  with  rapidity ;  in  Spain  with  M^^^doma. 
slow  and  painful  struggles.  The  settlement  of  Macedonia  by 
Aemilius,  in  some  respects  successful,  could  not  have  seemed  satis- 
factory to  patriotic  Macedonians.  Though  the  annihilation  of 
political  existence  was  accepted  with  apparent  acquiescence,  yet  the 
fourfold  division  of  the  country,  with  its  accompanying  restrictions  of 

^  A  copy  of  the  decree  remains  on  a  bronze  tablet,  found  at  Tiriolo,  in  Brut- 
tium,  in  1640,  and  now  at  Vienna.  See  C.  /.  L.  196,  and  almost  any  collection  of 
Early  Latin.  It  is  in  the  form  of  a  circular  letter  to  the  Italian  towns  ordering  it 
to  be  set  up  in  a  conspicuous  place  within  ten  days  of  its  receipt,  and  is  especially 
interesting  as  showing  how  the  Romans  already  interfered  in  the  internal  affairs  of 
the  Italian  towns,  just  as  in  143  the  sumptuary  laws  were  made  applicable  to 
them,  2  Valerius  Max.  i.  3,  i. 


522 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Macedonia 
becomes  a 
province, 
147-146. 


mutual  intercourse,  must  have  hampered  enterprise  and  depressed 
industry.!  Internal  disputes  and  disorders  broke  out  from  time  to 
time,  and  involved  appeals  to  Rome  and  the  visits  of  Roman  com- 
missions, and  the  expense  of  the  divided  administration  probably- 
more  than  counterbalanced  the  reduction  in  the  tribute.  It  is  not 
surprising,  therefore,  that  the  blessings  of  a  constitution  without  a 
sovereign  did  not  appear  self-evident  to  the  Macedonians,  and  that 
there  were  among  them  some  who  desired  to  regain  a  real  national 
life.  The  opportunity  came  with  the  appearance  of  more  than  one 
pretender.  The  first  was  a  certain  Andriscus,  said  to  be  of  humble 
birth,  who  professed  however  to  be  a  son  of  Perseus.  He  seems 
to  have  first  made  known  his  claims  about  152:  but  finding  no 
immediate  support  in  Macedonia  he  went  to  the  court  of  Demetrius 
of  Syria,  who,  being  anxious  to  conciliate  the  Romans,  arrested  and 
sent  him  to  Rome.  Being  treated  with  contempt,  and  carelessly 
guarded,  he  escaped,  and  gathered  an  army,  mostly  of  Thracians,  on 
the  Strymon  (149).  The  first  impulse  in  Greece  was  to  ridicule  him  ; 
but  before  long  he  had  been  joined  by  many  Macedonians,  had  defeated 
the  Roman  praetor  P.  luventius,  and  was  invading  Thessaly.  From 
Thessaly  he  was  driven  by  Scipio  Nasica,  with  the  help  of  troops  from 
Achaia,  and  in  the  next  year  was  defeated  by  Q.  Caecilius  Metellus, 
who  took  the  title  of  Macedonicus  from  his  victory.  Andriscus  fled 
for  refuge  into  the  dominions  of  a  Thracian  prince,  who  was,  however, 
induced  to  surrender  him,  and  he  adorned  the  triumph  of  Metellus.^ 
Yet  another  pretender  appeared  in  147,  calling  himself  Alexander;  and 
a  third  under  the  name  of  Philip  in  143,  both  claiming  to  be  sons  of 
Perseus,  and  succeeding  for  a  time  in  collecting  a  force  of  runaway  slaves 
and  other  elements  of  disorder,  until  suppressed  by  Roman  troops. 

An  end  was  now  put  to  the  empty  form  of  freedom  enjoyed  by 
Macedonia.  With  the  addition  of  Thessaly  and  parts  of  Epirus  it 
was  formed  into  a  province,  to  which  a  praetor  or  propraetor  was  to 
be  sent  every  year.  The  change  seems  to  have  been  distinctly 
beneficial.  The  abolition  of  the  fourfold  division,  and  the  construction 
of  the  great  military  road  {via  Egnatid)  from  Dyrrhachium  and 
Apollonia  to  Thessalonica,  facilitated  intercourse  and  trade ;  and 
in  spite  of  suffering  periodically  from  the  extortions  of  Roman 
capitalists  or  of  dishonest  magistrates,  the  province  of  Macedonia, 

^  In  158  it  is  said  that  the  working  of  the  mines  was  again  permitted.  This 
must  refer  to  the  gold  and  silver  mines,  for  iron  mines  had  not  been  closed  ;  and 
it  does  not  seem  certain  whether  the  measure  was  one  for  relief  of  distress,  or  a 
sign  of  confidence  in  the  peaceful  state  of  the  country. 

2  Andriscus  is  usually  called  pseudo-Philippus,  as  though  he  pretended  to  be 
Philip,  the  elder  son  of  Perseus,  who  had  died  at  Alba  two  years  after  his  father 
about  162.  But  according  to  others  he  professed  to  be  the  son  of  a  concubine  of 
Perseus,  brought  up  clandestinely  by  a  Cretan  at  Adramyttium  in  Mysia. 


■•{ 


XXXII  DISPUTES  IN  THE  ACHAEAN  LEAGUE  523 

protected  by   the   Roman   forces  against   the  Thracian  barbarians, 
remained  among  the  most  prosperous  and  loyal  in  the  empire.^ 

The  commission  of  Metellus  in   Macedonia  seems  to  have  in-  Greece 
eluded    a    general    superintendence   in   Greece ;    and  when   he  had  and  the 
disposed  of  Andriscus  his  attention  was  directed  there.     The  death  ■^^"-aean 
of  the  unprincipled  leaders,  whom  the  Roman  policy  had  encouraged    "  ^ 
in    various    parts   of  Greece,    had  by   this   time   helped   to   restore 
tranquillity.      But  there  were   elements  of  discord  in  Peloponnesus 
still    working    disastrously.       The    forcible    assignment     of    Sparta  Disputes 
to  the  Achaean  League  in  188  had  proved  as  impolitic  as  it  was  ^'^'^'^ 
unjust,  leading  to  constant  troubles,  which  generally  involved  appeals  ^P^^*^- 
to  Rome.     The  Senate  was  jealous  of  the  League,  as  the  one  power- 
ful  organisation  now   existing   in    Greece,   and   encouraged  appeals 
from  its  members,  in   which  its  decisions  were  for  the  most   part 
unfavourable  to  the  Government.       Among  the  detained  Achaeans, 
who  in  I  5 1  returned  embittered  by  exile  and  inexperienced  in  affairs, 
was  Diaeus.      Being  elected  strategus  for   150-149,  he   seized  the  Policy  of 
opportunity  of  a  dispute  with    Sparta  as  to   certain  boundaries  to  Diaeus, 
involve  the  League  in  war — in  order  to  cover,  it  is  said,  a  personal  ^^^' 
charge  of  corruption  against  himself.     The  Spartans  having  appealed 
to  Rome,  Diaeus  went  there  in   person  to  represent  the  Achaean 
case.     The  answer  of  the  Senate  was  that  Sparta  must  submit  to 
the  award  of  the  Achaean  government  in  all  thiiigs  short  of  life  a7td 
death.      By  omitting  this  last  qualification  he  induced  the  League  to 
declare  war  against  her,  as  having  broken  a  fundamental  law  which  He 
forbade  such  appeals  from  separate  states.      Professing,  however,  to  declares 
be  warring,  not  against  Sparta,  but  against  certain  traitors  in  that  ^^^. 
city,  he  was  at  last  induced  to  name  twenty-four  men  as  guilty.  Sparta, 

They  escaped  to  Rome,  and  being  condemned  to  death  in  their  1^0-148. 
absence,  their  case  became  merged  in  the  larger  question  of  the 
continued  adherence   of   Sparta  to  the  Achaean    League.      Diaeus 
had    either  been   deceived   himself    or  had    deceived    his    country- 
men  as  to  the  intention  of  the  Senate  ;    while  the  Spartan  envoy 
Menalcidas    had    also    assured  his  fellow- citizens    that   the    Senate 
had    decreed    that    Sparta    should    be  free   to   break    off  from  the 
League.      Thus    both    sides   believed    themselves   justified    in    con-  sparta 
tinuing  hostilities.      The  Roman    commission,   sent    to    decide    the  breaks  off 
question    on    the    spot,   did    not    arrive   till    147.       Meanwhile  \}ci^  from  the 
Spartans  had  set  up  their  independence  and  elected  a  strategus  of  ^^^S^^^- 
their  own,  but  had  been  worsted  in  the  field  by  the  Achaeans.      The 
latter  continued  to  push  on  their  advantage  in  spite  of  friendly  warnings 
sent  by  Metellus,   and  were  therefore   in   no  mood  to  listen  to  L. 

^  Macedonia,  fidelis  et  arnica  populo  Romano  provincia  (Cicero,  pro  Font. 
§34). 


524 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Aurelius  Orestes  and  his  fellow-commissioners,  when,  summoning  a 
meeting  of  the  League  magistrates  at  Corinth,  they  announced  that 
Sparta,  Corinth,  Argos,  Orchomenus  in  Arcadia,  and  Heracleia  in 
Phocis,  were  to  be  separated  from  the  League.  Diaeus,  who  was 
again  Achaean  strategus,  summoned  the  congress  to  consider  this. 
But  the  Corinthians  did  not  wait  for  its  decision  ;  they  broke  out 
into  a  riot,  plundered  the  houses  inhabited  by  Spartans,  and  roughly 
handled  Orestes  and  his  colleagues  when  they  tried  to  quell  the 
disturbance.  Orestes  reported  this  incident  in  strong  if  not  exag- 
gerated terms  at  Rome,  and  the  Senate  at  once  sent  a  fresh 
commission,  headed  by  Sext.  lulius  Caesar,  with  full  powers. 

At  a  meeting  of  the  League  congress  at  Aegium,  Caesar, 
touching  lightly  on  the  offence  at  Corinth,  plainly  stated  that  the 
orders  of  the  Senate  as  to  the  towns  mentioned  must  be  obeyed. 
The  alternative  was  war :  and  the  more  prudent  party  in  the  con- 
gress wished  to  obey,  and  to  avail  themselves  of  the  disposition 
of  the  Senate  to  wink  at  the  violence  offered  to  Orestes.  But 
Diaeus,  whose  year  of  office  was  coming  to  an  end,  was  to  be 
succeeded  by  Critolaus,  who  was  at  the  head  of  the  anti- Roman 
party ;  and  these  two  men,  believing  that  the  moderation  of  the 
Romans  arose  from  fear,  owing  to  the  unfinished  wars  in  Africa  and 
Spain,  determined  to  resist.  They  obtained  a  vote  to  defer  a  settle- 
ment until  a  meeting  with  Spartan  legates  at  Tegea  ;  and  when  Caesar 
went  to  Tegea,  Critolaus,  after  keeping  him  waiting  till  the  last 
moment,  again  refused  to  settle  anything  without  a  farther  reference 
to  a  League  congress.  Convinced  of  his  determined  hostility 
Caesar  and  his  colleagues  thereupon  returned  to  Rome,  where  war 
with  the  Achaeans  was  promptly  determined  upon.  Critolaus  spent 
the  winter  (147-146)  in  visiting  the  Peloponnesian  cities,  and  inciting 
them  against  Roman  interference.  By  proclaiming  a  temporary  relief 
of  debtors  he  induced  the  popular  party  in  most  to  follow  his  policy, 
though  the  cities  in  Elis  and  Messenia  were  prevented  by  the  presence 
of  the  Roman  fleet  from  supporting  him.  In  a  meeting  at  Corinth 
during  the  winter  some  legates  sent  by  Metellus  were  again  roughly 
treated ;  and  Critolaus,  accusing  all  opponents  of  treason,  and  hinting 
that  he  had  the  promise  of  foreign  support,  induced  the  Achaeans 
once  more  to  declare  war  against  Sparta  for  separating  herself  from 
the  League.  As  the  Spartans  had  acted  on  Roman  authority,  this 
was  practically  war  against  Rome,  and  as  such  it  was  regarded  there. 
Metellus  was  anxious  to  use  his  general  powers  in  Greece  to 
settle  this  war  before  he  was  superseded  by  the  consul  of  the  year. 
Early  in  146,  therefore,  he  advanced  through  Thessaly  by  the  coast 
road  skirting  the  Malian  gulf  Critolaus  had  meanwhile  collected 
the  League  army  at  Corinth,  and  encouraged  by   the   adhesion   of 


xxxii  FALL  OF  CORINTH  525 

some  Chalcidians   and  Boeotians  —  the  Thebans  particularly  being  146. 
discontented  with  certain  awards  made  by  Metellus  in  their  disputes  ^^^^-  ^\ 
with  the  Phocians — had  advanced  north  of  the  pass  of  Thermopylae  ^^^^^/^""^ 
and  was  now  besieging  Heracleia,   as  one  of  the  towns  that  had  /,. 
separated  from  the  League.       When  he  heard  from  scouts  of  the  Mummius. 
approach  of  Metellus,  he  broke  up   the   siege  and  retired  through 
Thermopylae,  which  he  left  unguarded,  towards  Scarpheia.      But  he 
was  overtaken  and  defeated  by  Metellus  before  he  could  reach  that  Defeat  of 
town,   and  was  either  lost   in  attempting  to  escape  over  the  salt-  Critolaus 
marshes,   or  put  an  end  to  his  life  by  poison.      By  the  Achaean  ^^I^i^^  ^e 
constitution    his    predecessor    Diaeus    now    became    strategus,    and  X46. 
showed  every  intention  of  carrying  on  his  policy.      By  proclaiming 
the    emancipation   of  slaves    of  military    age    he    obtained    10,000 
men  in  addition  to  the  general  Achaean  levy,  while  a  forced  con- 
tribution   from  the    richer    members   of   the   League    supplied    him 
with    money.      There   was    great    confusion   and    alarm   throughout 
Peloponnese,  increased  by  the  arrival  of  fugitives  from  Thebes  and 
other  parts  of  Boeotia  who  had  fled  before  the  advancing  Roman 
army.       Nevertheless    Diaeus   secured  his   re-election   as  strategus,  Diaeus. 
and  about  midsummer  came  to  Corinth  to  take   command  of  the 
troops.       He  had  made  a  mistake  in  dividing  his  forces  between 
Corinth    and    Megara ;    for    the    troops    in   the   latter,  by   instantly 
retiring  upon  Corinth  at   the  approach  of   Metellus,  had   produced 
a  feeling  of  defeat  and  panic.      Still,  believing  that  in  no  case  would 
he  be  personally  included  in  an  amnesty,  he  rejected  all  proposals 
from  Metellus,  and   imprisoned   and  put   to    death    several    of  the 
higher    officers    who    advocated    their    acceptance.       Consequently  siege  of 
Metellus  was  obliged  to  lay  regular  siege  to  Corinth,  and  had  to  Corinth. 
relinquish  the  hope  of  finishing  the  war ;  for  before  it  fell  he  was 
superseded  by  the  consul  L.  Mummius. 

Mummius  sent  Metellus  back  to  Macedonia,  and  encamped  in  Mummius 
the  isthmus  with  an  army  raised  by  adhesion  of  allies  to  26,000  arrives 
men  and    500   cavalry.      The  Romans  from  over- confidence  seem  ^^P^f 
to    have    been    at  .  first    somewhat    careless,    and    the   Achaeans    r  r     ^ 
gained    a    slight    advantage    in    a    sally,   which    encouraged  them 
to    offer   battle.      But   in  this  they  were   so  disastrously  defeated, 
that   Diaeus  abandoned  his   army  and   fled   to  Megalopolis,  where 
he    killed    his    wife    and    then    poisoned    himself.      On    the    third 
day    after    the    battle     Mummius    took    Corinth.      The    town    was  Destruc- 
stripped    of   everything    of  value  ;    and  the  works  of  art,   pictures,  Hon  of 
statues,    and    ornaments    of   every  description    were     collected    for  Corinth. 
transport   to   Italy.      Much,  however,  was  spoilt  by  the  greedy  and 
ignorant    soldiers,   and    Polybius — who  had  lately  returned  from  a 
similar  spectacle  at  Carthage — saw  some  of  the  finest  pictures  thrown 


526 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


on  the  ground  and  used  as  dice-boards.  Mummius  was  an  honest  man 
and  kept  nothing  for  himself,  but  ignorant  and  perhaps  contemptuous 
of  art.  It  was  told  of  him,  as  a  satire  on  this  ignorance, — though  he 
was  probably  only  using  a  regular  formula, — that  in  contracts  with 
the  shipowners  who  transported  these  things  to  Italy  a  clause  was 
inserted  by  him  that  they  should  replace  them  by  others  equally  good 
if  they  were  lost  at  sea.  Corinth  was  then  dismantled  and  burnt, 
and  remained  a  mere  village  until  its  restoration  in  46  by  Caesar. 

The  rest  of  Peloponnese  was  settled  by  ten  commissioners  sent 
out  immediately  after  the  fall  of  Corinth.  The  Achaean  League  was 
dissolved,  and  a  constitution  drawn  up  for  each  separate  state,  with 
the  advice  it  seems  of  Polybius,  who  was  employed  to  visit  the 
various  cities  and  explain  its  terms.  For  a  time  the  members  of  the 
several  states  were  prohibited  from  owning  property  in  others, 
and  the  meeting  of  the  League  assembly  was  forbidden, — though  the 
former  regulation  was  afterwards  withdrawn,  and  the  latter  relaxed 
for  certain  purposes  chiefly  religious.  The  same  measure  was  applied 
to  all  other  federations  (Kotva)  ;  and  the  policy  of  weakening  Greece 
by  a  thorough  division  was  strictly  followed.  No  '  province '  of 
Greece  in  the  technical  sense  was  erected,  no  yearly  governor,  pro- 
praetor or  proconsul,  was  sent  to  govern  it.  But  in  practice  Greece 
was  not  one  but  several  provinces.  Each  recognised  civitas  or  state 
paid  a  fixed  tribute  to  the  Roman  exchequer  and  was  ultimately  under 
the  authority  of  the  Senate  ;  and  thus  we  find  Cicero  enumerating  as 
among  the  '  provinces '  Achaia,  Thessalia,  Boeotia,  Lacedaemonii, 
Athenienses.  The  freedom  which  they  were  supposed  to  retain  was 
only  that  of  local  government :  for  certain  purposes  they  were  under 
the  governor  of  the  province  of  Macedonia,  who  could  levy  soldiers 
in  them  ;  and  in  every  external  relation  which  characterises  a  sovereign 
state  they  were  subject  to  Rome.  In  other  ways  Greece  as  a  whole 
was  much  reduced  ;  not  only  was  Thessaly  entirely  and  Epirus  partly 
assigned  to  the  province  of  Macedonia,  while  Aetolia  lay  desolate  and 
neglected,  but  large  tracts  of  territory  became  ager  publicus — the 
absolute  possession,  that  is,  of  the  Roman  people,  who  received  a 
rent  or  vectigal  from  it.  This  was  the  case  with  the  whole  territory 
of  Corinth — of  which,  however,  a  certain  portion  was  granted  to 
Sicyon  on  condition  of  paying  for  the  Isthmian  games  ;  this  was  the 
case  with  all  Euboea,  all  Boeotia — Thebes  and  Chalcis  having  shared 
the  fate  of  Corinth, — and  with  other  cities  which  had  been  taken  by 
force.  Yet  there  were  still  certain  cities,  such  as  Athens,  Sparta,  and 
Sicyon,  which  were  in  a  better  position  than  the  rest,  enjoying  the 
rights  secured  them  by  former  treaties,  and  being  known  as  libercB 
civitates^  who  seem  to  have  been  relieved  from  tribute,  and  into  which 
a  Roman  magistrate  entered  without  his  lictors  ;  while  several  smaller 


XXXII  MASANNASA  AND  CARTHAGE  527 

cities  were  for  special  reasons  also  granted  immunity  from  tax.  The  fall 
of  Greece  politically  was  accompanied  by  deterioration  in  other  ways. 
Ever  since  the  period  of  the  battle  of  Pydna  the  population  had  been 
declining  and  the  cities  falling  into  ruin.  This  doubtless  facilitated 
the  Roman  conquest,  but  cannot  safely  be  attributed  to  it.  Polybius 
alleges  more  fundamental  reasons, — the  odious  habit  of  infanticide, 
and  the  relaxation  of  morality  which  marked  the  epoch. 

The  subjection  of  Greece  had  been  preceded  by  the  still  more  Carthage 
disastrous  ruin  of  Carthage.      During  the  last  half-century  Carthage,  from  the 
though  precluded  from  foreign  extension,  had  largely  recovered  her  end  of  the 
wealth  and  prosperity  at  home,  and  was  being  watched  with  vigilant  ^^^'^^f 
jealousy  by   the   Romans.      At  the   end  of  the  last  war  they  had  202-146. 
established  Masannasa  in  an  extended  Numidian  kingdom,  in  such 
a  way  as   to  make    controversies   with    Carthage    inevitable.       He 
had  been  secretly  encouraged  to  encroach  on  Carthaginian  territory, 
and  in  the  references  to  Roman  arbitration  the  decision  was  invariably 
in  his  favour.      As  early  as  193  the  Carthaginians  by  one  of  these 
decisions  had  not  only  lost  a  considerable  district,  but  had  also  had 
to  pay  an  indemnity  of  500  talents.      This  was  followed  by  similar 
incidents  :  Masannasa  had  lost  no  opportunity  of  exciting  the  Roman 
suspicions ;     and    when,    during    the    war    with    Perseus,     Cartha- 
ginian ships  had  joined  the  Roman  fleet,  he  sent  his  son  Gulusa  to 
warn  the  Senate  that  the  Carthaginians  meant  to  use  for  their  own 
purposes  the  ships  which  they  pretended  to  have  built  for  the  Roman 
service.       Naturally  there  was   a   party  in  Carthage   that  regarded 
these  things  as  intolerable,  and  were  for  resisting  the  encroachments  Quarrel 
of  Masannasa  and  the  dictatorship  of  Rome.      This  party  became  of  Masan- 
prominent  when,  in  154,  the  quarrel  with  Masannasa  became  acute  ^^^^^  ^'"■"' 
owing  to  the  disputed  possession  of  part  of  the  Great  Plains,  which  ^-^  ^^ .; 
he  claimed  in  virtue  of  the  Roman  settlement.      Commissioners  were 
sent  from  Rome  to  investigate  the  matter — with  secret  instructions 
to  support  the  king — and  effected  a  short  suspension  of  hostilities  ; 
which,  however,  began  again  upon  fresh  encroachments  by  Masan- 
nasa.     More  than  one  Roman  commission  visited  Carthage  in  the 
course  of  the  next  two  years.     But  the  popular  party  was  now  getting 
the   upper   hand ;    and    indignant   at   the   flagrant   injustice   of  the 
commissioners'   decisions,    the   Carthaginian  government  refused  to 
refer  any  new  question  of  territory  to  them,  maintaining   that   the 
one  point  for  their  decision  was  whether  the  treaty  of  202  had  been 
infringed.     Finally,  when  Masannasa's  son  Gulusa  appeared  with  one  Cartha- 
of  the  commissions  to  negotiate,  they  refused  them   admission  to  the  S^'^^^^^ 
city.      The  war  thus    continued    resulted   in   severe   disaster  to   the    ^■y'^  ^     ^ 
Carthaginians,    and   reduced    them    to    the    necessity   of   accepting  nasa. 
almost  any  terms  the  Romans  should  choose  to  impose. 


528 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


The  Senate 
resolved  to 
destroy 
Carthage, 
ISO. 


Coss.  L. 

Marcius 

Censor- 

inus,  M. 

Manilius, 

149- 


A  majority  of  the  Roman  Senate  had,  however,  by  this 
time  gradually  come  to  a  determination  in  regard  to  Carthage 
which  is  one  of  the  most  iniquitous  known  to  history ;  and 
the  chief  adviser  of  it  was  the  veteran  champion  of  right  and 
justice,  Porcius  Cato.  He  had  served  on  one  of  the  commissions, 
and  had  been  struck  by  the  sight  of  the  rich  and  cultivated  lands,  by 
the  splendour  and  wealth  of  the  city.  With  a  narrowness  of  view, 
which  generally  characterised  him  in  dealing  with  foreign  nations, 
he  regarded  the  prosperity  of  Carthage  as  necessarily  a  menace  to 
Roman  supremacy  and  enterprise,  and  never  ceased  to  urge  that  she 
must  be  destroyed.  According  to  the  well-known  story  he  was  wont 
to  end  every  speech  in  the  Senate,  on  whatever  subject,  with  this 
sentiment ;  and  tried  on  one  occasion  to  impress  upon  the  fathers 
the  nearness  of  their  peril  by  bringing  some  splendid  figs  into  the 
Senate  house,  and  explaining  that  they  were  grown  only  three  days' 
sail  from  Rome.  To  men  less  prejudiced,  and  to  whom  justice  even 
to  an  enemy  was  still  of  some  weight,  the  difficulty  was  to  discover 
any  grounds  for  war.  To  Cato  and  his  party  it  was  sufficient  that 
Carthage  was  prosperous  ;  and  they  maintained  that  her  military 
and  naval  preparations,  forced  upon  her  by  the  conduct  of  their  own 
agent  Masannasa,  constituted  a  breach  of  her  treaty  with  Rome. 
Scipio  Nasica — once  judged  the  "  best  man  "  by  the  Senate, — on  the 
contrary,  held  that  as  yet  no  act  of  the  Carthaginians  justified  war, 
not  even  the  recent  refusal  to  admit  Gulusa  and  the  commissioners. 
But  the  disasters  of  the  struggle  with  Masannasa,  while  they  en- 
couraged the  war  party  at  Rome,  left  the  Carthaginians  so  weak  that 
they  were  obliged  to  pacify  the  Senate  by  every  possible  concession. 
The  leaders  of  the  party  olf  resistance  to  Masannasa  were  condemned 
to  death ;  ambassadors  were  sent  to  Rome  to  plead  their  excuse,  and 
to  beg  the  Senate  to  state  what  would  be  considered  sufficient  com- 
pensation. The  Senate  refused  to  name  the  terms,  declaring  that  the 
Carthaginians  well  knew  what  they  must  be. 

War,  in  fact,  had  been  determined  upon,  and  the  consuls  of  the 
year  ordered  to  proceed  with  their  armies  and  fleet  to  Lilybaeum  ; 
though  the  Senate  still  allowed  the  Carthaginian  envoys  to  imagine 
that  it  might  be  averted  by  full  submission.  Just  at  this  crisis  the 
city  of  Utica  surrendered  itself  unconditionally  to  Rome.  It  was  the 
largest  town  in  the  country,  next  to  Carthage  itself,  from  which  it 
was  only  eight  miles  distant,  and  its  excellent  harbour  and  military 
strength  gave  the  Romans  exactly  the  place  of  landing  and  position 
for  a  war  with  Carthage  that  they  required.  This  was  therefore  not 
only  a  blow  to  the  safety  of  the  Carthaginians,  but  also  took  away 
the  credit  of  the  step,  which  after  long  and  painful  discussion  they 
had  resolved  upon  as  necessary — namely,  the  surrender  of  their  whole 


XXXII  CARTHAGE  IS  TO  BE  DESTROYED  529 

country /<??'  deditio7tem^  trusting  to  the  mercy  of  the  RepubHc.     That   The 
mercy  was  indeed  cruel.      The  envoys  who  conveyed  the  surrender  Cartha- 
were  told  that  the  Senate  "  granted  them  freedom  and  independence,  ^'-"■^^"^^ 
the  inviolability  of  their  shrines  and  tombs,  and  the  enjoyment  of  ^^^^y 
their  territory,"  but  on  condition  of  sending  to  the  consuls  at  Lily-  territory  to 
baeum    300    boys    of   noble    birth    as    hostages.      No    mention,   as  Rome. 
the  terrified  Carthaginian  Senate  remarked    was  made  of  the  city  Roman 
itself;  and  there  was  some  hesitation  as  to  sending  the  hostages. ^  conditions 
But  the  alternative  was  immediate  war,  and  with  bitter  misgivings  l^  /^^ 
the  boys  were  sent.      Nevertheless  the  consuls  proceeded  to  Utica, 
and  the  Carthaginians  were  ordered  to  apply  to  them  for  farther  in- 
structions.   Their  envoys  were  received  by  the  consuls  in  solemn  state, 
sitting  on  the  raised  tribunal  and  surrounded  by  their  co?iciliu>n,  and 
were  next  informed  that  all  arms,  missiles,  and  war  engines  must  be  {2) 
at  once  brought  to  Utica.      This  measure  was  peculiarly  hard  at  the  ^'ti^"^'^^ider 
time;  for  Hasdrubal,  whom  the  citizens,  at  the  bidding  of  Rome,  ^•' '^    (i^i^^- 
had  condemned  to  death  as  a  leader  of  the  war  party,  was  actually 
encamped  with  an  army  against  their  city.     The  order,  however,  was 
obeyed.     Two  hundred  thousand  stands  of  arms  and  two  thousand 
catapults  were  brought  in  waggons   and    given  up  to  the  consuls,  (j) 
who  then  at  length  revealed  the  purpose  of  the  Senate  in  its  full  ^^^oval  to 
severity.      Acting    on    their  secret    instructions   they  informed  the  ^^f^^^^"'^^ 
envoys  that    Carthage    must    be    abandoned,    and    all    its    citizens  miles frotn 
removed  to  some  spot  not  less  than  ten  miles  from  the  sea.  the  sea. 

History    hardly    presents    a    determination    of    greater    cruelty   Terror  and 
executed    with    more    ingenuity    of   torture    long  drawn    out.      The  grief  of 
envoys  received   the   announcement   with  passionate  expressions  of  ^^^^  envoys. 
grief  and  terror,  raising  their  hands   to  heaven,  striking  their  heads, 
and  throwing  themselves  on  the  ground.      But  nothing  moved  the 
consuls.      All  the  comfort  they  could  give  was  the  promise  that  the 
sacred    buildings    and    tombs    should    be    preserved    and  open   for 
worship,   and  the  fishermen   still  allowed  to  carry  on  their  industry 
in  the  sea.     The  envoys  were  afraid  to  return  home  ;  and  begged 
that  at  least  Roman  ships  should  be  sent  to  Carthage  to  prove  that 
they  were  acting  under  compulsion.      Nor  was  this  precaution  un-  Frantic 
necessary.     Those  of  the  envoys  who  ventured  to  return  betrayed  excitement 
by  their  faces  that  they  brought  bad  news,   and   the    people,  in  a  ^^ 
state    of    terrified    expectation,    waited    outside    the    Senate    house     "^   ^^^' 
to   hear  the  worst.     A  cry  of  horror  from  the   senators,  followed 
by  an  interval  of  stony  despair,  caused  the  crowd  to  burst  in   and 

^  See  p.  129  note,  for  the  significance  of  this. 
"  2  The  historian  Polybius  was  hastily  summoned  by  the  consul  Manilius  to 
persuade  the  Carthaginians  to  give  the  hostages.      He  started  at  once,  but  learnt 
at  Corcyra  that  they  had  complied  (Polyb.  xxxvii.  3). 

2    M 


S30 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


demand  to  be  told  the  truth.  A  storm  of  indignation  followed,  which 
found  vent  in  cries  and  execrations,  in  violence  to  the  envoys,  or  to 
those  who  had  advised  the  sending  of  the  hostages,  in  assaults 
upon  Italians  in  the  streets,  or  in  a  hasty  rush  to  the  city  gates  as 
though  to  close  them  against  the  enemy  ;  while  the  temples  were 
crowded  by  a  terrified  crowd  uttering  frantic  appeals  and  reproaches 
to  the  gods.  But  these  wild  scenes  were  followed  by  an  heroic  deter- 
mination and  heroic  efforts.  It  was  resolved  at  all  hazards  to  resist 
the  orders  of  Rome,  and  to  defend  the  city.  Hasdrubal  consented 
to  be  reconciled  to  his  country,  and  to  undertake  her  defence  with  the 
troops  which  he  had  collected  to  attack  her.  The  whole  city  was 
turned  into  a  workshop  of  arms,  in  which  men  and  women  in  relays 
laboured  day  and  night ;  and  a  vast  number  of  shields,  swords,  cata- 
pults, and  missiles  were  produced  each  day,  the  women  even  cutting 
off  their  hair  to  be  twisted  into  cords  for  the  engines. 

The  delay  in  the  Roman  attack  gave  time  for  these  preparations. 
For  the  consuls,  partly  perhaps  because  they  thought  that  serious  resist- 
ance by  an  unarmed  populace  was  impossible,  partly  from  caution, 
did  not  advance  upon  Carthage  at  once.  They  spent  some  time  in 
negotiating  with  Masannasa,  as  to  whose  cordial  support  they  seem  to 
have  been  uneasy,  and  still  more  in  securing  bases  of  supply  in  Leptis, 
Hadrumetum,  and  other  towns.  They  did  not,  therefore,  find  a  city 
ready  for  surrender  when  they  at  length  arrived  under  its  walls. 
Manilius  attempted  to  assault  the  outer  wall  of  the  great  suburb  or 
Megara,  Censorinus  landed  on  the  taenia,  a  narrow  strip  of  land  be- 
tween the  lake  and  sea,  to  attack  the  walls  toward  the  sea,  where 
they  were  weakest.  Both,  however,  were  repulsed  more  than  once, 
to  their  own  dismay  and  the  encouragement  of  the  citizens,  and  had 
to  entrench  regular  camps  for  fear  of  Hasdrubal,  who  was  encamped 
near  at  hand  on  the  borders  of  the  lake.  Censorinus  effected  a  breach 
in  the  seaward  wall,  but  an  attempt  to  carry  the  city  through  it  was 
repulsed  with  some  loss,  in  which  the  Romans  were  saved  from 
disaster  by  the  prudence  and  gallantry  of  Scipio  Aemilianus. 

In  fact,  the  consuls  were  not  competent  for  their  task,  and 
Scipio,  though  only  a  military  tribune,  seems  from  this  moment 
to  have  gained  the  enthusiastic  confidence  of  the  amiy.  He 
was  the  younger  son  of  Aemilius  Paulus,  the  conqueror  of  Mace- 
donia, and  had  served  with  some  distinction  in  the  war  against 
Perseus,  and  afterwards  in  Spain.  His  aunt  Avas  the  wife  of  the 
great  Africanus,  and  having  been  adopted  by  his  cousin,  the  son  of 
Africanus,  he  was  now  known  as  P.  Cornelius  Scipio  Aemilianus.  A 
charming  account  of  his  pure  and  loyal  character  has  been  left  us 
by  his  friend  and  tutor  Polybius  ;  and  we  cannot  but  regret  that  it 
fell  to  the  lot  of  the  best  Roman  of  the  day  to  carry  out  one  of  the 


XXXII  FAILURES  BEFORE  CARTHAGE  531 

worst   public   crimes   of  which    the    Repubhc   was   guilty.       In   the 
operations  which   took   place   during   the  rest  of  the  year  and  the 
succeeding  winter  he  more  than  once  saved  the  troops  from  dangers 
into  which  incompetence    or  imprudence  had  led  them.      Towards    Winter  of 
the    end    of  the  year   Censorinus   returned   to   Rome  to  hold   the  149-148. 
consular  elections,   and    Manilius,   after  with    difficulty   resisting  a 
night  surprise  in  his  camp,  spent  the  winter  in  scouring  the  country 
and  collecting  supplies,   dogged  by  the  Carthaginian  cavalry  com- 
mander, Hamilcar  Phameas,  who  more  than  once  surprised  and  cut 
off  detached  parties  ;    while,   on  the  other   side,  the  Carthaginians 
all  but  succeeded  in  setting  fire  to  the  Roman  fleet.      When  com- 
missioners came  from  Rome  to  inspect  the  state  of  affairs,  neither 
Manilius  nor  his  staff  could  refuse  Scipio  the  credit  of  his  eminent 
services  during  these  operations,  and  the  veteran  Cato,  who  died  at 
the  end  of  149,  on  hearing  of  them  expressed  his  admiration  of  him, 
and  his  contempt  of  his  incompetent  superiors,  in  a  line  of  Homer :  "  He 
alone  has  the  breath  of  life  in  him,  the  rest  are  but  flitting  phantoms."  1 
Attracted  by  his  character,  and  perhaps  somewhat  by  his  name,  the  Death  of 
aged  Masannasa  on  his  deathbed  left  to  Scipio  the  task  of  arranging  Masan- 
for  the  division  of  his  kingdom  between  his  three  sons.      He  crowned  =^^-^'^- 
his  achievements  by  receiving  the  surrender  of  the  cavalry  commander, 
Hamilcar  Phameas  ;  and  when,  in  the  spring  of  148,  Manilius,  being 
about  to  be  superseded  by  Calpurnius  Piso,  resolved  to  send  Scipio 
home  with  Phameas,  the  soldiers,  accompanying  him  to  his  ship,  openly 
expressed  their  hope  that  he  would  return  as  consul  to  command  them. 

Piso,  who  arrived  in  the  summer  of  148  to  command  the  army,   ^^g.  Coss. 
with  his  legate  Mancinus  to  command  the  navy,  proved  a  complete  Sp. 
failure.     Without  venturing  to  assault  the  city,  he   spent  his   time  Postumius 
in  minor  operations — against  Clupea,  Hippo  Diarrhytus,  and  other    ,^  ^^^^  . 
towns, — in  most  of  which  he  was  unsuccessful.      Discipline  became  Calpur- 
relaxed,  and  deserters  from  Numidia — amongst  others  Bithyas,  with  nius  Piso 
2000  men — were  finding  their  way  to  Carthage,  whilst  the  sons  of  Caesonius. 
Masannasa  seemed  to  be  in  no  hurry  to  fulfil  their  obligations  as  to 
reinforcing    the    Roman    troops.      The    hopes  of  the  Carthaginians 
rose  ;  they  tried  to  rouse  the  co  mtry  against  the  Romans,  and  sent 
messages  to  Andriscus  in  Macedonia,  encouraging  him  to  continue 
the  war.      Hasdrubal,  elated  by  his  successes,  was  full  of  confidence. 
There  was  great  anxiety  at  Rome,  and  the  people  were  eager  to 
place  the  command  in  the  hands  of  Scipio,  though  he  was  not  yet 
of   the    consular    age.      He   had   come   to    Rome   to   stand  for   the 
aedileship,  but  a  large  number  of  the  tribes  returned  his  name  as 
consul.     This  was  irregular — for  the  consul  was  properly  elected  in 
the    centuriate    assembly — and    it    could    only  be    regarded    as    an 
^  oTos  TriirvvTai  'ral  5e  CKial  at(raov(ri. 


532 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


infonnal  resolution  of  the  people.  Accordingly  a  bill  was  brought 
before  the  tribes  relieving  him  from  the  terms  of  the  lex  Annalis,  and 
he  was  then  elected  by  the  centuries,  and  a  further  law  passed  by  the 
tribes  giving  him  the  '  province  '  of  Africa  without  drawing  lots,  i 

He  arrived  at  the  seat  of  war  with  a  suppleme7ttum  of  soldiers 
to  fill  up  the  legions,  as  well  as  with  a  body  of  volunteers  from  the 
allies  ;  and  was  immediately  joined  by  Gulusa,  the  son  of  Masan- 
nasa,  to  whom  he  had  assigned  the  command  of  the  Numidian  army 
as  his  share  of  his  father's  inheritance.  His  arrival  was  not  a  day 
too  soon.  Not  only  had  Piso  failed  to  effect  anything  against  the 
town,  or  to  maintain  discipline  in  the  army,  but  Mancinus  was  in 
actual  danger.  The  soldiers  on  the  taenia  had  succeeded  in 
effecting  a  breach  in  the  walls  toward  the  sea,  and  had  entered  the 
town.  Mancinus  hastened  after  them  with  a  number  of  half-armed 
men  from  the  fleet,  but  had  been  driven  back  and  beleaguered  on  a 
solitary  cliff,  and  was  only  saved  by  the  appearance  of  Scipio's  rein- 
forcements. He  was  now  sent  home,  and  the  fleet  was  put  under 
the  command  of  Atilius  Serranus.  Scipio's  next  care  was  the 
restoration  of  discipline.  The  straying  of  the  soldiers  from  the 
camp  in  search  of  plunder  for  their  own  advantage  was  put  an  end  to  ; 
non-combatants  and  idle  characters  were  expelled  from  the  camp  ; 
superfluous  luxuries  were  forbidden  ;  and  the  men  brought  to  a  state 
of  efficiency.  Before  long  he  actually  penetrated  the  outer  wall  into 
the  Megara,  but  finding  that  extensive  suburb  broken  up  by  woods, 
streams,  and  buildings,  affording  ample  opportunity  for  ambuscades, 
he  thought  it  prudent  to  retire.  After  this  Hasdrubal  left  his  camp 
outside  the  walls  and  withdrew  within  them  ;  and  his  namesake 
Hasdrubal,  grandson  of  Masannasa,  being  murdered  about  this  time, 
he  became  governor  of  the  town.  His  first  act  was  to  retaliate 
upon  Scipio  by  bringing  his  Roman  prisoners  to  the  wall,  and  there 
putting  them  to  death  in  sight  of  their  comrades  with  horrible 
tortures.  His  object  is  said  to  have  been  to  make  his  fellow-citizens 
feel  that  they  had  no  hope  of  mercy  from  the  Romans,  and  must  resist 
to  the  last.  It  is  scarcely  possible,  as  some  have  done,  to  doubt  a 
fact  which  Polybius  must  have  seen  with  his  own  eyes  or  heard 
of  immediately  from  those  who  saw  it ;  yet  though  he  represents 
Hasdrubal  as  a  glutton,  a  tyrant,  and  a  debauchee,  it  is  true  that  he 
had  for  two  years  baffled  the  Roman  army  outside  the  walls,  and 
1  This  seems  to  have  been  the  course  of  events  from  a  comparison  of  Livy, 
Epith.  xlix.  and  1.,  with  Appian,  Pun.  112;  though  Livy  leaves  it  doubtful 
whether  the  objection  of  the  Senate  was  founded  on  the  election  by  the  tribes,  or 
only  on  the  breach  of  the  lex  Annalis.  This  law  (180)  of  L.  Villius  seems  to 
have  established  the  certus  ordo  of  magistracies,  quaestor,  aedile,  praetor,  consul, 
and  thus  indirectly  the  age,  as  ten  years'  military  service  from  eighteen  was 
needed  for  the  first,  and  two  years'  interval  for  the  others.  Momms.  Straatsr. 
2.  P-  193.     Scipio  was  born  in  185. 


XXXII 


HASDRUBAL'S  DEFENCE  OF  CARTHAGE 


533 


now  maintained  an  heroic  defence  within  them,  refusing  until  almost 
the  last  the  offer  of  mercy  to  himself  apart  from  the  rest  of  the  citizens. 


of  Aesculanius 


Forum":^/ 

^(l^iiitanj  Harbour  .-,■  Cut  lion 


CARTHAGE 


ENGLISH    MILES 


ITalicr  &  Souiaii  s£. 


Having  completed  the  necessary  reforms  in  his  army,  Scipio  now 
burnt  Hasdrubal's  deserted  camp,  and  erected  a  continuous  line  of 


534  HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Complete      fortifications  across  the  isthmus  which  formed  the  approach  to  Car- 
mvestment    thage,  thus  completely  cutting  off  supplies  from  the  land  side.      The 
Carthase      ^^^  chance  for  the  besieged  lay  in  the  provisions  which  the  Numidian 
j^j^        '     Bithyas  could  send  round  by  sea.    Though  vessels  were  not  numerous, 
and  the  Roman  fleet  was  on  the  watch,  some  supplies  were  landed  ; 
for  the  Roman  ships  could  not  guard  all  the  coast,  or  venture  always 
to  follow  the  lighter  craft  who  ran  into  the  harbour  in  spite  of  them. 
Yet  these  supplies  were  wholly  inadequate  ;  and,  in  the  course  of  the 
autumn  and  winter  of  147-146,  the  people  were  reduced  to  horrible 
Scipids        extremities  of  famine.     To  complete  the  process  of  starvation,  Scipio 
mole,  determined  on  the  erection  of  a  mole  from  the  taenia,  which  would 

at  once  block  up  the  mouth  of  the  harbour,  and  give  him  passage  on 
to  the  end  of  the  quay  of  the  larger  or  merchants'  harbour.  It  was 
to  be  formed  of  great  stones,  and  at  the  base  to  be  96  feet  broad, 
narrowing  gradually  to  24  feet  at  the  surface.  It  seemed  an  impos- 
sible enterprise  to  the  Carthaginians,  and  never  likely  to  be  formid- 
able. But  it  was  pushed  on  day  and  night  with  such  energy,  that 
they  became  alarmed,  and  began  to  cut  a  new  entrance  to  the 
The  Cothon,  and  to  build  vessels  of  every  kind  of  wood  they  could  find, 

Cartha-        keeping  this  SO  secret,  that  Scipio  got  no  certain  information  of  their 
giman fleet  purpose,  until  this  new  channel  being  thrown  open  a  fleet  of  fifty 

issue  y  a     xx\rQ.vci^s.  with  numerous  smaller  craft,  sailed  out.      The  Romans  had 

new  '  ' 

channel.        in  many  cases  beached  their  ships,  or  were  so  intent  on  assisting  the 

operations  on  land,  that  if  they  had  been  at  once  attacked  they  might 

probably  have  been  destroyed.      But  the  Carthaginians  wasted  two 

days  in  mere   naval  demonstrations,   and  when   on   the  third  they 

began  a  real  attack,  the  Romans  were  prepared  ;  and,  though  the 

battle  was  indecisive,  the  new  entrance  became  quickly  blocked  up 

when  they  attempted  to  return,  and  the  larger  vessels  were  compelled 

to  anchor  along  the  outer  quay,  where  they  suffered  so  severely  from 

the  Roman  ships  that  only  a  few  eventually  made  their  way  back  into 

the  Cothon.     Next  day  Scipio  attacked  the  wall  of  the  quay  from  his 

mole,  and  though  the  besieged  garrison  made  a  desperate  resistance, 

and  even  succeeded  by  wading  through  the  sea  in  setting  fire  to  his 

siege  works,  yet  these  were  erected  again,  and  the  siege  pressed  on. 

Capture  of  The  summer  was  spent  in  these  operations,  and  Carthage  was  still 

Nepheris,      untaken.     But  in  the  winter  the  source  of  her  supplies,  which,  however 

'HlZ^Z.jf      scantily,  still  found  their  way  in,  was  finally  closed  by  the  capture  of 

Nepheris,  a  fortress  somewhere  on  the  lake  of  Tunis,  the  headquarters 

of  Diogenes,  who  had  charge  of  the  business  of  supplying  the  capital. 

The  capture  of  this  place  was  entrusted  chiefly  to  Gulusa,  supported  by 

a  detachment  of  the  Roman  army  under  Laelius,  and  superintended  by 

Scipio,  who  passed  backwards  and  forwards  between  it  and  his  camp. 

Carthage  being  thus  finally  cut  off  from  its  only  source  of  supply, 


h  J  47 -1 46. 

I 


XXXII  THE  CAPTURE  OF  CARTHAGE  535 

the  outer  harbour  being  completely  blockaded,  and  the  siege  works  Fall  of 
along   the  quay   now   reaching  the  height   of  the  city   wall,    Scipio  Carthage 
resolved  upon  delivering  his  final  assault.      During  the  winter  some  JJ^^-^^  ^^ 
negotiations  had  taken  place  with    Hasdrubal,   who  offered  to  sur-  ^^^ 
render,  if  life  and  freedom  were  granted  to  all  the  inhabitants  ;  but 
Scipio,  in  spite  of  the  advice  of  Gulusa,  had  declined  to  pledge  him- 
self to  anything  except  to  the  personal  safety  of  Hasdrubal  and  his 
family,  who  refused  to  accept  a  favour  apart  from  his  countrymen. 
When  he  saw  that  the  assault  was  coming,  Hasdrubal  ordered  the 
outer  harbour  to  be  fired.      In  the  confusion  that  followed  Laelius 
managed  to  scale  the  wall  higher  up,  and,  having  thus  got  possession 
of  the   Cothon,  admitted  Scipio  with  the  whole  Roman  army,  who 
easily  occupied  the  market-place.      There  remained  three  streets  of  Fighting 
houses,  six  stories  high,  leading  up  to  the  Byrsa.      From  these  the  ^^  ^^^^ 
Romans  were  assailed  by  every  kind  of  missile  ;  until,  forcing  their 
way  into  some  of  them,  and  clambering  from  roof  to  roof,  they  fought 
with  the  famished  enemy  in  detail,  hurling  them  from  the  roofs,  or 
cutting  them  down  with  their  swords.      For  six  days  and  nights  this 
desperate  fighting  was  maintained  by  relays  of  men  sent  forward  by 
Scipio,  who  himself  scarcely  stopped  to  eat  or  sleep.     It  was  not  until 
he  reached  the  foot  of  the  Byrsa  that  he  gave  the  order  to  fire  the 
houses,  in  which  numbers  of  helpless  inhabitants  perished.      He  had 
no  need  to  storm  the  Byrsa.     The  wretched  people  who  had  taken 
refuge  there  almost  immediately  surrendered  on  the  promise  of  their  Surrender 
lives  ;  and  50,000  men,  women,  and  children  were  allowed  to  descend  9f^^^ 
under  guard,  and  became  prisoners  of  war.      This  number,  probably     -^ 
not  a  tenth  of  the  regular  inhabitants,  speaks  strikingly  of  the  havoc 
which  famine  and  disease  had  made  among  them.    About  900  Roman 
deserters,  who  had  no  mercy  to  expect,  along  with   Hasdrubal  and 
his  wife  and  children,  took  refuge  in  the  temple  of  Aesculapius.    Before 
long   Hasdrubal  made  his  way   out  secretly  and   accepted  his  life 
from  Scipio  :  but  the  desperate  deserters  set  fire  to  the  temple,  and 
perished  in  the  flames  ;  while  Hasdrubal's  wife,  disdaining  to  follow 
her  husband's  humiliation,  slew  her  two  boys,  and  threw  herself  with 
them  into  the  burning  ruins. 

For  some  days  the  city  was  given  up  to  plunder.  Silver  and 
gold  and  the  works  of  art  in  the  temples  were  reserved  ;  and  many 
of  the  latter,  which  had  come  from  Sicily,  were  restored  to  their 
original  sites.  When  free  plunder  was  stopped,  the  remaining 
booty  and  slaves  were  sold,  and  the  army  rewarded.  A  swift  ship 
adorned  with  specimens  of  the  spoils  was  immediately  sent  to  carry 
the  news  to  Rome,  where  the  exultation  of  the  people  was  shown  by 
sacrifices,  games,  and  all  the  other  forms  of  popular  rejoicing.  It 
was  resolved  in  the  Senate  to  send  commissioners  to  organise  the 


536  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap,  xxxii 

new  possession  ;  but,  meanwhile,  orders  were  despatched  to  Scipio 
to  entirely  destroy  the  city  :  the  plough  was  to  be  drawn  over  its 
site,  and  a  curse  pronounced  upon  whoever  attempted  to  rebuild  it. 
Scipio  obeyed,  but  felt  the  full  horror,  and  foreboded  the  evil  results, 
of  such  a  step.  As  he  gave  the  order  for  firing  the  town  and  suburbs, 
he  turned  to  Polybius,  his  old  friend  and  tutor,  "  Oh,  Polybius,"  he 
said,  "it  is  a  grand  thing  ;  but  I  shudder  to  think  that  some  one  may 
one  day  give  the  same  order  for  Rome."  And  as  he  gazed  at  the 
burning  city,  where  the  fire  raged  for  seventeen  days,  he  thought  of 
the  empires  which  had  perished,  and  murmured  the  lines  of  Homer — 

The  day  shall  come  when  holy  Troy  shall  fall, 
And  Priam,  lord  of  spears,  and  Priam's  folk. 

The  settlement  of  the  country  was  the  work  of  the  ten  com- 
missioners sent  to  assist  Scipio.  The  provincial  arrangements, 
which  had  now  become  established  in  principle,  were  followed.  The 
site  of  Carthage  and  its  immediate  territory  became  domain  land 
of  the  Roman  people,  and  was  leased  out  to  tenants.  The  whole 
dominion  of  Carthage  was  made  into  the  Roman  province  of  Africa, 
to  be  administered  by  a  yearly  magistrate  from  Utica.  It  consisted, 
as  in  other  provinces,  of  a  collection  of  "  cities,"  with  municipal 
liberties  and  a  fixed  territory,  for  which  the  inhabitants  paid  a  rent  or 
sHpe7tdiuin  to  the  Roman  exchequer.  Some  towns  which  had  distin- 
guished themselves  by  fidelity  to  Carthage  were  mulcted  of  territory, 
or  altogether  destroyed,  and  their  lands  assigned  to  others.  The 
kings  of  Numidia  were  not  granted  any  addition  to  their  territory, 
nor  would  they  be  allowed  to  make  any  encroachments  on  lands 
which  were  now  Roman,  as  Masannasa  had  done  when  they  were 
Carthaginian.  The  only  notice  taken  of  them  appears  to  be  that  the 
public  libraries  of  Carthage  were  presented  to  them.  The  Romans 
had  committed  a  great  crime  ;  they  determined  at  any  rate  that  the 
fruits  of  it  should  be  their  own.  Their  merchants  soon  found  a  pro- 
fitable trade  with  the  interior  from  Utica  ;  and  the  foreboding  of 
some  of  the  aristocratic  party,  that  the  fall  of  Carthage  would  re- 
move a  check  upon  the  rising  discontents  of  the  lower  orders,  found 
its  fulfilment,  perhaps,  when  Gracchus  raised  a  storm  by  proposing 
a  new  colony  on  its  site. 

Authorities. — For  the  war  with  Andriscus,  Polybius,  xxxvii.  2  and  9  ;  Livy, 
Ep.  xhx.  1.  hii.  ;  Pausanias  vii.  12,  9  ;  Diodorus,  fr.  of  xxxii.  ;  Velleius,  i.  11  ; 
Eutropius  iv.  6,  7  ;  Florus  ii.  14  ;  Aurelius  Victor  Ixi.  ;  Zonaras  ix.  28.  For  the 
Achaean  war  and  fall  of  Corinth,  Polybius  xxxix.  10-13  ;  Livy,  Ep.  li.-lii.  ;  Pau- 
sanias vii.  12-15  ;  Orosius  v.  3.  For  the  third  Punic  war,  Polybius  xxxii.  2, 
8-16;  xxxvi.  1-8;  xxxvii.  1-3,  10;  xxxviii.  i;  xxxix,  1-5;  Livy,  Ep.  xhx. -li.  ; 
Appian,  Pun.  Ixvii.-cxxvi.  ;  Diodorus,  fr.  of  xxxii.  ;  Eutropius  iv.  5;  Orosius 
iv.  22  ;   Zonaras  x.  26-28. 


CHAPTER    XXXIII 

WARS    IN    SPAIN 
155-133 

Wars  with  Ligurians  and  Dalmatians  (168-155) — State  of  Spain  after  the  settle- 
ment of  Gracchus  (176).  I.  The  Lusitani  invade  tribes  subject  to  Rome 
(154) — Campaigns  of  L.  Mummius  and  M.  Atilius  (154-152) — Treacherous 
massacre  of  the  Lusitani  by  Galba  (150) — Rise  of  Viriathus  (147)  and 
disasters  of  Vetilius,  G.  Plautius,  and  Claudius  Unimanus  (147-145) — Cam- 
paigns of  Q.  Fabius  Aemilianus  (145-144) — Defeat  of  L.  Quinctius  (143) — 
Peace  made  by  Q.  Fabius  Servilianus  (142-141),  but  rejected  by  Q.  Servihus 
Caepio,  who  causes  the  murder  of  Viriathus  (141-140) — Campaigns  of  Decimus 
Junius  Brutus  in  north-west  Spain  (138-136).  II.  Celtiberian  Wars — the 
Titthi,  BeUi,  and  Arevaci — Disasters  of  Q.  Fulvius  Nobihor  (153-152) — M. 
Claudius  Marcellus  makes  terms  and  founds  the  town  of  Corduba  (152-151) — 
War  with  the  Arevaci  at  Numantia  and  the  Vaccaei  continued  by  L.  Licinius 
Lucullus  ( 1 51-150) — Plve  years  peace  (149-144) — The  Arevaci  again  revolt 
(144) — Campaigns  of  Q.  Caecilius  Metellus,  Q.  Pompeius  Rufus,  M.  Popilius 
Rufus,  C.  Hostihus  Mancinus,  Q.  Calpurnius  Piso  (144-134)  —  Scipio 
Aemilianus  sent  to  Numantia,  which  he  takes  after  a  long  siege  (134-133). 

For  twelve  years  after  the  fall  of  Perseus  (i  68-1  57)  such  wars  as  State  of 

the    Romans    undertook   were   not   with   distant  nations,   but   were  affairs 

fought    for   the    consolidation    of    Italy.      The    struggle    with    the  f^^^  ^^*^' 

Ligurians  was   always  with  them,  involving  once  at  any  rate  (163)   j^^^ 

an  expedition  to  Corsica.      But  in  Africa  they  were  content  for  the  Ligurians. 

present    to  allow  Masannasa    to    keep  the    Carthaginians   in   play ; 

and    in   the   East   such   questions   as   the  restoration   of  Ariarathes,  Aria- 

the  deposed  king  of  Cappadocia,  did  not  call  for  armed  interference,   rathes. 

especially  as  the  death  of  P^umenes  in  159  placed  on  the  throne  of 

Pergamus  a  king  (Attains  II.)  in  whom  they  had  greater  confidence. 

At    length    an    outbreak    among    the    Dalmatians,    who    quarrelled    xh^ 

with  their  neighbours  the  Lissi  and    Daorsi,   tribes  under  Roman  Dalma- 

protection,  roused  the  Roman  Government  for  a  time  to  the  sense  of  f^^fi^- 

its  extended   responsibihties  ;   and  the   consul   of    156,   C.   Marcius 

Figulus,  conducted  a  campaign  against  them  with  varied  fortunes. 


538 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Wars  in 

Spain, 

155-^39- 


Seep.  462. 


(7)  The 
Lusitani. 


L. 

Mummius, 

154-133' 


M.  Atilius, 

153-152- 
S.Sulpicius 
Galba, 
151-150. 


Treacher- 
ous 

massacre 
of  the 
Lusitani, 
ISO. 


It  was  reserved  for  Scipio  Nasica,  consul  for  155,  to  subdue  an 
enemy  who  survived  to  give  trouble  as  late  as  the  time  of  Augustus. 
From  this  time  also  the  Romans  were  engaged  in  the  West 
with  some  of  the  most  resolute  and  dangerous  enemies  they  had 
ever  encountered.  The  value  of  Spain  to  the  Roman  merchants,  the 
wealth  extracted  from  her  mines,  was  so  great,  that  in  spite  of  con- 
stant disasters  the  struggle  was  continually  renewed.  The  war  was 
twofold  :  that  with  the  Lusitani,  living  south  of  the  Douro,  in  what 
is  now  Portugal,  leading  to  the  eight  years'  struggle  with  Viriathus  ; 
and  that  with  the  Celtiberian  tribes,  especially  the  Vaccaei  and 
Arevaci,  culminating  in  the  heroic  resistance  and  final  destruction 
of  Numantia.  The  settlement  of  Gracchus  (176)  seems  to  have 
secured  quiet  for  a  time  in  Spain.  For  the  outbreak  which  now 
occurred,  after  twenty-three  years,  the  conduct  of  the  Roman 
praetors  may  very  likely  be  in  great  part  responsible.  Still  it  is 
to  be  remembered  that  the  mutual  depredations  of  robber  tribes 
must  have  caused  constant  complications,  and  that  governors  sent 
out  to  thus  struggle  with  Chaos  must  not  be  always  judged  by 
ordinary  rules. 

The  troubles  were  begun  by  raids  of  the  Lusitanians  upon  tribes 
under  Roman  protection.  The  south  of  Baetica  was  overrun,  and 
the  praetors  Manilius  and  Calpurnius  Piso  (155)  suffered  more  than 
one  defeat,  though  the  Lusitanian  leader  Punicus  fell  in  the  course 
of  the  campaign.  His  successor  Caesareas  again  defeated  the 
praetor  L.  Mummius  (154-153),  killing  9000  men  and  taking  many 
standards.  Mummius,  however,  afterwards  repaired  this  disaster 
and  recovered  the  standards  ;  and  moving  northward  to  the  Douro 
defeated  an  army  under  Caucaenus,  relieved  the  town  of  Ocelum 
{f  Ciudad  Rodrigo\  and  was  allowed  a  triumph.  His  successor  M. 
Atilius  (152)  made  Httle  progress  ;  and  in  151  Ser.  Sulpicius  Galba 
found  the  Lusitani  still  harassing  the  obedient  tribes.  He  attacked 
them  at  first  with  some  success,  but  finally  lost  heavily  in  a  carelessly 
conducted  pursuit,  and  was  obliged  to  go  into  winter  quarters  at 
Conistergis,  on  the  extreme  south  of  Lusitania.  Next  spring,  how- 
ever, he  was  assisted  by  the  consul  L.  Licinius  Lucullus,  who 
was  engaged  on  the  Celtiberian  war,  and  the  two  entered  the 
Lusitanian  territory  in  different  directions.  The  Lusitani  in 
alarm  offered  a  submission,  which  Galba  accepted  with  a  promise 
of  redressing  their  grievances  by  a  grant  of  new  territory,  if  they 
would  meet  him  in  three  separate  parties.  The  people  not  only 
unsuspiciously  assembled  at  the  places  named,  but  consented  to 
deliver  up  their  arms,  as  being  no  longer  needed  now  that  they  were 
under  Roman  protection,  and  were  then  treacherously  massacred  by 
Galba's  order.     Among  the  few  who  escaped  was  a  shepherd  named 


xxxiii  VIRIATHUS  TAKES  THE  LEAD  539 

Viriathus,  who  was  to  show  for  the  next  nine  years  what  desperate  Viriathus. 
patriotism  could  do.  Galba  was  denounced  at  home  by  the  tribune 
L.  Scribonius  Libo  and  in  the  last  speech  ever  delivered  by  the  aged 
Cato.  But  though  brought  to  trial  on  his  return,  his  subtle  oratory 
or  his  great  wealth  secured  his  acquittal ;  and  in  spite  of  numerous 
scandals  connected  with  private  business  transactions,  as  well  as  the 
complaints  of  the  army  as  to  the  embezzlement  of  the  Lusitanian 
spoil,  he  escaped  unscathed,  and  was  consul  in  144,  when  he  even  had 
the  assurance  to  demand  to  be  sent  again  to  Spain, — one  of  the 
earliest  as  well  as  the  most  flagrant  instances,  soon  to  be  too 
common,  of  wealth  dishonestly  acquired  securing  its  own  immunity. 

The  Lusitani,  however,  were  for  the  present  reduced  to  taking  Gains 
refuge  in  the  mountains,  and  it  was  not  until    147  that  the  praetor   Vetiluis 
Vetilius  found  them  collected  in  formidable  numbers.      A  party  of  P^^^^^^> 
them  were    besieged    in    a    stronghold    and  were   on   the   point  of 
surrendering,  when  Viriathus,  who   happened   to  be   among   them, 
urged    them   to    hold  out   in  view  of  the  former  treachery  of  the 
Romans,    and    being    elected    leader    by  acclamation    contrived    to 
extricate  them.      Before  long  he  decoyed  Vetilius  into  an  ambush, 
where  the  praetor,  who  was  old,  fat,  and  inactive,  lost  his  own  life 
with  that  of  4000  men.      Two  other  praetors.  Gains   Plautius  and 
Claudius    Unimanus   (146-145)   were   in    their    turn  baffled  by  the 
skill   of  the  new  leader  and  the   re-awakened    enthusiasm    of  his 
people,  and  expiated  their  misfortune  or  incapacity  by  condemnation 
at  Rome. 

But  now  that  Carthage  had  fallen,  and  Greece  had  been  subdued,  Q.  Fabius 
the  Senate  determined  that  such  a  state  of  affairs  in  Spain  should  ^laximus 
no  longer  be  tolerated.  The  consul  Q.  Fabius  Maximus  Aemilianus, 
younger  son  of  the  conqueror  of  Macedonia,  was  sent  against  ^^^. ' 
Viriathus  with  two  legions.  After  devoting  the  winter  to  the 
training  of  his  new  levies,  he  proceeded  against  him  in  144  by  the 
Fabian  method  of  dogging  his  steps  without  offering  battle,  until  at 
length  the  opportunity  came  of  striking  a  blow.  Viriathus  beaten 
in  the  field  was  obliged  to  shut  himself  up  in  .a  fortress,  while 
Fabius  wintered  at  Corduba.  But  Viriathus  was  not  at  the  end  of 
his  resources;  he  instigated  a  revolt  of  the  Celtiberian  tribes,  the 
Aravaci,  Titthi,  and  Belli  ;  and  having  thus  caused  the  Romans 
trouble  in  the  upper  province,  he  turned  again  into  Lusitania  and 
defeated  the  praetor  Quintius, — the  proconsul  Fabius  having  now 
apparently  returned  to  Rome, — and  forced  him  to  take  up  his 
winter  quarters  at  Corduba  several  months  before  the  usual  time. 

A  consul   was   again  sent   in    142.      Q.   Fabius   Maximus    Ser-  q.  Fabius 

vilianus  was  apparently  successful  in  his  first  year  ;  but  either  from  Maximus 

policy   or  from  reverses  in  his  second  he  listened  to  proposals  of  ^^*^^^- 

lanus,  142- 

141. 


S40 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


peace  from  Viriathus,  and  made  a  treaty  which  was  confirmed  by 
the  people.  But  his  brother  and  successor  Q.  ServiHus  Caepio 
persuaded  the  Senate  that  it  was  unworthy  of  their  dignity  to 
negotiate  with  Viriathus.  The  Senate  at  first  suggested  that 
Caepio,  without  openly  renouncing  the  treaty,  should  covertly  irritate 
Viriathus  ;  and  presently,  on  some  pretext  probably  thus  obtained 
from  Viriathus  himself,  again  proclaimed  war. 

Caepio  overtook  Viriathus  in  the  territory  of  the  Carpetani 
with  such  superior  numbers  that  the  Lusitanian  did  not  venture 
to  give  battle  ;  but  skilfully  eluded  him  and  enabled  the  greater 
part  of  his  army  to  escape.  Next  year  (139)  Caepio  was  sup- 
ported by  the  army  of  the  upper  province  under  M.  Popilius,  and 
thereupon  Viriathus  felt  it  necessary  to  attempt  negotiations.  One 
after  the  other  of  the  Roman  demands  was  accepted,  even  to  the 
surrender  of  many  of  his  countrymen  and  of  his  own  relations.  But 
when  finally  the  Roman  proconsul  demanded  the  surrender  of  all  arms, 
Viriathus  determined  on  resistance.  Caepio  however  had  corrupted 
his  agents,  who  contrived  to  murder  him  in  his  sleep,  and  when 
they  asked  for  their  reward  he  had  the  assurance  to  answer  that  the 
Romans  did  not  approve  of  the  murder  of  a  general  by  his  own 
soldiers.  His  fellow-countrymen  honoured  Viriathus  with  a  splendid 
funeral,  and  for  a  time  attempted  to  continue  the  war  under  a  new 
chief  named  Tantalus.  But  he  proved  incapable  of  the  task,  and 
presently  most  of  them  surrendered  their  arms,  and  accepted  lands 
assigned  them  by  Caepio.  When  next  year  (138)  the  consul 
Decimus  Brutus  was  sent  into  Lusitania  he  turned  his  arms  to  the 
North,  took  the  strong  town  of  Talabriga,  and  penetrated  far  into  the 
territory  of  the  Callaeci  {Gallicia).  It  is  to  his  campaigns  that  the 
pacification  of  Lusitania  was  mainly  due,  though  even  after  them 
there  were  renewals  of  disorder,  and  in  98  L.  Cornelius  Dolabella, 
and  in  93  P.  Licinius  Crassus,  celebrated  triumphs  over  the  Lusitani. 

Side  by  side  with  this  a  still  more  difficult  war  had  been  going 
on  with  the  Celtiberians,  so  fiercely  contested  and  so  dangerous, 
that  it  was  difficult  to  enrol  soldiers  or  induce  officers  to  give  in 
their  names  for  it.  This  "fiery  war,"  as  it  was  called,  began  with 
Segede,  a  town  of  the  Belli.  On  being  ordered  to  desist  from 
rebuilding  their  walls  and  to  supply  a  contingent  of  troops  and  a 
contribution  of  money,  the  Segedeans  replied  that  the  settlement  of 
Gracchus  only  forbade  the  forming  of  new  fortifications,  and  ex- 
pressly exempted  them  from  such  obligations.  The  former  plea  was  I 
probal3ly  an  evasion  ;  the  latter  may  have  been  well  grounded  :  but  | 
the  Senate  replied  that  all  such  exemptions  were  granted  "  during 
pleasure,"  and  prepared  to  enforce  its  orders.  The  consuls  entered 
on  their  office  on  the  ist  of  January  instead  of  the  15th  of  March, 


XXXIII  DIFFICULTIES  OF  THE  SPANISH  WAR  541 

expressly  that  an  army  might  be  promptly  sent  off  ;i   and  Q.  Fulvius  Coss.  Q. 
Nobilior  arrived  early  in  the  northern  province  of  Spain  with  an  Fi^l'vius 
army  of  nearly  30,000  men.      But  the  people  of  Segede,  abandoning   rS  ^ J°'^\ 
their  town,  took  refuge  with  the  Arevaci,  and  the  combmed  army  Luscus, 
decisively  defeated  Nobilior  with  the  loss  of  6000  Roman  soldiers,  yj-j. 
The  battle  was  on  the  day  of  the  Vulcanalia  (23rd  August),  which 
was  always  afterwards   regarded   as   unlucky.       Nobilior  sustained  Defeat  of 
fresh  losses  under  the  walls  of  Numantia,  in  which  the  Arevaci  and  Nobilior. 
their  allies  had  secured   themselves,   in  spite   of  the   assistance   of 
Numidian   cavalry   and   elephants    sent    by   Masannasa,    and    after 
several  other  minor  disasters  and  the  loss  of  his  magazines  at  Ocelum, 
he  went  into  winter  quarters,  where  he  again  lost  largely  from  sick- 
ness and  shortness  of  food. 

His  successor,  M.  Claudius  Marcellus,  was  somewhat  more  for-  M. 
tunate.    The  Titthi  and  Belli  at  once  submitted,  and  with  the  Arevaci  Claudius 
sent  ambassadors  to  plead  their  cause  before  the  Senate.     He  himself  ^^^^^^^^^^^ 
was  in  favour  of  peace,  and  had  already  conciliated  the  natives  by  the 
mild  treatment  of  Ocelum  and  Nercobriga,  which  he  had  recovered  ; 
and  on   going   into   winter  quarters   at   Corduba    had    taken    steps 
for  establishing  a  mixed  community  of  natives  and  permanent  Roman 
residents,  hardly  to  be  distinguished  from  a  colony — a  title,  indeed, 
which   Strabo  gives  it.^     But  the   Senate  would  not  consent.     The 
envoys  of  the  Titthi  and  Belli,  received  as  friends,  warned  the  Senate   The 
against  their  late  allies  the  Arevaci,  and  against  diminishing  their  Titthi, 
forces  in  Spain  ;  and  when  the  legates  of  the  Arevaci,  not  admitted  ^^^^>  '^^^ 
within  the  walls,  had  an  audience  of  the  Senate,  they  showed  such  ^^^^  j^i 
haughty  determination  to  claim  the  full  settlement  of  Gracchus  that 
they  were  dismissed  without  an  answer,  and  orders  were  despatched 
to  Marcellus  to  continue  the  war. 

The  consul  Lucullus,  however,  was  sent  as  soon  as  possible  to  L.  Licinius 
supersede  him,  but  found  the  greatest  difficulty  in  getting  military  Lucullus, 
tribunes  or  legati  or  soldiers.      At  this  crisis  Scipio  Aemilianus,  then  ^^^' 
thirty-four  years  old,  imitating  his  adoptive  grandfather,  the  elder 
Africanus,   volunteered  for   the   service.      His   example  had  a  good 
effect  in  inducing  others  to  undertake  the  duty  ;  and  by  forcing  all 
on  whom  the  lot  fell  in  the  tribes  to  serve,  an  army  was  got  together. 
When  Lucullus  arrived  in  Spain  he  found  that,  in  spite  of  the  Senate, 
Marcellus  had  made  terms  with  the  Arevaci.      But  he  was  deter- 
mined not  to  be  baulked  of  his  chance  of  reputation  and  wealth. 

1  The  consular  year  henceforth,  though  apparently  at  first  with  some  excep- 
tions, begins  on  the  ist  of  January,  the  new  arrangement  being  found  more 
convenient. 

2  Yet  like  Italica,  Aquae  Sextiae,  and  other  extra  Italian  settlements,  it  had 
not  the  full  rank  of  a  colony. 


542  HISTORY  OF  ROME 


The  Carpetani,  a  protected  tribe,  complained  of  raids  committed 
upon  their  territory  by  the  Vaccaei.  Lucullus  without  orders  from 
the  Senate  attacked  them,  and  massacred  the  people  of  Cauca 
with  such  treachery  that  the  neighbouring  inhabitants,  rather  than 
yield,  burnt  what  they  could  not  move  of  their  property  and  fled  to 
the  mountains.  He  then  laid  siege  to  Intercatia,  the  inhabitants  of 
which,  warned  by  the  treachery  practised  on  the  people  of  Cauca, 
held  out  obstinately,  and  only  surrendered  at  length  on  the  personal 
guarantee  of  Scipio — who  had  distinguished  himself  during  the  siege 
by  a  single  combat  with  a  champion  of  the  Vaccaei — that  the  terms 
should  be  respected.  The  Roman  army  had  suffered  severely  before 
Intercatia  from  sickness  and  the  unaccustomed  food  ;  and  it  suffered 
still  more  before  Pallantia,  which  Lucullus  next  unsuccessfully 
attacked,  so  that  he  had  to  abandon  the  siege  and  retire  into  winter 
quarters  at  Corduba.  He  sent  Scipio  to  Masannasa  for  more  ele- 
phants, and  next  year  (150)  joined  Galba  in  the  invasion  of  Lusitania. 
Disappointed  in  the  hope  of  finding  stores  of  silver  and  gold  among 
the  Vaccaei,  who,  in  fact,  were  a  tribe  farming  land  in  common,  and 
neither  possessing  nor  valuing  the  precious  metals,  he  yet  returned 
to  Rome  rich  and  infamous  to  found  a  temple  to  Felicitas. 
After  an  During  the  next  six  years,  which  witnessed  great  events  in  Greece 

i7iterval  of  ^^^  Africa,  there  was  comparative  quiet  in  northern  Spain.  It  was 
^lAQ-iA^)  ^^^  ^^^^  ^43  ^^^^  Viriathus,  who  had  been  all  along  maintaining  the 
the  struggle  in  Lusitania,  succeeded  in  instigating  the  Arevaci  to  move 

Numan-       once  more,  and  that  a  consul  was  again  sent  against  them  with  a 
ttne  war  is  i^j-ge  army.    Q.  Caecilius  Metellus,  the  conqueror  of  the  Macedonian 
egun  y       pretender,  found  the  Arevaci  engaged  in  harvest,  and  without  much 
Caecilius      difficulty  reduced  the   open   countiy  to   submission.      But  the  towns 
Metellus,      still  held  out,  especially   Termantia,  Numantia,  and   Contrebia,  and 
^43-142-       Metellus,  whose  character  for  strict  discipline,  prudence,  and  humanity 
was  much  enhanced  by  his  two  campaigns,  left   a  thoroughly  trained 
army  for  his  successor  Q.  Pompeius  Rufus,  but  deliberately  weakened, 
it  is  said,  by  wholesale  grants  of  furloughs,  remissions  of  service,  and 
waste  of  stores,  from  dislike  of  Pompeius.  1 

Though  Metellus  had  beaten  the  enemy  in  the  field  and  taken 
many  towns,  Termantia  and  Numantia  still  held  out ;  and  Pompeius 
began  his  command  by  an  attempt  on  Numantia.  Failing  to  make 
an  impression  he   transferred  his  attack  to   Termantia  with  equal 

^  This  story  is  told  by  Valerius  Maximus  (ix.  3,  7),  and  is  rather  inconsistent 
with  the  words  of  Appian  (vi.  76),  who  says  that  he  handed  over  "an  army  of 
30,000  infantry  and  2000  cavalry  in  a  most  excellent  state  of  disci])line. "  It  may 
have  been  invented  by  Pompeius  or  his  friends  to  account  for  his  own  failure. 
Similar  complaints  were  afterwards  made  against  Pompeius  himself,  probably 
with  more  foundation. 


XXXIII  MORE  DISASTERS  IN  SPAIN  543 

want  of  success.      He  then  began  a  regular  investment  of  Numantia,  Investment 
throwing  up  earthworks  and  diverting  the  river,  in  order  to  starve  it  </  Numan- 
out.     But  his  workmen  were  cut  off  by  saUies  of  the  besieged  ;  he    ^^'  ^'^^' 
lost  heavily  in   an  ambush  ;  and  finally  was  glad  to  go  into  winter 
quarters  to  train  the  new  levies,  which  had  come  to  replace  many  of 
the  veterans  of  Metellus,  and  there  to  receive  proposals  of  peace. 
He  demanded  openly  the  usual  submission  to  Rome,  return  of  fugi- 
tives and  deserters,  and  payment  of  money  :  but  at  the  same  time  he 
pledged  himself  to  certain  secret  articles  in  favour  of  the  Numan- 
tines,  which,  on  the  arrival  of  his  successor  M.  Popilius  Laenas,  he 
had  the  effrontery  to  repudiate,  in  spite  of  the  presence  of  Roman 
officers  who  were  witnesses  of  his  promise. 

Popilius  referred  both  parties  to  the  Senate,  who  decided  that  A^.  Popilius 
the  war  was  to  go  on.     But   Popilius   accomplished   nothing,   and  Laenas, 
Numantia  was  still  untouched  when  he  was  relieved  at  the  end  of  ^•^9-^sS- 
his  second  year  by  C.  Hostilius  Mancinus. 

Mancinus   was  still  more  unfortunate.      He  was  decisively   de-  Cos.  C. 
feated  and  obliged  to  take  refuge  in  a  disused  camp  of  Nobilior's,  Hostilius 
which  was  not  secure.      He  was  only  saved  from  utter  destruction  by     ^^^^^"^^^> 
the  influence  of  his  young  quaestor  Tiberius  Gracchus,  whose  name  Aemilius 
and  character  induced  the   Numantines  to  accept  a  treaty  acknow-  Lepidus, 
ledging  their  independence,  and  adopting  them  as  friends  of  Rome  ^37-^3^- 
on  equal  terms.      Mancinus  was  superseded  by  the  other  consul  M. 
Aemilius  Lepidus,  and  summoned  home  with  the  Numantine  legates 
to  state  his  case.    Meanwhile  Lepidus,  while  the  question  of  Numantia 
was  thus  pending,  indulged  his  desire  of  reputation  and  plunder  by 
invading  the  Vaccaei,  on  the  plea  that  they  had  supplied  the  enemy 
with   provisions.      The   Senate,    however,   quickly   decided   that  the 
treaty  with  Numantia  should  be  annulled,  and  Mancinus  was  sent 
back  stripped  and  handed  over  to  the  enemy,  who,  however,  refused 
to  receive  him.i     Orders  were  sent  to  Lepidus  to  withdraw  from  the  Siege  of 
expedition  against  the  Vaccaei  and  the  siege  of  their  capital  Pallantia,  ^^^^^«^^^- 
and  to  resume  the  siege  of  Numantia.     He,  however,  ventured  to  dis- 
obey, on  the  grounds  that  the  Senate  were  not  acquainted  with  the 
facts — that  the  Vaccaei  were   supplying   Numantia  with  food  ;   that 
he  was  actually  in  their  country  ;  that  Decimus  Brutus  was  assisting 
him ;  and  that,  if  he  retired  now,  Roman  prestige  would  be  ruined. 
Eventually,  however,  he  and  Brutus  had  to  raise  the  siege  of  Pal- 
lantia,  abandoning  their  sick   and   wounded,    and   pursued  by  the 

^  Plutarch  says  that  Mancinus  was  an  excellent  man,  but  supremely  unlucky. 
All  sorts  of  omens  are  said  to  have  foretold  his  misfortune,  as,  for  instance,  a 
voice  was  heard  as  he  embarked,  exclaiming,  "Mane,  mane,  Mancine "  (Valer. 
i.  6,  7).  His  return  to  Rome  after  his  surrender  gave  rise  to  a  dispute  as  to 
whether  he  had  lost  his  citizenship. 


i 


544 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Q- 

Calpurnius 
Piso,  Tjs- 


triumphant  Pallantians.  Brutus  recouped  his  reputation  by  a  briUiant 
campaign  in  the  next  year,  but  Lepidus  was  recalled,  brought  to  trial, 
and  fined.  His  successor  Piso,  from  fear  or  prudence,  did  not 
approach  Numantia  at  all,  but  spent  his  year  of  office  in  aimless 
movements  in  Carpetania  and  the  territory  of  Pallantia.  It  was 
time  that  some  man  of  military  reputation  and  tried  character 
should  take  the  place  of  these  incompetent  magistrates,  who  owed 
their  position  to  ability  in  the  Forum  or  family  interest. 

All  eyes  were  turned  to  the  conqueror  of  Carthage.  Scipio  was 
now  about  fifty-two  years  old.  He  had  been  in  Spain  in  1 51-150, 
and  had  done  good  service  there.  In  the  third  Punic  war  his 
character  had  made  him  the  only  possible  person  to  finish  what  the 
incompetence  or  corruption  of  others  seemed  to  render  hopeless, 
and  this  appeared  an  occasion  of  a  similar  kind.  Without  being  a 
candidate  for  the  consulship,  and  in  spite  of  the  law,i  he  was  unani- 
mously elected  by  all  the  centuries,  and  the  Iberian  war  was  assigned 
as  his  province.  He  made  no  new  levy,  but  was  accompanied  by 
5000  volunteers,  and  a  corps  of  500  personal  friends  under  the  com- 
mand of  his  nephew  Buteo.  On  his  arrival  at  the  camp  his  first 
task  was  the  restoration  of  discipline.  He  expelled  all  non-com- 
batants— traders,  soothsayers,  priests,  and  harlots  ;  sternly  suppressed 
the  luxury  which  the  slackness  or  corruption  of  previous  commanders 
had  connived  at ;  reduced  the  kit  of  the  soldiers  to  a  saucepan, 
drinking  cup,  and  spit ;  and  caused  the  waggons  and  sumpter  cattle 
to  be  sold.  He  would  not  engage  in  any  warlike  movements  till  he 
judged  his  men  fitted  by  a  long  series  of  labour  and  training  for 
service  on  the  field.  Towards  the  end  of  the  year  he  led  them  by  a 
circuitous  march  to  Numantia,  where  he  was  joined  by  Jugurtha  with 
elephants,  archers,  and  slingers.  There  he  formed  a  winter  camp, 
and  set  his  men  to  work  to  regularly  invest  the  town  and  throw  up 
every  kind  of  siege  work  before  it.  Among  those  who  came  from 
Rome  with  him  was  young  Gaius  Marius  on  his  first  campaign, 
destined  many  years  later  to  scourge  the  corruption  and  weakness  of 
the  Optimates  ;  and  here  he  must  have  met  for  the  first  time  with 
Jugurtha,  whose  intrigues  with  these  venal  nobles  were  to  give  him 
the  opportunity  he  required. 

Numantia  was  an  unwalled  town,  but  situated  on  a  steep  emi- 
nence which  could  only  be  approached  on  one  side,  where  it  was 
defended  by  ditches  and  other  works.  Scipio  constructed  a  line  of 
fortifications  and  trenches  outside  these  along  an  arc  measuring  about 

1  The  holding  of  the  consulship  a  second  time  appears  to  have  been  forbidden  I 
by  a  law  about  B.C.  151,  but  we  do  not  know  the  name  or  exact  date  of  the  law.  ™ 
But  this  second  consulship  of  Scipio  is  the  only  example  between  151  and  104, 
when  Marius  was  consul  for  the  second  time. 


Numantia, 


XXXIII  FALL  OF  NUMANTIA  545 

three  miles  ;  and  jfinding  that  the  besieged  could  still  get  provisions 
up  the  river  Douro,  he  built  a  fort  on  each  bank  and  connected  them 
with  cables  and  chains,  keeping  a  floating  dam  of  blocks  of  wood 
armed  with  spikes  across  the  stream.      Thus  cut  off  from  supplies, 
the    Numantines  in  vain  attempted  to  break  through  his  lines,  on 
which  a  careful  system  of  signals  secured  prompt  help  for  the  point 
attacked.     Through  the  winter,  spring,  and  summer  (134-133)  the  Horrible 
garrison  held  out  until  reduced  to  eating  the  corpses  of  the  slain,  and  sufferings 
even  to  killing  the  weak  or  sick  for  food.      One  body  of  400  men  ''/^'^^ . 
managed  to  escape  and  tried  to  rouse  neighbouring  cities  to  bring  ^^^^^ 
aid.      But  Scipio  discovered  where  they  were,  compelled  their  sur- 
render,  and    caused   their  hands    to   be  chopped  off.      Reduced  to  Stirrender 
despair,  at  length  they  accepted  Scipio's  demand  of  unconditional  '/ 
surrender, — though  even  then  many  preferred  suicide  ;  and  it  was  not 
till  the  third  day  after  the  surrender  had  been  agreed  upon  that  the 
miserable  survivors  appeared,  scarcely  human  in  aspect,  wolfish  from 
hunger,  horrible  from  filth,  with  long  shaggy  hair,  and  bodies  scarcely 
clothed  in  rags.     Scipio  selected  fifty  to  adorn  his  triumph,  and  sold 
the  rest  as  slaves.      The  town  he  completely  destroyed — a  matter  of 
trifling  labour  compared  with  his  task  at  Carthage.     The  Senate  had 
given  no  order  for  this  destruction,  but  made  no  objection,  and  Scipio 
adopted  the  additional  name   of  Numantinus   after  his  triumph  in 
132.     The  territory  was  divided  among  loyal  natives,  others  being 
punished  according  to  their  several  degrees  of  guilt.     The  Arevaci 
were  not,  after  all,  either  destroyed  or  wholly  subdued  ;  but   there 
was  comparative  peace  for  some  time,  and  it  was  not  till  95-94  that 
Titus  Didius,  after  taking  Temessus  and  Colida,  and  killing  20,000 
men,  forced  them  definitely  to  abandon  walled  towns. 

Authorities. — For  the  Lusitanian  wars  and  Viriathus,  Appian  vi.  56,  75  ; 
Livy,  Ep.  xlix.  liii.  liv.  ;  Velleius  ii.  i ;  Diodorus  Sic.  xxxiii.  fr.  ;  Dio  Cassius, 
^^'  Tit  75 ;  Orosius  v.  4.  For  the  Celtiberian  and  Numantine  war,  Polybius 
XXXV.  1-5;  Appian  vi.  45-55;  76-100;  Livy,  Ep.  xlvii.  xlviii.  liv. -Ivii.  lix.  ;  Velleius 
ii.  4  ;  Florus  ii.  17;  Orosius  v.  5,  7 ;  Eutropius  iv.  8;  Plutarch,  Tib.  Gracchus  5; 
Diodorus  Sic.  xxxiii.  For  anecdotes  of  Metellus  see  Frontinus  iv.  i,  23;  iv. 
7,  42;  Valerius  Max.  v.  1,5;  vii.  4,  5, 


The 

Arevaci  in 
the  future. 


2  N 


CHAPTER  XXXIV 

SERVILE    WARS    IN    SICILY 

State  of  Sicily  since  205 — Speculations  in  land — Miseries  of  the  slaves — Disorders 
in  the  island  from  about  139 — Murder  of  Demophilus,  and  organisation  of 
rebellion  under  Eunusand  Cleon — Defeat  of  the  praetors — M.  Perpenna  retakes 
Henna — Defeat  of  Hypsaeus — Campaigns  of  C.  Fulvius  Flaccus  (134-132)  and 
P.  Rupilius — Capture  of  Tauromenium — The  lex  Rupilia  (132) — Second  war 
in  103 — Fraudulent  reduction  to  slavery — Legal  decisions  of  Licinius  Nerva 
liberating  800  slaves — Protests  by  the  landowners — Outbreak  under  Tryphon 
and  Athenion — L.  Licinius  Lucullus  (103-102) — C.  Servilius  (102-101) — 
M'.Aquillius  ends  the  war  (101-99). 

The  Spanish  wars  had  brought  into  prominence  the  unworthiness 
of  some  of  the  new  nobility.  As  they  were  ending,  the  troubles  at 
Rome  in  connexion  with  the  legislation  of  Tiberius  Gracchus  showed 
the  dangers  that  underlay  society  in  Italy,  and  gave  a  foretaste  of 
the  violence  soon  to  become  frequent  in  the  capital.  Contemporary 
with  this  last  an  insurrection  of  slaves  in  Sicily  threw  a  lurid  light 
upon  another  plague  spot  in  Roman  civilisation. 
Sicily  from  For  sixty  years  after  the  expulsion  of  the  Carthaginians  and  the 

■^^J-  absorption  of  the  kingdom  of  Syracuse,  Sicily  had  apparently  enjoyed 

continuous    prosperity.      Its  fruitful    plains  were  rich  with  corn,  its 
hills  covered  with  sheep,  its  harbours  crowded  with  merchant  vessels, 
and  its  towns  still  decorated  with  some  of  the  masterpieces  of  Greek 
art.      It  was,  on  the  whole,  peacefully  administered  by  its  praetor  or 
propraetor,  with  two  quaestors,  one  at  Syracuse  and  the  other  at  Lily- 
baeum,  and  had  come  to  be  regarded  as  almost  an  integral  part  of 
Roman  territory,  "a  suburban  province."      Nevertheless  a  large  pro- 
portion of  the  men  and  women  living  in  it  were  in  a  most  miserable 
Position  of  position.     The  richness  of  its  soil  had  caused  Roman  speculators  to 
land  tenure  buy  up  large  estates,  which  they  cultivated  exclusively  by  gangs  of 
m  Sicily,      slaves,  native  or  foreign,  generally  without  residing  on  their  properties 
or  taking  proper  measures  even  for  the  bare  support  of  the  men  who 
produced  their  wealth,  and  whom  they  encouraged  to  supply  their 


J 


CHAP.  XXXIV  THE  SLAVES  IN  SICILY  547 

necessities  by  open  brigandage.  Some  of  the  wealthier  natives,  who 
had  retained  or  purchased  estates,  followed  the  bad  example  and  even 
bettered  the  instruction :  so  that  Sicily  is  described  as  rapidly  becoming  Disturbed 
a  constant  scene  of  robbery  and  murder,  scarcely  safe  for  living  in  state  of  the 
outside  the  walls  of  a  town,  or  for  peaceful  travellers  to  traverse,  ^^^^^^y- 
The  praetors  from  time  to  time  attempted  to  restrain  these  disorders  ; 
but  the  masters  of  the  slaves  were  influential  at  Rome,i  and  could  pro- 
cure the  prosecution  and  probable  condemnation  of  any  praetor  who 
offended  them  ;  and  the  magistrates,  therefore,  often  preferred  to 
share  the  profits  of  the  speculators  as  the  price  of  a  convenient 
blindness.  The  slaves,  besides  the  habits  of  robbery  almost  forced 
on  them,  had  terrible  wrongs  to  avenge.  The  horrible  life  of  the  Wrongs  of 
ergastula,  the  heavy  chains  in  which  they  had  often  to  work,  the  ^^^  slaves. 
brandings  and  the  blows,  the  wrongs  to  women  and  children,  and  in 
many  cases  the  fraudulent  proceedings  by  which  they  had  lost  their 
freedom,  all  contributed  to  swell  the  storm  of  just  resentment  now  to 
burst  upon  the  rich  landowners.  Large  numbers  of  slaves  had  been 
imported  into  the  island  from  the  East  ;  but  there  were  also  numerous 
natives  who  in  the  various  sieges  and  battles  had  been  reduced  to 
this  state  :  so  that  some  must  have  been  peculiarly  exasperated  by 
serving  on  the  lands  which  they  or  their  fathers  had  once  owned.  Of 
all  wars  that  of  slaves  against  their  masters  is  the  most  equitable  and 
even  praiseworthy  ;  yet  the  pent-up  rage  actuating  it,  and  the  absence 
of  the  conventions  tending  in  some  degree  to  mitigate  a  contest 
between  belligerent  nations,  make  it  too  often  bloody  and  cruel 
beyond  other  wars.  Women  and  children  have  to  suffer  for  the 
sins  of  husbands  and  fathers  ;  and  the  brutality  which  their  own 
oppression  has  helped  to  create  is  exercised  in  all  its  horror  on  the 
oppressors. 

It  was  not  exclusively  or  mainly  against  Roman  masters  that  the   The 
rebellion  was  directed.      Native  owners,  while  aping  Roman  luxury,  insurrec- 
had  often  outdone  Romans  in  cruelty,  and  were  even  more  hated   ,^^^,  ^^^^ 
because  more  constantly  present.      It  was  on  the  estate  of  a  Sicilian  slaves 
Greek,  Demophilus  of  Henna,  that  the  insurrection  began.      He  and  of  Demo- 
his  wife  Megallis  had  gained  an  evil  eminence  in  inhumanity  to  their  philus  of 
slaves.      They  at  length  conspired  to  murder  them,  and  to  strike  for     ^^^^' 
freedom  under  the  leadership  of  a  certain  Syrian  slave  named  Eunus, 
who  had  acquired  great  influence  by  the  profession  of  magic  powers 

1  Diodorus  says  that  the  owners  were  mostly  eguites,  who  acted  as  judices  in 
the  prosecutions  of  the  praetors.  But  he  here  anticipates  the  law  of  Gains 
Gracchus  by  ten  years  :  at  this  time  judices  were  exclusively  senators  ;  still  they 
may  in  many  cases  have  been  interested  in  Sicilian  properties,  and  if  the  equites 
were  not  yet  sitting  on  juries,  they  were  wealthy  men  and  might  at  any  time  become 
senators  and  so  judices. 


548  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap. 

and  the  performance  of  some  magic  tricks.  Collecting  a  body  of  400 
men  the  slaves  seized  Henna,  killing  men,  violating  women,  and 
dashing  out  the  brains  of  children.  Demophilus  and  Megallis  M^ere 
dragged  from  their  country  house  to  the  theatre  at  Henna  and  there 
torn  to  pieces.  Yet  even  in  the  height  of  their  rage  these  men 
proved  that  they  were  not  lost  to  all  feelings  of  humanity.  A 
daughter  of  Demophilus,  who  had  been  conspicuous  for  her  kindness 
to  her  father's  slaves,  was  rescued  by  some  who  remembered  her 
beneficence  with  gratitude  and  conveyed  in  safety  to  relatives  at  a 
distance. 
Eunus  Eunus  was  now  proclaimed  king,  and  organised  a  regular  govern- 

proclaimed   j-^ent,  with  assembly  and  council  according  to  the  Greek  type.      The 

^^f'£^?Ilr  only  free  inhabitants  of  Henna  who  had  been  spared  were  the  workers 
overcomes  •'  r       1  1  • 

the  island,  in  iron,  who  were  now  forced  to  manufacture  weapons  for  the  multi- 
139-135-  tude  of  shepherds,  farm  labourers,  and  domestic  slaves  who  flocked 
to  Henna,  rudely  armed  with  axes,  scythes,  or  even  pointed  stakes 
hardened  in  the  fire,  and  iron  spits  snatched  from  kitchens.  Eunus 
soon  had  an  army  of  6000  men,  with  which  he  scoured  the  country, 
plundering  and  slaying.  One  praetor  after  another  sustained  defeat 
at  his  hands,  and  every  success  added  to  the  numbers  that  joined 
his  standard.  Another  formidable  rising  began  at  Segesta  under  a 
slave  named  Cleon,  who  joined  Eunus,  and  acknowledged  his  autho- 
rity ;  and  the  numbers  of  insurgents  soon  rose  to  20,000  and 
eventually  to  200,000  men,  nearly  every  city  in  Sicily,  except 
M.  Messana,  being  infected  with  the  contagion  of  disorder.      The  first 

Perpenna,  success  against  them  was  gained,  it  seems,  by  the  praetor  M.  Perpenna, 
^33'  ^j^Q  retook  Henna  (135).      But  his  successor  L.  Plautius  Hypsaeus 

L.Plautiiis  (124)  was  again  defeated  ;  and  the  consul  C.  Fulvius  Flaccus,  though 
174,  C.  '  ^^  ^^^  head  of  a  regular  army,  appears  to  have  been  only  partially 
Fulvius  successful.  When  P.  Rupilius  took  over  the  command  in  132  the 
Flaccus,  slaves  were  still  strong  enough  to  defeat  his  legate  and  son-in-law 
134-^32-  Q  Ysh'ms  and  seize  Tauromenium,  where  they  made  their  last  stand. 
P. Rupilius  'pj^g  town  and  citadel  of  Tauromenium  {Taormind)  were  all  but 
^■^^'  impregnable  ;  but,  as  the  slaves  had  no  means  of  getting  provisions 

by  sea,  it  might  be  starved  out :  and  this  Rupilius  proceeded  to  do. 
'Tn-^fl.  The  men  were  reduced  to  the  most  horrible  extremities  of  famine  ; 
until  a  certain  Serapion  having  betrayed  the  citadel,  and  Cleon  with 
a  brother  of  Eunus  having  fallen  in  an  attempt  to  break  out,  the 
city  was  surrendered.  Eunus,  who,  with  the  name  and  insignia,  had 
assumed  all  the  luxury  of  royalty,  escaped,  but  was  afterwards  captured, 
and  died  in  a  loathsome  prison  at  Morgantia. 

Similar  risings  at  Athens,  Delos,  and  other  places  had  been  mean- 
while suppressed  with  comparative  ease ;  no  slave  war  equalled  that 
of  Sicily  in  its  persistence  or  in  the  horrors  which  accompanied  it. 


Tauro- 


XXXIV  THE  RUPILIAN  SETTLEMENT  IN  SICILY  549 

Rupilius  followed  up  the  capture  of  Tauromenium  by  hunting  down  End  of 
fugitives,  and  punishing  many  hundreds  with  the  cross,  which  their  t^^  ^«''- 
outrages  no  doubt  were  considered  to  have  richly  deserved.      It  is 
unfortunate  that  such  saviours  of  society  seldom  think  of  redressing 
the  wrongs  which  give  rise  to  the  disturbances  punished  with  such 
applause.       Some   reform  in   the  administration  of   Sicily,   indeed, 
was  considered  to  be  necessary,  and  ten  commissioners  were  sent, 
with  whose  help  a  new  scheme  of  government  was  drawn  up,  known 
as  the  lex  Rupilia^  under  which,  according  to  Cicero,  Sicily  enjoyed  The  lex 
peace  and  prosperity  for  many  years.      But  this  charta,  though  it  Rupilia, 
may  have    improved    the    legal    status    of  the  Sicilians    and    their  ^j*^- 
relations    with    Roman   tax-gatherers    and    citizens    residing    there, 
appears   to  have   made   no   change   in   the   system  of  land   tenure 
or  the  position  of  the  slaves.      Perhaps,  warned  by  the  sufferings  Some  slave 
of  these   terrible   years,   masters   may  have  been   more   careful    to  grievances 
treat  their  slaves  with  some  approach  to  humanity.      But  one  griev-  ^«^^- 
ance,  at  any  rate,   was   left   unredressed,   the  reduction,  that   is,  of    ^^^^^  ' 
freemen  by  fraud  or  violence  to  the  condition  of  slavery  :  for  thirty 
years  later  a  fresh  rebellion  of  slaves  broke  out  in  Sicily,  which  had 
its  origin  in  a  matter  connected  with  this  point.      It  was  not,  indeed, 
in  Sicily  only  that  the  slave  question  was  causing  trouble.      There 
were  at  that  time  outbreaks  in  Italy  also — one  at  Nuceria  and  two 
at  Capua — the  latter  proving  so  dangerous  as  to  require  the  presence 
of  the   praetor   L.    Lucullus  with  a   legion   (103).      Almost   simul- 
taneous with  this  last  was  the  second  outbreak  in  Sicily. 

The  attention  of  the  Senate  had  been  called  to  the  question  by  The 
Nicomedes  of  Bithynia,  who  on  being  asked  to  supply  Marius  with  question  of 
a  contingent  for  the  Cimbrian  war,  complained  that  large  numbers  ^^^^S'^^ 
of  his  subjects  had   been  reduced   to   slavery  by  the  publicani  on  ^^^^  ^^^ 
various  oppressive  pretexts.      The  Senate  ordered  investigations  to 
be    held    in    the    provinces,  in    order    to    release    such    inhabitants 
of  the  free  or  allied  states  as  could  be  shown  to  have  been  thus 
illegally    enslaved.       In    Sicily    the    praetor    Licinius    Nerva    had 
already  declared  the  enfranchisement  of  more  than  800,  when  he 
was   assailed  by  such  vehement  protests  from  the  landowners  that 
he  grew  frightened  and  closed  his  court.      But  the  slaves  were  so 
much  agitated  by  the  hope  and  its  disappointment,  that  plots  for  a 
general  rising  were  at  once  made.     The  first,  under  a  certain  Varius, 
was  quickly  suppressed  ;  but  it  was  followed  by  another,  which  began 
with  the   murder   of  a  Roman  knight   by  his   slaves.      The   rebels 
elected  Salvius  (Tryphon)  king,  who  soon  found  himself  at  the  head 
of  20,000  men,  with  whom  he  besieged  Morgantia,  defeated   the 
praetor,  and  scoured  the  country  at  his  will.     A  similar  rising  began 
at  Segesta  under  Athenion,  also  proclaimed  king,  who,  being  joined 


550 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP.   XXXIV 


L.  Licinius 
Lucullus 
praetor, 
103. 

C. 

Servilius, 
102. 

M'.Aquil- 

lius, 

lOT-gg. 


not  only  by  slaves  but  by  the  poor  and  the  fliers  from  justice  in  every 
direction,  marched  to  the  Leontine  plains,  killing  all  who  refused 
to  submit.  The  hope  that  the  rivalry  of  Tryphon  and  Athenion 
would  ruin  the  slave  cause  was  disappointed  by  the  submission  of 
the  latter ;  and  the  united  forces  occupied  Triocala,  a  place  of  great 
strength  twelve  miles  from  Thermae  Selinuntiae,  where  Tryphon 
strongly  entrenched  himself,  and  collected  large  supplies.  The 
praetor  L.  Licinius  Lucullus  (103),  lately  engaged  in  suppressing 
a  rising  at  Capua,  was  now  sent  with  two  legions,  chiefly  of 
Roman  citizens,  with  which  he  defeated  Tryphon  in  the  field, 
and  compelled  him  to  shut  himself  up  in  Triocala  ;  but  from  want 
of  ability,  or,  as  was  believed,  from  corruption,  made  no  progress 
in  the  siege.  His  successor  Gains  Servilius  (102)  proved  equally 
ineffective,  and,  like  his  predecessor,  was  condemned  and  banished. 

But  Lilybaeum  and  Morgantia  had  both  held  out  against  the 
slaves,  whose  final  reduction  was  effected  by  the  consul  M'.Aquillius 
(loi),  who  won  a  great  battle,  in  which  Athenion  (now  sole  leader 
on  the  death  of  Tryphon)  was  killed.  Though  severely  wounded 
himself  he  continued  the  campaign  against  the  rebels,  and  gradually 
secured  peace  throughout  the  island.  In  99  he  was  awarded  an 
ovation,  in  which  some  of  his  captives  were  compelled  to  fight  with 
wild  beasts.  Like  his  predecessors  he  was  prosecuted  for  malver- 
sation ;  but,  unlike  them,  was  acquitted.  The  slave  wars  in  Sicily 
were  for  the  present  at  an  end  ;  and  the  slaves  so  strictly  forbidden 
to  bear  arms  that  L.  Domitius  Ahenobarbus,  praetor  about  96,  is 
said  to  have  crucified  a  slave  for  killing  a  boar  with  a  hunting  spear. 
But  the  evils  of  the  system  were  to  be  again  forcibly  illustrated 
when  Spartacus,  thirty  years  later,  was  able  for  nearly  three  years 
to  play  the  part  almost  of  another  Hannibal. 


Authorities. — (i. )  Diodorus  Sic.  xxxiv.  fr.  ;  Livy,  Ep.  Ivi. ;  Strabo  vi.  2,  6  ; 
Valerius  Max.  ii.  7,  3  ;  Florus  iii.  19  ;  Orosius  v,  6.  For  the  lex  Riipilia, 
chiefly  scattered  references  in  Cicero's  Verrine  Orations,  especially  2,  13,  §  32. 
(ii. )  For  the  second  war,  Diodorus  xxxvi.  fr.  ;   Livy,  Ep.  Ixix.  ;  Florus  iii.  19. 


I 


CHAPTER   XXXV 


THE    GRACCHI,     133-I21 


PROVINCES 

CENSUS 

Asia.          .... 

B.C. 

127 

B.C. 

142 

.       328,342 

Gallia  Narbonensis     . 

B.C. 

118 

B.C. 

136 

.       323,000 

B.C. 

131 

.       313.823 

COLONIES 

B.C. 

125 

•       390.736 

Fabrateria  (for  Fregellae)    . 

B.C. 

124 

B.C. 

IIS 

•       394.336 

Minervia  (Scylacium)  \ 
Neptunia  (Tarentum)  J 

B.C. 

122 

Junonia  (Carthage)  soon  dis- 

established 

B.C. 

122 

Narbo  Martius  . 

B.C. 

118 

Depopulation  of  Italy — The  ager  piiblicus — Tiberius  Sempronius  Gracchus, 
tribunus  plebis  in  133,  attempts  to  re-enforce  the  Licinian  law — Diffi- 
culties of  the  attempt — Deposition  of  his  colleague  Octavius — His  law 
passed  and  a  land  commission  formed — He  promises  other  reforms,  but 
is  killed  while  seeking  re-election  as  tribune  for  132  —  His  younger 
brother  Gaius  returns  to  Italy  in  132 — Supports  Carbo's  law  for  allowing 
re-election  of  tribunes — The  Italian  holders  of  ager  publicus  protest  against 
the  resumption  of  their  allotments — Scipio  supports  them  and  transfers  the 
judicial  power  of  the  commissioners  to  the  consuls — Death  of  Scipio  (129) — 
Foreign  affairs  from  129  to  125 — Gaius  Gracchus  in  Sardinia  (126-125) — 
Elected  tribune  for  123 — His  legislation  :  (i)  de provocatio7ie,  (2)  lex frumen- 
taria,  (3)  lex  militaris,  (4)  de  provinciis,  (5)  lex  judiciaria,  (6)  de  sociis — 
Collection  of  the  taxes  in  Asia — His  roads,  bridges,  and  colonies  at  Fabra- 
teria, Tarentum,  Capua,  and  Carthage — Outbidden  by  the  tribune  Livius 
Drusus — Not  re-elected  a  third  time  as  tribune  for  12 1 — Proposal  to  annul  his 
colony  of  Junonia  at  Carthage — Death  of  Gracchus  during  the  riot  on  the 
day  of  voting — Prosecution  of  his  followers — Results  of  the  movement. 


While  the  dangers  attending  the  multiplication  of  slaves  were  being  £,1^. 
illustrated   in  Sicily,  the  decrease   of  the   rural   population  and  the  appearance 
growth  of  poverty  among  the  free  were  becoming  serious  in  Italy,  of  free 


These  evils  are  said  to  have  struck  Tiberius  Gracchus,  son  of  the 


inhabitafits 


'  in  Italy. 

pacificator  of  Spain   and  grandson   of  the   great  Africanus,  as  he 


552  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap. 


travelled  through  Etruria  on  his  way  to  Spain  as  quaestor  in 
137.  The  country  was  cultivated  by  gangs  of  slaves,  and  seemed 
bare  of  free  inhabitants,  while  the  towns  and  especially  Rome 
were  full  of  citizens  struggling  with  poverty.  As  he  afterwards 
expressed  it,  "The  wild  beasts'  in  Italy  had  lairs  and  sleeping 
places,  but  those  who  fought  and  died  for  her  had  no  share  in 
anything  except  air  and  light."  Reflecting  on  these  things,  it 
The  ager  seems,  his  mind  recurred  to  the  management  of  the  ager  publicus^ 
pubhcus.  that  land  which  in  various  parts  of  conquered  Italy  had  nominally 
remained  in  the  ownership  of  the  State  when  not  assigned  to  coloni. 
Laelius  had  already  made  an  attempt  at  reform,  but  had  desisted 
for  fear  of  the  hostility  he  foresaw.  The  law  of  Licinius  (367), 
limiting  the  amount  of  this  land  to  be  held  by  any  one  person, 
had  never  been  repealed,  but  had  from  the  first  been  constantly 
evaded  and  was  now  almost  forgotten.  At  times  the  occupation  of 
this  land  had  been  allowed  on  such  easy  conditions  that  the  idea  of 
undisturbed  ownership  naturally  grew  up,  and  the  small  payment  to 
the  State  came  soon  to  be  regarded  as  a  tax  rather  than  a  rent. 
Sales,  mortgages,  marriage  settlements  extending  over  200  years 
had  confirmed  the  habit  of  regarding  it  in  the  light  of  absolute 
property. 
The  Though  such  land  probably  did  not  form  a  large  proportion  of 

^wtw"^  '^  ^^  estates  of  the  richest  men,  yet  it  was  sufficiently  important  to 
a  considerable  number  to  make  any  interference  with  it  a  task 
of  great  difficulty,  especially  to  one  who,  like  Gracchus,  belonged 
by  birth  and  every  kind  of  tie  to  the  class  most  affected.  He 
and  his  brother  Gaius  were  the  surviving  sons  of  a  large  family 
born  to  their  father,  one  of  the  best  and  most  liberal  of  the  Optimates, 
by  Cornelia,  daughter  of  the  great  Africanus.  She  was  a  woman 
distinguished  not  more  for  her  illustrious  birth  than  for  the  dignity 
of  her  character  and  the  endowments  of  her  intellect.  A  collection 
of  her  letters  was  extant  in  Cicero's  time,^  and  they  were  regarded 
as  a  model  of  prose  style  ;  and  in  an  age  of  increasing  frivolity  she 
was  conspicuous  for  simplicity  of  life  and  devotion  to  the  education 
of  her  sons. 
Tiberius  When  Tiberius  Gracchus  returned  from  Spain  he  found  himself 

returns         an    object    of  popular    interest.      The    disaster    in   the   Numantine 
•^^^.  war  was    attributed   solely  to    the    incompetence    of   the  proconsul 

^-^    '  Mancinus  ;   that  its  consequences  had  not  been  worse  was  looked 

upon  as  owing  to  the  character  and  energy  of  his  young  quaestor 
Gracchus.      In   134  therefore  he  was  elected  tribune  without  diffi- 

1  Two   extracts    are   preserved    in    the  fragments   of   the  work  of  Corn  eh  us 
Nepos,  De  Historicis  Latinis. 


dealing 
with  it. 


XXXV  THE  LAND  LAW  OF  TIBERIUS  GRACCHUS  553 

culty,  and  immediately  set  himself  to  carry  out  the  remedial  measures 
of  which  he  had  been  thinking. 

He  was  now  twenty-nine  years  old  ;  his  brother  Gains,  nine  years   Tiberius 
younger,  was  serving  at  Numantia  under  Scipio  Aemilianus,  who  had  Gracchus 
married  their  sister  Sempronia.     He  himself  was  married  to  a  daughter  ^'"^^^^^-^ 
of  Appius  Claudius  ;  was   an  accomplished  and  persuasive  orator ;  ^  ^  "'  '■^^' 
simple  in  his  habits  ;  pure  in  character  ;  and  far  removed  by  taste 
and   temperament  from  the  rble  of  an  agitator.      It  was  not   part 
of  his  plan  to  attack  the  power  and  influence  of  the  Senate  ;  .but 
his  proposals  necessarily  involved  him  in  a  bitter  contest  with  the 
members  of  that  body  and  with  the  wealthy  equites,  which  forced  upon 
him  the  proceedings   that   discredited  him.     The  popular  expecta- 
tion of  the  benefits  to  arise  from  his  tribuneship  was  shown  in   a 
way  common  in  Rome, — by  pasquinades  and  Avritings  on  the  walls, 
calling  upon  him  to  relieve  the  poverty  of  the  people  by  dealing  with 
the  ager  publicics. 

His  first  proposal  was  designed  to  conciliate  the  holders  of  public  pirst 
land.      Possessors  of  more  than  the  legal  amount  (500  jugera  for  the  proposal 
father,  and  250  jugera  for  each  son)  were  to  be  compensated  for  (^ompara- 
disturbance    on  a  fair  valuation.       But    the   landholders   were   not  ^^^^v^^^^ 
satisfied.       Every  possible  hindrance  was   put   in   the   way  of  the 
law  being  brought  forward  ;  and  finally  one  of  his  colleagues,   M.  Second 
Octavius,    though    a    personal    friend,    was    induced    to    veto    it.  proposal 
Gracchus    had    been    too    much    elated    by    popularity    to    submit  ^^^^ . 
tamely.     The  compensating   clauses  were  withdrawn,   and   another 
law  substituted,    which   simply  proposed    to   divide    the   land  held     Ppo^^  - 
in   excess   of  the  legal   amount.      This  law  had  also  two    clauses  /^^^  ^^,,^. 
which  distinguished   it  from  previous  agrarian   legislation  :  a  com-  mission. 
mission  was  to  be  appointed  to  superintend  the  new  distribution,  Alienation 
and  the  alienation  of  the  new  allotments  was  to  be  forbidden.  forbidden. 

Octavius  interposed  his  veto  to  prevent  the  law  being  brought  Octavius 
before  the  people  :  Gracchus  retaliated  by  a  veto  on  the  proceedings  vetoes  the 
of  other  magistrates,  and  by  putting  his  seal  on  the  treasury  to  prevent  P^'^P^^^^ 
all  payments  and  receipts.      There  was  a  deadlock.      Octavms  would  ^^  deprived 
not  give  way,  and  Gracchus  is   said   to  have   been   forced  to  arm  of  office. 
himself  against  plots  upon  his  life  instigated  by  the  rich.     When  he 
tried  to  bring  forward  his  law  his  enemies  contrived  to  stir  up  a  riot, 
and  forcibly  removed  the  voting  urns.      A  compromise  in  the  Senate 
was  vainly  attempted,  and  then  Gracchus  resolved  on  deposing  his 
colleague  Octavius  from  office  by  a  vote  of  the  people.      It  was  a 
distinctly  revolutionary  proposal,  and  struck  at  the  root  of  the  con- 
stitution and  the  independence  of  the  magistrates.      No  principle  was 
more  fundamental  in  the  Roman  polity  than  that  a  magistrate  could 
not  be  resisted  in  the  exercise  of  his  legal  powers  during  his  year  of 


554 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


The  land 
bill  passed. 


First  land 
commis- 
sion. 


Tib. 

Gracchus 
candidate 
for  a  second 
year  of 
office. 


office,  though  he  might  be  impeached  when  he  laid  it  down.  The 
person  and  power  of  a  tribune  were  peculiarly  guarded  against  such 
attacks.  Still  it  was  impossible  to  limit  the  competence  of  a  popular 
vote.  Gracchus  argued  that  a  tribune  was  elected  to  protect  the 
people  :  if  on  the  contrary  he  injured  them,  he  thereby  abdicated  his 
functions  and  might  be  as  lawfully  deposed  as  a  king  who  exceeded 
his  prerogative. 

Right  or  wrong  the  reasoning  of  Gracchus  prevailed.  The  vote 
was  passed,  Octavius  was  dragged  from  the  rostra,  and  L.  Mummius 
substituted  for  him,  without  apparently  any  farther  disturbance. 
The  land  bill  was  then  brought  in  and  promptly  passed  ;  Tiberius 
Gracchus,  Appius  Claudius,  Gains  Gracchus  named  as  commis- 
sioners, and  set  to  work,  with  judicial  powers  to  decide  on  dis- 
puted questions  as  to  the  status  of  the  land  to  be  dealt  with. 

But  as  the  summer  wore  away  and  the  time  approached  at  which 
Gracchus  would  have  to  lay  down  his  office,  the  spirits  of  his  adver- 
saries revived,  and  they  openly  proclaimed  their  intention  of  revenge 
when  he  was  once  more  a  private  citizen.  His  supporters  had 
crowded  into  Rome  from  the  country ;  but,  the  law  once  passed, 
they  had  returned  and  were  busy  with  farm-work  or  the  preparations 
for  the  expected  allotments.  It  would  not  be  easy  to  recall  these, 
and  the  unconstitutional  proceedings  against  Octavius  had  no  doubt 
alienated  others.  Gracchus  cannot  be  acquitted  of  at  least  ill 
judgment  in  making  the  commission  such  a  family  coterie,  con- 
sisting of  himself,  his  brother,  and  his  father-in-law.  It  must  have 
given  his  enemies  a  good  excuse  for  representing  his  measures  as 
intended  for  personal  aggrandisement,  and  perhaps  even  for  the 
attainment  of  despotism  or  regnum^  the  suspicion  of  which  had  been 
fatal  to  so  many  earlier  reformers. 

Whether  the  re-election  of  a  tribune  was  lawful  was  somewhat 
of  a  moot  point.  The  general  feeling  was  no  doubt  against  it,  and 
the  struggle  between  the  two  parties  was  now  concentrated  upon  this 
question.!     The   Senate   in  rather  a  petty  spirit  had  shown  their 

1  A  Senatus  Consultum  in  460  had  declared  that  the  continuation  of  a 
magistrate's  office  beyond  the  year,  or  the  re-election  of  the  same  tribunes,  was 
unconstitutional  {contra  retfipublicam),  Livy  iii.  21.  This  resolution  of  the  Senate 
however  had  no  legal  force,  though  it  shows  what  the  constitutional  rule  or 
doctrine  was.  In  342  plebiscita  prohibited  holding  the  same  magistratus  within 
ten  years  or  two  magistratus  in  the  same  year  (Livy  vii.  42  ;  x.  13;  xxiv.  40; 
Cicero,  de  Legg.  iii.  3),  But  all  such  rules  were  liable  to  suspension  in  special 
circumstances  ;  and  it  was  somewhat  doubtful  whether  they  applied  to  the 
tribuneship,  as  not  being  a  magistratus.  At  any  rate  the  exceptions  to  the  rule 
had  been  common  at  one  time  in  regard  to  the  tribunes,  and  the  question  now 
was  whether  the  circumstances  were  such  as  to  justify  one. — See  Marquardt  and 
Mommsen,  ii.  p.  176, 


XXXV  MURDER  OF  TIBERIUS  GRACCHUS  555 

dislike  of  Gracchus   by  refusing  the  land  commission  a  grant  for 
their  expenses  from  the  exchequer  ;  but  he  was  now  able  to  offer  an 
additional  motive  for  those   who  had  benefited  or  were  to  benefit 
under  his  land  law  supporting  his  candidature.      In  the  course  of  The  trea- 
133  died  Attalus  III.,  last  and  worst  king  of  Pergamus,  leaving  the  sures  of 
Romans  his  heirs.     What  this  would  precisely  mean  to  the  people  Attains. 
of  his   dominions    will  be   discussed   hereafter.      But  his   personal 
wealth  in  money,  land,  or  revenue  from  certain  towns  would  come 
at  once  into  the  Roman  exchequer ;  and  Gracchus  promised  that,  if 
he  were  re-elected  tribune,  he  would  secure  that  this  treasure  should 
be  devoted   to   supplying  the  new  holders  of  allotments  with   the 
capital  necessary  for  starting.      He  attempted  to  win  the  populace 
also  by  promising  the    reduction  of  the  time  of  military   service  ; 
and   the   equites   by   proposing   that   they   should    be    admitted    to 
serve  on  juries,  confined  at  present  to  the  members  of  the  Senate. 
Still,  in  the  absence  of  the  country  voters  his  election  was  in  danger.  His 
and    he    appealed   to   the    feelings   of  the  people  by  appearing  in  re-election 
soiled  dress   and  the   signs  of  mourning.      When  two  tribes   had  opposed  as 
already  returned  his  name  a  protest  was  entered  on  the  part  of  the  ^  ^^^  ' 
Senate  against  the  legality  of  a  re-election.      The  tribune  Rubrius 
who  was  presiding  hesitated,  and  presently  resigned  the  presidency 
to  a  colleague.     Another  controversy  was  then  started  as  to  whether 
the  votes  already  recorded  were  to  be  accepted,  and  eventually  the  and 
business  was  postponed  to  the  next  day.      A  body  of  his  partisans  postponed. 
kept  guard  at  the  house  of  Gracchus  through  the  night  and  fresh 
appeals  were  made  to  the  people.      Evil  omens  were  reported  to  him 
in  the  morning,  but  in  spite  of  entreaties  he  listened  to  the  advice 
of  his  philosophic  friend  Blosius  of  Cumae  and  went  to  the  Capitol. 
There  he  found  a  scene  of  such  disorder  that  the  presiding  tribune. 
Mucins,  tried  in  vain  to  cany  on  the  form  of  election.      In  the  midst  Death  of 
of  the  excitement  a  senator,  Fulvius  Flaccus,  was  seen  making  his   Tiberius 
way  towards  Gracchus.      Having  reached  him  at  length,  he  told  him    '^'^'^'^  "■^' 
that  the  consul  had  refused  to  act  on  a  vote  carried  in  the  Senate 
giving  him  power  of  life  and  death,  but  that  the  extreme  party  in 
the  Senate  had  resolved  to  act  on  their  own  authority.     The  friends 
of  Gracchus  who  heard  the  announcement  armed  themselves  with 
clubs,  pieces  of  broken  benches,  and  other  weapons,  and  pressed 
round  him  ;  but  in  the  hubbub  those  on  the  outskirts  of  the  crowd 
could  not  tell  what  was  happening,  and  Gracchus  raised  his  hand  to 
his  head  as  a  sign  that  his  life  was  in  danger.^     This  was  reported 

^  The  Senate  it  seems  passed  the  vote  videant  consules  ne  quid  rcspublica 
detrimetiti  capiat,  which  armed  the  consul  with  dictatorial  powers, — a  proceeding 
which  by  this  time  had  superseded  the  older  custom  of  appointing  a  Dictator 
seditionis  causa,  which  Appian  expresses  surprise  at  their  not  doing  now. 


556 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


The 

grounds   of 
the  action 
of  the 
senatorial 
party. 


Trial  of 
the  sup- 
porters of 
Gracchus. 


to  the  Senate,  sitting  in  the  temple  of  Fides  close  by,  as  a  demand 
on  his  part  for  a  crown.  Thereupon  Scipio  Nasica  appealed  to  the 
consul  to  put  the  "tyrant"  to  death.  The  consul  refused  to  use 
violence  or  kill  a  citizen  uncondemned,  but  promised  to  regard  as 
invalid  any  vote  passed  under  illegal  pressure.  "  Since  the  consul 
deserts  the  State,"  cried  Nasica,  "  let  the  friends  of  the  constitution 
follow  me  ! "  A  large  number  of  the  senators,  rolling  up  their  togas 
to  protect  their  heads  and  breasts,  rushed  out  upon  the  Area 
Capitolina  and  charged  the  crowd.  The  attendants  hastily  closed 
the  door  of  the  temple  of  Jupiter,  and  in  a  few  minutes  there  was  a 
general  struggle  going  on,  in  the  course  of  which  Gracchus  was 
struck  down  and  slain, — the  first  blow  being  from  the  hand  of  one 
of  his  colleagues,  P.  Satureius, — and  his  adherents  scattered,  wounded, 
or  killed. 

In  deposing  his  colleague  and  seeking  re-election  Gracchus  had, 
to  say  the  least,  put  a  strain  on  the  constitution  ;  but  the  accusation 
of  attempting  to  establish  royal  power  was  stupid,  and  must  have 
been  known  by  the  aristocratic  rioters  to  be  a  mere  blind  to  justify 
themselves.  A  law  or  tradition  as  old  as  the  Republic,  that  a  man 
clearly  attempting  royalty  might  be  killed  without  trial,i  and  the  new 
doctrine,  that  a  vote  of  the  Senate  conferred  the  power  of  life  and 
death  on  the  magistrates,  gave  a  certain  air  of  legality  to  their 
proceedings.  But  it  was  essentially  a  riot,  and  the  blood  thus  shed 
was  amply  revenged  upon  the  Optimates  in  subsequent  scenes  of 
violence. 

For  the  present  the  senatorial  party  was  triumphant  and  used 
its  victory  to  the  full.  The  body  of  Gracchus  was  cast  unburied 
into  the  Tiber,  and  many  of  his  adherents  were  brought  to  trial  and 
condemned  by  the  consuls  of  the  next  year  (132)  ;  and  even  Scipio 
when  asked  his  opinion  as  to  the  fate  of  his  brother-in-law,  answered 
by  quoting  a  line  of  Homer — 

So  perish  all  who  do  the  like  again. 


Commis- 
sion in 
I30-I2g  : 
Gaius 
Gracchus, 
C. 

Papirius 
Carlo, 
M.  Fulvius 
Flaccus. 


Still  the  land  law  was  unrepealed  ;  and  the  place  of  Tiberius  on  the 
commission  was  filled  by  Publius  Crassus,  father-in-law  of  Gaius 
Gracchus,  and  on  his  death  in  130  by  M.  Fulvius  Flaccus,  a  partisan 
of  Gracchus,  while  the  place  of  Appius  Claudius,  who  died  in  132, 
was  taken  by  C.  Papirius  Carbo,  also  at  present  a  close  friend  and 
supporter.  On  the  other  hand  Scipio  Nasica,  who  had  led  the  attack 
on  Tiberius,  became  the  object  of  such  popular  detestation  that  the 
Senate  relieved  him  of  the  provisions  of  the  law  which  prevented  him 


1  Cicero,  who  had  to  defend  a  similar  action  of  his  own,  is  fond  of  quoting 
the  cases  of  Spurius  Cassius  and  Spurius  Maelius.    See  p.  93. 


XXXV  THE  PROTEST  OF  THE  ITALIANS  557 

as  Pontifex  Maximus  from  leaving  Italy,  and  sent  him  on  a  mission  Return  of 
to  Asia,  from  which  he  did  not  venture  to  return,  dying  the  follow-  Gains 
ing  year  at  Pergamus.     There  was  therefore  at  present  no  idea  of  ^^'^^  "^' 
hesitating  to  carry  out  the  provisions  of  the  law.      In    132    Gaius 
Gracchus  returned  to  Rome  in  the  train  of  Africanus,  and  seems  at 
once  to  have  attached  himself  to  the  party  of  progress.      He  too  was 
an  orator  of  ability,  though  in  a  more  violent  style  than  his  brother, 
and  he  supported  the  proposal  made  in  131  by  Carbo  to  allow  of  the 
re-election  of  a  tribune.      The  law  was  rejected,  but  seems  in  some 
shape  to  have  been  subsequently  passed.      During  the  next  year  no 
fresh  agitation  seems   to   have   taken  place.      But  in   129  the  pro- 
ceedings of  the  land  commission  gave  rise  to  a  new  difficulty. 

Up  to  that  time  the  commission  seems  to  have  dealt  only  with  The 
land  held  by  citizens.      Difficult  and  delicate  as  the  decisions  must  ^^^^^«« 
often  have  been,  where  titles  were  not  registered,  and  subsequent  public  land 
transactions    had    complicated    ownership,   a   still   farther  difficulty  protest, 
appeared   when  they  came  to  the  case  of  Italians  who  were  not  izg. 
citizens.     Their  holdings  of  public  land  must  have  resulted  from  a 
variety  of  special  circumstances,  as  each  town  fell  under  the  power 
of  Rome.      Individuals  among  the  natives  had  to  be  rewarded,  or 
citizens  were  not  found  willing  to  migrate  for  the  sake  of  new  farms, 
and  any  one  who  was  willing  to  cultivate  the  land  had  been  admitted. 
To  meddle  with  such  holdings  gave  rise  to  a  new  question.     There 
was  no  provision  in  the  Sempronian  law  for  distribution  except  to 
citizens,    and   the   Italians  exclaimed  against   being  subject  to  the 
disadvantages  without  sharing  in  the  advantages  of  citizens,  either 
in  this  respect  or  in  regard  to  protection  against  the  i7nperium  of 
magistrates.     They  found  a  patronus  to  undertake  their  cause  in  Scipio 
Scipio    Africanus.      After   his    Spanish    triumph    he    had    opposed  tmdertakes 
Carbo's  proposal  for  allowing  the  re-election  of  tribunes,  and  had  in  *^^^^'^^^ 
the    course    of  the    debate    expressed    his    opinion    that    Tiberius  Italians.- 
Gracchus  had  deserved  his  fate  ;  and  when  the  indignant  populace 
had  shouted  disapprobation,  he  had  turned  haughtily  upon    them 
and  bade  "  those  to  whom   Italy  was  but  a  stepmother "  be  silent. 
This   had   shaken  his   popularity,   but   he   still   possessed  immense 
influence  which  he  now  used  to  put  an  end  to  the  proceedings  of 
the  commissioners.      He  carried  a  motion  in  the  Senate  transferring   The 
the  judicial  powers  of  the  commissioners  in  cases  of  dispute  as  to  judicial 
the  public  land  to  the  consuls.     This  practically  brought  the  pro-  ^.V"^^^  ^. 
ceedings  of  the  commission  to  an  end  without  formally  abrogating  ^ioners 
the    law,   and    Scipio    seemed    to  have  used    his   influence   in    the  transferred 
interests     of    peace    and    compromise.       Crowds    of    enthusiastic  to  i^^ 
admirers    accompanied   him    to    his   house    whenever    he    returned  ^°^^^^^' 
from  the    Senate  or  Forum.      On  one  particular  day  he  had  thus 


558 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Death  of 
Scipio. 


Foreign 
affairs. 
War  with 
the 
lapydes, 

War  with 
Ariston- 
icus  in 
Asia,  iji- 

J2(p, 


Gains 

Gracchus 

in 

Sardinia, 

126-12S. 

Revolt  of 
Fregellae, 
123. 


Gains 
Gracchns 
tribu7ius 
plebis,  1 2 J. 


been  brought  home  as  though  he  had  been  celebrating  a  triumph, 
and  had  retired  early  with  his  writing  tablets  to  prepare  a  speech 
to  the  people  for  the  morrow ;  but  in  the  morning  was  found  dead 
in  his  bed.  No  inquiry  was  held,  and  it  was  assumed  that  his 
death  was  natural ;  but  popular  rumour  asserted  that  the  body  was 
carried  to  the  pyre  with  its  face  covered  to  conceal  the  marks  of 
violence,  and  that  Carbo  had  at  least  been  privy  to  an  assassination. 
Nothing  however  was  ever  proved,  though  scandal  did  not  spare 
the  names  of  his  closest  relations. 

His  death  removed  a  restraining  influence,  and  in  the  course  of 
the  next  few  years  the  popular  party  found  more  and  more 
opportunities  of  attacking  the  government  of  the  Optimates.  A  war 
against  the  Illyrian  lapydes  {Croatia)  under  the  consul  Sempronius, 
though  finally  successful  owing  to  the  ability  of  the  legate  D. 
Junius  Brutus,  was  at  first  marked  by  disaster  to  the  Roman  army. 
The  occupation  of  the  kingdom  of  Pergamus  in  accordance  with  the 
will  of  Attalus  had  been  disputed  by  the  illegitimate  son  of  his 
predecessor  Eumenes,  named  Aristonicus,  and  in  the  war  with  him, 
lasting  three  years,  a  consular  P.  Licinius  Crassus  had  lost  his  life 
in  circumstances  which  showed  both  incapacity  and  greed.  In 
129  the  consul  Perpenna  defeated  Aristonicus  and  brought  him 
a  prisoner  to  Rome  ;  but  M'.Aquilius,  who  was  deputed  to  settle  the 
province  of  Asia  at  the  conclusion  of  the  war,  was  only  acquitted  of 
malversation  by  means  of  bribery.  On  the  other  hand  the  success 
of  the  consul  L.  Aurelius  Orestes  (126)  in  restoring  order  in 
Sardinia  was  so  universally  attributed  to  his  quaestor  Gaius 
Gracchus,  that  the  Senate  became  jealous  ;  and  when  the  rejection 
of  the  proposal  of  the  consul  M.  Fulvius  Flaccus  (125)  to  admit  the 
Italians  to  citizenship  was  followed  by  a  rebellion  at  Fregellae, 
where  the  number  of  non- citizens  seem  to  have  been  numerous 
enough  to  direct  the  policy  of  the  town,  the  Optimates  tried  to 
attribute  some  of  the  mischief  to  the  intrigues  of  Gracchus  :  and 
they  endeavoured  to  keep  him  in  Sardinia  by  prolonging  the  imperium 
of  the  proconsul  Orestes, — which  carried  with  it  the  continuance 
of  the  quaestorship  of  Gracchus, — to  the  third  year  (124).  But 
Gracchus  defeated  this  manoeuvre  by  returning  to  Rome,  though 
his  successor  had  not  been  named  ;  and  when  called  to  account  by 
the  censors  argued  that  he  had  served  twelve  years  in  the  army  (ten 
being  the  legal  time  for  an  eques)  and  had  been  quaestor  for  two 
years,  the  law  only  requiring  one.  Once  more  regulations  which 
rested  on  custom  were  found  powerless  to  restrain  an  officer  resolved 
to  defy  them  and  to  rest  strictly  on  law.  The  censors  found  that 
they  could  not  affix  a  "note"  to  the  name  of  Gracchus,  and  he  was 
elected  tribune  for  the  next  year  (123)' 


XXXV  LEGISLATION  OF  GAIUS  GRACCHUS  559 

Tiberius  Gracchus  had  thought  first  of  his  reforms  and  had  not 
sought  the  hostility  of  the  Senate  ;  Gaius  at  once  attacked  the  party 
to  whom  his  brother  owed  his  death,  and  showed  his  intention  of 
lowering  the  power  of  the  Senate.      His  first  proposal,  aimed  at  his 
brother's    opponent    Octavius — "that  a  man    deposed    from    office  Sempron- 
should  be  incapable  of  any  other," — was  withdrawn  it  is  said  on  the  ^'«^  ^^«'- 
entreaty  of  his  mother.     The  second,  which  was  passed,  had  special  \^)  ^^.  ^^^' 
reference  to  the  execution  of  those  who  were  condemned  by  the 
consular  court  after  the  death  of  Tiberius.      It  deprived  the  consuls 
of  the  dictatorial  power  over  citizens  held  to  be  conferred  on  them 
by  the  decree  of  the  Senate  {indeant  consules  ne  quid  respublica 
detriinenti  capiat)  unless  it  was  confirmed  by  the  vote  of  the  people.  ^ 
The  law  was  so  drawn  as  to  have  a  retrospective  effect,  and  the 
surviving  consul  of  132,  P.  Popilius  Laenas,   like  Cicero  in  similar 
circumstances,  went  into  exile  rather  than  stand  his  trial. 

This  law,  which  affected  only  a  limited  class,  was  passed  with  [2)  Lex 
some  difficulty.  The  next  appealed  to  the  masses,  and  was  immedi-  /^«^«^«- 
ately  popular,  though  it  introduced  a  vicious  principle  in  finance  and 
was  mischievous  in  its  effects.  The  lex  frumentaria  entitled  all 
citizens  residing  in  Rome  to  a  certain  measure  of  corn  each  month 
somewhat  below  the  market  price.  It  was  a  permanent  arrange- 
ment, not  a  temporary  expedient  to  meet  a  special  difficulty,  as 
former  corn  laws  had  been.  As  a  poor  law  it  could  be  and  was 
evaded  by  those  who  were  well  off  securing  by  various  arrangements 
large  shares  in  the  distribution  and  reselling  at  their  own  price.  As 
a  measure  of  socialism  it  was  inadequate,  and  only  succeeded  in 
drawing  more  of  the  idle  and  thriftless  to  Rome.  As  a  bribe  to  the 
electors  its  effect  was  fleeting,  while  it  permanently  alienated  the 
upper  classes  and  defeated  its  own  object  by  exhausting  the  treasury. 

Having  thus  secured  the  urban  populace  for  the  moment  on  his 
side,  Gracchus  turned  his  attention  to  the  alleviation  of  the  country  New  roads 
folk.       He    fully    shared   his    brother's    views    of  the    necessity    of  «'«^ 
replenishing  Italy  with  an  industrious  and  thriving  population.     His  ^^^^^^^^- 
first  measure,  in  which  he  engaged  with  great  energy,  provided  for 
the  construction   of  roads  and  bridges,  which  would   facilitate   the 
transport  of  farming  produce  and  the  transaction  of  country  business. 
The  commission  for  allotting  land  being  now  practically  suspended, 
he  proposed  to  provide  for  the  landless  by  numerous  colonies  in 
Italy,    such    as   Fabrateria    in    the   place   of  the   ruined   Fregellae, 
Neptunia  in  Tarentum,  and  Capua,  and  also  obtained  a  decree  for  (j)  Lex 
a  colony  of  6000  citizens  in   the   territory  of  Carthage.     Another  ff^^^^^is. 

^  This  was  afterwards  apparently  evaded  by  the  Senate  first  declaring  the 
persons  against  whom  they  desired  to  direct  their  decree  hostes — they  were  then 
held  to  be  outside  the  protection  of  the  law. 


56o 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


(.;)  Lex  _ 
judiciaria. 


bill  relieved  the  soldiers  from  the  expense  of  providing  clothing  and 
arms  and  threw  it  on  the  state.  These  measures,  and  the  vast 
numbers  of  workmen  employed  through  him  on  the  roads,  public 
granaries,  and  other  undertakings,  who  were  prepared  to  support 
him  at  the  elections  and  legislative  comitia,  gave  him  such  influence 
that  he  was  not  only  able  to  secure  his  own  re-election  as  tribune, 
but  the  election  of  a  supporter  Gains  Fannius  as  consul  for  122. 

The  laws  hitherto  mentioned  (we  have  no  means  of  ascertaining 
the  order  of  their  proposal)  were  chiefly  concerned  with    practical 


intended  to  win  over  the  wealthy  class  immediately  below  the 
senators,  to  which  it  for  the  first  time  gave  a  definite  recognition  as 
the  ordo  equester.  For  the  origin  of  this  order  we  must  go  to  the 
earliest  times.  The  300  cavalry  of  the  primitive  period,  serving 
with  a  horse  supplied  at  the  public  expense,  had  been  gradually 
raised  to  1800,  enrolled  in  eighteen  centuries  for  voting  purposes  in 
Ordo  the  Servian  constitution.      These  had    always   been   the   wealthiest 

equesier.  \x\^x\_  in  the  state ;  and  though  they  were  juniores^  and  should  have 
given  up  their  horse  when  their  term  of  service  was  over,  or  when  they 
were  incapable  of  farther  service,  the  custom  had  grown  up  of  those 
who  chose  retaining  their  horse,  even  when  they  became  members 
of  the  Senate.  As  the  number  of  wealthy  men  increased  there  were 
many  who  had  the  equestrian  census  (400,000  sesterces)  but  could 
not  find  admittance  into  the  eighteen  centuries,  and  from  about  the 
time  of  the  siege  of  Veii  (403)  it  became  the  custom  for  such  men 
frequently  to  serve  on  their  own  horse  {equo  privatd).  For  though 
they  had  practically  ceased  to  be  a  military  class,  yet  every  individual 
among  them  had  still  to  serve  the  legal  number  of  campaigns 
before  becoming  candidates  for  office  ;  and  ten  campaigns  instead 
of  twenty,  as  in  the  infantry,  exempted  them  from  farther  service. 
These  therefore  who  were  included  in  the  eighteen  centuries,  or 
who  had  been  so  included,  or  had  served  on  their  own  horse 
without  being  included,  came  to  be  spoken  of  generally  as  the 
ordo  equester^  although  there  was  no  legal  recognition  of  any  except 
the  eighteen  centuries.  As  the  senators  and  their  sons  were 
excluded  from  commercial  enterprise,  the  public  contracts  and  the 
farming  of  the  revenues  had  fallen  almost  entirely  to  men  who 
belonged  to  this  class  ;  and  thus  the  piiblicani  formed  a  division  of 
the  equestrian  order  whose  interests  generally  put  them  in  political 
opposition  to  the  Senate.  Hitherto  in  one  important  point  the 
Senators  had  the  advantage  of  them :  in  the  trial  of  criminal 
charges,  such  as  malversation  and  misconduct  in  public  business 
abroad,  in  which  both  were  interested,  the  jurors  had  been  all  drawn 
from  the  roll  of  the   Senate.     As  the  number  of  such  qimestioncs 


XXXV  ASIA  AND  THE  PUBLICANI  561 

increased,  and  the  cases  before  the  quaestio  perpeiua  (estabhshed  by 
the  lex  Calpurnia  in  149)  became  more  numerous,  the  roll  of  the  rp^^ 
Senate  was  perhaps  found  not  large  enough  ;  and  according  to  Livy  judicia. 
and  Plutarch  the  first  proposition  of  Gracchus  was  to  add  300  (or 
600)  names  to  the  Senate  from  the  equestrian  order  and  to  make  up 
the  list  of  judices  from  this  enlarged  body.  But  finally  the  law  as 
passed  ordered  the  list  to  be  made  up  from  the  whole  equestrian 
order  of  men  over  thirty  years  of  age.  Whether  the  senators  had 
by  some  recent  regulation  been  already  excluded  from  the  eighteen 
centuries,  or  whether  Gracchus  now  excluded  them,  seems  uncertain. 
At  any  rate  it  seems  to  have  been  held  that  the  exclusion  only 
applied  to  cases  mentioned  in  his  law  ;  for  the  lex  de  repetmidis  of  Lex 
M'.Acilius  (121)  expressly  excludes  senators  as  well  as  ex-tribunes,  Acilia. 
plebeian  and  military,  and  some  others,  from  a  variety  of  courts  named, 
which  would  have  been  superfluous  if  the  law  of  Gracchus  had 
applied  to  all  courts.  The  effect  of  the  law  was  to  give  a  legal 
recognition  to  the  enlarged  ordo  equester^  and  to  put  the  courts 
in  the  hands,  wholly  or  in  overwhelming  majority,  of  the  men 
most  interested  in  business  which  gave  rise  to  the  accusations. 
It  did  not  therefore  effect  the  object  of  purifying  the  courts  and 
defending  the  provincials.  The  equites  in  fact  could  now  secure 
their  own  impunity  and  crush  any  senatorial  governor  more  scrupulous 
than  the  rest  who  tried  to  suppress  their  iniquities  in  his  province.^ 

By  another  proposal  Gracchus  himself  gave  men  of  the  The 
equestrian  order  a  new  field  of  enterprise,  in  which  their  rapacity  province  of 
led  to  deplorable  results  abroad,  and  to  much  political  trouble  ^-^^^^  ^^9- 
at  home.  The  kingdom  of  Attains  had  nominally  belonged  to 
the  Romans  since  133,  but  it  was  not  till  129  that  the  pretender 
Aristonicus  had  been  captured  by  M.  Perpenna,  and  the  province  of 
"Asia"  organised  by  M'.Aquillius  and  ten  commissioners.  Certain 
districts  which  had  been  under  the  kings  of  Pergamus  were  now 
separated.  The  Thracian  Chersonese  was  annexed  to  the  province 
of  Macedonia ;  Phrygia  major  was  handed  over  to  the  king  of  Pontus ; 
and  other  districts  to  the  sons  of  the  king  of  Cappadocia  who  had 
fallen  in  the  war.  The  province  now  organised  under  the  name  of 
Asia  consisted  of  Mysia,  Aeolia,  Caria,  and  the  Dorian  cities — 
except  the  Rhodian  Peraea.  It  was  treated  at  first  with  great 
indulgence.  The  Roman  Government  imposed  no  direct  tribute 
upon  it.  The  taxes  originally  paid  to  the  king  were  either  remitted 
or,  at  a  greatly  reduced  rate,  were  collected  by  native  tax-gatherers, 
and  the  Roman  publicanus  was  as  yet  not  known,  though  the  country 
was  quickly  invaded  with  money-lenders  and  speculators  from  Italy. 

1  For  the  case  of  P.  Rutilius  Rufus,  see  note  on  p.  603. 
2  O 


Provinciis. 


562  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap. 

(j)  Law  of  The  war  of  Aristonicus,  however,  was   made   an    excuse  for   reim- 

Gracchzis      posing    taxes  ;     and    either    to    give    the    equestrian    order,    whose 

^^  ^^^  support   he  needed,  another  chance  of  gain  :  or  to  find  money  for 

Tcvcnucs  of  , 

Asia,  I2J-    ^^^    expenses    caused    by    the    distribution    of  land,    his    colonies, 

122.  and  public  works  ;  or  perhaps  believing  that  a  better  class  of  men 

would   deal  with   the  Asian   revenues,  Gracchus  now  carried   a  law 
ordering    the    contracts    for    collecting    the    tenths    {decumae\    the 
pasture  rents  {scriptiirae)^  and  the  customs  {portoria)  of  Asia,  to  be 
sold  by  the  censors  at  Rome   like   other  public  contracts.      What- 
ever the  intention  of  this  measure  may  have  been,  its  result  was  to 
((5)  Lex        fill  Asia  with  Roman  publicani,  whose  extortions  led  to  the  disaster 
Seinproma    -^^  ^^  Mithridatic  war.     But  for  the  present  Gracchus  seems  to  have 
believed  that  reforms  needed  in  the  provinces  were  concerned  chiefly 
with  the  appointment  of  the  governors.      The  assignation  of  provinces 
had  been  tacitly  left  to  the  Senate.      The  consuls  and  praetors  had 
usually  drawn  lots  for  them,  but  the  Senate  retained  the  right  of 
assigning  them  without  lot  in  special  cases.      It  had  always  at  least 
named  those  for  which  consuls  or  praetors  were  to  cast  lots,  which 
enabled  it  to  withdraw  a  province  from  a  magistrate  it  disliked,  and 
assign  it  with  some  approach  to  certainty  to  one  of  whom  it  approved. 
Assignment  The  lex  de  provinciis  of  Gracchus  ordered  that  the  provinces  to  be 
of  consular    reserved  for  the  consuls  should  be  named  before  and  not  after  the 
pyovmces.     QQXi'i\y\.2cc  elections,  in  order  that  this  should  not  be  done  from  personal 
motives.     As  however,  except  in  times  of  unusual  excitement,  the 
Senate  were  generally  able  to  influence  these  elections,  the  effect  of 
the  law  was  not  of  great  importance. 
Proposal  to         Up  to  this  time  Gracchus  had  carried  all  before  him  :  the  people 
enfranchise  supported  him  at  the  comitia,  the  equestrian  order  were  won  over, 
and  even  in  the   Senate  he  exercised  a  great  influence.      His  next 
step  put  his  popularity  to  a  severe  test,  and  enabled  the  Senate  to 
T22.  give  vent  to  the  dislike  which  his  policy  had  planted  deep  in  the 

hearts  of  the  Optimates.  Their  instinct  indeed  was  not  at  fault ;  the 
planting  of  large  bodies  of  Roman  citizens,  retaining  their  civic  rights, 
at  wide  distances  from  Rome,  as  Gracchus  was  doing  by  his  colony 
of  lunonia  at  Carthage,  must  lead  eventually  to  the  supremacy  of  a 
narrow  cliciue  at  Rome  being  questioned.  Even  the  conception  of 
an  extended  and  united  nation  of  Italy,  in  the  place  of  a  privileged 
urban  populace  dominating  dependent  communities,  was  offensive  to 
them.  And  this  is  what  Gracchus  now  proposed  to  call  into  exist- 
ence by  extending  the  Roman  franchise  to  the  Italians.  Those  who 
at  present  enjoyed  the  "  Latin  "  rights  were  to  have  full  civitas,  the 
rest  the  Lafinitas.  No  longer  alarmed  for  their  possessions  in  the 
ager publicus  the  Italians  were  eager  for  this  reform.  The  requisitions 
and  oppressions  of  Roman  legati  and  magistrates  had  roused  strong 


the  Latins 

and 

Italiajis, 


XXXV  THE  ITALIANS  AND  THE  CITIZENSHIP  563 

feelings  of  resentment  in  many  parts,  and  a  determination  that,  if  122. 
they  were  to  remain  subject  to  Roman  government,  they  ought  to 
have  the  protection  which  citizens  enjoyed  through  the  right  of  appeal 
to  the  tribes,  or  by  the  auxihum  of  the  tribunes,  and  a  voice  in  electing 
the  magistrates  whom  they  were  to  obey.      Gracchus  quoted  some 
startling   cases   of  hardship   to   which   the    Italian   allies   had  been 
subjected.      Not  only  were  requisitions  for  free  quarters  and  means  Grievances 
of  transport  made  upon  the  towns,  but  the  persons  of  their  inhabitants  of  the 
were   not  safe.     At  Venusia  a   young  Roman,  travelling  on  some  ^^^^i^^^- 
legatio  in  his  closed  litter,  heard  a  peasant  ask  his  bearers  jestingly 
whether  they  carried  a  corpse.      He  bade  his  slaves  stop,  seize  the 
peasant,  and  beat  him  to  death  with  the  leather  thongs  of  his  lectica. 
At  Teanum  Sidicinum  a  consul,  annoyed  at  the  tardy  or  inadequate 
preparations  at  the  public  baths,  which  he  had  ordered  to  be  cleared 
for  his  wife's  use,  caused  the  chief  magistrate  to  be  tied  to  a  post  in 
the   market-place   and   flogged.      At    Ferentinum,  when   a    Roman 
praetor  made  a  similar  complaint,    one   of  the   duovirs  committed 
suicide,  the  other  was  arrested  and  flogged.     While  serving  in  the 
army  also  the  socii  were  at  a  disadvantage  as  compared  with  the 
full   citizens,   who   by   this   time   had   obtained   the  right  of  appeal  (7)  Rogatio 
against  sentence  of  death  even  when  pronounced  by  the  imperator  ^^  sociis. 
in  camp.i     These  instances  were  passionately  urged  by  Gracchus  in 
pleading  for  his  law.      But  they  fell  on  cold  ears  :  and  the  Senate 
saw  and  seized  its  opportunity  of  thwarting  him,  and  at  the  same  time 
of  assuming  the  part  of  champion  of  popular  rights.      It  not  only 
protested  against  the  admission  of  Italians  to  share  in  the  privileges 
of  citizens,  to  claim  their  part  in  the  distribution  of  corn  and  the 
assignation  of  land,  and  to  outvote  them  at  the  comitia  ;  but  also 
against  the  banishment  of  such  large  numbers  of  them  to  the  shores 
of  Africa  in  the  new  colony  at  Carthage.      The  Senate  induced  one  of  Proposals 
his  colleagues,  M.  Livius  Drusus,  to  veto  the  proposal  of  the  Italian  of  Livhts 
franchise,  and  to  outbid  him  for  popular  favour  by  proposing  twelve  D^^^^'^^y) 
colonies  in  Italy  of  3000  each  with  allotments  of  land  ;  the  remission  colonies  (A 
of  the  rent  of  lands  allotted  or  to  be  allotted  in  the  ager  publicus^  remission 
with  the  revocation  of  the  law  against  their  sale  ;  and,  lastly,  as  a  </  rent  and 
concession  to  the  Italians,  the  protection  of  socii  serving  in  the  army  P^f'^^f^'i'On 
from  flogging  on  the  order  of  Roman  officers.      Livius  also  paraded  ^^^  ^TT 
his  personal  disinterestedness,  in  contrast  with  Gracchus,  by  declining  protection 
to  act  on  the  commission  for  founding  the  colonies  and  distributing  of  Italian 
the  land. 2     In  a  moment  the  popularity  of  Gracchus  seemed  to  melt  ^<^^^^^^^- 

^  Mommsen  supposes  this  right  to  have  been  secured  by  Gracchus'  own  law, 
de  provocdtione. 

-  It  may  have  been  the  difficulty  of  finding  places  for  these  twelve  colonies, 
of  which   so  much  was  made,   that  caused  him   to  shrink  from  being  one  of 


564 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


away.  The  consul  Fannius  turned  against  him,  and  even  ordered 
by  an  edict  all  non-citizens  to  absent  themselves  from  Rome  when 
his  Italian  bill  was  allowed  to  be  brought  before  the  people.  Perhaps 
his  absence  of  seventy  days  in  Africa,  superintending  the  new  colony, 
helped  the  reaction.  At  any  rate  his  bill  was  rejected  ;  and  that  of 
Livius  passed,  and  when  the  day  for  electing  the  tribunes  for  121 
came  his  name  was  not  returned  ;  while  his  bitter  opponent,  L, 
Opimius,  the  destroyer  of  Fregellae,  was  elected  consul. 

On  the  loth  December  122  Gains  Gracchus  ceased  to  be  a 
tribune,  and  soon  after  the  new  consuls  for  121  entered  on  their 
ofHce  the  first  move  was  made.  He  was  not  attacked  in  person,  but 
the  tribune  Minucius  proposed  that  the  rebuilding  of  Carthage  should 
be  forbidden,  and  the  formation  of  the  new  colony  lunonia  be 
stopped.  The  superstitions  of  the  citizens  were  worked  upon.  The 
curse  pronounced  by  Scipio  upon  all  who  attempted  the  restoration 
of  Carthage  was  recalled,  and  a  report  spread  that  the  boundary 
stones  already  placed  to  mark  the  allotments  had  been  torn  up  by 
wild  beasts.  Everything  was  done  to  prevent  this  still  wider  removal 
of  Roman  citizens  from  the  influences  which  the  Optimates  could 
bring  to  bear  upon  the  urban  population.  It  was  not  the  first  of 
such  settlements  in  the  provinces.  The  elder  Africanus  had  founded 
Italica  in  Baetica  for  his  veterans  in  207  ;  Marcellus  had  placed 
Roman  settlers  at  Corduba  in  151;  and  only  in  123  C.  Sextius, 
after  conquering  the  Salluvii,  had  founded  Aquae  Sextiae  at  the 
famous  springs  of  hot  and  cold  water  in  Gallia  Narbonensis.  But 
these  places  had  not  the  rank  or  privileges  of  Roman  colonies 
(although  Strabo  gives  the  title  to  Corduba),  they  were  still  only 
foreign  towns,  in  which,  for  military  or  other  purposes  there  was  a 
castellum  and  a  number  of  Romans  resident.  Not  only  by  the  lex 
Rubria  was  lunonia  to  be  a  colony  of  Roman  citizens,  but  Italians  were 
to  be  competent  to  enrol  themselves  among  the  6000  settlers,  and 
were  thereupon  to  become  full  citizens.  This  was  enough  in  itself  to 
stir  the  jealousy  of  the  urban  population  as  a  step  towards  the  admis- 
sion of  Italians  to  the  civitas  ;  and  when  the  banishment  of  Roman 
citizens  over  sea  was  contrasted  with  the  proposed  twelve  colonies 
in  Italy,  the  success  of  the  proposal  of  Minucius  seemed  assured.  At 
first  Gains  was  inclined  to  submit  to  the  reaction  which  was  thus 
setting  in  against  him  ;  but  he  was  stirred  on  by  the  more  violent 
of  his  supporters,  and  as  the  day  for  voting  on  the  bill  for  sup- 
pressing lunonia  approached,  both  parties  prepared  for  the  worst. 

During  the  night  the  partisans  of  both  sides  made  a  lodgment 

the  board.  There  was  not  much  public  land  left :  Scylacium  (Minervium)  is 
the  only  colony  known  to  have  been  founded  under  this  law,  and  it  never 
prospered. 


XXXV  MURDER  OF  GAIUS  GRACCHUS  565 

on  the  Capitol,  lest  the  bill  should  be  rejected  or  carried  by  the  exclu-  Death  of 
sion   of  the  other  side.      With  two  mobs   thus  in  position  any  trifle  Gains 
might  bring  about  a  collision  ;  and  presently  a  certain  Q.  Antullius,   Gracchus, 
carrying  the  entrails  of  the  victims  slain  at  the  sacrifice,  at  which 
the   consul   presided,   irritated  the  followers   of  Gracchus   by   some 
contemptuous  words  and  was  killed.      Gracchus,  who  felt  the  dis- 
credit and  saw  the  consequences  of  thus  beginning  bloodshed,  loudly 
remonstrated   with   his   partisans ;  but   the    consul    Opimius    gladly 
seized  on  the  occurrence  to  hold  up  the  whole  party  to  odium.     The 
meeting  was  deferred  to  the  next  day  on  the  pretext   of  rain.      At 
daybreak  the  Senate  was  summoned,  the  corpse  of  Antullius  displayed, 
and  the  old  accusation   of  attempted  tyranny  {regnwii)  brought  up 
against  Gracchus.     The  Senate  passed  the  usual  decree  authorising 
the    consul    to    protect   the    state,    which    Opimius — unlike   Mucius 
Scaevola  in  133 — accepted  as  giving  him  full  dictatorial  powers. 

The    more    violent    partisans    of   Gracchus    were    led    by    M.  m. 
Fulvius   Flaccus,  who  as   consul  in  125  had  proposed  the  enfran-  Fulvius 
chisement  of  the  Itahans,  and  vcs.  \2Z  accepted  the  tribuneship  to  ^^«'^^«-^- 
support  Gracchus,   whom  he  had  however  considerably  discredited 
by  intemperate  conduct.     The  contrast  between  him  and  Gracchus 
was  eminently  marked  in  this  last  night  of  their  lives.      The  house 
of  Fulvius  was  guarded  by  a  noisy  crowd,  who  passed  the  hours  in 
revelry,  while  those  who  protected  Gracchus  were  serious  and  orderly, 
and  he  himself  is  said  to  have  been  deeply  distressed  at  the  now 
inevitable  resort  to  force.      Early  next  morning  Fulvius  armed  his  Flaccus 
immediate  followers  with  the  weapons  with  which  his  Galhc  victories  and 
had   adorned  his  house,  and  proceeded  to   occupy  the  half- empty  ^^^^^^^J^ 
Aventine   Hill,  where   Gracchus   presently  joined  him,   leaving  his  Aventine. 
house  with  gloomy  forebodings  of  disaster.      The  consul  Opimius  de- 
clared the  gathering  on  the  Aventine  an  act  of  war,  and  proclaimed 
a   reward  of  their  weight  in  gold  for  the  heads  of  Gracchus   and 
Fulvius.      When  the  son  of  Fulvius  arrived  at  the  Senate  with  offers 
of  ternis  he  was  refused  an  answer  and  retained  in  custody  by  the 
consul,   who   marched   with  a   troop  of  soldiers   and   some  Cretan 
archers  to  take  the  Aventine.    The  mob  there  could  offer  no  appreci- 
able resistance.      Fulvius  took  refuge  in  a  bath,  but  was  dragged  out 
and  killed  with  his  elder  son.    Gracchus,  who  had  struck  no  blow,  was 
prevented  from  suicide  by  the  entreaties  of  his  friends.      He  hurried 
towards  the  Sublician  bridge  accompanied  by  one  slave,  and  some  of 
his  friends  attempted  to  give  him  time  for  flight  by  holding  the  end  Gracchus 
of  the  bridge.      But  he  failed  to  find  a  horse,  and  was  forced  to  take  ^"«  the 
refuge  in  the  grove  of  Furina  on  the  Janiculum,  where  he  was  over-  ^''^f  ^ 
taken  and  killed,  or,  as  some  reported,  was  found  dead. 

However,  L.  Septumeleius,  of  Anagnia,  who  had  been  his  friend. 


566 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Prosecution 
of  his 
followers. 


Tef?iple  of 
Concord. 


Subsequent 
history  of 
Opimius 
and  Carbo. 


The  greater 
part  of  the 
changes  of 
Gracchus 
are  main- 
tained. 


Lex 

Thoria, 
iig. 

The 

failure  of 
the  new 
constitu- 
tion. 


carried  his  head  to  the  consul,  and  claimed  and  received  the  reward, 
having  even,  it  vi^as  believed,  filled  the  mouth  with  lead  to  increase  its 
weight.  The  man  who  took  the  head  of  Fulvius,  being  a  man  of  a 
lower  class,  is  said  to  have  got  nothing.  The  aristocrats  used  their 
triumph  unmercifully.  Besides  those  killed  on  the  Aventine,  as 
many  as  3000  are  said  to  have  been  condemned  by  a  commission 
presided  over  by  Opimius.  Many  of  them,  with  the  mere 
mockery  of  a  trial,  or  without  one  at  all,  were  ordered  by  the  consul 
to  be  strangled  in  prison.  With  the  proceeds  of  their  forfeited 
property  he  then  rebuilt  the  Temple  of  Concord,  as  though  the 
slaughter  of  political  opponents  had  ended  all  controversies.  The 
tribune  Q.  Decius  indeed,  in  120,  brought  him  to  trial  for  executing 
citizens  uncondemned :  but  the  influence  of  the  Optimates  secured  his 
acquittal,  and  it  was  not  until  109  that,  having  been  convicted  of 
receiving  bribes  from  Jugurtha,  he  went  into  exile  and  ended  his 
days  at  Dyrrhachium  in  abject  poverty,  an  object  of  hatred  and 
contempt.  But  C.  Papirius  Carbo,  once  a  warm  partisan  of  the 
Gracchi,  who  on  becoming  consul  in  120  had  changed  over  and 
supported  Opimius,  was  frightened  by  the  threat  of  a  similar  accusa- 
tion into  committing  suicide.  There  was  an  evident  revulsion  of 
feeling  in  favour  of  the  murdered  leader ;  and,  though  Gracchus  had 
disappeared  and  his  followers  had  been  in  large  numbers  put  to 
death,  the  Optimates  did  not  venture  on  reversing  his  legislation. 
His  colonial  scheme  fell  to  the  ground  :  Carthage  did  not  become  a 
colony,  though  the  settlers  were  not  disturbed  in  their  holdings  ;  the 
land  of  Capua  remained  agerpublicusj  and  Neptunia  alone  flourished 
for  a  time  in  ancient  Tarentum.  The  only  other  changes  made  for 
the  present  were  not  in  the  legislation  of  Gaius,  but  in  the  land  law 
of  Tiberius.  The  law  of  Livius  was  passed  abolishing  the  prohibi- 
tion of  alienating  the  newly  allotted  lands  ;  in  1 1 9  the  tribune  Sp. 
Thorius  carried  a  law  formally  abolishing  the  land  commission  and 
fixing  a  low  rent  on  the  lands  for  the  expenses  of  the  corn  distribu- 
tion ;  and  in  1 1 1  this  rent  was  abolished  and  the  allotments  became 
freeholds.  1 

The  Optimates  failed  indeed  to  prevent  the  formation  in  118  of 
the  first  regular  colony  outside  Italy  at  Narbo  Martius,  the  capital  of 
the  .new  province  in  Gallia  Transalpina,  but  on  the  whole  they 
recovered  their  power  and  influence.  Nor  did  the  lex  judiciaria 
of  Gracchus,  though  unrepealed,  have  the  desired  effect  of  purifying 
the  courts  and  restraining  fraud,  violence,  and  corruption.  The 
incapacity  and  venality  of  a    section    of   the   Optimates    displayed 


1  This  appears  to  be  the  law  of  which  fragments  are  preserved  (see  C.I.L, 
200,  Bruns,  p.  72).  It  also  relieved  those  who  fed  no  more  than  ten  oxen  or 
fifty  (?)  sheep  on  the  public  pasture  from  payment  of  the  scriptura. 


1 


XXXV  THE  COMING  AUTOCRACY  567 

in  the  Jugurthine  war  (i  1 1)  were  punished  by  the  outrages  of  Marius 
and  Ginna ;  the  oppression  of  the  pubHcani  in  Asia  led  to  the 
massacre  of  88  ;  while  the  refusal  of  the  franchise  to  the  Italians  led 
to  the  Social  war  of  90-88.  Sulla  looked  for  reform  of  abuses  in  the 
depression  of  the  Populares  and  the  stricter  control  of  the  Senate  ; 
but,  on  the  whole,  from  the  day  on  which  Gracchus  fell,  the  contest 
of  parties,  each  struggling  for  the  monopoly  of  power  and  profit,  each 
unscrupulous  and  corrupt,  was  tending  to  inevitable  civil  war  and 
the  rule  of  a  single  master. 

Authorities. — Livy,  Ep.  Iviii.-lx.  Plutarch,  Lives  of  Tiberius  and  Gains 
Gracchus.  Appian,  B.  Civ.  i.  7-27,  Velleius  ii.  2-7.  Dionysius  xxxiv.  fr. 
Dio  Cassius  fr.  83.  Orosius  v.  9,  12.  For  the  legacy  of  Attalus  and  the 
provinces  of  Asia  see  Strabo  xiii.  4,  2  ;  Justinus  xxxvi.  4  ;  Appian ,  Mithridates, 
62  ;  B.  Civ.  V.  4. 


CHAPTER  XXXVl 


THE   JUGURTHINE   AND    CIMBRIAN    WARS 


PROVINCES 

Gallia  Narbonensis      .      B.C.  ii8 
Cilicia         .         .         .      B.C.  102 


COLONY 
Narbo  Marti  us 


B.C.   118 


The  formation  of  the  first  province  in  Transalpine  Gaul — Wars  with  Gauls,  the 
Balearic  islands,  and  Dalmatia — The  Cimbki  defeat  Cn.  Papirius  Carbo 
at  Noreia  (113),  and  Manlius  and  Caepio  in  Gaul  (105) — History  of  Jugurtha 
— His  bribery  at  Rome — His  murder  of  Massiva — The  Jugurthine  war 
( 1 12-106) — Scandalous  misconduct  of  the  Roman  commanders — Successful 
campaign  of  Metellus  (109-108) — Marius  consul  (107) — Capture  of  Jugurtha 
(106) — Five  consecutive  consulships  of  Marius  (104-100) — His  conduct  of  the 
Cimbric  war — Great  defeat  of  the  Teutones  and  Ambrones  at  Aquae  Sextiae 
(102),  and  of  the  Cimbri  at  Vercellae  (loi). 


The  twenty  years  which  separated  the  death  of  Gaius  Gracchus  from 
the  next  outbreak  of  party  violence  were  filled  with  active  exertions 
in  various  directions,  which  showed  that  the  Romans  had  still  the 
greatness  to  understand  and  the  courage  to  maintain,  and,  if  necessary, 
to  extend  the  inheritance  of  their  fathers.  We  have  seen  with  what 
persistence  they  had  year  after  year  struggled  to  bring  into  order  the 
north-west  of  Italy,  and  secure  an  uninterrupted  road  into  Spain. 
They  were  now  to  find  themselves  responsible  for  the  peace  of  Gaul 
beyond  the  Alps.  The  town  of  Massilia  had  been  on  terms  of 
close  friendship  with  Rome  since  the  time  of  the  second  Punic  war. 
In  154  the  Romans  had  defended  it  from  its  neighbours  the  Ligurian 
Oxybii ;  and  recently  (in  125)  the  consul  M.  Fulvius  Flaccus  had 
been  sent  at  its  request  and  had  won  a  great  victory  over  another 
dangerous  tribe,  the  Salluvii,  inhabiting  the  country  between  Massilia 
and  Antibes,  who  were  joined  by  the  Vocontii  living  between  the 
Isere  and  the  Durance.  Flaccus  returned  to  celebrate  his  triumph 
in  123,  and  was  succeeded  by  C.  Sextius  Calvinus,  who  was  in  Gaul 
for  two  years  as  proconsul,  completed  the  conquest  of  the  Salluvii, 
and  founded  the  town  called  Aquae  Sextiae.  His  successor  Cn. 
Domitius  Ahenobarbus,  finding  a  war  going  on  between  the  Alio- 


CHAP,  xxxvi  THE  CIMBRIAN  INVASION  569 


broges  and  Aedui,  espoused  the  cause  of  the  latter  and  conquered 
the  Allobroges  at  VendaHum  (122).  He  remained  in  Gaul  during 
1 2 1- 1 20  under  the  consul  Q.  Fabius  Maximus,  and  two  victories 
were  gained  over  the  Allobroges  and  Arverni  {Aiivergne).  Bituitis 
king  of  the  Arverni  was  captured  and  carried  off  to  Italy  to  adorn 
the  consul's  triumph,  and  imprisoned  at  Alba  Fucentia.  The  large  The 
district  of  southern  Gaul  between  the  Alps  on  the  east  and  the  Province, 
Cevennes  and  upper  Garonne  on  the  west,  as  far  north  as  the  lake  ''^' 
of  Geneva  to  the  coast  of  the  gulf  of  Lyons  and  the  Pyrenees,  was 
formed  into  a  province,  and  in  118  a  colony  of  Roman  citizens  was 
founded  at  Narbo,  under  the  title  of  Narbo  Martius,  to  be  its  capital. 
The  province  was  called  in  general  terms  Gallia  Transalpina  or  Gallia 
Narbonensis — or  simply  the  Province,  as  opposed  to  other  parts  of 
Transalpine  Gaul,  a  name  which  has  survived  in  the  modern  Provence. 
Massilia  with  its  dependencies  was  not  under  the  governor  of  the 
Province,  but  remained  a  libera  civitas  in  alliance  with  Rome,  though 
much  of  its  commercial  prosperity  was  transferred  to  Narbo,  which 
the  Romans  took  great  pains  to  support. 

In  other  parts  of  the  West  also  real  or  pretended  disorders  were   The 
being  suppressed.     On  the  plea  of  their  support  of  piracy  Q.  Caecilius  Balearic 
Metellus  in  123  subdued  the  Balearic  islands  {Majorca  2in6.  Minorca).  "^^'^^•^• 
In  1 1 9  L.  Caecilius  Metellus  conquered  the  Dalmatians,  who  were  Dalmatae. 
accused  of  harrying  the  protected  tribes  of  Illyricum.      On  a  similar 
plea  the  Thracian  Scordisci  in  Pannonia  were  attacked  by  the  consul  C.  Scordisci. 
Porcius  Cato,  governor  of  Macedonia  (114),  who  fell  into  an  ambush  and 
nearly  lost  his  life  in  the  course  of  the  invasion.     The  Scordisci,  how- 
ever, were  subdued  two  years  later  by  the  consul  M.  Livius  Drusus  (112). 

But  now  a  more  terrible  danger  threatened  Italy  on  the  north- 
east.     In   1 1 8  Q.  Marcius  Rex  had  subdued  the  Stoeni  living  near  Stoeni. 
the  Euganean  hills  between  Verona  and  Padua  ;  but  in   113  news 
was    brought    to    Rome    of  a  vast   horde    of  barbarians   who  had 
arrived    in    the    valley    of  the    Drave,    and    were    expected    either 
to  cross  the  Alps  into   Italy  or  to   penetrate  into  Illyricum.       The   The 
nationality  of  the  Cimbri,   as  these  people  were   called,   is    still  a  Civibri. 
vexed  question.     The  ancient  writers  are  almost  unanimous  in  calling 
them  Celts,  and  what  is  known  of  their  armour  and  customs  points 
the  same  way  and    against    classing    them   with   Germans.       It   is 
scarcely  doubtful,  however,  that  they  came  from  Jutland,  and  were 
now  wandering,  for  what  cause  beyond  their  restless  nature  we  do 
not  know,  in  search  of  fresh  settlements.      The  consul  Cn.  Papirius  Defeat  of 
Carbo  (113)  went  into  Noricum  to  meet  them  and  sustained  a  severe  C^- 
defeat  near  Noreia,   the  modern  Newnarkt  in  Styria.      In  the  next  ^^P^p^^^ 
eight   years,  joined  by  the  Teutones  on   the   borders  of  the   Gallic  i^oreia 
province  and  by  the  Tigurini  in  Switzerland,  they  hung  like  a  cloud  iij. 


570 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


upon  the  northern  frontier  of  Italy,  and  defeated  one  consular  com- 
mander after  another  who  were  sent  to  bar  their  progress.  The 
consul  M.  Junius  Silanus  was  beaten  by  them  in  109.  L.  Cassius 
Longinus  was  defeated  and  slain  by  the  Tigurini  in  107.  The 
consul  Q.  Servilius  Caepio  took  Tolosa  {Toulouse)  in  106,  which 
had  sided  with  the  invaders,  and  plundered  the  stores  of  gold  kept 
in  its  temples  ;  but  in  the  next  year,  as  proconsul,  with  the  consul  Cn. 
Manlius,  he  sustained  a  terrible  defeat,  losing  his  camp  and  80,000 
men,  besides  vast  numbers  of  camp  followers.  The  country  between 
the  Rhone  and  Pyrenees  was  now  at  the  invaders'  mercy,  and  hav- 
ing glutted  themselves  with  its  spoils,  they  crossed  the  mountains 
into  Spain,  but  were  repulsed  by  the  Celtiberi  and  returned  into 
Gaul.  The  Cimbri  now  left  the  Province  in  the  hands  of  the 
Teutones  and  Ambrones  who  were  to  make  their  way  from  the  west  ; 
while  they  themselves,  in  whole  or  in  part,  moved  to  the  east 
and  prepared  to  enter  Italy  down  the  valley  of  the  Athesis  {Adige\ 
the  two  hosts  intending  to  meet  in  Gallia  Cisalpina.  Thus  Italy 
was  being  threatened  on  two  sides,  and  the  alarm  was  so  great  at 
Rome  that  Gaius  Marius,  who  after  the  capture  of  Jugurtha 
had  remained  as  proconsul  in  Numidia  in  105,  was  elected  consul 
in  his  absence  for  104,  and  four  times  in  succession  after  that  year, 
in  spite  of  all  constitutional  rules.  He  was  the  champion  and 
nominee  of  the  popular  party  :  and  the  continuous  power  thus  given 
him  was  a  measure,  not  only  of  the  terror  prevailing,  but  of  the 
distrust  entertained  of  the  ability  or  honesty  of  the  aristocratic 
magistrates,  who  had  failed  in  Numidia  and  against  the  Cimbri  alike. 
To  understand  how  Marius,  a  man  of  humble  birth,  without  wealth 
or  political  connexions,  had  risen  to  this  position  we  must  follow  the 
course  of  the  war  against  Jugurtha,  begun  in  the  third  year  after  the 
advent  of  the  Cimbri  was  first  reported  at  Rome. 

Masannasa  died  in  149,  leaving  his  kingdom  of  Numidia  to  his 
three  sons  Micipsa,  Gulussa,  Mastanabal,  who  divided  the  royal 
functions  according  to  an  arrangement  made  by  Scipio  Aemilianus. 
Before  long  the  two  latter  died,  and  Micipsa  reigned  alone  till  1 1 8, 
when  he  bequeathed  his  dominions  to  his  two  sons  Adherbal  and 
Hiempsal,  and  joined  with  them  a  natural  son  of  his  brother  Mas- 
tanabal, whom  he  had  adopted. ^     This  was  Jugurtha,  who  had  served 


1  Masannasa  ob.  149 

1 

Micipsa  ob.  ii8 

Gulussa 

1 

Mastanabal 
i 

Adherbal                   Hiempsal 
:illed  at  Cirta          killed  118-117 
112                     at  Therniida 

Massiva               Hiempsal 
murdered  in         ob.after  62 
Rome  110                   1 

Juba  ob.  46 

1                          1 
Jugurtha         Gau 

XXXVI  THE  CRIMES  OF  JUGURTHA  571 

in  the  siege  of  Numantia,  and  had  returned  home  with  a  strong  letter 
of  recommendation  from  Scipio.     He  had  the  qualities  to  win  favour,  character 
and  the  cunning  to  conceal  his  unscrupulous  ambition  till  the  time  of 
came  to  gratify  it.     First  in  all  manly  exercises,   in  the  chase  and  Jugurtha. 
the  field  of  battle,  he  indulged  in  no  idleness  or  luxury,  and  boasted 
of  no  success.      He  was  older  than  his  cousins  and  co-heirs,  and  had 
secretly  resolved  to  reign  without  them,  acting  it  is   said  on  hints 
from  Roman  nobles,  whose  acquaintance  he  had  made  at  Numantia, 
that  any  favour  could  be  got  at  Rome  for  money.      Disagreements 
as  to  the  division  of  the  royal  treasures  soon  gave  him  a  pretext. 
Hiempsal  was  murdered  by  his  orders   in  his  house  at  Thermida  ;  Murder  of 
and  Adherbal  hurriedly  sending  off  legates  to   Rome  to  denounce  Hiempsal. 
this  crime,  after  a  faint  show  of  resistance,  took  refuge  in  the  Roman 
province,  and  thence  went  in  person  to  Rome  to  plead  his  cause. 
The  kingdom  of  Numidia,  enlarged  by  the  addition  of  most  of  the 
kingdom  of  Syphax  as  far  west  as  the  river  Mulucha,  and  consider- 
able portions  of  the  old  dominions  of  Carthage,  had  been  held  in 
nominal  independence  by  Masannasa,  but  in  a  close  alliance  with 
Rome,  which  gave  the  Romans  a  right  of  interference  in  regard  to 
its  foreign  relations,  and  practically  in  the  form  of  its  government. 
Since   this  reconstruction    at  the  end  of  the   second   Punic   war,  it 
had  become  a  favourite  field  of  commercial  enterprise,  and  its  capital 
Cirta  was  full  of  Roman  negociatores  engaged  in  the  African  trade. 
The  Romans  therefore  had  every  motive  for  keeping  Numidia  in  a 
'  state  of  peace  and  strictly  subordinate  to  their  authority. 

There  could  be  no  doubt  of  Jugurtha's  crime  and  of  the  justice  Legates 
of  Adherbal's  case.       But  legates  from  the  crafty  Numidian  appeared  A^'^ 
in  Rome  laden  with  money :  and,  instead  of  calling  Jugurtha  to  account,  ^^f^^^^J^^ 
the  Senate  named  ten  commissioners  to  proceed  to  Numidia   and  Hiempsal 
divide  the  country  between  the  two.     The  head  of  this  commission  by  bribery, 
was  L.  Opimius,  who  as  consul  in  1 2 1  had  made  himself  conspicuous  ^^7- 
in  the  punishment  of  the  adherents  of  Gaius  Gracchus.       He   and 
others  of  the  commission  seem  undoubtedly  to  have  received  bribes 
from  Jugurtha.      They  awarded  him  the  wealthier  and  more  warlike 
share,  including  what  was  afterwards  called  Mauretania  Caesariensis, 
while  to  Adherbal  was  given  Numidia  proper,  with  its  capital  Cirta. 
But    no   division   made   by   the   commissioners   was    likely   to    last.  Jugurtha's 
Adherbal    was    of   a    quiet    and    un warlike    disposition  ;    Jugurtha  pohcy  of 
vigorous  and  ambitious,  a  splendid  soldier,  and  restrained  by  no  fear  ^^dJierk^ 
or  scruple.      He  purposely  irritated  Adherbal    by  depredations   on  X17-JT2.' 
his  frontiers,  returned  insulting  answers  to  his  expostulations,  and 
forced  him  to  take  up  arms.     The  cousins  met  near  Cirta,  into  which 
Adherbal  was  soon  forced  to   retreat.     There  Jugurtha  closely  be- 
sieged him,  though  he  was  able  to  despatch  messengers  to  Rome  to 


572 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Siege  of 

Cirta. 

Two 

embassies 
from  Rome 
fail  to 
induce 
Jugurtha  to 
raise  it 

112. 


Death 
of  Adher- 
bal. 

Massacre 
of  Italians. 

War 
declared 
against 
Jugurtha, 

JI2-TII. 
L. 

Calpurnius 
Bestia  in 
Nutnidia 
is  bribed  by 
Jugurtha, 
III. 


Sp. 

Postumius 
Albinus, 
iio-iog. 


Jugurtha 
in  Rome. 


lay  his  wrongs  again  before  the  Senate.  Legates  were  sent  to  Africa  ; 
but  Jugurtha  was  ready  with  specious  pleas,  asserting  that  Adherbal 
had  conspired  against  his  life,  and  that  he  was  only  acting  in  self- 
defence.  Whether  from  corruption  or  conviction,  the  Roman  legates 
quitted  Africa  without  having  induced  him  to  raise  the  siege.  A 
despairing  letter  from  Adherbal  moved  a  party  in  the  Senate  to  vote 
for  instant  war  ;  but  the  senators  in  the  king's  interest,  or  who  honestly 
thought,  as  some  may  have  done,  that  he  had  made  out  a  case  for 
himself,  proved  the  stronger  ;  and  as  a  compromise  another  legation 
of  higher  rank  headed  by  M.  Aemilius  Scaurus,  the  princeps  senatus., 
was  sent,  who  summoned  Jugurtha  to  appear  before  them  at  Utica. 
He  listened  to  the  threatening  message  of  the  Senate,  but  did  not 
break  up  the  siege  of  Cirta  ;  and  the  second  embassy  left  Africa 
without  having  effected  more  than  the  first.  Adherbal,  in  despair, 
followed  the  advice  of  the  Roman  residents  in  that  city,  and  sur- 
rendered on  terms.  But  Jugurtha  cared  little  for  engagements  of 
any  sort.  Adherbal  was  immediately  put  to  death,  and  the  inhabitants 
massacred  without  distinction  between  Numidians  and  Italians. 

The  tribune  C.  Memmius  denounced  the  intrigues  of  the  nobles 
whereby  Jugurtha  had  enjoyed  immunity  so  long,  and  the  Senate  no 
longer  ventured  to  oppose  the  popular  sentiment.  It  was  forced  for 
shame  to  assign  the  '  province '  of  Numidia  to  one  of  the  consuls 
designate,  L.  Calpurnius  Bestia  ;  to  sanction  the  enrolment  of  an 
army ;  and  to  decline  receiving  Jugurtha's  son  and  other  legates 
unless  they  brought  an  unconditional  surrender.  Bestia  began  the 
campaign  with  spirit,  took  several  towns,  and  a  large  number  of 
prisoners.  But  presently,  along  with  his  legatus  Scaurus,  he  succumbed 
to  the  temptation  of  Jugurtha's  gold,  and  admitted  him  to  make  an 
open  and  formal  surrender,  which  left  him  practically  in  full  posses- 
sion of  his  territories,  while  the  Roman  army  remained  inactive 
in  its  quarters.  Again  Memmius  denounced  this  scandalous  trans- 
action ;  and  in  1 1  o,  on  the  proposal  of  the  tribune  C.  Mamilius,  a 
tribunal  was  appointed  to  determine  who  had  received  bribes  from 
Jugurtha.  Bestia  and  many  others  were  condemned,  though  Scaurus 
escaped  by  getting  himself  nominated  one  of  the  three  qiiaesitorcs. 
The  conduct  of  the  war  was  meanwhile  given  to  the  consul  Spurius 
Albinus,  who  made  haste  to  take  over  his  command,  but,  when 
obliged  to  return  to  Rome  for  the  elections,  had  done  nothing.  The 
scandal  had  been  so  great,  that  the  praetor  L.  Cassius  had  been  sent 
in  no  to  bring  Jugurtha  under  a  safe-conduct  to  Rome,  to  give 
evidence  as  to  those  who  had  taken  his  money.  He  still  found  that 
he  was  able  to  gain  support  by  the  same  means  ;  but  was  obliged  to 
fly  secretly  from  the  city  when  it  became  known  that  the  young  prince 
Massiva,  a  son  of  Gulussa  then  residing  in  Rome,  whom  Albinus 


XXXVI  METELLUS  AND  JUGURTHA  573 

proposed  to  set  up  as  king  of  Numidia,  had  been  assassinated  by  his  Murder  of 

order.      In  the  absence  of  Albinus  from  Numidia,  his  brother  Aulus,  Massiva. 

whom   he   had  left   in   command,   made  an   expedition  in    January 

of  109,  and  met  with  such  severe  disaster  that   he  was  forced  to 

make  a  disgraceful  treaty  with  Jugurtha,  and  to  withdraw  his  army  Treaty  of 

into  the  Province.      Albinus  hurried  back,  but  found  the  army  too  Aulus. 

much  demoralised  to  do  anything  effectual.     The  Senate  repudiated 

the  treaty  of  Aulus  :  but  no  hope  of  prosecuting  the  war  with  any 

good  result  remained,  unless  some  one  should  take  the  command 

who  was  at  once  able  and  incorruptible. 

Such   a    man   was   Q.    Caecilius  Metellus,  who   in   the   summer  Q. 
of  that    year  took   over    the    army  of  Albinus.      He   found  it   in    a  Caecilius 
disgraceful  state   of  disorder,  and  would   attempt  nothing  until  by  ^^^^^fjf^« 
expelling   from   the   camp   all   the   ministers   of  luxury,   and  forcing  ^^^ 
the  soldiers   to  regular  and   severe  labours,   he  had  restored   it   to 
a  state    of  efficiency.     The    report    of   his    incorruptibility  induced 
Jugurtha  to  offer  submission  on  condition  of  his  own  and  children's 
lives  being    secured.       Metellus,   without   giving  any  answer,   tried 
to  persuade  the  ambassadors  by  promises  of  great  rewards  to  sur- 
render  Jugurtha ;    and    meanwhile    marched    into     Numidia,    ably 
supported  by  his  legate  Gains  Marius,  who  was  in  command  of  the 
cavalry.     Jugurtha  attempted  to  cut  him  off  by  occupying  a  strong  Battle  of 
position  above  the  river  Muthul,  but  was  defeated  with  great  loss,  the  river 
and  forced  to  take  refuge  in  a  wild  country  covered  with  forest  and  ^^thul. 
rock,  and  could  do  nothing  but  attack  detached  parties  of  the  Roman 
army,  keeping   to  the   hills   and  avoiding  a  pitched   battle.      After 
devastating  Numidia  and  occupying  many  towns,    Metellus  finally 
laid  siege  to  Zama, — the  "citadel  of  Numidia."     Zama,  however, 
proved  for  the  present  impregnable,  and  Metellus  put  his  army  into 
winter  quarters  in  the  Province,  leaving  garrisons  in  the  towns  which 
he   had    taken.       During    the    winter  Jugurtha    was    persuaded    by 
Bomilcar, — .the  assassin   of  Massiva,   whom    Metellus   had   worked 
on   by   promising  him   impunity  for  his   crime, — to   again   offer    a 
submission.       But  the  negotiation  fell   through  on   the   question  of  Fruitless 
a    personal    surrender ;    and    when    the    season    for    campaigning  negotia- 
came  again,    Metellus   set  out   to  recapture   Vaga,    the  inhabitants  ^^^^^' 
of    which    had    during    the    winter    surprised    and    massacred    the 
Roman  garrison,  leaving  none  alive  but  the  commander  T.  Turpilius 
Silanus.     This  accomplished,  he  proceeded  to  attack  Jugurtha,  who 
having    discovered    that    Bomilcar    was    tampering    with    his    most 
intimate  friends,  and  that  he  could  trust  hardly  any  one  about  him, 
was   moving    from    place    to    place    with    restless    haste.       Where 
Jugurtha  commanded  himself  his  men  stood  firm,  but  the  rest  were 
easily  put  to  flight ;  and  he  was  forced  to  make  his  way  over  the 


574 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


His  con- 
nexio?i 
with 
Metellus. 


desert  to  Thala,  where  Metellus  followed  him.  With  his  children 
and  treasure  he  escaped  by  night,  and  the  town  fell  into  the  hands 
of  Metellus,  though  not  till  after  a  siege  of  forty  days.  Meanwhile 
Jugurtha  had  made  his  way  across  the  desert  to  the  country  of  the 
Gaetuli,  where  his  money  enabled  him  to  get  soldiers,  and  where  he 
was  near  enough  to  the  western  Mauretania  to  negotiate  with  king 
Bocchus.  The  two  agreed  to  march  together  upon  Cirta,  near  which 
Metellus  was  now  encamped,  having  detached  a  part  of  his  army  to 
secure  Leptis.  Thus  the  year  io8  was  wearing  away,  and  while 
encamped  at  Cirta  Metellus  learnt  that  the  third  year  of  office  decreed 
him  by  the  Senate,  in  which  he  hoped  to  finish  the  war,  was  not  to 
be  his,  but  was  to  fall  to  the  new  consul  Gains  Marius  in  circum- 
stances peculiarly  galling  to  his  pride. 

Gains  Marius,  born  near  Arpinum  in  157  of  parents  in  humble 
circumstances,  had  risen  slowly  in  political  life,  which  he  appears  to 
have  been  encouraged  to  enter  upon  by  L.  Caecilius  Metellus,  consul 
in  119,  to  whose  family  his  own  had  been  in  some  way  attached  as 
clients.  He  first  distinguished  himself  when  serving  at  Numantia 
under  Scipio  Africanus  the  younger,  who  is  said  to  have  pointed  him 
out  half-playfully  as  the  man  likely  to  succeed  himself  as  a  military 
commander  in  case  of  great  national  danger.  It  was  not,  however, 
till  five  years  after  his  return  from  Spain  that  he  ventured  to  stand 
for  office.  In  1 19  he  was  tribune,  and  during  that  year  carried  a  law, 
of  which  we  do  not  know  the  terms,  intended  in  some  way  to  secure 
purity  in  elections.  The  Senate  passed  a  decree  against  the  law 
being  brought  before  the  people  ;  but  Marius  threatened  to  imprison 
both  the  consuls  unless  they  withdrew  the  decree,  as  being  an  inter- 
ference with  the  liberty  of  a  tribune,  and  the  law  was  passed.  Though 
he  had  won  popular  favour  by  this  boldness,  he  failed  to  secure  the 
next  step  in  official  rank,  the  aedileship,  and  was  only  returned  at  the 
bottom  of  the  list  of  the  praetors  for  1 1  5.  His  year  of  office  as  praetor 
added  nothing  to  his  reputation  ;  but  being  propraetor  in  farther 
Spain  in  1 14-1 13,  he  showed  energy  in  putting  down  brigandage  and 
civilising  his  province  ;  and  about  this  time  acquired  some  additional 
social  position  by  marrying  lulia,  of  the  aristocratic  family  of  the 
Caesars,  and  aunt  to  the  future  dictator.  In  naming  him  as  one  of 
his  legati  in  the  African  war,  Metellus  no  doubt  imagined  that  he  was 
selecting  a  useful  officer,  who  had  given  evidence  of  energy  and 
respectable  ability,  and  who  at  the  same  time  was  attached  to  his 
own  family  by  traditional  ties  ;  but  he  had  no  idea  that  he  was  on  a 
par  with  himself,  or  likely  to  interfere  with  his  commission  in  Africa. 
It  was  a  shock  to  him  therefore  when  during  the  winter  of  109-108 
Marius  applied  for  leave  to  go  home  to  stand  for  the  consulship.  He 
had  been  promised  the  highest  honours  by  fortune  tellers,  and  had 


XXXVI      MARIUS  CONSUL  AND  COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  575 

been  secretly  preparing  for  it  for  some  time  by  gaining  the  good-will 
of  the  soldiers.  Strict  in  discipline,  he  had  shown  that  readiness 
to  share  in  their  toils,  hardships,  and  rough  fare,  which,  when  com- 
bined with  undoubted  courage  and  military  skill,  is  sure  to  secure 
their  allegiance.  He  had  let  it  be  known  also  that  he  believed  more 
energy  might  have  been  shown  in  pursuing  Jugurtha,  and  that  he  would 
undertake  to  finish  the  war  in  a  very  short  time.  Metellus  received 
the  application  with  indignant  surprise.  In  the  tone  of  an  indulgent 
superior  he  advised  Marius  to  abandon  a  measure  which  could  only 
result  in  mortification  ;  and  finally,  when  he  could  not  persuade  him, 
said  sarcastically  that  it  would  be  time  enough  for  him  to  think  of 
standing  for  the  consulship  when  his  son,  the  young  Metellus,  then 
twenty,  serving  on  his  father's  staff,  did  the  same.  However  Marius  Marius 
continually  repeated  his  request,  which  had  at  last  to  be  granted.         ^^^^  ^^ 

He  arrived  in  Rome  when  the  inquiry  under  the  lex  Ma77iilia    f"^^,  ? 
1  •  c  ■>         cf  •       1  •  r    1  stand  for 

mto  the  corruption  of  the  officers  m  the  previous  part  of  the  war  was  tf^g  consul- 
still  involving  the  nobility  in  grave  scandal,  and  giving  the  popular  ship. 
party  a  strong  case  against  them.      He  had  taken  care  also  that  he 
should  be  preceded  by  letters  from  merchants  and  soldiers  complain- 
ing of  the  dilatory  proceedings  of  Metellus  ;  and  from  Cauda,  a  son 
of  Mastanabal,  whose  pretensions  to  be  treated  as  a  royal  personage 
had  been  slighted  by  Metellus,  and  who  had  received  Marius'  promise 
of  supporting  his  claim  to  the  throne  in  the  future.      The  popular 
feeling  thus  roused  overbore  all  opposition  from  the  nobles.      Not  loj.  Coss. 
only  was   Marius  returned  for  the  consulship  by  all  the  centuries,  ^-  Ca^^i^^ 
but  a  plebiscitum  also  gave  him  the  command  in  Numidia,  which  ^^p^^^' 
overrode   the   Senatorial    decree  already  passed   continuing  the   im-  Marius. 
perium  of  Metellus.      We  have  seen  how  Metellus  was  informed  of 
this  when  almost  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy.      He  was  so  deeply 
mortified  that,  when  Marius  arrived,  he  deputed  one  of  his  legati  to 
hand  over  the  army  to  him,  and  returned  to  Rome  with  the  feelings 
of  a  disgraced  man.      To  his    surprise  he  was  received  with  every 
honour,  and  no  objection  was  made  to  his  triumph  or  his  cognomen 
of  Numidicus.      It  was  not  against  him  personally  that  the  prejudice 
had  grown,  but  against  the  supremacy  of  a  class  which  had  shown 
itself  unworthy. 

Marius  had  openly  spoken  of  his  success  as  a  blow  to  the  nobles,  Marius 
and  his  consulship  as  a  spoil  taken  in  war  with  them.      Nevertheless  Pj'^P'^^^^ 
the  Senate  did  not  venture  to   refuse  him  a  suppleme7iiiim  for  the  Africa. 
legions,  or  anything  else  he  asked.      They  even  hoped  that  his  activity 
in  pressing  men  into  his  service  would  ruin  his  popularity.      But  the 
result  was  the  reverse.      He  induced  veterans  to  re-enlist ;  he  made  a 
point   of  selecting   Latins   of  tried   courage  without   regard   to  their 
possessing  full  citizenship  ;  and  instead  of  formally  convening  the 


576 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Capture  of 
Capsa. 


Capture  of 
the  royal 
fort  on  the 
Mulucha. 


L. 

Cornelius 
Sulla. 


centuries  in  the  Campus  Martius,  and  selecting  from  the  five  classes, 
he  received  all  who  volunteered,  whether  rated  up  to  the  standard  of 
the  fifth  class  or  no.  This  reform  was  maintained  ;  the  number  of 
needy  citizens  ready  and  fit  for  service  had  no  doubt  much  increased 
as  land  became  more  and  more  concentrated  in  few  hands,  and  it  was 
imperative  to  find  some  employment  for  them ;  but  by  it  almost  the  last 
shred  of  the  old  theory  of  a  citizen  soldiery  serving  as  a  public  duty 
was  torn  away.  Men  enlisted  as  in  a  profession,  expecting  to  live  on 
pay  and  plunder,  and  to  be  maintained  afterwards  by  grants  of  land  ; 
and  in  the  revolutionary  times  now  drawing  near,  these  men,  anxious 
to  join  any  army,  or  as  veterans  willing  to  return  to  the  only  employ- 
ment for  which  they  were  fit,  were  a  ready  material  for  any  leadef 
who  could  find  them  pay  or  offer  hopes  of  plunder. 

For  the  present  all  went  well.  Marius  found  plenty  of  volunteers, 
even  more  than  the  number  he  was  authorised  to  levy ;  and  soon 
after  he  had  entered  on  his  consulship  arrived  at  Utica  and  took  over 
the  army.  He  at  once  led  them  into  a  rich  district,  gratified  them 
with  booty,  and  set  them  the  comparatively  easy  task  of  capturing 
forts  and  small  towns,  whose  garrisons  were  too  weak  to  resist.  But 
while  thus  apparently  indulging  his  soldiers  he  kept  the  most  vigilant 
look-out  for  all  chances.  Jugurtha  and  Bocchus  had  not  ventured  to 
await  his  attack,  but  had  retired  in  different  directions,  hoping  to  find 
some  opportunity  of  catching  him  off  his  guard.  But  Marius  beat 
Jugurtha  at  his  own  tactics,  and  eventually  in  a  skirmish  near  Cirta 
forced  him  to  throw  away  his  arms  and  fly.  Bocchus  was  already 
trying  to  make  peace  for  himself  But  Marius  would  listen  to  nothing. 
He  determined  that  to  finish  the  war  Jugurtha  must  be  deprived  of 
every  stronghold.  By  a  movement  of  extraordinary  rapidity  he  seized 
Capsa,  a  strong  position  near  the  Tritonian  lake,  and  one  of  the 
royal  treasure  cities,  which  he  burnt,  killing  or  selling  all  its  inhabitants. 
He  followed  this  up  by  a  series  of  assaults  upon  other  cities  and  forts, 
until  he  reached  another  depot  of  the  royal  treasure  in  the  far  west, 
on  the  river  Mulucha,  which  separated  the  dominions  of  Jugurtha  and 
Bocchus. 

This  fortress,  perched  on  a  high  rock,  proved  more  difficult  than 
Capsa.  He  was  on  the  point  of  retiring,  when  a  way  up  the  rock 
was  discovered  accidentally  by  a  Ligurian  soldier  gathering  some 
edible  snails  on  its  side.  Thus  far,  therefore,  his  success  had  been 
sufficient ;  but  the  great  object  of  capturing  Jugurtha  was  apparently 
as  far  off  as  it  had  been  in  the  time  of  Metellus.  He  was  now,  how- 
ever, joined  by  his  quaestor  L.  Sulla,  who  had  stayed  behind  to  enrol 
cavalry  from  the  Italian  allies,  and  arrived  just  after  the  capture  of 
the  fort  on  the  Mulucha.  Though  inexperienced  in  war,  and  nineteen 
years  younger  than  Marius,  his  abilities  and  vigour  quickly  made  him 


XXXVI  CAPTURE  OF  JUGURTHA  577 

beloved  and  respected  by  the  soldiers  and  valued  by  his  chief.    They  Jugurtha 
soon  had  an  opportunity  of  testing  their  powers.     Jugurtha  had  per-  ^^^ 
suaded  Bocchus  by  a  promise  of  a  large  part  of  his  dominions  to  join  ^"ff^ck^the 
him  again,  and  the  two  kings  reappeared  in  force  towards  the  end  of  Romans 
the  year  107,  and  swept  down  upon  the  Roman  camp  with  unexpected  near  ana, 
suddenness.     The  attack  was  repulsed  and  the  armies  of  the  kings  ^^^^  ^"-  ^^7- 
dispersed,  but  only  to  gather  again.      Following  the   march  of  the 
Romans  towards  their  winter  quarters,  they  fell  upon  their  rear  when 
close  to  Cirta.      Once  more  the  Romans  were  all  but  defeated,  and 
Jugurtha  brandishing  a  bloody  sword  exclaimed  loudly  that  he  had 
killed  Marius  with  his  own  hand.      The  lie  was  presently  confuted  by 
the  appearance  of  Marius  himself,  who  came  from  the  van  to  support 
his  wavering  rearguard,  and  a  brilliant  charge  of  Sulla's  cavalry  upon 
the  Mauri  decided  the  result  of  the  day.      Jugurtha  was  surrounded 
as  he  was  frantically  endeavouring  to  rally  his  men  to  complete  what 
he  thought  was  a  victory,  and  escaped  almost  alone  through  the  darts 
of  the  enemy. 

The  result  of  these  engagements  induced  Bocchus  once  more  to    Winter  of 
try  to  make  his  peace  with  Rome,  even  at  the  price  of  betraying  his  ^07-106. 
ally.     As  soon  as  the  king's  legates  reached  him  in  Cirta,  Marius 
despatched  L.  Sulla  and  A.  Manlius  to  visit  Bocchus,  who  assured 
them  of  his  devotion.    He  obtained  permission  to  send  plenipotentiaries 
to  Rome,  who  expatiated  on  the  king's  repentance,  and  obtained  a 
rather  grudging  decree  admitting   him   to   friendship   and   alliance. 
Bocchus  then  begged  that  Sulla,  whose  winter  quarters  were  at  Utica,  Bocchus 
should  again  visit  him.      Even  then  he  appears  to  have  been  hesi-  ^^^^^^ 
tating  and  to  have  been  negotiating  with  Jugurtha.     But  the  firm  tone 
and  uncompromising  spirit  of  Sulla  at  length  prevailed,  and  Bocchus 
consummated  his  treachery  by  inducing  Jugurtha  to  meet  him  and  Sulla 
in  conference,  letting  Jugurtha  imagine  that  he  meant  to  put  Sulla  in 
his  hands,  as  a  hostage  whose  high  birth  and  estimation  at  Rome 
would  give  him  the  greatest  advantage  in  treating.      Jugurtha  had  Jugurtha  a 
suggested  this  treachery,  and  it  was  turned  upon  himself      He  came  P^^^^ner, 
to  the  conference,  unarmed  and  with  few  attendants,  was  surrounded 
by  troops  and  handed  over  to  Sulla,  who  took  him  and  his  son  to 
Marius. 

The  news  that  this  dangerous  enemy  was  in  chains,  and  was  to 
be  brought  to  Rome  to  adorn  a  triumph,  caused  great  exultation  ;  and  Marius 
when  in  105 — during  which  year  Marius  still  remained  in  Africa  commander 
with  his  army — the  defeat  of  Manlius  and  Caepio  by  the  Cimbri  made 
it  imperative  to  find  a  general  whom  they  could  trust,  the  eyes  of  all 
turned  to  Marius,  and  he  was  elected  consul  in  his  absence,  in  spite 
of  the  law,  and  bidden  to  return  to  save  his  country. 

He  entered  Rome  in  triumph  on  the  same  day  as  he  took  up  his 

2  p 


578 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


104. 

Marius 
triumphs, 
and  takes 
the  field 
against 
the  Cimbri. 


Marius 
consul 
third 
tijne,  loj. 


Marius 
fourth  time 
consul. 


The  battle 
of  Aquae 
Sextiae, 
102 
[autujuji). 


First  day. 


The  Am- 
b  rones. 


second  consulship,  the  ist  of  January  104.  Jugurtha  and  his  two 
sons  were  led  in  the  procession,  and  afterwards  thrust  into  the  vault 
of  the  Mamertine  prison  and  left  to  starve.  The  ceremonies  usually 
performed  at  the  beginning  of  a  new  consulship  being  over,  Marius 
advanced  towards  Gaul  to  meet  the  threatened  invasion  of  the  Cimbri 
and  Teutones.  But  the  barbarians  were  engaged  in  their  fruitless 
expedition  into  Spain,  and  had  not  come  into  contact  with  him 
when  his  year  of  office  was  drawing  to  a  close  ;  and  he  was  elected 
a  third  time  in  his  absence,  and  spent  yet  another  year  in  waiting 
for  the  enemy.  He  had  to  return  to  Rome  to  hold  the  elections  at 
the  end  of  103,  his  colleague  Orestes  having  died.  He  pretended 
to  deprecate  re-election  ;  but  easily  gave  way  before  the  reproaches 
of  the  tribune  L.  Saturninus, — who  declared  that,  if  he  refused,  he 
would  be  a  traitor  to  his  country, — and  was  returned  with  Q.  Lutatius 
Catulus  for  the  fourth  time.  The  great  storm  was  now  ready  to 
burst.  The  Teutones  and  Ambrones  were  in  southern  Gaul,  and 
were  ready  to  make  their  way  into  Italy  along  the  coast ;  while  a 
vast  horde  of  Cimbri  were  entering  in  the  east  by  the  Brenner  pass. 
Marius  commanded  in  Transalpine  Gaul :  Catulus  in  Cisalpine  Gaul 
near  Verona. 

The  first  to  move  were  the  Teutones  and  Ambrones  :  and  Marius 
now  crossed  the  Alps  and  posted  himself  strongly  on  the  lower  Rhone, 
securing  his  communication  with  the  sea  by  digging  a  canal  through 
the  alluvial  deposits  at  the  mouth  of  the  river.  Through  the 
summer  he  kept  his  men  employed  in  such  laborious  works,  and 
refused  to  be  tempted  to  give  the  enemy  battle  till  he  could  do  so  to 
advantage,  in  spite  of  the  murmuring  among  his  soldiers,  who  were 
eager  to  try  their  strength  against  the  barbarians  under  a  leader 
whom  they  trusted.  The  Teutones  encouraged  by  what  seemed  his 
timidity  grew  more  insolent,  and  even  attempted  to  storm  his  camp. 
Failing  in  that,  they  resolved  to  pass  him  by  and  enter  Italy. 
For  six  days,  it  is  said,  their  vast  host  filed  past  in  view  of  the 
Roman  army,  some  of  them  so  near  that  they  could  shout  jeeringly 
to  the  men  on  the  vallum,  asking  if  they  had  any  messages  for  their 
wives  at  Rome.  But  as  soon  as  they  had  passed,  Marius  broke 
up  his  camp  and  followed.  He  found  them  encamped  near  Aquae 
Sextiae,  about  sixteen  miles  north  of  Marseilles,  and  only  a  few 
days'  march  from  the  pass  into  Italy,  and  determined  to  give  them 
battle  there.  The  barbarians  were  in  possession  of  the  stream,  and 
when  his  men  complained  of  want  of  water  Marius  pointed  to  their 
camp,  and  said  that  they  could  get  it  there  but  would  have  to  pay 
for  it  with  blood.  The  first  day's  battle  was  in  fact  brought  on  by 
struggles  for  the  water,  in  which  the  Ambrones  were  cut  to  pieces  or 
chased  to  their  lager  of  waggons  ;  in  defending  which  the  women 


XXXVI        DESTRUCTION  OF  TEUTONES  AND  CIMBRI  579 

fought  as  desperately  as  the  men,  clinging-  to  the  shields  and  spears 

of  the  Romans,  and  enduring  wounds  and  blows  with  the  bravest. 

At  nightfall  the  ground  was  thickly  strewn  with  dead  Ambrones  :  but 

the  Teutones  were  still  collected  in  vast  numbers  ;  and  the  night  was 

made  hideous  by  their  yells  over  the  dead,  mixed  with  war  cries  and 

threatening    shouts.      Next  day,  however,   C.    Marcellus  with   3000  Secondday. 

men  made  his  way  through  rough  ground  to  some  hills  on  their  rear. 

The  barbarians  tried  to  carry  this  position,  but  were  driven  back 

and  found   Marius  with  his  main  army  waiting  for  them  in  the  plain, 

while  Marcellus  charged  down   upon  them   from  the  hills.      They 

were  defeated  with  a  slaughter  so  immense  as  to  amount  to  almost 

annihilation.      More  than  100,000  are  said  to  have  fallen  ;  and  the  Great 

plains  on  which  they  lay  produced  an  extraordinary  harvest  for  some  slaughter  of 

seasons  afterwards,  while  the  Massilians  are  said  to  have  used  the   Teutones. 

bleaching  bones  to  fence  their  vineyards.      Even  now  remnants  of 

the  battle  are  found,  and  the  village  of  les  Pourrieres  {pulndi)  recalls 

the  memory  of  the  slaughter. 

The  battle  had  taken  place  late  in  102,  and  while  Marius  was  cele-  Marius 

brating  his  victory  by  burning  a  huge  pile  of  spoil  which  could  not  -fif^^  ^^'"^^ 

be  removed,  couriers  brought  the  news  that  the  consular  elections  ^"^^"^' 

.  .  lor. 

were  over,  and  that  he  had  been  returned  a  fifth  time.     The  province 

in  Transalpine  Gaul  being  thus  secured,  he  returned  to  Rome  with 

his  army  to  enter  on  his  consulship  and  to  consult  as  to  the  danger 

still  threatening  in  the  north-east.      Catulus  had  not  been  able  to  pre-  Defeat  of 

vent  the  Cimbri  from  crossing  the  Brenner  ;  and  in  the  spring  of  loi    Catulus 

they  had   descended  upon   his   position   on   the  Adige,   somewhere  "ff^'^ 

between  the  lago  di  Garda  and  Verona,  with  such  fury  that  he  had  ^^^ 

to  retreat  beyond  the  Po.      Marius  at  once  started  to  his  assistance, 

met  him  marching   up   the   Po,   like   Prince   Eugdne  in    1706,   and 

crossing  that  river  found  the  Cimbri   near  Vercellae,  whither  they 

had    come   after   ravaging    the    plains    of    Lombardy,   expecting   to 

meet  their   allies   the  Teutones    and  Ambrones,  whose   destruction 

at  Aquae  Sextiae  they  do  not  seem  to  have  known.      They  tried  at 

first  to  negotiate,  and  sent  messengers   to  Marius  asking  for  land 

in  which  to  settle  for  themselves  and  their  brethren  the  Teutones. 

"  You  need  not  trouble   yourselves    about    your    brothers,"    replied 

Marius  grimly,  "  they  have  got  land  which  they  will  never  have  to 

surrender."      He  also  showed  the  legates  some  of  the  Teutonic  chiefs, 

who  had  been  stopped  in  their  flight  by  the  Sequani,  and  handed  over  joth  of 

to  him.      "  It  was  a  pity  they  should  go  away  without  greeting  their  -^"^  ^<'^' 

brethren,"  he  said.     When  the  Cimbricking  challenged  him  to  single    !f^^  ^  °^ 

combat  at  a  fixed  time  and  place,  he  replied  that  it  was  not  the  habit   Raudian 

of  the  Romans  to  allow  their  enemies  to  name  the  time  or  place  at   plains  near 

which   they  were   to   fight.      He  would    however    engage    to    meet    Vercellae, 


58o  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap,  xxxvi 

him  on  the  third  day  on  the  plains  of  Vercellae.  On  these  plains — 
called  the  Raudian  plains — the  battle  took  place,  in  which  the 
Cimbri  in  their  turn  were  annihilated.  It  is  useless  to  try  to  name 
exact  numbers,  and  the  calculations  vary  between  200,000  and 
100,000.  The  horde  was  utterly  destroyed,  and  the  women  killed 
themselves  with  their  children,  although  many  thousands  of  both 
sexes  were  also  taken  alive  and  sold  into  slavery.  Catulus,  with 
whom  Sulla  was  now  serving,  regarded  the  credit  of  the  battle  to  be 
chiefly  his,  and  complained  that  Marius  had  by  his  dispositions  en- 
deavoured to  deprive  him  of  his  due  share  of  the  glory.  Popular 
sentiment,  however,  was  on  the  side  of  Marius.  He  was  offered  two 
triumphs,  but  would  only  accept  one,  and  that  in  conjunction  with 
Catulus.  The  danger  that  had  been  overshadowing  Italy  for  twelve 
years,  the  forerunner  of  many  similar  terrors  in  generations  to  come, 
was  dispelled.  It  had  had  the  effect  among  other  things  of  raising  a 
mere  soldier  to  the  highest  position  in  the  State.  The  events  which 
followed  showed  how  little  capable  he  was  as  a  politician  of  directing 
the  fortunes  of  the  country,  which  he  had  known  how  to  protect  as  a 
general. 

Authorities. — Sallust,  Jugurtha,  Livy,  Ep.  62,  64-67.  Velleius  ii.  11,  12. 

Diodorus  fr.  of  xxxv.      Plutarch,  Marius,  Sulla.      Orosius  v.  15,  16.      Flonis  iii. 

3.  Strabo  vii.  2  (for  the  Cimbri).  Dio  Cassius  fr.  88,  89.  Eutrop.  iv.  26,  27. 
Appian  fr.  of  res  Numidicae. 


\ 


CHAPTER    XXXVII 

THE    FIRST    PERIOD    OF   CIVIL    WARS,    IOO-84 

Political  parties  at  Rome — The  Senate  and  the  equestrian  order — Frequent  scenes 
of  violence — Marius  and  the  reformed  army — ^The  second  tribunate  of  L. 
Appuleius  Saturninus — Murder  of  Nonius — Agrarian  law  of  Saturninus  and 
banishment  of  Metellus — Murder  of  Memmius — Death  of  Saturninus  and 
Glaucia  (100) — Events  abroad  from  102  to  92 — The  lex  Licinia  Marcia  and 
alienation  of  the  Italians  (95) — Compromises  proposed  by  M.  Livius  Drusus 
(91) — Death  of  Drusus — Prosecutions  of  Varius  —  The  Marsic  or  Social 
war  (90-88) — Sulla  consul  with  command  of  the  Mithridatic  war — Revolu- 
tionary proposals  of  Sulpicius  and  the  substitution  of  Marius  for  Sulla — Sulla 
advances  on  Rome — Death  of  Sulpicius  and  flight  of  Marius  (88) — Cinna 
consul  in  87 — Expelled  from  Rome,  raises  army  and  returns  with  Marius— Reign 
of  terror  in  Rome — Death  of  Marius  in  his  seventh  consulship  (86) — Suc- 
cessive consulships  of  Cinna,  persecution  of  the  party  of  Sulla,  and  preparations 
to  prevent  Sulla's  return  (85-84) — Death  of  Cinna  (84). 

The  division  between  the  parties  of  the  Optimates  and  Populares  was  Political 
now  becoming  more  clearly  defined  and  more  bitter.      The  reaction  parties  at 


Rome,  the 
Optimates 


after  the  legislation  of  Gaius  Gracchus  had  brought  back  some  of  the 

old  evils  in  an  acuter  form.      Land  was  falling  again  into  the  hands  ^^^^ 

of  great  proprietors,   and   poverty  was   on  the  increase — abundant  Populares. 

material  for  political  discontent.     The  Senate  was  becoming  miserably 

weak  and  discredited,  its  numbers  sinking, ^  and  its  authority  flouted 

by  magistrates  who  obtained  office  by  the  influence  of  family  cliques 

and  wished  to  be  unrestrained  in  it.     Moreover  on  the  question  of  the   The  Senate 

judicia  in  public  trials  it  was  constantly  estranged  from  the  equestrian  '^^^  ^^^, 

order,  which  accordingly,  for  the  most  part,  threw  its  influence  on  ^^^^^ 

the  side  of  the   Populares.      The   chief  aims   of  the  leaders  of  the 

Populares  were  to  break  down  the  monopoly  of  office  maintained  by 

the  great  families  ;  to  reform  the  administration  ;  and  to  widen  the 

basis  of  power  by  removing  the  barriers  which  at  present  separated 

Italian  and  Roman.     But  in  order  to  carry  their  followers  with  them, 

^  Speaking  of  the  period  about  100  and  95,  Appian  says  that  the  number  of 
the  Senate  could  scarcely  be  kept  up  to  300  [Bell.  Civ.  i.  35). 


582 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


who  especially  in  the  last  point  were  jealous  and  suspicious,  they  had 
to  satisfy  the  immediate  demands  for  relief  suggested  by  the  wants 
and  difficulties  of  th6  time.  This  complexity  of  interests  helps  to 
account  for  the  bitterness  of  opposition  on  the  part  of  the  Optimates 
on  questions  apparently  subordinate,  and  for  the  sudden  desertion  of 
their  followers  sometimes  experienced  by  the  popular  leaders.  Mean- 
while the  scandals  and  failures  of  the  oligarchical  government  were 
increasing ;  and  the  reform, which  Sulla  afterwards  sought  in  strengthen- 
ing the  Senate  and  curbing  the  power  of  the  tribunes,  the  leaders  of 
the  Populares  tried  to  accomplish  by  severer  laws,  frequent  prosecu- 
tions, and  by  putting  the  administration  more  directly  in  the  hands 
of  the  people. 

But  the  violence  which  was  becoming  more  and  more  common  at 
elections  and  meetings  for  legislation  showed  clearly  that  in  the  end 
the  question  of  supremacy  would  be  decided  by  arms  ;  and  it  was 
therefore  success  in  war,  and  the  power  of  commanding  the  allegiance 
of  the  soldiers,  that  now  marked  out  a  man  as  chief  of  either  party. 
Marius  in  many  ways  was  ill-suited  to  the  position  of  a  political  leader. 
The  popular  party  had  generally  been  led  by  some  aristocrat  of  ability 
and  eloquence,  who  espoused  its  side  from  conviction  or  from  per- 
sonal quarrels  with  his  own  equals  ;  Marius  belonged  by  birth  to  the 
lower  class  of  farmers,  and  had  no  gift  of  eloquence  to  make  up  for  his 
lack  of  social  influence  or  political  insight.  But  he  had  the  confidence 
of  soldiers,  and  by  the  changes  he  had  introduced  in  the  army  had 
made  it  a  readier  instrument  in  the  hands  of  a  party  chief.  Though 
his  reforms  were  primarily  intended  to  increase  its  effectiveness  in 
the  field,  they  resulted  in  the  final  disappearance  of  the  notion  of  it 
as  a  citizen  militia,  in  which  the  distinctions  of  civil  life  and  the 
census  determined  the  rank,  arms,  and  place  in  the  field  of  the  men, 
who,  though  receiving  pay,  yet  by  a  theory  which  had  not  quite 
ceased  to  be  a  reality  were  also  performing  a  necessary  duty  of  citizen- 
ship. Marius  raised  the  number  of  a  legion  to  6000,  divided  into 
ten  cohorts,  in  which  citizens — without  regard  to  any  property  quali- 
fication— and  Italian  allies  were  freely  admitted.  Once  become 
members  of  a  legion  all  distinction  disappeared  :  the  old  division  of 
hastati,  principes,  and  triarii  was  dropped,  and  the  men  were  arranged 
on  the  field  according  to  the  will  of  the  commander.  When  so 
arranged,  generally  in  the  old  triple  order,  these  names  were  still  used 
to  describe  them,  but  they  no  longer  marked  a  different  rank  in  the 
legion,  or  indicated  the  men  who  were  necessarily  to  form  these 
divisions.  The  velites^  as  part  of  a  legion,  also  disappeared,  their 
place  being  taken  by  foreign  troops,  slingers,  archers,  and  the  like 
from  Crete,  the  Balearic  Isles,  and  other  places.  The  rule  that  the 
Roman    cavalry   should    consist    of  men    drawn    from    the    eighteen 


XXXVII  MARIUS  AND  SATURNINUS  583 

centuries    of    equites    had    long    been    falling    into    disuse.       They   The 
were    the   richest  men  of   the   State,    with  no   special  aptitude  for  eqmtes 
their  work,  were  insubordinate,  and  a  difficulty  to  the  commander.  ^^^•^^.  " 
Instead  of  them  cavalry  was  levied  from  Gaul  or  other  places,  and  /^^^ 
the   equites  were   only   employed   as   a  coho7's  praetoria — staff  and  cavalry. 
bodyguard  of  the  imperator — into  which  he  admitted  his  friends  and 
sometimes  promoted  legionaries.      This  praetorian  cohort  had  been 
formerly   represented    by   the   extraordinarii — certain    of   the    socii 
(cavalry  or   infantry)   selected  for  this    service  by  the   commander, 
along  with  his   own  friends  who  volunteered.       Thus  Scipio  in  the 
Numantine   war    had   a    body    of    500,    all   volunteers    or    personal 
friends,  who  did  this  duty  ;  and  when  the  distinction  between  citizens 
and  socii  in  the  legion  was  done  away  with,  the  praetorian  cohort   The  cohort 
became  a  means  whereby  the  rich  equites,  who  declined  to   serve  praetona. 
with  common  soldiers,  could  perform  the  ten  years'  service  necessary 
before  being  candidates  for  office.     The  army  thus  became  a  paid  body 
of  men,  who  for  the  most  part  regarded  service  not  as  a  temporary 
duty  but  as  a  profession  ;  and  not  being  influenced  by  strong  senti- 
ments of  loyalty  to  the  constitution  or  city,  looked  to  its  commander 
first,  as  securing  them  continuance  of  employment  and  grants  of  land 
afterwards,  for  which  there  was  no  provision  in  the  law.      And  as  the 
equality  in  the  legion  ignored  the  census,  so  did  it  tend  to  obliterate 
the  distinction   between    citizen   and    Italian.      Service  in  the  army   Citizenship 
became  one  of  the  means  of  obtaining  citizenship,  which  Marius,  for  through  the 
instance,  on  one  occasion  bestowed  upon  a  thousand  men  of  Camer-  ^^^y- 
inum  as  a  reward,  excusing  himself  by  saying  that  in  the  noise  of 
arms  he  could  not  hear  the  laws.      A  farther  step  was  taken  when  in 
the  Social  war  he  enrolled  freedmen  in  the  legions,  who  had  hitherto, 
except  at  great  crises,  only  served,  in  the  fleet.      Other  reforms  attri-  Effect  of  the 
buted  to  him  were  in  matters  of  detail,  for  the  comfort  or  efficiency  of  reforms. 
the  soldiers.     But  taken  as  a  whole  they  produced  a  different  army, — 
recruited  from  all   Italy,  with  auxiliaries  furnished  by  the  provinces 
and  client  states,  and  ready  to  follow  its  leader  even  against  Rome 
itself. 

It  was  the  knowledge  that  Marius  might  depend  upon  such  an  L. 
army  that  seems  to  have  induced  Saturninus,  the  next  party  leader  Appukius 
and   reformer  of  importance,  to   look  to   him  as   the  most   capable  ^^,*^^- 
leader  of  the  popular  party.      L.  Appuleius  Saturnmus,  as  quaestor  quaestor, 
in  104,  had  Ostia  as  his  "province"  and  the  superintendence  of  the  104; 
corn  supply.      The  Senate,  thinking  him  remiss,  superseded  him  and  tribune, 
appointed    M.   Aemilius   Scaurus.       This   or  other  reasons   induced  ^^^' 
him  to  join  the  opposition,  by  whose  influence  he  became  tribune  in 
102.      In  his  tribuneship  he  mortally  offended  the  Optimates  by  his 
law  of  majestas,  under  which  he  prosecuted   Manlius  and  Caepio  for 


584 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


mismanagement  in  the  Cimbrian  war.^  Metellus  Numidicus,  leader 
of  the  Optimates,  would  have  retaliated  by  striking  his  name  from 
the  roll  of  senators,  but  was  prevented  by  his  colleague  in  the  censor- 
ship ;  and  from  this  time  Saturninus  acted  with  the  popular  party, 
and,  in  order  to  carry  out  his  policy,  sought  re-election  to  the  tribunate 
for  ICO.  For  that  year  Marius  also  desired  a  sixth  consulship, 
while  another  vehement  member  of  the  party,  C.  Servilius  Glaucia, 
was  a  candidate  for  the  praetorship.  The  three  therefore  united 
their  interests  with  the  idea,  like  that  of  the  triumvirate  of  thirty 
years  later,  that  by  a  simultaneous  possession  of  the  chief  offices 
they  would  control  the  administration.  But  in  loi  Saturninus 
denounced  and  insulted  the  ambassadors  of  Mithridates  for  bribing 
senators.  The  accusation  was  very  likely  true  ;  but  his  opponents 
represented  his  conduct  as  a  dangerous  violation  of  the  law  of 
nations,  and  brought  him  to  trial :  and  though  the  senatorial  judges 
did  not  venture  to  condemn  him  in  the  face  of  the  loudly  expressed 
wishes  of  the  multitude,  yet  he  lost  his  election,  and  A.  Nonius, 
who  had  been  forward  in  denouncing  him  and  Glaucia,  was  returned 
instead.  On  the  evening  of  the  election,  however.  Nonius  was 
murdered,  and  Saturninus  was  named  in  his  place.  Marius  and 
Glaucia  also  carried  their  elections,  and  the  first  point  was  thus 
gained. 

The  first  law  proposed  by  Saturninus  in  his  second  tribuneship 
was  for  the  division  of  the  lands  in  Gallia  Cisalpina,  lately  occupied 
by  the  Cimbri  or  their  allies.  It  was  sure  to  be  opposed  by  the 
Optimates  on  the  same  grounds  as  other  proposals  for  extra-Italian 
settlements  of  citizens.  There  may,  perhaps,  have  also  been  in  this 
case  some  scruple  at  treating  as  forfeited  the  lands  of  a  province 
not  guilty  of  any  act  of  hostility.  At  any  rate  Saturninus  anticipated 
resistance  to  the  execution  of  his  law,  and  added  a  special  clause 
ordering  every  senator  to  take  an  oath  of  obedience  to  it  under  a 
heavy  penalty.  Marius  as  consul  assured  the  Senate  that  he  would 
not  take  such  an  oath  ;  but,  when  the  law  passed,  immediately  took  it, 
and  advised  the  Senate  to  do  the  same.  One  senator,  however,  was 
firm.  It  was  known  that  Metellus  Numidicus  would  decline  the 
oath,  and  the  hope  of  securing  his  civil  ruin  is  said  to  have  been  the 

1  All  crimes  harming  or  diminishing  in  any  way  the  Roman  Stale  were  anciently 
included  under  the  range  oi perdue llio.  Thus  Cn.  Fulvius  Flaccus  was  charged  with 
perduellio  in  211  for  losing  an  army  (Livy  xxvi.  3).  This  seems  now  to  have  been 
superseded  by  majestas  [crimen  iimninutae  majestatis  P.  R. ),  which  might  strike 
those  magistrates  who  had  incurred  disasters  and  yet  could  not  be  brought  under 
the  laws  de  repetundis.  Under  the  law  of  majestas  the  trial  was  before  an 
ordinary  court  ;  whereas  cases  of  pei-duellio  were  decided  by  duoviri  especially 
elected,  with  an  appeal  to  the  comitia, —Vin  obsolete  process  revived  by  Caesar 
in  the  case  of  Rabirius  in  63. 


xxxvii  MURDER  OF  SATURNINUS  585 

motive  for  inserting  the  clause.      Rejecting  the  offer  of  his  friends  100. 
to  protect  him  with  arms   Metellus  retired  to  Rhodes,  and  the  usual  ^f^ 
interdictio  aquae  et  ignis  was  passed  upon  him.      The  new  legislation  lJ^U^^^^  ^ 
then   proceeded   unchecked.      Glaucia   carried  a  law  de  repetu7idis^ 
in  which  senators  were  more  strictly  barred  than  before  from  the 
judicia;   while  Saturninus  carried  laws  for  new  colonies  in   Sicily,  j^aws  of 
Achaia,  and  Macedonia,  in  which   Italians  were  to  share ;  and  for  Satur- 
fixing  the  price  of  the  public  corn  at  five-sixths  of  an  as  for  a  modius,  ninus. 
instead  of  allowing  it  to  vary  with  the  market  price.      This  last  .was 
carried,  in  a  scene  of  some  violence,  in  spite  of  a  hostile  decree  of 
the  Senate,  of  the  intervention  of  his  colleagues,  and  of  a  statement 
of  the  quaestor  Q.  Caepio  that  the  exchequer  could  not  support  the 
expense. 

But  while  Saturninus  had  gained  sufficient  popularity  to  secure 
his  re-election  for  99,  the  conduct  of  Marius  had  brought  him  into 
contempt.     He  was  politically  extinct  and  had  no  chance  of  being 
elected  again.      Saturninus  was  all  the  more  anxious,  therefore,  that 
the  other  member  of  the  trio  should  succeed  in  his  canvass  for  the 
consulship,  although  the  law  ordered  an  interval  of  a  year  between 
the  praetorship  and  consulship.     One  of  the  candidates,  M.  Antonius, 
seems  to   have  been  certain  of  election  :   the  rival  of  Glaucia  was 
C.    Memmius.      Assassins  were    accordingly   hired    and    Memmius  Murder 
was  got  rid  of  by  the  dagger.     Whether  this  was  done  quietly  or  (^f  C. 
in  an  election  riot,  Saturninus  and  Glaucia  were  universally  believed  -*'^^^^^^-s"- 
to   have   been    the    instigators    of    it.      A    popular   reaction  set   in 
against  them  :  and  finding  their  lives  in  danger  they  took    refuge, 
with    some    others  of    their    party,  on    the    Capitol.      The    Senate  Death  of 
seized  its  advantage  to  pass  the  usual  decree  declaring  them  public  'S'a/^r- 
enemies,  and  arming  the  consuls  with  special  powers  against  them.   Qiauda 
Marius  was  in  a  position  of  great  embarrassment.     The  men  were  joo. 
his    friends    and    partisans ;    yet    he    was    not    prepared    to    break 
entirely  with  the   party  of  law  and  order,   and  to  risk  the   loss  of 
what  remained  of  his  reputation  as  a  statesman.      He  tried  to  play 
a  double  game,  admitting  the  emissaries  of  the  Senate  by  one  door 
and  those  of  the  popular  party  by  another.      Finally  he  took  the 
necessary  steps  to  arrest  the  conspirators,  whom  he  yet  hoped  Ao 
protect.      He  cut  off  the  water    pipes    supplying    the  Capitol,  and 
Saturninus  and  his  friends  were  soon  forced  to  surrender.      To  save 
their   lives  he   placed   them    in  the  Curia :    but   a   mob   of   equites 
broke  in  the  door  or  untiled  the  roof  and  killed  them — a  murder  of 
which  the  Senate  expressed  its  approval  by  enfranchising  a  slave  who 
claimed  the  honour  of  killing  Saturninus  ;  though  forty  years  later 
an  eques  named   C.    Rabirius  was  tried   for    it,   at  the  instance  of 
Caesar,  and  all  but  condemned. 


586 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Setting  aside  the  murders  of  Nonius  and  Memmius,  which  have 
rightly  attached  an  evil  reputation  to  Saturninus,  there  is  a  good  deal 
to  be  said  for  him  as  a  statesman.  The  Optimates  hated  him  because 
he  attacked  and  denounced  the  fraudulent  and  incompetent  members 
of  their  body.  In  giving  the  Italians  a  share  in  the  Gallic  lands  he 
risked  his  popularity  to  promote  the  enlightened  policy  of  equalising 
them  with  the  citizens  ;  and  though  his  corn  law  was  a  financial 
mistake,  it  was  a  mistake  shared  in  by  many  ;  while  his  personal 
freedom  from  corruption  is  acknowledged  by  Cicero.  The  ominous 
feature  in  the  conflict  was  the  fact  that  such  a  policy  as  his  could 
neither  be  promoted  nor  defeated  without  violence,  disorder,  and 
assassination.  Unscrupulous  partisans  went  beyond  their  leaders 
and  hurried  them  on  irresistibly,  and  the  Senate  was  only  too  ready 
to  employ  the  sharpest  weapon  which  law  or  terror  put  into  its 
hands. 

For  the  present  the  policy  of  the  popular  party  was  checked. 
Marius,  with  his  credit  on  both  sides  utterly  lost,  left  Rome  for  Asia . 
on  a  votiva  legaiio,  pretending  that  he  must  perform  a  vow  to  the  Bona 
Dea,  and  endeavoured  to  find  a  new  field  for  his  warlike  prowess  by 
promoting  the  quarrels  of  Nicomedes  and  Mithridates.  The  colonies 
and  the  division  of  the  Gallic  lands  under  the  laws  of  Saturninus 
were  suspended,  and  Metellus  was  recalled.  But  the  storm  of  pro- 
secutions went  on  :  the  scandals  of  the  Jugurthine  and  Cimbric  cam- 
paigns were  not  forgotten,  and  were  followed  by  others  as  gross  ; 
nor  did  any  marked  successes  abroad  help  to  cover  the  discredit  of 
the  governing  class.  The  praetor  M.  Antonius  had  suppressed 
some  piracies  in  Cilicia  and  reduced  part  of  it  to  the  form  of  a 
province  (103-102),  and  T.  Didius  had  fought  some  successful 
campaigns  in  Spain  (97)  :  but  the  East  was  much  neglected,  and 
when  Ptolemy  Apion  in  96  left  Gyrene  to  the  Romans,  the 
Government  would  not  undertake  to  form  a  new  province.  It  con- 
tented itself  with  levying  a  tribute,  and,  declaring  the  cities  free,  left 
them  to  fight  out  their  differences  among  themselves. 

Unsuccessful  abroad,  the  policy  of  the  Optimates  was  mischievous 
at  home.  We  have  seen  that  in  various  ways  access  to  the  citizen- 
ship was  being  opened  to  the  Italians.  If  the  process  had  been  let 
alone,  this  privilege  might  perhaps  have  been  quietly  extended  so  as  to 
embrace  so  large  a  number  that  the  question  would  have  solved  itself. 
But  in  95  the  consuls  L.  Licinius  Grassus  and  Q.  Mucius  Scaevola,  both 
men  of  high  character,  and  the  latter  a  considerable  jurist,  determined 
on  tightening  the  law, — a  process  which  has  often  resulted  in  hastening 
the  revolution  which  it  is  intended  to  prevent.  The  grants  of  consuls, 
military  commanders,  or  leaders  of  colonies, — even  colonies  voted 
though  never  actually  formed. — had  it  seems  produced  a  number  of 


XXXVII  THE  PROPOSALS  OF  M.   LIVIUS  DRUSUS  587 

citizens  whose  claim  to  that  status  would  hardly  bear  a  strict  investi- 
gation. The  consuls,  perhaps  from  their  devotion  to  jurisprudence, 
could  not  endure  a  process,  however  wholesome,  which  did  not  rest 
on  a  legal  basis ;  and  they  proposed  a  law  establishing  a  com- 
mission for  investigating  such  claims,  and  ordering  all  who  had 
illegally  assumed  or  acquired  the  citizenship  to  return  to  their  own 
towns.  No  immediate  outbreak  took  place,  but  there  was  a  growing- 
feeling  among  the  Italians  that  they  should  either  share  the  privileges 
of  the  Romans  or  separate  entirely  from  them.  Such  a  separation 
would  not  now,  as  in  old  times,  mean  the  loss  to  Rome  of  so  much 
foreign  territory.  The  Italian  cities  were  becoming  part  and  parcel 
of  the  State  ;  the  army  was  filled  with  Italians  ;  in  every  district,  side 
by  side  with  the  unenfranchised,  were  living  full  citizens.  A  struggle 
between  the  two  classes  would  in  effect  be  a  civil  war. 

Such  a  struggle   was  now  inevitable,  and  was  actually  brought  Proposals 
about  by  the  failure  of  an  attempt  to  obviate  it.     One  of  the  tribunes  '//^^ 
for  91,  M.  Livius  Drusus,  son  of  that  Livius  who  had  been  employed   ^  ^Xzz/j 
by  the  Senate  to  outbid  Gains  Gracchus,  was  a  young  man  of  great  Drusus,  gi. 
eloquence    and  virtue,    who  had  already  served  with  good  reputa- 
tion as  quaestor  in  Asia.      By  birth,   tastes,  and  connexions  he  was 
allied  to  the  Optimate  party,  from  which  in  fact  he  never  willingly 
separated,  though  he  incurred  the  enmity  of  both  parties  alike.      He 
saw  that  the   cure  for  the  dissatisfaction   in  Italy  was  to  make  it  a 
united  state  without  distinction  of  civil  status.     This  was  the  main 
object  of  his  policy,   and  to  carry  it  out  it  was  necessary   to   con- 
ciliate all  orders  in  the  State — Senate,  equites,  and  poorer  citizens. 
Like  many  who  try  by  compromise  to  satisfy  contending  factions, 
he    eventually    dissatisfied    all  —  became    hated    by    the    party    of 
privilege,  and  but  faintly  trusted  by  those  whose  claims  he  wished  to 
support.      He  first  tried  to  put  an   end  to  the  continued  contest  be- 
tween  the  Senate  and  equites  as  to  the  judicia  by  a  compromise 
like  that  attributed  to   C.  Gracchus  by  Plutarch.      He  proposed  that 
to    the    Senate,   then  weakened  both  in  credit    and   numbers,    300 
equites  should  be  added,  and  that  the  list  of  jurors  should  be  made 
up   from   the  roll  thus  formed.      Neither  order  was  pleased.      The 
existing  senators  thought  that  they  would  be  swamped  by  the  new  He  dis- 
members,   who   would  form  a   distinct   party  ;    the   equites    thought  ^aiisjies  all 
that  the  300  would  cease  to  have  any  sympathy  with  them,  and  that  ^""^  ^^^' 
the  measure  only  disguised  their  exclusion  from  the  judicia.      At  the 
same  time  Livius  attempted  to  gain  to  his  side  the  urban  populace  by 
the  usual  proposition  for  increased  distributions  of  corn,  new  colonies 
in  Italy  and  Sicily,  and  assignments  of  land,  many  of  which  had  been 
long  ago  voted — both  on  the  proposal  of  his  own  father  and  on  that  of 
Saturninus, — and  not  carried  out.     The  people,  however,  though  glad 


588 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


of  these  measures,  were  easily  made  suspicious  by  the  knowledge  that 
his  ultimate  purpose  was  to  put  the  Italians  on  an  equality  with  them- 
selves ;  whilst  the  richer  Italians,  who  had  long  occupied  parts  of  the 
ager  publicus^  were  alarmed  at  his  proposed  assignations  of  land,  for 
they  could  not  see  where  it  was  to  come  from  without  disturbing 
some  of  their  own  holdings.  Thus  he  had  incurred  the  enmity  of 
Senate  and  equites,  who  for  once  combined  against  a  common  danger ; 
while  the  Italians,  whose  interests  he  had  at  heart,  were  divided,  the 
richer  among  them  denouncing  his  laws,  and  joining  with  the 
publicani,  who  feared  a  loss  of  profit  in  the  collection  of  the  dues 
on  the  public  lands.  The  laws  for  the  distribution  of  corn,  the 
colonies,  and  the  judicia  were  however  passed,  but  in  violation  of  the 
The  Senate  lex  CaeciUa-Didia  (98),  which  forbade  miscellaneous  propositions  to 
declare  his  be  put  in  a  block  to  the  people,  and  in  spite  of  some  alleged  defect 
in  the  auspices.  The  Senate  accordingly  declared  them  invalid. 
Drusus  disregarded  this  vote,  and  was  proceeding  to  carry  them 
out,  in  spite  of  the  wildest  rumours  by  which  it  was  sought  to  alarm 
the  people.  The  old  cry  of  course  was  raised  that  he  aimed  at 
kingly  power.  The  very  oath  that  was  to  be  administered  to  the 
Italian  allies  binding  them  to  follow  him  was  handed  about ;  it  was 
stated    that    10,000    Marsians    under    Pompaedius    Silo    had  been 


laws 
invalid. 


Rumours 
of  his 


treasonable 
practices. 


Death  of 
Drusus, 


and  persuaded  by  C.  Domitius  to  adopt  more  peaceful  measures  ;  a 
plot  to  murder  the  consul  Philippus  at  the  feriae  Latinae  on  the 
Alban  Mount  had  also,  it  was  said,  been  known  of  by  Drusus, 
though  he  had  warned  Philippus  to  be  on  his  guard.  Whatever 
foundation  there  may  have  been  for  such  stories  their  circulation 
succeeded  in  bringing  Drusus  into  suspicion.  But  that  the  hopes 
of  the  bulk  of  the  Italians  still  rested  on  him  was  presently  shown 
by  the  prayers  for  his  recovery  offered  throughout  Italy,  when 
he  suddenly  fainted  while  speaking  in  the  Forum,  and  was  carried 
home  insensible.  He  was  subject,  it  is  said,  to  the  falling  sickness 
(jnordus  coimtialis),  some  form  of  epilepsy,  for  which  he  had  on  one 
occasion  gone  to  Anticyra  to  try  the  cure  of  the  hellebore.  This  per- 
haps may  account  for  his  sudden  death  not  long  afterwards,  though 
the  prevailing  opinion  was  that  he  was  assassinated.  Believing  that 
his  life  was  in  danger,  it  is  said,  he  lived  in  retirement,  receiving  his 
partisans  in  his  own  house.  On  one  occasion,  as  he  was  bidding  them 
farewell  in  the  open  portico,  he  suddenly  exclaimed  that  he  was 
stabbed,  and  fell,  sprinkling  the  bust  of  his  own  father  with  his  blood. 
A  leather-cutter's  knife  was  found  in  his  side  and  in  a  short  time  he 
expired.  No  investigation  was  held  ;  and  whether  violent  or  natural, 
his  departure  seems  to  have  dashed  the  last  hopes  for  the  Italians  of 
a  peaceful  settlement.      Preparations  for  revolt  had  doubtless  been 


XXXVII  BEGINNING  OF  THE  SOCIAL  WAR  589 

already  made,  and  perhaps  some  overt  proceedings  had  taken  place,  Prosecu- 
which  gave  an  excuse  to  the  tribune   Q.  Varius  in  90  to  institute  a  Hons  of 
number  of  prosecutions  under  a  new  law  of  majestas^  extending  that  of  ^^'^'■'^^• 
Appuleius,  which  was  carried  in  spite  of  the  veto  of  the  other  tribunes 
by  a  body  of  equites  who  appeared  at  the  Comitia  with  drawn  swords. 
There  followed  another  storm  of  impeachments,  before  which  Calpurnius 
Bestia,  Aurelius  Cotta,  Memmius,  and  others  went   down.      But  the 
proceedings  of  the  court  were  violent,  and  so  entirely  directed  against 
political  opponents,  that  the  restoration  of  the  Varian  exiles  became 
a  point  in  the  programme  of  the  popular  party  hereafter. 

The  Social  war  was  actually  begun  by  an  outbreak  at  Asculum  in   The 
Picenum.      Information  of  the  secret  communications  going  on  be-  Social  war, 
tween   Italian  towns  reached  the  proconsul  Q.  Servilius,  who  was  in  90'^^- 
command  of  that  district  with  a  legatus  named  Fonteius.      He  at 
once  went  to  Asculum,  and  harangued  the  citizens  in  such  threaten- 
ing terms,  that  the  popular  indignation   broke  out  with  irresistible 
violence.       vServilius    and    Fonteius  were   murdered,   and  a   general  Murder  of 
massacre  of  Roman  citizens  in  the  town  began.      It  was  the  signal  Q- 
for  a   general   rising.      On  a  sudden  it  became   apparent   that  the  Servthus 
Roman  policy  in  Italy  of  breaking  up  nationalities  and  dividing  the  pgnteius  at 
country  into  separate  towns  or  inunicipia^  unconnected  with  others  Asculum. 
inhabited  by  the  same  nation,  had  not  been  successful.    The  old  names 
still  meant  something  :  and  in  a  brief  space  we  hear  of  the  Vestini, 
Marsi,  Peligni,  Marrucini,  Samnites,  and  Lucani  all  joining  the  revolt  Revolt  of 
of  the  Picentes,  each  with  leaders  of  their  own.      Hardly  in  the  midst  the 
of  the   old   struggles  with  Volscian  or  Samnite  had   Rome  seemed  ito.hans. 
in  greater    danger.       The   superiority  of   her    position    now   chiefly 
consisted   in  the  fact  that  Italy  was  studded  with  thirty-two  Roman 
and  forty  Latin  colonies,  generally  established  with  a  view  to  military 
purposes,  which  for  the  most  part  remained  faithful.      In  the  former 
the   Roman  citizens  were  usually  in   sufficient  strength  to  overawe 
the    unprivileged    natives ;     the    latter,    though    only    enjoying    the  Fidelity 
imperfect  citizenship  called  Latinitas,  were  still  in  a  superior  position  of  the 
to  the  municipia.      It  was  these  municipia^  towns  which  endured  the  ^o^onies. 
burden  of  tribute  and  military  service  without  the  public  rights  of 
citizenship,  in  which  the  rebellion  spread.      SomQ  civitates  foederatae, 
which,  though   not   enjoying  the  franchise,   had  joined   the   Roman 
system   on  favourable    terms,   such   as    Naples,   had   no   motive  for 
sharing   in    the    rebellion,   and   in  fact    preferred  their   own    status  ; 
while  the  Samnites  and  Lucanians,  though  they  eventually  accepted 
the  Roman  franchise,  would  have  preferred  and  long  contended  for 
entire  separation. 

The  movement  spread  rapidly  through   Italy,  and  the   greatest 
exertions  were  necessary.      Before  the  winter  of  91-90  was  over,  the 


590 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Italian 
^consuls. 


The  consuls 
P.  Rutilius 
Lupus,  L. 
Julius 
Caesar, 
and  their 
legati,  go. 

The  war 
in  the 
South,  go. 


rebels  had  organised  a  new  state  on  the  model  of  the  Roman  consti- 
tution, the  seat  of  which  was  to  be  Corfinium,  now  called  Italica.  A 
large  forum  and  senate-house  were  laid  out,  a  senate  of  500  named, 
and  two  consuls  with  six  legates  each  to  conduct  the  war.  The 
Senate,  as  at  first  selected,  must  in  some  way  have  represented  the 
various  nations,  but  no  arrangement  seems  to  have  been  made  for 
what  we  mean  by  a  representative  government  in  filling  up  vacancies 
or  for  electing  the  consuls.  The  two  first  were  a  Marsian  named 
Q.  Pompaedius,  who  was  to  command  with  six  legates  in  the  north 
of  Italy,  and  Gnaeus  Papius  Mutilus,  a  Samnite,  with  six  legates 
in  the  south.  There  was  no  great  concentrated  campaign.  The 
only  plan  seems  to  have  been  that  these  consuls  and  their  legates 
in  their  several  districts  should  attack  Roman  colonies  and  such  of 
the  rnunicipia  as  had  Roman  garrisons  or  many  Roman  residents. 
It  was  a  war  therefore  scattered  all  over  Italy,  and  the  Romans  had 
to  make  arrangements  corresponding  to  that  of  the  enemy.  The  two 
consuls,  P.  Rutilius  Lupus,  L.  lulius  Caesar,  undertook  the  north  and 
south  respectively,  and  under  them  were  a  number  of  legates  of  con- 
sular or  praetorian  rank.  Thus  under  Rutilius  were  Q.  Caepio,  Cn. 
Pompeius  Strabo,  C.  Perpenna,  C.  Marius,  Valerius  Messala  ;  under 
Caesar,  P.  Lentulus,  T.  Didius,  Licinius  Crassus,  L.  Cornelius  Sulla, 
M.  Claudius  Marcellus  ;  and  auxiliaries  were  sent  for  from  Gaul, 
Africa,  Numidia,  and  other  places. 

It  was  in  the  south,  where  the  Italian  "  consul"  Papius  commanded 
in  chief,  that  the  war  was  at  first  most  active  and  dangerous.  The 
consul  Caesar  lost  a  battle  to  Vettius  Cato,  a  legate  of  Papius,  near 
Aesernia,  which  fell  after  a  long  and  heroic  defence  by  Marcellus. 
Meanwhile  Papius  had  invaded  Campania  :  Nola,  Stabiae,  Salernum, 
Nuceria  all  fell  into  his  hands  ;  and  then  going  to  Venusia  he  took 
Oxyntes,  son  of  Jugurtha,  who  was  confined  there,  and  dressing  him 
in  royal  purple  appealed  so  strongly  to  the  loyalty  of  the  Numidian 
auxiliaries  that  Caesar  found  it  safer  to  send  them  home.  Another 
Latin  commander  named  Marius  Ignatius  took  Venafrum,  and 
massacred  two  Roman  cohorts  stationed  there  ;  Licinius  Crassus  was 
beaten  by  T.  Lafrenius  near  Grumentum  in  Lucania;  and  the  Picenian 
C.  Judacilius  occupied  Venusia,  Canusium,  and  a  great  part  of 
lapygia.  Before  the  end  of  his  year,  indeed,  Caesar  had  won  a  battle 
over  Papius  near  Acerrae,  but  had  not  been  able  to  prevent  him 
from  laying  siege  to  that  town,  and  had  himself  been  beaten  by 
Ignatius  near  Teanum  Sidicinum.  He  retired  again  towards  Acerrae, 
the  siege  of  which  by  Papius  he  endeavoured  to  raise.  However 
his  victories  over  Samnites  and  Lucanians  were  received  with  joy  at 
Rome,  and  were  made  the  occasion  of  the  Senate  laying  aside  the 
sagum  and  appearing  once  more  in  the  toga.      He  was  continued 


I 


XXXVII  END  OF  THE  SOCIAL  WAR  591 

in  office  in  the  following  year  as  proconsul,  and  died  while  engaged 
in  the  siege  of  Asculum. 

In  the  north  the  vicissitudes  had  been  still  greater,      C.  Perpenna   The  war 
after  losing  4000  men  was  deposed  by  the  consul  Rutilius  from  his  i"-  the 
command,   his    troops    being  transferred  to   Marius.       But   Rutilius  ^^^^^'  9°- 
himself  soon  after  fell.     He  was  stationed  with  Marius,  at  some  little 
distance  from  each  other,  on  the  Tolenus,  a  tributary  of  the  Liris, 
and  contrary  to  the  advice  of  Marius   crossed  the  river  to  attack 
Vettius  Cato.      The  first  news  Marius  had  of  his  disaster  was  given 
by  the  arms  and  corpses  brought  down  the  stream.      By  a  rapid 
march  Marius  seized  Cato's  camp,  while  he  was  engaged  in  pursuing 
the  army  of  the  fallen  consul ;  and  thus  forcing  him  to  retreat  killed 
8000  of  his  troops.      But  he  does  not  appear  to  have  done  much 
more  ;  and  when  he  returned  to  Rome  at  the  end  of  the  year  had 
only  some  doubtful  successes  over  the  Marsians  to  recount :  while 
Q.  Caepio,  who  had  taken  over  the  army  of  Rutilius,  and  boasted  at 
first  that  he  had  done  as  much  as  Marius,  was  defeated  and  killed  by 
Q.  Pompaedius  in  the  territory  of  the  Vestini.      In   Picenum  Pom- 
peius   Strabo  was  defeated  by  Lafrenius  and  retired  upon   Firmum. 
Here,  however,   Lafrenius  was  in  his  turn  defeated  and  killed,  and 
Pompey  gained  a  series  of  victories  over  the  Picentes,  which  caused 
the  magistrates  at  home  to  resume  the  state  robes  which  had  been  laid 
aside,  and  began  the  siege  of  Asculum.      The  Roman  fortunes,  how-  Movement 
ever,  were  sufficiently  low  to  induce  the  Etruscans  and  Umbrians,  of  Etrus- 
who  had  hitherto  held  aloof,   to  declare  on  the  side  of  the  rebels.  '^^'^•^• 
But  the  Umbrians  were  defeated  by  A.  Plotius,  and  the  Etruscans 
were  conciliated  by  the  lex  lulia^  now  carried  by  the  consul,  which   The  lex 
gave  the  franchise  to  all  Italians  who  had  not  been  actually  in  arms.^  lulia,  go. 

The  consuls  of  the  next  year  were  Gnaeus  Pompeius  Strabo  and-  Successes  of 
L.  Porcius  Cato,  grandson  of  the  censor.      Cato,  who   took  over  the  Strabo  and 
army  of  Marius,  was  after  some  successes  defeated  and  killed  by  the  '^"'^^^'    9- 
Marsi, — the  second  Roman  consul  to  fall  in  this  war.      But  elsewhere 
the  superiority  in  the  struggle  was  slowly  inclining  to  Rome.      Ascu- 
lum still  held  out,  but  Corfinium  had  been  taken,  and  the  seat  of  the 
federal  government  had  to  be  removed  to   Bovianum,  and  then  to 
Aesernia.      Strabo  intercepted  and  cut  up  a  body  of  15,000  Italians 
on  their  way  to  Etruria  ;  and  in  the  south  Sulla,  who  in  the  previous 

^  The  citizenship  had  to  be  accepted  by  the  communities  (as  opposed  to 
individuals),  and  those  which  so  accepted  it  were  called  populi  fundi.  It  seems 
first  to  have  been  proposed  that  these  Italians  should  be  enrolled  in  ten  new 
tribes,  and  afterwards  that  they  should  be  confined  to  eight  of  the  old  tribes 
(which  had  now  ceased  to  be  local).  This  would  minimise  their  influence  on 
the  voting,  and  therefore  the  next  question  was  their  distribution  through  all  the 
tribes. 


592 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Fall  of  year  also  had  had  some  successes,  and  who  intended  this  year  to 
Corfiniiim,  stand  for  the  consulship,  had  been  carrying  all  before  him.  He  beat 
^^'  Cluentius  near  Pompeii,  and  drove  him  to  take  refuge  in  Nola,  where 

he  was  killed.      He  took  Aqullonia,  the  chief  town  of  the  Hirpini, 
and  overran  Samnium,  and  stormed  Bovianum,  defeating  Papius  again 

Bovianum.  and  again,  and  returned  to  Rome  with  irresistible  claims  to  the 
consulship.  Other  successes  had  been  won  in  Lucania  by  Aulus 
Gabinius,  though  he  had  himself  fallen  in  an  attack  upon  a  camp  ; 
by  Sulpicius  against  the  Marrucini  ;  by  Caecilius  Metellus  in  lapygia, 
where  the  Latin  "  consul  "  Pompaedius  fell ;  and  by  C.  Cosconius  and 
Lucceius  in  eastern  Samnium  and  Apulia.  An  appeal  by  the  con- 
federates to  Mithridates  to  assist  them  by  invading  Italy  had  been 
declined  on  the  ground  that  he  must  first  secure  Asia  ;  and  an  attempt 
in  this  or  early  in  the  following  year  to  seize  Rhegium  in  order  to 
carry  the  war  into  Sicily  had  been  defeated  by  the  propraetor  C. 
Norbanus.  When  early  in  88  Strabo  at  length  took  Asculum,  and 
received  the  submission  of  the  Marsi,  Vestini,  and  Peligni,  little 
remained  to  be  done  except  in  the  south,  where  Nola  and  some 
other  towns  still  held  out.  But  the  object  of  the  rebellion,  which  had 
cost  the  life  of  300,000  men  of  military  age  in  Italy,  was  gained.  A 
plebiscitum  of  the  tribunes  C.  Papirius  Carbo  and  M.  Plautius 
Silvanus  extended  the  citizenship  to  every  member  of  a  civitas 
foederata  in  Italy,  who  within  two  months  declared  before  a  praetor 
his  desire  to  take  it  ;  while  a  lex  Pompeia  gave  the  Latmitas  to  the 
cities  between  the  Po  and  the  Alps. 

During  the  Social  war  the  Roman  government  had  had  other 
anxieties.  The  Salluvii  had  again  rebelled  and  had  been  suppressed 
by  C.  Caecilius  in  90.  In  89  there  had  been  a  severe  commercial 
crisis,  and  the  moneyed  class  had  assassinated  the  praetor  Asellio  on 
account  of  his  decisions  in  favour  of  the  debtors  :  while  in  that  and 
the  following  year  the  movement  of  Mithridates,  to  upset  the  arrange- 
ments in  Cappadocia  made  by  Sulla  in  92,  had  been  accompanied  by 
invasions  of  the  Thracians  on  the  north  of  Macedonia.  War  with 
Mithridates  had  in  fact  been  determined  upon  when  Sulla  took  up 
the  consulship.  His  colleague  Pompeius  Rufus  was  to  remain  in  Italy, 
while  the  command  of  the  southern  army  at  Nola,  and  the  war  with 
Mithridates,  for  which  that  army  was  destined,  were  assigned  to  Sulla. 
But  the  quiet  execution  of  these  arrangements  was  interrupted  by  the 
intervention  of  the  tribune  P.  Sulpicius  Rufus.  He  had  hitherto 
been  a  partisan  of  the  Optimates,  and  in  95  had  prosecuted  C.  Nor- 
banus in  their  interests,  and  was  a  personal  friend  of  the  consul 
Rufus.  His  sudden  change  to  the  leadership  of  the  opposition  was 
explained  by  his  enemies  as  the  result  of  embarrassed  circumstances 
exposing  him  to  the  temptation  of  a  bribe  from  Marius.      The  position 


XXXVII      REVOLUTIONARY  MEASURES  OF  SULPICIUS  593 

of  Marius  was  certainly  mortifying.      He   had   lost   all   credit  as   a  Position  of 
politician  since  his  vacillating  conduct  in  regard  to   Saturninus  in  Marius  in 
100  ;  and  when  he  abdicated  his  sixth  consulship  at  the  end  of  that  ^^'      ' 
year  he  ceased  to  be  politically  important.      He  was  eager,  however, 
to  recover  his  prestige,  and  believed  that  he  could  only  do  so  in  case 
his  services  were  again  needed  in  war.      Since  his  visit  to  Asia  in 
99-98,  and  his  interview  with  Mithridates,  he  seems  to  have  had 
hopes  that  he  might  eventually  have  the  command  against  him.     But 
he  had  had  to  see  Sulla,  once  his  subordinate,  charged  with  the  restor- 
ation of  Ariobarzanes  to   Cappadocia,  from  which   Mithridates  had 
driven  him  (92).    When  the  Social  war  began  he  was  content  to  act  as 
legate  to  the  consul  Rutilius  ;  but  at  the  end  of  the  first  year  returned 
to  Rome  without  having  materially  increased  his  reputation.     He  was  Marius 
sixty-eight  years  old  and  began   to  be  thought  over-cautious   and  desires  the 
senile,  while  Sulla  in  89  was  acquiring  fresh  laurels  and  securing  his  '^(^"^"^(^"■d 
consulship  ;  and  when  in  the  course  of  that  year  the  war  with  Mithri-  ^^jf^^^. 
dates  was  decided  on,  the  command  was  given  by  the  Senate  not  to  dates. 
him  but  to  Sulla.     This  could  only  be  altered  by  a  vote  of  the  people 
overriding  the  decree  of  the  Senate,  as  had  once  before  been  done 
in  his  favour  against  Metellus  in  the  Jugurthine  war. 

Whether  it  was   Sulpicius  who  saw  in  the  old  hero's  unsatisfied 
ambition  a  means  for  gaining  the  support  of  the  popular  party  for  the 
measures  he  now  contemplated, — or  whether  it  was  Marius  who  bribed 
Sulpicius  to  propose  measures  giving  the  popular  party  the  upper  hand,  Laws  of 
and  so  securing  his  nomination  to  the  command, — the  result  was  Sulpicius. 
that  Sulpicius  now  brought  in  a  series  of  laws  which  the  Optimates 
regarded    as     revolutionary.       The    new    Italian     citizens    (perhaps 
amounting  to  500,000)  were  to  be  enrolled  in  all  the  tribes,  instead 
of  only  eight  or  ten,  and  so  would  be  able  to  carry  all  measures  they 
chose  ;    freedmen    were  no   longer  to  be  confined  to  the  four  city 
tribes,  but  were  to  be  spread  over  all  ;  those  condemned  of  inajestas 
by  the  law  of  Varius  in  90  were  to  be  restored  ;  bankrupts  were 
to    cease  to  be  members   of  the   Senate  ;  and   lastly  the   command 
of  the  Mithridatic  war  was  to  be  transferred  to  Marius.      The  first  of  Their 
these  laws  was  necessary  for  the  full  enfranchisement  of  the  Italians,  object  and 
and   was  a  measure  in  fact  which  could  not  be  and  was  not  long  ^-^^^' 
delayed  :  but  its  immediate  effect  would  doubtless  be  to   render  it 
more  easy  to  swamp  the  influence  of  the  family  coteries  which  con- 
trolled elections  and  legislation.      The  reform  of  the   Senate  would 
also  crush  the  influence   which  the  richest  heads    of   families  had 
been  accustomed  to  exercise  over  the  poorer  senators  who  practically 
depended  upon  them  ;  and  the  recall  of  the  Varian  exiles  admitted 
the  principle  of  overriding  verdicts  of  juries  by  a  popular  vote. 

The  Optimates  determined   to   resist.      The   consuls   attempted 

2  Q 


594 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


The  consuls 
order  a 
justitiu77i, 
88. 
Riots. 


Sulla 
resolves  io 
resist  his 
removal 
fro  771  the 

C017l77ia7ld. 


Sulla  and 
Rufus 
enter 

Ro77ie  with 
the  ar7ny. 


Death  of 
Sulpicius. 


Flight  of 
Marius, 


to  Stop  the  proceedings  by  declaring  a  justitium., — a  suspension  of 
business  forreligious  observances.  But  the  armed  followers  of  Sulpicius 
attacked  them  with  such  violence  that  they  were  obliged  to  withdraw 
the  notice.  In  the  riot  a  son  of  Pompeius  Rufus  was  killed,  and  he 
himself  had  to  withdraw  from  Rome  ;  whilst  Sulla  only  escaped  death 
by  taking  refuge  in  the  house  of  Marius.  He  presently  withdrew  to  the 
camp  at  Nola  ;  and  thereupon  the  laws  of  Sulpicius  were  passed. 

Marius  had  now  attained  his  wish,  and  was  to  command  in  Asia. 
He  despatched  two  tribunes  to  Nola  to  take  over  the  command  in 
his  name,  intending  to  follow  shortly  in  person.  But  Sulla  was  not 
the  man  tamely  to  submit  to  such  a  defeat.  In  his  eyes  he  was  legal 
commander  ;  the  bill  which  superseded  him  had  been  passed  by 
means  of  such  violence  as  compelled  both  consuls  to  leave  Rome,  and 
was  ipso  facto  invalid.  The  army  which  he  commanded  Avas  devoted 
to  him,  and  had  shown  that  it  cared  for  little  else.  A  few  months 
before  it  had  stoned  Postumius  Albinus,  a  praetorian  legate,  and 
Sulla  had  been  content  with  a  reprimand,  remarking  that  they  must 
atone  for  their  fault  by  additional  energy  in  the  war.  It  was  thus 
not  unprepared  for  illegal  conduct ;  and  when  Sulla  laid  his  case 
before  the  soldiers,  they  eagerly  promised  to  follow  him  to  Rome, 
and  promptly  murdered  the  tribunes  sent  by  Marius.  Sulla  was 
joined  by  his  colleague  Rufus  on  the  march,  and  when  they 
approached  the  city  Marius  and  Sulpicius,  after  vainly  trying  to  raise 
a  force  by  offering  freedom  to  the  slaves,  were  obliged  to  fly.  The 
consuls  entered  the  city,  and  though  the  anger  of  the  people  at  seeing 
soldiers  within  the  walls  was  manifested  by  showers  of  stones  and 
other  missiles  from  the  housetops,  they  were  warmly  welcomed  by 
the  Senate.  Sulpicius,  Marius,  and  twelve  of  their  followers  were 
at  once  declared  public  enemies,  whom  it  was  every  one's  right  and 
duty  to  kill,  Sulpicius,  having  taken  refuge  in  a  villa,  was  betrayed 
and  put  to  death  by  a  slave,  who  was  rewarded  by  emancipation, 
and  then  hurled  from  the  rock  by  Sulla's  order. 

Marius  was  more  fortunate.  He  reached  Ostia  in  safety,  where 
he  was  supplied  with  a  ship,  and  at  once  set  sail.  He  was  forced, 
however,  by  a  storm  to  land  near  Circeii,  and  wandered  about  help- 
lessly until,  being  warned  by  a  peasant  that  horsemen  were  scouring 
the  country  for  him,  he  concealed  himself  in  the  woods  without  food 
or  place  of  rest.  Hunger  compelled  him  to  descend  upon  the  beach, 
and  he  was  again  taken  on  board  a  ship,  the  master  of  which  with 
some  hesitation  refrained  from  delivering  him  up  to  the  horsemen  on 
the  shore.  But  after  conveying  him  as  far  as  the  mouth  of  the  Liris,  he 
landed  him  on  the  marshy  ground  near  Minturnae,  Making  his  way 
with  difficulty  over  the  bogs  and  ditches  he  at  last  found  the  hut  of 
an  old  labourer,  who  concealed  him  in  a  hollow  and  covered  him 


XXXVII      FLIGHT  OF  MAKIUS  &  LEGISLATION  OF  SULLA     595 

with  reeds  and  wood.  When  the  pursuers  arrived  and  threatened  88. 
the  old  man,  Marius  in  terror  tried  to  hide  himself  more  completely 
in  the  water,  but  was  observed  and  dragged  out  covered  with  mud. 
He  was  carried  off  to  Minturnae,  and  delivered  up  to  the  magis-  Marius 
trates  of  the  town,  who,  after  long  consultation,  determined  to  put  at  Min- 
him  to  death.  But  the  executioner  sent  was  a  Gallic  slave  who  ^i^^^^^- 
had  seen  him  in  his  glory  during  the  Cimbric  campaign.  When  he 
entered  the  room  the  well -remembered  form  rose,  the  fierce  eyes 
glared  in  the  dim  light,  and  a  voice  said  sternly,  "  Man,  darest  thou 
slay  Gains  Marius?"  He  threw  down  his  sword  and  rushed  from 
the  room  exclaiming,  "  I  cannot  kill  Gaius  Marius."  The  citizens  of 
Minturnae  then  repented,  and  resolved  to  allow  the  saviour  of  Italy 
to  go  free.  They  conducted  him  to  the  shore  and  put  him  on  board 
a  ship.  This  time  the  wind  was  favourable.  He  sailed  first  to  the 
island  of  Aenaria  {Ischia),  where  he  found  some  of  his  friends,  and 
from  thence  to  Africa,  where  his  son  had  arrived  before  him  in  safety. 
He  stayed  himself  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Carthage  and  sent  his 
son  to  beg  protection  of  Hiempsal,  king  of  Numidia,  But  the  pro- 
praetor of  Africa,  Sextilius,  felt  it  his  duty  to  refuse  him  harbourage, 
and  yet  did  not  wish  to  injure  him.  He  therefore  sent  a  message  to 
him  bidding  him  leave  the  province.  As  the  messenger  waited  for 
an  answer,  Marius,  after  remaining  for  a  long  time  silent,  at  last  said, 
"  Go  and  tell  him  that  you  saw  Gaius  Marius  sitting  amidst  the  ruins  Marius  at 
of  Carthage."  Meanwhile  his  son  had  been  politely  received  by  Carthage. 
Hiempsal,  but  had  soon  discovered  that  the  king  was  secretly  de- 
signing to  gratify  the  Sullan  party  by  doing  him  some  mischief. 
By  the  favour  of  one  of  the  royal  harem  he  escaped  to  meet  his 
father,  who  was  just  about  to  sail.  They  made  their  way  to  the 
island  of  Cercina,  and  there  waited  till  the  news  from  Rome  in- 
duced them  to  return  to  Italy,  with  some  exiles  and  Mauritanians, 
whom  they  persuaded  to  take  service  with  them. 

To  understand  this  change  of  plan  we  must  go  back  to  Rome  Sulla  in 
and  Sulla.      The  first  measure  of  the  consuls,  when  they  found  them-  Rome,  88. 
selves  supreme  once    more,  was  to   revoke  the   laws  of  Sulpicius, 
whether  by  the  Senate  declaring  them  invalid,  as  having  been  passed 
by  violence,  or  by  a  regular  vote  of  the  people.     Certain  measures  His  re- 
were  then  passed  to  meet  the  actual  difficulties  of  the  moment :  the  aciio?iary 
rate  of  interest  was  reduced  to  a  maximum  of  ten   per  cent  (as  it  ^^easures. 
had  been  in  357)  ;  the  usual  order  for  new  colonies  was  issued  ;  and 
the  roll  of  the  Senate  filled  up  by  the  admission  of  300  new  members. 
In  regard  to  the  comitia  the  old  arrangement  attributed  to  Servius 
was  recalled  as  far  as  was  possible  in  the  altered  state  of  things.!     For 

^  It  seems,  however,  doubtful  whether  this  change  took  place  now  or  after 
Sulla's  return  from  Asia. 


596 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Restraint 
on  the 
Tribunes. 


Coss. 

Gnaeus 

Octavius, 

L. 

Cornelius 

Cinna,  8j. 


Sulla 
crosses  to 
Greece. 


Pompeius 

Rufus 

killed. 


Revolu- 
tionary 
measures  of 
Cinna. 


Cinna 
expelled 
from  Rome 
collects  an 
army  ijt 
Italian 
cities, 
yS. 


voting  purposes  those  who  possessed  property  to  the  standard  of  the 
first  class  (100,000  sesterces)  were  distributed  into  centuries  almost 
equal  to  half  the  entire  number,  and  could  thereby  command  nearly 
a  majority  of  votes  at  elections.  How  far  this  was  applied  to  the 
tribes,  which  since  241  had  also  been  divided  into  centuries  accord- 
ing to  rating,  does  not  seem  certain  ;  but  their  importance  in  legisla- 
tion, usually  brought  forward  by  tribunes,  was  lessened  by  a  regu- 
lation prohibiting  the  tribunes  from  proposing  bills  without  the 
previous  sanction  of  the  Senate, — a  condition  once  imposed  by  custom, 
then  abolished  by  law,  and  now  for  the  first  time  enacted  by  law. 

But  Sulla  was  in  haste  to  rejoin  his  army,  which  after  the  restora- 
tion of  order  he  had  sent  to  Capua.  He  tried  to  propitiate  the 
popular  party  by  allowing  the  election  of  C.  Cornelius  Cinna  to  the 
consulship  for  87,  though  he  first  exacted  an  oath  from  him  to  abstain 
from  reversing  the  measures  just  passed.  Some  of  the  Lucani  and 
Samnites  were  still  in  arms,  and  Nola  held  out.  He  therefore  had 
enough  to  detain  him  in  Italy  until  the  spring  of  87,  in  spite  of  the 
tragic  events  in  Asia  which  demanded  his  presence.  He  crossed  to 
Epirus  in  the  early  summer,  leaving  Italy  by  no  means  quiet.  His 
legati  Q.  Caecilius  Metellus  and  Appius  Claudius  retained  the  com- 
mand in  Samnium  ;  but  Cinna  had  shown  his  animus  at  once  by  pro- 
posing to  impeach  him,  though  he  had  apparently  gone  to  the  army 
without  condescending  to  answer  the  charge.  The  northern  troops 
were  still  under  the  optimatist  Strabo  ;  for  Pompeius  Rufus,  who  had 
been  sent  to  supersede  him,  was  murdered  by  the  soldiers,  and 
Strabo  quietly  resumed  the  command. 

Yet  no  sooner  had  Sulla  left  Italy  than,  trusting  to  the  support 
of  the  new  citizens,  Cinna  proposed  to  recall  Marius  and  his  friends, 
and  to  distribute  the  Italians  among  all  the  thirty-five  tribes.  His 
colleague  Octavius  determined  to  oppose  him,  but  waited  until  some 
act  of  violence  gave  him  an  excuse  for  interfering.  Being  informed 
that  a  crowd  of  armed  Italians  were  in  the  Forum  to  overawe  the 
citizens  into  voting  for  Cinna's  bill,  and  were  actually  driving  the 
opposing  tribunes  from  the  rostra,  he  led  an  armed  body  of  men  into 
the  Forum,  killed  many  of  the  rioters,  and  drove  the  rest  through  the 
gates.  Cinna,  after  vainly  endeavouring  to  raise  the  slaves,  escaped 
from  the  city.  He  set  himself  at  once  to  raise  a  party  in  the  Italian 
towns,  which  he  instigated  to  take  up  arms.  At  Nola  he  was  joined 
by  most  of  the  army  under  App.  Claudius,  and  by  senators  and 
other  members  of  his  party,  among  whom  was  the  able  and  active 
Q.  Sertorius.  He  was  thus  distinctly  levying  arms  against  the  city 
and  joining  with  her  revolted  subjects.  The  Senate  at  Rome 
therefore  declared  him  a  public  enemy  and  no  longer  consul,  and 
contrived  to  have  L.  Merula,  the  Jlainen  dialis^  elected  in  his  place, 


XXXVII  MARIUS  ENTERS  ROME  597 

as  though  he  were  dead.  Such  a  proceeding  was  of  course  not 
provided  for  by  the  constitution  :  but  it  rested  on  the  same  ground 
of  equity  as  all  depositions  of  kings  or  other  rulers,  namely,  that  he 
was  using  his  office  to  the  harm  of  the  State.  Cinna  answered  by 
coming  to  Capua,  where  there  were  troops,  with  whom  he  pleaded 
that  the  consulship  had  been  given  him  by  them,  and  could  only  be 
taken  away  by  those  who  had  given  it.  A  considerable  number  of 
the  men  took  the  oath  to  him,  and  many  more  of  his  partisans 
joined  him  there. 

It  was  the  news  of  these  events  which  reached  Marius  in  Cercina,  Return  of 
and  made  him  resolve  to  return  to   Italy.      He  landed  at  Telamon  Marius, 
on  the  Etruscan  coast,  and  immediately  communicated  with  Cinna,     '^' 
who  named  him  his  legate  with  proconsular  power  ;    and  the  two 
agreed  to  advance  on   Rome,  which  for  the  next  few  weeks  was  thus 
threatened  by  four  armies,  under  Cinna  and  his  three  legates,  Marius, 
Sertorius,  and  Carbo.      The  city  walls  were  in   a  dilapidated   state, 
and  the  Senate  was  striving  to  protect  them  by  trenches  and  other    Weakness 
fortifications,  while  sending  urgent  messages  to  Strabo  in  Picenum,  of  the 
and  ordering  Metellus  and  Claudius   in  Campania  to  make   terms  ^^^^^  '^^'^^' 
with  the  people  of  Nola  and  come  to  their  aid.      Strabo  had  been 
annoyed  at  being  refused  a  second  consulship,  and  it  was  uncertain 
what   he  would  do.      But    he   obeyed  the    summons   and   advanced 
towards  the  Colline  gate.      Metellus  and  Claudius  came  to   Rome, 
without   however  making  terms  with   the    Samnites,   who   presently 
joined  Marius  and  defeated  a  Roman  army  under  Plancius.     Refusing 
to  supersede  the  consul   Octavius  in  the  supreme  command,  as  the 
soldiers  wished,  Metellus  retired  from  the  city  and  crossed  to  Africa  ; 
and  Claudius,  who  was  stationed  on  the  Janiculum,  finally  made  terms 
with  the  Marians,  and  admitted  them  into  the  city. 

Meanwhile    Marius  had    occupied    Ostia,   and  thus  got  control  Marius  in 
of  the  com   supplies.       He   then   proceeded  to  take  the  towns  on  Latium. 
the  Appian  Way,  Antium,  Lanuvium,  and  Aricia,  and  crossing  the 
river  joined  Cinna  on  the  Janiculum.      The  Senate  found  themselves 
gradually  reduced   to  helplessness.      Large    desertions  were  taking 
place  from  the  army  of  the  consuls  to  Cinna,  and  numbers  of  slaves  Battle  at 
were  attracted   to  his    camp   by  offers  of  freedom.      Strabo's  army 
was  suffering  from  fever,  and,  soon  after  an  indecisive  battle  with 
Sertorius   near    the    Colline    gate,   he    was    himself   killed    by  light- 
ning.    The  Senate  humbled  itself  to  invite  Cinna  and  Marius  into  the 
city,  only  begging  that  they  would  spare  the  lives  «f  the  citizens. 
Cinna  made  fair  professions,  but  Marius,  who  stood  by  the  consul's 
chair,  said  nothing,  and  his  grim  look  gave  no  sign  of  mercy.      The 
first  demand  made  by  Cinna  on  entering  the  city  was  that  Marius, 
and  the  other  exiles  who  had  joined  him  at  Ostia,  should  be  formally 


the  Colline 
Gate. 


598 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


The  reign 
of  terror. 


Coss.  L. 
Cornelius 
CiJtna  II. 
Gaius 
Marius 
VII. ,  86. 


Death  of 
Alar  ins, 
ijth 
January 
86. 


Coss  L. 
Cornelius 
Cinna  III. 
Cn.  Papl- 
rius  Carbo, 
85-84. 


recalled.  But  too  impatient  to  wait  for  the  vote,  Marius  entered  the 
Forum  surrounded  by  a  band  of  ruffians,  and  the  work  of  blood 
began.  The  consul  Octavius  had  already  been  killed  as  he  sat  on 
the  curule  chair,  and  his  head  brought  to  Cinna  ;  and  now  every 
one  whom  Marius  pointed  out  by  word  or  gesture  in  the  streets 
was  cut  down  by  his  attendants,  or,  as  some  say,  every  one  whose 
salutation  he  did  not  return.  His  former  colleague  and  rival  Catulus 
in  vain  asked  through  friends  for  mercy  :  moriendum  est — was  the 
only  answer  given  by  the  bitter  old  man.  The  famous  orator  M. 
Antonius  took  refuge  with  a  humble  client,  but  was  betrayed  by  a 
wine-seller,  whose  suspicions  were  roused  by  the  man  sending  for  a 
superior  kind  of  wine,  and  Marius  was  scarcely  restrained  from  going 
to  feast  his  eyes  upon  his  execution.  Some,  such  as  Lucius  Merula, 
Cinna's  substitute  in  the  consulship,  were  to  be  subjected  to  a  form 
of  legal  trial,  but  Merula  at  any  rate  preferred  suicide.  Everywhere 
the  trackers  of  blood  were  on  the  search,  and  no  man's  life  who  had 
opposed  Marius  was  safe.i  Cinna  soon  got  disgusted  with  these 
cruelties,  and  he  and  Sertorius  at  length  put  to  death  a  number  of 
Marius's  ruffian  guards  who  were  revelling  in  murder,  rape,  and 
robbery. 

Cinna's  next  step  was  to  secure  the  election  of  himself  and  Marius 
to  the  consulship  of  86.  But  the  veteran  Marius  only  survived  this 
realisation  of  his  dream  of  a  seventh  consulship  a  few  days.  The 
hero  of  Vercellae  had  lived  too  long  for  his  fame,  and  his  services 
to  his  country  were  forgotten  in  the  horror  of  his  last  days.  Worn 
out  with  excitement  or  fever  he  died  on  the  ides  of  January,  and  was 
succeeded  by  L.  Valerius  Flaccus,  who  was  sent  to  supersede  Sulla 
in  the  command  against  Mithndates. 

Meanwhile  Cinna  was  all-powerful.  He  caused  himself  to  be  nomin- 
ated consul  with  Carbo  for  85  and  84  ;  and  carried  laws  which  were 
meant  to  secure  the  adhesion  of  the  populace  of  the  city  and  the 
Italians.  The  new  citizens  were  distributed  among  the  thirty-five 
tribes  by  the  censors  of  86-85  ;  all  impediments  on  the  distribution 
of  corn  were  removed;  three-fourths  of  all  private  debts  were  can-^ 
celled  ;  and  some  coloni  actually  established  at  Capua.^  Sulla  wasB 
declared  a  public  enemy  and  his  town  house  demolished  :  and  the 
provinces  were  placed  or  continued  in  the  hands  of  adherents  of  the 
consuls.      In  Macedonia  alone  Sulla  was  supreme,  and  there  he  was 

^  Some  no  doubt  escaped.  For  instance  we  are  told  of  one  Cornutus  whose 
slaves  loved  him*  and  covered  his  retreat  by  displaying  the  dead  body  of  one  of 
their  fellow-slaves  to  the  pursuers,  and  pretending  that  it  was  their  master  whom 
they  had  killed. 

2  Capua  did  not  obtain  the  status  of  a  colonia  till  59,  though  a  conventus 
capable  of  corporate  action  existed  there  before,  Cicero  pro  Sest.  §  9.  Cinna's 
colony  therefore  was  either  incomplete  or  was  abolished  by  Sulla. 


XXXVII  PREPARATIONS  TO  RESIST  SULLA  599 

joined  by  many  of  the  Optlmates  who  fled  from  Rome.     He  presently 
had  what  might  ahnost  iDe  looked  upon  as  a  senate,  and  he  let  it  be 
known  that,  when  the  war  of  Mithridates  was  ended,  he  was  coming  Sulla 
home  with  his  army  to  protect  him,  and  would  ignore  all  the  legisla-  prepares  to 
tion  of  Cinna  except  in  regard  to  the   Italian  voters.      The  Senate  ^^  ^^^'^' 
tried  to  make  peace  by  proposing  that  Sulla  should  come  to  Rome 
without  his  army  under  a  safe-conduct,  and  that  the  consuls  should 
cease  their  preparations  for  war.      Sulla  did  not  openly  decline,  but  Prepara- 
sent  word  to  say  that  the  exiled  nobles  must  be  first  recalled,  and  the  ^^^'f-^  ^^^  _ 
authors  of  illegal  massacres  punished.      There  was  clearly  to  be  war.   '^^""f^    !T' 
The  consuls  spent  85  and  84  principally  in  collecting  money,  troops,  of  Cinna, 
and  war-ships  on  the  Adriatic  coast,  and  several  legions  were  sent  84. 
across  to  Epirus  under  Cn.  Papirius   Carbo.     In  the  latter  part  of 
84,  however,  Cinna  was  killed  in  a  mutiny  of  soldiers,  who  declined 
to  cross  to  Greece  to  attack  their  fellow-citizens  ;   and  Carbo,  now 
sole   consul,    returned   to    Italy,    and   went    into   winter  quarters   at 
Ariminum.      Such  was  the  state  of  things  in   Italy  in   the  winter  of 
84-83.      To  understand  Sulla's  position  we  must  follow  the  course  of 
the  Mithridatic  war. 

Authorities.  —  Livy,  Ep,  69-84;  Appian,  B.  Civ.  i.  28-78;  Velleius 
Paterc.  li.  12-23;  Plutarch,  Sulla,  Marius,  Sertorius,  Pompeius ;  Florus  iii. 
16-18  ;  Diodorus,  fr.  of  xxxvii.  ;  Dio,  fr.  95-106  ;  Granius  Licinianus,  p.  23 
sq.  ;  Orosius  v.  16-20.  For  the  Lex  Papiria  Plautia,  see  Cicero  pro  Archia,  37. 
For  the  characters  and  aims  of  the  men  of  this  period  the  writings  of  Cicero, 
who  served  his  only  campaign  under  Strabo  in  the  Social  war,  now  become 
important.  For  Saturninus  see  also  Val.  Max.  9,  7,  3  ;  and  for  a  law  of  Servilius 
Caepio  in  106,  which  is  held  by  some  to  have  partially  restored  the  judicia  to  the 
Senate,  see  Cic.  Bnit.  §43,  44,  63,  86. 


h 


Indepen- 
dent 

powers  in 
Asia,  yet 
owning  an 
informal 
protector- 
ate. 


Pergamus. 


CHAPTER  XXXVIII 

MITHRIDATES^    IN    ASIA    AND    GREECE 


The  origin  and  state  of  the  Roman  province  of  Asia — Causes  of  discontent — 
Rise  of  the  kingdom  of  Pontus  (31 5-1 21) — Early  life  and  character  of 
Mithridates  Eupator  (i 20-1 11) — His  victories  in  the  Crimea  and  extension  of 
the  Pontic  kmgdom  north  of  the  Black  Sea  (111-102) — His  tour  in  Asia  (105) 
He  joms  Nicomedes  of  Bithynia  in  an  attack  upon  Paphlagonia  (104) — Obeys 
Roman  commissioners  and  evacuates  Paphlagonia,  but  occupies  Galatia — 
Breach  between  Nicomedes  and  Mithridates  in  regard  to  Cappadocia — 
Meeting  of  Marius  and  Mithridates  {98) — The  Senate  order  Mithridates  to 
evacuate  Cappadocia  (94) — Tigranes  of  Armenia  allied  with  Mithridates — 
Sulla  restores  Ariobarzanes  (92) — M'.Aquillius  in  Asia  (90-89) — Mithridates 
determines  on  war  (88)  —  Defeat  of  the  Roman  forces  and  massacre  of 
the  Italians  (88) — Mithridates  attacks  Rhodes,  and  his  general  Archelaus 
occupies  AthenS'(88-87) — Sulla  arrives  in  Greece  with  five  legions  {2)'j). 

In  virtue  of  the  treaty  with  Antiochus  (189)  the  Romans  had  estab- 
hshed   an  informal   protectorate  in  Asia.      No  regular  province  had 
been  constituted,  no  tribute  imposed  except  for  <var  indemnities,  and 
no  army  or  fleet  stationed  in  Asia  to  overawe  or  protect  the   peoples. 
The  kingdoms  of  Cappadocia  and  Bithynia  were  left  untouched  ;  the 
freedom  of  the  Asiatic  Gauls  was  respected, — though  they  were  to 
cease  their  depredations  on  their  neighbours  ;  the  Greek  cities  -  were 
to  be  free,   and  to  be  relieved  of  the  tribute  formerly  paid  to  the 
Seleucidae  or  other  princes  ;  the  rest  of  Asia   Minor  north  of  Mount 
Taurus  for  the  most  part  was  given  to  the.  king  of  Pergamus.      Besides  j 
his  ancestral  kingdom  of  Mysia  he  received  in  Europe   Lysimachia  j 
and  the  Thracian  Chersonese  ;  in  Asia  Hellespontine  Phrygia,  Lydia  "' 
with   Sardis   and   Ephesus,  part   of  Caria,   including   Magnesia  and 
Tralles,    part  of  CiHcia,   Greater  Phrygia,    Lycaonia ;   and  in  Lycia,| 
Milyas  and  the  harbour  town  Telmissus. 

^  The  correct  form,  as  found  in  Greek  inscriptions,  is  Mithradates,  i.e.  wor- 
shipper of  Mithras.  I  have,  however,  adopted  the  more  familiar  spelling  o^ 
Roman  writers. 

^  Especially  those  who  had  joined  the  Romans  against  Antiochus — Dardanus 
Ilium,  Cyme,  Smyrna,  Clazomenae,  Erythrae,  Chios,  Colophon,  Miletus,  and  th 
Lycian  confederate  towns. 


6o2 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


It  was  this  kingdom  which  passed  to  the  Roman  people  in  133 
by  the  will  of  Attains  III.,  and  was  organised  as  a  province  in  129 
under  the  name  of  Asia  with  Ephesus  as  its  capital.  The  European 
possessions,  however,  were  annexed  to  the  province  of  Macedonia  ; 
Telmissus  was  given  up  to  the  Lycian  federation,  and  some  other 
outlying  districts  to  various  princes,  who  were  to  relieve  the  Romans 
from  the  burden  of  defending  the  eastern  frontiers.  The  Greek 
cities  declared  free  in  189  still  nominally  retained  that  freedom  in 
129  ;  and  the  province  consisted  of  the  districts  known  as  Mysia, 
Caria,  and  Lydia,  with  the  adjacent  islands,  and  the  Greek  cities 
other  than  those  left  free.  Phrygia  for  a  time  was  left  in  dispute, 
but  was  subsequently  joined  to  the  province.  This  was  surrounded 
by  independent  states,  which  were  friends  or  clients  of  Rome,  the  re- 
publics of  Rhodes,  Cyzicus,  and  Heracleia,  the  Lycian  federation,  and 
the  three  kingdoms  of  Cappadocia,  Bithynia,  and  Paphlagonia. 
Lycaonia  and  CiHcia  Trachea  (includmg  and  sometimes  called  Pam- 
phyHa)  were  in  129  assigned  to  the  king  of  Cappadocia. 

When  the  inheritance  first  fell  to  Rome,  the  Roman  Government 
had  promised  a  remission  of  the  tribute  paid  by  the  states  to  the 
kings  of  Pergamus,  contenting  itself  with  the  profits  of  the  royal 
estates.  The  rebellion  of  Aristonicus  (i  31-129),  however,  gave  a  pre- 
text for  evading  this  promise.  The  cultivators  of  the  soil  now  paid 
a  tenth  of  their  produce  {decumae)  ;  a  rent  was  levied  for  feeding  cattle 
on  the  public  pastures  {scripturd)  ;  and  an  ad  valorem  duty  of  2.V  per 
cent  was  imposed  on  imports  iportoriuni).  Besides  these  burdens, 
the  expenses  of  Roman  governors  and  the  exactions  of  their  retinue, 
more  or  less  supported  by  law  or  custom,  had  to  be  borne  by  the 
provincials,  already  impoverished  by  war  indemnities,  and  deeply  in 
debt  to  Roman  money-lenders  or  bankers,  who  flocked  over  in  the 
wake  of  the  conquering  armies. 

The  distress  of  the  country  was  accentuated  by  the  next  change. 
By  the  lex  Sempro7iia  of  Gains  Gracchus  (123)  the  various  taxes  were 
sold  by  the  censors  every  quinquennium  to  companies  of  publicani, 
who  paid  a  fixed  sum  to  the  treasury  and  recouped  themselves  by  the 
estimated  surplus  of  the  revenue.  This  system,  which  lasted  nearly 
eighty  years,  was  a  fruitful  source  of  oppression.  The  first  object 
of  the  publicani  was  to  obtain  a  handsome  profit  ;  and  as  the 
decumae  (paid  in  kind)  2jn<l  portoria  varied  with  the  yearly  produce 
and  the  value  of  the  merchandise,  every  device  was  employed  to 
enhance  the  amount.  The  closest  and  most  offensive  forms  of 
espionage,  with  every  engine  of  legal  chicanery  or  personal  violence, 
were  set  at  work.  If  the  provincials  appealed  to  the  proconsul,  they 
generally  found  that  his  interests  or  fears  were  on  the  side  of  the 
publicani — his   interests,  for  he  might  receive  a  percentage  of  the 


xxxvrir  THE  OPPRESSION  OF  ASIA  603 

profits  ;  his  fears  because,  if  accused  on  his  return,  he  would  have  to 
stand  a  trial  before  a  jury  composed  of  the  very  equites  who  had 
enjoyed  or  hoped  to  enjoy  the  chance  of  similar  profits.  The  oppres- 
sion of  course  varied  somewhat  with  the  character  of  the  proconsul. 
There  were  instances  of  righteous  and  incorrupt  governors,  with 
firmness  equal  to  their  virtue.  Under  such  men  for  a  time  the  pro- 
vince was  happy  and  prosperous.  But  they  were  few  and  far  between  ; 
and  the  ruin  which  the  disappointed  publicani  generally  managed  to 
inflict  upon  them  scared  those  who,  perhaps  no  less  well  disposed, 
had  not  the  courage  of  their  opinions.  1  For  the  most  part  the  pro- 
consuls were  conveniently  blind,  and  the  people  suffered. 

It  was  natural  that  this  government  should  be  detested  in  most  Consequent 
of  the  States  ;  that  the  visits  of  the  publicani  should  be  regarded  with  ^^popu- 
fear  and  anger  ;  and  that  the  Roman  merchants,  bankers,  and  money-  ^^^  Roman 
lenders,  in  whose  books  many  of  the  natives  were  deeply  involved,  govemmen 
should  be  the  most  unpopular  residents  in  the  towns  and  harbours,  andRoma) 
and  while  receiving  the  outside  deference  which  weakness  pays  to  ^^^'■'i^^^^^- 
superior  force,  should  yet  be  eyed  askance  with  the  stealthy  hatred 
which  has  the  will  without  the  strength  or  courage  to  strike. 

For  thirty-five  years,  however  (123-88),  all  seemed  to  be  going  Division 
smoothly.      The  natives  groaned  or  scowled,  but  the  Roman  publican  of  parties 
and  money-lender  returned  gorged  with  wealth  to  plunge  into  the  "^     ^ 
luxuries  or  vices  of  Rome.      Yet  black  as  is  the  picture  which  all  our 
authorities  give,  there  must  have  been  some  counterbalancing  ad- 
vantages in  the   Roman   sway  ;  for  in  nearly  every  town,  when  the 
crash  came,  we  find  a  Romanising  party.      Probably  this  was  gener- 
ally the  merchant   or  trading  class,  who  found  the  Romans  willing 
and  able  to  protect  them  against  all  piracy  or  pillage  other  than  their 
own  ;  and  the  Roman   courts,  when   not  judging  cases  of  revenue, 
more  trustworthy  and  impartial  than  those  of  the  natives.      Still  there 
was  enough  well-grounded  disaflfection  to  make  it  certain  that  at  the 
first  opportunity  the  smouldering  discontent  would  burst  into  flame. 
That  opportunity  came  in   88,   when  the  king  of  Pontus  advanced  Mithri- 
into  Roman  Asia  with  an  army  which  had  just  beaten  a  combined  dates  enter 

force  of  Bithynians  and  Italians,  bringing  with  him  a  Roman  governor  ^^^   . 

r  r^-y  •  •      u-  •  J  1  •  I.  province  01 

01  Cilicia  as  prisoner  m  his  train,  and  presently  exposing  to  the  scorn  \4siain8S 

and  insult  of  the   inhabitants  a  Roman   legate  of  consular  rank  m 

chains,  and  treated  with  every  species  of  ignominy. 

Mithridates  had  already  achieved  no  mean  work  in   life  ;    had 

extended  his  power  almost  to  encircle  the  Black  Sea,  and  had  come 

^  The  most  notorious  case  was  that  of  P.  Rutilius  Rufus,  who  having  in  95 
distinguished  himself  (as  legatus  of  Q.  Mucius  Scaevola)  by  repressing  the  extor- 
tions of  the  pubhcani,  was  condemned  by  a  conspiracy  of  the  equites  at  Rome  in 
92  (Livy,  Ep.  70;  Valer.  Max.  ii.  10,  5.) 


6o4  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap. 

Character  forward  as  the  successful  champion  of  Hellenism  beyond  the 
of Mithri-  Caucasus;  but  during  the  last  fifteen  years  had  found  the  Roman 
power  more  than  once  thwarting  the  influence  which  he  desired  to 
exercise  in  Asia  Minor.  He  was  a  man  of  exceptional  vigour  and 
ability.  A  youth  of  hardship  and  danger  had  left  him  with  a  frame 
of  uncommon  strength  and  endurance.  A  brave  and  skilful  com- 
mander himself,  he  had  the  faculty  of  attaching  others  to  his  service 
with  unalterable  fidelity,  and  had  been  generous  in  rewarding  success 
and  in  making  allowance  for  failure.  In  spite  of  his  stormy  youth 
he  had  some  tincture  of  Greek  taste  and  culture,  had  a  famous  collec- 
tion of  engraved  gems  and  other  works  of  art,  and  was  gifted  with 
such  extraordinary  powers  of  acquisition  and  memory  that  he  is  said 
to  have  been  able  to  converse  in  twenty-five  languages  while  transact- 
ing business  with  deputies  from  his  widely-spread  dominions.  On 
the  other  hand  this  veneer  of  Greek  culture  could  not  conceal  the 
vices  and  passions  of  the  Oriental  despot,  who  measures  everything 
by  the  standard  of  his  personal  desires.  His  well-filled  harem  was 
stained  by  the  blood  of  more  than  one  wife,  and  several  of  his  sons 
fell  victims  to  a  father's  jealousy.  When  once  his  suspicions  were 
roused,  however  causelessly,  past  services  and  tried  loyalty  went  for 
nothing.  He  was  not  conspicuously  cruel  in  war,  yet  the  massacre 
of  the  Italians  in  Asia,  the  violent  removal  of  the  inhabitants  of 
Chios,  the  cold-blooded  murder  of  his  nephew  Ariarathes,  the  young 
king  of  Cappadocia,  were  characteristic  of  the  barbarian  despot ;  and 
while  posing  as  a  friend  of  Hellenism  he  soon  showed  that  he  had 
no  idea  of  Hellenic  freedom  apart  from  himself  as  master. 
The  The  kingdom  ruled  by  this  remarkable  man  had  grown  up  from 

growth  and  <^^  dissolution  of  the  Persian  Empire.      At  the  time  of  the  invasion 
ment  of        ^^  Alexander  the  Great  the  name  of  Pontus  as  a  territorial  designa- 
Pontus,         tion  had  no  existence.      The  country  formed  part  of  the  satrapy  of 
starting        Cappadocia,   which   then   extended  from   the  Black   Sea  to    Mount 
frojn  the       Taurus.      Alexander,    scarcely   entering    Cappadocia,    committed   its 
'Ca-bladocia  conquest  to  his  lieutenants.      The  Cappadocians  refused  to  accept  a 
Hn  the  4th     Macedonian  satrap,  but  after  the  battle  of  Arbela  (331)  the  Greek 
ventury.        towns   along   the   coast   of  the   Black   Sea  submitted,   and  obtained 
various  degrees  of  favour  or  freedom.      Meanwhile  Ariarathes,  who 
pretended   to   trace  his   descent  from  Otanes,  one  of  the  Magi  who 
killed  the  false  Smerdis  in  522,  maintained  a  kind  of  royal  power  in 
Cappadocia  while  Alexander  was  engaged  in  his  distant  enterprise. 
After  Alexander's  death  the  regent  Perdiccas  conquered  and  crucified 
Ariarathes,  and  reduced  Cappadocia  to  the  position  of  a  Macedonian 
province,  with  the  addition  of  Paphlagonia  (322).      But  the  quarrels 
between  the  successors  of  Alexander  gave  the  Cappadocians  a  chance 
of  ridding  themselves  of  the  Macedonian  yoke.     About  31  5  Ariarathes, 


XXXVIII  RISE  OF  THE  KINGDOM  OF  PONTUS  605 

a  nephew  and  adopted  son  of  the   old  Persian   satrap   crucified  by  Ariarathcs 
Perdiccas,  raised  a  rebellion  to  regain  his  paternal  inheritance  ;  while  ^I- 
Mithridates,   called  Ctistes,   or  the  Founder — a  deposed    satrap  of  Mithri- 
Cappadocia  Pontica — roused  the  northern  Cappadocians  and  Paphla-  ^^^^f  ^^' 
gonians,  and  two  kingdoms  were  carved  out   of  the  satrapy.      That  ^    ^^  ^^'' 
obtained  by  Mithridates  was  at  first  still  called  Cappadocia  Pontica, 
while  that  of  Ariarathes,  comprising  the  basin  of  the  Halys,  was  called 
simply  Cappadocia.      The  attempts  of  Seleucus  to  reduce  them  to 
obedience  were  fruitless,  and  from  the  time  of  his  death  (280)  they 
were  firmly  established. 

It  is   Cappadocia  Pontica,  presently  called  simply  Pontus,  which  Cappadocia 
developed  into  the  kingdom  ruled  over  by  the  great  Mithridates.     For  Pontica 
a  long  time  it  was  not  important.    The  chief  power  in  Asia  till  the  battle  /^^^^f/ 
of  Magnesia  (190)  was  that  of  the  Seleucids  ;  and  even  the  inferior 
kingdoms  of  Pergamus  and  Bithynia  were  more  than   a  match  for 
Pontus.      But  a  succession  of  kings   had  slowly  aggrandised  it  by 
marriages,  alliances,   and  other  means.      Mithridates  III.  (302-266)  Early 
gained  parts  of  Cappadocia  and  Paphlagonia  ;  Ariobarzanes  (about  ^^^S^  "f 
266-240)  took  Amastris  ;   Mithridates  IV.  (about   240-190)  received     '^^  ^^• 
Phrygia  as  the  portion  of  his  wife,  a  daughter  of  Seleucus  Callinicus. 

The  battle  of  Magnesia  (190),  though  it  put  an  end  to  the  power  Beginning 
of  the  Seleucids  in  Asia,  brought  into  the  country  the  still  more  formid-  of  Roman 
able   Romans.     The  next  king,  Pharnaces  I.  (about    190-169),  who  '^^f^^e  j8q 
was  restless  and  encroaching  and  fought  with  nearly  all  his  neigh- 
bours,   was   compelled    to   abandon    his    conquests    in    Galatia    and 
Paphlagonia  at  the  bidding  of  Roman  legates,  though  he  succeeded 
in  retaining  the  important  Greek  town  of  Sinope.      His  brother  and 
successor  Mithridates  V.   (about    169-12 1)    sought   and   maintained  Mithri- 
alliance  with  Rome,  supplied  ships  and  men  during  the  third  Punic  ^^^^^ 
war,  and    in    133-129  joined    in    assisting    her    to   take   possession  ^^^^S^^^^^ 
of  the  kingdom  of  Attains  and  to  put  down  Aristonicus.      For  this  j()q.i2i. 
last  service  he  asked  for  the  addition  of  the  greater  Phrygia  to  his 
dominions,  to  which  he  alleged  a  claim  under  the  marriage  contract  Phrygia 
of  his  mother,  daughter  of  Seleucus  Callinicus.      But  Nicomedes  of  ^^^^^ned  by 
Bithynia  also  claimed  it,  and  the  decision   in   favour  of  the  king  of    /^  ^^'  , 
Pontus  was  obtained  from  Aquillius  by  means  of  an  enormous  bribe.  Nicoinedes. 
The  transaction,  however,  was  too  notorious  ;  the  "  acts  "  of  Aquillius 
were  annulled,  and  for  some  years  the  question  of  Phrygia  remained 
open,  the  agents  of  both  kings  lavishing  gold  in  Rome.     The  lex 
Aufeia  in  123  proposed  to  assign  it  to  the  king  of  Pontus  :  but  Gains  Lex  Aufeia 
Gracchus,  who  wished  to  annex  it  to  the  province  in  order  to  increase  g^'^i^S 
the  revenue,  declared  that  both  proposer  and  opposer  of  the  law  were  j^jif^^i-   ^ 
bribed  by  Mithridates  and  Nicomedes  respectively  ;  and  the  case  was  dates,  123. 
so  scandalous   that   the   execution  of  the   law  was   suspended,  and 


6o6 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Takes  ihe 
government 
into  his 
own  hands, 

HI. 

The  eaj'ly 
reign  of 
Mithri- 
dates. 


nothing  was  done  till  after  the  death  of  the  Pontic  king.  In  ii6, 
when  Mithridates  Eupator  was  still  a  child,  Phrygia  was  annexed  to 
the  Roman  province.  Meanwhile  Euergetes  occupied  it  without 
waiting  for  the  decision  of  the  Senate  ;  was  extending  his  influence  in 
Cappadocia,  Paphlagonia,  Galatia,  and  Crete  ;  and  was  maintaining  a 
formidable  army  and  fleet.  His  ambitious  projects  were  suddenly 
cut  short  in  120.  While  feasting  in  his  palace  at  Sinope  he  was 
slain  by  some  of  his  courtiers,  not  without  suspicion  of  the  complicity 
of  his  wife  and  of  a  secret  suggestion  from  Rome. 

The  elder  of  his  two  sons  by  his  wife  Laodice  was  Mithridates 
Eupator.  Born  in  132  at  Sinope,  he  was  only  twelve  years  of  age 
at  the  time  of  his  father's  death,  and  had  been  carefully  educated  in 
all  the  accomplishments  of  Greek  learning  by  his  mother,  a  Syrian 
princess,  probably  a  daughter  of  Antiochus  Epiphanes.  She  now 
became  regent,  while  the  guardians  of  the  boy  were  the  assassins  of 
his  father.  The  queen  was  believed  to  be  jealous  of  her  son,  whose 
approach  to  maturity  threatened  her  with  a  too  speedy  loss  of  power. 
Acting  under  a  hint  from  her  the  guardians  were  said  to  have  at- 
tempted his  life  in  various  ways,  now  by  inducing  him  to  mount  an 
unbroken  horse,  now  by  mixing  poison  with  his  food.  The  boy's 
prowess  or  good  fortune  secured  him  from  these  plots.  But  finding 
himself  in  danger  at  Sinope,  he  made  his  love  of  hunting  a  pretext 
for  retiring  to  the  mountains  and  forests  on  the  south-east  of  the 
Pontus.  There  for  seven  years  (i  18-1 1 1)  he  lived  the  hard  life  of  a 
hunter,  avoiding  inhabited  villages,  and  preferring,  after  a  day  of  toil 
and  danger  in  the  pursuit  of  wild  beasts,  to  sleep  out  under  the  open 
sky.  From  this  stern  discipline  he  emerged  with  bodily  powers 
extraordinarily  developed,  radiant  with  youth  and  beauty,  and  con- 
fident in  himself  and  his  fortunes.  Meanwhile  the  government^  at 
Sinope  had  been  ill-conducted  by  his  mother  and  guardians.  His 
father's  great  projects  had  been  abandoned,  the  fleet  allowed  to  go  to 
ruin,  the  army  to  melt  away  ;  and,  though  we  do  not  know  the  circum- 
stances, it  is  easy  to  conceive  how  the  reappearance  of  the  glorious 
young  prince  was  hailed  at  Sinope  as  a  relief  from  mismanagement 
and  incompetence.  In  1 1 1  he  took  the  government  into  his  hands, 
imprisoning,  some  say  putting  to  death,  his  mother.  For  a  short 
time  his  younger  brother  Chrestos  was  associated  with  him ;  but 
Chrestos  soon  disappeared,  either  by  natural  death  or  by  a  court 
intrigue,  and  Mithridates  Eupator  became  sole  sovereign. 

He  at  once  showed  that  he  meant  to  revive  the  fallen  fortunes 
and  influence  of  Pontus.  He  renewed  the  connexion  with  western 
Greece,  especially  with  Delos  and  Athens  ;  surrounded  himself  with 
Greek  officers  ;  and  personally  superintended  the  reorganisation  of 
the  army,  of  which  a  body  of  6000  mercenary  hoplites,  armed  and 


XXXVIII       F.XTENSION  OF  THE  KINGDOM  OF  PONTUS  607 

drilled  in  the  Macedonian  fashion,  formed  the  nucleus.      He  was  then  He  is 
ready  to  carry  out  the  policy  of  expansion  over  which  he  had  been  invited  to 
brooding.      The    first    opportunity  of   using    his    new    forces    came  ^^^^^^    ^ 
about  the  year   iio  or   109,  on  the  invitation  of  the  Greek  towns  offfig 
in  the  Tauric   Chersonese  or  Crimea,   which,   once   flourishing  and  Crimea, 
rich,    while    they    supplied    Athens     and     other    cities    with     corn,   J^io-iog. 
had  gradually  sunk  into  poverty,  as  the  demand  and  the  security 
of   transport    failed  with  the  decline    of   Greece,    especially  of  the 
Athenian  empire,  and  Greek  ships   no    longer  cleared  the  seas  of 
pirates.     This  commercial  ruin  had  been    accelerated  by  the  con- 
quests of  Alexander,  which  helped  to  spoil  their  market  by  encourag- 
ing the  supplies  of  corn  from  Egypt.     For  the  last  two  centuries  also 
they  had  suffered  from  increasing  encroachments  of  the  barbarous 
Scythians,  while  their  means  of  maintaining  their  defences  or  hiring 
soldiers    were     diminishing.       Such     trade    as    still    remained    was 
chiefly  with   the   cities    on    the  southern    shore   of   the    Black    Sea, 
especially  Heracleia  and  Sinope  ;  it  was  therefore  natural  for  them  to 
appeal  to   Mithridates  for  help.      After  some  hesitation   Diophantus  Success  of 
was  sent  with  an  army  and  fleet  to  establish  a  Pontic  protectorate  in  {"'-^  general 
the  Chersonese  ;  and  not  only  were  the   Scythians  forced  to  confine  ^if  .  ^ 
themselves  to  the  centre  of  the  Crimea,  but  a  fort  was  erected  which 
became  the  city  of  Eupatorium,  and  served  to  secure  peace  for  the 
Greek  towns.     A  second  expedition  established  the  Pontic  supremacy 
on  the  opposite  coast  across  the  Bosporus,  and  Diophantus  returned 
triumphant  to  Sinope.      It  required,  indeed,  four  campaigns  before 
the  conquest  was  fully  accomplished;  but  by  107  Mithridates  found 
himself  sovereign  of  a  rich  and  populous  district,  as  considerable  as 
that  which  he  had  inherited,  with  excellent  harbours,  and  subjects  Extension 
who    were    skilful     sailors     and    good    soldiers.       It    would    supply  ^^^^. 
Pontus  with  corn  and  fish,  command  the  trade  of  the  north,  and  pay  kingdom 
a   splendid   tribute   in    return   for   protection.      Moreover  his    name  round  the 
became  known  throughout  Greece,  and  he  was  encouraged  to  extend  Black  Sea, 
his  conquests,— to  the  west  up  to  the  Carpathian  mountains,  to  the  ^^7-^os, 
east  along  the   coast   of  the   Maeotis   and   the   district   of  Colchis. 
Treaties  of  commerce  were  made  with  Iberia,  the  Greater  Armenia,  (^nd  in 
and  Media  Atropatena  (a  vassal  state  of  the  Parthians)  :  and  the  ^•^'^• 
Pontic  kingdom  was  itself  rounded  off  and  extended  to  the  upper 
Euphrates    by    the    annexation  of   Lesser  Armenia,    famous   for   its 
cavalry  and  archers. 

Thus  with  a  territory  nearly  trebled,  with  the  Black  Sea  almost  a  He  fears 
Pontic  lake,  with  an  army  trained  in  victory,  and  an  almost  inex-  ^^^^  ^"^"^^^^ 
haustible    recruiting    ground,    Mithridates    had     become    the    most  ^'^'^^^' 
powerful  king  of  his  day.      He  soon  turned  his  eyes  to  western  Asia, 
where  his  character  as  champion  of  Hellenism  gave  him  the  required 


6o8 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


pretext.  He  knew,  however,  that  this  policy  would  bring  him  into 
collision  with  Rome,  a  power  which  he  had  perhaps  learnt  to  hate, 
when  in  1 16  it  withdrew  Phrygia  from  his  sway,  in  spite  of  the  bargain 
with  his  father,  and  though  it  had  been  administered  by  the  Pontic 
king  for  more  than  ten  years.  Still  Rome  was  formidable,  and  he 
desired,  if  possible,  to  secure  his  objects  without  incurring  her  open 
enmity. 

In  preparation  for  his  new  enterprise  Mithridates  made  a  tour  of 
inspection  throughout  Asia.  Everywhere  he  found  decaying  king- 
doms or  oppressed  populations  sighing  for  a  liberator.  The  centre  of 
the  peninsula  was  occupied  by  the  Galatae,  a  loose  federation  of 
three  distinct  nationalities  (Tolistobogii,  Sangarii,  Trocmes),  each  sub- 
divided into  tribes  under  tetrarchs.  The  only  central  authority  was 
an  assembly  of  300  of  these  tetrarchs,  meeting  on  fixed  dates  in  a 
sacred  wood,  and  judging  cases  of  homicide.  It  had  no  political 
functions,  and  each  tribe  managed  its  own  affairs,  foreign  or  domestic. 
A  state  so  divided  was  necessarily  weak,  and  would  have  fallen  under 
the  influence  of  its  powerful  neighbour,  had  not  Roman  policy 
regarded  its  independence  of  other  Asiatic  powers  as  imperatively 
necessary.  The  Galatae  were  still  the  best  soldiers  in  Asia,  and  the 
Romans  would  not  risk  the  loss  of  such  a  recruiting  ground. 

Paphlagonia,  a  smaller  district,  had  also  been  distracted  by 
divisions,  and  had  been  left  as  a  legacy  by  its  last  king  Pylemenes  to 
the  father  of  Mithridates.  The  Romans  had  forbidden  the  will  to  be 
carried  out,  and  the  country  was  again  split  up  among  petty  princes. 
Here,  too,  Mithridates  saw  a  chance  and  could  urge  a  claim. 

The  kingdom  of  Cappadocia  was  in  a  state  of  disorder.  Since 
1 90  it  had  been  a  faithful  ally  of  Rome.  But  in  1 30  the  death  of  its 
king  Ariarathes  v.,  the  reformer  and  Philhellene,  had  left  the  regency 
in  the  hands  of  his  widow  Nysa,  an  abandoned  woman  said  to  have 
caused  five  of  her  sons  to  be  poisoned  that  she  might  retain  her 
power.  Her  cruelties  provoked  a  revolution  in  125,  which  placed  her 
sixth  and  only  surviving  son  Ariarathes  Epiphanes  on  the  throne.  He 
retained  it  until  he  was  assassinated  in  iii,  leaving  an  infant  son, 
Ariarathes  Philometor,  under  the  guardianship  of  his  widow  Laodice. 
But  some  in  Cappadocia  remembered  that  it  was  once  united  with 
what  was  now  called  Pontus,  and  looked  to  a  reunion  under  Mithri- 
dates as  a  security  against  the  miseries  of  the  past  twenty  years. 
"  The  invasion  of  Mithridates  Euergetes  during  the  regency  of  Nysa, 
the  marriage  of  Epiphanes  with  a  Pontic  princess,  his  murder  by  one 
who  was  regarded,  rightly  or  wrongly,  as  an  agent  of  the  king  of 
Pontus,  were  so  many  episodes  which  marked  the  progress  of  the 
unionist  idea  and  prepared  its  triumph." 

The  other  Asiatic  kingdom  which  he  would  visit  was  Bithynia. 


XXXVIII     FIRST  ROMAN  LEGATION  TO  MITHRIDATES  609 

Its  present  ruler,  Nicomedes  II.,  had  gained  power  by  the  murder  of 
his  father,  who  had  wished  to  disinherit  him.  In  spite  of  this  he  was 
a  popular  king,  who  elevated  and  hellenised  his  people.  He  had 
been  brought  up  at  Rome,  and  posed  as  the  enthusiastic  friend  and 
ally  of  the  Romans.  But  secretly  he  bore  them  ill-will,  both  on  per- 
sonal and  public  grounds  :  because  his  accession  had  been  opposed 
by  them,  and  because  the  contiguity  of  the  Roman  province  gave  rise 
to  frequent  disputes  as  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  publicani,  who  not 
unfrequently  crossed  the  frontier  to  exact  what  they  alleged  to  be 
due  to  them  from  his  subjects.  He  was  rich,  and  possessed  a 
powerful  war  fleet.  Mithridates  might  count  on  him  for  support  if 
he  ever  wished  to  strike  at  Rome, 

Mithridates  had  also  reason  at  the  time  to  think  that  the  attention    The 
of  the  Romans  would  not  easily  be  diverted  to  him.      The  Senate  and  Romans 
the  Optimates  desired  peace.      They  cared  little  what  went  on  in  the  ^/^^^^^^ 
East,   so  long  as  the    Roman    territories  were  not   attacked  to   the  los-gs- 
detriment  of  the  revenue.      The  struggle  with  Jugurtha  had  thrown  a 
lurid  light  on  the  weakness  of  the  army  and   the  corruption  of  its 
officers.      A  new  war  meant  fresh  power  to   Marius  or  some  other 
popular  favourite  dreaded  as  an  opponent  of  the  nobility.      They  had 
also   enough  to   do   nearer  home.      The   Cimbri  were  pouring  into 
Gaul  and  threatening   Italy,  and  the  danger  was  not  at  an  end  till 
the  victory''  of  Vercellae  in    loi  ;    Sicily  was  being  threatened  with 
another  slave  war,   and  all  possible  troops  were   needed  at  home  : 
the  East  was  almost  without  a  Roman  soldier,  and  the  field  was  clear 
for  his  intrigues. 

Mithridates  began  his  scheme  of  aggrandisement  with  the  nearest  Mithri- 
and  smallest  of  the  Asiatic  districts.      He  formed  an  alliance  with  ^^^-^  ^'"^ 
Nicomedes  of  Bithynia,  and  the  two  kings  invaded  Paphlagonia  with    -^^^^^ 
the  intention  of  each  taking  the  part  nearest  their  own  dominions.   Paphla- 
The  dispossessed   princes   hurried   off  to   denounce   Mithridates   at  gonia,  104. 
Rome,  where  already  legates  from  Scilur,  the  Scythian  king  in  the 
Crimea,   had  arrived  with   similar  complaints.      The   Romans  were 
not  protectors   of  the    Scythians  ;    but   their   complaints   helped   to 
warn  the  Senate  of  the  wide-reaching  ambition  and  strenuous  char- 
acter of  the  king.      Moreover  the  principle  laid  down  in  the  treaty 
with  Antiochus  — "  that  the  kings  of   Asia  should    not  set  foot  on 
Europe  " — was  held  to  apply  to  the  Crimea.     Accordingly  a  commis-  A  commis- 
sion was  at  once  sent  to  the  two  kings  demanding  a  restitution  of  the  ^^'^"-  ^^"^ 
original  state  of  things,  both  in  Asia  and  the  Crimea.      Mithridates  A^J' ^^^^'r 
was  not  yet  prepared  for  open  defiance.      He  promised  satisfaction  in 
the  Crimea,but  asserted  his  claim  by  inheritance  to  at  least  the  southern 
part  of  Paphlagonia,  called  Gangra.      Nicomedes  was  less  submissive, 
and  could  not  restrain  his   long   pent-up  bitterness.      Promising  to 

2  R 


6io 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


evacuate  Paphlagonia  in  favour  of  its  rightful  sovereign,  he  at  once 
proclaimed  a  natural  son  of  his  own,  to  whom  he  gave  the  name  of 
Pylemenes,  asserting  him  to  be  a  son  of  the  last  king  of  the  whole 
country.  In  addition  to  this  covert  defiance,  he  answered  a  farther 
demand  brought  by  the  commissioners  from  the  consul  Marius,  to 
furnish  in  accordance  with  his  treaty  a  contingent  against  the  Cimbri, 
that  the  Roman  publicani  had  left  him  no  subjects  to  send.  To 
crown  all,  under  the  very  eyes  of  the  commissioners,  the  two  kings 
proceeded  to  occupy  Galatia. 

It  would  be  difficult  to  understand  why  the  Senate  submitted 
quietly  to  such  defiance,  did  we  not  know  from  the  denunciations  of 
Saturninus  that  agents  of  Mithridates  were  distributing  lavish  bribes 
among  the  senators,  that  they  might  close  their  eyes  to  what  the  two 
kings  were  doing.  But  there  were  other  evils  in  the  East  which 
demanded  redress  ;  and,  partly  perhaps  to  atone  for  their  neglect  in 
one  direction,  the  Roman  government  resolved  to  do  something  in 
another.  Cilician  pirates  mfested  the  seas  and  even  ventured  to 
land  on  the  shores  of  Italy  itself  The  orator  M.  Antonius  had 
Cilicia  as  his  'province'  in  103-102  with  proconsular  powers,  and 
was  directed  to  suppress  the  pirates.  He  occupied  certain  ports  on 
the  coasts  of  Cilicia  Trachea,  to  which  henceforth  a  propraetor  was 
regularly  sent,  and  the  parts  occupied  by  the  Romans,  gradually 
extended  and  organised,  became  the  province  of  Cilicia. 

Eventually  Nicomedes  and  Mithridates  brought  Roman  inter- 
ference upon  themselves  by  quarrelHng  over  their  spoil.  Nicomedes 
began  his  encroachments  by  invading  Cappadocia.  Laodice  the 
queen-regent  was  a  sister  of  Mithridates,  and  appealed  for  protection 
to  her  brother  ;  but  before  his  help  arrived  she  had  made  terms 
with  and  married  Nicomedes.  This  meant  the  virtual  annexation 
of  Cappadocia  to  Bithynia,  which  Mithridates  resolved  to  prevent  by 
invading  the  country.  Laodice  and  her  new  husband  retreated  into 
Bithynia,  and  her  young  son  Ariarathes  VI.  was  established  on  the 
throne.  He  soon  found,  however,  that  he  was  to  be  wholly  sub- 
servient to  his  uncle  Mithridates,  who,  on  his  venturing  to  resist, 
demanded  a  conference  and  killed  his  nephew  with  his  own  hand. 
Though  not  daring  openly  to  annex  Cappadocia,  he  installed  one 
of  his  own  sons  in  it,  pretending  that  he  was  a  grandson  of  Aria- 
rathes v.,  whom  he  had  brought  up  in  his  court.  He  took  the 
name  of  Ariarathes  Eusebes  Philopator,  and  the  unscrupulous 
Gordios  was  made  his  guardian  and  chief  minister. 

It  was  while  in  Cappadocia  that  Mithridates  met  the  veteran 
Marius,  who  had  come  on  his  votiva  legatio  to  the  Mother  of  the 
Gods,  with  the  double  object  of  cloaking  his  loss  of  influence  and  of 
seeking  occasion  in  Asia  for  the  war  in   which  alone  his  eminence 


1 


xxxviii  INTRIGUES  OF  MITHRIDATES  6ii 

was  unquestioned.      Mithridates  employed  all  his  powers  Of  pleasing  Mithri- 
to  win  over  the  famous  soldier.      But  Marius  was  not  to  be  moved.  ^^^^-^ 
"Make  yourself  stronger  than  Rome,  or   submit  to  the  orders   of  ^L^l^^i^^ 
Rome,"  was  his  final  advice  to  the  king.     But  no  such  spirit  animated  Cappa- 
the  Senate.      For  five  more  years  the  practical  supremacy  of  Mithri-  docia, 
dates  in  Cappadocia  was  allowed  to  continue,  although  the  harsh  and  ^oo-^j. 
cruel  administration  of  Gordios  provoked  more  than  one  popular  out- 
break.     But    Nicomedes  of   Bithynia    feared   for  his  own  territory  Jealousy  of 
from  the  growing  ambition  of  Mithridates,  and  determined  in  self-  Nicomedes. 
defence   to   reconcile    himself  with    Rome.       Queen    Laodice    went 
thither  with  a  handsome  youth  whom  she  affirmed   to  be  her  third 
son  by  Ariarathes  Epiphanes,  and  consequently  the  true  heir  to  the 
throne    of  Cappadocia  ;    while    Mithridates   sent    Gordios    to  assert 
that  the  reigning  sovereign  was  really  the   grandson  of  Ariarathes 
Philopator. 

Public  feeling  at    Rome,    however,    was   now   beginning    to    be  Roman 
alarmed  by  the  encroachments  of  Mithridates.      Marius   no  doubt  ^^naU 

•  •       dpctdE  to 

had  enlightened  his  party  as  to  the  reality  of  what  was  gomg  on  m  j^^f^^f^^^ 
Asia.  The  Senate  therefore  passed  a  decree  ordering  Mithridates  g^-g^. 
to  evacuate  Cappadocia  and  the  share  of  Paphlagonia  which  he 
had  annexed,  and  Nicomedes  to  withdraw  his  son  from  the  rest  of 
Paphlagonia.  The  same  decree  declared  Cappadocia  and  Paphla- 
gonia free.  The  Paphlagonians  quietly  resumed  their  old  govern- 
ment of  chiefs.  But  the  Cappadocians  refused  this  offer  of  illusory 
"  freedom,"  which  they  believed  would  mean  internal  discord  and 
ultimate  annexation  to  the  Roman  province,  and  obtained  per- 
mission to  elect  a  king.  Their  choice  fell  upon  a  noble  named 
Ariobarzanes,  who  adopted  the  title  of  Philoromaeus.  a 

Thus   Mithridates  was    forced    to    surrender    the    prize    in    his    Tigranes 
first  encounter  with   Rome.      But  though  yielding  for  the  moment  king  of 
he  had  not  given  up  his  schemes  of  aggrandisement.      Next  time,  ^^^^^^^ 
however,  he  contrived  to  induce  another  to  confront  the  danger  in  Cappadocu 
what   was   really   his   own   undertaking.       Of  the   two   kingdoms  of  at  the 
Lesser   and    Greater   Armenia,    which  had   been    set   free   after  the  instigation 
defeat  of  Antiochus   at    Magnesia    (190),   the  former  had   been  for  ^J^/ 
some  time   incorporated  with    Pontus,   the  latter  had  remained   in- 
dependent, and  was  now  under  the  rule   of  an  energetic  and  able 
sovereign  named  Tigranes,   who  had  already  absorbed  the  district 
of  Sophene,    on   the  frontier   of  Cappadocia,   and   was    turning   his 
eyes  towards   Cappadocia  itself.      With  him   Mithridates  negotiated 
an  alliance  through  his  minister  Gordios,  giving  him  one  of  his  own 
daughters  in  marriage,   and   persuading  him  to  attack  Cappadocia, 
then  ruled  by  the  recently-elected  Ariobarzanes.      Without   attempt- 
ing resistance,  the  feeble  Ariobarzanes  collected  his  treasures  and 


6l2 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Iffect  in 
{sia  of  the 
'ocial  war 
'I  Italy, 
i-SS. 


fled  to  Rome,  leaving  the  country  in  the  power  of  Tigranes,  who 
committed  it  to  the  regency  of  Gordios,  the  tool  of  Mithridates. 

Once  more  Mithridates  had  to  yield  the  prey  which  his  intrigues 
had  won.  The  Roman  government  listened  to  the  appeal  of  Ario- 
barzanes,  who  had  not  come  empty-handed  to  Rome,  and  Lucius 
Sulla  was  commissioned  to  restore  him.  Sulla  was  praetor  in  93, 
and  was  to  go  as  propraetor  to  Cilicia  in  92  with  the  special  charge 
of  restoring  Ariobarzanes,  and  with  the  understanding  that  his  chief 
object  should  be  to  check  the  growing  power  of  Mithridates.  He 
took  only  a  small  force  of  Roman  soldiers,  but  having  quickly  secured 
large  contingents  from  the  province  and  the  allied  kingdoms,  ad- 
vanced into  Cappadocia,  defeated  the  troops  raised  to  resist  him, 
expelled  Gordios,  and  proclaimed  the  restoration  of  Ariobarzanes. 
Having  penetrated  to  the  extreme  east  of  Cappadocia  Sulla  encamped 
on  the  banks  of  the  Euphrates,  and  was  there  visited  by  Orobazos, 
legate  of  the  Parthian  king — the  first  occasion  on  which  the  Arsacids 
came  into  communication  with  a  Roman  officer.  Sulla  felt  the  im- 
portance of  the  occasion,  and  the  necessity  of  impressing  this  great 
but  unknown  power  with  the  might  of  Rome.  He  received  the 
ambassador  seated  on  a  lofty  tribunal,  with  two  lower  seats  arranged 
for  the  Parthian  legate  and  the  king  of  Cappadocia  on  either 
hand.  And  though  Arsaces  afterwards  put  his  legate  to  death  for 
compromising  the  dignity  of  the  Great  King,  the  fact  remained  to 
the  credit  of  Sulla  that  to  him  first  the  Parthian  monarch  had  sent 
desiring  the  friendship  and  alliance  of  Rome.  It  seemed  the  crown- 
ing point  of  his  success,  and  the  presage  (as  some  necromancer  was 
careful  to  tell  him)  of  his  future  greatness.  Asia  was  apparently 
more  completely  in  the  hands  of  Rome  than  ever.  With  Parthia 
friendly,  with  Mithridates  and  Nicomedes  forced  to  submit,  and  with 
the  king  of  Cappadocia  wholly  dependent  on  the  support  of  the 
Republic  for  his  throne  and  safety,  there  seemed  to  be  no  quarter 
from  which  danger  might  be  expected.  The  province  itself  was 
more  content  than  usual,  for  it  had  lately  been  governed  (94-93)  by 
the  honest  Q.  Mucius  Scaevola  and  his  still  more  noble  legate  P. 
Rutilius,  and  had  experienced  a  temporary  alleviation  of  the  exactions 
and  cruelties  of  the  publicani.  The  Egyptian  and  Syrian  dynasties, 
so  formidable  in  the  past,  were  in  the  last  stage  of  decline,  and  could 
never  more  raise  a  hand  to  contest  Roman  supremacy.  All  seemed 
safe  and  quiet. 

But  this  tranquillity  was  shaken  by  the  news  which  reached  Asia 
at  the  end  of  91,  or  the  beginning  of  90,  of  the  outbreak  of  the 
Marsic  war.  The  Roman  troops  were  hurriedly  ordered  home,  and 
the  provinces  left  unprotected.  At  once  we  hear  of  Thracian  incur- 
sions upon   Macedonia,  of  renewed  activity  of  Mithridates  in  Asia. 


XXXVIII  ROMAN  INTERFERENCE  IN  BITHYNIA  613 

He  had  been  preparing  fleets  and  forces  for  farther  expeditions  to 
the  north  of  the  Black  Sea  ;  but  his  preparations  were  not  complete  ; 
and  again  he  induced  Tigranes  to  be  his  cat's-paw — to  invade 
Cappadocia,  and,  expelling  Ariobarzanes,  once  more  to  set  upon  the 
throne  Mithridates'  own  son.  About  the  same  time  he  instigated  a 
revolution  in  Bithynia.  Nicomedes  II.  had  died  in  91  and  had  Revolution 
been  succeeded  by  his  eldest  son  Nicomedes  Philopator,  a  cruel  in 
and  cowardly  tyrant,  whose  bastard  brother  Socrates,  after  insti-  ^^^^y"^^"^- 
gating  abominable  executions  in  the  royal  family  in  the  apparent 
interest  of  the  king,  and  after  securing  the  support  of  Mithridates, 
retired  to  Rome,  accused  his  brother  of  atrocious  crimes,  and  asked 
to  be  declared  king  in  his  place.  Rejected  by  the  Senate  he  retired 
first  to  Cyzicus,  where  he  assassinated  his  sister  in  order  to  obtain  her 
property,  then  to  Euboea,  and  lastly  to  the  court  of  Mithridates,  just 
when  the  news  of  the  Marsic  war  had  made  him  feel  that  he  might 
do  as  he  liked  in  Asia  without  fear  of  Roman  interference.  Mithri- 
dates did  not  actively  assist  this  disreputable  adventurer ;  but  he 
allowed  him  to  enlist  troops  in  Pontus,  with  which  he  easily  defeated 
Nicomedes  III.  and  seized  on  the  throne  of  Bithynia. 

But  again  Mithridates  found  that  he  had  reckoned  too  confidently  M\ 
on   the  blindness  or  indifference   of  the   Senate.       Nicomedes    and  Aquillius 
Ariabarzaneshad  both  hurried  to  Rome,  and  found  there  the  crisis  of  ^^  Asia, 
the   Social   war  already   past.      The   Senate  warmly  espoused  their  ^' 

cause,  and  a  commission  was  sent  to  Asia  to  restore  the  exiled  kings. 
At  the  head  of  it  was  Manius  Aquillius  (son  of  the  organiser  of  the 
province  in  129),  who  had  already  distinguished  himself  in  1 02-1 01  by 
his  vigorous  suppression  of  the  revolted  slaves  in  Sicily.  But  though 
a  brave  and  successful  soldier,  his  character  for  venality  was  bad. 
He  had  barely  escaped  being  convicted  of  peculation  after  his 
Sicilian  campaign,  and  was  not  likely  to  resist  the  still  greater  tempta- 
tion offered  by  the  state  of  Asia. 

The  instructions  given  to  Aquillius  and  his  colleagues  were  to  re-  Nicomedes 

store,  by  force  if  necessary,  the  two  kings  Nicomedes  and  Ariabarzanes  <^nd 

to   the    thrones    of    Bithynia    and    Cappadocia.      They    brought    no  ^^^^^bar- 

troops,  but  were  to  have  the  services  of  the  small  Roman  force  in  the  ^""T  ^J  ^^ 

1    ,         ,  .  ,  .  restored, 

provmce,  augmented  by  the  contmgents  of  the  allied  states,  among  Sg, 

which  Pontus  itself  was  reckoned.  To  the  surprise  of  all  Mithri- 
dates submitted.  He  does  not  appear  to  have  sent  the  required 
contingent,  but  he  did  not  resist  the  restoration  of  the  two  kings, 
which  was  peaceably  accomplished  in  the  spring  of  89. 

Whether  this  proceeded  from  a  politic  desire  to  gain  time  for 
preparations,  or  from  a  real  wish  to  be  at  peace  with  Rome  in  order 
to  push  on  his  conquests  in  the  north,  it  would  have  been  prudent 
on  the  part  of  Aquillius  to  have  affected  belief  in  his  sincerity.      But 


6i4 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


{is  strong 
osition 
n  8g. 
1 


a  peaceful  solution  of  the  difficulty  was  in  fact  a  disappointment  to 
him.  He  had  come  to  Asia  in  the  hopes  of  enhancing  his  reputation 
as  a  soldier  and  of  enriching  himself.  It  did  not  suit  him  that  Mithri- 
dates  should  make  no  resistance.  There  was,  however,  one  method 
of  producing  fresh  complications.  Though  there  had  been  no  fight- 
ing, an  army  had  been  raised  and  kept  on  foot  for  some  months  and 
had  to  be  paid.  The  restored  kings  had  not  yet  had  time  to  fill  their 
coffers,  and  could  not  find  the  money.  Who  should  more  justly  pay 
than  Mithridates,  who  had  made  Roman  interference  necessary  ?  In 
answer  to  the  demand  the  king  produced  an  account  of  the  sums 
already  disbursed  by  him  in  maintaining  good  relations  with  the 
Senate  ;  the  Romans  were  his  debtors  rather  than  his  creditors. 
Aquillius,  thus  repulsed  by  Mithridates,  demanded  payment  from 
Nicomedes  and  Ariobarzanes,  and  when  they  pleaded  their  inability, 
advised  them  to  fill  their  exchequers  by  raids  upon  the  territory  of 
Mithridates.  The  advice  was  acted  upon  by  Nicomedes,  though 
Ariobarzanes  was  more  cowardly  or  more  scrupulous.  The  former 
led  an  expedition  over  the  Pontic  frontier  to  the  walls  of  Amastris, 
and  returned  with  sufficient  booty  to  repay  the  money  which  Aquillius 
and  his  colleagues  had  raised  from  Roman  publicani  and  bankers 
in  Asia. 

Mithridates  acted  diplomatically.  He  ordered  his  troops  to 
retire  before  the  Bithynians  ;  and,  when  the  raid  was  over,  one  of  his 
officers,  Pelopidas,  appeared  at  the  Roman  headquarters  demanding 
the  punishment  of  the  aggressors,  and  ignoring  the  fact  that  the  raid 
had  been  advised  or  connived  at  by  the  Romans.  Aquillius  and  his 
colleagues  parried  the  demand  with  equal  caution.  "  We  will  not," 
they  said,  "  permit  Mithridates  to  be  injured  by  Nicomedes  any  more 
than  Nicomedes  by  Mithridates."  Thus  refused  satisfaction  Mithri- 
dates replied  by  sending  his  son  Ariarathes  at  the  head  of  an  army 
into  Cappadocia,  and  once  more  driving  Ariobarzanes  from  the 
country.  Then  Pelopidas  appeared  again  and  informed  the  Roman 
commissioners  of  the  just  reprisals  taken  by  his  master,  who  at  the 
same  time  was  sending  an  ambassador  to  Rome  to  complain  of  their 
conduct.  Still  he  offered  that,  if  they  would  even  now  give  him  just 
satisfaction  for  the  injuries  of  the  king  of  Bithynia,  he  would  not  only 
withdraw  from  Cappadocia,  but  would  also  supply  ships  and  men  to 
put  down  the  Italian  revolt. 

Mithridates  was  now  so  formidable  that  the  Roman  legates  might 
prudently  have  listened  to  this  offer.  During  the  year  then  drawing 
to  a  close  his  generals  had  conducted  a  successful  campaign  north  of 
the  Euxine  against  the  Bastarnes  and  Sarmatians  ;  his  army  had 
been  swollen  by  enormous  contingents  from  Scythia  ;  his  fleet  already 
consisted  of  300  vessels  of  war  :   many  others  were  being  built,  and 


XXXVIII  WAR  WITH  MITHRIDATES  BEGUN  615 

his  wealth  enabled  him  to  hire  skilful  pilots  and  sea-captains  from 
Egypt  and  Phoenicia  ;  while  throughout  Asia  his  agents  were  work- 
ing successfully  in  securing  him  alliances  not  only  in  the  East — in 
Iberia,  Media,  and  Parthia, — but  also  among  the  Greek  towns  in  the 
West,  both  in  Asia  and  Europe,  in  Crete,  Egypt,  and  Syria. 

But  Aquillius  was  blind  to  the  terrors  of  such  a  coalition  at 
a  time  when  the  energies  of  Rome  were  still  demanded  for  the  re- 
mains of  the  Marsic  war.  He  answered  Pelopidas  by  declaring  that 
his  master  must  respect  the  freedom  of  Bithynia,  must  evacuate  "^" 
Cappadocia  and  restore  Ariobarzanes,  or  take  the  consequences. 
At  the  same  time  Pelopidas  was  ordered  to  quit  the  Roman  quarters 
and  not  to  return  except  with  a  full  subjmission  from  the  king. 

Mithridates  accepted  the  challenge  thus  haughtily  thrown  down,  War. 
and  in  the  spring  of  88  open  war  began.  The  Roman  and  allied  forces  ^P^'^^g  of 
were  in  four  divisions.  The  Bithynian  army  of  60,000  infantry  and 
6000  cavalry  under  Nicomedes  was  to  invade  Paphlagonia.  Of  the 
rest,  one  corps  commanded  by  Q.  Oppius,  governor  of  Cilicia,  accom- 
panied by  one  of  Aquillius'  colleagues,  Manlius  Mantinus,  was  to 
enter  Cappadocia  ;  another  under  Aquillius  himself  was  stationed  on 
the  river  Billeos,  near  the  western  frontier  of  Paphlagonia,  to  support 
Nicomedes  ;  a  fourth  under  L.  Cassius  Longinus,  governor  of  Asia, 
was  posted  in  reserve  at  Gordiocome,  on  the  river  Sangarios,  near  the 
southern  frontier  of  Bithynia,  to  protect  Galatia  and  Phrygia.  To  this 
attack  by  land  was  added  one  by  sea  ;  a  fleet  of  vessels  belonging 
partly  to  Bithynia,  partly  to  the  province  of  Asia,  was  stationed 
(under  the  command  of  Minucius  Rufus  and  Gaius  Popilius)  at 
Byzantium,  to  close  the  Propontis  to  the  Pontic  ships  of  war. 

These   preparations    occupied    the   winter    of  89-88,    and   when   The  hvo 
hostilities  commenced  the  Roman  forces  collected  from  the  province  armies. 
and  allies  consisted  of  about  190,000  men.      The  army  of  Mithridates 
gathered  from  all  parts  of  his  extensive  dominions  was  superior  by 
nearly  100,000  men,  including  a  large  body  of  Greek  mercenaries, 
50,000  cavalry,  and   130  scythed   chariots   under  the   command  of 
Crateros.      The  chief  officers  were  Dorylaus  in  command  of  the  picked 
corps  or  phalanx,  and  Archelaus  and  Neoptolemus  (apparently  Mace- 
donian mercenaries)  for  the  rest  of  the  army.      The  king  himself  was 
commander-in-chief,  and  showed  extraordinary  activity  and  vigilance 
in  every  department.      The  bulk  of  the   Pontic  army  was  to  muster  Defeat  of 
in  the  plain  of  Amasia,  on  the  south-west  frontier  of  Pontus.      But  ^^^^ 
before   this   could   take   place   the    Bithynians   had   already  entered  ^^^^1^^^^' 
Pontus  by  the  valley  of  the  river  Amnias,  where  they  were  met  by  a  sprino- of 
force  under  Archelaus  and  Neoptolemus,  and  after  a  slight  success  88. 
were  disastrously  defeated   and    almost    annihilated.      This  was    in 
the  early  spring  of  88,   and   Mithridates  was   prompt   to  follow  up 


6i6 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Defeat  of 
Aquillius, 
and 
getieral 
retreat  of 
the  Roman 
forces, 
88. 


Cassius 
retires  to 
Apatneia. 


i  Success  of 
Mithri- 
dates. 

Flight  of 
.the  Roman 
command- 


Capture  of 
Oppius, 


the  advantage.  One  division  of  his  forces  was  pushed  forward 
towards  Cappadocia  to  stop  Oppius,  while  the  main  army  crossed 
Paphlagonia  by  forced  marches  to  attack  Aquilhus  on  the  Billeos. 
Everywhere  the  prestige  of  this  victory  over  Nicomedes  stood  him 
in  stead :  the  Bithynian  outposts,  guarding  defiles  on  his  line  of 
march,  abandoned  their  ground  directly  he  appeared  ;  Nicomedes 
himself  retreated  southward  to  join  L.  Cassius  at  Gordiocome ; 
and  Aquillius  found  his  Asiatic  auxiliaries  gradually  deserting  and 
scattering  to  their  homes.  He  presently  felt  obliged  to  abandon  his 
position  on  the  Billeos,  and  to  attempt  to  join  his  colleague  Cassius 
also.  But  before  he  could  traverse  the  distance  between  the  two 
positions  the  advanced  guard  of  the  army  of  Mithridates  caught  him, 
and  at  a  place  unknown  to  us,  called  Protopacheion,  he  was  obliged  to 
fight.  The  Roman  army  was  completely  defeated,  and  lost  its  camp 
with  10,000  men  killed  and  300  made  prisoners.  Aquillius  himself 
escaped  by  favour  of  the  darkness,  which  prevented  immediate  pursuit, 
and  crossing  the  Sangarios  arrived  at  Pergamus. 

Cassius  was  more  prudent.  He  distrusted  his  newly  enrolled 
troops,  consisting  almost  entirely  of  Asiatics  and  the  fragments  of  the 
recently  beaten  Bithynian  army,  and  retiring  southward  into  Phrygia 
posted  himself  in  a  strong  position  at  a  fortified  village  called  the 
Lion's  Head.  Here  his  distrust  of  his  Asiatic  troops  was  justified  by 
their  constant  desertion  :  and  at  length  abandoning  all  idea  of  giving 
Mithridates  battle,  he  dismissed  them  to  their  homes,  and  retired 
with  his  Roman  legionaries  to  Apameia  on  the  Meander. 

The  failure  of  the  Roman  interference  was  complete,  and  through- 
out Asia  there  was  a  rush  to  seek  the  alliance  and  protection  of 
Mithridates.  Aquillius  not  thinking  himself  safe  even  at  Pergamus 
retired  to  Mitylene  ;  his  colleague  Mantinus  escaped  to  Rhodes  ;  Nico- 
medes and  Ariobarzanes  embarked  for  Italy  and  Rome  ;  Cassius 
abandoned  Apameia  at  the  approach  of  the  Pontic  troops,  and  retired 
also  to  Rhodes.  Oppius,  who  had  retreated  to  Laodicea  in  Caria, 
attempted  to  hold  the  town.  But  when  a  herald  from  Mithridates 
proclaimed  to  the  townsfolk  that,  if  they  delivered  up  the  Roman 
general,  they  should  be  unharmed,  they  allowed  the  mercenary  troops 
to  escape,  and  led  out  Oppius,  preceded  in  mockery  by  his  lictors, 
and  handed  him  over  to  the  king,  whom,  like  other  Greeks  in  Asia 
Minor,  they  were  ready  to  receive  as  a  deliverer  from  the  heavy  yoke 
of  Rome.  Mithridates,  however,  was  not  yet  prepared  for  acts  of 
unpardonable  hostility.  Oppius  was  not  ill-treated  or  thrown  into 
chains,  but  was  merely  taken  in  the  king's  suite  as  a  prisoner  on 
parole.  But  this  was  enough  to  impress  the  people  with  the  great- 
ness of  the  king's  power.  He  entered  the  Roman  province  by  the 
valley  of  the  Maeander,  and  was  everywhere  enthusiastically  received. 


XXXVIII  MASSACRE  OF  ITALIANS  IN  ASIA  617 

At  EphesLis  he  embarked  on  board  his  fleet  and  proceeded  to  secure 
the  submission  of  the  islands.  Chios  submitted  with  reluctance  ;  but 
tho  people  of  Mitylene  handed  over  Aquillius  with  ready  officiousness.  and  of 
Mithridates  treated  him  very  differently  from  Oppius.  He  had  now  Aquillius. 
resolved  to  break  openly  with  Rome,  and  the  punishment  of  one  who 
had  been  notorious  for  oppressive  exactions  would  impress  the  im- 
aginations of  the  people  whom  he  now  affected  to  liberate.  He 
exposed  him  therefore  to  every  kind  of  indignity,  and  at  length  put 
him  to  a  cruel  death. ^ 

All  the  Greek  cities  were  now  stirred  with  the  hope  of  shaking  off  The  Greek 
the  burden  of  Roman  tax-gatherers  and  money-lenders,  of  Roman  (^^ties  join 
proconsuls    and   their  train.     In   some  few  the   richer  commercial  ^^^^^ 
classes  still  clung  to  the  Roman  connexion,  as  well  as  some  specially 
favoured  cities,  such  as  Stratonice  in  Caria,  which  Mithridates  had 
to  take  by  force  ;  while  at  Adramyttium  in  Mysia,  though  its  Senate 
declared  for  Rome,   the   popular   party  massacred   the    Senate  and 
delivered  the  town  to  the  king.      In  the  greater  number  of  Greek 
cities  there  was  no  appreciable  division  or  hesitation  in  following  the 
example   of  Ephesus,   where  the  statues  in  honour  of  Rome  were 
thrown  down  and  the  royal  troops  welcomed  with  every  demonstration 
of  joy. 

But  a  still  more  terrible  blow  was  to  be  struck.      The  capture  of  The 

Stratonice  completed  the  conquest  of  Asia  Minor,  but  it  had  not  massacre  of 

relieved  the  cities  of  the   Italian  residents,  who  to  the  number  of     ^^^"-    . 

',  ^    ,  .  ^  residents  in 

above  100,000  were  settled  in  them  as  members  of  the  companies  of  Asia,  88. 

publicani,  or  as  bankers  and  merchants.  Many  of  them  were  person- 
ally obnoxious  either  as  oppressive  collectors  of  taxes  or  extortionate 
money-lenders,  but  many  more  were  honest  and  peaceable  traders. 
Public  feeling,  however,  was  too  much  excited  to  make  distinctions. 
All  were  alike  regarded  with  hatred  as  the  representatives  of  the 
conquering  race  whom  tyranny  had  made  odious  to  all.  As  a  question 
of  policy  they  presented  a  difficulty  to  the  king.  War  had  been 
determined  upon  early  in  88  at  Rome,  and  the  consul  Lucius  Sulla 
was  already  with  his  army  preparing  to  cross  to  Asia.  The  Italian 
residents  were  sure  to  be  a  nucleus  of  resistance  to  the  supremacy 
of  the  king,  and  the  support  of  the  Romanising  party  in  each  state. 
How  was  he  to  deal  with  them  ? 

He  was  not  long  in  deciding  ;  and  having  decided   he  carried 

^  According  to  some,  however,  Aquillius  killed  himself ;  according  to  others 
he  was  taken  through  Asia  riding  on  an  ass,  and  forced  by  blows  continually  to 
proclaim  his  name,  and  was  finally  killed  by  having  molten  gold  poured  down  his 
throat.  In  Licinianus,  p.  34,  it  is  said  that  his  restoration  to  liberty  was  stipu- 
lated for  in  the  treaty  of  Dardanus  (84).  If  that  is  so,  it  is  evident  that  his  real 
fate  was  unknown.     See  p.  635. 


6i8 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


All  Latin- 
speaking 
reside?!  Is  to 
be  put  to 
death  on  a 
fixed  day 
and  cast  out 
unbiiried. 


The  order 
almost 
universally 
obeyed. 


Some 
escape  to 
Rhodes. 


The  con- 
fiscations 
used  to  re- 
lieve the 
towns. 


out  his  plan  with  great  adroitness,  so  as  to  avail  himself  to  the  full 
of  the  popular  exasperation  against  the  Romans.  Secret  instructions 
were  sent  round  to  the  governors  of  the  towns  whom  he  had  himself 
appointed,  and  to  the  magistrates  of  those  which  were  still  nominally 
free,  that  on  the  thirtieth  day  from  the  receipt  of  the  order  every  Latin- 
speaking  resident,  without  distinction  between  Roman  and  Italian,^ 
without  regard  to  sex  or  age,  was  to  be  put  to  death,  and  their  bodies 
cast  out  unburied.  Rewards  were  to  be  offered  to  slaves  or  debtors 
who  killed  Italian  masters  or  creditors.  Slaves  were  to  have  their 
freedom,  debtors  the  remission  of  half  their  debts,  while  severe 
punishment  was  threatened  to  all  who  gave  harbour  to  the  living  or 
burial  to  the  dead. 

When  the  fatal  day  came  the  horrible  order  was  almost  universally 
obeyed.  Neither  shrine  nor  altar  was  allowed  to  shelter  the  fugi- 
tives. From  the  temple  of  Artemis  at  Ephesus,  of  Asclepius  at 
Pergamus,  of  Hestia  at  Cannes,  and  of  Concord  at  Tralles,  the  terrified 
suppliants  were  torn  away  and  slain  within  the  sacred  precincts. 
Different  degrees  and  forms  of  cruelty  were  used  in  different  places. 
Sometimes  the  victims  had  their  hands  cut  off  before  being  slain  ;  at 
Caunes  all  the  children  were  killed  in  the  presence  of  their  mothers, 
the  wives  before  the  eyes  of  their  husbands,  who  were  put  to  death 
last.  At  Adramyttium  they  were  driven  into  the  sea  and  drowned. 
At  Tralles  the  citizens,  not  willing  to  stain  their  own  hands  with 
blood,  hired  a  Paphlagonian  captain  of  mercenaries  to  carry  out  the 
order.  Here  and  there  a  Roman  escaped  by  adopting  a  Greek 
dress  ;  in  a  few  places,  such  as  Cos,  Calymne,  and  Magnesia  on  the 
Maeander,  the  rights  of  sanctuary  were  for  a  time  respected,  and  the 
Italians  managed  to  escape  to  Rhodes,  the  sole  Greek  territory  within 
possible  distance  still  holding  aloof  from  Mithridates.  The  number 
of  the  victims  is  variously  stated  from  80,000  'to  150,000,  while 
15,000  slaves  were  rewarded  with  liberty.  Whatever  were  the  exact 
figures  of  the  black  list,  it  is  certain  that  the  slaughter  was  very  large, 
and  that  the  property  collected  in  Pergamus  was  so  vast  that  Mithri- 
dates was  able  to  crown  his  popularity  in  Asia  by  relieving  the  cities 
from  tribute  for  five  years.  This  wealth  was  increased  by  other 
acts  of  spoliation.  At  Cos  he  laid  hands  upon  800  talents  deposited 
by  Jewish  bankers  in  the  temples,  and  upon  the  treasures  of  a  young 
Egyptian  prince  (Ptolemy  Alexander),  whom  he  took  with  him  to 
Pontus.  It  may  be  true  that  in  some  cases  the  Greek  citizens  were 
reluctant  to  carry  out  the  order.  It  would  be  impossible  to  conceive 
that  in  no  case  had  the  Italian  residents  gained  the  friendship  and 


^  The  recent  enfranchisement  of  the  ItaUans  perhaps  made  any  distinctioi 
between  citizen  and  non-citizen  difficult,  even  if  it  were  desired. 


XXXVIII  MITHRIDATES  REPULSED  AT  RHODES  619 

esteem  of  their  neighbours  ;  but  it  seems  certain  that  in  the  majority 
the  massacre  was  in  the  strictest  sense  popular,  and  the  gratification 
of  a  long  repressed  but  burning  hatred. 

Having  thus  secured  Asia  Mithridates  proceeded  to  extend  his  Mithri- 
power  in  the  rest  of  Greece.     The  one  place  which  still  remained  ^^^^^ 
faithful    to   Rome  was    Rhodes  ;    and    therefore,    while   sending  his  ^^^^^J  ^^^^ 
lieutenant  Archelaus  to  Athens,  on  the  invitation  of  the  Athenians,  occupies 
he   himself  embarked   at   Ephesus   and  sailed   with   a  fleet  of  war  the 
vessels,  carrying  siege  artillery  and  all  the  implements  for  attacking  P^^raeus 
walls,  to  that  island.     The  Rhodians  were  before  all  things  merchants,  |^J  ^^^ 

and  had  suffered  some  disadvantages  under  the  Roman  supremacy, 
which  had  deprived  them  of  their  continental  possessions  in  Caria 
and    Lycia,    and   damaged  their   trade  by   opening   the  harbour    of 
Delos  as  a  rival  to  their  own  in  146,      Still  they  were  cautious,  and 
had  no  confidence  in  the  ultimate  success  of  Mithridates.      They  saw 
that  the  immediate  effect  of  joining  him  would  be  the  failure  of  their   The 
Italian  trade,  and  the  removal  of  Italian  merchants,  for  which,  even  Rhodmns 
if  Mithridates  ultimately  succeeded,   there  was  no   obvious  way  in  ^f^^fTpit 
which  he  could  compensate  them  ;   whereas    if  the  Romans  should  j^ome. 
succeed,  their  vengeance  would  be  certain  and  heavy.      Therefore, 
though  they  had  received  many  favours  at  the  hands  of  Mithridates, 
and  indeed  had  erected  his  statue  in  their  town  as  a  benefactor,  they 
determined  to  resist.     Their  fleet  met  the  king's  off  Myndos  in  Caria  : 
but  though  superior  in  skill  it  was  inferior  in  numbers,  and  after  a 
severe  engagement  the   Rhodian  admiral   Damagoras   drew  off  his 
ships  and  returned  home.      Mithridates  followed  and  blockaded  the 
town  of  Rhodes,  situated  on  a  lofty  rock  at  the  north-east  corner  of 
the  island.     But  all  his  efforts  to  capture  it  proved  futile.      For  some  Mithri- 
time  his  siege  artillery  was  delayed  by  contrary  winds  ;   and  mean-  '^^^^^/"-^^^ 
while  the  daily  skirmishes  which  took  place  went  rather  against  the  ^/^^^^^.^ 
Pontic   fleet   and  army,   the  king  himself  on  one  occasion  all   but 
falling  into  the  enemy's  hands.      When  the  artillery  arrived  attempt 
after  attempt  to  scale  the  rock  or  batter  the  walls  failed,  and  after 
one  desperate  endeavour  to  effect  an  escalade  by  night  Mithridates, 
finding  winter  approaching,  withdrew  his  fleet  to  Asia  ;  where  having 
made  an  equally  unsuccessful  attack  upon  Patara  in  Lycia,  he  removed 
for  the  winter  to   Pergamus,  which  was  now  to  be   the  capital  and 
headquarters  of  his  great  empire. 

Meanwhile  his  lieutenant  Archelaus  had  had  a  much  easier  and  Archelaus 
more  successful  task  in  European  Greece.      The  burden  of  Roman  ^^  Athens, 
sway  had  weighed  much  less  heavily  on  the  Greeks  of  Europe  than 
^on  those  of  Asia.     Though  for  certain   purposes  Greece  had  been 
placed  under  the  supremacy  of  the  governor  of  Macedonia,   yet  its 
local  liberties  had  been  respected,  and  the  phantom  of  independence 


620 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP 


88. 


Divided 
feelings  at 
Athens. 


The  party 
in  favour 
of  Mithri- 
dates 
prevail, 
and  send 
Aristion  to 
Ephesus. 


Aristion 
reports  in 
favour 
of  an 
alliance 
with 
Mithri- 
dates. 


preserved.  Of  all  the  republics  of  Greece,  amounting  to  some  hun- 
dred, none  had  been  more  favourably  treated  than  Athens.  Even 
some  shadow  of  its  old  imperial  position  had  been  restored  to  it,  by 
allowing  it  to  possess  Oropus  and  Haliartus,  and  the  islands  of  Paros, 
Scyros,  Imbros,  and  Lemnos,  and  above  all  Delos,  as  the  centre  of 
a  flourishing  commerce.  Yet  even  at  Athens,  though  not  without 
a  Romanising  party,  there  was  a  feeling  that  the  Roman  supremacy 
stood  in  the  way  of  a  still  more  splendid  future,  and  a  disposition  to 
hail  Mithridates  as  the  messiah  of  a  restored  Hellenism.  In  their 
dreams  the  Athenians  saw  once  more  the  empty  basins  of  the 
Peiraeus  crowded  with  vessels  of  war  or  commerce  ;  the  arsenals 
once  more  replenished  ;  the  long  walls  restored  ;  the  Pnyx  filled  with 
the  ecclesia  of  a  powerful  republic,  making  treaties  with  kings  or 
dictating  measures  to  subject  states.  The  alliance  of  Mithridates 
seemed  to  offer  the  opportunity  required.  He  was  lord  of  those 
regions  with  which  the  commerce  of  a  restored  Athens  would  be 
specially  concerned ;  and  he  and  his  father  before  him  had  for 
many  years  kept  up  a  friendly  intercourse  with  the  republic,  attested 
by  a  gymnasium  built  by  Euergetes,  a  college  of  Eiipatoristae  of 
which  Mithridates  was  patron,  and  by  numerous  offerings  in  the 
temples  of  Delos.  It  was  determined  to  send  an  ambassador  to  him 
at  Ephesus  to  offer  the  friendship  of  the  city,  and  to  investigate  on 
the  spot  the  state  of  affairs,  and  whether  it  would  be  prudent  for  the 
state  to  commit  itself  farther.  The  agent  chosen  was  Aristion, 
son  of  the  peripatetic  philosopher  Athenion,  and  himself  a  philoso- 
pher and  rhetorician  of  some  repute.  He  was  received  with  the 
highest  honours  by  Mithridates  ;  was  enrolled  as  one  of  the  king's 
"friends"  ;  and  wrote  such  glowing  accounts  to  Athens  of  the  Pontic 
sovereign's  abilities,  popularity,  and  success,  that  on  his  return 
accompanied  by  a  crowd  of  slaves  laden  with  gold,  and  bearing  on 
his  finger  a  ring  engraved  with  the  portrait  of  the  king,  he  was 
received  in  the  Peiraeus  with  all  the  honours  of  a  triumph,  attended 
by  a  bodyguard,  lodged  in  the  principal  building — the  official  resi- 
dence of  the  chief  commissioner  of  the  Delian  revenue — and  invited 
to  give  an  account  of  his  embassy  from  the  lofty  tribune  usually 
reserved  for  the  governors  of  Macedonia. 

The  oration  which  he  then  delivered  dwelt  on  the  wrongs,  real 
and  imaginary,  which  the  city  suffered  under  Roman  supremacy  ;  and 
painted  in  such  bright  colours  the  court  of  Mithridates,  whose  ante- 
chamber was  guarded  by  kings  and  crowded  with  ambassadors  from 
every  imaginable  country,  that  in  a  state  of  wild  excitement  the  citizens 
rushed  to  the  theatre,  elected  Aristion  chief  minister  for  war  (a-TpaTY]- 
yos  cTTt  Tot  oTrAa),  allowing  him  to  choose  his  own  colleagues,  and 
immediately    afterwards     declared    the    full    republic    restored,    re- 


XXXVIII  MITHRIDATES  SUPREME  IN  GREECE  621 

nounced    the   friendship   of   Rome,    and    accepted    the    alliance    of  88. 
Mithridates. 

The  example  of  Athens  was  followed  by  nearly  all  the  states  in    The  rest  of 
Greece,  from  the  Achaeans  and  Spartans  in  the  south  to  the  borders   Greece  joins 
of  Thessaly  in  the  north,  and  by  the  islands  of  the  Aegean  with  ^^^^^P' 
the  one  exception  of  Delos.      Besides  containing  a  large  number  of  except 
Italian  residents,  Delos  owed  its  commercial  position  and  importance  Delos. 
to  the  favour  of  Rome,  which  it  might  easily  lose,  but  was  not  likely 
to  enhance,  by  a  change  of  allegiance.      An  expedition  sent  out  by  Failure  of 
Aristion,  under  the  command  of  another  philosopher  named  Apellicon  Athenian 
of  Teos,  was  cut  to  pieces  by  Orbius,   a  legate  of  the  governor  of  J"^-^  ^"^^^'^ 
Macedonia  or  a  resident  magistrate  at   Delos.       Apellicon   had  no 
knowledge  of  warfare  :  leaving  his  camp  without  proper  defences  he 
was  surprised  and  had  to  fly  back  to  Athens,  with  the  loss  of  the 
greater  part  of  his  ships  and  men.      But  shortly  after  this  repulse  of  Arrival  of 
Apellicon  Archelaus  arrived  at  Delos  :  he  took  the  island,  put  to  death  Archelaus 
all  the  Italians  and  many  of  the  Delians,  sold  the  women  and  children,   /^^^^^  ^^^^ 
plundered  the  temples,  and  levelled  the  city, to  the  ground.      Half  of  of  88. 
the  spoil,   indeed,  was  given  up  to  the  Athenians  ;   and   their  chief  Athens 
magistrate  Aristion,  who  now  joined  the  fleet,  was  treated  with  high  "^'^(^^^f 
honour,  and  had  a  guard  of  2000  soldiers  assigned  to  him.      But  it  ^^i,ject  to 
soon  became  evident  that  in  shaking  off  the  yoke  of  Rome  Athens  the  king  of 
had  fallen  under  a  worse  slavery.     Aristion  was  practically  a  military  Pontus. 
dictator  or  tyrant,   himself  the  tool   of  a  foreign  king.      A   Pontic 
garrison   occupied  the  Peiraeus,   and    Mithridates  himself  early  the 
following  year  was  elected  chief  strategus,  with  Aristion  as  his  second 
colleague.      Seeing  that  this  was  coming,  a  large  number  of  those 
who  still  favoured  the  Roman  alliance  left  the  city,  until,  alarmed  at 
the  number  of  emigrants,  Aristion  stationed  guards  at  the  gates  to 
kill  all  who  endeavoured  to  escape. 

Meanwhile  Archelaus,  established  quietly  in  the  Peiraeus,  received  Establish- 
the  submission  of  all  Greece.      One  of  the  Pontic  lieutenants,  Metro-  '^^"■^  ^f  ^^^ 
phanes,   seized   Chalcis  and  secured  all  Euboea.       Thebes  led  the  ^ofMUhri- 
defection  of  Boeotia,  in  which  Thespiae  alone  refused  to  join.      The  dates  in 
Spartans  and  Achaeans  brought  over  all  Peloponnese,  and  the  neigh-  Greece, 
bouring   islands  followed   suit.      The  governor  of    Macedonia,    who  ^^-^7- 
should  have  interfered,  was  at   the    time  engaged   in   repulsing  an 

■  invasion  of  Thracians,  who,  instigated  perhaps  by  Mithridates,  and 
certainly  allied  with  him,  had  penetrated  as  far  south  as  Epirus,  and 
had  pillaged  the  temple  of  Dodona.  Before  the  spring  of  87  all 
Greece  south  of  Thessaly,  with  the  islands  of  the  archipelago,  had 

.fallen   almost  without  a  blow  under  the  supremacy  of  Mithridates. 

\  It  was  the  highest  point  of  his  prosperity.  From  being  the  king  of 
a  comparatively  insignificant  district  of  Asia,  he  had  in  six  months 


622 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP.  XXXVIII 


Sulla 
starts  for 
Greece  in 
the  summer 
0/87. 


become  master  of  Asia  Minor,  and  of  all  Greece  south  of  Thermo- 
pylae, with  the  islands  of  the  Aegean.  The  power  of  Rome,  which 
at  the  beginning  of  the  year  extended  almost  without  dispute  over 
all  these  lands,  had  been  entirely  wiped  out.  It  may  well  have 
appeared  strange  that  the  Roman  government  seemed  to  be  tamely 
submitting  to  this  disgrace,  to  this  loss  of  territory  and  prestige. 
There  were  not  wanting  some  more  cautious  than  the  rest,  who  fore- 
saw that  the  vengeance  was  only  delayed  and  would  assuredly  fall. 
Already  the  omens  were  said  to  be  bad  for  Mithridates,  and  a 
crowned  figure  of  victory  which  was  being  lowered  to  his  seat  in  the 
theatre  of  Pergamus,  just  as  it  was  about  to  touch  his  head,  had 
slipped  from  its  cords  and  been  broken  in  pieces.  But  more 
alarming  than  any  omen  was  the  news  that  Sulla  had  overcome 
his  difficulties  at  home   and  was  on  his   way  with  five    legions  to 


Greece. 


Authorities. — See  p.  639, 


CHAPTER   XXXIX 

SULLA    AND    THE    FIRST    MITHRIDATIC    WAR 

Success  of  the  quaestor  Q.  Bruttius  Sura  in  the  spring  of  87 — Sulla  lands  in 
Epirus  in  the  early  summer,  and  marches  to  Athens — Revolution  of  feeling 
in  Greece — Siege  of  Athens  and  the  Peiraeus  (87-86) — LucuUus  sent  to  Egypt 
and  the  islands  to  collect  a  fleet  (86-85) — Capture  of  Athens  (86) — Destruction 
of  the  Peiraeus — Battle  of  Chaeroneia  (86) — Unpopularity  of  the  government 
of  Mithridates  in  Asia  and  revolt  of  Ephesus,(86) — Dorylaus  defeated  by 
Sulla  at  Orchomenus  (85) — The  Romans  again  supreme  in  Greece — L. 
Valerius  Flaccus,  sent  out  to  supersede  Sulla,  is  murdered  by  Fimbria  (85) — 
Fimbria  overruns  Bithynia  (85) — Mithridates  takes  refuge  in  Pitane  (85-84) — 
Arrival  of  Lucullus  with  his  fleet,  and  negotiations  with  Mithridates  at 
Pergamus — Death  of  Fimbria  (84) — Return  of  Sulla  to  Italy  (83). 

When   Sulla  landed  in  Epirus  in  the  summer  of  87,  the  fortunes  of  Q.  Bruttius 
Mithridates  had  already  received  a  check.      Metrophanes,  after  con-  y^^^' 
quering  Euboea,  had  sailed  northward,  and  was  threatening  Deme-  ^^  praetor 
trias,  an  important  magazine  and  place  of  arms  of  the  province  of  of  Mace- 
Macedonia.      Here  he  was  surprised  by  the    proquaestor    Bruttius  donia. 
Sura,  lost  two  ships  with  their  crews  and  was  obliged  to  sail  away.   ^</^'^^^ 
Bruttius  then  made  a  successful  descent  upon  the  island  of  Sciathos,  planes 
where  the  stores  and  booty  of  the  Pontic  army  had  been   collected,  spring  of 
killed  the  slaves    in  charge,   and  cut    off   the  hands    of   free  men.   Sj. 
Returning    to    the    mainland    and    receiving     reinforcements     from 
Macedonia  he  marched  south,  and  met  Archelaus   and  Aristion  in 
Boeotia  near  Chaeroneia.      For  three  days  he  maintained  the  contest, 
driving  his  opponents  towards  the  coast,  until,  the  Pontic  army  being 
reinforced  by  some  Spartans  and  Achaeans,  he  was  obliged  to  retire. 
But  his  success  had  already  caused  a  revolution  of  feeling  in  Greece, 
and  by  the  time  he  had  met  Lucullus  with  Sulla's  advanced  guard, 
and  had  been  ordered  to  return  to  Macedonia,  the  cities  were  for  the 
most  part  ready  to  submit. 

Sulla  had  landed  with  five  legions,  or  about  31,500  men,  and 
collecting  reinforcements  of  men  and  money  from  Thessaly  and 
Aetolia,  was  on  his  march  to  Athens,  now  the  stronghold  of  the  Pontic 


624 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Sulla 
marches  to 
Athens, 
summer 


0/87. 


He 

confiscates 
the 

treasures  of 
the  temples. 


Siege  of 
Athens 
and  the 
Peiraeus, 
87-86. 


forces.  When  he  arrived  in  Boeotia,  Thebes  set  the  example  of  sub- 
mission, and  his  camp  was  visited  by  legates  from  many  other  parts  of 
Greece,  asking  pardon  for  their  defection  and  promising  obedience 
for  the  future.  Before  long  Archelaus  could  count  on  nothing  south 
of  Thermopylae  except  Euboea  and  Attica.  There  indeed  Athens, 
influenced  by  Aristion  and  the  Pontic  garrison  of  the  Peiraeus,  closed 
her  gates  and  defied  the  proconsul.  Sulla,  in  spite  of  a  tincture  of 
letters  and  art,  was  not  the  man  to  feel  any  sentimental  wish  to 
spare  Athens  for  the  sake  of  her  glorious  past  or  the  genius  of  her 
poets  and  philosophers.  "  I  am  come  to  Athens,"  he  said,  "  not  to 
study  but  to  subdue  rebels,"  Nor  had  he  any  scruples  as  to  other 
sacred  places  in  Greece.  The  war  required  money,  which  could  be 
obtained  from  the  treasuries  of  the  temples.  His  agents  were  sent 
to  the  temple  of  Zeus  at  Olympia,  and  of  Asclepius  at  Epidaurus, 
with  orders  to  bring  all  the  offerings  that  were  of  value.  To  the 
Amphictyonic  council,  to  whom  belonged  especially  the  care  of  the 
temple  at  Delphi,  he  wrote  in  mocking  terms  that  the  treasures  of 
that  temple  had  better  be  transferred  to  his  custody,  as  he  would 
be  able  to  keep  them  more  securely,  or,  if  he  were  obliged  to  use 
them,  would  be  able  to  repay  their  value.  And  when  his  agent, 
Kaphis  the  Phocian,  reported  that  he  was  awed  by  the  sound  of  the 
god's  lyre  within  the  shrine  as  he  approached  it,  he  wrote  back  word 
to  him  not  to  be  afraid,  for  singing  was  a  sign  of  joy,  and  the  god 
was  doubtless  rejoiced  to  hand  over  his  treasures. 

He  found,  however,  that  the  difficulty  before  him  was  a  formid- 
able one.  The  long  walls  connecting  Athens  and  the  Peiraeus  had 
for  many  years  been  in  ruins.  But  their  materials  had  been  used  to 
repair  the  fortifications  of  the  Peiraeus  and  of  the  city  itself,  which 
was  still  surrounded  by  walls  more  than  five  miles  in  circuit,  some- 
times double,  with  huge  square  towers  at  the  principal  gates,  able  in 
most  parts  to  resist  the  ordinary  siege  artillery  of  the  time.  The 
fortifications  of  the  Peiraeus  were  still  more  formidable,  as  they  had 
been  ever  since  the  time  of  Pericles.  A  wall  about  fifty-five  feet 
in  height  and  fifteen  in  breadth,  built  entirely  of  hewn  stone  secured 
by  iron  clamps,  enclosed  the  whole  peninsula  within  a  circuit  of  about 
eight  miles,  and  contained  an  almost  impregnable  citadel  on  the  height 
of  Munychia.  Sulla  had  not  sufficient  forces  to  undertake  the  siege 
and  assault  of  both  these  strong  places.  He  therefore  contented  him- 
self with  leaving  enough  men  outside  the  city  to  prevent  the  egress 
of  the  citizens  or  the  introduction  of  supplies,  and  bent  his  whole 
energy  upon  the  taking  of  the  Peiraeus,  where  Archelaus  was  posted 
in  force,  commanding  the  entrance  to  the  harbour  with  his  ships. 

To  supply  materials  for  this,  not  only  were  the  treasures  of 
the  temples  seized  and  converted  into  money  by  Lucullus  in  Pelo- 


XXXIX  LUCULLUS  COLLECTS  A  FLEET  625 

ponnese  ;    but    requisitions   were    made    on    all    the   cities.       Long   The 
strings  of  mule-carts,  ten  thousand  in  number,  brought  timber,  iron,  Peiraeus, 
and   workmen   from    Boeotia   and   elsewhere.       When    that    proved     ^'    ' 
insufficient  he  did  not  hesitate  to  cut  down  the  sacred  groves,  and 
especially  the  trees  of  the  Academy — spared  through  so  many  genera- 
tions and  so  many  hostile  occupations.      Still  the  mighty  walls  of  the 
Peiraeus  defied  him,  and  the  construction  of  his  embankment  against 
them  was  interrupted  by  frequent  sallies  of  the  garrison,  in  one  of 
which   the    Roman   troops    were   only   saved   from   a   panic   by   the 
strenuous  efforts  of  the  legate  Murena  and  the  opportune  arrival  of 
a  fresh  legion,  which  had  been   engaged  in  collecting  timber.     Yet 
when  the  winter  came  neither  the  Peiraeus  nor  the  city  had  fallen  : 
and    Sulla   withdrew   his   troops   to   a    camp   between    Eleusis   and  Sulla 
Megara,  which  he  defended  by  a  trench  reaching  to  the  sea,  and  winters 
devoted  himself  to  active  preparations  for  the  spring.      The  difficulty  "^?'^ 
of  taking  the  Peiraeus  was  much  enhanced,  if  not  made  insuperable,  ^,.^5^  ' 
by  the  fact  that  the  king's  fleet  held  the  sea,  and  commanding  the 
entrance  to  the  harbour  could  always  throw  in  provisions.      It  was 
therefore   necessary   to   have   ships,    and   Lucullus   was    despatched 
during  the  winter  to  Egypt  and  the   Roman  province  of  Africa  to 
obtain  them. 

He  started  with  a  small  fleet  of  three  Greek  vessels  and  the  same  Lucullus 
number  of  Rhodian  galleys,  and  made  his  way  to  Crete.  Having  ^^  ^gypl, 
secured  the  loyalty  of  that  island  he  crossed  to  Cyrene,  where  he  was  ^yP^J^' 

,.,..%-  til  •  1    •  1       Rhodes.and 

received  with  high  favour,  and  asked  to  give  advice  as  to  the  ^^^  Aegean 
political  constitution  of  the  country.  From  Cyrene,  though  losing  Sea,86-8s. 
some  of  his  ships  by  pirates,  he  made  his  way  safely  to  Alexandria. 
The  lately-restored  king  Ptolemy  Lathyrus  (89-81)  received  him 
with  royal  honours,  and  lodged  him  in  the  palace,  but  refused  to 
supply  him  with  ships,  not  wishing  to  take  either  side  in  the  contest. 
He,  however,  sent  Lucullus  with  a  convoy  to  Cyprus,  who  found 
means  as  he  was  coasting  along  Syria  and  Cilicia  to  get  ships  from 
the  cities.  At  Cyprus  he  learnt  that  the  king's  fleet  was  lying  in 
wait  for  him  on  the  coast  of  Asia.  He  contrived,  however,  by  a  ruse 
to  get  safely  to  Rhodes,  where  he  obtained  an  addition  to  the  number 
of  his  ships.  Thus  strengthened  he  persuaded  the  people  of  Cnidus 
and  Cos  to  abandon  Mithridates,  and  join  him  in  an  attack  upon 
Samos.  He  then  proceeded  to  Colophon,  which  he  set  free,  arresting 
its  tyrant  Epigonus,  and  expelling  the  king's  garrison  and  partisans. 
These  operations,  which  lasted  through  86  and  85,  were  eventually  of 
great  service  ;  and  the  fleet  thus  collected  struck  the  last  blow  in  the 
war  and  gave  Sulla  decisive  help  at  the  supreme  moment :  but  for 
two  years  Sulla  learnt  nothing  of  them,  and  had  to  carry  on  the  war 
with  the  disadvantage  of  an  almost  total  want  of  ships. 

2  s 


fe 


626 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Fall  of 
Athens,  ist 
March  86. 


Aristion 
in  the 
Acropolis. 


With  the  return  of  spring  the  siege  of  Peiraeus  and  Athens  was 
pushed  on  with  new  vigour.  Sulla  was  specially  eager  to  take 
Athens  from  irritation  caused  by  insults  aimed  at  him  by  Attic  wits, 
who  jeered  at  his  blotched  face,  which  they  likened  to  a  mulberry 
sprinkled  with  meal,  and  satirised  his  wife  Metella.  But  though 
the  chief  efforts  had  been  hitherto  directed  against  Peiraeus, 
Athens  fell  first,  because  it  could  not  be  relieved  with  provisions  by 
sea  as  the  Peiraeus  could.  Traitors  within  gave  Sulla  warning  of  in- 
tended sorties  or  expected  convoys  of  provisions  ;  so  that  the  latter 
were  nearly  always  intercepted.  Starvation  was  imminent,  and 
people  were  seen  gathering  herbs  on  the  Acropolis  and  soaking 
leather  shoes  and  oilskins  to  make  food.  The  gay  and  careless 
Athenians  bore  privation  with  admirable  good  temper  and  unex- 
pected patience.  But  it  was  impossible  that  they  could  hold  out 
much  longer.  It  added  bitterness  to  their  sufferings  to  be  told  that 
Aristion — who  appears  to  have  quarrelled  with  Archelaus — was  still 
living  luxuriously,  and  had  wealth  stored  in  the  Acropolis,  whilst  they 
were  feeding  on  grass  and  leather.  When  members  of  the  boule  and 
priests  entreated  him  to  have -pity  on  the  people  and  make  terms  with 
Sulla  he  caused  his  archers  to  shoot  them  down.  Nor  were  his  dis- 
positions complete.  A  weak  place  in  the  walls,  between  the  Sacred 
Gate  into  the  outer  Ceramicus  and  the  Gate  of  the  Peiraeus,  was  in- 
sufficiently guarded,  of  which  Sulla  was  made  aware  by  some  of  his 
agents  overhearing  a  conversation.  The  few  sentries  fled  on  the 
approach  of  the  Roman  soldiers,  and  before  daybreak  of  the  first  of 
March  a  suf^cient  breach  was  made  for  Sulla  to  march  in  at  the 
head  of  his  troops.  For  a  while  the  town  was  given  up  to  all  the 
horrors  of  military  licence  ;  the  streets  flowed  with  blood,  the  air  re- 
sounded with  the  screams  of  the  dying,  butchered  in  the  agora,  or 
in  the  streets  and  houses  where  the  furious  soldiers  were  allowed  to 
work  their  will  ;  while  many  who  did  not  fall  by  Roman  swords  put 
an  end  to  their  own  lives  in  despair.  Sulla  had  indeed  forbidden  the 
town  to  be  fired,  but  it  seems  as  though  he  intended  to  denude 
it  of  all  inhabitants,  except  those  of  the  Romanising  party  who  had 
already  found  their  way  to  his  camp.  But  some  of  this  party  now 
threw  themselves  at  his  feet,  entreating  him  to  spare  the  town, 
and  their  entreaties  were  supported  by  Roman  senators  in  his 
own  army,  moved  by  the  unique  fame  of  a  city  in  which  perhaps 
they  had  themselves  studied  in  their  youth.  Sulla  yielded,  saying 
with  sullen  scorn  that  he  granted  the  lives  of  a  few  to  the  merits  of 
many,  the  living  to  the  dead.  The  contemptible  Aristion  caused 
the  Odeum  to  be  bm-nt,  and  took  refuge  in  the  Acropolis.  Here 
for  a  short  time  he  held  out,  blockaded  by  Sulla's  legate  Gaius 
Scribonius    Curio.      Want    of  water,    however,   compelled    him    to 


XXXIX  FALL  OF  THE  PEIRAEUS  627 

surrender,  but  not,  it  appears,  until   after   Sulla  had  left  Attica  for 
Phocis.i 

The  fall  of  the  city  was  followed  shortly  by  that  of  the  Peiraeus,   Capture 
against  which  every  method  of  attack  had  as  yet  proved  vain.      A  ^'^^ 
huge  earthwork  had  been  thrown  up  to  bring  the  battering-rams  and  JJ^^^'^  ^°"' 
other  engines  on  a  level  with  the  wall,  but  Archelaus  undermined  the  pdraeus, 
mound,  so  that  it  suddenly  collapsed.     With  difficulty  saving  their  siege  86. 
apparatus,  the  Romans  dug  a  countermine  to  meet  that  of  the  garrison, 
and  the  soldiers  met  underground  and  fought  in  the  darkness.      At 
another  time,  having  set  fire  to  one  of  the  towers  of  defence  and  knocked 
down  some  of  the  upper  part  of  the  wall,  Sulla  sent  some  of  his  most 
courageous  men  to  scale  the  gap  ;  but  the  wall  was  undermined  and 
shored   up  with  wooden  props,  which  were  set  on  fire  by  tow  and 
sulphur  and  other  combustible  materials,   so  that  it  suddenly  gave 
way,  bringing  down  besiegers  and  besieged  in  indescribable  confusion. 
Sulla  brought  up  fresh  men  to  the   breach  ;    but  Archelaus  had  suffi- 
cient reserves  to  defend  the  still  formidable  ruins  and  in  the  night 
to  repair  the  disaster  by  hastily  erecting  new  loop-walls  covering  the 
weakened  places  in  the  old.      When   Sulla  assaulted  these,  thinking 
that  not  being  thoroughly  set  they  might  easily  be  battered  down,  he 
found  himself  assailed  in  front   and  both  flanks   at  once,   and  was 
obliged  to  withdraw  his   men  from  the  narrow  ground  between  the 
debris  of  the  old  wall  and  the  curve  of  the  new.      The  fall  of  the  city, 
however,  set   free   a   large   number  of  the   besieging  army,  and  the 
attacks  on  Peiraeus  were  resumed  with  redoubled  fury.      The  walls 
were   so   continuously   battered    and   assaulted    that   Archelaus    was 
forced  to  abandon  them.      He  retreated  to   Munychia,  which  could   The 
only  be  attacked   from    the  sea.      The   Romans,  who  had  no  ships,  Pontic 

could  not  touch  him.      They  occupied  and  dismantled  the  rest  of  the  S^Y^_^^^^ 

.  .  .    .  .  retain 

Peiraeus,  while  Archelaus  remained  on  Munychia,  avoiding  all  direct  Munychia. 

engagements  with  them,  but  on  the  watch  from  it  and  from  his  ships 

to  cut  off  their  supplies  and  so  prolong  the  war,      Sulla  ordered  the 

Peiraeus  to  be  destroyed,  and   the  docks  and  magazines  burnt — a 

ruin  from  which  it  never  recovered. 

Both  he  and  Archelaus,  however,  had  soon  imperative  reasons  for  Sulla  and 

quitting  Attica,      Sulla  was  called  to  the  North  both  by  the  necessities  Archelaus 

of  his  own  position  and  by  the  fact  that  his  legate   Hortensius  had  ^    £^ 

entered  Phocis  with   a  corps  of  8000  men,  and  was  cut  off  from 

^  According  to  Pausanias  (i,  20,  4)  the  fall  of  Athens — by  which  he  seems  to 
mean  that  of  the  Acropolis — took  place  almost  simultaneously  with  the  battle  of 
Chaeroneia,  so  that  the  messengers  from  Curio  and  Sulla  mutually  announcing 
the  two  events  met  each  other  on  the  road.  Appian  seems  to  place  it  soon  after 
the  fall  of  the  city, — ov  iierh.  ttoXv  ;  but  Plutarch  says  that  Aristion  held  out  a 
considerable  {(rvx^^J')  time. 


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j^fl^ii 


CQ; 


CHAP.  XXXIX     THE  WAR  IN  PHOCIS  AND  BOEOTIA  629 

retreat  and  unable  to  venture  forward  owing  to  a  Pontic  force  occupy- 
ing the  pass  of  Thermopylae  behind  him  and  besieging  Elateia. 

For  while  wSulla  had  been  intent  upon  Athens  and  the  Peiraeus  a   Tlie  army 
Pontic  army  under  Askathias,  a  son  of  Mithridates,  in  the  year  87  ofMithn- 
had  entered  Macedonia.      Finding  it  almost  bare  of  Roman  troops,  ^^^^*^ 
he  had  with  little  difficulty  reduced  the  province  by  the  spring  of  86  and  Mace- 
and  established  governors   or  satraps  in  the  cities.      He  had  then  donia,  8j- 
marched  southward  with  the  express  purpose  of  attacking  Sulla  and  ^^^ 
relieving  Athens.      Apparently  in  order  to  avoid  Hortensius,  he  had 
marched  through  Magnesia  to  the-  promontory  of  Tisaeum,  intending 
perhaps  to  cross  to  Euboea.      But  at  Tisaeum  he  was  taken  ill  and 
died,i  and  the  command  of  the  army  passed  to  Taxiles,  who  brought 
the  troops  to  Thermopylae,  and  sent  a  message  begging  Archelaus  to 
join  him,  proceeding   meanwhile   to   invest  Elateia,  the  next  strong- 
hold   in  the   way  of  his   march   to    Boeotia.       When    the  message 
reached  Archelaus  the  Peiraeus  had  been  lost  and  he  was  occupying 
Munychia,  which  could  be   safely  left  in  charge  of  a  garrison.      He  Archelaus 
therefore  seems  to  have  determined  to  obey  the  summons.     About  ^nd  Sulla 
the  same  time  Sulla  resolved  to  march  into   Boeotia  and    Phocis.  J^^ 
Attica  was    a    poor    country  and    could  not  supply  his    army  with  Boeotia, 86. 
food  ;  and  having  no  ships  he  could  not  be  certain  of  getting  sup- 
plies  elsewhere.      His  own   position  also  was  now  most  precarious. 
Since  he  left   Italy  the  Cinnan   revolution  had  taken  place.      Marius 
indeed  had  died  in  January  of  this  year  (86),  but  his  successor  in  the 
consulship,  L.  Valerius  Flaccus,  had  been  named  to  the  command  of 
the  Mithridatic  war.      Sulla  w^as  not  yet  absolutely  recalled,  but  was 
to  remain  if  he  would  act  under  Flaccus.      But  it  was  well  understood 
that  it  was  intended  virtually  to   supersede  him  and  deprive  him  of 
the  credit  of  conquering  Mithridates.      It  was  all-important  for  him- 
self and  his  party  to  anticipate  this  by  striking  a  decisive  blow.      To 
do  this  he  was  anxious  to  effect  a  junction  with  Hortensius  before  the 
combined  armies  of  Archelaus  and  Taxiles  could  attack  him.      His 
own  forces  were  thinned  by  the  various  casualties  of  a  long  march 
and  a   wearisome    siege.      Taxiles,  whom  Archelaus  had  joined   at 

^  This  is  Appian's  statement  {Mith.  xxxv. )  There  is,  however,  some  difficulty 
as  to  the  prince  and  the  circumstances  of  his  death.  Plutarch  {Sull.  xi. )  says  that 
the  son  of  Mithridates  serving  in  Thrace  and  Macedonia  was  Ariarathes,  and 
{Pomp,  xxxvii. )  that  in  some  secret  memoranda  of  the  king's,  which  afterwards  fell 
into  Pompey's  hands,  it  was  discovered  that  he  had  ordered  his  son  to  be  poisoned. 
Reinach  accepts  the  statement,  and  supposes  that  the  king  had  ordered  his  son  to 
be  put  to  death  because  he  had  become  convinced  of  his  incapacity.  Appian, 
however,  thrice  repeats  the  name  (cc.  7,  35,  41),  which  is  found  in  an  Attic 
inscription  (C.  I.  G.  964).  Memnon  (ap.  Phot.  379  H.)  attributes  the  operations 
in  Thrace  and  Macedonia  to  Taxiles  alone,  and  dwells  on  the  service  done  by  them 
to  Archelaus  in  the  Peiraeus  by  securing  the  market  for  supplies  at  Amphipolis. 


630 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Junction  of 
Sulla  and 
Hortensius 
in  the 
valley  of  the 
Cephisus, 
early 


Thermopylae  by  sea,  had  an  army  much  superior  in  numbers  and 
furnished  with  numerous  cavalry,  war  chariots,  and  all  the  best  arms 
known  to  the  East. 

Meanwhile  Hortensius  had  been  guided  by  Kaphis  of  Chaeroneia 
round  the  foot  of  Parnassus  to  a  stronghold  on  a  precipitous  clifif 
called  Tithorea.  When  he  heard  that  Sulla  had  entered  Phocis  he 
descended  from  this  place  of  safety  and  joined  him  in  the  valley  of 
the  Cephisus,  and  the  united  forces  encamped  on  an  elevation  in  the 
plain  of  Elateia,  called  Philoboeotus,  which  commands  the  only  defile 
between  Phocis  and  Boeotia.  They  could  not  descend  to  the  level 
ground,  because  the  enemy — still  engaged  on  the  siege  of  Elateia — 
were  greatly  superior  in  cavalry  and  scythed  chariots.  Sulla  there- 
fore was  compelled  for  a  time  to  look  on  passively  while  the  enemy 
harried  the  country.  But  he  kept  his  men  so  rigorously  to  work  at 
digging  trenches  to  keep  off  the  cavalry  that  they  clamoured  for  a 
battle  in  preference  to  such  labours.  In  answer  Sulla  bade  them 
seize  a  hill — once  the  citadel  of  a  ruined  town  called  Parapotamii — • 
which  was  an  important  point  of  vantage  on  the  road  to  Chaeroneia. 
Archelaus  saw  its  importance  when  too  late,  but  failing  to  anticipate 
or  dislodge  the  Romans  he  attempted  to  march  past  it  and  reach 
Chaeroneia.  Sulla  had  men  of  Chaeroneia  in  his  camp  who  entreated 
him  to  save  the  town.  He  therefore  sent  off  his  advanced  guard, 
who  outstripped  Archelaus  and  were  welcomed  as  deliverers  at 
Chaeroneia,  and  he  himself  presently  followed  with  his  main  army. 
He  now  occupied  two  excellent  positions — Parapotamii  commanded 
the  road  back  to  Elateia,  Chaeroneia  commanded  that  to  Thebes  as 
well  as  a  branch  road  to  Opus.  Taxiles  and  Archelaus  were  caught, 
and  must  either  fight  or  retreat  round  the  lake  Copais  by  a  road 
difficult  and  full  of  defiles,  leading  to  the  coast  opposite  Chalcis. 

It  was  in  a  narrow  valley  near  the  entrance  to  this  difficult  route, 
between  two  hills  called  Hedylion  and  Acontion,  that  Taxiles  and 
Archelaus  were  encamped.  The  battle  was  fought  between  Mounts 
Hedylion  and  Thurion,  in  a  somewhat  contracted  part  of  the  plain  of  the 
Cephisus,  unfavourable  to  the  use  of  the  war  chariots,  which  required 
a  considerable  space  for  charging  ;  and  at  the  very  beginning  of  the 
day  the  Pontic  army  had  been  thrown  into  confusion  by  a  sudden 
attack  upon  the  rear  of  their  left  flank.  Some  natives  of  Chaeroneia 
had  guided  a  Roman  detachment  by  a  shepherd's  track  over  Mount 
Thurion,  which  brought  them  down  on  the  rear  of  one  wing  of  the 
enemy.  Not  only  did  these  men  themselves  inflict  considerable  loss  on  fl 
the  troops  thus  attacked,  driving  them  in  upon  the  Roman  right,  where  \ 
they  were  cut  to  pieces,  but  the  survivors  of  the  disaster  demoralised 
their  own  army  when  they  rushed  into  its  ranks  for  safety.  Archelaus 
had  forces  nearly  four  times  as  numerous  as  those  of  Sulla, — amounting 


XXXIX  THE  BATTLE  OF  CHAERONEIA  631 

to  60,000,  while  Sulla  had  i  5,000  infantry  and  i  500  cavalry, — but  they 
were  a  motley  throng  of  various  nationality,  and  though  capable  of 
obstinate  resistance  if  brought  to  bay,  were  no  match  for  Roman 
legions,  if  their  cavalry  failed  from  want  of  space,  or  if  the  phalanx — 
the  nucleus  of  the  whole  army — was  broken.  Both  of  these  circum- 
stances occurred  at  Chaeroneia  :  and  after  some  severe  fighting  the 
whole  army  became  a  disorganised  mass,  rushing  for  safety  to  the 
camp  from  which  they  had  issued  in  the  morning,  followed  and 
butchered  almost  without  resistance  by  the  victorious  Romans,  who 
are  asserted  by  Sulla  to  have  lost  but  twelve  men.  The  slaughter 
was  continued  in  the  captured  camp,  and  the  survivors  were  obliged 
to  light  false  watch-fires  and  entice  into  the  same  death-trap  some  of 
their  own  men  who  had  been  foraging.  Out  of  an  army  of  60,000, 
about  10,000  managed  to  escape  with  Archelaus  round  the  lake  Archelaus 
Copais  to  the  Euripus,  and  to  cross  to  Chalcis.  From  this  place  escapes  to 
he  carried  on  a  kind  of  piratic  war,  ravaging  the  coasts  of  Pelo-  *-"'^'■'^''■^• 
ponnesus  and  the  island  of  Zacynthus,  from  which  he  destroyed  some 
of  the  ships  employed  to  transport  the  army  of  Flaccus  into  Epirus. 

But  the  victory  of  Chaeroneia  had    secured    Sulla's  position  in  Sulla  in 
Greece,  though  fruitless  in  regard  to  the  immediate  prosecution  of  Greece  after 
the  war,  since  he  had  not  sufficient  force  to  enable  him  to  venture  ^^  ^^^^^^  '^ 
into  Asia  to  attack  Mithridates  himself      The   next   month  or  two  ^^^^^  ' 
were  devoted  to  refreshing  and  recruiting  his  army,  to  the  celebration  latter  part 
of  his  victory  by  trophies  and  splendid  games  outside  Thebes,  and  to  of  86. 
punishing  those  who  had  joined  the  rebellion.      Thus  at  Athens,  to 
which  he   returned   for  a   time,  Sulla  condemned  to  death  Aristion 
and  all  who  had   sensed    as  his   bodyguard  or  had  held  any  office 
during  the  rebellion,  and  confiscated  their  property.      The  freedom 
of  Athens  was  restored,  but  all  citizens  who  had  remained  in  the  city 
were  to  be  disfranchised  for  life.      Delos  was  given  back  to  her,  but 
the  territory  of  Oropus  was  assigned  to  the  temple  of  Amphiaraos, 
probably  in  compensation  for  treasures  appropriated  by  Sulla,  and  in 
gratitude   for   favourable    oracles    before   the    battle    of  Chaeroneia. 
Thebes  also  was  punished  for  its  defection  without  regard  to  its  early  Ruin  of 
return  to  its  duty.     Half  its  territory  was  confiscated,  and  the  revenues    Thebes. 
from  it  assigned  to   compensate    the   treasuries   of   the  temples  of 
Delphi,  Olympia,  and  Epidaurus,  which  Sulla  had  emptied. 

Meanwhile  a  change  of  feeling  had  been  taking  place  in  Asia.    The  rule  of 
The  government  of  the   king,   conducted   as    that    of   the   Attalids  J^^ithri- 
from  Pergamus,  was  at  first  liberal  and   popular.      A  general  relief  ^^^^^  ^^ 
from  imposts,  a  respect  for  ancient  institutions  and  for  the  rights  of  88-86. 
sanctuary,  large  subventions  from   the   royal   exchequer  in  relief  of 
distress  caused  by  earthquakes  or  other  disasters,  seemed  to  secure 
the  cheerful  allegiance  of  all  and  to  promise  an  era  of  peace  and 


632 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


happiness.  But  though  only  one  city,  Magnesia  ad  Sipylum,  still 
openly  held  out  against  the  royal  authority,  yet  in  many  other  of  the 
Greek  towns  there  was  secretly  a  strong  Romanising  party,  generally 
consisting  of  those  who  had  been  most  influential  in  politics  or  most 
successful  in  commerce.  Their  hostility  or  distrust  had  been  natur- 
ally roused  by  the  measures  of  the  king,  meant  to  conciliate  the  lower 
orders,  such  as  the  abolition  of  debts,  and  the  general  enfranchise- 
ment of  slaves  who  had  betrayed  their  masters.  Nor  did  the  king's 
yoke  prove  lighter  than  that  of  the  Romans  ;  for  although  taxes  were 
lessened  military  service  was  as  rigorous  and  more  constant.  Large 
conscriptions  were  needed  for  the  wars  in  Thrace,  Macedonia,  and 
Greece.  The  success  of  Sulla  and  the  fall  of  Athens  gave  a  vent  to 
this  discontent,  and  by  the  time  of  the  battle  of  Chaeroneia  matters 
were  ripe  for  change.  By  an  elaborate  system  of  espionage  the  king 
was  kept  aware  of  what  was  going  on  :  and  the  ferocious  measures 
which  he  took  to  secure  himself,  the  frequent  execution  of  real  or 
suspected  conspirators,  the  massacre  of  Galatian  tetrarchs  with  their 
families,  whom  he  had  forced  to  come  as  hostages  to  Pergamus,  and 
the  deportation  of  the  inhabitants  of  Chios  on  a  frivolous  pretext, 
irritated  and  alarmed  the  Greek  communities. 

The  first  movement  was  at  Ephesus.  After  the  cruel  treatment 
of  Chios,  Zenobius,  the  agent  for  the  execution  of  the  decree,  landed 
at  Ephesus  and  summoned  an  assembly  of  citizens  for  the  next 
day.  A  rumour  spread  among  the  people  that  the  fate  of  Chios  was 
in  store  for  them.  Instigated  by  the  chiefs  of  the  Romanising 
party,  they  dragged  Zenobius  from  his  bed  and  put  him  to  death  ; 
and  a  decree  was  passed  with  enthusiasm  renouncing  allegiance  to 
Mithridates,  whom  it  declared  to  have  possessed  himself  of  Ephesus 
by  treachery,  and  proclaiming  their  unchanging  loyalty  to  Rome^  i 
which  it  asserted  the  citizens  to  have  always  retained,  while  yielding!, 
to  superior  force.  ^  The  example  of  Ephesus  was  followed  by  othef 
towns,  and  a  general  defection  was  only  arrested  by  measures  of  great 
severity  in  the  case  of  those  cities  which  the  king  was  able  to  take  ; 
and  finally  by  a  decree  declaring  all  Greek  cities  which  had  remained 
faithful  free,  debts  abolished,  slaves  liberated,  and  metics  full  citizens. 
This  for  a  time  engaged  the  lower  classes  in  the  several  cities  on  his 
side,  for  fear  of  the  revocation  of  such  a  decree,  which  would  of 
course  follow  the  return  of  Roman  rule. 

To  secure  his  influence,  however,  the  king  knew  that  he  must  be 
successful  in  Greece.  An  army  of  70,000  was  again  raised,  includ- 
ing 10,000  cavalry  and  70  scythed  chariots.  It  was  carefully  selected 
and  placed  under  the   command  of  Dorylaus,  a  trusted  friend  and 

^  The  decree  itself  is  still  extant  {Waddington,  Inscriptions  d' Asie  ATineure, 
No,  136a  ;   Dittenberger,  Sylloge,  No.  253  ;   Reinach,  Appendix,  p.  463). 


XXXIX  BATTLE  OF  ORCHOMENUS  633 

• 
councillor.      Sailing  to  Euboea  Dorylaus  joined  Archelaus  and  the 
survivors  of  Chaeroneia,  and  the  two  made  descents  upon  the  coast 
of  Boeotia  and  recovered  the  allegiance  of  several  towns. 

This  brought  Sulla  back  into  Boeotia.  Soon  after  the  battle 
of  Chaeroneia  he  had  learnt  that  the  consul  L.  Valerius 
appointed  in  his  place  to  the  chief  command  in  the  Mithridatic  war,  Flaccus. 
was  marching  with  two  legions  through  Thessaly.  He  resolved  not 
to  accept  the  secondary  place  thus  left  to  him,  and  marched  towards 
Thessaly  to  meet  him.  He  came  upon  his  advanced  guard  at 
Melitaea,  at  the  foot  of  Mount  Orthrys,  on  the  road  from  Pharsalus. 
Flaccus  had  already  made  himself  so  offensive  to  his  men  by  severity 
and  greed  that  they  to  a  large  extent  deserted  to  Sulla, — an  example 
which  would  have  been  followed  by  larger  numbers  still  but  for  the 
exertions  of  the  consul's  legate  Fimbria,  who,  though  a  man  of  violent 
and  unreasonable  character,  possessed  ability  and  influence.  Flaccus, 
however,  gave  up  the  idea  of  marching  into  Greece  to  take  over 
Sulla's  army  or  attack  him,  and  turned  northwards  to  the  Hellespont. 
Sulla  wished  to  follow  him,  but  urgent  messages  came  from  Boeotia 
announcing  the  arrival  of  Dorylaus,  the  defection  of  the  Boeotian 
towns,  and  depredations  of  the  Pontic  army.  In  all  haste  he  repassed 
the  defile  of  Thermopylae  and  marched  back  into  Boeotia. 

The  struggle  there  was  short  and  decisive.  Archelaus,  with  his  Battle  of 
experience  of  Roman  troops,  advised  that  they  should  avoid  a  regular  Orcho- 
engagement.  But  Dorylaus  was  intoxicated  with  the  easy  successes  ^"^""^' 
already  obtained  and  anxious  to  measure  swords  with  Sulla.  His  first  s6. 
encounter,  however,  which  took  place  at  Tilphasium,  a  hill  and  town 
on  the  south  of  the  lake  Copais,  between  Coroneia  and  Haliartus,  con- 
vinced him  of  his  mistake.  He  too  was  now  anxious  to  avoid  an  en- 
gagement, and  hoped  rather  to  wear  out  Sulla  by  protracting  the  war 
with  all  its  attendant  expenses.  He  therefore  selected  a  position  which 
he  thought  favourable.  This  was  the  plain  of  Orchomenus  on  the 
west  of  the  lake,  not  far  from  the  battle-field  of  Chaeroneia,  but  much 
wider  and  more  open,  where  his  cavalry  and  chariots  would  have  full 
play,  and  would  deter  the  Roman  legions  from  attacking  his  camp. 
It  proved  a  fatal  selection.  To  prevent  the  excursions  of  the 
cavalry,  Sulla  at  once  began  digging  a  network  of  trenches  ten  feet 
wide,  which  he  pushed  gradually  up  to  the  enemy's  camp.  The 
cavalry  sent  to  interrupt  the  work  gained  some  success  at  first  against 
the  companies  of  Roman  infantry  posted  to  defend  the  diggers.  But 
an  incipient  panic  was  prevented  by  Sulla,  who  flung  himself  from 
his  horse,  and  seizing  a  standard  rushed  into  the  thick  of  the  fight, 
shouting  out,  "  Soldiers,  if  asked  where  you  abandoned  your 
general,  say  at  Orchomenus."  He  was  followed  by  his  principal 
officers,  and  their  example  sufficed  to  shame  or  encourage  the  rest. 


634 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Destruc- 
tion of  the 
Pontic 
army. 


Effects  of 
the  battle  of 
Orcho- 


Sulla 
winters  in 
Thessaly, 
86-8S. 

Flaccus 
marches 
through 
Macedonia 
and  Thrace 
to  Byzan- 
tium, 86. 


The  main  army  having  now  come  on  to  the  ground,  the  ranks  were 
soon  reformed,  and  presented  a  sohd  wall  of  defence.  The  enemy's 
cavalry  dashed  themselves  to  pieces  on  the  serried  ranks  of  the 
legions,  and  fell  in  immense  numbers.  The  Pontic  archers  charged 
by  the  legions  fought  desperately,  using  their  arrows  as  daggers  when 
they  could  no  longer  shoot ;  so  that  by  the  evening  the  field  was 
covered  with  nearly  15,000  dead,  among  whom  was  a  son  or  son-in- 
law  of  Archelaus.  The  survivors  took  refuge  in  their  camp,  but  were 
entirely  surrounded,  and  had  no  way  out  except  across  the  lake. 
Next  morning  Sulla  began  another  trench,  to  complete  the  cir- 
cumvallation,  which  they  vainly  tried  to  interrupt.  When  it  was 
finished  he  gave  the  signal  for  an  assault.  The  Romans  scaled 
the  vallum  and  another  butchery  began.  Some  who  endeavoured 
to  escape  by  swimming  in  the  lake  were  slain  by  arrows  and  javelins  ; 
so  that  in  the  time  of  Plutarch,  200  years  afterwards,  bows,  swords, 
helmets  and  coats  of  mail  were  still  found  in  the  mud  at  the  bottom. 
As  many  as  50,000  are  said  to  have  perished,  and  25,000  prisoners 
were  sold  by  military  auction  after  the  battle. 

Dorylaus  and  Archelaus  escaped  to  Chalcis  :  but  the  question 
of  supremacy  in  Greece  was  settled.  Archelaus  recalled  such 
Pontic  garrisons  as  still  held  Greek  towns  to  Chalcis,  and  the  country 
was  once  more  in  the  power  of  the  Romans.  The  effect  was  at 
once  felt  in  Asia.  The  Galatians  expelled  the  Pontic  satrap  :  their 
example  was  followed  by  a  great  number  of  Asiatic  Greeks  ;  and 
Mithridates  was  only  saved  from  an  immediate  attack  by  Sulla's 
lack  of  ships.  He  had  not  enough  even  to  cross  to  Chalcis,  and  had 
to  content  himself  wreaking  vengeance  on  the  revolted  Boeotians. 
But  if  he  was  not  to  be  anticipated  by  Flaccus  in  defeating  Mithri- 
dates he  must  have  a  fleet.  No  news  had  yet  come  of  Lucullus  ;  and 
when  he  went  into  winter  quarters  he  began  shipbuilding  for  himself. 

Meanwhile,  Flaccus  had  made  his  way  to  the  Bosporus  through 
Macedonia  and  Thrace,  pillaging  the  towns  and  enslaving  the  people 
without  mercy.  Philippi  was  taken  ;  the  royal  army  besieging 
Abdera  fled,  and  he  reached  the  loyal  town  of  Byzantium  in  time  to 
take  up  his  winter  quarters  outside  the  walls.  But  the  unpopularity 
of  Flaccus  had  been  increased  on  the  march.  Grasping  and 
unscrupulous  himself,  he  had  been  severe  in  punishing  similar 
conduct  among  the  men  :  and  while  he  was  in  Byzantium,  negotiating 
with  shipowners  for  a  passage  across  the  Bosporus,  they  broke  out 
almost  into  open  mutiny.  He  tried  to  remedy  this  by  dividing 
them,  sending  the  advanced  guard  under  Fimbria  across  to  Chalcedon. 
But  a  quarrel  between  Fimbria  and  the  quaestor  about  billeting 
the  soldiers,  having  been  referred  to  Flaccus,  was  decided  in  favour 
of  the  quaestor.      Fimbria,  after  threatening  to  return  to  Rome,  and 


XXXIX  PRELIMINARIES  OF  PEACE  AT  DELIUM  635 

being  thereupon   deposed   from  the  command  of   the  cavalry,   pro- 
moted another  mutiny.      Flaccus  fled  for  his  life  to  Nicomedia,  where 
Fimbria  discovered  and  put  him  to  death.      It  cannot  be  supposed  Murder  of 
that  the  murder  of  a  proconsul  by  his  legatus  was  approved  by  the  Flaccus, 
Senate,  but  the  dislike  of  the  dominant  party  to  Sulla  was  stronger  '^^• 
than  any  other  feeling.      Fimbria  was  not  recalled  and,  though  he  was 
repudiated  by  Sulla  and  Lucullus  (who  presently  arrived  with  his  fleet 
on  the  coast  of  Asia   Minor),  it  was  less  perhaps  as  a  murderer  than 
as  the  agent  of  the  party  of  Cinna,      But  the  change  in  the  command 
of  the   army   thus   made   added  to  its  effectiveness.      Fimbria  was 
abler  and    more    active    than    Flaccus,    and    a    series    of  successes  Success  of 
against  the  younger  Mithridates  and  other  officers  of  the  king  in  Fimbria 
Bithynia    seemed   to    promise    a    speedy    termination    of    the    war.  ^^^        . 
Nicomedia  was  carried  by  assault,  and  other  towns  in  Bithynia  were         -^ 
terrified  into  submission.      Mithridates  was  in  instant  expectation  of  Mithri- 
being  besieged  in   Pergamus,   and  retired  to   the   harbour  town   at  dates  iyi 
Pitane.      Whether  Fimbria  could  force  him  to  surrender  depended  ^^t'^'"-^- 
on  the  action  of  the  fleet  of  Lucullus.     But  Lucullus  refused  to  co-  Lucullus 
operate  with  Fimbria,  and  it  was  Sulla,  therefore,  who  with  his  own  "^m  not 
ships  and  those  of  Lucullus  could  come  at  any  time  to  Asia,  that  '^^■^P^^^*^ 
Mithridates  had  to  fear.      Early  in  84  a  message  came  from  Archelaus  pi^ii,yia, 
requesting  a  conference.      Sulla's  political  position  at  the  time  made 
it  of  primary  importance  to  him  to  end  the  war.      His  refusal  to  act 
under  Flaccus  had  been  answered  by  a  decree  of  the  Senate,  proposed 
by  Cinna,  declaring  him  a  public  enemy  and  depriving  him  of  his  Sulla 
command :    his   town  house  had   been    pulled   down,    his   wife   and  declared  a 
children  forced  to  fly  ;  and  with  them  came  to  his  camp  in  Thessaly  fi-ostis,  8j. 
a  large  number  of  the  Optimates,  who  believed  themselves  no  longer 
safe   at    Rome.      And   now   this   same  Senate   preferred   to   keep   a 
murderer  like  Fimbria  in  command  rather  than  acknowledge  him. 
It  was  time  to  make  an  end  of  the  war  and  to  return  in  force  to  Italy. 
He  therefore  agreed  to  receive  Archelaus  at  Delium. 

After  the  usual  attempts  to  beat  each  other  down  by  arrogant  Prelim- 
language  preliminaries  were  agreed  upon.      The  king  was  to  abandon  inaries  of 
all  conquests  made  since  the  beginning  of  the  war ;    to    surrender  -^^J^f  ^^ 
the     province    of    Asia ;    to    evacuate    Bithynia    and     Cappadocia,  g. 
and  in   return  was  to  be  guaranteed  in  the  rest  of  his   dominions 
as    "a  friend"  of  Rome.       He  was  to  furnish  Sulla  with  seventy 
decked  vessels,  with  crews  and  provisions,  and  500  archers  ;  prisoners, 
hostages,  and  deserters  to  be  mutually  restored. ^     The  population 

1  Licinianus  mentions  among  those  to  be  restored  M'.Aquillius  and  Q. 
Oppius.  But  according  to  all  other  authorities  Aquillius  had  been  put  to  death 
long  ago.  If  it  is  true  that  his  name  was  mentioned  in  the  preliminaries,  we  must 
either  suppose  that  Sulla  did  not  know  of  his  death  and  that  Archelaus  dared  not 


636 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


of  Chios,  removed  to  the  Black  Sea,  were  to  be  allowed  to  return 
home,  as  well  as  the  families  driven  from  Macedonia,  while  Sulla  was 
to  grant  an  amnesty  to  the  cities  in  Asia  Avhich  had  sided  with  the 
king.i 

Though  the  terms  were  less  than  might  be  expected  at  Rome, 
the  king  thought  them  severe,  and  never  quite  forgave  Archelaus,  whom 
he  suspected  of  having  been  bought  over,  especially  when  it  after- 
wards appeared  that  Sulla  had  granted  him  an  estate  in  Boeotia. 
He  particularly  objected  to  the  cession  of  Paphlagonia  and  the  supply 
of  the  seventy  ships  ;  and  he  secretly  made  overtures  to  Fimbria,  while 
transferring  himself  to  Mitylene,  where  he  would  be  safe  from  any 
enemy  who  had  no  ships.  But  though  this  made  him  independent 
of  Fimbria,  who  was  obliged  to  confine  himself  to  the  devastation 
of  the  Troad, — among  other  things  utterly  destroying  Ilium  for 
the  offence  of  asking  aid  from  Sulla,- — -it  put  him  still  more  in 
danger  of  attack  from  Sulla,  who  after  the  conference  at  Delium 
had  advanced  northwards  and  was  to  be  joined  by  Lucullus  and  his 
fleet  at  the  Thracian  Chersonese.  While  subduing  some  tribes  on 
the  frontier  of  Macedonia  and  Thrace  Sulla  was  met  by  a  courier 
conveying  the  king's  objections  to  the  terms.  Affecting  the  utmost 
anger  he  swore  that  he  would  not  bate  a  single  point.  Archelaus, 
still  in  the  Roman  camp,  and  treated  with  extraordinary  marks  of 
regard  by  Sulla, — who  had  gratified  him  with  the  execution  of 
Aristion, — begged  with  tears  to  be  allowed  to  go  to  the  king, 
promising  that  he  would  bring  the  ratification  or  perish  by  his  own 
hands.  On  his  return  he  found  Sulla  at  Philippi,  and  brought  word 
that  the  king  assented  generally  to  the  terms,  but  desired  a  personal 
interview. 

Of  the  nature  of  their  interviev/  we  have  the  account  of  Sulla 
himself  preserved  by  Plutarch,  which,  however,  is  open  to  some 
suspicion  as  composed  to  defend  his  conduct  from  what  some  thought 
an  act  of  treason.  The  kmg,  he  says,  offered  his  hand,  which  he 
refused  to  accept  until  he  signified  in  express  terms  his  acceptance  of 
the  treaty.  After  an  interval  of  silence  Mithridates  began  a  long 
defence  of  his  conduct.  Sulla  interrupted  it  by  saying  that  he 
admired  the  king's  eloquence,  but  that  words  could  not  alter  deeds, 
and  that  he  demanded  a  direct  answer  of  yes  or  no,  adding  a  state- 
ment of  the  injuries   sustained  by  the  Romans  at   his  hands.     At 


mention  it,  or  that  the  story  of  the  molten  gold,  etc.  was  a  fiction  of  the  king's 
enemies  (see  p.  617  note). 

^  This  last  provision  is  only  mentioned  by  Memnon  of  Heracleia,  who  was 
likely  to  be  well  informed  on  such  a  point,  though  in  the  rest  of  his  account  there 
are  several  inaccuracies.  The  treaty  was  not  written,  and  therefore  there  may 
have  been  disputes  on  many  points. 


I 


xxxix      PEACE  OF  PERGAMUS  AND  FALL  OF  FIMBRIA  637 

length  the  king  signified  his  acceptation  of  the  treaty  :  whereupon   Treaty  of 
Sulla  caused  the  deposed  kings  of  Bithynia  to  come  forward  and  Pergamus, 
bear  witness  to  the  treaty  which  was  to  restore  them  to  their  domin-     ''' 
ions.      Mithridates  acknowledged  Nicomedes  with  courtesy,  but  he 
refused  to  receive  Ariobarzanes,  the  elect  of  the  nobles  of  Cappadocia, 
as  not  of  royal  blood,  a  mere  subject  or  slave,  to  whose  royalty  he 
would  give  no  social  acknowledgment. 

Thus  the  first  Mithridatic  war  was  at  an  end.  It  had  cost  nearly  Unsatis- 
half  a  million  of  lives ;  it  had  brought  with  it  the  ruin  or  de-  factory 
struction  of  a  large  number  of  flourishing  towns  ;  and  after  all  it  ^^^^^^^  "f 
had  not  been  decisive.  It  had  indeed  settled  that  Mithridates'  plan 
of  uniting  Asia  Minor  and  Greece  under  his  sceptre  was  not  to  be 
realised  ;  but  it  left  the  Roman  province  with  a  feeling  of  insecurity, 
while  the  king — with  such  memories  in  his  heart — was  still  close 
to  the  frontier,  and  still  powerful  in  money,  ships,  and  men.  In 
every  city  there  were  still  two  opposed  parties,  with  the  recollec- 
tion of  mutual  wrongs  and  sufferings.  The  richer  class  were 
"  Romanisers,"  the  lower  were  still  "  Cappadocists,"  whose  perpetual 
antagonism  promised  danger  and  trouble  for  the  future.  And  it 
might  well  be  remembered  at  Rome  that  this  lame  result  was 
after  all  the  effect  of  political  differences  :  that  if  the  two  armies 
of  the  republic  had  been  acting  in  unison,  and  if  Lucullus  with 
his  ships  had  not  declined  to  support  Fimbria,  the  war  might  have 
been  ended  for  ever  by  the  captivity  or  death  of  Mithridates, 

For  Sulla  the  retirement  of  Mithridates  was  not  the  end  of  his  Sulla's 
difficulties.     He  was  still  an  outcast  by  the  vote  of  the  Senate  ;  and  difficulties. 
if  he  was  to  recover  his  own  position  and  rescue  his  party  from  the 
faction  of  the  consuls  Cinna  and  Carbo,  he  must  return  to   Italy  at 
the  head  of  an  army  which  left  no  foe  behind  it,  and  was  capable 
of  meeting  every  enemy  at  home.      His  own  soldiers,  indignant  at 
the  sight  of  the  king  allowed  to  depart  unharmed,   after  all  their 
labours  and  victories,  or  disappointed  at  the  loss  of  the  easy  spoil 
which  they  had  expected  from  an  Asiatic  war,  must  be  satisfied.     Fim- 
bria, too,  was  encamped  near  Thyatira  in  the  north  of  Lydia,  between 
the  rivers  Carius  and  Hermus,  and  refused  to  surrender  or  to  fight. 
Sulla  began  at  once  to  beleaguer    his    camp   by  digging    trenches  Attack 
round  it.      Fimbria's  soldiers  deserted  in  great  numbers,  and  helped  ^pon 
to   complete  the  trenches.      Those  who  remained  refused  to  fight  ^^'"'^'^^^^ 
their  fellow-citizens,  or  to  take  an  oath  of  fidelity  to  him.      He  failed 
also  to  procure  Sulla's  assassination,  and  having  come  to  the  end 
of  his  resources  asked  for  a  personal  interview.      Sulla  contemptu- 
ously refused  it,  but  he  sent  word  by  Rutilius — ^the  exiled  quaestor 
of  Scaevola— that  he  would  give  him  a  safe-conduct  to  the  sea  on 
condition  that  he  immediately  left  Asia.      But  Fimbria  knew  that  his 


638 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Death  of 
Fimbria, 


Settlement 
of  Asia. 


Punish- 
ment of 
disloyal 
towns. 


life  would  not  be  safe  when  Sulla  returned  to  Italy,  and  determined 
to  escape  dishonour  by  death.  He  fled  to  Pergamus,  and  stabbed 
himself  in  the  temple  of  Asclepius.  The  wound  was  not  mortal,  but 
he  persuaded  a  slave  to  kill  him,  and  the  whole  of  his  legions,  with 
the  exception  of  a  few  officers  who  took  refuge  with  Mithridates, 
then  joined  Sulla's  standard, 

Sulla  spent  the  rest  of  the  year  and  the  following  spring  (85-84) 
in  regulating  affairs  in  Asia.  Whether  or  no  there  was  an  article  in 
the  treaty  granting  amnesty  to  the  Asiatic  cities  which  had  joined 
the  king's  party,  he  certainly  did  not  observe  its  spirit.  The  Greek 
cities  which  submitted  were  not  destroyed,  but  the  party  in  them 
opposed  to  Rome  suffered  ruthless  punishment.  After  despatching 
Curio  with  a  sufficient  force  to  superintend  the  restoration  of 
Nicomedes  in  Bithynia  and  of  Ariobarzanes  in  Cappadocia,  he 
proceeded  to  take  certain  towns  which  still  held  out,  and  therefore 
might  be  considered  in  any  case  to  be  excluded  from  the  benefit 
of  the  clause.  The  abolition  of  the  king's  proclamation  relieving 
debtors  and  freeing  slaves  caused  the  resistance  to  be  more  obstinate, 
and  the  punishment  the  more  severe  ;  the  towns  were  dismantled 
and  pillaged,  and  their  inhabitants  sold  into  slavery.  Even  in  cities 
not  so  treated  individual  citizens  convicted  of  disloyalty  were 
executed.  At  Ephesus,  for  instance,  all  were  so  treated  who  could 
be  proved  to  have  been  leaders  in  the  rebellion,  or  to  have  taken 
part  in  the  massacre  of  Itahans  in  88,  or  in  denouncing  the 
Romanisers  in  86.  Here  too,  in  the  course  of  his  visit,  Sulla 
announced  to  an  assembly  of  notables  from  the  cities  that  the  five 
years'  tribute — remitted  by  Mithridates — was  now  to  be  paid  in 
full,  besides  a  fine  of  20,000  talents,  or  about  ^5,000,000,  the  whole 
country  being  divided  into  fourty-four  districts,  to  be  rated  according 
to  the  property  of  the  inhabitants,  in  order  to  raise  the  sum.  To  add 
to  the  distress  the  soldiers  were  billeted  for  the  winter  in  various 
towns  upon  private  individuals,  who  were  obliged,  besides  lodging 
them,  to  pay  each  soldier  four  drachmae  a  day,  as  well  as  one  meal 
for  himself  and  any  guest  he  might  choose  to  invite  ;  and  each 
centurion  fifty  drachmae  and  two  suits  of  clothing.  This  burden  on 
the  middle  and  richer  classes  made  it  all  the  more  difficult  for  the 
cities  to  procure  the  money  to  pay  Sulla's  demand.  It  was  only 
done  by  borrowing  money  on  heavy  and  usurious  terms,  and  by 
mortgaging  public  buildings  of  all  sorts ;  and  it  left  Asia  in  a 
state  of  financial  ruin  from  which  it  was  long  in  recovering.  Nor 
in  return  did  Sulla  secure  the  country  from  other  evils.  In  the 
course  of  the  troubles  of  the  last  four  years  piracy  had  again  become 
rife.  Sailing  it  is  said  at  first  under  letters  of  marque  from  Mithri- 
dates, these  pests  of  the  sea  had  increased  to  the  dimensions  of  a 


XXXIX  SULLA'S  RETURN  TO  ROME  639 

fleet,  and  captured  whole  islands  and  towns.  lassus  and  Samos, 
Clazomenae  and  Samothrace  were  seized  by  them  while  Sulla  was 
at  Ephesus  ;  and  it  does  not  appear  that  he  took  any  measures  to 
repress  them. 

He    was    now   intent   upon    his    return   to    Italy.        In    the    late  Sulla 
summer    of    84,    leaving    Murena    as    governor    and     Lucullus    as  ^^«y" 
<luaestor  in  charge  of  Asia,  he  embarked  his  army  — increased  by  ^J^^^;^^ 
fresh  levies  and  with  ships,  which  the  vast  spoils  and  fines  had  given  0/84. 
him   the  means  to   acquire   to  the  number  of  1200, — and  in  three 
days   arrived    at    the    Peiraeus.       He    stayed   for   some    months    at 
Athens,  where  he   collected  fresh  troops  from   Macedonia  and   the  At  Athens. 
Peloponnese,  and  enriched  himself  with  various  treasures,  such  for 
instance  as  the  famous  library  of  Apellicon,  which  contained  a  great 
collection  of  the  writings  of  Aristotle  and  Theophrastus.      He  found 
there  the  well-known   Pomponius  Atticus,  afterwards  the  friend  and 
correspondent    of    Cicero,    then    a    young   man,   who    had    already 
made  himself  thoroughly  conversant  with  Attic  ways  and  speech,  and 
seems  to  have  exercised  that  charm  over  Sulla  which  rendered  him 
the  close  friend  of  so   many  leaders  of  opposite  parties  at  Rome. 
Perhaps  it  was  under  his  guidance  that   Sulla  threw  himself  into  the 
Attic  life  for  a  time,  and  was  among  other  things  initiated  in  the 
Eleusinian  mysteries  and  established  a  new  festival  called  the  Sulleia. 
But  the  hardships  of  the  last  four  years  had  told  on  his  health.     He  was 
attacked  with  a  severe  fit  of  gout,  and  had  to  remove  to  the  Lelantine 
plain  near  Chalcis  for  the  sake  of  the  baths,  or  to  Aedipsus  on  the  Sulla 
north-west  coast,  famed  for  its  hot  springs.      It  was  not  therefore  returns  to 
till  the  next    spring    (83)  that  he  set  out  again,   marching  through  ^(^ly  ^'^^ly 
Thessaly  and    Macedonia    to   Dyrrachium,   whence    he    crossed    to 
Brundisium  with  40,000  men  and  1200  ships. 

Authorities. — Livy,  Ep.  78-82.  Appian,  Mithridatica.  Justin,  37,  38. 
Granius  Licinianus,  fr.  of  book  xxxv.  Diodorus,  fr.  of  xxxvii.  Meninon  of 
Heracleia  in  Photius,  Mithridatica.  Velleius  Paterculus,  ii.  23,  24.  Plutarch, 
Sulla,  Lucullus.  Pausanias,  i,  20,  4  ;  9,  7,  5  ;  30,  i  ;  33,  6.  Orosius,  v.  19. 
The  most  continuous  narrative  is  in  Appian  and  Plutarch.  The  date  of  Licinianus 
is  uncertain,  he  may  perhaps  be  the  earliest  of  all.  The  inscriptions  illustrating 
the  affairs  of  Asia  during  the  period  will  be  found  in  the  Appendix  to  M.  Reinach's 
Mithridate  Eupator. 


CHAPTER  XL 


VICTORIES    OF    SULLA    IN    ITALY,    AND    THE    NEW    CONSTITUTION 

83-78 

Sulla  lands  in  Italy — He  is  joined  by  Metellus,  Pompey,  Crassus,  and  many 
others — His  march  to  Rome — Defeat  of  Norbanus  and  the  younger  Marius  at 
Tifata — Surrender  of  Scipio  and  Sertorius  at  Teanum — Fire  at  the  Capitol 
(83) — Campaigns  of  82 — Defeat  of  Marius  at  Sacriportus,  and  siege  of  Prae- 
neste — Victory  of  Metellus  on  the  Aesis — The  war  in  Etruria  and  Gallia  Cis- 
alpina — Battles  of  Saturnia,  Clusium,  Faventia,  Fidentia— Flight  of  Norbanus 
and  Carbo — Defeat  of  the  Samnites  at  the  Colline  Gate — Fall  of  Praeneste 
and  Norba  (November  82) — Sulla  at  Rome — The  proscriptions — Sulla  dictator 
—  His  political  reforms  —  His  code  of  laws  —  B'all  of  Nola  and  Volaterrae — 
Devastation  of  Samnium  (82-80) — Pompey  in  Sicily  and  Africa  (81) — Abdi- 
cation of  Sulla  (79) — His  death  (78) — Rome  expanded  into  Italy — Change  in 
the  colonial  system — Extent  of  Empire — Number  of  provinces — Their  con- 
tributions to  the  Roman  exchequer — Indifference  at  Rome  to  foreign  affairs 
— The  new  generation — Development  of  oratory  and  literature. 


When  Sulla  landed  at  Brundisium  early  in  83  no  farther  disguise 
was  possible,  — there  was  to  be  open  civil  war.  The  negotiations 
with  the  Senate  had  not  cancelled  the  decree  declaring  him,  and 
those  who  had  joined  him,  public  enemies  :  his  town  house  had  been 
pulled  down,  his  property  confiscated,  and  the  constitutional  authori- 
ties were  almost  unanimously  opposed  to  him.  Both  consuls  were  his 
enemies  :  Sertorius,  the  ablest  man  of  the  party,  was  a  praetor ; 
Marius,  nephew  and  adopted  son  of  the  great  Gaius  Marius,  was  a^ 
consul-designate  for  the  next  year  ;  Carbo,  who  had  already  been^j 
twice  consul,  was  to  be  his  colleague,  and  was  now  commanding  an  ' 
army  in  Cisalpine  Gaul  as  proconsul.  The  very  fact  that  so  many 
senators  and  other  Optimates  had  taken  refuge  with  Sulla  in  Greece, 
or  now  joined  him  on  his  march,  left  the  comitia  in  the  city — so  far 
as  they  were  consulted  at  all — even  more  entirely  in  the  hands  of  his 
enemies,  who  had  thus  the  technical  advantage  of  a  constitutional 
position.  On  the  other  hand,  Sulla  had  never  laid  down  his  procon- 
sular imperium^  and  until  he  did  so,  or  until  he  entered  the  city,  there 


CHAP.  XL  SULLA  DEFEATS  THE  CONSULS  641 


was  no  certain  means  of  depriving  him  of  it.  The  decree  of  the 
Senate  declaring  him  a  hostis  was  affinned  by  him  and  his  friends 
to  be  invahd,  as  having  been  extorted  by  violence,  and  in  the  forcible 
absence  of  many  members.  Both  sides  thus  claimed  to  be  legally 
within  their  right :   no  solution  was  possible  except  by  battle. 

Sulla  had  a  devoted  army,  which  regarded  its  military  oath  to  His  army. 
him  as  of  superior  obligation  to  obedience  to  Senate  or  consuls. 
Nor  can  such  a  view  seem  surprising  when  at  this  very  time  the  son 
of  Strabo,  Gnaeus  Pompeius,  an  eques  of  three-and-twenty,  who  had 
held  no  office,  and  was  a  mere  privatus^  had  been  able  to  raise 
three  legions  in  Picenum,  without  authority  and  without  any  one 
knowing  what  he  was  going  to  do  with  them.  Thus  Sulla  profited 
by  the  changes  made  in  the  army  by  his  great  rival  Marius.  His 
only  partisan  who  could  claim  a  constitutional  position  was  Metellus 
Pius.  When  Marius  and  Cinna  entered  Rome,  Metellus  had  gone 
to  Africa.  Having  been  beaten  there  by  the  Marian  governor  C. 
Fabius,  he  had  returned  to  Liguria  and  was  watching  events.  He 
had  never  laid  down  the  iviperiuin  which  he  held  during  the 
Marsic  war,  and  was  therefore  still  proconsul ;  and  when  he  hastened 
to  join  Sulla  was  greeted  by  him  as  "  Imperator." 

Carbo   and   the  dead  Cinna   had  been  working  for  some  years  Sulla  s 
past  to  secure  themselves,  and  there  were  now  enormous  forces  on  march 
foot  to  resist  Sulla.      Several  Italian  towns,  and  the  Samnites  gene-  ^f^3*^^ 
rally,  who  had  not  laid  down  their  arms  at  the  end  of  the  Social    Way,  8-^. 
war,  warmly  espoused  the  side  of  Carbo,  and  as  many  as  225,000 
men  were  said  to  be  under  arms  in  various  parts  of  Italy  under 
fifteen    different   commanders.      Formidable    as   these    forces    must 
have  seemed,   their  composition   was   of  some  advantage  to  Sulla, 
who  could  pose  as  the  champion  of  the  citizens  against  rebels.     They  Defeat  of 
were  also  widely  separated.      Carbo  was  in  Cisalpine  Gaul ;  three  of  Norbanus. 
his  legati  —  M.   Brutus,   C.  Caelius  Caldus,  and  C.  Caninas — were 
kept  in  play  in  Picenum  by  Pompey,  who  had  declared  for  Sulla  as 
soon   as  he  landed.      It  was  with  the   two  consuls    Norbanus  and 
Scipio,  who  had  hastily  enrolled  an  army  of  100,000  men  from  the 
city  and  the  neighbourhood,  that  Sulla  had  first  to  reckon.      They 
were  marching  to  meet  him  in  two  divisions,  Norbanus  and  Marius  in 
front,  Scipio  at  no  great  distance  in  the  rear.      Sulla,  who  had  been 
warmly  welcomed   at   Brundisium,  and   was    receiving   continual  ad- 
hesions, found  Norbanus  encamped  near  Mount  Tifata,  overlooking 
Capua.      The  conflict   was    short   and   decisive.       The  consul's  raw 
levies  proved  unable  to  face   Sulla's  veterans,  and  he  had  to  retreat 
into  Capua  with  the  loss  of  6000  men. 

Sulla,  who  asserts  that  he  only  lost  seventy   men    in   this    battle, 
continued  his  advance  along  the  via  Appia,  and  in  the  neighbourhood 

2  T 


642  HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Scipio,  of  Teanum  came  in  sight  of  Scipio  and  the  second  division  of  the 
tJ^hose  army  consular  army.  But  the  effect  of  the  victory  of  Tifata  was  soon 
manifest.  Sulla  made  some  proposals  for  pacification  to  the  consul, 
and  when  Scipio  hesitated  to  accept  them,  he  suddenly  found  him- 
self deserted  by  his  army,  which  went  over  to  Sulla  almost  to  a  man. 
He  was  left  nearly  alone  in  his  tent  with  his  son,  and  was.  obliged  to 
accept  Sulla's  terms.  But  Sertorius,  who  was  with  him,  seems  to 
have  been  able  to  lead  off  a  certain  number  of  men,  and  on  his 
way  seized  Suessa,  which  had  sided  with  Sulla ;  and  though  Scipio, 
whom  Sulla  had  allowed  to  go  free,  repudiated  this  action  of 
Sertorius,  Sulla  affected  to  consider  that  thereby  the  terms  had  been 
broken,  and  he  continued  his  advance,  wasting  the  lands  of  all  who 
were  opposed  to  him. 

He  did  not,  however,  as  yet  approach  Rome.  The  opposite  party 
was  still  strong  there,  and  Carbo  now  came  himself  to  the  city  from 
Gaul,  and  prevailed  upon  the  remnant  of  the  Senate  to  denounce  as 
hostes  all  who  had  joined  Sulla.  He  and  young  Marius,  as  consuls- 
designate,  with  their  numerous  legati,  had  been  raising  forces  in 
Latium,  Etruria,  and  Cisalpine  Gaul,  and  Sulla  was  obliged  to  pause 
till  he  could  reckon  on  armies  somewhat  equivalent  to  theirs.  The 
winter,  also,  which  was  devoted  to  these  preparations,  chanced  to 
be  an  unusually  severe  one,  which  made  active  operations  impossible. 
But  Rome  was  in  a  state  of  great  anxiety  throughout  the  autumn 
and  winter  of  83  ;  and  it  seemed  no  slight  omen  of  impending  disaster 
that  on  the  6th  of  July  a  fire  had  destroyed  the  venerable  temple 
of  Jupiter  on  the  Capitol,  which  had  stood  for  more  than  400  years, 
the  visible  emblem  of  the  greatness  of  Rome,  and  that  in  it  had 
perished  those  Sibylline  verses  so  often  consulted  in  the  hour  of 
danger. 

In  the  spring  Sertorius  had  gone  as  propraetor  to  Spain,  and  the  war 
began  with  a  severe  battle  between  Metellus  and  Carbo's  legate 
Caninas  on  the  river  Aesis,  separating  Picenum  and  Umbria.  Metellus 
was  prevented  from  following  up  his  victory  at  once  by  the  presence 
of  Carbo,  who  came  to  the  rescue  of  Caninas.  Before  long,  however, 
Carbo,  hearing  that  his  colleague  Marius  had  been  defeated,  retired 
to  Ariminum,  the  headquarters  of  his  party  in  the  north,  harassed 
by  Pompey  on  the  rear.  Caninas  made  his  way  to  Spoletium  in 
Umbria,  where  presently  Pompey  and  Crassus  followed  and  again 
defeated  him,  shutting  him  up  in  the  town.  Meanwhile  Marius  had 
been  trying  to  intercept  Sulla,  who  was  taking  various  towns  in 
Latium.  But  he  had  sustained  so  severe  a  defeat  at  Sacriportus, 
between  Setia  and  Praeneste,  that  part  of  his  army  went  over  to 
Sulla,  and  he  was  himself  compelled  to  fly  with  the  rest  to  Praeneste. 
So  hot  was  the  pursuit  that  the  Praenestines  dared  not  open  their 


XL  DISASTERS  OF  THE  PARTY  OF  CARBO  643 

gates,  and  had  to  haul  him  up  the  wall  by  a  rope.      Sulla  invested 

Praeneste,  and,  presently  entrusting  to  Lucretius  Ofella  the  task  of 

starving  it  out,  led  his  army  in  several  columns  by  different  roads  to 

Rome,  and  pitched  a  camp  in  the  Campus  Martins. 

But  he  did  not  stay  long  at  Rome.      He  had  not,  indeed,  arrived  Sulla's 

in  time  to  prevent  a  last  act  of  vengeance  on  the  part  of  Marius,  Ji^^{ 

who  had  found  means  to  send  a  message  to  the   praetor  urban  us,  ^J'J'^'^^  ^ 
_.  ,.,  •  /-/-,-,.  Rome. 

Damasippus,  ordenng  the  execution  of    four  leadmg  senators,  one 

of   them    the  pontifex    maximus     Scaevola.      The   order  had  been 

carried  out  with  cold-blooded   craft.      Damasippus   had   summoned 

the   Senate   on  pretence  of  business,  had   then  had   three   of  them 

assassinated  in  or  just  outside  the  Curia,  while  Scaevola  was  killed 

in  the  temple  of  Vesta  itself.      Still  Sulla  could  not  stay  to  punish 

this  at  once.      He  had  just   time  to  order  the  confiscation  of  the 

property  of  the  most  violent  of  his   opponents,   and   to  address  an 

encouraging  speech  to  a  meeting  of  citizens,  and  then  started  in  all 

haste  to  attack  Carbo,  who  had  come  to  Clusium  on  his  way  to  the 

relief  of  Marius.      His  cavalry  defeated  some  Celtiberian  auxiliaries  Cavalry 

of  Carbo   on  the  Clanis,  the  survivors  partly  coming  over  to  him,  skirmish 

partly  being  cut  to  pieces  by  Carbo,  who   suspected  their  fidelity.  ^^     f 

He  next  defeated  another  division  of  the  enemy  at  Saturnia,  and  then 

advanced  on  Clusium.     As  usual,  he  dashed  upon  his  enemy  without  Battle  at 

any  well-considered  plan,  and  a  severe  fight  lasting  all  day  long  was  Clusium. 

after  all  indecisive.     Yet  when  Carbo  attempted  to  send  an  army  of 

relief  from  Ariminum  to  Caninas  at  Spoletium,  Sulla  intercepted  and  Carlo  fails 

defeated  it  with  a  loss  of  2000  men,  and  Caninas  in  despair  took  lo  relieve 

advantage  of  a  dark  rainy  night  to  escape,  only  to  perish  a  few  months  ^P^^ ^^^"^ 

later.     Carbo  still  attempted  to  send  troops  under  Marcius  to  relieve  ^^^j^^, 

Marius  in  Praeneste  ;   but  he  was  followed  by  Pompey,  now  set  free 

from  besieging  Spoletium.      Overtaken  in  the  difficult  ground  near 

Praeneste,  he  was  utterly  defeated,  and  forced  to  take  refuge  in  the 

hills.     The  men  laid  the  blame  on  Marcius,  and  either  made  their 

way  back  to  Ariminum  or  dispersed  to  their  homes. 

Meanwhile    fresh    disasters    befell    the    Carbonian    party   in  the  Battle  of 

north.      After  his  victory  on  the  Aesis,  Metellus  collected  ships  and  Faventia. 

sailed  up  the  east  coast  of  Italy,  making  descents  on  his  way  ;  and  as  ^^^  ^ 

Carbo  and  Norbanus  held  Ariminum,  he  occupied  the  next  harbour  ^^^  Gallia 

north  of  it  at  Ravenna.     From  that  town  he  led  his  army  to  Faventia,  cisalpina. 

on  the  Via  Aemilia^  barring  the  road  between  Ariminum  and  the 

towns  in  the  valley  of  the  Po.      Here  Carbo  and  Norbanus  attacked 

him,  but  were  defeated  with  a  loss  of  10,000  men.      Six  thousand 

of  the  survivors  then  went    over  to   Metellus,   while  the  rest    took 

refuge  in  Arretium.      This  was  followed  by  the  betrayal  of  Ariminum 

by  P.  TuUius  Albinovanus,  who  even  poisoned  a  number  of  the  officers 


644 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Victory  of 
Luciillus  at 
Fidentia. 


The 

Samnite 
anny  under 
Pontius  of 
Telesia. 


Flight  of 
Carbo. 


His  troops 
advance  on 
Rome. 


Battle  at 
the  Colline 
Gate,  ist 
November 
82. 


at  a  banquet.  Norbanus  had  refused  the  invitation,  and  so  escaped ; 
but  finding  Ariminum  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  and  the  rest  of 
GalHa  Cisalpina  submitting  to  Sulla,  he  took  ship  and  fled  to  Rhodes, 
where,  some  time  afterwards,  when  he  saw  the  Rhodian  magistrates 
deliberating  what  to  do  in  answer  to  a  demand  from  Sulla  for  his 
surrender,  he  stabbed  himself  in  the  agora.  The  defection  of  Gallia 
Cisalpina,  indeed,  was  inevitable  when  Ariminum  was  lost  ;  and  soon 
after  that  event  M.  Lucullus,  who  had  been  besieged  in  Fidentia,  cut 
his  way  out  by  a  sudden  sally  and  defeated  the  besieging  army. 
The  valley  of  the  Po  was  therefore  in  the  hands  of  the  legates  of 
Sulla. 

Carbo,  whose  activity  and  spirit  had  been  remarkable  throughout 
this  campaign,  did  not  fly  at  once  after  his  defeat  at  Faventia.  He 
had  still  30,000  men  at  Clusium,  and  his  legates  Damasippus, 
Caninas,  and  Marcius  still  were  at  the  head  of  some  troops.  One 
last  attempt  was  resolved  upon.  An  army  of  Samnites,  Lucanians, 
and  Campanians,  under  Pontius  of  Telesia,  M.  Lampronius  the  Lu- 
canian,  and  Gutta  of  Capua,  was  on  the  way  from  the  south  to  the 
relief  of  Praeneste.  If  he  and  his  legates  could  effect  a  junction 
with  them,  his  colleague  Marius  might  still  be  rescued.  L.  Dama- 
sippus was  at  once  sent  off  with  two  legions,  but  was  prevented  by 
Sulla  from  approaching  Praeneste  ;  and  Carbo,  seeing  all  going 
against  him,  lost  heart,  and  escaping  secretly  from  headquarters  at 
Clusium  with  a  few  friends  made  his  way  to  Africa,  where  his 
own  adherent  Cn.  Domitius  Ahenobarbus  had  taken  over  the  govern- 
ment. The  troops  remaining  at  Clusium  were  attacked  by  Pompey  ; 
many  were  killed,  and  the  rest  dispersed  to  their  homes.  Caninas, 
Marcius,  and  Damasippus,  indeed,  succeeded  in  joining  the  Samnites, 
who  were  advancing  on  Praeneste  ;  but  Pompey  had  followed  close 
behind  them,  and  finding  themselves  likely  to  be  caught  between 
his  army  and  that  of  Sulla,  they  abandoned  the  attempt  to  reach 
Praeneste,  in  which  they  had  already  suffered  severely,  and  made  a 
dash  upon  Rome. 

There  were  no  troops  in  Rome,  and  its  walls  were  not  in  a 
state  to  stand  a  siege ;  but  with  Samnites  at  the  gates,  party  spirit 
for  the  moment  was  hushed,  and  the  men  of  military  age  armed 
themselves  and  sallied  out  against  the  enemy.  They  were  defeated, 
however ;  and  when  Sulla — following  close  behind  the  700  cavalry 
which  he  had  sent  forward  under  Balbus — arrived  in  the  after- 
noon of  the  1st  of  November,  he  found  the  enemy  encamped 
within  a  mile  of  the  city.  Rejecting  the  entreaties  of  his  officers, 
that  he  would  rest  his  men  before  fighting,  he  attacked  at  once.  It  1 
was  the  bloodiest  battle  of  the  whole  war.  Fifty  thousand  men  are] 
said  to  have  fallen  in  the  two  armies,  and  Sulla  himself  was  onh 


XL  SULLA'S  VICTORY  AND  CRUELTIES  645 

saved  from  death  by  his  groom,  who  seeing  a  spear  coming  at  him, 
whipped  on  his  horse  and  just  secured  him.      Nor  did  his  disposi- 
tions do  him  any  credit  as  a  general.      His  right  wing  under  Crassus    Victory  of 
was  completely  successful,  and  drove  the  enemy  to  Antemnae,  three  ^^^^,  ^^S^^^ 
miles  off;  but  the  left,  in  which  he  was  himself  commanding,  was  "^"'f^^J^ 
driven  back  upon  its  camp  ;    and    he  was  so  entirely  ignorant  of 
what  had  happened  on  his  right,  that  he  only  learnt  that  Crassus 
was  at  Antemnae  by  a  message  from  him  in  the  evening  asking  for 
provisions.      Still,    the  loss   inflicted   on  the   enemy  had  been  very 
great.      Pontius  himself  had  fallen,  and  a  large  number  of  prisoners   The  left 
had  been  taken  ;  and  though  at  one  time  in  the  afternoon  Sulla's  ^^f<^ 
defeat  had  seemed  so  certain  that  a  messenger  had  been  despatched     ^^^^"'  ^^' 
to  Praeneste   begging  Ofella  to  come,  and  announcing  his   death, 
he  was   able   next    morning    to   join   Crassus   at   Antemnae.       The 
enemy  were   still   in   considerable  force,   but   3000   of  them   offered  Surrender 
to  submit,  and  Sulla  promised  them  their  lives  if  they  would  attack  of  the 
their  own  comrades.     A  large  number  having  fallen  in  this  unnatural  ^'^""^'^^^^^ 
combat,  the  remaining  6000  were  taken  to  Rome,  drawn  up  in  the  Antemnae. 
Circus,  and  cut  to  pieces  by  his  orders. 

Sulla  now  met   the  Senate    in   the  temple   of   Bellona,   outside  Sulla  at 
the   pomoerium,    within  which   he   could  not  legally  enter    without  Rome, 
losing  his  imperium.      While  he  was  actually  addressing  them  the      ^•^^^^^ 
shrieks  of  the  six  or  eight  thousand  Samnite  prisoners,  who  were 
being  cut  down  hard  by,  startled  the  fathers.     Sulla  bade  them  not 
be  disturbed ;  they  were  only  some  criminals  being  punished  by  his 
orders.       If  the    senators  were    content    to    condone    such    cruelty 
on  the  ground  that  the  victims  were  Samnites,  the  common  enemy, 
they  soon   found  that  the  same  measure  was  to  be  meted  out  to 
others.       The    victory    at    the    Colline    Gate    brought    with    it    the 
surrender  of  Praeneste.      Marius  committed  suicide,  but  all  men  of 
military  age  were   put  to   death  by  Lucretius,  doubtless  by  Sulla's  Severities 
order  ;  and  in  Norba,  the  last  town  in  Latium  to  hold  out,  when  it  ^^  Prae- 
was  taken  by  Aemilius  Lepidus,  those  of  the  inhabitants  who  did  not  ^■^^^^'^'^ 
die  by  their  own  hand  were  all  executed,  and  the  town  was  burnt. 
Marcius  and   Caninas,   who   had   escaped    after    the    battle    of   the 
Colline  Gate,  were  arrested  and  at  once  put  to  death  ;  while  Marius 
Gratidianus — in  revenge,  it  seems,  for  the  death  of  Catulus  in  the 
Marian  massacres — was  taken  to  the  tomb  of  the  Catuli  and  put  to 
death  with  horrible  tortures. 

Though  Sulla  was  probably  not  the  author  of  this  crime,  he  had 
resolved  upon  a  wholesale  slaughter,  which  has  rightly  blackened  his 
name  for  ever.      It  was  not  primarily  personal  revenge,  or  cruelty  for 
cruelty's  sake  that  moved  him,  though  iDOth  passions  perhaps  had  their  The  pro- 
influence.     Rome  was  to  be  renewed,  and  the  constitution  restored  to  ^"'ip^ons. 


646 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


the  state  existing  before  the  time  of  the  Gracchi  ;  and  to  this  end  those 
who  had  in  any  way  contributed  to  the  disastrous  change  were  to  be 
remorselessly  removed.  He  now  told  the  people  in  public  meeting 
what  his  intentions  were.  All  who  had  borne  office  as  praetors, 
quaestors,  or  military  tribunes,  or  who  had  co-operated  with  the  enemy 
since  the  agreement  made  with  the  consul  Scipio  in  the  previous  year, 
were  to  be  first  put  to  death.  Forty  senators  and  about  sixteen  hundred 
equites  were  at  once  named,  Sulla  remarking  that  there  were  others 
whom  he  could  not  at  present  remember.  Everywhere  the  execu- 
tioners— chiefly  his  Celtic  guards — were  sent  in  the  track  of  the 
condemned,  not  only  in  Rome  but  in  all  the  cities  of  Italy.  Death 
was  denounced  on  all  who  sheltered,  and  a  large  'reward  promised 
to  all  who  could  prove  that  they  had  killed  any  of  them.  The 
vagueness  which  attended  the  announcement  of  the  first  batch  of 
victims  added  to  the  horror  of  the  time  ;  and  it  was  perhaps  with  a 
view  of  confining  the  executions  to  the  persons  he  desired  to  get  rid 
of  that  he  adopted  the  plan,  recommended  in  the  Senate  by  C. 
Metellus,  of  putting  up  a  list  of  the  condemned  in  the  Forum.  Even 
then,  the  terrible  uncertainty  was  not  removed,  for  the  first  pro- 
scription list  was  followed  by  at  least  two  others,  and  they  seem  to 
have  been  so  carelessly  supervised  by  Sulla  himself  that  alterations 
and  additions  were  always  possible.  Full  rein  was  thus  given  to 
private  hatred  or  covetousness,  and  many  a  man  perished  because 
he  had  incurred  a  neighbour's  enmity,  or  possessed  what  another 
desired.  Nothing  was  easier  than  to  get  a  man's  name  on  the  list, 
and  sometimes,  as  Catifine  is  said  to  have  done  in  the  case  of  his 
own  brother,  the  murder  was  first  committed  and  the  name  after- 
wards inserted.  Proscription  involved  confiscation  of  property, 
and  Sulla  enriched  himself  with  what  he  called  his  "  spoils,"  and 
allowed  his  friends  and  freedmen  to  enrich  themselves  by  pur- 
chasing for  small  sums  as  sectores  the  estates  of  the  dead  men,  and 
selling  them  later  on  at  enormous  profit.  Even  with  such  deduc- 
tions the  treasury  is  said  to  have  received  about  ^4,000,000  from 
the  sales. 

Many  of  these  executions,  perhaps  most  of  those  actually  carried 
out  in  Rome,  seem  to  have  taken  place  while  Sulla  held  no  official 
rank  except  the  military  one  of  proconsul.  For  what  remained  to  be 
done,  some  position  recognised  within  the  city  seemed  necessary.  He 
therefore  sent  a  letter  to  the  Senate  expressing  an  opinion  that,  in 
the  disordered  state  of  the  republic,  supreme  power  ought  to  be 
entrusted  to  some  one  in  order  to  restore  the  state,  and  that  he  was 
willing  to  undertake  the  task.  The  Senate  of  course  complied,  and 
as  one  of  the  consuls  was  dead,  and  the  other  out  of  Italy,  the  old 
expedient  of  an  interrex  was  adopted.     L.  Valerius  Flaccus,  princeps 


SULLA  DICTATOR  647 


senatus,  was   elected,  and   proposed  a  bill  to  the   people  appointing  Bill  for 

Sulla  dictator,  with  full  power  of  legislation  and  government  every-  constitut- 

where,  and  without  any  limit  of  time.     This  would  not  prevent  the  ^jf!f 

.,.,  ,.  ,  1,,-  ,.i-     dictator, 

election  of  the  usual  magistrates,  but  would  subject  them  in  their  Nov. -Dec. 

administrative  acts  entirely  to  the  majus  imperiiim  of  the  dictator.  82. 
The  office  had  been  in  abeyance  for  120  years;  nor  was  the  new 
dictatorship  like  the  office  of  former  times  except  in  name.  The 
irregularity  of  his  mode  of  appointment — by  bill,  instead  of  on  the 
nomination  of  a  consul—might  perhaps  be  regarded  as  unimportant, 
and  had  something  like  a  precedent  in  the  case  of  Fabius  Cunctator ; 
his  assumption  of  twenty-four  lictors  merely  raised  a  disputed  ques- 
tion in  archaeology :  ^  where  Sulla's  dictatorship  differed  from 
former  dictatorships  was  first  in  absence  of  any  limit  of  time — the 
old  dictators  having  been  confined  to  six  months,  and  constantly 
abdicating  sooner — and  secondly  in  the  words  expressing  his  com- 
petence. Of  old  dictators  had  been  named  for  the  routine  pur- 
poses of  holding  elections  {comitiorum  habendoruvi  c),  for  suppress- 
ing seditions  {sedandae  seditionis  c),  or  for  taking  the  command  of 
the  army  {rei gerendae  c).  But  Sulla  was  appointed  to  settle  the 
constitution  {ret  piiblicae  constituendae  c),  which  gave  him  authority 
to  propose  every  kind  of  legislation,  however  much  opposed  to  the 
spirit  of  existing  laws  and  customs,  without  any  of  the  usual  checks 
from  Senate  or  Tribune.  To  be  binding  after  his  dictatorship 
his  laws  had  to  be  passed  by  the  centuries,  but  his  unlimited 
coercive  powers  would  make  that  a  meje  form.  He  was  now 
practically  master  and  monarch,  and  might  well  have  forborne  the 
mean  revenge  of  ordering  the  ashes  of  his  great  rival  Marius  to  be 
torn  from  their  grave  and  scattered  on  the  Aesis. 

The  bill  constituting  Sulla  dictator  contained  clauses  giving  him  Limitation 
indemnity  for  the  past  and  confirming  his  acts  ;  but  also  it  appears  of  time  of 
limiting  the  time  during  which  proscriptions  should  continue,  and 
sales  of  confiscated  property  hold  good,  to  the  ist  of  June  81. 
This  period  was  probably  not  longer  than  was  necessary  to  carry  tims. 
out  his  plans  in  Italy,  where  certain  towns  still  held  out, — Nola 
in  Campania,  Aesernia  in  Samnium,  Volaterrae  in  Etruria, — and  had 
to  be  reduced.  This  was  made  an  occasion  for  disfranchising  them 
and  other  towns.  Sulla  did  not  break  his  promise  of  not  repealing 
the  Julian  law  or  reversing  Cinna's  arrangement,  which  allowed 
Italians  to  be  enrolled  in  all  the  tribes.       Special   laws   or  edicts 

^  Livy  says  that  no  dictator  ever  had  twenty-four  hctors  before  ;  but  as  Poly- 
bius  (iii.  87),  Dionysius  (x.  24),  Plutarch  {Fab.  i),  and  Appian  {B.  Civ.  \.  100) 
all  say  that  a  dictator  had  twenty-four  lictors,  there  may  at  least  have  been  a 
diversity  of  opinion  on  a  subject  now  a  matter  of  almost  ancient  history.  The  last 
dictatorship  was  in  202,  and  then  only  for  holding  the  comitia.    See  p.  20S. 


648 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


prohibited  the  inhabitants  of  particular  towns,  or  certain  individuals 
and  their  sons,  from  being  so  enrolled ;  the  general  law  was  left 
untouched.  But,  in  fact,  he  made  it  unimportant :  for  he  confiscated 
vast  tracts  of  land  in  all  parts  of  Italy;  and  so  nearly  depopulated 
the  great  seat  of  disaffection,  Samnium,  that  the  towns  became 
mere  villages,  and  whole  districts  were  almost  left  empty  to  receive 
the  new  colonies  of  veterans,  of  whom  forty-seven  legions,  according 
to  Livy,  or  twenty-three,  according  to  the  more  moderate  statement 
of  Appian,  were  planted  in  the  empty  farms.  This  was  his  notion 
of  Romanising  Italy  ;i  and  it  was  in  fact  the  most  permanent  of  all 
his  measures. 

His  triumph  over  Mithridates  was  celebrated  on  the  istof  Feb- 
ruary (81)  with  all  splendour.  He  assumed  the  titles  of  FeHx  and 
Epaphroditus,  as  though  he  were  the  special  favourite  of  fortune  and 
love  ;  and  then  went  on  with  the  constitutional  changes  for  which  he 
had  sought  the  dictatorship.  His  object  was  to  restore  the  oli- 
garchy, with  the  control  of  the  Senate  rendered  effective  over  every 
magistrate  and  every  department  —  resting,  indeed,  ultimately  for 
authority  on  the  people,  but  a  people  purged  of  many  elements  of 
sedition,  and  looking  to  the  Senate  and  the  consuls  for  guidance  in 
legislation  rather  than  to  tribunes.  The  Senate,  now  much  thinned 
by  war  and  massacre,  was  strengthened  by  the  addition  of  300  of  the 
most  respectable  equites.  .  Their  names  seem  to  have  been  selected  by 
Sulla,  but  each  was  submitted  to  a  vote  of  the  centuries.  This  was 
only  a  measure  for  the  nonce.  It  would  not  be  needed  for  the  future  ; 
for  henceforth  the  quaestorship  was  to  entitle  a  man  to  a  seat ;  and 
as  the  number  of  quaestors  was  now,  owing  to  the  multiplied  spheres 
of  duty,  raised  to  twenty,  and  that  of  the  praetors  to  eight,  there 
were  enough  magistrates  elected  each  year  to  fill  up  vacancies.  It 
was  not  a  new  thing  to  thus  replenish  the  Senate  from  the  magistracy, 
but  it  was  now  to  work  automatically,  without  the  necessity  of  a  quin- 
quennial revision  of  the  censors.^  The  importance  of  the  censors 
was  already  decreased  by  the  fact  that,  since  the  tributum  was  no 


^  Sulla  is  accused  of  allowing  his  treatment  of  particular  towns  to  be  influenced 
by  the  payment  of  money  (Cic.  de  off.  iii.  22,  87).  This  may  mean,  not  that  he 
took  bribes,  but  that  he  allowed  towns  to  commute  their  offence  for  a  fine  to  the 
exchequer. 

2  The  magistrates  and  ex-magistrates  sat  and  spoke  in  the  Senate  up  to  this 
time,  but  were  not  senators  till  the  censor  made  up  the  list  with  their  names  in 
it.  This  interval  seems  to  have  been  abolished  by  Sulla  ;  they  now  became 
senators  at  once.  The  censor's  powers  were  farther  curtailed  by  Clodius  in  58  ; 
and  though  that  law  was  repealed  by  Metellus  in  52,  the  office,  as  far  as  the 
exercise  of  the  right  of  affixing  the  nota  and  revising  the  Senate  was  concerned, 
became  impossible  ;  and  the  last  censors  appointed  (in  50)  were  unwilling  to 
accept  the  duties,  and  did  nothing. 


XL  SULLA'S  CONSTITUTIONAL  CHANGES  649 

longer  paid  by  the  citizens,  a  census  of  property  was  unnecessary.  Sr  79. 
Another  reason  for  their  existence  now  disappeared,  and,  in  fact,  the 
office  fell  into  abeyance  :   none  were  appointed  till  70,  and  then  it 
seems  without  the  power  of  making  up  the  roll  of  the  Senate. 

The  regulations  as  to  the  government  of  the  provinces  were  also  The 
calculated  to  increase  the  power  of  the  Senate.  Henceforth  consuls  magistrates 
and  praetors  were  to  stay  in  Rome  during  their  year  of  office,  and  "'I^.^i^^^^ 
only  to  have  military  imperium  in  their  second  year  in  one  of  the 
provinces.  The  particular  province  which  each  was  to  have  was 
still  usually  decided  by  lot ;  but  the  Senate  arranged  beforehand 
which  were  to  be  consular  and  which  praetorian  provinces,  or  could 
withdraw  any  particular  province  from  allotment,  and  so  prolong  the 
tenure  of  any  one  whom  they  wished  to  remain.  On  the  other  hand, 
he  was  bound  not  to  pass  the  limits  of  his  province  in  arms  without 
order  from  the  Senate,^  and  to  leave  it  within  thirty  days  of  the 
arrival  of  his  successor,  retaining  however  his  imperium  until  he 
arrived  in  Italy,  or,  if  he  claimed  a  triumph,  which  depended  on  a 
vote  of  the  Senate  as  before,  till  he  entered  Rome.  The  Senate, 
therefore,  at  least  in  theory,  controlled  the  men  with  military  imperium, 
and  could  recall  them  or  lengthen  their  tenure  of  it.  The  recent 
innovations  on  the  tenure  of  the  consulship,  marked  by  the  seven 
consulships  of  the  elder  Marius  and  the  election  of  the  younger 
Marius  at  twenty-seven,  were  now  forbidden.  Not  only  were  the 
regulations  as  to  age  to  be  reinforced,  but  no  one  was  to  be  praetor 
who  had  not  been  quaestor,  or  consul  who  had  not  been  praetor.  The 
highest  magistracy  would,  therefore,  only  be  held  by  men  of  official 
experience  and  sober  age.  "  One  should  be  rower  before  taking 
the  helm,"  was  Sulla's  comment  when  he  saw  the  gory  head  of  the 
younger  Marius.  But  the  ten  years'  military  service  seems  to  have 
been  no  longer  required.^  The 

The  Comitia  tributa  was  still  to  elect  the  lower  magistrates  ;  but  comitia. 
it  practically  ceased  under  Sulla's  arrangement,  as  probably  in  that 
made   in   his   consulship   in  88,  to  pass  laws,  to  be  consulted,  and 
addressed  on  public  affairs,  or  to  judge  in  cases  affecting  the  caput 
of   a   citizen.       These   functions  were    transferred  to  the   centuriate 
assembly,  in  which  property  and  age   still  had  the  preponderating 
influence,  and  to  the  quaestiones  perpetuae^  in  which  all  public  charges  Gives 
were  now  tried.      But  while  the  Italian  towns  were  to  be  peopled  by  CornelH. 
new  citizens  drawn  from  Sulla's  veterans,  the  urban  electorate  was 
modified  by  the  addition  of  more  than  10,000  slaves  of  masters  who 
[    had  fallen  in  arms  against  him  or  had  been  proscribed.      They  were 
1    made  full  citizens,  and  enrolled  in  the  urban  tribes  under  the  general 
name  of  Cornelii,  a  measure  which  might  be   called  a  noble  act  of 

1   The  lex  Cornelia  de  majestate  (Cicero  ///  Pis.  §  50). 

-  Willems,  p.  242,  Momms.  Staats.  2,  p.   160.      See  p.  532,  iwle. 


650 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


81-79- 


The 
tribunes. 


The  sacred 
colleges. 


Sulla  s 

crimmal 

code. 


Senators 
jurymen 
hi  stead  of 
equites. 


justice,  if  we  could  think  it  done  from  regard  to  the  natural  rights  of 
men,  and  not  rather  with  a  view  to  strengthen  his  own  hold  upon 
the  populace  of  the  city. 

The  tribuneship,  again,  lost  much  of  its  power  and  prestige.  It 
had  indeed  wandered  far  from  its  original  purpose.  The  auxilium  of 
the  tribunes  was  less  and  less  frequently  needed  as  the  administration 
of  the  law  became  more  settled  ;  and  they  had  used  their  veto  chiefly 
for  political  ends,  generally  as  tools  of  a  party  in  the  Senate,  and  to 
check  liberal  legislation  proposed  by  any  one  of  their  number  more 
mindful  than  the  rest  of  his  proper  functions.  They  had,  therefore, 
ceased  to  interest  the  people  at  large,  while  Sulla  feared  the  confusion 
which  their  powers,  if  freely  exercised,  might  introduce  in  the  control 
which  it  was  his  object  to  give  to  the  Senate.  They  had  practically 
lost  their  legislative  function,  for  they  were  forbidden  to  propose 
measures  without  previous  sanction  of  the  Senate,  or  to  summon  and 
address  the  people ;  and  the  office  was  rendered  unattractive  to  men 
of  ability  by  the  rule  which  made  tribunes  ineligible  to  all  other 
offices.  Their  right  of  veto  was  not  wholly  taken  away,  but  was 
restricted  in  some  way  not  accurately  known. 

Finally  the  colleges  of  sacerdotes  and  augures,  which  since  104 
had  by  the  lex  Domitia  been  filled  by  election  in  the  Coinitia  tribufa, 
recovered  their  right  of  co-optation  ;  and  the  much-coveted  member- 
ship was  thereby  kept  more  strictly  in  the  hands  of  a  few  famihes. 

Besides  these  organic  political  changes,  Sulla  showed  extra- 
ordinary diligence  in  extending  or  codifying  the  criminal  law  and 
arranging  for  its  administration.  In  doing  this  he  followed  the 
precedent  of  the  lex  Calpurma  in  149.  The  general  principle,  that 
it  was  the  part  of  the  comitia  to  order  the  investigation  of  a  public 
charge  by  a  committee  representing  it,  was  maintained;  but,  as  the 
lex  Calpurnia  had  established  a  standing  commission  to  investigate 
charges  of  malversation  {de  repetimdis\  so  Sulla  now  established 
nine  new  standing  commissions  to  try  cases  of  various  defined  crimes. ^ 
Each  would  have  certain  peculiarities  in  its  composition  or  pro- 
cedure, but  they  were  all  alike  in  the  fact  of  the  juries  being  drawn 
from  the  roll  of  the  Senate,  instead  of  the  equestrian  order,  and  in 
being  presided  over  usually  by  one  of  the  six  praetors,^ — the  civil 
business  being  left  to  the  praetor  urbanus  and  the  praetor  peregrinus. 
It  would  no  longer  be  necessary  for  a  magistrate  to  bring  in  a  bill! 


1  They  were  de  7najestate,  de  sicariis  et  venejiciis,  de  parricidio,  de  peculatu, 
de  ambitu,  de  nujntnis  adulterinis,  de  falsis,  de  vi publica. 

2  When  there  was  more  business  than  the  six  praetors  could  do,  it  was  usualj 
to  appoint  special  presidents — jjidices  quaestionum  —  apparently  by  lot  anion^ 
ex-aediles,  who  would  usually  be  praetors  the  next  year.  Both  classes 
presidents  are  spoken  of  in  general  terms  as  quaesitores. 


XL  POMPEY  IN  SICILY  AND  AFRICA  651 

before  the  people   to   secure   the   prosecution   of  any  one   of  these  Si-jg. 
crimes.      Any  citizen  might  now  bring  the  offender  to  trial :  and  in 
fact  it  became  the  regular  way  for  a  young  man  courting  popular 
favour,  as  a  preparation  for  curule  office,  to  prosecute  some  of  the 
governors  of  provinces  or  party  leaders  at  home.     The  general  aim 
was    no   doubt    to    protect    the    provinces,   check   the    magistrates, 
strengthen  the  control  of  the    Senate,  and  depress  the   equestrian 
order, — an    aim  but  imperfectly   attained  even    for  a  time.       The 
equestrian  order,  indeed,  was  a  special  object  of  his  attack.      Large  The 
numbers  were  put   on  the    proscription   lists  ;   they  lost  their  right  ^q^i'^te^- 
to  sit  on  juries  ;   and  Sulla's  arrangement  for  the    five  years'   taxes 
in  Asia   deprived   them  for  a   time  of  a  profitable   field   of  enter- 
prise,   though    before    long    the     publicani    were    again    at    work 
there. 

Sulla  retained  power  long  enough  to  see  that  the  new  constitu- 
tion  should  at  any  rate  be  tried.      He  was  consul  himself  in  80  ; 
but  declined  re-election  for-  79,  apparently  because  his  new  law  was 
then    in    operation :    and    when     Lucretius     Ofella, — the    victor    at 
Praeneste, — ventured  to  appear  as  a  candidate  for    the   consulship  Assassin- 
without  having  previously  been  praetor,  and  refused  to  withdraw  on  ^^^"^'^  ^f 
Sulla's  order,  he  sent  a  soldier  to  cut  him  down  in  the  Forum,  and  told  ^1//^  "'^"^ 
those  who  appealed  to  him  on  the  tribunal  to  punish  the   assassin 
that  it  had  been  done  by  his  direction. 

He  was  not,  however,  able  or  willing  to  crush  the  rising  influence  Pompey  in 
of  Pompey,  who  insisted  on  a  triumph  for  his  actions  in  Africa,  and  Sicily  and 
dared  to   tell  him,  when   he   objected,  that  "more  worshipped   the  00^' 
rising    than    the    setting    sun."      Pompey    had   been    sent  to    Sicily 
at  the  end  of  82  to  put  down  the  remains  of  the  party  of  Carbo, 
entertained  there  by  the    praetor  M.   Perpenna,  who   had  returned 
a  resolute  defiance  to  Sulla's  message  demanding  his   submission. 
At  Pompey's  approach  he  fled,  and  Sicily  remained  under  Pompey's  Death  of 
government.      Carbo  himself  was  on  his  way  to  Sicily  from  Africa,   Carho. 
and   sent   forward  M.  Brutus  to  see  whether  Pompey  had  arrived. 
Brutus  being  caught  off  Lilybaeum  killed  himself;   and  Carbo  took 
refuge    in    the    island    of    Cossyra,    half  way    between    Sicily   and 
Africa,  but  was   there   arrested,   brought  to   Pompey,    and  at   once 
executed  and  his  head  sent  to  Rome.      While  engaged  in  organising 
affairs   in    Sicily,   in   doing  which   he  gained  a  high  reputation  for 
justice  and  incorruptibility,  Pompey  received  an  order  from  Sulla  to 
cross  to  Africa,  where  Cn.  Domitius  Ahenobarbus,  Cinna's  son-in-law, 
who   had   been   proscribed   and  fled   to  Africa,  had   taken  over  the  Defeat  0/ 
troops  of  the  praetor  Fabius  Hadrianus  (burnt  in  his  own  praetorium  ^henobar- 
at  Utica),  and  by  the   assistance  of   Hiarbas,    a   pretender  to    the 
throne  of  Numidia,  collected  a  considerable  force.      Domitius  fell  in 


652 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


battle  with,  it  is  said,  1 7,000  out  of  the  20,000  of  his  army.  Hiarbas 
was  captured  and  put  to  death,  and  Hiempsal  restored  to  the  throne 
of  Numidia — all  within  forty  days.  Returning  to  Rome,  Pompey 
was  met  by  the  dictator  at  the  head  of  a  great  procession,  and 
addressed  by  him  with  the  cognomen  of  Magnus,  which  he  thence- 
forth adopted.  His  claim  to  a  triumph,  however,  was  in  strictness 
barred  by  the  fact  that  he  was  a  privatus,  his  rank  in  Sicily  and  Africa 
having  been  that  of  propraetor  only.  Sulla  tried  to  persuade  him 
to  forbear  asking  it,  and  when  it  was  referred  to  the  Senate  openly 
opposed  it.  Pompey,  however,  was  firm,  and  Sulla  gave  way  with  the 
half-contemptuous  expression,  "  Let  him  triumph  then  ! "  Nor  was 
this  the  only  point  in  which  Pompey  dared  to  oppose  Sulla.  It  seems 
from  coins  that  he  assumed  the  title  of  proconsul  instead  of  the 
lower  one  of  propraetor,  under  which  he  had  been  sent  to  Sicily 
and  Africa  ;  and  in  79  he  supported  M.  Aemilius  Lepidus  in  his 
canvass  for  the  consulship  against  Sulla's  express  wish  and  warn- 
ing. Lepidus  was  elected  even  before  Sulla's  candidate  Q.  Lutatius 
Catulus. 

It  seems  the  more  surprising,  in  view  of  such  proof  of  diminished 
influence,  that  Sulla  should  have  ventured  to  divest  himself  of  supreme 
power.  It  is  true  that  all  the  provinces  were  now  in  the  hands  of 
his  partisans  ;  that  Italy  was  everywhere  dotted  with  settlements  of 
his  veterans,  whose  interests  would  induce  them  to  maintain  the 
validity  of  his  laws  ;  and  that  the  urban  voters  in  the  centuries  were 
for  various  causes  influenced  by  the  same  consideration.  Still  the 
party  of  his  enemies  was  not  destroyed,  and  there  must  have  been 
many  whose  resentment  he  would  have  to  fear.  His  resignation, 
therefore,  seems  another  instance  of  that  bold  trust  in  chance  which 
characterised  so  many  of  his  actions  in  war  as  well  as  peace.  "  He 
never  succeeded  so  well,"  he  used  to  say,  "  as  when  he  made  least 
preparation."  He  looked  upon  himself  as  pre-eminently  the  favourite 
of  fortune.  He  not  only  called  himself  Felix,  but  his  son  and 
daughter  Faustus  and  Fausta.  He  may  have  been  tired  of  power 
and  resolved  to  risk  it.  Happily  for  himself,  perhaps,  he  did  not  live 
long  enough  to  test  the  gratitude  of  friends  or  to  give  free  scope 
to  the  ill-will  of  enemies.  He  abdicated  the  dictatorship  towards 
the  end  of  79,  and  retired  to  his  villa  at  Cumae,  where  in  the  society 
of  artists,  actors,  musicians,  and  men  of  letters,  he  gave  free  vent  to 


1  This  date  is  deduced  from  Licinianus,  fr.  of  bk.  36.  Clinton  has  fixed 
it  in  September  81,  which  certainly  seems  more  reasonable.  If  the  12th  March 
given  by  Licinianus  is  to  be  accepted  it  would  seem  more  likely  to  be  in  80.  But 
Livy  (Ep.  89)  says  he  was  twenty-four  years  old,  and  on  the  30th  of  September  81 
he  would  be  twenty-five.  Therefore  according  to  Livy  the  triumph  must  have 
been  before  the  end  of  September  8i. 


XL  SULLA'S  DEATH  AND  CHARACTER  653 

his  taste  for  literature  and  art  as  well  as  luxury,  though  he  still 
interfered  in  the  local  politics  of  the  neighbouring  town  of  Puteoli. 
Before  many  months  had  passed  he  was  attacked  by  a  loathsome  and 
painful  disease,  and  seems  to  have  had  presages  of  death, —  Sulla's 
Chaldaeans  had  assured  him  that  he  was  to  die  at  the  height  of  death,  18. 
his  good  fortune  :  his  son  by  Metella  (whom  he  had  divorced  on 
her  death -bed  because  engaged  in  a  solemn  festival  for  which 
he  would  be  unfitted  by  contact  with  the  dead)  had  appeared 
in  his  dreams  and  invited  him  to  come  with  him  to  his 
mother.  He  prepared  for  his  end  with  calmness,  busying  himself 
with  the  composition  of  his  memoirs  until  two  days  before  it 
came. 

Thus  the  man  whose  hands  were  so  deeply  dyed  in  the  blood  of  His 
his  fellow-citizens,  the  scourge  of  Greece  and  Asia,  the  destroyer  of  funeral. 
Samnium,  died,  like  his  great  rival  Marius,  quietly  in  his  bed ;  and 
in  spite  of  some  opposition  on  the  part  of  the  consul  Lepidus,  was 
honoured  by  a  magnificent  funeral  procession  to  the  Campus 
Martins,  where  his  body  was  burned,  and  a  monument  erected 
with  an  inscription,  said  to  be  composed  by  himself,  affirming 
that  no  friend  had  outdone  him  in  benefits  or  foe  in  injuries.  Per- 
haps he  struck  the  true  keynote  of  his  career  when  he  called  himself  Estimate  of 
"  lucky."  He  certainly  had  been  supremely  fortunate  at  more  than  ^^l^^- 
one  crisis  in  his  career.  Coming  to  the  Jugurthine  war  almost  at 
the  eleventh  hour,  by  a  curious  series  of  chances  he  all  but  robbed 
Marius  of  the  credit  of  finishing  it.  His  enemy  Fimbria  had  all  but 
reduced  Mithridates  to  despair,  when  the  opportune  appearance  of 
Lucullus  and  his  fleet  gave  Sulla  all  the  advantage  of  what  the 
other  had  done.  In  the  Civil  war,  while  he  was  all  but  beaten 
himself,  both  at  Clusium  and  the  Colline  Gate,  he  was  excellently 
served  by  others.  Pompey,  Crassus,  Metellus,  Ofella  struck  the 
decisive  blows  in  the  war  from  which  he  reaped  all  the  profit.  A 
great  soldier  rather  than  a  great  general,  he  showed  a  courage  on 
the  field — partly  born  of  fatalism — which  inspired  others,  and  saved 
him  from  situations  into  which  a  greater  strategist  would  not  perhaps 
have  fallen.  By  a  mixture  of  severity  towards  breaches  of  military 
duty  which  affected  success,  and  indulgence  towards  crimes  which 
were  only  the  offspring  of  cruelty  or  avarice,  he  won  and  retained 
the  devotion  of  his  army.  Dissolute,  cynical,  and  cruel,  he  could 
have  possessed  the  love  of  few  in  civil  life  ;  yet  by  two  characteristics 
— definite  clearness  as  to  what  he  desired  and  utter  disregard  of 
human  life  in  attaining  it — he  not  only  gained  supreme  power,  but, 
what  was  more  surprising,  left  it  with  safety.  To  the  admirer  of  the 
Roman  libertas., — that  tyranny  of  the  few  under  republican  forms, — this 
homage  to  the  constitution  seemed  to  compensate  for  many  crimes. 


654 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Yet  in  neither  of  the  two  great  works  of  his  life  was  he  really  success- 
ful. Mithridates  was  not  crushed,  but  was  soon  at  war  with  Rome 
again.  The  constitution,  which  he  had  created  or  restored  at  the 
cost  of  so  much  blood,  stood  unshaken  for  scarcely  ten  years,  and 
finally  collapsed  in  the  great  Civil  war,  in  which  men  who  shared  his 
achievements  or  suffered  under  his  tyranny  as  youths,  took  principal 
parts  when  scarcely  past  middle  age. 

The  most  permanent  part  of  Sulla's  work  was  the  Romanising  of 
Italy.  Though  certain  cities  and  individuals  were  disfranchised  for 
the  time,  Italy  became  an  extended  Rome, — the  pomoerium,  as  it 
were,  being  pushed  up  to  the  Rubicon,  south  of  which  no  provincial 
governor  might  come  with  an  army,  and  especially  no  governor  of 
Gaul,  without  laying  down  his  imperium.  Cisalpine  Gaul  itself  was 
on  the  way  to  become  part  of  Italy.  The  three  Roman  colonies, 
Mutina,  Parma,  and  Eporedia,  had  always  enjoyed  the  citizenship, 
and  at  the  close  of  the  Social  war  the  four  "  Latin "  colonies — 
Placentia,  Bononia,  Cremona,  Aquileia — obtained  the  same  rights. 
Again  in  89  the  lex  Pompeia  organised  the  native  communities  south 
of  the  Po  on  the  model  of  the  Italian  municipia,  and  gave  the 
inhabitants  the  position  oi  peregrtm,  which  like  the  LaH7iitas  secured 
them  conubium  and  commercium,  though  not  the  suffrage,  except  in 
the  case  of  provincial  magistrates.  Thus,  though  Gallia  Cisalpina 
remained  a  province  and  was  governed  by  a  propraetor  or  proconsul 
until  after  the  death  of  Caesar,  it  was  on  a  peculiarly  favourable 
footing,  and  was  so  filled  with  Roman  citizens  that  it  became  known 
as  Gallia  Togata,  as  distinguished  from  Gaul  beyond  the  Alps. 

But  Italy  south  of  the  Rubicon  was  now  united  and  organised 
as  head  of  the  Empire.  The  old  system  of  planting  colonies  in  it  for 
military  purposes,  as  though  amidst  a  hostile  population,  came  to  an 
end.  Coloni  indeed  were  still  established  in  various  parts,  and  with 
the  old  formalities  of  the  military  colony, ^  but  their  purpose  was  now 
the  provision  for  poor  citizens  or  veteran  soldiers,  not  military 
defence.2  Since  the  lex  lulia  (89)  they  enjoyed  no  higher  political 
status  than  other  cities.  All  alike  came  under  certain  general  laws 
such  as  the  lex   lulia   mu7iicipalis    of    Caesar,    all    shared    in    the 


1  Cicero,  2  Phil.  §  102. 

^  The  Italian  colonies  before  the  Punic  wars  have  been  given  on  p.  156. 
Those  settled  afterwards  were  : — I.  "  Latin"  :  Brundisium  (244),  Spoletium  (241), 
Copia  or  Thurii  (193),  Valentia  or  Vibo  (192),  Pisae  (180).  II.  Roman  :  Pyrgi 
(191),  Puteoli,  Volternum,  Liternum,  Salernum,  Buxentum,  Sipontum,  Tempsa, 
Croton  (194),  Potentia,  Pisauruni  (184),  Satvirnia  (183),  Graviscae  (181),  Luna 
(180),  Auximum  (157),  Fabrateria  (124),  Minervia  at  Scylacium,  and  Neptunia  at 
Tarcntuni  (122). 


XL  THE  ORGANISATION  OF  THE  EMPH<E  655 

immunity  from  tributum,i  and  only  had  the  same  obligation  as  to 
military  service  as  other  cities.  The  right  of  voting  was  of  little 
value  perhaps  to  men  who  seldom  went  to  Rome,  but  such  as  it  was 
they  possessed  it :  and,  what  was  more  valuable,  they  had  the 
citizen's  protection  or  remedy  against  the  arbitrary  acts  of  Roman 
magistrates.  The  old  differences  of  internal  government  still  kept  up 
the  distinction  between  coloniae,  municipia,  praefecturae,  conciliabula 
and  fora, — but  from  the  standpoint  of  political  status  all  alike  might 
be  classed  as  municipia,  in  which  all  who  enjoyed  the  municipal 
franchise  were  thereby  Roman  citizens. ^  Therefore  the  military 
"  colonies  "  formed  by  Sulla  and  others  are  not  to  be  classed  with 
those  of  former  times, — the  list  of  which  may  now  be  considered 
closed,  —  but  were  rather  systematic  grants  of  land.  "Latin" 
colonies  could  no  longer  be  planted  in  Italy ;  but  though  the  pre- 
cedent of  the  Carthaginian  lunonia  of  C.  Gracchus  in  122  was 
followed  in  118  in  the  case  of  Narbo  Martius,  where  the  coloni 
retained  their  citizenship,  colonies  in  the  provinces  hereafter  had 
only  a  restricted  citizenship  analogous  to  the  old  Latinitas. 

Italy,    thus   organised,   was  at  the    head  of   an   empire    already  The  extent 
stretching  across  Europe  ;   and  the  territories  afterwards  added  were  ^^^^^. 
in   some  cases,  as  in  Gaul,  Greece,  and  Egypt,  already  preparing  to      ^"'^^''^• 
accept  her  power,  in  others  were  in  a  sense   merely  consequential 
accretions,  necessary  for  the  development  or  defence  of  that  already 
possessed.     There  were  now  ten  provinces^  governed  by  a  propraetor  Te7i 
or  proconsul,  with  a  quaestor  and  staff,  with  Sifonnula  or  charta,  under  pfovi7ices. 
a  law  passed  in  the  case  of  each  according  to  its  special  circumstances. 
Their  administration  gave  employment  and  chances  of  wealth  to  many 
Romans,  both  among  the  aristocrats  and  the  middle  class.      But  they 
also  contributed  to  the  greatness  of  Rome  by  the  auxiliaries  which  Their 
they  supplied  to  her  army  and   fleet,  and  the  tribute  paid   to   her 
exchequer.      This  tribute  was  raised  in  various  ways.      In  Sicily  and 
Asia  a  tenth  {decumd)  of  the  produce  of  the  year — in  wine,  oil,  wheat,  exchequer. 

1  The  twelve  colonies  which  in  209  refused  their  contingents  were  in  204 
subjected  to  the  census  and  tributum  like  Roman  citizens  (Livy  xxix.  15,  27)<  but 
from  the  latter  they  would  be  freed  like  the  other  citizens  in  168. 

2  To  put  it  differently,  a  man  who  was  a  citizen  of  one  of  these  towns  was 
ipso  facto  a  Roman  citizen,  but  what  constituted  him  a  citizen  of  one  of  these 
towns  was  still  different  in  different  municipia,  coloniae,  etc. 

^  Sicily,  Sardinia  with  Corsica,  Hispania  Citerior,  Hispania  Ulterior,  Gallia 
Cisalpina,  Gallia  Narbonensis,  Macedonia,  Africa,  Asia,  Cilicia.  Besides  these 
Illyricum  or  Dalmatia  was  partly  organised,  paid  tribute,  and  was  under  pro- 
tection, but  it  seems  that  no  annual  governor  was  sent  there  regularly  till  the  time 
of  Caesar.  Cyrenaica  had  been  left  to  Rome  (95),  but  had  not  yet  been  made  a 
province  in  form.  Egypt,  it  was  said,  had  also  been  bequeathed,  and  at  any  rate 
its  kings  depended  on  Roman  support.  Greece  was  partly  incorporated  with 
Macedonia,  partly  enjoyed  a  nominal  freedom. 


tributions 
to  the 
imperial 


656 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


oats,  and  other  grains — was  transmitted  to  Rome.i  Customs  {por- 
toria),  and  a  charge  for  the  use  of  the  pasture  land  {scripturd)^ 
which  had  been  reserved  in  the  several  states,  were  paid  in  money. 
There  was  this  distinction  between  the  two  provinces  :  in  Sicily  the 
contracts  for  farming  the  revenue  were  sold  at  Syracuse ;  for  Asia, 
by  the  censors  in  Rome.  In  the  other  provinces  a  fixed  sum  was  paid 
{stipe7idium  or  tributimi)^  but  the  manner  of  assessing  it  differed  in 
the  several  provinces,  or  even  in  the  several  communities  in  the  pro- 
vinces, generally  in  accordance  with  the  fiscal  arrangements  existing 
before  the  Roman  occupation.  In  every  province  there  were  certain 
cities  which,  either  as  a  reward  for  services,  or  in  consequence  of 
terms  made  at  their  surrender,  were  free  from  the  stipendium  {im- 
niimes).  But  even  these  shared  in  the  special  land  tax  {tributum 
soli),  which  was  raised  to  pay  the  expenses  of  the  praetor  and  his 
staff,  or  to  defray  the  cost  of  war.  Besides  these  sources  of  revenue 
the  Roman  exchequer  received  a  royalty  on  mines,  saltworks,  and 
fisheries,  which,  like  the  customs  and  pasture  rents  in  the  several 
communities  within  the  province,^  were  paid  in  money. 

Like  our  own  Indian  Empire  this  great  empire  had  been  built  up 
by  men  able  and  active,  though  sometimes  cruel  and  corrupt,  often 
with  little  direction  or  control  from  home,  where  the  chief  interest 
felt  was  in  the  wealth  poured  into  the  treasury  and  the  games  and 
shows  which  accompanied  the  triumphs.  In  regard  to  no  part  of  the 
empire  was  this  indifference  more  conspicuous  or  more  harmful  in 
its  consequences  than  in  the  East.  The  pirates  of  Cilicia  and  Crete 
swept  the  Aegean,  crippling  commerce  and  ruining  cities,  and  the 
Romans  seemed  not  to  be  moved  till  the  audacity  of  these  sea-rovers 
brought  them  actually  into  Italy.  Dynasties  rose  and  fell  in  Asia 
without  seriously  disturbing  the  minds  of  statesmen  or  people  ;  and 
the  good  or  ill  government  of  the  provincials  was  regarded,  not  so 
much  a  matter  for  energetic  interference  and  reform,  as  affording 
opportunities  for  party  triumphs  and  personal  revenge. 

Meanwhile  the  last  years  of  Sulla's  life  introduce  us  to  a  group 
of  men  who  were  to  play  prominent  parts  in  the  closing  scenes  of 
the  republic,  and  who,  either  from  the  greater  abundance  of  the 
records  remaining  of  them,  or  the  more  permanent  import  of  their 
work,  occupy  a  larger  share  than  almost  any  other  in  the  imagina- 


1  The  publican!  calculated  the  average  produce  and  undertook  to  transmit  a 
tenth  to  Rome,  making  their  profit  by  the  excess  of  the  produce  over  the  estimate. 
A  bad  harvest,  therefore,  or  a  careless  collection  might  cause  them  to  lose 
heavily  ;  and  in  their  eagerness  for  business  they  sometimes  made  so  high  an 
estimate  as  to  overreach  themselves, 

-  A  province  consisted  of  a  collection  of  urban  communities  with  a  recognised 
territory.     But  in  each  there  was  usually  a  reserve  of  public  land. 


XL  THE  NEW  GENERATION  AND  LITERATURE  657 

tion  of  posterity.  Pompey  had  triumphed  in  8 1  ;  Caesar  had  served 
his  first  campaign  ;  Crassus  had  laid  the  foundation  of  his  colossal 
fortune  at  the  auctions  of  the  Sullan  confiscation  ;  Catiline  had 
committed  his  first  crime  ;  Cicero  had  delivered  his  first  speech  in 
a  public  cause  ;  M.  Terentius  Varro,  "  the  most  learned  of  the 
Romans,"  was  already  forty  years  old,  and  yet  survived  them  all. 

With  the  new  men  a  new  literary  development  was  taking  place,    xhe  jiew 
The   most   characteristic   and   flourishing    department   was    that    of  literature. 
oratory.      It  was  natural  that  it  should  be  so.      Most  of  the  upper 
class  desired  public  ofiice,  and  one  of  the  surest  claims  to  it  was  the 
reputation,  not  only  for  skill  in  addressing  Senate  or  people,  but  even 
more  for  the   power  of  convincing  juries,  who,   being  senators   or 
equites,  were  above  the  average  in  education  and  intelligence.      Ac- 
cordingly every  man  of  note  in  this  and  the  previous  age  was  more 
or  less  of  an  orator ;    many  of  them  left  speeches  written  out  for  Orators. 
publication,    as    Africanus,    the     Gracchi,     Metellus     Macedonicus, 
and    many    others.      The    most    noted    of  all    before    the    time   of 
Cicero  was  M.  Antonius  (143-87),  the  grandfather  of  the  triumvir, 
and    L.   Licinius   Crassus   (140-91),  long   looked   up   to   as   models 
on  which  young  Roman  orators  should  form  their  style.      But  in 
other  ways  also  the  mass  of  Roman  literature  (though  only  frag- 
ments survive)  had  been   steadily  swelling  and  developing   in  new 
directions.      L.  Attius  (170-104)  had  kept  to  the  custom  of  adapting 
Greek  tragedies ;  but   T.    Quintius   Atta   (ob.    78)  and  L.   Afranius 
(b.  154)  had  been  prolific  in  fabidae  togatae — comedies  on  Roman  Comediae 
subjects  with  titles  drawn  from  Roman  festivals  or  stories.     Above  togatae. 
all  C.  Lucihus  (148-103)  had  almost  created  a  new  department  of 
literature   in   his   saiirae,  which   handled   subjects  of  the  day   and  Satire. 
started  a  form  of  composition  claimed  as  wholly  Roman  by  Quin- 
tilian,  afterwards  so  brilliantly  used  by  Horace,  Persius,  and  Juvenal. 
It  was  also   an  age  of  memoir-writing.      Q.   Catulus,   the  victor  at  Memoirs. 
Vercellae,    Sulla  himself,   and   P.    Rutilius    Rufus   all   left   memoirs 
behind  them  ;  while  more  formal  history  was  represented  by  L.  Lu-  History. 
cullus  on  the  Social  war,  Piso  on  the  Civil  wars  of  Marius  and  Sulla, 
and  by  a  number  of  Annalists.      In  jurisprudence  there  were  already  Jurispru- 
many  eminent  names,  especially  those  of  the  two   Scaevolae.     And  dence. 
Greek  philosophy,   which,  however   imperfectly  understood,   was  to  Philosophy. 
influence  so  profoundly  the  best  men  at   Rome,  had   already  been 
expounded  by  the   stoic   C.    Blosius  of  Cumae,  by  Q.  Tubero,   Q. 
Scaevola  the  augur,  L.  Aelius  Stilo,  and  others.      Thus  both  the  in- 
tellectual life  at  Rome  and  her  foreign  dominion  were  assuming  the 
form  which  they  presented  at  their  highest  development. 

In  social  life  we  may  notice,  first,  that  family  life  in   Rome  was 
being  much   undermined  by  the  facility  of  divorce.      Divorce  was 

2  u 


Verres. 


658  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap,  xl 

known  in  early  times  and  provided  for  by  the  XII  Tables,  but  was  so 
rare  that  that  of  Carvilius  (231)  was  spoken  of  as  the  first.  It  is 
probable  that  the  most  solemn  matrimony — that  by  confarreatio — 
was  indissoluble  except  in  the  gravest  circumstances.  But  marriage 
in  manus  or  usiis^  which  became  the  prevalent  form,  was  easily  dis- 
soluble by  the  mere  will  of  either  of  the  pair ;  and  though  Cicero's 
remark  on  Pompey's  divorce,  that  it  was  "generally  approved," 
shows  that  public  opinion  was  not  always  favourable,  yet  it  had 
evidently  become  exceedingly  common,  and  tended  to  be  more  and 
more  so.  Secondly,  enormous  private  fortunes  were  becoming 
common,  and  establishments  were  maintained  on  an  almost  in- 
credible scale.  The  slaves  in  a  rich  man's  house  were  counted  by 
hundreds,  every  department  of  household  work,  dress,  and  comfort 
had  their  special  attendants.  Crassus  thought  no  man  rich  whose 
income  could  not  support  an  army.  Lucullus  could  spend  50,000 
denarii  on  a  single  feast.  Cicero,  who  had  little  paternal  wealth, 
and  was  forbidden  by  the  lex  Cmcia  (204)  to  take  fees,  yet  ac- 
knowledges the  receipt  of  a  sum  equal  to  ^160,000  in  legacies,  and 
mentions  at  least  seven  villas  belonging  to  him  besides  his  town 
house.  In  many  cases  this  wealth  came  from  the  plunder  of 
provinces.  The  most  conspicuous  example  of  this  was  C.  Verres. 
As  pro-quaestor  of  Cilicia  (80-79)  he  had  not  only  enriched  himself 
with  money,  but  with  works  of  art  from  numberless  towns  in  Asia 
and  Achaia.  This  he  carried  on  to  an  incredible  extent  in  his  three 
years  as  propraetor  in  Sicily  (73-71).  No  chicane,  no  art,  no  violence 
was  omitted  to  wring  from  towns,  nobles,  and  rich  men  their  money  or 
the  most  cherished  objects  of  religious  or  ancestral  veneration.  His 
trial  took  place  in  70,  and  was  of  special  importance  as  testing  the 
impartiality  of  the  senatorial  courts.  But  though  Cicero  by  his  exer- 
tions made  his  condemnation  inevitable,  he  was  able,  on  retiring  to 
Marseilles  to  escape  it,  to  retain  the  vast  majority  of  his  ill-gotten 
gains,  and  to  live  in  profusion  and  luxury  till,  in  43,  he  fell  an 
unpitied  victim  to  the  proscriptions  of  the  Triumvirs. 


Authorities.  — Plutarch,  Lives  of  Sulla,  Pompey,  Lucullus,  SertoriuSi  Crassus. 
Livy,  Ep.  84-90.  Appian,  B.  Civ.  i.  79-108  (the  only  continuous  narrative). 
Florus  iii.  21.  Dion  Cassius,  fr.  106-110.  Diodorus,  fr.  of  xxxvii.  Orosius  v. 
20-22.  Zonaras  x.  i.  Cicero's  speech  in  defence  of  Roscius  of  Ameria  (81  or  80) 
refers  directly  to  a  circumstance  rising  out  of  the  proscriptions.  His  Verrine 
Orations  and  Letters  to  his  brother  Quintus  are  the  best  authorities  for  the  treat- 
ment of  the  provinces. 


CHAPTER    XLI 

WARS   IN    ITALY,    SPAIN,    AND   THE   EAST 

Lepidus  attempts  to  rescind  Sulla's  acts — He  is  sent  to  Etmria  (78) — Attacks 
Rome — Is  defeated  and  goes  to  Sardinia  {jy) — Sertorius  in  Spain — Defeats 
many  Roman  armies — The  campaigns  of  Metellus  (79-76) — Sertorius  joined 
by  Perpenna  and  partisans  of  Lepidus  {77) — Negotiates  with  Mithridates 
(75-74) — Pompey  in  Spain  (76-74) — Death  of  Sertorius  (72) — Rebellion  of 
gladiators  and  slaves  under  Spartacus  (73-71) — Victories  of  Crassus  (72-71) — 
Second  war  with  Mithridates  under  Murena  (83-81) — Wars  with  Thracians 
and  with  the  pirates  (78-74) — Third  war  with  Mithridates  and  campaigns  of 
Lucullus( 74-67) — BiTHYNiA  left  to  the  Roman  people(74) — Battle  atChalcedon 
and  siege  of  Cyzicus  (73)— Naval  victories  (72) — Battle  of  Cabira  (71) — Mith- 
ridates in  Armenia  (71-69) — Lucullus  invades  Armenia,  battle  at  Tigranocerta 
(69) — Battle  of  Arsanias  (68) — Mutiny  in  the  Roman  army  (67) — Recall  of 
Lucullus  {6y) — Census  b.c.  70,  450,000. 

SULLA  was  no  sooner  dead  than  the  opposition  to  his  system  revived.   Coss.  M. 
The  consul  Lepidus,  whose  appointment  Pompey  had  regarded  as  a  Aemilius 
triumph  over  Sulla,  was  not  long  in  showing  his  hand.      He  was  just  ^^l^  ^^' 
the  sort  of  man  of  whom  Sulla  had  desired  to  cleanse  the  state,  and  ^^^  Catn- 
had  returned  from  his  praetorship  in  Sicily  (80)  infamous  for  extor-  lus,  78. 
tion   and  tyranny  ;  while  his   colleague,  a  strong  supporter  of   the 
Optimates,  is   represented  by  Cicero  as  one  of  the  best  and  most 
honest  of  men.     The  two  were  at  any  rate  always  at  variance,  and 
Lepidus  seems  to  have  relied  for  support  on  the  discontent  existing 
in  the  Italian  communities,  on  which  Sulla's  hand  had  been  heavy. 
He  began  by  opposing  the  ex-dictator's  public  funeral,  but  withdrew 
in  deference  to  Pompey,  who,  in  spite  of  his  inclination  to  the  side 
of  the  Populares,  his  strained   relations  with  Sulla  during  the  last 
years  of  his  life,  and  the  slight  of  being  passed  over  without  mention 
in  his  will,  still  wished  to  pay  him  this  last  honour.     Soon  afterwards 
he  brought  in  a  series  of  laws  intended  to  rescind  Sulla's  acta.      He 
was  not  indeed  prepared  to  restore  the  tribunitian  power,i  but  he 

1  Verum  ubi  convenerant  Tr.  PI.  consules  uti  tribuniciam  potestatem  restituerent, 
negavit  prior  Lepidus,  et  in  contione  magna  pars  adsensast  dicenti,  non  esse  utile 
restitui  tribuniciam  potestatem.     Licinianus  (who  alone  records  this). 


66o 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


carried  a  law  without  opposition  to  renew  the  distribution  of  cheap 
corn,  and  proposed  to  recall  those  who  had  been  banished  by  Sulla, 
and  restore  the  lands  which  had  been  divided  among  the  veterans  to 
their  owners.  The  contention  between  the  two  consuls  became  so 
vehement,  that  the  Senate  was  glad  to  send  both  into  Etruria, 
to  put  down  a  rising  of  certain  of  those  dispossessed  owners  who 
were  forcibly  recovering  their  estates.  The  Senate  had  required 
them  to  swear  not  to  turn  their  arms  against  each  other  ;  but 
Lepidus  regarded  the  oath  as  only  binding  during  his  consul- 
ship :  next  year  as  proconsul  of  Narbonensis  he  would  have  a 
free  hand.  The  Senate  in  alarm  ordered  him  back  to  Rome  to 
hold  the  elections,  but  he  declined  to  come ;  and  as  Catulus  could 
not  safely  leave  his  army,  the  new  year  opened  without  consuls,  and 
Appius  Claudius  was  appointed  interrex.  With  the  spring  of  77 
Lepidus  prepared  for  action.  Leaving  his  legate  M.  Brutus  in  com- 
mand of  the  valley  of  the  Po  with  an  army  at  Mutina,  he  marched 
against  Rome.  He  found  Catulus  waiting  for  him  at  the  Milvian 
Bridge,  and  was  decisively  defeated  there,  or,  as  some  say,  in  the 
Campus  Martius,  to  which  Catulus  had  retired.  He  retreated  to 
Cosa  in  Etruria,  followed  by  Catulus,  and  had  to  fight  again  in  order 
to  take  ship  for  Sardinia,  where  he  shortly  afterwards  died  from 
disease, — aggravated  by  chagrin  at  his  failure  ;  at  the  loss  of  his  son 
Scipio,  who  had  shut  himself  up  in  Alba  but  had  been  starved  out 
and  executed ;  and,  as  some  say,  at  the  discovery  of  the  unfaithfulness 
of  his  wife.  Pompey,  who  had  determined  to  support  the  Senate,  and 
had  received  a  military  command,  then  marched  against  Brutus  in 
Mutina.  Brutus  did  not  await  his  attack,  but  retired  to  Regium 
(seventeen  miles  off)  with  an  escort  of  cavalry,  and  there  next  day 
was  killed  by  Geminius  on  the  order  of  Pompey. ^ 

The  Optimates  had  thus  for  the  time  successfully  defended  the 
Sullan  constitution.  But  a  formidable  danger  was  also  threatening 
in  Spain.  Quintus  Sertorius  left  Italy  after  the  battle  of  Tifata,  at 
the  end  of  83,  to  take  up  the  government  of  farther  Spain  as  pro- 
praetor. Some  say  that  he  did  so  under  pressure  of  Cinna  and  the 
younger  Marius,  who  found  his  counsels  inconvenient.  However 
that  may  be,  he  made  himself  popular  with  the  Roman  residents  by 
his  mildness  and  equity,  and  with  the  natives  by  wise  measures, 
as  well  as  by  liberal  gifts.  He  knew  that  Sulla  would  supersede  him, 
and  had  left  his  legatus  lulius  Salinator  with  6000  men  to  block 
the  road  over  the  Pyrenees.  But  when  Sulla's  nominee.  Gains 
Annius,  appeared,  Salinator  was  murdered  ;  his  soldiers  abandoned 
their  entrenchments  ;   and  Annius  marched  down  the  country  with 


Scandal  said  that  he  svirrendered  on  promise  of  his  life. 


XLi  SERTORIUS  IN  SPAIN  66i 

a  large  army.       Sertorius,  who  had  only  3000    men,   retired    into  Sertorius 

New  Carthage,  and  thence   crossed  to   Mauritania  with  ships  and  crosses  to 

men.      Repulsed   there,  and  dogged    by  the    ships  of  Annius   from  ^f^^^^- 

island  to  island,  he  passed  through  the  Straits  and  landed  near  the 

mouth  of  the  Baetis,  accompanied   by  some  Cilician  pirate  vessels. 

Here  he  was  told  by  sailors  of  delightful   islands   in  the  Atlantic 

where  the  climate  was  charming,  the  means  of  life  abundant,  and 

peace  unbroken.      He  longed,  it  is  said,  for  this  rest  from  war  and 

trouble ;  but  his  Cilician  auxiliaries  preferred  arms  and  plunder,  and 

he  had  to  cross  to  Africa  again,  where,  in  support  of  the  Mauritani, 

who  were  rebelling  against  their  king,  he  took  Tangier,  having  first 

defeated  Sulla's  legate  Paccianus. 

His  fame  now  induced  the  Lusitani  to  invite  him  to  become  their  Sertorius 

leader.       He   therefore   crossed   once   more   to    Spain,    and  quickly  ^^«^'^'' 

established  a  great  reputation  among  the  simple  country  folk,  which  i^^^i^^^ii 

he  enhanced  by  a  pretence  of  Divine  aid.     A  favourite  fawn,  given 

him  by  a  hunter,  accompanied  his  camp,  which  he  allowed  it  to  be 

understood  had  been  bestowed  on  him  by  Diana,  and  was  a  pledge 

of  her  support.      He  soon  had  a  large  army,  constantly  supplemented 

by  refugees  from  Rome  who  disliked  or  feared  the  present  regime. 

He  still  claimed  to  have  constitutional  imperium,  but  was  in  fact  in 

open  war  with   Rome.      He   made    frequent   raids  on  Baetica,   the 

southern  province  ;  took  many  towns  ;  and  defeated  the  propraetor  Q. 

Fufidius  on  the  Baetis  with  a  loss  of  2000  men,  and  Cotta  in  a  sea-  Caecihus 

fight  near  Gibraltar.      Quintus  Caecilius,  who  came  as  proconsul  to   •Jtj.ZL 

farther  Spam   m  79,  found  himself  in  a   country  devoid  of  roads,  yg.yd. 

always  liable  to  be  attacked  by  an  enemy  whom  he  yet  could  not 

bring  to  battle  ;  while   L.  Domitius,  governor  of  the  upper  province,  Fall  of  L. 

was,  with  the  legate  Thorius,  defeated  and  slain  by  the  quaestor  of  Domitttts 

Sertorius.     As  in  the  old  wars,  the  Romans  were  being  pushed  to  ,  henobar- 

the  north   of  the    Ebro :    and  even   there    Sertorius    defeated    two 

armies,    one    under  L.   Valerius   Praeconinus    on    the    Sicoris,   and  DefeatofL. 

another  under  L.   Manlius,  who  had   come  to  the  aid  of  Metellus    Valerius 

from  Gallia  Narbonensis.     In  77  he  was  reinforced  by  M.  Perpenna,  ^     .: 

a  legate  of  the  rebellious  proconsul  Lepidus,  who,  after  the  death  of  -^_ 

his  chief,   came  from  Sardinia  with  an  army  and  many  nobles  who 

had  been  involved  in  the  abortive  movement.      He  was  now  at  the  Sertorius 

head  of  a  considerable  party  of  citizens  ;  his  constitutional  preten-  pined  by 

tions  were  still  more  insisted  upon  ;  and  it  was  believed  that  he  meant    „"  . 

.  r-        '  Jrerpeniia, 

to  march  agamst  Rome  itself.     It  was  resolved,  therefore,  to  remforce  J77. 
Metellus  with  a  fresh  army  under  Pompeius,  already  distinguished 
for  services  in  the  Marsic  war  and  in  Africa.      He  was  still  at  the 
head  of  a  force  outside  Rome,  kept  on  foot  since  the  rebellion  of 
Lepidus ;    and  he  was  now  elected    to    the  command  in    Spain  as 


662 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


73-72. 
Position  of 
Pompey. 


proconsul,  or  rather,  as  his  proposer  answered  some  caviller,  pro 
consulibus. 

The  arrival  of  Pompey  inspired  new  energy  in  the  Roman  forces, 
which  had  been  slackly  handled  by  Metellus,  now  past  fifty  and 
always  inclined  to  a  luxurious  life.  Yet  his  first  essay  was  unfor- 
tunate. He  advanced  to  the  relief  of  Lauron,  a  town  south  of  the 
Sucro,  which  had  declared  for  Rome,  and  was  accordingly  being 
besieged  by  a  division  of  the  forces  of  Sertorius.  But  he  allowed 
himself  to  be  caught  in  an  unfavourable  position,  and  was  forced 
to  look  on  while  the  enemy  captured  and  burnt  the  town. 

Next  spring  he  again  marched  south  to  attack  Dianium,  the  naval 
headquarters  of  Sertorius,  and  port  of  Sucro,  named  from  a  temple 
of  Diana  on  the  foreland.  But  Sertorius  hastened  to  defend  it,  and 
Pompey,  beaten  and  wounded,  retired  upon  Saguntum.  There  he 
was  joined  by  Metellus,  who  had  defeated  L.  Heracleius  at  Italica. 
Another  desperate  battle  was  fought,  in  which  the  cavalry  commanded 
by  Sertorius,  though  losing  heavily,  routed  the  Roman  cavalry  with 
great  loss,  though  the  division  commanded  by  Perpenna  was  defeated 
and  cut  to  pieces  by  Metellus.  On  the  whole,  Sertorius  had  held  his 
own  in  a  remarkable  manner.  He  advanced  to  the  Ebro,  occupied 
Calagurris,  and  forced  Pompey  almost  out  of  Spain.  A  large  party 
in  Rome  wished  him  success,  and  wrote  encouraging  him  to  perse- 
vere ;  and  about  the  same  time  he  was  visited  by  Metrophanes,  an 
envoy  of  Mithridates.  The  king  offered  to  recognise  him  as  head  of 
the  Roman  State,  and  supply  him  with  money  and  ships,  if  he  would 
in  return  acknowledge  the  king's  right  to  the  province  of  Asia. 
Sertorius  declined  this  concession,  but  offered  Bithynia,  Cappadocia, 
Galatia,  and  Paphlagonia,  which  were  not  Roman  provinces  though 
under  Roman  guarantee.  But  when,  at  the  end  of  74,  the  question 
of  the  Bithynian  succession  came  up,  Mithridates  sent  him  3000 
talents  and  forty  ships  ;  and  in  return  Sertorius  sent  M.  Marius  (the 
One-Eyed)  as  "  proconsul"  of  Asia,  to  co-operate  with  the  king. 
Thus  Sertorius  was  acting  as  a  constitutional  magistrate  of  Rome, 
dealing  with  the  empire  as  already  under  his  control,  and  with  a 
sufficient  number  of  Roman  men  of  rank  in  his  district  and  camp 
to  keep  up  the  pretence  of  a  Senate,  as  Pompey  was  to  do  in  49-48, 
and  as  Sulla  had  done  before. 

In  73  Pompey  was  still  confined  almost  to  the  north-east  corner 
of  Spain.  He  had  exhausted  his  own  resources,  and  had  had  to  ask 
for  money  and  men  from  Rome  ;  which  he  got  the  more  readily 
as  the  consul  Lucullus  wished  for  the  command  against  Mithridates, 
and  feared,  if  Pompey  were  discouraged  in  Spain,  that  he  would 
return  home  and  be  sent  to  Asia  instead.  As  the  war  went  on  and 
became  more  and  more  wearisome,  it  was  prosecuted  with  increasing 


xi.i  REVOLT  OF  THE  GLADIATORS  663 

severities    on    both    sides.       Sertorius'    temper  was    embittered    by  Exasper- 
desertions,  and  his  savage  acts  of  retaliation,  especially  the  killing  (i^ion  of 
or  enslaving  of  a  number  of  boys  at  Osca  {Huesca\  where  he  had  ^^^i^rius 
himself  established  a  school,  alienated  the  affections  of  many.      He 
could  not  trust  his   Roman  bodyguard,  but  surrounded  himself  with 
Celtiberians,  who   irritated  and   shamed   his   Roman   adherents   by 
bringing   into  painful  prominence   the  fact  that  they  were  fighting  Successes 
against  their  country.      The  result  was  that  the  aniiies  of  Metellus  Metellus 
and  Pompey  made  steady  progress  in  forcing  the  submission  of  towns  "^^^ 
that  had  taken  part  with  him  ;  and  though  he  still  performed  some 
brilliant  feats,  such  as  forcing  Pompey  to  raise  the  siege  of  Pallantia, 
he  must  have  felt  his  cause  declining. 

The  more  that  was   the   case  the  sharper   his  temper  and  the  7^. 
heavier  his  hand  became  ;  and  Perpenna,  who  had  always  chafed  Murder  c 
under  his   subordination,  beginning  to  fear  for  his   own  safety,   re-  ^^^^^^^^^^ 
solved  to   strike   the  first  blow^.      To  celebrate  a  real  or  pretended 
victory  he  induced  Sertorius  to  attend  a  banquet,  at  which,  contrary 
to  his  known  wishes,  certain  buffooneries  were  indulged  in,  which 
made  him  turn  on  his  couch  away  from  the  table.     At  this  moment 
Perpenna  gave  the  signal  by  dropping  a  cup,  and  the  guest  next 
Sertorius  suddenly  stabbed  him.    Attempting  to  rise,  he  was  dragged 
back  by  the  conspirators  and  killed,  and  many  of  his  guards  who 
were  about  the  house  shared  his  fate.      Perpenna,  however,  did  not  Perpenna 
gain  what  he  hoped.    The  natives  on  every  side  offered  their  sub-  gains 
mission   to'  Pompey  and    Metellus,    and   he   soon   found  his   cause  ^^^^^i 
hopeless  ;    he  had,  however,  seized  Sertorius'  papers,  among  which 
were  letters  from  leading  men   at   Rome,  and  he  hoped  by   offer- 
ing them  to   Pompey  to  purchase    his   own   safety.       But  Pompey 
refused  to  see  him,  ordered  him  to  be  killed,  and  the  letters  to  be 
burnt  unread. 

Resistance  was   not  wholly  overcome   in    Spain  ;    certain    towns  Spartacu. 
still  held  out,  and  the  horrors  of  the  siege  of  Calagurris  iCalaherrd)  73-7^- 
have   scarcely  ever  been   surpassed.      But   attention  at  Rome  was 
turned  to  dangers  nearer  home.     The  custom  of  exhibiting  gladiators.   Gladiator 
begun  in  264,  had  become  thoroughly  established.      They  were  the 
most  popular  of  shows,  for  which  the  theatres   and   almost   every 
other    amusement  were  quickly  deserted.     The  unhappy  men  thus 
forced    to    mutual    slaughter    to  "  make    a    Roman    holiday,"   were 
perhaps    at    first    criminals,    whose    lives    were    forfeited    in     any 
case,   like    the    slaves    brought    from    Sicily,   or    at    any   rate  were 
prisoners  of  war.      But  as  the  fashion  extended  the  wealthy  began 
to  pride  themselves  on   training  the  best  fighters,  and  likely  men 
were    bought    up   in    every  direction.       The    people    of   the    north 
were  specially  valued  for  the  purpose  on  account  of  their  size  and 


664 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


72. 

Continued 
victories  of 
Spartacus. 


Coss.  L. 

Gelliits 

Poplicola, 

Cn. 

1  Cornelius 
'Lenfulus, 
\'72, 


^partacus 
\t  Thurii, 


\2-7f. 


valour.  They  were  confined  in  training  establishments  or  hidt  until 
wanted,  where  their  food  and  exercise  were  specially  directed  by  a 
trainer  or  lanista.  A  large  school  of  this  kind  at  Capua,  in  which 
certain  Gauls  and  Thracians  were  being  trained,  was  owned  at  this 
time  by  one  Lentulus.  Two  hundred  of  them  made  a  plot  to  escape. 
It  was  discovered,  but  about  eighty  contrived  to  break  out ;  armed 
themselves  with  knives  and  spits  from  a  neighbouring  cook-shop  ; 
and  seized  some  waggons  full  of  arms  going  to  another  gladiatorial 
school.  They  elected  Spartacus,  a  Thracian  of  great  power  and 
ability,  as  their  captain,  and,  entrenching  themselves  on  a  spur  of 
Mount  Vesuvius,  resisted  all  attempts  of  the  forces  in  Capua  to  arrest 
them.  One  of  the  praetors,  C.  Claudius  Pulcher,  was  sent  against 
them,  but  was  defeated  and  lost  his  camp.  They  were  now  joined 
by  the  slaves  from  the  various  ergastula  in  the  country  round,  and 
soon  had  a  formidable  force.  Another  praetor,  P.  Varenus,  did  no 
better  than  Claudius,  and  the  slave  army  daily  increased.  Varenus' 
legate  Furius  was  routed ;  another  member  of  his  staff,  Corsinius, 
lost  his  life  and  many  men,  with  all  his  baggage  and  camp  ;  and 
Varenus  himself  was  again  and  again  beaten  in  skirmishes.  Spar- 
tacus traversed  Italy  almost  at  his  will,  intending,  it  is  said,  to  make 
his  way  over  the  Alps  to  his  native  land.  But  his  followers  were 
more  intent  on  plunder,  and  years  afterwards  Horace  could  express 
a  half  playful  doubt  whether  any  of  the  wine  cellars  in  the  country 
houses  had  escaped  the  "  wandering  Spartacus."  ^  The  consuls  of 
7  5  were  despatched  with  a  regular  army  against  them  ;  and  Crixus, 
one  of  their  commanders,  was  defeated  and  killed  near  Mount 
Garganus,  on  the  coast  of  Apulia.  But  the  consuls  were  in  turn  de- 
feated by  Spartacus  when  they  attempted  to  stop  his  march  to 
the  north.  Cassius,  proconsul  of  Gallia,  was  beaten  near  Mutina  ; 
and  finally  Spartacus  inflicted  a  great  slaughter  on  both  consuls  in 
Picenum.  It  was  after  this  victoiy  that  he  committed  almost  the 
only  cruelty  to  be  fairly  charged  against  him,  when  he  forced  300 
Romans  to  fight  as  gladiators  at  the  funeral  of  Crixus. 

His  followers  now  forced  him  to  abandon  his  plan  of  crossing  the 
Alps  ;  nor  did  he  venture  to  advance  on  Rome.  Turning  south  once 
more  he  occupied  Thurii  for  the  winter,  where  merchants  crowded  in 
with  every  kind  of  goods.  Forbidding  the  importation  of  gold  and 
silver,  he  spent  the  winter  in  collecting  materials  of  war  and  forging 
weapons,  and  was  ready  in  the  spring  for  still  greater  enterprises. 
Such  was  the  terror  inspired  by  him,  that,  the  war  having  been 
assigned  as  the  praetorian  '  province,'  there  were  no  candidates 
for    the    praetorship   at    the   end   of   72.      At    length    L.    Licinius 


H ' 


^   Hor.  Od.  III.   14,  19,  Spartaciim  si  qua  potuit  vagantcjnfallcre  testa. 


XLI  THE  FALL  OF  SPARTACUS  665 

Crassus  volunteered,  and  took  the  field  as    praetor   against    Spar-  7/.  The 
tacus,  whose   movements,  however,  were   so   rapid   and  incalculable  command 
that  it  was  impossible   to   settle  on  a  plan  of  campaign.     Crassus  ^f^^"  ^" 
entered     Picenum    and    sent    his    legate    Mummius     to    find    and 
follow  the  enemy,  without  attacking  him.      But  Mummius  could  not 
refrain  from  battle  ;  and  in  it  his  soldiers  behaved  so  badly,  that  Defeat  of 
having    sternly    reprimanded    him    Crassus    punished    the    men    by  Mummius. 
decimation.      Having  thus  restored  discipline  he  defeated  a  body  of 
10,000  slaves,  encamped  separately,  with  a  loss  of  two-thirds  of  their 
number.      He  then   advanced  against   Spartacus  himself,  whom  he  spartacus 
forced   to   retire   into   the   extreme   south,   and   shut  himself  up   in  defeated 
Rhegium,  where  he  tried  to  negotiate  with  some   Cilician  pirates  to  "^'^  shut 
transport  his  anny  to  Sicily.      He  hoped  to  rouse  the  slaves  there  j^/iegiuvt. 
and   cut   off  a  great  source  of  corn  supply  from  Rome.      But  the 
Cilicians,  though  they  received  his  money,  put  out  to  sea  and  left 
him  ;  and  Crassus,  who  had  followed  him,  now  endeavoured  to  shut 
him  up  in  the  Bruttian  peninsula  by  a  deep  trench  and  bank  from 
sea  to  sea  somewhere  above  Scylacium,  about  thirty  miles  in  length. 
Spartacus,  however,  with  a  third  of  his  army  contrived  to  cross  it  by  Spartacus 
means  of  fascines,  and  made  his  way  towards  Thurii.      Alarmed  lest  breaks  out. 
he  should  again  march  towards  Rome,  Crassus  asked  the  Senate  to 
summon   Pompey  from   Spain   and   M.    Lucullus   from    Macedonia. 
But  he  repented  of  the  application  when  he  found  that  there  were 
dissensions  in  the  enemy's  ranks,  and  that  a  large  division  of  them 
had  left  Spartacus  and  was  encamped  by  itself,  not  far  from  Volci, 
under  Gains  Gannicus  and  Castus.      He  routed  these  men,  but  was 
prevented  from  a  pursuit  by  the  appearance  of  Spartacus,  who  had 
followed  him.     Yet  he  presently  compelled  the  combined  forces  to  Defeat  of 
give  him  battle,  and  after  a  desperate  fight  killed  12,000  of  them,  of  Spartacus 
whom  only  two  are  said  to  have  had  wounds  in  the  back.      Spartacus  'ff^'^. 
retired  to   the  mountains  near  Petelia,   where  he  again  turned  on 
the  Roman  forces  under  the  legate  Quintus  and  the  quaestor  Scrofa, 
and  defeated  them,  Scrofa  himself  being  severely  wounded.      But  this 
was  the  end  of  his  successes.      His  followers,  always  difficult  to  keep 
in  hand,  were  elated  by  the  victory,  and,  forcing  him  to  abandon  his 
system   of  avoiding   open    battle,    insisted   on   again    attacking    the 
Roman    army.       M.    Lucullus,    who     had    just    returned    from    his 
province,  shut  him  off  from  Brundisium,  and  Crassus  was  entrenched 
in  his  front  and  had  dug   a  deep  trench  to  prevent  his  progress. 
Spartacus,  unable  to  control  his  men,  prepared  for  a  last  desperate 
struggle.      He  killed  his  charger  as  a  sign  that  he  would  not  fly,  but 
looked  for  victory  or  death,  and  hewed  his  way  through  the  Roman  Death  of 
ranks  till,  deserted  by  his  followers,  and  fighting  fiercely  to  the  last,  Spartacus. 
even  when  beaten  to  his  knees,  he  fell  at  last  among  such  heaps  of 


666 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Pompey 
cuts  off  the 
survivhig 
slaves. 


The  slaves 
crucified. 


Affairs  in 
the  East. 

Macedonia 

and 

Thrace, 

Appius 

Claudius, 

76.  C. 

Scribonius 

Curio, 

75-73-    M. 

Lucullus, 

72-71. 

P. 

So'vilius 

Vatia 

Isauricjis, 

7S-74. 


Reorga7iis- 
ation  of  the 
province  of 
Cilicia. 


Murena 
and  Mith- 
ridates, 
84-81. 


slain  that  his  body  was  never  recovered.  His  army  was  cut  to 
pieces,  while  the  Romans  lost  about  1000  men.  The  survivors  of 
the  revolted  slaves,  still  numbering  many  thousands,  were  scattered 
over  the  mountains  in  four  bands,  where  they  were  for  the  most  part 
pursued  and  killed  by  Pompey,  returning  to  claim  his  triumph  over 
Sertorius,  who  boasted  that,  though  Crassus  had  won  battles,  he 
had  cut  up  the  rebellion  by  the  roots.  Some  still  survived  near 
Thurii  in  60  ;  but  6000  were  crucified  along  the  Appian  road, — a 
cruelty  shamed  by  the  merciful  conduct  of  Spartacus  himself,  in  whose 
camp  some  thousands  of  Roman  prisoners  were  found  uninjured.  It 
is  difficult  to  estimate  the  effect  of  the  horrible  spectacle  of  these 
corpses  bleaching  along  the  great  highway  in  hardening  the  hearts  of 
a  people  whose  craving  for  blood  and  insensibility  to  human  suffering 
were  already  fearfully  fostered  by  the  shows  of  the  arena. 

Meanwhile  the  officers  sent  yearly  to  Macedonia  and  Asia  had 
not  been  wholly  idle.  In  76  Appius  Claudius,  proconsul  of 
Macedonia,  had  repulsed  the  Thracian  border  tribes  in  several 
engagements  ;  and  his  successor,  C.  Curio,  for  the  first  time 
carried  the  Roman  arms  to  the  Danube  and  celebrated  a  triumph 
over  the  Dardani,  though  they  were  not  finally  subdued  until 
the  next  year  by  M.  Lucullus.  From  7Z  to  74  P.  Servilius  Vatia, 
as  proconsul  of  Cilicia,  had  been  engaged  in  a  successful  war 
with  the  pirates.  Defeated  by  him  at  sea  they  took  refuge  in  the 
strongholds  of  Lycia,  Pamphylia,  and  Cilicia.  Servilius  landed  in 
Lycia  ;  took  Olympus,  which  was  defended  by  a  robber  chief  named 
Zenicetes  ;  and  then  marched  through  the  country  into  Cihcia,  taking 
various  strongholds  on  the  way,  ending  with  Corycus  on  the  Cilician 
coast.  Crossing  Mount  Taurus  into  Isauria,  he  took  the  capital 
of  this  strange  race  of  mountain  robbers,  and  defeated  them  in 
many  dangerous  engagements.  He  was  greeted  by  his  soldiers 
with  the  title  of  imperator,  and  on  returning  home  to  celebrate  his 
triumph  assumed  the  name  of  Isauricus.  The  province  of  Cilicia 
was  organised  and  enlarged  by  the  addition  of  Pamphylia,  Pisidia, 
Isauria,  and  Cappadocia,  and  became  the  most  important  bulwark  of 
the  Roman  Empire  in  the  East. 

But  now  the  Romans  found  themselves  once  more  involved  in  a 
war  with  Mithridates  of  Pontus.  When  Sulla  left  Asia  in  84,  after 
making  the  treaty  of  Pergamus,  he  left  L.  Licinius  Murena  as 
propraetor  of  Asia,  with  his  quaestor  L.  Lucullus,  to  see  that  the 
terms  of  the  unwritten  agreement  were  observed.  Of  all  the  states 
that  had  rebelled  against  Rome  only  Mitylene  still  held  out.  The 
reduction  of  that  town  and  island  was  presently  delegated  to  M. 
Minucius  Themius,  in  whose  camp  C.  lulius  Caesar,  who  having , 
defied    Sulla,    had   found    it    prudent    to   leave    Rome,    was    making  I 


XLI  MURENA  AND  MITHRIDATES  667 

his  first  campaign.      Murena  was  engaged  meanwhile   in   fighting 
with   pirates   and   deposing   Moagetes   the   tyrant  of  Cibyra,  which 
he  annexed  to  Phrygia.      But  he  was  ambitious  to  gain  credit  by  a  Second 
victory   over   Mithridates   himself,    and   therefore    picked  a   quarrel  Mithri- 
with  him  on  the  subject  of  certain  parts  of  Cappadocia  which  he  f^^^^^^' 
still  retained.     Archelaus,   who  had  been  rewarded   by  Sulla  after 
negotiating  the  preliminaries  and  had  been  suspected  of  treason  by 
Mithridates,  now  openly  joined  Murena  and  denounced  the  ambitious 
projects  of  the  king.      Murena  seized  on  the  pretext  for  crossing  the  Murena 
Pontic  frontier  and  pillaging  the  great  temple  of  I  sis  in  Comana  ;  and  ^^vades 
then  wintered  in  Cappadocia,  where  he  seems  to  have   fortified  a     ^^  "^'  ^' 
town,  called  after  his  own  name  Licinia,  to  defend  the  country.      In 
vain  Mithridates  appealed  to  the  treaty.     Murena  professed  not  to  be 
cognisant   of  it,  and  while   the  king   was   sending  ambassadors   to 
Sulla  in  Greece  and  to  Rome,  he  again  in  the  next  spring  entered 
Pontus  and  pillaged  a  great  number  of  villages.     The  Senate  sent 
Calidius  to  order  him  to  refrain  from  hostilities.      But  the  Senate  was 
the  now  discredited  remnant,  which  Sulla  was  on  his  way  to  put 
down,  and  Murena  refused  to  obey  ;  or,  as  some  say,  Calidius  had 
secret  instructions  contradicting  his  official  message. 

At  any  rate  early  in  82   Murena  advanced  to  attack  the   Pontic  Murena 
capital   Sinope,  but  was  disastrously  defeated  by  Mithridates  on  the  advances 
Halys,  and  his  army  had  to  find  its  way  by  various  mountain  roads  ^S^^^^^ 
into  Phrygia.      The   Roman  garrisons  were  driven  from  the  towns  in 
Cappadocia  ;  and  the  news  made  so  great  a  sensation  in  Asia,  that 
the  anti-Roman  party,  which  had  been  reduced  to  silence,  began  to 
stir  again,  and  a  fresh  invasion  by  Mithridates  was  looked  for.      But 
early  in  81   Sulla  sent  Gabinius  with  positive  orders  to  Murena  to  Pacifica- 
cease  hostilities,  and  charged  with  the  task  of  reconciling  Mithridates  ^^°^ 
and  Ariobarzanes  of  Cappadocia.      The  king  of  Pontus  once  more  %  ff^  / 
showed    his    desire    to    avoid    direct    hostilities    with    Rome.       He 
consented  to  promise  his  infant  daughter  in  marriage  to  a  son  of 
Ariobarzanes,   and    a   festival    of  marriage    and    reconciliation   was 
celebrated  with  great  magnificence.      Murena  was  appeased  with  the 
promise  of  a  triumph,  and  Mithridates  quietly  retained  portions  of 
Cappadocia. 

From  that  date  until  the  question  of  the  succession  to  Bithynia  Peace frovi 
arose  in  74  he  lived  on  tolerable  terms  with  the  Roman  governors  of  ^^-74- 
Asia,  who  were  forbidden  by  a  lex  Cornelia  to  pass  the  official  limits 
of  their  province  without  orders  from  the  Senate.  But  he  still  had 
reason  to  fear  that  the  Romans  eventually  meditated  a  renewal  of  the 
war.  His  ambassadors  at  Rome  were  unable  to  obtain  the  formal 
ratification  of  the  treaty  of  Pergamus,  and  were  told  that  their  master 
must  first  evacuate  the   portion   of  Cappadocia  which  envoys   from 


668 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Ariobarzanes  complained  of  his  retaining.  Not  getting  any  answer 
to  a  second  embassy  in  78  he  busied  himself  in  collecting  and 
improving  his  naval  and  military  forces.  The  Roman  government, 
aware  of  this,  strengthened  their  garrisons  in  Asia  from  time  to 
time,  but  did  little  to  stop  what  was  more  dangerous, — the  ill-feeling 
which  their  fiscal  system  was  again  rousing  in  the  province.  L. 
LucuUus,  who  stayed  after  Sulla's  departure  till  80  as  quaestor,  had 
carried  on  the  financial  administration  with  equity  and  consideration  ; 
but  on  his  departure  the  farming  of  the  taxes  by  the  publicani 
suspended  by  Sulla  was  re-established,  with  the  usual  results  of 
oppression  and  discontent.  Such  men  as  Dolabella  and  the  notorious 
C.  Verres,  proconsul  and  quaestor  in  Cilicia  (80-78),  did  more  for 
the  cause  of  Mithridates  than  an  army  could  do  against  him. 

Mithridates  was  fully  alive  to  these  things,  and  was  also  availing 
himself  of  dynastic  changes  in  central  Asia,  to  which  the  Romans 
remained  indifferent,  in  order  to  secure  for  himself  extension  of 
territory  and  support.  He  is  even  said  to  have  had  an  understanding 
with  the  pirates  who  invested  the  Aegean,  to  whom  he  would  be  able 
to  look  for  strengthening  his  fleet,  or  for  giving  rapid  intelligence  ; 
and  his  dealing  with  Sertorius  had  proved  how  keenly  he  was  watch- 
ing for  every  opportunity  of  striking  at  Rome.  War  seems  to  have 
been  already  determined  upon  at  Rome,  when,  towards  the  end  of 
74,  Nicomedes  of  Bithynia  died,  leaving  his  kingdom  to  the  Roman 
people.  Nicomedes  had  also  left  a  young  son,  whom  some  at  any 
rate  regarded  as  the  heir  in  spite  of  this  will,  and  in  spite  of  rumours 
as  to  the  unfaithfulness  of  his  mother  to  her  husband.  The  Romans, 
however,  decided  to  accept  the  inheritance,  and  the  propraetor  of 
Asia  was  ordered  to  take  it  over,  while  his  quaestor  carried  off 
the  royal  treasury  to  Rome.  The  Romans  thus  obtained  a  consider- 
able district  on  the  Black  Sea,  could  command  the  entrance  to  it 
with  their  fleet,  and  by  blockading  the  Bosporus  could  ruin 
the  Pontic  trade.  It  was  natural,  therefore,  to  expect  that  their 
possession  of  this  new  district  would  hardly  be  maintained  without  a 
struggle ;  and  either  from  that  idea,  or  from  earlier  reports  of 
Mithridates'  proceedings,  it  had  been  resolved  to  send  an  army 
and  special  commander  to  supplement  the  two  legions  in  Asia 
(those  formerly  commanded  by  Fimbria)  and  the  two  in  Cilicia.  In 
fact,  everything  seemed  as  it  was  in  the  former  war.  Asia  dis- ! 
turbed  :  the  Thracians  invading  Macedonia  :  and  Mithridates  negoti-j 
ating  with  the  rebels  in  Spain,  as  formerly  with  the  Socii  inj 
Italy.  Pompey  was  known  to  be  anxious  for  the  command 
and  therefore  Lucullus — who  wished  for  it  also — took  care 
that  sufficient  money  and  supplies  were  sent  to  him  in  Spain  t( 
induce  him  to  continue  the  war  against  Sertorius  ;  and  though  th( 


XLi  THIRD  WAR  WITH  MITHRIDATES  669 

proconsular  province  assigned  to  himself  had  been  Cisalpine  Gaul,  he 
induced  the  Senate — under  the  influence  of  P.  Cethegus — to  transfer 
him  to  Cilicia,  which  happened  to  fall  vacant  by  the  death  of  the 
proconsul  L.  Octavius  ;  and,  that  having  been  done,  he  was  named 
by  an  unanimous  vote  of  the  centuries  commander-in-chief  against 
Mithridates.  His  colleague  Cotta  was,  at  his  own  urgent  entreaty, 
allowed  to  take  part  in  the  war.  He  was  to  guard  the  Propontis 
with  ships  obtained  on  the  spot  and  to  hold  Bithynia ;  while  M. 
Antonius,  praetor  in  75,  was  to  be  in  command  of  the  fleet  and  all 
the  coasts  of  the  Mediterranean,  to  clear  the  sea  of  pirates. 

Mithridates  having  spent  the  winter  in  every  kind  of  preparation,  Mithri- 
building  ships,  making  arms,  and  collecting  corn,  began  hostilities  in  dates  begins 
the  spring  of  73  by  an  invasion  of  Paphlagonia,  having  first  solemnly  ^hewar, 
thrown  a  chariot  and  four  white  horses  into  the  sea  as  a  sacrifice  to  !:     ^^  •' 
Poseidon.     He  was  accompanied  by  some  Roman  officers — among 
whom  was   Marius,  the  One-Eyed,  sent  as  proconsul  by  Sertorius 
and    his    "  senate."       In    nine    days    the    army    marched    through 
Paphlagonia  and    part  of  Galatia  and  entered   Bithynia,  while  the 
Pontic  fleet  appeared  in  the  harbour  of  Heracleia,  a  city  which  had 
lately  shown  its  anti- Roman  feeling  by  killing  some  Roman   agents 
sent   to   claim    it    for    Rome.     The    Bithynians   received  him   with 
no  show  of  hostility,  and  the  Roman  residents  fled  to  Chalcedon, 
opposite  Byzantium,  where  Cotta  had  on  his  arrival  in  the  previous 
winter  fixed  his  headquarters  and  collected  a  fleet.      Lucullus,  who 
had  also  come  late  in   74,  was  engaged  in  restoring  something  like 
order  in  the  province  of  Asia — joined  to  that  of  Cilicia  for  the  time, 
and  groaning  under  the  renewed  exactions  of  publican!  and  money- 
lenders, who  had  taken  the  occasion  of  the  heavy  burden  imposed 
on  it  by  Sulla  to  exact  such  exorbitant  interest,  that  the  provincials 
had  incurred  a  debt  of  double  the  amount  of  the  indemnity,  and  had 
only  paid  it  by  mortgaging  their  sacred  buildings,  and  even  selling 
their  children.      Cotta  wished  to  use  the  interval  to  secure  the  credit 
of  defeating  Mithridates  ;  and  accordingly  when  the  king,  sending  his 
fleet  forward  to  meet  him,  marched  against  Chalcedon,  Cotta  gave 
him  battle  under  its  walls  and  was  decisively  beaten  with  a  loss  of  Defeat  of 
3000   men,    his   legate   P.    Rutilius   Rufus,    commanding    the    fleet,   Cotta  at 
being   only   saved  by  being  drawn   up   the   wall  by   a  rope.      The  Chalcedon, 
Pontic  fleet  also  broke  the  chain  across  the  mouth  of  the  harbour,  ^j[^J'"S  ^J 
destroyed  or  towed  off"  the  Roman  ships,  and  thus  opened  the  passage 
of  the  Bosporus. 

Leaving  a  detachment  to  blockade  Chalcedon,  Mithridates  entered  Mithri- 
the   province   of  Asia  proclaiming  the   freedom   of  the  cities  from  ^^^^-^  i»-  ^^'^ 
imposts  in  the  name  of  the  "proconsul"  M.  Marius,  who  was  mean-  ^^"^^^ 
while   holding  the   lines   of  the   Sangarius   against   Lucullus.      But 


670 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Siege  of 
Cyzicus  by 
Mithri- 
dates  and 
M.  Marius, 
autumn  of 
73- 


Lucullus 

relieves 

Cyzicus. 


Mithri- 
dates 
escapes  by 


Result  of 
the  first 
year  of  the 


Lucullus,  avoiding  a  battle,  cut  off  his  provisions  so  successfully  that 
he  had  to  retire  to  the  coast.  There  he  was  joined  by  Mithridates, 
and  the  two  laid  siege  to  Cyzicus,  chief  port  of  Asia  on  the  Propontis, 
which  had  clung  to  the  Roman  cause  and  was  almost  impregnable.  ^ 
Situated  on  the  neck  of  an  isthmus,  which  stretched  towards  a  rocky 
island  with  artificial  causeways  and  bridges,  it  had  the  sea  on  one  side 
and  Mount  Dindymon  on  the  other.  Its  fortifications  dated  from  the 
time  of  Timotheos  of  Athens  in  the  fourth  century,  and  its  people,  who 
had  abundance  of  provisions  stored  in  two  immense  magazines,  and  a 
powerful  navy  in  their  harbours,  were  resolute  to  defend  it.  The 
undertaking  proved  disastrous  to  Mithridates.  Failing  to  take  it  by 
assault  he  blockaded  the  city  by  sea  and  land.  But  though  he 
employed  every  device  and  every  engine  known  to  the  science  of  war, 
they  proved  unavailing,  and  a  dreadful  storm  swept  away  in  an  hour 
the  preparations  of  laborious  weeks.  Moreover,  when  Lucullus  came 
to  the  relief  of  Cyzicus,  Mithridates  was  persuaded  to  quit  his  lines, 
which  were  at  once  occupied  by  the  Romans,  and  was  himself  con- 
fined to  the  peninsula  and  the  high  ground  of  Mount  Dindymon.  The 
approach  of  winter  made  it  difficult  to  obtain  supplies  by  sea ;  the 
Roman  cavalry  cut  off  his  convoys  by  land  ;  and  famine  with  its 
accompaniment  of  pestilence  began  to  make  dreadful  ravages  in  his 
army.  It  was  necessary  for  him  to  break  out.  But  when  the  long 
train  of  beasts  of  burden,  sutlers,  and  their  convoy  had  reached  the 
river  Rhyndacus,  a  few  miles  to  the  east  of  Cyzicus,  the  Romans 
overtook  it,  killed  great  numbers,  took  i  5,000  prisoners,  with  all  the 
animals  and  an  immense  booty.  The  king  after  this  escaped  on 
board  ship  by  night,  but  those  of  his  troops  who  could  not  find  ships 
were  pursued  by  Lucullus,  lost  1 1,000  men  while  crossing  rivers,  and 
finally  were  shut  up  in  Lampsacus,  from  which  the  survivors  were 
taken  off  by  the  Royal  fleet  in  the  following  spring  (72). 

The  grand  army  was  at  an  end.  Of  i  50,000  men  whom  Mithri- 
dates commanded  at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign,  20,000  only 
could  now  be  mustered  ;  while  the  fleet  had  suffered  more  than  one 
disaster  from  storms,  and  100  vessels  were  missing.  Moreover,  the 
news  of  the  death  of  Sertorius  took  away  all  semblance  of  right  of 
his  Roman  ally,  M.  Marius,  and  some  of  his  Roman  officers  at 
once  made  overtures  to  Lucullus.      Yet  the  king  still  kept  up  the 


^  These  operations  have  generally  been  assigned  to  the  year  74,  principally 
because  Livy  attributes  the  actions  to  Cotta  and  Lucullus  as  consuls.  It  has, 
however,  been  satisfactorily  shown  from  coins  that  Nicomedes  did  not  die  till  late 
in  74  ;  and  though  the  Romans  had  resolved  on  war  before  they  became  possessed 
of  Bithynia,  it  was  not  begun  until  after  that  event.  The  confusion  perhaps  arose 
from  the  fact  that  Cotta  and  Lucullus  left  Rome  before  the  end  of  their  year  of 
oflfice,  though  no  hostilities  occurred  till  the  beginning  of  the  next  year. 


XLi  THE  DISASTERS  OF  MITHRIDATES  671 

fight.     With  half  his  fleet  he  attacked  the  towns  on  the  Propontis  ; 

while  M.  Marius  led  another  squadron  into  the  Aegean,  where  there 

was  nothing  to  resist  him,  for  Cotta  had  lost  his  ships  at  Chalcedon, 

and  Antonius  had  been  beaten  at  Crete.      Lucullus,  however,  collected 

ships  and  in  two  battles,  off  Tenedos  and  Lemnos,  destroyed  the  fleet  Naval 

of  M.  Marius,  taking  him  and  his  two  colleagues  prisoners,  while  his  ""ictones  of 

army  was  recovering  Bithynia  and  driving  out  the  Pontic  garrisons.  ^^"^^  "^' 

Mithridates  himself,  after  being  shut  up  for  a  time  in  Nicomedia  by 

Cotta  and  Triarius,  had  broken  the  blockade  and  forced  his  way  out, 

but  lost  sixty  vessels  and   10,000  men  in  a  storm,  and  only  escaped 

by  getting  on  board  a  pirate  vessel  which  landed  him  at  the  mouth 

of  the  Hypios  {Karasa\  whence  he  was  admitted  into  Heracleia. 

In  another  part  of  Asia  his  arms  had  been  equally  unsuccessful. 
After  the  victory  of  Chalcedon  he  had  sent  a  large  force  under 
Eumachus  through  Phrygia  and  Cilicia.  At  first  Eumachus  had 
carried  all  before  him  ;  had  massacred  the  Roman  residents  ;  and 
received  the  adhesion  of  the  Isaurians  and  Pisidians.  But  C.  lulius 
Caesar,  who  was  studying  rhetoric  at  Rhodes,  crossed  to  Caria,  raised 
a  force  of  volunteers,  and  prevented  the  Pontic  troops  from 
approaching  the  coast,  while  the  propraetor  C.  Salvius  Naso  barred 
their  way  into  Phrygia  Epictete,  and  Mysia.  Mamercus,  a  legate  of 
Lucullus,  defeated  another  army  under  Fannius  and  Metrophanes  ; 
a  treasure  of  10,000  staters,  which  was  being  conveyed  by  Aris- 
tonicus  into  the  Aegean,  to  corrupt  the  islanders,  was  captured ; 
and  the  Gallic  tetrarch  Deiotarus  finally  drove  the  Pontic  garrisons 
from  the  towns  of  Phrygia. 

Mithridates  was  obliged  to  look  for  help  to  other  Asiatic  powers,   7/. 
and  especially  to  Tigranes,  king  of  Armenia.      Naturally  he  found  in  Mtthri- 
his  present  circumstances  that  the  response  was  cold  and  doubtful.  ^^Z^i^  fg 
Of  the  kingdoms  in  the  East  the  one,  besides  that  of  Mithridates,    Tigranes  of 
which  had  during  the  last  twenty  years  increased  in  power  and  extent  Armenia. 
was  Armenia.      Tigranes  had  united   to   his   original   kingdom  by 
successive    conquests    the    districts     of    Sophene,    Atropatene,    and 
Gordiene,  and  had  built  a  new  capital,  Tigranocerta,  in   the  upper 
valley  of  the  Tigris.      In  83  the  whole  of  the  Syrian  monarchy,  from 
the  Euphrates  to  the  sea,  had  submitted  to  him.      In  extent  of  terri- 
tory, therefore,  and  external  show  of  power,  Tigranes  had  no  rival  in 
Asia  ;  and  Mithridates  had  endeavoured  to  secure  his  friendship  and 
support  by  giving  him  his  daughter  Cleopatra  in  marriage,  and  now 
sent    Diodes  to   demand  his   aid.      But    Tigranes   was   engaged    in 
securing  his  own  hold  on  Syria,  and  gave  nothing  but  vain  promises, 
being  in  fact   privately  dissuaded  from  doing  more  by  the  envoy  of 
Mithridates  himself.      Nor  was  this  the  only  indication  of  declining 
power  given  by  the  defections  or  coldness  of  friends.      His  own  son. 


672 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Spring 

of  7^' 
battles  of 
Cabira. 


Flight  of 

Mithri- 

dafes. 


He  is  de- 
tained in 
Armenia, 


Machares,  king  of  Bosporus,  who  a  year  afterwards  made  terms 
with  Lucullus,  even  now  showed  no  haste  to  help  him.  His  minister 
Dorylaus  was  put  to  death  for  treason  ;  and  other  princes  and 
magistrates,  among  them  the  grandfather  of  the  geographer  Strabo, 
dehvered  up  fortresses  to  the  Romans.  Still  the  king  by  great 
exertions  raised  an  army  and  defended  the  triangle  formed  by  the 
rivers  I  sis  and  Lycos  round  Cabira.  There  Lucullus,  after  a  difficult 
and  fatiguing  march  across  Bithynia  in  the  spring  of  7 1  (leaving  L. 
Murena  with  two  legions  before  Amisus)  came  upon  him.  He  had 
three  legions  ;  Mithridates  40,000  infantry  and  4000  cavalry.  At 
the  first  encounter  the  Roman  cavalry  was  totally  defeated  by  the 
Pontic  horse,  and  Lucullus  fell  back  towards  Mount  Paryadres,  but 
contrived  to  gain  a  position  commanding  the  plain,  and  defended  by 
a  deep  ravine.  Here  they  remained  opposite  each  other  for  some 
weeks.  But  though  the  Pontic  army  in  the  skirmishes  that  took  place 
not  only  held  its  own,  but  once  at  least  inflicted  a  serious  disaster  on 
the  Romans,  yet,  while  both  camps  were  in  great  straits  for  provisions, 
Mithridates  was  the  more  distressed  of  the  two ;  and  when,  in 
attempting  to  cut  off  a  convoy  of  wheat  coming  to  the  Roman 
camp,  he  lost  between  5000  and  6000  men,  he  decided  to  retire 
into  Lesser  Armenia.  The  design  was  kept  secret  •  from  the 
soldiers,  who  were  roused  before  dawn  by  the  noise  of  the  servants 
and  baggage  waggons  of  the  officers  quitting  the  camp.  Believing 
themselves  betrayed,  they  broke  out  into  a  furious  panic,  killed 
the  drivers,  and  pillaged  the  waggons.  Mithridates  himself  barely 
escaped  with  his  life  by  the  fidelity  of  the  eunuch  Ptolemy,  who  gave 
him  his  horse,  and,  accompanied  by  about  2000  cavalry,  fled  to  the 
south  towards  Comana.  When  Lucullus  appeared  next  morning  before 
the  Pontic  camp  he  found  it  deserted  ;  and  it  was  plundered  in  spite 
of  his  order  to  let  the  booty  alone  till  the  enemy  was  destroyed. 
The  cavalry,  under  M.  Pompeius,  was  sent  in  pursuit.  But  they  too 
lost  time  by  stopping  to  plunder  some  of  the  king's  baggage  :  and 
finding  that  he  was  four  days'  march  ahead  of  them  they  returned. 
Mithridates  arrived  safely  at  Comana,  from  which  he  sent  one  of 
his  eunuchs  back  to  a  fortress  in  which  his  harem  was  guarded, 
with  orders  that  all  his  wives  and  concubines  were  to  die,  lest 
they  should  fall  into  Roman  hands.  Then  he  hurried  on  to 
Armenia  to  demand  hospitality  and  succour  from  his  son-in-law. 
Tigranes  did  not  refuse  the  fugitive  king  a  certain  protection  ;  but 
he  declined  to  see  him,  and  assigned  him  as  a  residence  a  strong 
castle  in  an  unhealthy  district,  where,  surrounded  by  a  so-called  guard 
of  honour,  he  was  practically  a  prisoner  for  nearly  two  years  (71-69). 
Meanwhile  Lucullus  and  his  legates  were  carrying  all  before  them. 
Cities,  fortresses,  and  deposits  of  treasure  everywhere  fell  into  his 


71' 


XLi  LUCULLUS  AT  EPHESUS  673 

hands  ;  Pharnacia,  Trapezus,  and  other  towns  on  the  Pontus  yielded 

without  a  struggle.      Amisos,  which   had  been  holding  out  against  Capture  of 

Murena,    was    taken    by    assault    and    burnt,    though    part    of    the  ^^^^^^^^^t 

inhabitants  escaped  by  sea,  and   Lucullus  restored  the  rest  to  their  ji^^sos. 

homes  and  caused  the  town  to  be  rebuilt.^     Heracleia,  which  Cotta 

had    been    besieging  since   the  summer    of  72,   was  still  untaken.   Heracleia 

But  a  fleet  under  Triarius,  set  free  by  the  victories  in  the  Aegean,  now  ^f^^-^  ^"^ 

co-operated  with  Cotta.     The  Heracleote  fleet  was  beaten  ;  famine  ^  ^ 

,  .,  ...  Ill-  sufnmer  of 

and  pestilence  were  ragmg  m  the  town  ;  and  at  last  the  garrison  -^^^ 

escaped  by  sea,  and  the  strategus  Demopheles  admitted  the  soldiers 

of  Triarius.      The  town  was  burnt  and  pillaged,  and  Cotta  carried  off 

his  prisoners  and  spoil  to  Italy  (70). 

Lucullus   resided   during  the  winter  of  71-70  at   Ephesus,   dis-  Lucullus 
tributing  his  army  into  winter  quarters  in   Pontus.      He  spent  the  "^^nters  at 
time  partly  in  celebrating  by  games  and  gladiatorial  contests  his  ^/f'^-^^f 
recent  victories,  partly  in  farther  regulating  the  financial  troubles  of  ^^^ 
the  provincials  of  Asia,  still  overburdened  by  debt.      He  cut  down  the  provincial 
interest  legally  recoverable  to  12  per  cent,  and  forbade  the  recovery  debtors, 
of  arrears  amounting  to  more  than  the  original  debt.      Defaulting  T^'^^- 
debtors  finally  were  not  to  be  dispossessed  of  their  whole  property. 
The  creditor  could  only  take  one-fourth  of  the  debtor's  income,  and 
so  gradually  wipe  out  the  debt.      These  debts  had  been  mostly  owed 
to  Roman  publicani   and   money-lenders,  and   their  hostility  made 
it  easier  for  his  opponents   at   home  in  67  to  secure   the  recall  of 
Lucullus. 

In  the  autumn  of  7 1  Appius  Claudius  ^  had  been  sent  to  Tigranes  Mission  to 
to  demand  the  surrender  of  Mithri dates.      Misled  by  his  guides  he   Tigranes, 
went  a  great  circuit  before  reaching  the  Euphrates  ;  and  when  he  7i-7o. 
finally  arrived  at  Antioch  he  had  to  wait  until  the  king  returned  from 
Phoenicia.     He  made  his  demand  in  peremptory  language,  and  as  the 
despatch  of  Lucullus  addressed  Tigranes  as  king,  instead  of  "  king  of 
kings,"  Appius  was  dismissed  with  scarcely  the  semblance  of  an  answer, 
though  with  a  decent  show  of  liberality.       Extravagantly  elated  with 
his   recent  victories  and  accession  of  territory,   and   with  an  intelli- 
gence corrupted  by  twenty-five  years  of  flattery,  the  king  could  not 
conceive  that  Lucullus  would  attack  him  or  could  escape  destruction 
if  he  did.      He  therefore  devoted  himself  to  the  development   of  his 
new  capital,  Tigranocerta,  and  made  no  special  preparations. 

The  attack  upon  him  was  still  delayed  for  a  year.      During  the 

^  It  was  here  that  the  grammarian  Tyrannion  was  captured.  IaicuHus  seems 
to  have  meant  to  have  taken  him  to  Rome  as  a  friend.  But  Murena  begged  him 
and  emancipated  him  as  a  friend  of  Cicero. 

2  Appius  Claudius  Pulcher  and  his  more  notorious  brother  PubHus  were 
brothers-in-law  to  Lucullus,  and  were  serving  on  his  staff  as  legati. 

2  X 


674 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Luculhis 
takes 
Sinope,  yo. 


Lucullus 
ivinters  in 
Pontus, 
70-6g. 


Lucullus 

invades 

Armenia, 


6g. 


Passage 
of  the 
Euphrates 
and  TiiSris. 


Defeat  of 

Mithro- 

barzaftes. 


winter  the  blockade  of  Sinope  had  been  begun  by  a  Roman  fleet  under 
Censorinus.  It  was  defended  by  Leonippus  and  Cleochares,  with  a 
garrison  of  about  12,000  Cilicians,  and  a  fleet  of  ships  which 
enabled  them  in  spite  of  the  Roman  vessels  to  receive  the  pro- 
visions which  were  sent  from  time  to  time  by  Machares  of  Bosporus, 
the  son  of  Mithridates, — nearly  the  only  service  he  ever  rendered  to 
his  father's  cause.  But  when  Lucullus  rejoined  the  army  in  the 
spring  of  70  Machares  made  terms  with  him  ;  and,  ceasing  to  send 
provisions  to  the  town,  consented  to  send  them  to  the  Roman  camp 
instead,  as  well  as  all  property  deposited  in  his  kingdom  by  the 
Sinopian  generals.  The  garrison,  therefore,  threatened  with  famine, 
collected  all  they  could  gather  on  board  their  ships,  set  fire  to  the 
rest  and  to  the  town,  and  escaped  to  the  coast  of  the  Caucasus. 
Lucullus  could  now  turn  his  attention  to  Tigranes,  who  was  offensive 
to  Rome  not  only  from  his  entertainment  of  Mithridates,  but  by  his 
conquests  in  Cilicia  and  Phoenicia.  The  Romans  could  not  view 
with  indifference  his  becoming  a  Mediterranean  power  ;  and  the 
Jews,  allies  of  Rome  since  161,  were  already  alarmed  at  his  progress 
towards  Palestine,  Lucullus,  therefore,  made  plans  to  cross  the 
Euphrates  in  the  spring  of  69. 

Tigranes  now  seemed  to  be  more  alive  to  his  danger.  He  sum- 
moned his  vassals,  admitted  Mithridates  to  an  interview,  caused  the 
ministers  who  had  kept  them  apart  to  be  executed,  and  placed  the 
Pontic  king  at  the  head  of  10,000  cavalry.  But  still  he  thought  of 
invading  the  Roman  domains,  not  of  being  invaded  himself.  Mith- 
ridates was  to  march  with  his  cavalry  to  recover  his  kingdom  ;  his 
own  generals  were  to  enter  Roman  Cilicia  and  Lycaonia.  To  his 
intense  surprise  these  two  movements  were  hardly  begun  when  it 
was  announced  that  Lucullus  had  crossed  the  Euphrates  and  the 
Tigris,  and  was  in  full  march  upon  Tigranocerta.  He  had  started 
early  in  the  spring,  leaving  6000  men  to  hold  Pontus ;  had 
crossed  Melitene  by  forced  marches  along  the  route  of  the 
caravans,  carrying  with  him  the  materials  for  a  pontoon  over  the 
Euphrates ;  had  seized  Tomasa,  the  first  fortress  in  Armenia  ; 
passed  through  Sophene  ;  and  crossed  the  Tigris  almost  at  its  source. 
The  first  messengers  who  announced  this  were  disbelieved  and 
hanged.  But  it  was  impossible  to  deny  facts.  The  king,  however, 
still  imagining  himself  all  powerful,  sent  3000  cavalry  under  Mithro- 
barzanes,  with  orders  to  bring  Lucullus  dead  or  alive.  They  were 
cut  to  pieces  by  a  Roman  division  under  Sextilius  :  and  Tigranes] 
hastily  recalling  Mithridates  from  his  march  to  Pontus,  and  Maga- 
dates  from  Syria,  with  all  the  men  in  garrisons  there,  strengthenec 
the  fortresses  between  the  Tigris  and  Tigranocerta,  and  then  reJ 
treated  with  his  main  army  towards  the  mountains.      Tigranocert/ 


\Li  VICTORY  OF  LUCULLUS  AT  TIGRANOCERTA  675 

was  thus  left  deserted,  and  its  siege  was  presently  commenced  by 

Sextilius,  who  had  cut  to  pieces  a  force  of  Arabians  on  their  way  to 

join  Tigranes,  and  continued  by  Lucullus  when  he  arrived  with  the 

main  army.     A  body  of  6000  men,  however,  was  sent  by  the  king 

to  remove  his  harem  and  chief  treasures,  and  their  success  in  eluding 

or  breaking  through  the  Roman  lines  encouraged  the  king  to  lead 

his  immense  forces — joined  by  allies  and  subject  kings  from  many 

parts^ — to  raise  the  siege.      His  contempt  was  moved  by  the  small- 

ness  of  the  Roman  army, — "too  many  for  ambassadors  and  too  few 

for  an  army,"  and  he  determined,  in  spite  of  remonstrances,  to  give 

battle.       The    two    armies   were    on    opposite   sides   of  the   Tigris,  Battle  of 

and   a   movement   of  Lucullus   at  first   made   the   king    think  that   Tigrano- 

be  was  retiring  to  Cappadocia.     When  it  was  found  that  he  had  ''^^^     f 

,  ,      1,  .    ,         ^^       ,  .  .,         ,       ,  .         October  bo. 

only   marched   higher  up   the  river  to  cross  more  easily,  the  king 

hastily  got  his  huge  army  into  some  order,  commanding  in  the  centre 
himself,  with  two  client  kings  on  either  wing.  It  was  an  unlucky 
day  in  the  Roman  calendar, — that  on  which  Caepio  had  been 
beaten  by  the  Cimbrians  ;  but  Lucullus  proudly  declared  that  he 
would  make  it  a  lucky  one.  When  he  got  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  river  he  sent  his  Thracian  and  Galatian  cavalry  to  skir- 
mish up  to  the  enemy  and  tempt  them  down  on  to  the  plain  ; 
and  it  was  soon  evident  that  the  ill-assorted  and  ill -disciplined 
Asiatic  army  was  no  match  for  his,  with  its  nucleus  of  Roman 
veterans.  It  was  cut  to  pieces  in  detachments,  and  before  the 
day  was  over  the  ground  was  strewn  with  30,000  dead,  while 
Lucullus  boasted  in  his  despatch  that  he  had  only  lost  five  killed 
and  100  wounded. 

Tigranes  fled  with  150  horsemen,  flinging  away  his  royal  tiara  to  Flight  of 
escape   detection,   and   was   met   by   Mithridates,    who,   without   re-  Tigranes. 
preaching  him  with  his  own  long -delayed  reception,  encouraged  and 
consoled  the  old  man,  and  was  entrusted  with  the  absolute  manage- 
ment of  affairs.     All  the  provinces  south  of  the  Tigris  were  now  lost 
to  Armenia  ;  Tigranocerta  surrendered  ;  and  an  immense  booty  fell 
to   Lucullus.      Eight  thousand  talents  (nearly  two  million  pounds)  Dismem- 
were  found  in  the  royal  treasury  ;    the  sale  of  the  plunder  brought  in  berment  of 
a  third  as  much  again  ;    and    a    large    bounty  was   given  to   each  -^^  king- 
soldier.     The  chiefs  in  the  districts  round  hastened  to  tender  their     ^^' 
submission,    and  Antiochus  Asiaticus^  was   allowed  once  more  to 
call    himself  king  of   Syria.      This  was    the    climax    of  the    good 
fortune    of   Lucullus.      Tigranocerta,    stripped    of   the    Greek    and 
Asiatic    inhabitants    placed    there   forcibly  by   Tigranes,   who  were 

^  This  last  of  the  Seleucidae  had  fled  to  Rome  when  Tigranes  took  Syria.      He 
was  finally  deprived  of  his  kingdom  by  Pompey  in  65. 


676 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Battle  of 
Arsanias, 
September 
68. 


Winter  of 
68-67. 
Mutiny  in 
the  army  of 
Lucullus. 

Mithri- 
dates 
recovers 
Pontus. 

Defeat  of 
Hadri- 


now  allowed  to  return  to  their  native  cities,  soon  ceased  to  be  of 
importance ;  and  the  Roman  army  went  into  winter  quarters  in 
Gordyene  (69-68).  Both  parties  tried  during  the  winter  to  enlist 
Phraates,  king  of  the  Parthians,  on  their  side,  but  without  inducing 
him  to  commit  himself 

In  the  spring  of  68  Lucullus  advanced  northwards  to  continue  his 
conquest  of  Armenia  and  found  Tigranes  still  at  the  head  of  vast 
forces,  which  under  the  vigorous  direction  of  Mithridates  baffled  his 
attempts  to  bring  them  to  battle.  Tired  of  useless  manoeuvres,  he  at 
length  determined  to  make  for  Artaxata  on  the  Araxes,  the  ancient 
capital  of  Armenia.  In  the  valley  of  the  eastern  Euphrates  formed 
by  the  mountains  Arsanias  he  was  overtaken  by  the  kings,  and 
though  he  gained  another  victory,  it  was  at  the  cost  of  heavy  losses. 
And  now  his  own  army  began  to  show  signs  of  mutiny.  Already  the 
troops  left  in  Pontus  had  refused  to  obey  his  summons  to  join  him  in 
Gordyene.  He  was  in  a  mountainous  country  in  which  the  summer 
was  very  brief,  and  by  the  time  of  this  battle  (September)  the  snow 
began  to  fall  and  the  cold  to  be  great.  The  men  insisted  on  turning 
southward  to  Mesopotamia ;  and  after  vainly  attempting  to  secure 
their  compliance  by  humiliating  entreaties  and  promises,  he  was 
fain  to  give  in  and  console  himself  by  taking  Nisibis,  the  one  great 
city  south  of  the  Tigris  still  holding  for  Tigranes.  But  during  the 
winter  following  (68-67)  he  found  himself  reduced  to  complete 
inaction  by  this  mutinous  temper  of  his  troops,  who,  instigated  by 
his  own  brother-in-law  P.  Clodius,  refused  to  endure  any  more 
labours  and  fatigues  or  to  undertake  any  farther  expeditions.  The 
time  of  service  of  the  two  legions  was  about  to  expire,^  and  they  were 
not  prepared  to  risk  their  safe  return.  Meanwhile  Mithridates  with 
8000  men  was  said  to  be  approaching  Pontus.  The  people  of 
Lesser  Armenia  and  eastern  Pontus  rose ;  began  killing  Roman 
residents,  and  declaring  for  their  king.  The  legate  M.  Fabius 
Hadrianus  was  defeated  near  Cabira,  when  he  tried  to  stop  his 
advance,  and  was  only  saved  from  the  gravest  disaster  by  the 
fact  of  the  king  being  wounded.  He  was  superseded  by  Triarius, 
who  came  with  his  fleet  to  the  coast  of  Pontus  and  disembarked  to 
relieve  him.  But  Triarius  did  not  venture  to  attack  Mithridates,  who 
was  now  behind  the  river  Iris,  and  the  two  armies  wintered  in  face 
of  each  other  without  stirring.  Triarius  sent  to  Lucullus  for  aid,  but 
his  soldiers  would  not  leave  the  pleasant  land  of  Mesopotamia  to  enter 


1  They  had  been  enrolled  in  86  by  I^.  Valerius  Flaccus  for  service   against  j 
Mithridates  in  the  first  war.      They  were  taken  over  by  Fimbria  after  the  murder  of  J 
Flaccus,  and  after  his  death  submitted  to  Sulla,  but  were  kept  permanently  ii 
Asia.     The  full  term  of  service  was  twenty  years.      Therefore  at  the  end  of  67 
they  could  claim  their  discharge. 


XLI  RECALL  OF  LUCULLUS  677 

on  the  toilsome  winter  march  back  to  Pontus.    And  Triarius  thus  left  Spring  of 

alone  was  tempted  in  the  spring  of  67  to  cross  the  Iris  and  offer  battle  ^7-  ^f^^^^ 

between  his  winter  station  at  Gaziura  and  Zela.      He  lost  almost  all  v     ^^^^' 

his  infantry,  while  his  cavalry  was  again  saved  from  a  hot  pursuit  by 

the  severe  wound  received  by  the  king  from  a  Roman  centurion  who 

had  got  access  to  him  under  the  guise  of  a  deserter.      But  7000 

Roman  soldiers  were  lying  dead  upon  the  field,  24  tribunes,  and  150 

centurions.      Lucullus,  now  at  length  on  his  way  back  to  Pontus, 

heard    the    news   of  the    defeat    of  Triarius,  and  hastened    on    to 

prevent   the  fruits  of   his    previous    conquests    being    entirely  lost. 

But    Mithridates    hung    about    the    mountains    and    refused    battle, 

while   a  son-in-law  of  Tigranes,    Atropotenes    of   Media,    scoured 

Cappadocia  ;    and  Tigranes  himself  was  recovering  full  possession 

of  Armenia. 

The  news  of  these  disasters  enabled  the  enemies  of  Lucullus  at  Lucullus 

Rome,  backed  by  the  equites  whose  enmity  he  had  incurred  in  Asia,  superseded. 

to  secure  his  recall.      His  brother-in-law  Q.  Marcius  Rex  (consul  in 

68)  had  already  come  to  Cilicia  as  proconsul ;  and  a  plebiscitum 

was  obtained  conferring  the  command  against  Mithridates,  with   the 

province  of  Bithynia  and  Pontus,  on  M'.Acilius  Glabrio,  at  the  end  of 

his  consulship  (67).      Still  it  was  imagined  at  Rome  that  Mithridates 

was  as  good  as  conquered,  and  that  a  new  province  of  Bithynia  and  End  of  67. 

Pontus  was  awaiting  organisation.^     Such  indeed  had  been  the  impres-  ^'^^ 

sion  conveyed  by  the  despatches  of  Lucullus  ;  and  ten  commissioners     ,'^'^^"' 

11111  11  •       •        1         1       •  -r^  1         sioners 

as  usual  had  been  despatched  to  assist  m  that  busmess.      But  when  f^y  ffig  new 

they  arrived  they  found  Lucullus  almost  without  an  army;  while  Pontus,  province  of 

so  far  from  being  ready  for  organisation,  was  again  in  the  hands  of  Pontus. 

Mithridates.      Lucullus  had  hoped  before  their  arrival  to  strike  some 

blow  to  recover  his  losses  ;  but  Marcius  Rex  had  refused  his  appeal 

for  help  from  Cilicia,  and  his  own   troops   had,  in   spite   of  almost 

abject  entreaties,  declined  to  march  again  into  Armenia  to  prevent 

the  junction   of  Tigranes   and    Mithridates,    when   they  learnt   that 

the  command  was  about  to  pass  from  Lucullus  to  Glabrio.     Those 

whose  period  of  service  had  elapsed  marched  in  a  body  out  of  his 

camp,  followed  by  some  who  had  not  the  same  excuse.      This  was  Glabrio  s 

no  doubt  in  great  measure  directly  the  effect  of  the  action  of  Glabrio.  ^?^^Ya' 

As  soon  as  he  arrived  in  his  province  of  Bithynia  at  the  end  of  67     '^' 

he  issued  edicts  releasing  the  soldiers  from  their  military  oath  to  Loss  of 

Lucullus,  who  was  obliged  to  see  Pontus  and  Cappadocia  completely  ^'^^^""^  ^^'^ 

recovered  by  Mithridates  without  being  able  to  stir :  while  Glabrio —  dlcia' 

utterly  incompetent  for  miHtary  affairs — remained  inactive  in  Bithynia, 

^  Bithynia  had  been  a  province  since  74.  It  was  now  proposed  to  add  to  it 
the  western  part  of  the  kingdom  of  Mithridates.  After  Pompey's  arrangements 
in  65,  it  was  known  as  Bithynia  Pontus,  or  Bithynia  et  Pontus. 


678  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap,  xli 

even  allowing  the  enemy  to  make  raids  over  its  borders.  But 
LucuUus  seems  to  have  remained  at  the  head  of  some  troops,  and  at 
any  rate  spent  the  winter  of  77-76  in  Galatia,  where  he  still  was,  when 
the  necessity  of  the  case  and  the  course  of  politics  at  Rome  brought 
about  the  appointment  of  Pompey. 

Authorities. — For  the  war  of  Lepidus  :  Appian,  B.  Civ.  i.  105,  107  ;  Livy, 
Ep.  90  ;  Plutarch,  Pompeius  15-16  ;  Sallust  fr.  Hist.  i. ;  Oros,  v.  22  ;  Licinianus 
fr.  43.  For  Sertorius  :  Livy,  Ep.  90-93;  Appian,  5.  Civ.  i. ,  108-115;  Plutarch, 
Serforius,  Pompeius  17-19;  Oros.  v.  23.  For  Spartacus :  Livy  Ep.  95-97; 
Plutarch,  Crassus  8-11;  Appian  B.  Civ.  i.  116-120;  Sallust  fr.  Hist.  3,  67-71  ; 
Frontinus,  Strateg.  i,  5,  20-22.  For  Mithridates  :  Livy,  Ep.  93-103;  Appian, 
Mithrid.  64-121 ;  Cicero,  pro  lege  Manilia;  Sallust  fr.  Hist.  4 ;  Memnon  ap. 
Photium,  74  R.  sq,\  Die  Cassius  36,  3-46;  Oros.  vi.  19,  sq.\  Plutarch,  LucuUus, 
Pompeius, 


i 


CHAPTER   XLII 

POMPEY    IN   THE   EAST 

Pompey's  first  consulship — Censors — Restoration  of  Tribunician  power — The 
judices  (70)  —  Pompey  and  the  war  with  pirates  (67-66) — The  lex  AJatiilia 
appointing  him  to  Bithynia  and  the  Mithridatic  war — He  goes  to  Pontus 
— Two  defeats  of  Mithridates  who  retires  across  the  Caucasus — Capture  of 
Artaxata  and  submission  of  Tigranes — Victory  over  the  Albani  (66) — Victory 
over  the  Iberes — Reduction  of  Pontus  and  settlement  of  Asia  (65) — Syria 
taken  from  Tigranes — Dispute  in  Judaea  between  Hyrcanus  and  Aristobulus 
— Pompey's  arrival  in  Damascus  (64) — Death  of  Mithridates — Pompey  takes 
Jerusalem  (63) — Returns  to  Amisos — Makes  final  arrangements  in  Pontus  and 
Asia — Returns  to  Rome  (62) — New  Provinces  :  Bithynia  and  Pontus  (74- 
63),  Cyrene  (74)  joined  with  Crete  (67),  Syria  (64). 

When  Pompey  returned   to    Italy  in  71   and   crowned  his   success  Coss.  Cn. 
in  Spain  by  crushing  the  last  sparks  of  the  slave  war,  there  seems  to  Pompeins 
have  been  no  question  as  to  his  consulship  for  the  next  year.      He  ^^^S^'^^^ 
celebrated  his  second   triumph   on  the   last   day  of  December,  and  \jcinius 
entered  on  his  consulship  on  the  first  of  January  of  70.      His  election  Crassus, 
was  in  defiance  of  the  law,  for  he  was  under  the  consular  age   and  70- 
had  held  none  of  the  inferior  offices.      He  had   commanded  armies  Pompey's 
from  his  earliest  youth,  but  had  never  been  even  a  quaestor,  and  did  (^l^ction  in 
not  become  a  member  of  the  Senate  until  he  presided  over  the  first  ^P^*^  ^f  ^  *■ 
meeting  of  the  new  year.      He  had  shown  in  the  matter  of  Lepidus 
that    his    sympathy    with    the    Populares    stopped    short    of    armed 
rebellion.      Still  it  was  to  that  side  that  he  was  inclined  ;  and  for  all 
these  reasons  the  Optimates  regarded  his  election  with  anxiety.     And, 
in   fact,  though   he    was    moderate   in    his    legislation,  the    reaction 
against  the  Sullan  constitution  made  considerable  progress  during  his 
year  of  office.      Censors  were  appointed,  after  an  interval  of  sixteen   The 
years,  who  struck  sixty -four  names  off  the  roll  of  the   Senate  ;  he  censors  of 
removed  the  restriction  on  the  exercise  of  the  Tribunician   powers  ;  7o- 
and  a  law  of  the  praetor  Aurelius  Cotta  ordained  that  only  one-third   Triiune- 
of  a  jury  should  consist   of  senators,  the   other   two-thirds   were   to  ^^j'^  *y^^"- 
be  filled  in  equal  proportions  by  equites  and  tribuni  aerarii,  whose 


68o 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


ratable  property  was  next  below  that  of  the  equites.^  In  other 
respects  his  consulship  passed  with  nothing  more  serious  than 
constant  bickerings  with  his  Optimatist  colleague  Crassus,  whose 
influence  resulted  from  enormous  wealth.  He  himself  was  careful  to 
parade  his  obedience  to  the  law,  appearing  before  the  censors  at  the 
review  of  the  knights  leading  his  horse  and  answering  the  usual 
question,  whether  he  had  served  the  required  number  of  campaigns 
and  under  what  commander,  by  saying  that  he  had  served  them  all 
as  imperator  himself  The  two  years  following  he  spent  in  retire- 
ment, seldom  appearing  in  the  Forum,  though  his  house  was  crowded 
with  visitors  and  admirers.  From  petty  intrigues  and  unimportant 
combinations  he  held  aloof  with  prudent  dignity.  But  an  occasion 
soon  arose  which  seemed  worthy  of  his  intervention. 

The  greatest  blot  in  the  administration  of  the  Empire  had 
been  the  toleration  of  the  pirates  in  the  Mediterranean.  Their 
numbers  and  audacity  had  risen  to  such  a  height  that  commerce  was 
threatened  with  extinction,  and  the  sea  had  become  almost  impass- 
able to  any  but  large  vessels  with  armed  men  on  board.  Scarcely  a 
temple  or  sacred  asylum  in  Asia,  Greece,  or  Epirus  had  escaped 
their  ravages.  The  shores  of  Italy  itself  were  not  safe  from  them. 
They  had  captured  two  Roman  praetors  with  their  attendants,  and 
carried  off  ladies  of  high  rank.  They  had  even  run  into  the  har- 
bours of  Caieta  and  Ostia  and  set  fire  to  the  ships.  Now  and  again 
some  of  their  victims  proved  strong  enough  to  be  avenged  upon 
them.  In  76,  for  instance,  they  captured  lulius  Caesar  on  his  way 
to  Rhodes,  and  exacted  a  ransom  of  fifty  talents.  He  raised  the  money 
in  certain  Greek  towns,  and  then  having  obtained  ships  captured 
and  caused  them  to  be  put  to  death  at  Pergamus.  But  though  some 
fitful  and  partial  attacks  had  been  made  upon  them  from  time  to  time 
since  the  Illyrian  war  of  220,  no  great  or  determined  effort  had  been 
made  to  put  them  down.  The  Balearic  islands  were  taken  in  123, 
on  the  pretext  of  harbouring  them  ;  Murena  had  dealt  with  some  of 
them  in  Asia  without  much  success  in  83-82  ;  P.  Servilius  Isauricus 
had  only  made  a  partial  and  temporary  impression  in  Cilicia  and 
Isauria  (74)  ;  C.  Antonius  had  failed  shamefully  in  Crete  (74)  ;  and 
though  Q.  Caecilius  Metellus, — who  had  already  dealt  ably  with 
them  when  praetor  in  Sicily  in  70, — was  at  this  very  time  sub- 
duing   Crete    successfully,    it    had    become    plain    that    something 

^  Who  the  tribuni  aerarii  were  is  a  vexed  question.  The  best  opinion  seems 
to  be  that  they  were  originally  tribal  officers  employed  to  collect  the  tributum  and 
pay  the  soldiers.  They  were  taken  from  those  whose  property  was  reckoned  next 
below  the  400,000  HS.,  which  was  the  equestrian  fortune;  and  when  the 
tributum  ceased  to  be  collected  (168)  men  so  rated  still  continued  to  be  called 
tribu7ii  aerarii  and  were  reckoned  as  a  distinct  ordo^  though  the  law  of  Cotta  is 
the  first  known  recognition  of  them  as  such. 


I 


XLii  POMPEY  CLEARS  TPIE  SEAS  OF  PIRATES  68i 

more   was   wanted  to  vindicate  the  position  of  Rome  as  protector  of 
her  allies  and  subjects.      The  people  of  Rome  were  themselves  now 
experiencing  the  inconvenience  of  farther  toleration  by  a  serious  rise 
in  the  price  of  provisions  ;  and  when   the  tribune  A.  Gabinius  pro-  Lex 
posed  that  a  commander  should  be  named,  with  absolute  powers  for  Gabinia, 
three  years  all  over  the  Mediterranean  and  fifty  miles  inland  from  '^' 
all  coasts,  with  200  ships,  and  unlimited  power  of  drawing  upon  the   Caliur'nius 
treasury,  all  eyes  were  turned  to  Pompey,  though  he  was  not   named.   Piso,  M. ' 
Caesar    supported    the    measure    in    the    Senate,    but  the  majority  Acilius 
vehemently  opposed  it,  as  granting  dictatorial  powers  dangerous  to  the   '^'■^"^^^• 
state,  and  Gabinius  almost  lost  his  life  at  the  hands  of  a  senatorial 
mob  headed  by  the  consul  Piso.       But  the  people  in  their  turn  saved 
Gabinius,  and  would  have  killed  Piso,  had  not  Gabinius  given  him 
refuge  in  his  house.     Another  tribune,  Trebellius,  was  next  set   up 
to  veto  the  bill,  and  refused  to  withdraw  his  veto  till  seventeen  out  of 
eighteen  tribes  required  for  a  majority  had  voted  on   the  proposal 
of  Gabinius  to  depose  him.      The  law  was  then  passed  and  Pompey  Pompey 
named  for  the  post.      After  some  hollow  pretence  of  reluctance  he  o.ppo^nted 
accepted  it.     In  their  enthusiasm  the  people  voted  him  an  even  more    °'.    ^ 
liberal  equipment  than  that  originally  proposed.      He  was  to  have  ^jjars. 
500  vessels,  2  quaestors,  24  legates,  and   120,000  sailors  and  foot- 
soldiers,  with  500  horse.      The  orator  Q.  Hortensius  and  Q.  Catulus 
opposed  the  bill  on  the  grounds  that  it  was  dangerous  to   give  a 
man  such  great  powers,  especially  outside   Italy.      Like  Marius  or 
Sulla  he  might  return  to  make  himself  a  despot.      But  the  people 
were  convinced  of  the  wisdom  of  the  measure  when,  on  the  day  after 
his  appointment,  the  prices  of  provisions  suddenly  fell. 

Pompey  lost  no  time.      Before   spring  had   well  begun   he    had  Pompey 
divided  the   sea  and  coasts  into  nine  regions,  to  be  explored  and  clears  the 
cleared  by  his  several  legates  ;  had  visited  in  person  the  shores  of  ^^?  ^     ,, 
Africa  and  Sicily ;  and  stationed  squadrons  along  them  to  protect  the 
corn  ships.      Then  returning  to  Italy,    after  a  brief  visit  to  Rome, 
he  started  again  from  Brundisium.     Within  forty  days  the  pirates 
were  scattered,   killed,   or  forced    to  submit,   and  their  strongholds 
in    Cilicia   and    Pamphylia   taken   or   destroyed.       He  wintered    in 
Cilicia,    and  employed  himself  in   bringing  the    province  to  order, 
founding  cities,  and  settling  the  best  of  the  pirates  in  districts  where 
they  could  live  honestly.      His  only  serious  difficulty  was  with   Q.  Q.Caecilins 
Metellus,  who  had  been  engaged  since  68  in  his  successful  war  in  Crete,  ^^^^tellus 
which  was  one  of  the  chief  sources   of  piracy,  and  greatly  resented  ^^.^^    ' 
the  authority  which   Pompey's  commission  enabled  him  to  exercise 
in  that  island,  as  in  all  others.      But  the  states  in  Crete,  expecting 
better   terms   from   Pompey,   begged    him   to   interfere.       He  wrote 
to  Metellus,  ordering  him  to  suspend  operations,  and  to  the  cities  not 


gives 


682  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap. 

to  obey  him,  and  sent  his  legate  L.  Octavius  to  openly  oppose  him. 
Crete  nevertheless  was  joined  to  Cyrenaica,  which  had  been  made  a 
province  in  75,  and  Pompey's  attention  was  soon  turned  elsewhere. 
The  popular  party  used  his  success  to  again  mortify  the  Senate. 
The  lex  Qne  of  the  trilDunes,  C.  Manilius,  now  proposed  a  plebiscitiMi^  con- 
^^^"^^'^  ferring  the  province  of  Bithynia  upon  Pompey,  in  addition  to  his 
^^^  existing  powers,  with  the  command  against  Mithridates,  and  full 
authority  to  settle  all  matters  in  Phrygia,  Lycaonia,  Galatia,  Cappa- 
docia,  Cilicia,  Colchis,  and  Armenia.  This  immense  addition  to  his 
commission  was  of  course  alarming  to  the  Senate,  and  was  opposed 
again  by  Hortensius  and  Q.  Catulus  ;  but  lulius  Caesar,  who  was 
aedile  elect,  supported  it,  and  Cicero,  who  was  praetor  urbanus, 
spoke  in  its  favour.  The  law  was  passed  by  all  the  tribes,  and  as 
soon  as  Pompey  was  informed  of  it,  while  pretending  indignation  at 
the  constant  demands  upon  his  services,  he  ceased  to  think  of  Crete ; 
turned  his  whole  attention  to  his  new  duties  ;  and,  leaving  three 
legions  to  cover  Cilicia,  started  for  the  war.  He  found  LucuUus 
in  Galatia  still  at  the  head  of  an  army,  and  at  first  treated  him  with 
respect ;  but  made  it  clear  that  he  had  no  intention  of  allowing  him 
any  share  in  finishing  the  war.  He  deprived  him  of  all  but  1500 
of  the  worst  of  his  soldiers,  upset  his  arrangements,  and  spoke 
contemptuously  of  his  pretensions  to  settle  with  the  commissioners  a 
province  over  which  he  had  lost  all  military  control.  Lucullus  was 
glad  to  go  home  for  his  triumph. 

But  in  fact  Pompey  found  Pontus  ready  to  fall  into  his  hands. 
Mithridates,  indeed,  was  still  at  the  head  of  30,000  infantry  and 
2000  cavalry ;  but  his  fortunes,  which  seemed  so  fair  in  the  previous 
year,  were,  nevertheless,  at  a  low  ebb.  The  country  which  he  had 
reoccupied  was  wasted  and  desolate ;  he  had  lost  the  help  of 
the  piratical  fleets  ;  and  his  son-in-law  Tigranes,  king  of  Armenia, 
was  again  alienated.  Of  the  three  sons  of  Tigranes  the  eldest 
in  the  course  of  the  previous  year  fell  in  arms  against  his  father ; 
the  second  was  executed  for  hastily  assuming  the  royal  tiara  when 
his  father  was  rendered  insensible  by  a  fall  from  his  horse  ;  and, 
finally,  the  third,  who  had  seemed  the  only  one  loyal,  seized  the 
opportunity  of  his  father's  absence  in  Cappadocia  to  rebel,  and  when 
his  father  advanced  against  him  fled  to  his  father-in-law  Phraates, 
king  of  Parthia.  These  young  princes  were  all  sons  of  Cleopatra, 
the  daughter  of  Mithridates  ;  and  Tigranes,  suspecting  that  they 
acted  at  the  instigation  of  their  grandfather,  was  little  inclined  to 
help  him.  Mithridates  therefore  stood  alone,  and  was  no  longer  con^ 
fronted  by  2i  faineant  like  Glabrio,  or  by  a  discredited  general  lik 
Lucullus,  with  a  disorganised  army  ;  but  by  a  man  confident  an 
energetic,  invested  with  fullest  powers,  and  enjoying  the  confidence  c 


I, 

i 


XLii  POMPEY  DEFEATS  MITHRIDATES  683 

his  amiy.      Still  he  would  not  listen  to  the  terms  offered  by  Pompey  ;  The 
and  tried  again  as  a   last   resource  to  attract  the  Parthians  to  his  Parthian 
aUiance.      But  in  this,  too,  Pompey  baffled  him.      Envoys  appeared  ^^^^««^^- 
at  the  court  of  Phraates,  promising  alliance  with    Rome  and    the 
Euphrates  as  a  frontier ;  and  the  Parthian  king,  resolving  to  accept 
the  offer,  prepared  to  invade  Armenia,  thus  forcing  Tigranes  event- 
ually to  seek  Roman  protection. 

Early  in  66  Pompey  appeared  in  Bithynia  with  an  army  of  60,000  Pompey  h 
men,  which  included  the  two  Fimbrian  legions  that  had  refused  to  Pontics, 
serve  any  longer  under  Lucullus.      His  great  fleet  was  guarding  all 
points  along  the  shore  from   Phoenicia  to  the  Bosporus,  and  he  now 
advanced  to  the  frontier  of  Pontus.      In  answer  to  offers  made  by 
Mithridates  he   demanded  unconditional  submission  and   surrender 
of  all   deserters.       The   army   of  the   king   was  full   of  such  men, 
and  their  alarm  forced  him  to  declare  his  determination  to  surrender 
none,  explaining  that  his  envoys   had  been  really  meant  as  spies. 
Nevertheless  he   dared   not    meet    Pompey's    superior   force.       He 
retreated  eastward,  trying   to   harass  the  advancing   army  by  inter- 
cepting convoys   and  cutting   off  detached   parties.       But   Pompey  Pompey 
out -manoeuvred    and    out -marched    him;    drew   him    into    country  out- 
ill-suited  to   cavalry  ;  got  between  him  and  the  road  into  Greater  ^^/^^^^-^ 
Armenia ;  and  cut  up  his  cavalry  near  Nicopolis  by  means  of  an  ^^. 
ambuscade.       Mithridates   then  entrenched  himself  on  a  hill  near 
the  river  Lycus,  where  he  had  an  abundant  supply  of  water,  and  was 
able   to   hold  out  for  forty-five  days.       Pompey  sent  for  reinforce- 
ments from  Cilicia,  and  cut  off  his  supplies  by  throwing  a  corps 
across  the  Euphrates  and  occupying  the  district  on  his  rear,  while  he 
drew  round  him  a  vast  line  of  fortresses  extending  for  fifteen  miles. 
At  length  Mithridates,  finding  his  provisions  running  short,  determined 
to  escape.     The  wounded  and  sick  were  killed,  the  watch-fires  were 
lit  as  usual,  and  in  the  darkness  of  the  night  he  and  his  main  army 
made  their  way  through  the  Roman  lines  in  the  direction  of  the 
Euphrates.      But  they  dared  not  march  except  by  night,  concealing 
themselves  during  the  day  in  glens  and  forests.    This  gave  the  pursuers 
an  opportunity  of  out-marching  them.     On  the  third  day  Pompey 
stationed  his  men   so  as   to  command  a  defile  through  which  the 
Pontic    forces   would  necessarily   pass   in   the   next   night's   march. 
As    they   entered    the    defile    the    Roman    trumpets  and  battle -cr>^ 
suddenly  broke  the  stillness  of  the  night,  and  the  advanced  guard  Night 
found  themselves  overwhelmed  on  all  sides  by  a  shower  of  darts,  ^^i^l^ 

stones,   and  arrows  ;    Mithridates    was   roused    by   his    officers   and  ^"'  *^^^  ■ 
J  1  1  1  •  .lilt,  ,    mountain 

endeavoured  to  draw  up  his  men  m  battle  order ;  but  they  proved 
unable  to  withstand  the  Roman  attack,  and  were  cut  to  pieces, 
driven  over  precipices,  or  trampled  under  foot  by  the  horses.      The 


684 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


moon  rose  during  the  struggle  behind  the  Romans,  but  the  deceptive 
hght  made  it  impossible  for  the  Pontic  archers  to  take  good  aim  or 
to  judge  of  distances.  The  army  was  annihilated  ;  10,000  were 
killed ;  and  the  rest  were  taken  prisoners,  or  wandered  away  among 
the  mountains.  Pompey  returned  his  loss  as  only  forty  killed  and 
1000  wounded.  Mithridates  escaped  with  some  horsemen,  who 
presently  deserted  him,  and  arrived  with  two  attendants  and  his 
wife  Hypsicrate  at  Sinoria,  on  the  frontier  of  the  Greater  Armenia, 
from  which  he  sent  once  more  to  demand  the  hospitality  of  Tigranes. 
But  Tigranes  was  in  no  case  to  help  him,  and  with  no  inclination  to 
do  so  if  he  were.  The  Parthian  king  had  penetrated  to  his  capital, 
Artaxata,  accompanied  by  the  younger  Tigranes.  As  the  winter 
was  approaching,  Phraates  left  the  siege  of  the  city  to  this  young 
prince  and  returned  to  Parthia.  Thereupon  the  elder  Tigranes  re- 
appeared, appealed  to  the  loyalty  of  his  subjects,  and  proceeded  to 
attack  his  son.  The  young  Tigranes  fled,  intending  to  join  Mithri- 
dates, but,  hearing  of  his  defeat,  changed  his  plan,  and  proceeding 
to  the  Roman  camp  surrendered  to  Pompey.  The  elder  Tigranes, 
still  believing  Mithridates  to  be  the  instigator  of  his  son,  seized  his 
envoys  and  sent  them  also  to  Pompey,  whom  he  tried  to  propitiate 
by  offering  100  talents  for  the  head  of  Mithridates. 

The  Pontic  king,  thus  deserted  on  all  hands,  resolved  to  make  his 
way  to  the  Bosporus  and  recover  the  kingdom  held  by  his  son 
Machares,  who  had  betrayed  him  and  made  peace  with  Lucullus. 
The  large  treasures  at  Sinoria  furnished  a  year's  pay  in  advance  for 
the  troops  which  still  remained  to  him  ;  and  before  long  he  started 
with  a  small  army  along  the  right  bank  of  the  Euphrates  on  his  way 
to  Colchis  and  the  Caucasus.  The  line  of  the  Caucasus,  between 
the  Black  Sea  and  the  Caspian,  was  held  by  two  warlike  tribes,  the 
Albani  and  the  Iberes,  with  the  latter  of  whom  he  had  long  had 
diplomatic  relations.  He  easily  persuaded  them  that  a  Roman  army 
would  endanger  their  independence  ;  and  having  thus,  as  he  hoped, 
secured  an  interruption  to  Pompey's  pursuit,  continued  his  march 
round  the  Black  Sea  and  wintered  at  Dioscurias  in  Colchis. 

Pompey  did  not  immediately  follow  him.  The  Roman  fleet  under 
Servilius  sailed  up  the  coast  of  the  Euxine  as  far  as  the  mouth  of 
the  Phasis  ;  while  Pompey  himself,  guided  by  young  Tigranes, 
marched  through  Armenia  upon  Artaxata.  There  was  no  resistance  ; 
and  at  fifteen  miles  from  the  city  the  old  king  Tigranes  appeared, 
offering  full  submission.  He  was  kindly  received  by  Pompey  ;  treated 
as  a  king ;  and  admitted  to  friendship  and  alliance  with  Rome,  on 
condition  of  surrendering  all  his  conquests  in  Syria,  Phoenicia, 
Cilicia,  and  Galatia,  and  paying  a  war  indemnity  of  6000  talents. 
This  did  not  satisfy  the  young  Tigranes,  who  was  to   have  as  his 


XLii        POMPEY  CONQUERS  THE  ALBANI  AND  IBERES         685 


sole   reward    the  kingdom  of  Sophene,   the   south-western  district, 
annexed  by  his  father  to  Armenia.       He  had  annoyed  Pompey  by  j-f^^ 
his   rudeness   to   his   father  when   both   were   entertained  by  him ;  younger 
and  now  his  language  was  so  haughty  and  defiant  that  Pompey  put   Tigranes 
him  in  chains,  and  resolved  to  send  him,  with  his  wife  and  family,  "^/^•^^"• 
to   Rome  to  adorn  his  triumph.      Ariobarzanes  was  restored  to  the 
kingdom  of  Cappadocia,  with  the  addition  of  Sophene,  now  taken 
from  the  young  Tigranes,  and  charged  to  protect  the  line  of  the 
Euphrates. 

Pompey  moved  into  winter  quarters  on  the  banks  of  the  Cyrus 
{Khur)  on  the  extreme  north-western  frontier  of  Armenia,  and  ob- 
tained from   the  kings   of  the  Albani  and  Iberes  a  promise  of  free 
passage  through  their  territories  in   pursuit  of    Mithridates  in  the 
spring.       But  while  the   Roman  troops  were    keeping    the  festival  Battles 
of  the  Saturnalia  (17th  December)  king  Oroizes  led  40,000  Albani  "^^i-th  the 
across  the   Cyrus   and  fell  upon  the  three   camps — of  Pompey,    L.  £,ccember 
Valerius  F'laccus,  and  Q.  Metellus  Celer.      The  treacherous  attack  ^^^^ 
was   repulsed   with   severe   loss,    and   Oroizes   was   obliged    to  beg 
humbly  for  a  truce.      Next  spring,   however,   though  Artokes,  king  and  with 
of  the   Iberes,  affected  to  keep   up   friendly   negotiations,    Pompey  ^^^  Iberes 
resolved  to  anticipate  the  attack  which  he  ascertained  that  he  was  ^?^^  ^ 
meditating.      He  surprised  him  by  marching  up  the  Cyrus  and  seiz- 
ing the  defiles  before  the  Iberian  army  was  ready.     Artokes  retired 
behind  the  Cyrus,  burnt  the  bridge  behind  him,  and  tried  to  renew 
negotiations.      But  Pompey  continued  to  advance,  and  at  last  came 
up  with  him  close  to  the  Caucasus.      There  Artokes  was  forced  to 
fight,  and  after  losing  9000  killed  and  10,000  prisoners,  was  fain  to 
submit  to  terms  and  give  his  own  children  as  hostages. 

Having  thus  subdued  a  nation  whose  freedom  had  never  been 
infringed,  either  by  the    Persian   kings    or  by  Alexander,   Pompey 
continued    his    advance    in    pursuit    of   Mithridates    as    far    as   the 
Phasis,  at    the    mouth    of   which    a    Roman    fleet   was   at   anchor.  Pompey  on 
Btit    there  finding  that    Mithridates   had   left    Dioscurias,  and  was  ^^^  Phasis. 
well  on  his  way  to  the   Bosporus,   he  resolved    to    follow  him  no 
farther.      He  believed  that  the  Roman  fleet  in  the  Black  Sea  would 
suffice   to  cut    him  off  from    provisions  and  other  help,  and    that 
he   might  be  safely  left  to  go  to  ruin.      He   turned  his  steps  once  Pompey 
more  to  the  south  ;  defeated  the  Albani  again,  who  were  inclined  to  returns  to 
hinder  his  passage,  killing  their  leader  Kosis  with  his  own  hand  ;  and  ^^^^^^^ 
arrived  in  Lesser  Armenia  in  the  early  summer  of  65,  where  fortress  (,., 
after  fortress  was  captured  or  surrendered.      Sinoria  was  taken  by 
his  legate   Manlius    Porcius  ;  Symphorion  was   surrendered   by  the 
deserted  Queen   Stratonice  ;  and  the  archives   of  the  kingdom  fell 
into  Pompey 's  hands  at  a  place  called  the  New  Town.     Taking  up 


686 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


his  residence  at  Amisos  he  proceeded  to  regulate  the  affairs  of  Asia 
with  absolute  authority,  and  was  visited  by  twelve  kings  desirous  to 
obtain  recognition  or  pardon.  He  also  reduced  the  kingdom  of 
Pontus  to  the  form  of  a  province,  to  be  united  with  Bithynia.  Stripped 
of  the  outlying  districts,  granted  to  various  princes  and  tetrarchs,  it 
consisted  of  eleven  urban  communities  {civiiates)^  some  already  exist- 
ing, others  founded  or  restored  by  Pompey  himself,  as  Pompeiopolis 
on  the  Amnias,  and  Nicopolis  in  the  valley  of  the  Lycus,  where  he 
first  conquered  Mithridates. 

The  one  important  monarch  who  still  ventured  on  acts  of  hostility 
was  Phraates,  king  of  the  Parthians — that  mysterious  people,  whose 
mission  seemed  to  be  to  create  a  reaction  against  the  hellenisation 
of  Asia,  and  to  put  a  limit  to  the  Empire  of  Rome  in  the  East. 
Phraates  occupied  the  part  of  the  territory  of  Tigranes  called 
Gordyene,  and  threatened  the  rest.  As  the  remaining  dominion  of 
Tigranes  had  been  guaranteed  to  him  by  Pompey,  L.  Afranius  was 
despatched  to  expel  Phraates.  Having  done  so  he  continued  his 
march  with  great  difficulty  through  Mesopotamia  towards  Syria.  This 
great  district  between  the  Euphrates  and  the  Mediterranean,  bounded 
on  the  north  by  the  ranges  of  Amanus  and  Taurus,  and  on  the 
south  by  the  desert  of  Arabia  Petraea,  had  been  taken  by  Tigranes, 
but  was  now  to  become  a  Roman  province.  L.  Aemilius  Scaurus 
had  been  sent  by  Pompey  to  take  possession  of  it,  and  arrived 
in  Damascus  at  the  end  of  65,  which  he  found  already  held  by 
two  of  Pompey's  legates.  There  his  interposition  was  invited  in 
the  affairs  of  Palestine.  Hyrcanus  II.,  who  was  high  priest, 
succeeded  his  mother  Alexandra  in  the  kingdom  of  ludaea  in 
69  ;  but  his  younger  brother  Aristobulus,  who  was  of  a  far  more 
energetic  character,  raised  an  army  and  defeated  him  near  Jericho, 
and  compelled  him  to  resign  the  crown.  Instigated,  however,  by 
Antipater  or  Antipas  (father  of  Herod),  he  asked  help  from  Aretas, 
king  of  the  Nabataei  in  Arabia  Petraea  (6  5 ).  Aretas  defeated  Aris- 
tobulus and  blockaded  him  in  the  Temple,  which  had  been  strongly 
fortified  since  the  time  of  the  Maccabees,  he  and  Hyrcanus  holding 
the  rest  of  Jerusalem.  When  Scaurus  arrived  at  Damascus  both 
sides  appealed  to  him,  and  both  offered  him  large  bribes.  He 
decided  in  favour  of  Aristobulus  (who  seems  to  have  bidden  highest), 
and  ordered  Hyrcanus  and  Aretas  to  withdraw.  Aristobulus  pursued 
them  as  they  retired  and  inflicted  a  defeat  upon  them.  Such  was 
the  state  of  affairs  when  Pompey  himself  arrived  at  Damascus  from 
Pontus,  leaving  the  fleet  to  blockade  the  shores  of  the  Euxine,  and 
starve  out  Mithridates. 

At  Damascus  he  was  visited  by  embassies  from  all  parts  of 
Syria    and    from    Egypt.      Among    others  Aristobulus    sent    him    a 


POMPEY  IN  lUDAEA  687 


present  of  a  golden  vine,  worth   500  talents  ;  and  at  the  same   time  He  makes 
envoys  appeared  on  the  part  of  Hyrcanus  and  Antipas,  denouncing  Syria  a 
the    bribery    which     had     secured    the     intervention    in    favour   of  P^'^"^^^' 

dtlttlttltl 

Aristobulus.      Pompey  wintered  in  Syria,  where  his  legate  Afranius  ^^^, 
subdued  the  people  in  the  north  at  the  foot  of  the  Amanus  range,  while 
he  himself  was  employed  in  reducing  the  kingdom   of  the   deposed 
Antiochus    to    the    form    of   a    province.       In     the     spring    of    63 
he    summoned    representatives    of  the   two   rivals   to   meet    him  at 
Damascus.     Having  heard  them  he  refused   to  give  a  decision  at 
once,  but  expressed  his  intention  of  coming  shortly  into  ludaea  and 
judging  by  his  own  eyes.      Owing,  however,  in  a  great  degree    to 
the  skilful  advocacy  of  Antipas  his  inclination  was  clearly  shown  to  be  Pompey 
in  favour  of  Hyrcanus:  and  accordingly  Aristobulus,  instead  of  obey-  favours 
ing  his  injunction  to  take  no  warlike  steps  till  he  came,  proceeded  ^y^^*^^^^^- 
to    occupy  the    roads    and  passes   into    ludaea.      Pompey  therefore 
determined  to  attack  him  and  subdue  the  whole  country.      Marching  He 
to  Pella  he  crossed  the  Jordan  to  Scythopolis,  and  thence  entered  invades 
ludaea.     There  he  summoned  Aristobulus,  who  was  securely  posted        f^f  , 

€Cif'lV  ttt  O  ? 

on  the  hill  fortress  of  Alexandreion.  He  feigned  obedience,  mean- 
while secretly  occupying  all  the  strong  places  he  could  on  the  way 
to  Jerusalem.  Ordered  to  deliver  up  these  fortresses  he  reluctantly 
obeyed,  and  retiring  to  Jerusalem,  there  fortified  himself 

As  Pompey  approached  Jericho  couriers  arrived  in  the  Roman  Pompey 
camp    informing    him    that    the    great    object    of   his    mission    was  hears  of 
accomplished.      Mithridates   was   dead.      While   Pompey  in  65  had  ^^j^^^^^^^-. 
been  parcelling  out  the  kingdom  of  Pontus,  the  fugitive  lord  of  these  dates. 
wide  domains  had  been  pressing  on  towards  the  Bosporus.     Arrived 
after  a  harassing  march  on  the  shores  of  the  Maeotis  he  summoned 
his    ancient    vassals,    distributed    gold,    promised    his   daughters    in 
marriage  to  the  chiefs,  and  was  soon  at  the  head  of  a  formidable 
force.      His  treacherous  son  Machares  in  alarm  sent  envoys  to  demand 
pardon  and  make  terms.      Mithridates  answered  by  offering  a  reward 
for  his  head,  and  the  unfortunate  prince,  deserted  by  all,  fled   from 
Phanagoria  to  Panticapaeum  {Kertch\  and   there  fell  on  his  sword. 
Mithridates  was  again  a  king,  and  secured  himself  in  the  impregnable  Mithri- 
citadel  of  Panticapaeum.      Still  he  was  at  bay.      The  Roman  fleet,  ^^^^^  ^^ 
though    it    could    not   starve   him,   since  he  was    in   a   land  of   rich  ^,  ' 

corn  fields,  could  interrupt  and  hamper  the  trade  of  his  recovered 
kingdom.  He  knew  that  he  must  in  some  way  remove  the  blockade 
if  he  was  to  remain  king  ;  and  early  in  64  he  sent  offers  of  submission 
to  Pompey,  agreeing  to  hold  his  realms  as  the  vassal  of  Rome,  and 
to  despatch  his  sons  as  hostages.  Pompey  would  have  nothing  but  a 
personal  surrender  and  unconditional  submission.  Then  the  old  king 
conceived  the  bold    project   of  making    his   way  by   land    through 


L_ 


688 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Mithri- 
dates  medi- 
tates an 
invasion  of 
Italy. 


!  Death  of 
I    Mithri- 
j    dates, 
f    spring  of 
(>3- 


Pompey 
takes 

Jerusalem. 


Scythia,  descending  into  the  valley  of  the  Danube,  and  thence  by 
the  Brenner  Pass  into  Italy,  where  he  believed  that  the  Romans  were 
so  beset  by  difficulties,  and  the  Italians  so  ripe  for  revolt,  that  he 
might  yet  sweep  all  before  him,  and  succeed  where  the  less  disciplined 
Cimbrians  had  failed.  This  last  heroic  dream,  however,  was  baffled. 
His  people  were  suffering  from  the  distress  caused  by  the  Roman 
blockade,  aggravated  by  a  destructive  earthquake  ;  he  was  himself 
confined  to  his  palace  by  illness  ;  and  a  sHght  cause  might  at  any 
time  produce  a  revolution.  An  attempt  to  garrison  Phanagoria  on 
the  Asiatic  side  of  the  Bosporus  caused  a  violent  outburst,  in  which 
his  sons  and  daughters  residing  there  were  captured  and  handed  over 
to  the  Roman  fleet.  This  example  was  followed  in  the  Crimea,  and 
soon  the  king  had  nothing  left  but  Panticapaeum  and  the  army. 
Even  in  the  army  mutiny  was  breaking  out,  and  the  cruel  punishment 
with  which  he  tried  to  suppress  it  only  served  to  inflame  it.  The  troops 
conducting  his  two  daughters  to  their  Scythian  husbands  mutinied, 
killed  the  eunuchs  in  charge,  and  handed  over  the  girls  to  the 
Romans.  And  presently  the  one  son  left  him,  Pharnaces,  fearing  the 
fate  of  his  brothers,  four  of  whom  had  died  by  their  father's  orders, 
conspired  against  the  aged  king.  The  plot  was  discovered,  the 
secret  agents  tortured,  but  the  prince  pardoned.  Mithridates  hoped 
that  once  on  the  Italian  expedition  he  would  forget  his  schemes. 
But  a  few  days  before  the  date  fixed  for  the  start  Pharnaces  appeared 
among  the  Roman  deserters  serving  the  king ;  urged  them  to  join 
him  in  delivering  themselves  from  his  tyranny  ;  and  sent  emissaries 
through  the  town  to  rouse  all  who  were  similarly  aggrieved.  The 
people,  hardly  knowing  what  was  happening,  joined  in  the  movement, 
and  Mithridates  from  the  hill,  on  which  were  the  citadel  and  palace, 
could  see  the  rebels  and  hear  Pharnaces  proclaimed  king.  He  knew 
that  his  time  was  come.  He  had  a  deadly  poison  concealed  in  the 
hilt  of  his  sword.  He  drew  it  forth  and  began  mixing  it.  His 
two  daughters  demanded  to  share  the  draught  and  soon  lay  dead 
at  his  feet.  It  failed,  however,  to  have  a  like  rapid  effect  upon 
himself  Either  what  remained  of  the  potion  was  too  little,  or, 
as  he  believed,  his  body  was  fortified  by  antidotes.  At  any  rate 
he  was  still  alive  when  the  noise  of  the  approaching  rebels  was 
heard.  He  exerted  all  his  remaining  authority  to  induce  one  of  his 
Gallic  guards  to  give  him  the  death-stroke  ;  and  the  emissaries  of 
Pharnaces  burst  into  the  chamber  to  find  the  great  king  a  corpse. 

With  him  fell  all  resistance  to  Rome  in  the  East  for  the  present  ; 
and  when  the  news  reached  Pompey  he  knew  that  he  could  safely 
delay  his  return  to  Pontus  till  he  had  finally  subdued  Aristobulus 
and  the  Jews.  As  he  approached  Jerusalem  he  seemed  likely 
to  accomplish  this  without  striking  a  blow.     That  prince  had  lost 


XLii  SURRENDER  OF  JERUSALEM  689 

heart,  and  now  appeared  in  the  camp  offering  complete  submission. 
His  offer  was  accepted,  and  Gabinius  was  sent  to  take  possession  of 
the  city  and  obtain  supplies.  But  the  obstinacy  of  the  Jews  had  not 
been  taken  into  account.  They  closed  their  gates,  repudiated  the 
bargain  of  Aristobulus,  and  refused  all  supplies.  Pompey,  thinking 
himself  deceived,  put  Aristobulus  in  chains  and  advanced  to  assault 
Jerusalem.  The  inhabitants  were  divided,  one  part  wishing  to  submit, 
the  other  determined  to  resist.  The  former  delivered  the  city,  the 
latter  entrenched  themselves  in  the  precincts  of  the  temple,  breaking 
down  the  means  of  communication  between  it  and  the  city.  The  men  Siege  of  the 
in  the  temple  were  summoned  but  refused  to  submit ;  and  Pompey  t^^nple. 
pitching  his  camp  to  the  north  of  the  hill  proceeded  to  invest  it.  He 
cut  down  wood  in  every  direction  to  fill  up  the  deep  moat  round 
the  temple  hill,  and  siege  artillery  was  sent  for  from  Tyre.  The  reso- 
lute adherence  by  the  Jews,  even  in  this  hour  of  danger,  to  the 
observance  of  the  Sabbath  gave  the  besiegers  an  advantage  they 
were  quick  to  seize.^  Still  the  besieged  held  out  till  the  third  month. 
At  length  one  of  the  great  towers  yielded  to  the  blows  of  the 
battering  rams,  and  through  the  breach  the  Roman  soldiers,  headed 
by  Cornelius  Faustus,  son  of  Sulla,  poured  in.  Twelve  thousand  Jews 
are  said  to  have  perished  by  the  enemy's,  or  by  each  other's  hands, 
or  by  flinging  themselves  from  the  precipitous  rock.  Pompey  insisted 
on  entering  the  Holy  of  Holies,  and  gazed  at  a  shrine  without  a  god, 
at  the  golden  table  and  candlesticks,  at  the  censers  and  incense. 
He  respected  the  sublime  simplicity  of  a  religion  which  he  did  not 
understand  ;  left  the  sacred  objects  in  their  place  ;  and  ordered  the 
temple  to  be  cleansed  and  restored.  The  high  priesthood  was  given 
to  Hyrcanus,  with  the  authority  though  not  the  title  of  king,  and 
Jerusalem  was  subjected  to  a  tribute,  and,  with  a  curtailed  territory, 
was  treated  as  a  separate  community.  The  towns  on  the  sea  coast —  Restored  on 
Gaza,  Joppa,  Dora,  Stratonis  Turris  {Caesared) — were  severed  from  the  request 
Jewish  control,  and  retaining  internal  freedom  were  reckoned  in  the  ^f  ^^^^ 
new  province  of  Syria,  ^  along  with  the  towns  of  Decapolis.  The  ■^^^^^"^/^'^ 
final  settlement  of  the  country  was  left  to  Gabinius  when  pro-  aGadaretu. 
consul  of  Syria  in  57.  Aretas  of  Arabia  Petraea  was  punished 
for  his  interference  by  an  invasion  under  Scaurus,  and  was  glad 
to  secure  by  a  payment  of  300  talents  the  freedom  of  his  territory 
from  plunder.  Aristobulus  and  his  family  were  carried  off  to 
Rome. 

1  An  attack  might  be  repelled  on  the  Sabbath,  but  not  made.  Therefore  the 
work  of  trenches  and  the  like  were  uninterrupted  on  it  (Jos.  Ant.  xiv.  4  ;  Bell. 
Jud.   I,  7,  3  ;   Dio  xlvii.  16). 

2  7rd(ras  6  IIo/ATrTjibs  d(prJKev  eXevdepas  Kal  TrpoaivcLfxe  ttj  i7rapxi<^  (Joseph. 
Antiq.  xiv.  5,  4). 

2  Y 


690 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Pompey 
returns  to 
Pontus,  62. 


Restoration 
of  the 
kings. 


Towns 
founded  or 
rebuilt. 


Pompey  s 
journey 
home,  62. 


Greatness 
of  Pompey  s 
achieve- 
ments. 


Jerusalem  seems  to  have  been  taken  in  October  1  63,  and 
Pompey  must  have  been  detained  for  some  time  making  these 
arrangements  for  the  cities  of  Palestine  ;  but  early  in  62  he  started 
once  more  for  Pontus.  At  Amisos  an  envoy  from  Pharnaces 
appeared,  bringing  presents  and  hostages,  and  above  all,  the 
embalmed  body  of  Mithridates,  which  Pompey  would  not  look  at  and 
ordered  to  be  buried  in  the  royal  mausoleum  at  Sinope.  Pharnaces 
was  rewarded  with  the  kingdom  of  the  Bosporus,  and  the  usual 
title  of  "friend  and  ally"  of  Rome.  Phanagoria  was  declared 
free  ;  and  a  number  of  the  partisans  of  Mithridates  were  sent  to 
Rome  in  readiness  for  Pompey's  triumph.  The  greater  Asiatic 
kingdoms  Avere  restored  generally  to  those  who  had  been  driven  out 
— Armenia  to  Tigranes,  Cappadocia  to  Ariobarzanes,  Commagene 
with  Seleucia  to  Antiochus  ;  while  Deiotarus  was  made  tetrarch  of  a 
part  of  Galatia ;  Attains  prince  of  Paphlagonia ;  Aristarchus  of  Colchis 
and  Archelaus  high  priest  of  Comana,  an  office  which  carried  with  il 
royal  power.  Pompey  wished  also  to  perpetuate  his  name  by  the 
restoration  or  foundation  of  cities.  In  Pontus,  Eupatoria  was 
changed  to  Magnopolis  ;  in  Cappadocia,  Mazaca  was  restored,  and 
Nicopolis  Pompeii  built  on  the  site  of  his  victory  over  the  king  ;  in 
Cihcia,  Soli  became  Pompeiopolis, — and  so  with  many  cities  in 
Pontus,  in  Palestine,  Coele- Syria,  and  Cilicia,  though  in  many  cases 
the  name  was  not  permanently  preserved;  finally,  as  a  favour  to  his 
friend  the  Greek  historian  Theophanes,  he  touched  at  Mitylene 
and  restored  to  it  the  freedom  forfeited  in  81.  These  arrange- 
ments made,  Pompey  proceeded  to  Ephesus,  Rhodes,  and  Athens, 
which  he  presented  with  a  subscription  of  fifty  talents  towards  the 
restoration  of  the  city,  and  thence  to  Italy,  landing  at  Brundisium 
towards  the  close  of  the  year. 

He  returned  with  a  record  of  achievement  never  surpassed. 
The  seas  were  cleared  of  the  pirates.  Two  large  provinces 
had  been  added  to  the  Empire ;  from  the  Caspian  and  Araxes 
to  the  Mediterranean  all  sovereigns  reigned  by  the  will  and  undei 
the  protection  of  Rome.  His  ships  were  crowded  with  kings, 
princes,  and  chiefs,  who  had  ruled  or  claimed  to  rule  over  greal 
territories,  and  with  their  families  numbered  300.  For  four  years 
he  had  exercised  an  unlimited  authority  over  a  vast  expanse  oi 
country,  had  set  up  and  deposed,  had  destroyed  and  built,  had  re- 
warded with  imperial  magnificence  and  (more  seldom)  had  punished 
with  unquestioned  authority.  And  in  this  exalted  position  he  had 
won  esteem  and  even  affection  by  his  unblemished  integrity  and 
wise  lenity.      His  return  to   Italy,  at  the  head  of  such  large  forces, 

^  Josephus  says  kv  rrj  ttjs  prjaTelas  rjix^pq.,  the  day  of  Atonement,  i.e.  loth 
October,  about  loth  November,  of  unreformed  Roman  calendar.  Lewis,  Fasti 
Sacri,  gives  Tisri  loth,  22nd  September;   Clinton,  F.  H.,  says  December. 


XLii  RETURN  OF  POMPEY  TO  ITALY  691 

and  with  the  halo  of  such  glory,  was  looked  forward  to  with  anxiety 
by  the  senatorial  party,  which  had  always  been  jealous  of  him,  and 
with  mixed  feelings  of  hope  and  doubt  by  the  Populares,  who  had 
never  been  able  to  feel  sure  of  his  allegiance.  To  both  it  seemed 
that  his  advent  might  be  the  beginning  of  incalculable  change.  But 
Pompey  disappointed  hopes  and  fears  alike.  He  was  too  confident 
in  the  glory  which  he  had  won  to  think  of  playing  the  part  of  a  Sulla 
or  a  Marius.  As  soon  as  he  landed  at  Brundisium,  after  munificently 
rewarding  the  men,  and  pledging  himself  to  obtain  grants  of  land  for 
the  veterans,  he  quietly  dismissed  his  army. 

Authorities. — Livy,  Epit.  99-102  ;  Plutarch,  Pompey,  23-43  ;  Appian, 
Dellum  Mithridat.  93-121  ;  Josephus,  Antiq.  xiv.  2-4  ;  Dio  Cassius  xxxvi.  19- 
xxxvii.  20 ;  Orosius  vi.  4-6 ;  Zonaras  x.  3-5.  The  2nd  of  the  Apocryphal 
"  Psalms  of  Solomon  "  appears  to  refer  to  the  entrance  of  Pompey  into  the  Holy 
of  Holies,  and  his  death  in  Egypt  as  a  retribution. 


CHAPTER  XLIII 


THE   CONSPIRACY   OF   CATILINE,    AND   THE    FIRST   TRIUMVIRATE 

State  of  parties  at  Pompey's  return — The  leaders  of  the  Optimates — The  Popu- 
lares  without  a  leader — C.  lulius  Caesar — His  early  career — His  support  of 
popular  measures  (73-68) — Quaestor  in  Spain  (68) — Supports  the  Gabinian  (67) 
and  Manilian  laws  (66) — Aedile  (65) — Fails  to  get  appointed  to  Egypt — 
Judex  quaestionis  (64) — As  duovir  capitalis  condemns  C.  Rabirius — The 
Catiline  conspiracy  crushed  by  Cicero  as  consul  —  Caesar  advises  against 
executing  the  conspirators — His  election  as  pontifex  maximus  (63) — Caesar's 
praetorship  —  His  contests  with  the  Senate — Fall  of  Catiline  (62) — Caesar 
propraetor  in  Spain  (61) — Caesar  returns  from  Spain  to  stand  for  consulship — 
Is  not  allowed  to  be  a  candidate  without  entering  Rome — Elected  consul,  and 
forms  a  league  with  Pompey  and  Crassus  (60) — His  consulship  and  laws  (59) 
— P.  Clodius  —  His  violation  of  the  mysteries  (62)  —  His  adoption  into  a 
plebeian  gens  and  election  as  tribune  (59) — Cicero  is  banished  and  Caesar 
goes  as  proconsul  to  Gaul  (58) — Clodius'  laws — Quarrels  with  Pompey  who 
supports  the  recall  of  Cicero  (57) — Pompey  praefectus  annonae  for  five  years — 
Goes  to  the  congress  at  Lucca  on  Caesar's  invitation  (56). 

of  Pompey  did  not  reach  Rome  till  late  in  62.  The  Senate  had  refused 
his  request  to  postpone  the  Comitia  in  order  that  he  might  pay  M. 
Pupius  Piso,  one  of  his  legates,  the  compliment  of  being  present  at 
his  election.  He  had  imagined  that  hardly  any  request  of  his  would 
be  rejected,  and  he  perhaps  learnt  from  it  that  a  general  without  an 
army  was  not  likely  to  be  as  influential  as  he  hoped  to  be.  Changes 
at  Rome  were  rapid,  and  an  absence  of  four  years  was  enough  to 
put  a  man  out  of  touch  with  them. 

at  Both  of  the  two  great  parties  at  Rome,  the  Optimates  and  the 

Populares,  had  a  specious  programme.  The  Optimates  wished  to  pre- 
serve the  ancient  constitution,  the  national  religion  and  system  of 
auspices,  the  powers  of  the  magistrates,  the  influence  of  the  Senate, 
the  Senatorial  hold  on  the  law  courts,  the  credit  of  the  exchequer, 
the  subordination  of  the  army,  the  government  of  the  provinces. 
The  Populares  maintained  that  the  religious  system,  especially  that 
of  the  auspices,  was  employed  to  enable  certain  aristocratic  families 
to  retain    hold  of  office    and    prevent  necessaiy  reforms  ;    that  the 


I 


innova- 
tions on  the 
Sullan 
constitn- 


CHAP.  XLiii        THE  OPTIMATES  AND  THE  POPULARES  693 

authority  of  the  Senate  should  always  bow  before  the  popular  will  ; 
that,  under  pretence  of  maintaining  national  credit,  lands  were  with- 
held from  the  people  and  served  only  to  enrich  the  already  wealthy  ; 
that  the  law  courts,  when  in  the  hands  of  the  Senate,  were  corrupt  ; 
that  the  provinces  were  oppressed  and  plundered  by  the  aristocratic 
governors.  But  in  fact  neither  party  had  clean  hands  in  these  matters. 
Though  there  were  honest  and  good  men  on  both  sides,  there  was 
a  large  number  on  both  also  whose  sole  object  was  to  get  the  advan- 
tages now  arising  from  office. 

Sulla  had  attempted  to  reform  the  existing  evils  by  increasing  Pompey 
the  power  of  the  Senate,  and  diminishing  that  of  the  tribunes,  who 
had  long  ceased  to  be   the  protectors   of  the   oppressed,   and   had 
learnt  to  use  their  great  powers  for  purely  political  purposes.     But 
Pompey's   own   measures    in    his   consulship    (70)    had   to   a    great  Hon,  yo. 
extent  undone  Sulla's  work.      The  old  constitution  was  restored  with 
all   its   anomalies, — a  close  oligarchy  under  democratic  forms  tem- 
pered by  prosecutions.      These  prosecutions  were  made  the  means 
of  party  triumphs,  and  young  men  on  the  look-out  for  office  found 
their  account  in  popular  favour  or  aristocratic  fears  by  bringing  an 
extortionate  or  unsuccessful  governor  to  trial.      But  such  a  man  had 
often  made  such  good  use  of  his  time  that  he  possessed  a  fortune  A  provin- 
large  enough  to  pay  for  the  shows  by  which  he  got  office,  and  to  ""^^ 
bribe  the  jury  as  well ;  or,  if  his  case  was  too  flagrant  or  his  oppon-  S^^'^^nor  s 
ents  too  influential,  to  enable  him  to  live  in  splendour  at  Marseilles  fortunes. 
or  other  residence  open  to  exiles.      So  little  did  these  prosecutions 
do   for    the  provinces  that  some  said  that    it  would  be  better  for 
them  if  there  were  no  law  de  repetu7tdis  j  the  governors  would  have 
one  less  fortune  to  make  out  of  them. 

The  party  of  the  Optimates  was  the  smaller  but  the  more  com-   The 
pact.      Its  strength  lay  in  long  prescription,  family  connexions,  and  Optimates 
the  influence  which  the  actual  possession  of  wealth  and  power  gives.     '^  "f'^ 
Its  weakness  was  that  it  disliked  and  mistrusted  great  men.     A  true  sin<rie 
oligarchy,  it  regarded  all  who  seemed  likely  to  be   specially  promi-  leader. 
nent  Avith  suspicion.      Pompey  had  shown  independence  :   had  joined 
Sulla  and  yet  opposed  him  on  more  than  one  occasion.    The  measures 
of  his  consulate  had  indeed  served  to  class  him  with  the  Populares  ; 
but  his  services  against  Lepidus  and  Sertorius,  and  his  dismissal  of 
his  army  on  his  return  from  the  East  had  proved  that  he  meant  to 
confine  himself  within  the  limits  of  the  constitution.      Yet  the  Opti-   They  dis- 
mates  slighted  and  thwarted  him,  and  drove  him  into  the  arms  of  Z'-^'?^ 
Caesar  and  Crassus,  of  the  former  of  whom  he  was  jealous,  while  he  Pompey. 
personally  disliked  the  latter.      M.   Tullius  Cicero,   great  orator  and  Cicerds 
brilliant  man  of  letters,  joined  the  party  but  never  seemed  at  home  party 
in  it.      He  had  ventured  to  beard  Sulla  at  the  height  of  his  power  in  P^^^^^on. 


694 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Cicero  joins 
the  Opti- 
inates. 


The 

weakness 
of  the 
Optimatist 
leaders. 

Catuliis. 


Cato. 


defending  Roscius  of  Ameria  (80)  ;  as  quaestor  at  Lilybaeum  he 
had  established  a  character  for  integrity  and  activity;  and  his  influence 
in  the  law  courts  was  so  great  that  though  a  "  new  man"  there  seemed 
to  be  no  serious  opposition  to  his  rise  through  the  regular  gradations 
of  office  to  the  consulship.  His  impeachment  of  Verres,  whose 
scandalous  peculation  in  Cilicia  (80-79),  and  still  more  abominable 
cruelties  in  Sicily  (73-71),  had  been  passed  over  by  the  Senate, 
which  had  left  him  three  years  in  office,  seemed  to  point  him  out  as 
a  member  of  the  popular  party.  But  he  was  before  all  things  a 
lawyer  in  politics.  The  best  of  all  possible  constitutions — that 
under  which  he  had  risen — must  be  maintained  :  and  when  to  his 
horrified  amazement  he  found  that  there  were  men  who,  while 
ostensibly  fighting  for  reforms,  cared  nothing  for  this  wonderful  con- 
stitution, with  all  its  elaborate  contrivances  to  enable  a  small  knot  of 
men  to  monopolise  the  right  of  doing  wrong,  he  joined  the  party  of 
privilege,  and  lent  all  his  eloquence  to  the  maintenance  of  the  whole 
obsolete  machinery  of  tradition,  senatorial  influence,  and  religious  and 
ceremonial  checks.  Into  this  he  fancied  new  life  might  be  breathed 
if  the  languid  and  corrupt  nobility  could  be  induced  to  leave  their 
country  palaces  and  fish-ponds  and  take  a  real  part  in  public  affairs  ; 
and  if  the  best  men  of  the  senatorial  and  equestrian  orders  would 
but  combine  to  uphold  the  constitution,  to  purify  the  law  courts,  and 
honestly  administer  the  provinces.  But  he  spoke  to  deaf  ears  :  nor 
was  he  himself  sufficiently  true  to  his  principles  to  have  weight  with 
others.  His  voice  was  often  raised,  either  from  private  friendship 
or  party  needs,  in  defence  of  notorious  wrongdoers  ;  and  for  every 
friend  which  his  eloquence  made,  it  made  a  dozen  angry  or  jealous 
enemies.  His  policy  of  winning  over  Pompey  and  setting  him  up  as 
a  counterpoise  to  Caesar  for  a  long  time  found  no  support. 

The  sort   of  leaders    pleasing    to    the  Optimates   were  men   of 
mediocre  abilities  and  narrow  views,  who  had  no  hold  on  the  popular 
imagination.      Q.  Lutatius  Catulus,  one  of  the  best  men  of  the  day, 
had  held   all  the  highest  offices   and  had  saved  the  city  from  the 
attack  of  Lepidus.      But  the  narrowness  of  his  views  was  shown  by 
his  refusal  as  censor  to  enrol  any  of  the  Transpadani  as  citizens  ;  and 
the  weakness  of  his  influence  by  the  failure  of  his  opposition  to  thai 
Gabinian  and  Manilian  laws.      M.  Porcius  Cato,  great-grandson  of  I 
the  censor,  was  a  figure  of  some  interest  and  was  influential  in  thej 
Senate.      But  his  Stoicism  was  as  unpopular  as  Puritanism  after  the 
Restoration,  and  his  success  at  elections  was  but  moderate.    He  never] 
rose   above   the   praetorship  or  held  a  first-class  government.       H( 
would  compromise  nothing :    he  offended  Pompey  by  resisting  th< 
allotments  to  his  veterans,  and  Caesar  by  talking  out  the  proposal  t^ 
allow  him  to  triumph  from  Spain  and  yet  stand  for  the  consulshij 


XLiii  EARLY  CAREER  OF  lULIUS  CAESAR  695 

M.  Licinius  Crassus  was  chiefly  devoted  to  amassing  wealth,  and  Crassus. 
though  he  showed  energy  in  the  war  with  Spartacus,  he  was  a 
poHtician  by  accident,  and  owed  his  influence  to  the  fact  of  being 
the  creditor  to  a  large  section  of  the  nobility.  L.  Lucullus,  on  his  Lucullus. 
return  from  the  East,  preferred  to  enjoy  his  vast  wealth  in  private 
luxury,  and  only  interfered  in  politics  when  moved  by  personal 
resentment,  and,  so  far  as  he  did  act,  prevented  any  conciliation  of 
Pompey. 

But  while  the  Optimates  had  no  need  or  wish  for  a  leader,  the   The 
larger  and  more  divided  party  of  the  Populares  was  helpless  without  Pop^l^^^^^ 
one.       And   as   yet  there   had    been    no    successor  to  Marius    and  f^j^^^ 
Cinna.       The    movement    of   Lepidus    proved    abortive.       Sertorius 
in    Spain    had   seemed  almost   like   a   foreign    enemy,  and   though 
some  of  the  extreme  Populares  joined  him,  there  was  no  movement 
in  Rome.     There  was,  indeed,  one  man  whose  character  was  only 
beginning  to  be  understood.      In  the  light  of  after  events  the  Roman 
writers  dwelt   much  on   the  early  career  of  Caesar  ;  but   it  seems  Early 
certain  that  in  63  he  was  not  generally  regarded  as  the  head  of  his  <:(i^^^^  of 
party,  or  likely  to  be  so.      Gaius   lulius  Caesar  was  born  in  100  (or  (^^J^^l^^ 
loi),    of  one   of   the    most    illustrious    patrician  gentes.      He   had 
already  shown  daring  and  independence.      In  83  he  married  Cornelia, 
daughter  of  Cinna,  and  defied  Sulla  when  ordered  to  divorce  her. 
Serving  his  first  campaign  under  Thermus  at  Mytilene  he  had  been 
selected  to  demand  from  the  king  of  Bithynia  the  use  of  his  fleet 
(81-80).      Returning  to  Rome  after  Sulla's  death  he  gained  a  great 
reputation   for  eloquence  in  the   prosecution  of  Cn.    Dolabella   for 
extortion  in  Macedonia  {y"])^  and  of  C.  Antonius  for  a  like  crime  in 
Greece  (76).      On  his  voyage  to  Rhodes  to  study  rhetoric  he  was 
captured  and  put   to  ransom  by  pirates,  and  revenged  himself  by 
pursuing  and  putting  them  to  death  ;  and  while  at  Rhodes,  at  the 
beginning  of  the   Mithridatic  war  (74),  he  collected  troops,  crossed 
over  to  Asia,  and  repulsed  the  general  of  the  king.      He  returned  to 
Rome   in   T}^^  and  from   that   time  was   forward   in   promoting  the  Supports 
measures  of  the  popular  party.      Thus  he  supported  the  law  of  his  ^^^ 
uncle  Aurelius   Cotta  for  transferring  the  judicia  from  the  Senate  to  Sf,"?^^"^ 
the  three  orders,  and  the  lex  Plotia  for  restoring  the  exiles  of  the 
party  of  Lepidus  and   Sertorius.      In   68  at  the  funeral  of  his  aunt 
lulia,  widow  of  Marius,  he  rejoiced   the   Populares   by  causing   the 
images  of  Marius  to  be  carried  in  the  procession.      But  he  had  not 
yet  held  office,  and  his  achievement  in  Asia  was  probably  little  known 
or  cared  for  at  Rome.^    His  friends  (as  well  as  some  of  his  enemies) 

1  As  an  illustration  of  the  indifference  at  Rome  to  any  but  the  most  striking 
events  in  the  provinces  may  be  quoted  the  story  that  Cicero  tells  of  his  own 
mortified  vanity  when  landing  at  Baiae  from  his  quaestoi'ship  at  Lilybaeum,  where 


696 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


might  remember  Sulla's  saying  that  there  were  the  materials  of  many 
Mariuses  in  the  young  man  ;  but  it  was  at  best  as  a  possible  leader 
in  the  future  that  he  was  regarded  when,  returning  from  his  quaestor- 
ship  in  farther  Spain  in  67,  he  gave  his  support  to  Pompey,  and 
warmly  advocated  the  Gabinian  and  Manihan  laws.^  All  sorts  of 
motives  were  afterwards  attributed  to  him  ;  he  foresaw  that  he  would 
want  similar  powers  himself  in  the  future  :  he  hoped  that  Pompey 
would  crush  the  powers  of  the  Optimates  :  he  imagined  that  in 
Pompey's  absence  he  could  secure  popular  favour  for  himself.  Yet 
his  motives  may  have  been  more  simple.  He  was  not  ready  yet  to 
take  the  lead.  He  had  done  nothing  to  justify  a  hope  of  being 
selected  out  of  the  ordinary  course  for  high  command.  He  must 
rely  at  present  on  the  ordinary  means  of  securing  favour,  and  rise 
in  the  regular  course.  Meanwhile  an  important  piece  of  work  had 
to  be  done,  and  no  one  was  better  fitted  to  do  it  than  Pompey,  whose 
political  leanings  at  least  were  on  the  popular  side,  and  whose  appoint- 
ment would  be  a  hint  to  the  Optimates  that  family  arrangements  were 
not  always  to  shelter  incompetence.  At  any  rate,  if  Pompey  did 
return  at  the  head  of  his  army  as  an  enemy  of  any  party,  it  would 
be  of  that  to  which  Caesar  himself  was  opposed. 

It  is  from  the  time  of  Pompey's  departure  to  the  East  perhaps 
that  we  may  date  Caesar's  deliberate  designs  of  securing  the  first 
place  for  himself,  though  it  was  not  till  the  end  of  the  decade  that  he 
can  be  said  to  have  attained  his  object  and  gained  the  undisputed 
leadership.  He  adopted  the  usual  measures  for  the  purpose. 
Becoming  a  commissioner  for  the  repair  of  the  Appian  Way  in  67 
he  expended  large  sums  out  of  his  own  purse;  as  aedile  in  65  he 
outshone  all  his  predecessors  in  the  magnificence  with  which  he 
celebrated  the  games  and  adorned  the  public  buildings  ;  and  one 
morning  the  survivors  of  the  Marian  veterans  were  delighted  to  find 
that  during  the  night  the  statues  of  Marius  and  the  representations 
of  his  Jugurthine  and  Cimbrian  triumphs,  removed  by  Sulla,  had 
been  restored  on  the  Capitol  by  his  order.  But  he  had  now  not 
only  spent  all  his  private  fortune,  but  was  so  deeply  in  debt  that 
but  for  "  his  hopes "  he  must  have  seen  nothing  but  bankruptcy 
before  him.  Some  lucrative  office  alone  could  save  him.  At  that 
time  there  was  a  burning  question  in  Egypt.  The  reigning  king, 
Ptolemy  Auletes,  was  a  miserable  debauchee  and  feeble  tyrant, 
whose  subjects  despised  and  wished  to  get  rid  of  him.  Crassus 
as  censor  proposed  in  the  Senate  that  Egypt  should  be  made  tribu- 

hc  flattered  himself  that  he  had  made  a  profound  impression,  and  had  done  much 

towards  securing  his  future  elections,  to  find  that  no  one  knew  where  he  had 

been  {Pro  Plane.  §  65). 

^  See  pp.  681,  682. 


I 


XLiii     CAESAR  TAKES  THE  LEAD  OF  THE  POPULARES        697 

tary  to  Rome,  having  been  already,  it  was  believed,  left  to  the  Roman 
people  by  will,  and  the  question  of  Ptolemy  be  reserved  for  considera- 
tion.     The    Senate   rejected   the   proposal,  for    the    importance    of 
Egypt  to  the  corn  supply  made  them  jealous  of  allowing  any  one  to 
go  there  with  imperium  ;    and  when  Caesar,  as  aedile,  proposed  to 
secure  the  mission  by  a  plebiscitu7n,  the  Senate  induced  a  tribune  to 
veto  the   measure,  which  would  have  relieved   him   from  debt,  and 
have  at  once  made  him  a  formidable  rival  of  Pompey.      Baffled  in 
this  he   next  year  attempted   to  frighten  the  Optimales.      He  was  As  Judex 
appointed    in    64   by   the    praetor    to    act   as    mdex   qtcaestio7iis    in  gnaesHonis 
cases  of  murder,   and  in    that  capacity  condemned  some  who  had  condemns 
killed   citizens    during    Sulla's   proscriptions  ;    and    in    the    following  sullu^dd 
year,  getting  himself  and  his  cousin  nominated  in  accordance  with 
an  obsolete  law  duoviri  capitales^    condemned    C.  Rabirius  oi  per-  63. 
dtieilio,   when    impeached  by  the  tribune    Labienus  for   murdering  Duoviri 
Saturninus.      Rabirius    appealed    to   the    people,    and    would    have  ^^P^^<^^^^- 
been  condemned    by  them,   in    spite   of  Cicero's    defence,  had    not . 
the  augur  and  praetor  Metellus,  opposing  one  obsolete  practice  by 
another,  pulled  down  the  red  flag  which  by  an  old  custom  floated  on   c.  Rab- 
the  laniculum  during  public  business.      Its  lowering  was  supposed  to  irius  saved 
indicate  the  approach  of  an  enemy,  and  all  business  was  at  once  stopped.  ^^  *^^^. 
The  attack  on  Rabirius  was  not  renewed  ;  but  Caesar  had  effected  his  ^^^  ^ 
object  in  warning   the  Optimates  that  such    things  were   not  to  be 
done  with  impunity.      Again  in  the  last  days  of  64  he  supported  an 
agrarian  law  of  the  tribune  P.  Servilius  Rullus,  not  probably  because  Caesar 
he   thought    that   such   a   wide -reaching   scheme  had   a   chance   of  supports  the 
passing,  but    because   it   sketched    a    policy.^      To    fill    Italy    with  ^<fJJ"^^^ 
prosperous  freeholders  was  the  primary  object  ;  but  another  was  to  Julius. 
stop  a   source   of  discontent  by  buying  out  those  who  held  under 
Sulla's  confiscations  and  regranting  the  land  to  the  original  owners. 
Cicero  successfully  opposed  the  law  as  he  did  another,  to  restore  the 
children  of  those  disfranchised  by  Sulla,  on  the  ground  that  the  safety 
of  the  State  was  at  present  bound  up  with  the  Sullan  settlement. 

Caesar  now  had  an  opportunity  of  testing  the  popularity  he  had  Caesar 
acquired.     At  the  end  of  64  or  beginning  of  63  the  office  of  Pontifex  (Jgainst  the 
Maximus  became  vacant.      Caesar  was  a  pontifex,  but  if  the  election  P/^^'^'"^"'' 
was  to  be  according  to  Sulla's  law  by  co-optation,  he  would  have  no  candidate 
chance.       Labienus  was  therefore    again    employed  to  carry  a  law  for pon- 
restoring    the    election    to    the    tribes.       Caesar's    opponents    were  ^^f^x 
Q.    Lutatius  Catulus,  princeps  senatus,  and.  P.   Servilius   Isauricus, 
under  whom  he  had  served.      He  staked  his  all  on  success,  refused 

^  Ten  commissioners  were  to   decide  what  was   ager  publicus  in  Italy  and 
the  provinces  ;  to  sell  it ;    and  with  the  money  make  allotments  and  colonies 

Italy. 


7!iaxtmus, 
6S- 


698  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap. 

large  offers  from  Catulus  of  relief  from  debt  if  he  would  retire,  and 
told  his  mother  as    he  left  home  on  the  day  of  election  that  he 
would  return  Pontifex  Maximus  or  an  exile.      But  he  was  already 
praetor  elect,  and  after  his  year  of  office  was  to  go  to  Spain.      There 
at  last  he  would  have  the  chance  of  commanding  troops  and  showing 
his  capacity  for  power. 
L.  Sergius         But  there  were  other  members  of  the  party  of  Populares  who  were 
Catiline.       not  prepared   to  wait :   and  the  leadership  of  this   section  at   least 
seemed  open  to  any  one  who  could  grasp  it.      Such  a  man  was  found 
in  L.  Sergius  Catiline.      An  aristocrat  by  birth,  though  without  inherit- 
ance, he  could  only  hope  to  satisfy  his  ambition  and  desires  by  the 
profits  of  office,  and  could  only  hope  for  office  from  service  to  one  of 
the  great  parties.      Earlier  in  life  he  is  found  in  the  Sullan  party,  and 
some  of  its  worst  excesses  were  attributed  to  him,  such  as  the  murder 
of  his  own  brother  and  that  of  Gratidianus  with  torture.      Since  then 
he  was  said  to  have  poisoned  wife  and  son  to  make  room  for  a  new 
.wife,  the   rich   Aurelia   Orestilla,  and   to   have   debauched  a  Vestal 
Virgin,       The    extreme    licence   of   abuse    indulged    in   by  political 
adversaries  at  Rome  must  make  us   cautious  of  such  stories.      He 
certainly  obtained    the   praetorship   in    68    without    difficulty,    went 
next  year  as  propraetor  to  Africa  without  remark,  and  returned  in 
66  hoping  for  the  consulship.      It  is  now  that  his  definite  break  with 
the  Optimates  begins.      The  consuls  elected  at  the  comitia   of  66 
were    disqualified    for    bribery,  and  the    defeated   candidates,   Cotta 
and    Torquatus,    were    elected    in    their    place.        Soon     after    the 
6s.   Coss.      beginning   of   their    year   (65),  in  order    to    prevent    Catiline    from 
L.  Aur-      standing   at   the   next    comitia,  they   instigated    P.  Clodius   Pulcher 
elius  Cotta,  —  ^<^    ^^^<^    time    an    Optimatist  —  to    accuse    him    of   extortion    in 
Torauatus    Africa.       The   accusation  was    so    timed    as    to    prevent    his    being 
a   candidate   for   the    consulship  :     and    meanwhile   a   rumour    of   a 
plot,  in  which  he  was  concerned,  was  spread  abroad.      It  depended 
First  on  the  merest  gossip,  which  did  not  spare  even  the  names  of  Caesar 

Catiline  and  Crassus.  In  conjunction  with  P.  Antonius  Paetus — one  of  the 
conspiracy,  candidates  disqualified  for  bribery — he  is  said  to  have  conspired  to 
kill  the  consuls  on  the  ist  of  January,  seize  the  fasces,  and  put  the 
province  of  Spain  in  the  hands  of  a  confederate,  Cn.  Calpurnius  Piso. 
The  consuls  were  warned  and  took  precautions,  and  the  murder, 
postponed  till  the  5  th  of  February,  was  at  last  prevented  by  Catiline 
giving  the  signal  too  soon.  This  is  known  as  the  first  Catiline  con- 
spiracy. It  is  enough  to  observe  that  no  investigation  was  ever  held, 
and  that  the  Senate  sent  Piso  to  Spain  after  all  with  extraordinary 
powers. 

Catiline's  acquittal  on  the  charge  of  extortion  in  Africa— in  spite 
of  Cicero's  assertion  that    it  was    impossible — cannot  be  held  as  a 


XLiii  CONSPIRACY  OF  CATILINE  699 

proof  of  innocence.      But  so  far  from  regarding  him  as  outside  the  64. 
pale,  Cicero  wished  to  conciHate  him,  and  even  to  be  elected  with  him  Catiline 
at  the  comitia  of  64.      He  undertook  also  to  defend  him  on  another  (^ffi^^^^d  at 
•         ,  •        1  •  ,  r     1  •   T  1  thecotmtia. 

charge  brought  agamst  him  this  year,  the  nature  01  which  we  do  not 

know.     But  whether  the  charge  was  again  so  timed  as  to  prevent  his  6j.  Coss. 

profession  or  whether  his  evil  reputation  united  all  parties  against  him,  ■^{-  Tulhus 

Cicero  and  C.  Antonius  were  elected  for  63,  and  Catiline  was  more    ^^^f^'^    • 

.   ,        ^'  .  Antomus. 

than  ever  thrown  upon  the  support  of  the  extremists, 

Cicero  would  have  us  believe  that  he  was  aware  from  the  first  The 
day  of  his  consulship,  or  before  it,  that  a  nefarious  plot  was  hatch-  schemes  of 
ing :   that  Catiline  had  collected  round  him  the  needy  desperadoes     '^^^  ^^^' 
whose  bankruptcy  could  only  be  warded  off  by  revolution,  and  had 
promised  them  offices,  plunder,  abolition  of  debts,  confiscations,  and 
the  usual  harvest  of  political  disruption.      The  time  was  favourable: 
Piso  would  support  them  in  Spain  ;   P.  Sittius  in  Africa.      There  were 
no  forces  in  Italy,  and  the  flower  of  the  army  was  with  Pompey  in 
Asia.     The  first  step  was  for  Catiline  to  get  elected  consul  for  63. 
When  that  failed,  there  was   still   the   chance  of  the  next  election, 
C.   Antonius,   one  of  the  consuls,  being  on  their   side  ;    and   lastly, 
disturbances    were    reported    in    Gaul    which    might    turn    to    their 
advantage,    as    well    as    in    Etruria,    where    the    land -holders     put 
in  by  Sulla  (who  had  not  prospered),  as  well  as  the  dispossessed 
heirs,  were  ready  for  revolt. 

From  the  first,  whether  fully  aware  of  these  things  or  no,  Cicero  Cicero  s 
had   seen   that  it  was   necessary   to  buy  off  the  opposition  of  his  ifi^asures. 
colleague    by  resigning  to    him    the    rich    province   of   Macedonia. 
He  then  introduced  certain  reforms,  intended  to  benefit  the  provinces 
and  to  prevent  violence  at  home.      The  abuse  of  the  libera  legatio 
was  mitigated  by  a  restriction  as  to  time  :   banishment  was  added  to 
the  existing  penalties  for  bribery  at  elections  ;   and  the  exhibition  of 
gladiators  forbidden  to  any  candidate  within  two  years  of  his  election, 
except  when  carrying  out  the  provisions  of  a  will.      These  measures 
went  very  little  way  in   stopping   the   evils   from  which   the   needy 
at  home    and   the    oppressed  abroad  were   suffering.      And   as   the 
summer  wore   away  rumours  of  dangerous  associations  throughout 
Italy  became  frequent.       Catiline  was  *  again   a    candidate  for    the 
consulship  ;  and  Cicero  believed,  or  affected  to  believe,  that  he  meant 
with  the  connivance  of  Antonius  to  assassinate  him  while  presiding  <5j.  Meet- 
at  the  election.      He  therefore  got  the  comitia  postponed,  and  at  a  ing  of 
meeting  of  the  Senate,   about  the   21st    September,   asked    Catiline  Senate, 
in  the  Senate  for  an  explanation.      He  had  already  been  threatened  ^  ^^   ^^^ 
with  an  impeachment  by  Cato,  and  had  retaliated  by  declaring  that,  if 
the  Optimatcs  lit  the  flames  of  civil  war,  he  w^ould  quench  them  by  a 
general  overthrow.      He  now  disdained  to  clear  himself  in  answer 


700  HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Catiline       to    Cicero,  but  avowed  amidst   the  groans   of  the  Senators  that  he 


loses  his 
electiofi 


proposed  to  give  the  larger  party  in  the  State  what  alone  it  needed 
— a  leader. 

Cicero  declared  his  own  life  in  danger  and  came  to  the  comitia 

wearing  a  cuirass  under  his  toga  and  surrounded  by  an  armed  guard 

Fresh  of  his  supporters.^     Catiline  was  again  defeated,  and  then,  according  to 

rumours  of  ^\^^  received  story,  entered  upon  a  deliberate  plot  for  a  revolution. 

^ett  -Oct     ^^^  consul  Antonius  was  believed  to  be  in  favour  of  the  conspirators, 

(5j.  as   well   as    Caesar,   praetor-elect,    and   the  actual   praetor   urbanus, 

P.   Cornelius  Lentulus.       Every  movement  of  persons  suspected  of 

sympathy  had  been  watched  with  jealousy.      P.  Sulla  was  at  Naples  : 

he  was  believed  to   be  concocting  plots  in  the    South.      P.   Sittius, 

who  had  business  connexions  with  the  king  of  Mauretania  and  in 

southern  Spain,  went  to  Spain  leaving  orders  to  sell  his  property  in 

Italy  :   it  was  rumoured  that  he  was  going  as  an   emissary  of  the 

conspirators.     Other  reports  spoke  of  a  rising  in   Picenum,  and  of 

C.  Manlius  slaves  in  Capua  and  Apulia  ;   but  what  alone  was  certainly  known  in 

i7i  Etruria  Rome  was  that  C.  Manlius,  an  old  officer  of  Sulla,  had  collected  a 

^^    ^^'         number  of  malcontents  and  was  encamped  near  Faesulae,  where  the 

Sullan  colonists  were  in  a  state  of  bankruptcy,  and  had  set  up  his 

standard  on  the  27th  of  October,   with  the  intention  of  marching 

towards  Rome. 

The  plot  Cicero  had  meanwhile  kept  a  close  watch  on  the  doings  of  Cati- 

betrayed  to    line  and  his  confederates  at  Rome,  whose  plans  were   betrayed  to 

Cicero.         \{\Yi\  by  Fulvia,  the  mistress  of  Q.  Curius,  one  of  the  band.      But 

though   the   Senate  had   conferred  upon   the   consuls   extraordinary 

powers   by  the   usual  decree,  Cicero   does  not  appear  to  have  got 

Mcasuresof  sufficient    information   to  justify  an  arrest.     When    the   information 

precaution,   g^g   ^q   t]^g  movement  of  Manlius  was  announced  in  the  Senate  by 

L.    Saenius,   who    read    a    letter   he    had    received    from    Faesulae, 

military  preparations  were  begun  ;  measures  taken  to  secure  Etruria, 

Apulia,  Capua,  and  Picenum  ;   and  rewards  offered  for  information. 

Meeting  in  Catiline  now  determined  to  join  the  army  at  Faesulae,  and  in  a  meeting 

the  house  of  of  his  confederates  at  the  house  of  M.  Porcius  Laeca,  arranged  the 

\  '     "^'■^'^^  parts  to  be  played  by  those  who  remained  behind.      L.  Vargunteius 

jth  Nov.       ^^'^^  ^^   eques  named   C.   Cornelius  were   to  assassinate   Cicero   at 

his  own  house  ;  while  the  praetor  P.  Cornelius  Lentulus,  the  senator 

C.  Cornelius  Cethegus,  with  Statilius  and  Gabinius,  were  to  co-operate 

with  the  invading  army  by  firing  the  city  in  several  places  at  once 

and  attacking  the  houses  of  the  leading  Optimates. 

Cicero  Cicero,   informed   of  everything,  secured   a   guard   for   his   own 

informed 

Qflf^  -^  The  day  usually  named  for  the  comitia  is  the  28th  October.     It  seems  too 

late  for  what  happened  afterwards.      Some  hold  that  they  were  as  usual  in  July. 
I  still  believe  that  there  was  a  postponement  till  about  the  21st  September. 


XLiii  THE  BARGAIN  WITH  THE  ALLOBROGES  701 

house    and    strengthened    the    city   watches ;     and    on    the    7th    of  First 
November  denounced  CatiHne  in  a  fiery  speech  before  the  Senate  in  oratio?t 
the  temple  of  lupiter  Stator,  which  was  surrounded  by  a  number  of  '^^^f^J^ 
the  equestrian  order  armed.      Cowed  by  the  vehemence  of  the  orator  j,^;^  ^^^' 
and  by  the  obvious  disfavour  of  the  Senators,  who  avoided  sitting  dj. 
near  him,  he  quitted  the  house  after  appeahng  against  a  hasty  and 
unsupported  judgment.     That  same  night  he  left  Rome  for  Marseilles,   Catiline 
addressing  a  letter  on  the  road  to  the  prittceps  senatus^  Q.  Catulus,  quits 
asserting  his  innocence  of  everything  except  an  intention  to  support  ^ome,^ 
the   poor   and   oppressed,    and   asking   his   protection    for   his   wife.   '         ^'' 
Next  morning  in  a  speech  to  the  people  Cicero  explained  why  he  had  Second 
allowed  Catiline  to  escape  ;   promised  the  citizens  protection  ;   and  ^P^^^^f^ 
warned  the  remaining  conspirators.       In  a  few  days  it  was  known  ^'^y" 
that  Catiline  had  not  gone  on  to  Marseilles,  but  had  entered  the  [Contio), 
camp  at  Faesulae  and  assumed  the  ensigns  of  zmpertum.  8th  Nov. 

The  Senate  at  once  declared  Catiline  and  Manlius  public  enemies  :  Catiline 
ordered   the   consuls   to   levy   troops, —  Cicero   remaining  in  Rome,  and 
Antonius  advancing  against  Catiline, — and  offered   an   amnesty   to  ^^^^^J^^ 
all  who  would  quit  the  camp.      The  offer  had  no  effect.      Adherents  /^^j^^^. 
were  flocking  to  Faesulae,  while  the  ^confederates  in  Rome  were  pre- 
paring to  carry  out  their  part  of  the  plot,  under  the  praetor  Lentulus. 
The  conflagrations  were  to  be  the  care  of  Statilius  and  Gabinius  ; 
Lentulus   was   to   attack  Cicero,   Cethegus   other   leading  senators ; 
while  the  tribune  L.  Bestia  was  to  persuade  the  people  that  Cicero 
had  invented  the  story  of  a  plot  in  order  to  drive  away  their  leader. 

Whether  these   plans  were   in   reality  so  far  matured  or  no,  it 
seems   that   Cicero,   in    spite   of  his    spies,    had    not   yet    sufficient 
evidence  to  enable  him  to  act.      Perhaps  the  plot,  whatever  it  was, 
had   not  been   so   definitely  formulated   as    Cicero  would    have    us 
believe,  or  was   not    so   distinctly  treasonable  and  murderous.      But 
the  confederates  now  took   a   step  which   delivered    them   into  the 
hands  of  the  vigilant  consul,  and  made  it  easy  for  him  to  ascribe  any- 
thing to  them,  however  nefarious.     There  were  at  Rome  some  envoys 
from  the  Allobroges,  a  tribe  between  the  Rhone  and  the  Isere  in  the 
province  of  Transalpine  Gaul.     They  had  come  to  plead  for  protection 
against  the  tyranny  of  the  Roman  governors  and  the  extortion  of 
Roman   money-lenders,  to  whom   their   state  was  deeply  indebted. 
The  Allobroges  ever  since  their  conquest  in  120  had  been  a  dan- 
gerous element  in  the  province,  and  had  as  yet  got  no  answer  from 
the  Senate.       Lentulus   commissioned   P.   Umbrenus  to  open  com-   The  Catil- 
munication  with  them,  offering  to  secure  satisfaction  of  their  claims  ^^^^^f^f^^ 
if  their  tribe  would  promise  to  support  the  contemplated  movement.   ^^n^'„if.^fg 
Umbrenus  had  done  business  in  their  country  and  was  known  there,  -with  the 
The  envoys  caught  at  the  chance  and  begged  him  to  exercise  his  Allobroges. 


702 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


The 

Allohroges 
promise 
their  aid. 


The 

A  llobroges 

betray  the 

conspiracy. 


Arrest  of 
the  Alio- 
broges  on 
the 

Milvian 
bridge, 
2nd  Dec. 

Volturcius 

turns 

hiformer. 


Cicero 
sufnmofis 
the  con- 
spirators. 


influence  in  their  behalf.  But  before  entering  into  a  positive  engage- 
ment they  naturally  wished  to  know  whether  he  was  backed  by  a 
party  strong  enough  to  secure  the  fulfilment  of  their  promises.  They 
were  accordingly  introduced  to  P.  Gabinius — one  of  the  most  active 
of  the  conspirators, — and  a  list  was  given  them  of  men  actually  in 
the  plot  or  known  to  be  in  favour  of  it.  But  the  cunning  Gauls 
reflected  that  they  had  no  proof  that  the  men  whose  names  they 
had  heard  were  really  prepared  to  move,  or,  if  they  succeeded, 
would  deal  any  better  with  their  tribe  than  the  party  in  power. 
It  would  be  a  great  thing  to  have  their  debt  wiped  out ;  but  would 
it  not  be  safer  to  take  what  they  could  get  by  betraying  the 
scheme  to  the  consuls  1  They  soon  decided.  Their  hereditary 
patronus  —  the  descendant  probably  of  their  conqueror  —  was  Q. 
Fabius  Sanga.  To  him  they  imparted  the  whole  business,  and  by 
him  Cicero  was  made  aware  of  what  was  going  on.  It  was  exactly 
what  he  wanted  to  complete  his  case.  Once  convict  the  men  of 
tampering  with  these  dangerous  provincials,  and  any  crime  could  be 
safely  attributed  to  them.  Public  sympathy  would  be  diverted  from 
them  and  would  support  him,  at  least  for  a  time,  in  almost  any 
measure  he  might  take.  He  instructed  the  envoys  to  feign  com- 
pliance, to  arrange  a  speedy  departure,  and  to  ask  for  written 
credentials  for  their  own  Senate.  Volturcius  w^as  to  accompany 
them  with  a  letter  to  Catiline,  on  whom  they  were  to  call  on  their 
way.  They  were  to  start  in  the  night  of  2nd  December,  and  Cicero 
arranged  with  the  praetors  L.  Flaccus  and  C.  Pomptinus  to  arrest 
them.  This  was  effected  on  the  Milvian  bridge,  on  the  via 
Flaminia.,  the  great  road  to  the  North.  The  envoys  of  course 
allowed  themselves  to  be  taken  quietly.  Volturcius  at  first  drew 
his  sword  and  would  have  defended  himself,  but  the  praetors  had 
made  their  dispositions  so  well,  that  he  soon  recognised  the  futility 
of  resistance  and  surrendered  quietly.  The  whole  party  being  taken 
to  Cicero's  house,  Volturcius — on  promise  of  his  life — acknowledged 
that  he  was  the  bearer  of  a  letter  and  a  message  from  Lentulus  to 
Catiline,  bidding  him  come  as  soon  as  possible  to  Rome  with  his 
army,  since  all  was  ready  for  the  promised  conflagration.  The  envoys 
deposed  that  Lentulus,  Cethegus,  and  Statilius  had  sworn  to  fulfil 
their  part  of  the  contract,  and  had  given  them  letters  to  their  Senate  ; 
that  L.  Cassius  had  commissioned  them  to  send  cavalry  to  Catiline  ; 
and  that  Lentulus  had  assured  them  that  according  to  a  Sibylline 
oracle  three  Cornelii  were  destined  to  be  supreme  in  Rome — two  had 
already  been  so,  Sulla  and  Cinna  ;  he  was  to  be  the  third. 

Exercising  his  right  of  summons  {vocatio).,  Cicero  ordered  the 
attendance  of  all  the  men  named.  They  came  without  knowing 
of  the  arrest   of  the   Allobroges,    and    prepared    to    maintain    their 


XLiii  EXAMINATION  OF  THE  CONSPIRATORS  703 

innocence.      Cicero  now  had  a  case  which  would  not  wholly  rest  on 

the  word  of  foreigners  against  that  of  Roman  magistrates  or  citizens. 

He  produced  the  letters  to  the  Allobrogian  Senate,  asking  Cethegus,  ^^^  ^ 

Statilius,  and  Lentulus  to  acknowledge  their    signets.      With  seals  ^^.^^^^^^ 

unbroken  the   letters  were  given   to    the  Praetor.      At  daybreak  a 

meeting  of  the  Senate  was  summoned,  and  the  letters  read.      They 

bore  on    their    face  nothing    treasonable.       They  merely  contained 

an  assurance   that   the  writers  would  fulfil  their   engagements,   and 

begged  the   Senate   and  people   of  the  Allobroges   to  do  what   the 

envoys  had  undertaken  in  their  name.     The  innocence  or  guilt  of 

this  depended  after  all  upon  the  evidence  of  the  envoys  as  to  what 

the   bargain    referred  to  was.      It  might  be  only  an  undertaking  to 

promote  their  cause   before   the    Senate  ;  it   might   be   much   more. 

There  was  still  one  other  letter, — that  written  by  Lentulus  to  Catiline 

and  entrusted  to  Volturcius.      It  had  no  name  of  writer  or  person 

addressed,  but   Lentulus   again   acknowledged   his  signet.       It   was 

vague  enough,  1  but  Cicero  represents  Lentulus  as  greatly  agitated,  Letter  of 

and  confessing  the  truth  when  confronted  with  the  Allobroges.     Yet  Lentulus. 

it  does  not  appear  that  he  confessed  anything  beyond  the  remark 

about  the  Sibylline  oracle.      And  when  P.  Gabinius  was  confronted 

with   them,  all    Cicero   can    say  is  that   he   denied   nothing,   though 

until  then  he  had  spoken  with  great  assurance.      The  same  seems 

to  have  been  the  case  with  Q.  Caeparius,  who  had  escaped  from  the 

city  on  hearing  of  the  arrest,  but  had  been  captured  and  brought  back. 

This  meeting    of   the    Senate  was    in   the    temple    of   Concord.  Meeting  of 
Volturcius  was   introduced  and  told  his  tale,  but  affirmed    that   he  ^^^  Senate, 
had  lately  joined   and   only  knew  the   names  of  some   of  the   con-^' 
spirators  told   him   by  Gabinius.       The  Allobroges  had   nothing   to 
add  except  the  foolish  talk  of  Lentulus  about  the  three   Cornelii  in  Five  con- 
the  Sibylline  oracles.     When  the  letters  had  been  read,  the  Senate  •'^^''^^^^•^^^'^ 
committed  the  five  men  to  the   custody  of  five   senators,   Lentulus  ^p^ Lentulus 
having  been  first  forced  to  abdicate  his  praetorship.      To  persuade  Sura,  L. 
the  Senate  was  perhaps  easy.      It  was  necessary  to  produce  the  right  Statilius, 
effect  upon  the  people;  and  when  the  Senate  rose  on  the  evening  q^P-  G^^- 
the  3rd,  Cicero  proceeded  to  address  the  people  from  the  rostra,  and  ^Cethe<rtis 
dwelt  at  length   on   the   treasonable   league  vv'ith   the  Allobroges   to  q,  Cae-  ' 
excite   a  war   beyond    the    Alps,  and    on    the    large  store    of   arms  parius. 
found  at  the  house  of  Cethegus.     The  revulsion  of  popular  feeling  Third 
encouraged  the  Consul  to  proceed  on  his  course.  Catilin- 

The  4th  December  was  spent  in  taking  precautions  against  any  '^''^'^^ 
attempt  to  release  the  prisoners  by  violence.      The   Forum  and  the  fcoNno). 

1  ' '  Who  I  am  you  will  learn  from  the  bearer.  See  that  you  play  the  man 
and  understand  fully  your  present  position.  Omit  no  necessary  measure  ;  avail 
yourself  of  all  auxiliaries,  even  the  most  humble." 


704  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap. 

road  up  to  the  Capitol  were  occupied  by  armed  men,  mostly  of  the 
equestrian  order,  who  volunteered  to  take  the  military  oath,  which 
next  morning  was  required  of  all  citizens.  At  the  next  meeting  of 
the  Senate,  on  the  5  th,  Cicero  brought  the  question  of  the  prisoners 
before  it.  The  Senate  had  no  right  to  sit  in  judgment  on  the  lives 
of  citizens.  It  was  the  consul  who,  in  virtue  of  the  special  powers 
conferred  on  him,  had  for  the  time  the  power  of  life  and  death. 
But  it  was  a  power  which  rested  on  no  law,  and  its  exercise  was  at 
least  invidious  ;  Cicero  therefore  desired  to  be  supported  by  a  resolu- 
tion of  the  Senate.  D.  lunius  Silanus,  as  consul -designate,  was 
called  on  first  and  delivered  an  opinion  in  favour  of  death. ^  In  the 
same  sense  fourteen  consulars  also  gave  their  voices.  The  next  to 
speak  was  C.  lulius  Caesar,  as  praetor-designate.  He  warned  the 
senators  against  embarking  on  a  course  of  illegality,  and  proposed 
that  the  prisoners'  property  should  be  confiscated  and  they  them- 
selves confined  for  life  in  certain  municipia  :  "  Their  crimes  deserved 
the  severest  punishment ;  but  when  the  excitement  was  over,  severity 
beyond  the  laws  would  be  remembered,  the  crimes  forgotten.  He 
suggested  no  mitigation  :  in  their  case  death  might  be  regarded 
rather  as  a  release  from  suffering.  If  one  law  were  disregarded, 
why  not  neglect  another  and  have  them  flogged  before  execution  ?  - 
The  bad  character  of  the  men  did  not  make  unconstitutional 
measures  safer.  The  thirty  tyrants  at  Athens  at  first  destroyed 
only  criminals  ;  they  soon  went  on  to  attack  the  good  ;  and  even 
Sulla  had  begun  by  what  seemed  the  righteous  condemnation  of 
Damasippus.  There  was  no  fear  of  such  tyranny  with  Cicero 
consul,  but  no  one  could  speak  for  the  future." 

The  speech  made  a  strong  impression  and  seemed  likely  to  carry 
the  day.  After  a  time  Cicero  summed  up  the  arguments  for  the  two 
proposals,  professing  that  he  was  able  and  willing  to  carry  out  either, 
the  Senate),  but  plainly  inclining  to  the  side  of  severity.  Still  he  failed  to  do 
away  with  the  effect  of  Caesar's  speech  :  and  when  Tib.  Nero  (grand- 
father of  the  Emperor  Tiberius)  suggested  as  a  compromise  that  a 
final  decision  should  be  postponed  till  Catiline  had  been  crushed,  and 
that  then  the  accused  should  be  tried  in  the  law  courts,  being  kept 
meanwhile  in  custody,  Silanus  and  many  others  professed  to  be  con- 
vinced.     But  M.  Porcius  Cato  (tribune-elect)  here  interposed,  and  in 

1  This  was  to  include  also  L.  Cassius,  P.  Furius,  P.  Umbrenus,  Q.  Annius, 
who  at  present  had  avoided  arrest.  A  senator  named  Aulus  Fulvius  is  said  to  have 
been  put  to  death  by  his  father. 

2  The  Valerian  and  subsequent  laws  de  provocatione  would  be  broken  by  the 
consul  putting  the  men  to  death  withoixt  trial  before  the  people  or  a  popular  jury 
representing  them.  The  law  which  prevented  the  flogging  of  a  criminal  citizen 
before  execution  was  the  lex  Porcia  (see  p.  93). 


XLiii  DEFEAT  AND  DEATH  OF  CATILINE  705 

a    fiery    speech   denounced    the    conspirators    and    demanded    their 

death.  1       This    seems    to    have    settled    the    matter.       When    the 

consul  put  the  question,  the  majority  were  for  death,  and  he  lost  The  Senate 

no  time    in   acting   on  the  decree.       The   prisoners  were  taken   to  '^'?^f  ^.^^^ 

the    Mamertine  prison,   let  down  into   the  dungeon,   and  strangled,  p^^alty. 

When  it  was  over  Cicero  made  his  way  through  the  crowd  in  the 

Forum   exclaiming,    "They   are    dead!"       He   was   encouraged  by   ''Vixe-^ 

what  seemed  to  him  the   universal    expression    of   relief,  and  was  '>^^i' 

greeted  by  Cato  and   Catulus   as    "  Father  of  his   country."  ^      It 

was  a  triumph  for  the   Optimates,  but  a   measure  of  fatal  import  The 

for  the  constitution.      The  inviolability  of  a  magistrate  was  set  at  ''^•^^^^■^• 

naught  in  the  person  of  Lentulus,  by  means  of  a  forced  abdication  ; 

the  Senate  had  lent  its  authority  to  the  consul  in  breaking  the  law 

and  usurping  the  functions   of  the  courts.^     The  time  was  soon  to 

come  when  hundreds  of  these  Optimates,  and  Cicero  himself,  were  to 

reap  as  they  had  sown  and  perish  by  the  sword  which  they  had  drawn. 

Catiline  recognised  it  as  reducing  him  to  desperation.      He  had  Death  of 
a  force  of  about  12,000'*  men  at  Faesulae,  though  imperfectly  armed,   Catiline, 
and  early  in  62  attempted  to  make  his  way  into  Gaul.      But  Metellus     ^' 
Celer  with  three  legions  barred  the  direct  road  at  Bononia,  and  C. 
Antonius  was  advancing    against  him  with  another  army  from  the 
south.      At   Pistoria  he   turned   to   bay.      Unable  to   get   food  for  Desperate 
his   men,  he  resolved  to  give  Antonius  battle,    and,   if  he  won,  to  battle  near 
push  on   to  join   the  Allobroges.       He  took  post  in   the  centre   of  ^"^^''f^ 
his  line  close  by  the  eagle,  once  belonging  to  Marius  and  regarded  ^^ 
by  him  with  superstitious  reverence,  and  prepared  his  men  in  a  bold 
speech  for  victory  or  death.      Antony  was,  or  feigned  to  be,   ill  with 
gout,   and  the    Roman    army    was    commanded    by    his    legate    M. 
Petreius.      The  rebels  fought   desperately.     Their  centre  was  driven 
in  by  the  praetorian  cohort  ;  but  the  rest  fell  where  they  were  posted, 
and  the  dead  bodies  were    found    with  all    their   wounds    in    front. 
Catiline  himself,  when  he  saw  all  was  lost,  rushed  into  the  thickest 
of  the  enemy  and  fell  fighting  fiercely  to  the  last. 

Cicero  had   soon   reason   to   know,   though  obstinately  blind   to  Cicero's 

the  fact,  that  he  had  estranged  friends  and  increased  his  enemies.  ^^^^  ^f 

influence. 

^  Cicero  was  indignant  with  Brutus,  who  wrote  a  history  of  the  affair,  for 
representing  the  vote  as  being  given  between  Caesar  and  Cato.  Technically,  it 
seems,  the  two  motions  before  the  house  were  those  of  Silanus  and  Caesar.  Still,  as 
Cato's  speech  decided  the  vote,  it  was  loosely  said  that  the  Senate  in  Catonis 
sententiam  discessit  (Sallust,  Cat.  55  ;    Cic.  ad  Att.  xii.  21). 

2  The  Xx'C^Q  pater  ox  parens  patriae,  given  by  the  Senate  to  the  emperors,  is  not 
to  be  confounded  with  this  compHment.  It  is  applied  by  Livy  to  Romulus  (i.  16) 
and  to  Camillus  (v.  49)  ;  and  had  been  given  to  luhus  (Cic.  13  Phil.  §  23). 

2  The  execution  was  the  consul's  own  absolute  act ;  though  he  chose  to  support 
himself  by  the  auctoritas  of  the  Senate.  ^  Appian  says  20,000,  Dio  3000. 

2  Z 


7o6 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


62.    Coss. 
D.  Lunius 
Silaniis, 
L.  Licinius 
Muraena. 


Continuous 
rise  of 
Caesar. 

Caesar 
praetor 
urban  us, 
62. 


Cato  and 
Metellus. 


Caesar 
defeats  the 
Senate. 


Futile 
attempt  to 
connect 
Caesar 
with 

Catiline  s 
conspiracy, 
62. 


The  tribune  Q.  Caecilius  Metellus,  a  legate  of  Pompey,  and  supposed 
to  represent  his  views,  prevented  him  from  making  the  usual  speech 
on  laying  down  his  consulship  on  the  31st  of  December ;  and  he  had 
to  console  himself  with  the  cheer  which  greeted  his  loud  declaration, 
when  the  oath  was  tendered  to  him,  that  he  had  "  saved  the  republic." 
Yet  his  feverish  anxiety  for  expressions  of  approval  showed  an  un- 
easy sense  of  his  equivocal  position. 

The  real  gainer  was  Caesar,  whose  election  as  pontifex  maximus 
was  promoted  by  the  popularity  of  his  action  in  regard  to  the  con- 
spirators. ^  From  this  time  he  steadily  comes  to  the  front  in  spite 
of  rumours  (on  which  Cicero  never  ventured  to  act)  that  he  and 
Crassus  were  privy  to  the  plot  of  Catiline.  The  year  of  his  praetor- 
ship  (62)  was  not  marked  by  striking  events,  yet  he  showed 
sufficiently  in  it  that  he  meant  to  defy  the  Optimates.  On  the  first 
day  of  it  he  attempted,  though  without  success,  to  oust  Q.  Catulus 
from  the  commission  for  repairing  the  Capitol,  and  fixed  a  slight  upon 
him  by  not  calling  on  him  to  speak  first  when  presiding  in  the 
Senate  ;  and  he  afterwards  supported  the  tribune  Caecilius  Metellus 
when  he  proposed  to  recall  Pompey  to  protect  citizens  from  illegal 
punishment.  To  this  vote  of  censure  on  the  proceedings  of  the 
previous  year  the  Optimates  offered  strenuous  resistance.  Cato 
vetoed  the  law,  was  driven  from  the  Forum,  and  returned  with 
numbers  of  armed  Optimates.  It  was  then  the  turn  of  Metellus  to 
fly.  He  made  his  way  to  Pompey's  camp,  who  had  lately  come  to 
Italy.  The  Senate  declared  him  deposed  from  his  tribuneship  (per- 
haps on  the  ground  of  his  absence  from  Rome),  and  suspended 
Caesar  also  from  his  praetorial  functions.  He,  however,  continued  to 
preside  in  his  court,  till  the  Senate  sent  armed  officers  to  drag  him 
from  his  seat.  He  then  dismissed  his  lictors,  threw  off  his  toga 
praetexta,  and  retired  to  his  house.  But  to  have  thus  drawn  the 
Senate  into  an  illegal  position  was  a  real  triumph.  His  house 
was  visited  by  such  crowds,  and  the  popular  feeling  was  shown  so 
threateningly,  that  two  days  afterwards  the  Senate  rescinded  its 
decree  and  offered  him  an  apology.  But  this  was  not  the  last  attack 
by  the  Optimates.  L.  Vettius  was  set  on  to  accuse  him  before  the 
quaestor  Novius  of  having  been  an  accomplice  of  Catiline,  and  O. 
Curius  to  denounce  him  in  the  Senate  on  the  same  ground,  promising 
to  produce  an  autograph  letter  of  his  to  Catiline.  In  his  defence 
Caesar  appealed  to  Cicero  to  testify  that  he  had  volunteered  infor- 
mation ;  and  he  succeeded  in  preventing  the  reward  for  informa- 
tion being  paid  to  Curius  :  while  Vettius  was  nearly  torn  to  pieces  in 

1  Both  Plutarch  (Caes.  7)  and  Dio  (xxxvii.  37)  imply  this.  It  has  been 
generally  stated  that  Caesar  was  elected  on  the  previous  6th  of  March,  on  tlie 
authority  of  Ovid  {Fast.  iii.  415-428).      But  Ovid  is  referring  to  Augustus. 


XLiii  CAESAR  PROPRAETOR  IN  SPAIN  707 

the  Forum,  and  was  thrown  into  prison,  as  was  Novius  also,  for  hearing 
a  charge  against  a  magistrate  of  higher  rank  than  himself  ^ 

At  the  end  of  his  praetorship  Caesar  went  to  his  province  of  Caesar  in 
farther  Spain.  He  was  so  deeply  in  debt — wanting  (he  said)  -S/^azw,  61. 
250,000,000  sesterces  to  be  worth  nothing — that  his  creditors  would 
have  retained  him,  had  not  Crassus  interposed  as  security  for  a  large 
sum.  Even  so  he  was  later  than  usual  in  starting,  and  to  the  satis- 
faction of  the  Senate  had  to  stay  some  months  longer  than  usual  in 
the  next  year.  In  Spain  he  was  principally  occupied  with  military 
operations  in  Lusitania  and  Gallaecia,  which  were  in  a  state  of  semi- 
rebellion,  though  he  had  also  an  opportunity  of  showing  his  skill  as 
a  statesman  in  legislation  at  Gades.  For  the  first  time  he  was  able 
to  send  home  reports  of  battles  won  and  towns  taken,  as  well  as  to 
pay  large  sums  into  the  treasury.  He  was  probably  not  much  more 
scrupulous  than  others  in  regard  to  enriching  himself;  and  at  any 
rate  after  the  Spanish  government  we  hear  little  more  of  financial 
embarrassment.  His  achievements  in  Spain  had  been  honoured  by 
a  siippHcatio^  and  it  was  understood  that  on  his  return  he  should  be 
allowed  a  triumph.  He  however  arrived  at  the  gates  of  the  city  Returns  to 
somewhat  late  in  the  summer  (60),  not  long  before  it  was  necessary  Rome  late 

for  him   to  make  his  i)rofessio  as  a  candidate  for  the   consulship.  ^^     ^ 

^  •/-,  1.  ,-,  ii-  summer  of 

Custom,  if  not  law,  made  it  necessary  for  that  to  be  done  in  person  ;  ^^ 

yet   he   could  not  enter  the   city  without  forfeiting  his  triumph,  the 

preparations  for  which  could  not  be  completed  in  time.      He  applied 

to  the  Senate  for  a  relaxation  of  the  rule  requiring  a  personal /r(9- 

fessio.     A  lex  Cornelia  in  70  {iie  legibtis  solverentur)  required  such  a 

suspension  of  a  law  to  be  passed  in  a  Senate  of  not  less  than   200 

members  and  afterwards  to  be  ratified  by  the  people.     The  Optimates 

saw  a  way  of  mortifying  Caesar,  and  Cato  talked  the  proposition  out. 

Caesar  had  therefore  to  decide  between  his  triumph  and  his  election.  Caesar 

He  at  once  entered  the  city,  made  the  declaration  as  required,  seven-  cibandons 

teen   days   before   the   election,  and  was    returned  with    M.  Bibulus,  ^" '^^^"'^ 

Lucceius   undertaking   to   find   the   money,  which   now  almost   as  a  triumph. 

matter  of  course  was  distributed  among  the  tribes 

But  the  animus  shown  by  the  Optimates  in  the  Senate  proved  the  S9- 

necessity  of  strengthening  his  position.      If  he  was  to  be  upon  a  level  Caesars 

with  Pompey,  he  must,  like  him,  have  a  lengthened  term  of  imperium,  °^J^'^^^- 

and  in  a  province  where  he  might  have  a  chance  of  distinction.      In 

^  Caesar's  complicity  in  the  plot  has  always  been  a  moot  point.  Rumour 
connected  both  his  name  and  that  of  Crassus  with  it,  and  Mommsen  regards  it  as 
certain  that  they  were  both  implicated.  The  ancient  authorities  do  not  counte- 
nance it,  with  the  doubtful  exception  of  Suetonius  (17).  According  to  Sallust  (49) 
Catulus  and  Piso  vainly  urged  Cicero  to  include  Caesar's  name.  Cicero  nowhere 
implicates  him,  as  surely  he  would  have  done  in  after  times  if  he  had  had  grounds. 


L 


7o8  HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Spain  it  was  said  that,  coming  across  some  likeness  of  Alexander  the 
Great,  he  had  sighed  to  think  that  he  had  achieved  so  little, 
though  past  the  age  at  which  Alexander  had  conquered  the  world. 
Gaul  seemed  the  province  now  most  likely  to  give  him  the  oppor- 
tunity. But  to  secure  it  for  a  sufficient  time  and  with  a  free  enough 
hand  he  must  get  the  support  of  Pompey  :  and  he  now  found  Pompey 
willing  to  help  him  to  his  objects  in  order  to  secure  his  own. 
Situation  Pompey' s   return   had   been   looked  forward   to  with   anxiety  in 

of  Pompey     niany    quarters.       Cicero    hoped    for    his    approval,    while    Crassus 
^^'^ tu  n  affected  fear  and  removed  his  family  from  Rome.      The  Populares 

6i-^o'  expected  his  support  both  against  the  illegal  measures  of  the  Optimates 
and  in  the  better  government  of  the  provinces.  C.  Antonius,  for 
instance,  in  Macedonia  (62)  had  been  both  oppressive  and  flagrantly 
unsuccessful  against  the  surrounding  barbarians,  and  Pompey  was 
said  to  have  declared  that  he  must  be  recalled.  But  the  Optimates 
generally  were  suspicious  and  unfriendly.  We  have  seen  how  they 
slighted  his  request  for  a  postponement  of  the  comitia.  That  might 
be  defended  on  good  grounds.  But  to  his  main  object — that  of 
having  his  acta  in  the  East  confirmed— he  found  also  unexpected  and 
The  Senate  annoying  opposition.  It  touched  his  honour  and  pride  nearly  that 
hesitate  to  the  awards  made  by  him  after  his  victories  in  the  new  provinces  and 
confirm  his  surrounding  states  should  be  formally  ratified.  The  opposition 
in  the  Senate  was  led  by  L.  Lucullus  and  his  brother.  Lucullus 
naturally  resented  the  fact  that  Pompey  was  reaping  the  fruits  of  his 
own  labour,  and  he  plausibly  opposed  the  demand  of  Pompey  that 
the  acta  should  be  approved  en  bloc  :  it  was  pledging  the  senators  to 
they  knew  not  what ;  each  item  should  be  debated  and  passed  by 
itself.  At  the  best,  however,  this  would  take  much  time,  and  Pompey 
failed  to  hasten  it.  He  found  himself  disliked  by  the  Optimates  and 
yet  not  well  received  by  the  Populares.  "  His  first  speech,"  says 
Cicero,  "  did  not  gratify  the  poor,  was  unsatisfactory  to  the  revolu- 
tionary party,  unacceptable  to  the  rich,  and  regarded  as  unsound  by 
the  conservatives  ;  and  so  fell  very  flat."  ^  He  could  not  therefore 
overcome  the  opposition  in  the  Senate  by  any  manifestation  of  popu- 
larity, in  spite  of  his  splendid  triumph  (28th  September  61),  and 
the  acclamations  of  the  people  hailing  him  as  "  Magnus."  Nor  did 
his  conduct  in  the  two  chief  party  contests  in  the  interval  gain  him 
the  allegiance  of  any  party  in  the  state. 
The  case  of  The  first  of  these  was  caused  by  the  silly  freak  of  the  dissolute 

P.  Clodius  p  ciodius.  He  was  discovered  in  woman's  dress  in  the  house  of 
Caesar,  whose  wife  Pompeia  (a  grand-daughter  of  Sulla)  was  entertain- 
ing the  ladies  engaged  in  celebrating  the  mysteries  of  the  Bona  Dea, 


Pukher 
62-6T 


^  Cicero  ad  Att.  i.  14. 


XLiii  THE  TRIAL  OF  CLOBIUS  709 

from  which  males  were  strictly  excluded.  It  was  assumed  that  he 
was  intriguing  with  Pompeia,  although  Caesar  declared  that  he  had 
no  reason  to  think  so,  but  divorced  her  on  the  ground  that  his  wife 
must  be  above  suspicion.  Shocking  as  this  senseless  escapade  was 
to  religious  feeling,  its  consequences  were  altogether  out  of  proportion 
to  its  importance.  It  was  made  the  occasion  of  a  violent  party  con- 
flict. The  bill  for  his  impeachment  contained  a  special  clause  as 
to  the  selection  of  the  jury  by  the  praetor  urbanus.  It  was  proposed 
under  the  direction  of  the  Senate  by  the  consul  Piso,  who  however 
was  opposed  to  it  and  spoke  against  it.  The  Populares  looked  upon 
this  as  a  device  for  tampering  with  the  jury  system  :  Clodius  became 
a  popular  hero,  and  the  question  of  his  trial  a  test  of  strength  be- 
tween the  two  great  parties.  Pompey  was  called  upon  to  express  61.  Coss. 
his  opinion  in  a  coiitio  at  the  instance  of  the  tribune  Fusius,  and  ^{-  P'^Pj^^ 
also  in  the  Senate  in  answer  to  the  consul  Messala.  In  both  cases  y^ig^i^^ 
he  spoke  vaguely  of  his  deference  to  the  Senate,  but  was  outbidden  Messala. 
in  that  point  by  Crassus,  while  he  yet  said  enough  to  annoy  Piso 
and  the  Populares,  who  eventually  triumphed.  The  comitia  was 
broken  up  by  bands  of  ruffians  or  mechanics  {o^erae)  ;  a  new  bill 
had  to  be  passed  without  the  obnoxious  clause  ;  and  Clodius,  by 
means  of  exercising  his  right  of  challenge,  secured  a  jury  in  which 
a  majority  was  easily  purchased  ;i  and  a  subsequent  proposal  in  the 
Senate  for  an  investigation  was  resented  by  the  equestrian  order  and 
vetoed  by  a  tribune.  The  only  importance  of  the  whole  foolish 
business  was  the  light  thrown  on  the  defects  of  the  jury  system, 
and  the  lengths  to  which  party  feeling  would  go.  Secondary  con- 
sequences were  that  Cicero  made  a  vindictive  enemy  of  Clodius  by 
testifying  to  having  seen  him  in  Rome  on  the  day  of  the  alleged  im- 
piety, on  which  he  affirmed  that  he  was  at  Interamna  ;  and  secondly, 
that  Pompey  had  again  failed  to  please  any  party. 

The  next    burning    question   was  the    controversy  between   the   The  case 
Senate  and  the  equestrian  order.      Cicero  made  it  one  of  the  chief  of  the 
points  of  his  policy  to  promote  harmony  between   the  two.     Their   -^  ^^i^ 
interests  were,  he  contended,  closely  allied.     The  equites  would  be  ^i, 
the  chief  sufferers  by  the  triumph  of  the  extremists.     A  wiping  out 
of  debts — novae  tabulae — was  a  bugbear  always  before  the  eyes  of 
rich  men,  and  in  some   form  or  other    supposed  to   be   always   in 

^  The  jury  pretended  to  be  alarmed  and  asked  for  a  guard.  After  the 
verdict  Catulus  said  sarcastically  that  he  supposed  they  wanted  it  to  protect 
their  money.  Clodius,  however,  was  believed  to  have  succeeded  in  a  double 
rascality,  by  tintercepting  the  promised  bribe ;  thus,  as  Cicero  sardonically 
remarked,  after  all  keeping  the  law  which  punished  those  who  paid  bribes.  The 
lively  and  graphic  letters  of  Cicero  [ad  Att.  i.  14,  16),  describing  the  scenes  in 
the  Senate,  contio,  and  court  should  be  read.  Curio  divided  the  Senate  on  the 
question  of  having  a  special  rogatio  at  all,  but  lost  by  15  to  400. 


7IO 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


The  claim 
of  the 
publicani 
rejected. 


60.  Coss.  L. 

Afranius, 

Q.  Cae- 

cilius 

Metellus 

Celer. 


First  {in- 
formal) 
triumvi?'- 
ate. 


the  popular  programme  ;  while  allotments  of  land  and  the  supply 
of  free  corn  at  the  public  cost  must  eventually  be  made  at  the  ex- 
pense of  the  rich.  Therefore  they  should  hold  together  ;  they  were 
alike  bojiij  they  were  equally  interested  in  the  maintenance  of  the 
constitution.  This  harmony  was  now  endangered  by  what  the  equites 
chose  to  consider  a  hardship.  In  the  eager  competition  for  state 
contracts  the  publicani  had  bought  the  taxes  of  Asia  at  a  price 
which,  owing  to  a  too  sanguine  estimate,  or  a  bad  season,  threatened 
them  with  bankruptcy.  They  applied  to  the  Senate,  in  whose  hands 
such  matters  lay,  for  some  abatement.  It  was  an  indefensible  claim, 
and  Cicero  spoke  of  it  as  disgraceful. ^  Yet  he  was  for  going  even 
this  length  to  propitiate  the  rich  middle  class.  Cato  however  was 
uncompromising, — "living,"  Cicero  said,  "in  a  republic  of  Plato," 
— and  carried  the  majority  of  the  Senate  with  him.^  The  breach 
between  the  orders  grew  worse  and  worse  ;  and  Pompey  did  not 
'  avail  himself  of  the  opportunity  to  get  credit  by  healing  it,  or  by 
lending  his  support  to  either  side.  He  held  aloof  altogether,  think- 
ing only  of  the  confirmation  of  his  acta  and  the  satisfaction  of  his 
veterans.  He  hoped  to  secure  these  by  getting  his  adherent  Afranius 
elected  consul  for  60.  But  Afranius  proved  a  failure  and  had  no 
influence.  Therefore  when  Caesar  returned  from  Spain  he  found 
Pompey  as  far  from  his  object  as  ever  ;  and,  though  enjoying  im- 
mense prestige,  without  a  party  strong  enough  to  carry  his  measures. 
Both  had  now  reasons  for  discontent  with  the  Senate,  and  a 
motive  for  combination.  Caesar  could  give  Pompey  what  he  lacked, 
the  cordial  support  of  the  Populares  ;  and  together  they  might  check- 
mate the  Optimates  and  Cicero  by  adopting  the  latter's  policy  of 
conciliating  the  equites.  Shortly  before  Caesar's  election  therefore 
the  proposal  of  co-operation  seems  to  have  been  made.  Caesar, 
however,  could  not  afford  to  forfeit  the  support  of  the  wealthy 
Crassus,  and  his  first  step  was  to  reconcile  him  with  Pompey. 
Thus  was  formed  what  has  been  called  the  First  Triumvirate.  It 
was  not,  like  the  triumvirate  of  43,  a  legally  established  commis- 
sion ;  it  was  rather  on  the  precedent  of  the  informal  agreement  of 
Marius,  Saturninus,  and  C.  Servilius  Glaucia  in  90,  to  secure  the 
administration  in  the  hands  of  friends.      Caesar  went  to  the  comitia 


-^  Invidiosa  res,  turpis postulatio,  et  confessio  temeritatis  [ad  Att.  i.  17). 

2  We  do  not  know  what  they  had  to  say  for  themselves.  The  great  capitalist 
Crassus  supported  them,  but  he  may  have  been  an  interested  party.  Cicero's 
policy  was  the  most  barefaced  expediency, — the  equites  must  be  conciliated.  Just 
as  after  the  trial  of  Clodius  he  opposed  an  investigation  becaugfe  the  equites. 
regarded  it  as  a  slight  upon  themselves.  The  only  thing  that  seems  possil)le  to 
be  urged  in  favour  of  the  abatement  is  that  it  would  perhaps  have  saved  the 
provincials  themselves  some  extra  suffering  and  pressure  ;  but  that  nobody 
thought  of. 


XLiii  CAESAR'S  CONSULSHIP  711 

walking  between  Pompey  and  Crassus  ;  and  all  the  Optimates  could 
do  was  to  secure  the  return  of  M.  Bibulus  as  his  colleague,  who  was 
devoted  to  their  interests. 

It  was  now  the  turn  of  the  Populares.      Pompey  was  gratified  by  s9-foss.C. 
the  confirmation  of  his  acia,  and  his  veterans  obtained  allotments  of  ^^^^^^ 
lands  under  an  agrarian  law  dealing  with  all  the  a^er  publicus  in  ^J^^/^'j 
Italy.     The  Stellatian  plain  and  other  lands  in  Campania  were  divided  ^  .' 

among  20,000  citizens  who  had  three  or  more  children  ;  a  colony  jfi^asures. 
was  settled  at  Capua;  the  equestrian  order  was  conciliated  by  an 
abatement  of  a  third  from  contracts  for  the  revenues  of  Asia  ;  and 
the  urban  populace  by  fresh  bills  for  distribution  of  corn.  These 
measures  were  not  carried  without  some  violence.  Pompey,  who 
had  now  married  Caesar's  daughter  lulia,  appeared  at  the  head  of  an 
armed  force  in  the  Campus,  nominally  to  keep  order,  really  to  over- 
awe the  voters ;  and  when  Cato  persisted  in  a  vehement  opposition 
in  the  Senate  Caesar  ordered  his  lictors  to  drag  him  to  prison.  This 
was,  however,  going  too  far.  Cato  was  respected,  if  not  followed  ; 
and  one  of  the  tribunes,  on  a  hint  from  Caesar,  released  him.  His 
colleague  Bibulus  tried  in  vain  to  vitiate  Caesar's  agrarian  law  by 
sending  him  notice  that  he  was  watching  the  sky  {se  servare  de  caeld). 
Finding  his  interposition  neglected  he  retired  to  his  house  and  con- 
tented himself  with  issuing  edicts,  much  admired  as  specimens  of 
style,  but  wholly  disregarded.  The  wits  declared  that  the  acts  of 
the  year  were  done  in  the  year  of  lulius  and  Caesar, — Bibulus  did 
not  count.i  While  thus  carrying  reforms  at  home,  however,  Caesar  lex  lulia  d< 
was  not  unmindful  of  the  still  more  crying  claims  of  the  provinces,  repetundis. 
Among  his  measures  was  a  new  law  de  repetundis^  under  which  the 
whole  of  the  retinue  of  a  governor  was  made  responsible  for  ex- 
tortion. Restitution  was  to  be  made  to  four  times  the  value,  and  a 
conviction  was  to  disable  a  man  from  bequeathing  his  property 
{mteslabilis),  and  in  certain  cases  was  to  involve  perpetual  exile. 
The  Senate  was  studiously  ignored  :  and  not  consulted  as  to  the 
legislation  which  the  consul  brought  before  the  people. 

The    next   step   was    to    secure   a    lengthened    imperium   and   a   The 
province   with   chances    of    distinction.       The    Senate   had    allotted  province 
"Italy"  as  the  province  for  the  consuls  of  59.^    But  Caesar  did  not  -^^^ 
mean  to  be  content  with  that.      The   tribune   P.  Vatinius,  who  had 
been  his  most  forward  partisan  throughout   the  year,  brought  in  a 
rogatio  conferring  on  Caesar  the  government  of  Illyricum   and  Cis- 
alpine Gaul  for  five  years.      This  was  in  itself  (though  perfectly  legal)   kx 
an  invasion  of  a  department  which  had  always  been  left  to  the  Senate.    Vatinia. 
But  the  Senate,  accepting  the  inevitable  with  apparent  good  grace, 

^  Non  Dibulo  quicquam  nuper  sed  Caesare  factum  est; 

Nam  Dibulo  fieri  consule  nil  memini  (Suet.  lulius,  20). 
2  That  is  certain  duties  in  Italy,  silvae  callcsque  (Suet.  C.  19). 


712 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Measures 
of  security 
during 
Caesar  s 
absence. 

^8.  Coss.  L. 
Calpurnius 
Piso,  A. 
Gabinius. 


Cicero  to  he 
re?noved. 


P.  Clodius 
'>ecomes 
'ribune 
vrs8. 


even  added  to  this  already  large  province  that  of  Transalpine  Gaul. 
Their  motive  however  was  not,  it  seems,  a  desire  to  promote  Caesar's 
honour.  The  Cisalpine  province  presented  no  special  difficulty  or 
cause  for  alarm,  although  Caesar  was  known  to  be  in  favour  of  giving 
the  citizenship  to  the  Transpadani :  but  rumours  of  dangerous  rnove- 
ments  in  Transalpine  Gaul  had  for  some  time  been  rife  ;  and  only 
in  6 1  a  rebellion  of  the  Allobroges  had  been  crushed  by  the  praetor 
Gnaeus  Pontinus  at  Solonium.  No  doubt  some  man  of  energy  was 
needed  there  ;  but  the  Senate  caught  at  the  chance  of  removing 
Caesar  to  a  distance,  where  there  was  also  a  possibility  of  his  meet- 
ing with  disaster.  His  sphere  would  be  in  strictness  the  Roman 
'province'  or  Narbonensis;  but  any  expedition  or  extension  demanded 
by  the  safety  of  the  province  would  be  in  his  hands. 

Caesar,  moreover,  would  not  be  cut  off  from  Roman  politics  as 
completely  as  Pompey  had  been  during  his  Eastern  command. 
Spending  the  winters  at  Lucca  or  Ravenna  or  some  other  place  in 
Cisalpine  Gaul,  he  could  easily  be  visited  by  his  partisans,  and  be  kept 
in  touch  with  home  affairs.  But  still  it  was  necessary  to  keep  the 
administration  in  the  hands  of  friends.  For  5  8  therefore  the  consul- 
ship was  secured  for  his  father-in-law  L.  Calpurnius  Piso  Caesonius  and 
for  Pompey's  legate  and  partisan  A.  Gabinius.  C.  Cato,  the  tribune 
of  56,  tried  to  prevent  Gabinius  from  entering  upon  his  office  by  laying 
a  charge  of  bribery  against  him  ;  but  the  praetors  avoided  hearing  the 
case  ;  and  Cato  himself  was  nearly  murdered  by  the  mob.  He  had 
to  content  himself  with  speaking  of  Pompey  as  a  "  private  dictator." 
Farther,  they  judged  it  necessary  to  remove  Cicero  from  Rome  at 
least  for  a  time.  His  opposition  to  the  policy  of  the  triumvirs  was 
well  known.  It  had  even  been  possible  to  connect  his  name  with  a 
plot,  in  conjunction  with  C.  Curio,  L.  Lucullus  and  others,  to  murder 
Caesar  and  Pompey ;  and  though  the  informer  Vettius — who  had 
previously  denounced  Caesar  in  the  affair'  of  Catiline — contradicted 
himself  so  outrageously  that  he  was  no  more  worthy  of  credit  than 
Titus  Gates,  and  was  eventually  found  strangled  in  prison,  there 
perhaps  remained  some  uneasiness  in  their  minds. 

There  was  one  obvious  way  of  getting  rid  of  him,  P.  Clodius, 
after  his  acquittal  on  the  charge  of  impiety,  had  gone  as  quaestor 
to  Sicily  (60),  and  had  returned  in  the  following  year  intending  to 
stand  for  the  aedileship.  But  though  it  was  impossible  to  regard 
him  as  a  serious  politician,  he  seems  now  to  have  taken  up  the 
side  of  the  extremists  among  the  Populares,  and  to  have  had  a  definite 
scheme  of  legislation  ;  and,  above  all,  to  have  determined  to  revenge 
himself  upon  Cicero  for  giving  evidence  against  him.  This  ven- 
geance could  be  conveniently  joined  with  the  rest  of  his  extremist 
politics  ;  and  in  order  to  effectually  carry  out   both  purposes,   the 


XLiii  CLODIUS  BECOMES  A  TRIBUNE  713 

tribuneship  would  be  better  than  any  other  office.  To  become  a 
tribune,  however,  he  would  have  to  become  a  member  of  a  plebeian 
gens.  As  he  was  not  in  potestate  patris  he  could  only  be  adopted  by 
a  process  called  adrogatio  in  the  old  comitia  curiata^  and  with  the 
sanction  of  the  college  of  pontifices.  To  hold  the  comitia  curiata 
also  certain  religious  rites  had  to  be  observed  requiring  the  presence 
of  an  augur.  But  with  Caesar  pontifex  maximus,  and  Pompey  a 
member  of  the  college  of  augurs,  this  would  not  be  difficult,  supposing 
them  to  be  willing.  They  thus  had  to  their  hand  an  instrument 
for  getting  rid  of  Cicero. 

Clodius  made  no  secret  of  the  fact  that  his  motive  in  seeking  Clodius 
such  an  adoption  was  to  qualify  for  the  tribuneship  and  then  to  and  the 
attack  Cicero.  For  some  time  Caesar  and  Pompey  apparently  ^^■^"^' 
hesitated  to  gratify  him.  But  when  Cicero  disgraced  himself  by 
defending  C.  Antonius  on  a  charge  of  majestas  for  his  failures  and 
extortions  in  Macedonia,  in  the  course  of  his  speech  he  made  some 
allusion  to  the  political  situation,  which  was  reported  in  exaggerated 
terms  (he  says)  to  Caesar  and  Pompey.  Within  three  hours  the 
adoption  of  Clodius  into  a  plebeian  gens  was  accomplished,  Pompey 
himself  presiding.  Still  Caesar  (who  had  a  sincere  liking  and 
admiration  for  him)  endeavoured  to  induce  Cicero  to  leave  Rome  in 
some  honourable  way, — as  his  own  legatus  in  Gaul, — as  a  member 
of  the  land  commission  under  his  new  agrarian  law, — or  at  least  on  a 
tour  with  a  libera  legatio.  But  Cicero  declined  all  such  friendly 
offers.  For  some  time  he  seems  to  have  hardly  credited  the  inten- 
tion of  Clodius  to  attack  him,  and  believed  that  he  aimed  at  a 
mission  to  Tigranes  of  Armenia,  or  a  seat  on  the  land  commission  ; 
and  when  he  could  no  longer  shut  his  eyes  to  the  truth,  he  buoyed 
himself  up  with  the  belief  that  his  own  services  had  been  so  extra- 
ordinary that  his  safety  would  be  the  care  of  every  respectable  citizen. 
Pompey  also  seems  to  have  assured  him  that  he  would  be  protected. 
He  determined  to  stay  and  fight  Clodius  at  home. 

On  the  loth  of  December  59  Clodius  entered  upon  his  tribune- 
ship  ;    and  at  the  end  of  the  year  Ceasar  left   Rome  to  enrol  his 
legions   and   make  his  preparations  for  Gaul,  but  for  some  weeks 
was  outside  the  city.      Clodius  showed  his  animus  at  once  by  pre-  P.  Clodius 
venting  Bibulus  from  speaking  when  formally  abdicating  his  consul-  Pukher 
ship  on  the  3 1  st  December,  and  soon  afterwards  produced  his  project   ^%J^^ 
of  legislation.      The  first  item  was  as  usual  a  more  liberal  distribution   cg-ioth 
of  corn.      This  was  only  what  others  had  done.      The  three  next  items  Dec.  jS. 
had  more  important  consequences.      The  first  related  to  the  auspices.  His 
By  the  /er  Aelia  (160)  a  magistrate  was  prohibited  from   continuing  popular 
any  public  business  if  another  magistrate  gave  notice  that  the  omens  ''"-^a^^^^^- 
were  bad,  or  that   he   was  "watching  the  sky."     This  was  called 


714 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


The  obnun- 
tiatio. 


Collegia 
opificum. 


The 
censors. 


Piso  and 
Gabinius 
sent  to 
Cilicia  and 
Syria. 

Cyprus 
annexed  to 
Cilicia. 


Banish- 
ment of 
Cicero, 
March  ^8. 


obnuntiatio^  and  was  used  as  a  means  of  hindering  legislation  or 
elections  obnoxious  to  either  party.  Bibulus  had  employed  the  right 
in  the  case  of  Clodius'  own  adoption,  though  his  interference  had 
been  disregarded,  Clodius  now  abolished  the  clause  in  the  lex  Aelia 
by  forbidding  such  obnuntiationes.,  at  least  in  legislative  comitia.  The 
next  law  also  requires  a  few  words  of  explanation.  From  very  early 
times  (traditionally  in  .the  reign  of  Numa)  guilds  {sodalitates  or  collegia) 
of  various  craftsmen  had  existed  at  Rome,  each  with  its  own  objects 
of  worship  and  trade  rules.  But  in  course  of  time  there  had  grown 
up  certain  other  collegia  sodalicia, — whether  developed  from  them 
or  entirely  independent  it  is  difficult  to  say, — whose  object  was  to 
influence  elections  and  legislation.  This  object  was  often  effected  by 
violent  means,  the  collegia  forming  the  nucleus  of  riots,  and  furnish- 
ing those  gangs  of  workmen  {operae)  of  which  we  hear  so  much  in 
the  next  few  years.  These  collegia  had  been  declared  illegal  by  a 
senatus-consultum  in  64  :  they  were  now  legalised  afresh.^  The 
third  important  Clodian  law  regarded  the  censors.  Since  the  severe 
measures  of  the  censors  of  70,  by  which  several  of  the  Populares  as 
well  as  the  Optimates  had  suffered,  the  office  had  been  almost  in 
abeyance.  Clodius  now  deprived  them  of  the  power  of  striking  off 
names  from  the  Senate  except  after  a  formal  trial  before  both. 

These  laws  were  of  course  odious  to  the  Optimates.  His  foreign 
policy  was  equally  objectionable  to  them.  He  carried  a  bill  assign- 
ing Cilicia  and  Syria  to  the  consuls  Piso  and  Gabinius  respectively, 
thus  putting  the  East  for  the  time  in  the  hands  of  his  party  ;  and 
another  to  depose  Ptolemy,  king  of  Cyprus, — once  called  friend  of 
the  Roman  people, — on  the  pretext  of  abetting  the  pirates,  and  to 
send  Cato  to  confiscate  the  king's  treasures.  Ptolemy  killed  him- 
self ;  but  Clodius  effected  the  double  object  of  getting  rid  of  Cato  for 
a  time  on  an  invidious  and  disgraceful  service  and  of  filling  the 
treasury,  exhausted  by  his  corn  distribution  and  his  remission  of  a 
fifth  of  the  vectigalia.  But  his  greatest  stroke  was  to  secure  Cicero's 
fall.  Early  in  58  he  brought  in  a  bill  rendering  liable  to  prosecution 
all  magistrates  who  had  put  citizens  to  death  without  trial.  As  soon 
as  it  was  passed  he  appears  to  have  given  notice  of  his  action  {diein 
dixit).  The  confidence  which  Cicero  had  expressed  in  the  support 
he  would  find  throughout  all  Italy,  in  the  pledges  of  Pompey  and 
Caesar,  in  the  good  disposition  of  the  praetors  and  of  the  majority 
of  the  tribunes,  proved  at  once  illusory.^     Caesar,  who  was  outside 


1  They  disappeared  under  the  Empire,  only  those  guilds  being  licensed  which 
could  prove  their  antiquity  (Suet.  Aug.  32).  The  illegitimate  collegia  came  to  be 
regarded  as  dangerous  everywhere,  almost  like  the  "  secret  societies  "  of  our  time. 

2  This  confidence  is  expressed  in  a  remarkable  way  in  a  passage  beginning, 
*' Si  diem  nobis  Clodius  dixit :  tota  Italia  concurred     .    .   .   written  to  his  brother 


EXILE  OF  CICERO  7i5 


onica  and 
Dyrra- 
chium,  ^8. 


the  walls,  would  do  nothing.  Pompey  retired  to  his  Alban  villa  and 
refused  to  see  Cicero  when  he  came  there.  One  consul,  Gabinius, 
repulsed  him  rudely  ;  the  other,  Piso,  was  more  courteous  but  ad- 
vised him  to  yield  to  the  storm  and  retire  for  a  time.  By  a  merciful 
custom  voluntary  exile  saved  a  man  from  condemnation.  Cicero's 
thoughts  seem  at  first  to  have  turned  to  suicide  ;  but  from  this  he 
was  diverted  by  his  friend  Atticus,  and  early  in  April  he  left  Rome 
for  South  Italy,  intending  it  seems  to  go  to  Malta.  At  Vibo  (Hip- 
ponium)  in  Lucania  he  heard  that  Clodius  had  taken  the  step  always 
possible  in  regard  to  a  voluntary  exile.  He  had  carried  a  rogatio 
declaring  him  a  public  enemy,  confiscating  his  property,  and  pro- 
hibiting him  from  "  fire  and  water  "  within  400  miles  of  Rome.  The 
Senate  indeed  had  protested,  and  a  majority  had  put  on  signs  of 
mourning,  but  it  could  not  prevent  or  counteract  a  law.  Clodius 
proceeded  to  pull  down  Cicero's  town  house  on  the  Palatine,  to 
declare  its  site  dedicated  to  Liberty,  and  to  dismantle  his  Tusculan 
and  Formian  villas. 

Meanwhile,  having  received  notice  from  the  praetor  in  Sicily,  that  Cicero  at 
he  would  not  be  allowed  to  come  there  on  his  way  to  Malta,  Cicero  Thessal 
arrived  at  Brundisium  on  the  1 6th  of  April,  and  on  the  i  st  of  May  ^"^^ ' 
crossed  to^  Epirus  and  travelled  along  the  Egnatian  road  to  Thessal-  chium 
onica,    where    he    remained    till    November ;  and   then    returned    to 
Dyrrachium  in  expectation   of  the  recall  which  he   felt  sure  would 
come  with  the  new  magistrates  of  57,  and  from  the  differences  which 
had  arisen  between  Clodius  and  Pompey. 

For  Clodius,  growing  insolent  from  success,  had  irritated  and  Clodius 
insulted  Pompey,  with  the  secret  support  it  seems  of  Crassus,  with  quarrels 
whom  Pompey  was  never  on  cordial  terms.  He  secured  the  reversal 
of  some  of  his  measures  ;  prosecuted  some  of  his  friends  ;  connived  at 
the  escape  of  Tigranes,  son  of  the  Armenian  monarch,  whom  Pompey 
had  kept  as  a  hostage  ;  and  openly  ridiculed  and  denounced  him. 
His  riotous  partisans  almost  murdered  Q.  Cicero,  the  orator's  brother  ; 
and  treated  Pompey  himself  with  such  violence  in  the  Forum,  that  he 
retired  to  his  house,  refused  to  appear  any  more  in  the  Forum  while 
Clodius  was  tribune,  and  resolved  to  secure  the  recall  of  Cicero. 

Clodius  ceased  to  be  tribune  on  the  loth  of  December,  and  of  57.  Coss. 
the  consuls  who  came  into  office  on  the  ist  of  January  following  (57),   Cornelius 
Lentulus  was  a  close  friend  of  Caesar's  ;  and  Metellus,  who  had  been   cf-^^f""^ 
a  legate  of  Pompey's,  was  the  tribune  of  62  who  prevented  Cicero  q,  cae- 
making  the  usual  speech  on  laying  down  his  consulship.      But  Len-  cilius 
tulus,  who  from  this  time  sided  with  the  Optimates,  on  the  ist  of  ^^t^llus 
January  declared  in  the  Senate  that  he  would  not  oppose  the  recall  ^'^^''•^• 

after  the  elections  for  58.     It  is  too  long  to  quote,  but  it  is  worth  reading  as  show- 
ing how  far  Cicero  was  blinded  {Ad  Q.  Fr.  i.  2,  9). 


with 
Pompey. 


7i6 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Milo  fights 
Clodius 
with  his 
own 
weapons. 


Pompey 
appointed 
praefectus 
annonae 
forfive 
years,  j/. 

j6.  Coss. 

Cn. 

Cornelius 

Lentulus, 

L.  Mar- 

cius 

Philippus. 


of  Cicero  ;  and  his  colleague  Metellus  seems  to  have  joined  in  the 
same  assurance,  purely,  it  seems,  out  of  deference  to  Pompey.  But 
it  was  many  months  before  the  measure  was  carried.  Two  of  the 
new  tribunes  were  found  to  hinder  the  resolution  of  the  Senate 
being  passed,  directing  the  consul  to  bring  in  a  law,  till  the  25  th  of 
January.  But  even  then,  Clodius  contrived  to  prevent  the  consul 
carrying  out  the  Senate's  order.  His  law  as  to  the  collegia  had 
secured  him  the  services  of  bands  of  workmen  {pperae\  and  he  con- 
tinually interrupted  by  violence  the  comitia  summoned  to  pass  the 
law.  The  Optimates  opposed  him  with  equal  violence.  One  of  the 
tribunes,  P.  Annius  Milo,  collected  similar  bands,  or  hired  gladiators, 
with  whom  he  attacked  the  bands  of  Clodius,  and  retaliated  by  pre- 
venting the  comitia  at  which  he  was  a  candidate  for  the  aedileship. 
The  city  was  constantly  a  scene  of  fierce  violence.  It  was  not  till 
the  4th  of  August  that  Lentulus  was  able  to  bring  his  law  before 
the  comitia  centuriata  and  get  it  passed.  Cicero,  who  had  come  to 
Brundisium  on  5th  August  reached  Rome  on  the  5th  September.  But 
though  Clodius  could  not  prevent  that,  he  could  make  life  dangerous  to 
him  by  attacks  of  his  mob,  and  by  burning  his  brother  Quintus'  house ; 
while  he  vehemently  opposed  the  rebuilding  of  Cicero's  own  house  on 
the  Palatine,  and  the  vote  of  money  for  the  restoration  of  liis  villas. 

Cicero  returned  professing  gratitude  to  Pompey,  and  bent  on  his 
old  policy  of  detaching  him  from  Caesar  and  attaching  him  to  the 
Senate.  Of  Caesar  he  spoke  as  bitterly  as  he  dare.  "  He  would  not 
call  him  an  enemy,"  he  said,  "  but  he  was  aware  that  he  had  allowed 
others  to  call  him  so  without  a  word  of  contradiction."  ^  In 
pursuance  of  this  policy,  he  proposed  immediately  after  his  return 
that,  in  view  of  an  alarming  scarcity  and  dearness  of  corn,  Pompey 
should  be  appointed  praefectus  anjt07iae  for  five  years,  with  ships  and 
legates,  and  authority  over  all  ports,  agricultural  operations,  and  corn 
markets  throughout  the  Empire.  Though  this  removed  Pompey  for 
a  short  time  from  Rome,  it  gave  him  a  standing  and  prestige  which 
might  keep  him  on  equal  terms  with  Caesar,  He  went  to  Sicily,  and 
succeeded  in  promoting  the  supply  of  corn  and  bringing  down  the 
price.  But  on  his  return  at  the  beginning  of  56,  instead  of  the 
popularity  he  expected,  he  found  himself  constantly  attacked  by 
Clodius, — now  aedile,  and  therefore  safe  from  impeachment, — and 
an  object  of  jealousy  to  the  Optimates  in  the  Senate.  He  attributed 
much  of  this  to  the  persistent  enmity  of  Crassus,  and  for  a  brief 
time  a  rupture  in  the  triumvirate  seemed  imminent.  His  thoughts 
turned  again  to  the  East.  If  he  could  get  the  commission  to  restore 
Ptolemy  Auletes  to  the  throne  of  Egypt,  he  might  occupy  again  a 


^  Post  reditum  in  Sen.  §  32. 


XLiii  POMPEY  GOES  TO  LUCCA  7i7 

position  in  the  East  counterbalancing  that  of  Caesar  in  the  West. 
But  the  jealousy  of  the  Senate  prevented  this,  or  in  fact  any  appoint- 
ment. ^  A  Sibylline  oracle  was  produced  forbidding  Ptolemy's  restora- 
tion by  force  :  and,  finding  himself  the  object  of  aversion  to  the 
Clodian  and  Optimate  extremists  alike,  Pompey  was  compelled  to 
accept  the  invitation  of  Caesar  to  a  conference  at  Lucca,  whither 
Crassus  had  already  gone,  in  order  to  settle  anew  the  questions  that 
had  arisen  since  Caesar  had  left  Rome. 

Thus    Cicero's    hope    of  detaching    Pompey    from    Caesar    was  Renewal 
frustrated,  and  the  complete  agreement  between  the  three  was  out-  °f  ^.^^    . 
wardly  renewed.      Events   indeed  presently  showed  its  hollowness  ;  agreement 
freed  Pompey  from  his  double  bondage  ;  and  placed  him  in  a  position  at  Lucca, 
in  which  complete  control  of  the  state  seemed  to  be  in  his  hands.  April ^6. 
Had  he  grasped  it  with  vigour,— had  he  seen,  as  his  rival  did,  that 
the  hour  of  the  old  constitutional  regime  and  its  hypocrisies  had 
come,  the  fate  of  the  Republic  might  have  been  changed. 

1  Cicero,  adQ.  Fr.  ii.  i6  ;  Plutarch,  Pomp.  49  ;  Dio  Cass.  39,  21-16.  Ptolemy- 
had  assisted  Pompey  in  the  Jewish  war  in  63  ;  had  been  declared  a  ' '  friend  and 
ally"  in  59  (Caes.  B.  Civ.  iii.  107),  and  had  on  his  expulsion  from  Alexandria 
come  to  Rome  to  ask  assistance  (57).  See  p.  696.  A  tribune  named  Caninius 
promulgated  a  rogatio  for  commissioning  Pompey  without  an  army  to  go  to 
Alexandria  and  attempt  a  reconciliation  between  Ptolemy  and  his  subjects,  but  it 
fell  through.  He  was  finally  restored  by  Gabinius  in  55  (Cic.  2  Phil.  §  48),  He 
was  the  father  of  Cleopatra,  and  died  in  51. 

Authorities, — The  best  are  the  letters  and  speeches  of  Cicero  himself.  If 
the  letters  are  read  in  chronological  order,  they  will  be  found  of  extraordinary  in- 
terest. There  are,  however,  only  eleven  before  63,  none  unfortunately  in  that 
year  (the  consulship),  but  a  great  number  from  62  to  56.  The  speeches  most 
useful  for  this  period  are  the  two  Contra  Rullum  ;  those  after  his  return — in  Senatu, 
ad  Quirites^  de  Dome  sua,  de  Haruspicum  response ;  pro  Sestio,  in  P.  Vatinium,  de 
Provinciis  Consularibus.  For  the  Catiline  conspiracy  Cicero's  four  speeches  and 
the  monograph  of  Sallust.  With  works  so  entirely  contemporary  others  become  less 
important.  Still  much  may  be  got  from  Plutarch's  lives  of  Pompey,  Cicero,  Caesar, 
Crassus;  and  from  Suetonius*  Life  of  Caesar.  We  have  now  Dio's  continuous 
history  from  67  onwards,  books  36-39.  Of  Livy  there  are  only  epitomes  of  books 
102-104.  Appian  [Bell.  Civ.  ii.  1-16)  is  interesting,  but  curiously  inaccurate. 
For  the  so-called  first  conspiracy  of  Catiline,  Dio  36,  44  ;  Livy,  Ep.  loi  ;  Suet. 
Caes.  9  ;  Cic.  Pro  Sulla,  §  67-8. 


CHAPTER  XLIV 

CONQUEST    OF    GAUL   AND    OUTBREAK  OF    CIVIL    WAR,    58-49 

Caesar  vainly  attacked  for  actions  during  his  consulship  (58) — First  campaign 
in  Gaul  against  the  Helveiii  and  Germans  under  Ariovistus  (58).  Second, 
against  the  Belgae  and  Nervii  (57) — Attacks  upon  Caesar  in  Rome  by  Aheno- 
barbus,  and  the  conference  at  Lucca  (57-56).  Third  campaign  in  Gaul,  the 
Veneti — Consulship  of  Pompey  and  Crassus  (55).  Fourth  campaign,  de- 
feat of  Germans  on  the  Meuse — Crossing  the  Rhine — First  invasion  of  Britain 
(55).  Fifth  campaign,  second  invasion  of  Britain — Outbreak  in  North 
Gaul  and  loss  of  a  legion  (54).  Sixth  campaign,  the  Nervii  and  Tre- 
VERi — Second  crossing  of  the  Rhine  (53) — Seventh  campaign,  Rebellion  in 
southern  Gaul — Capture  of  Avaricum — Failure  at  Gergovia — Capture  of 
Alesia  (52).  Eighth  and  Ninth  campaigns,  reduction  and  pacification 
of  Gaul  (51-50) — Events  leading  to  the  Civil  war  (55-50) — The  Senate  decide 
to  give  Caesar  a  successor — Refuse  to  consider  his  despatch — Expelthe  tribunes 
— Caesar  crosses  the  Rubicon  [January  49]. 

S8.  Coss.  There  had  been  sufficient  show  of  force  at  the  comitia  when  Caesar's 
laws  were  passed  to  give  a  handle  to  his  enemies.  Two  of  the  praetors 
for  58,  Gaius  Memmius  and  L.  Domitius  Ahenobarbus,  consulted  the 

Gab'inius.  Senate  on  a  prosecution  ;  and  one  of  the  tribunes  was  only  prevented 
by  the  veto  of  his  colleagues  from  bringing  him  to  trial,  while  he  was 
still  outside  the  walls  preparing  to  start  for  his  province.  But  all 
such  hindrances  were  brushed  aside  by  alarming  news  from  Trans- 
alpine Gaul.  The  part  of  his  province  which  was  south  of  the  Alps 
was  rapidly  becoming  Romanised,  and  though  the  Transpadani  were 
not  yet  full  citizens,  the  question  of  admitting  them  to  that  privilege 
was  one  for  a  statesman  rather  than  a  soldier.  Illyricum  was  always 
open  to  attacks  from  the  Dalmatians,  and  since  167  (when  it  became 
a  province)  there  had  been  at  least  three  wars  there.  It  seems  that 
even  now  it  was  looked  upon  as  the  most  likely  part  of  Caesar's 
government  to  require  force  ;  for  three  out  of  his  four  legions  were 
sent  to  Aquileia,  from  which  they  might  easily  cross.  But  in  fact, 
during  Caesar's  rule,  with  the  exception  of  one  brief  outbreak  towards 
the  end,  it  remained  peaceful,  and  was  only  visited  by  him  for  the 
holding  yearly  assizes  or  conventus. 


L.  Cal- 
ptirnius 
Piso,  A 


CHAP.  XLiv  CAESAR  PROCONSUL  IN  GAUL  719 

Transalpine  Gaul,  added  at  Pompey's  instance  to  Caesar's  govern-  Trans- 
ment,  turned  out  to  be  the  real  sphere  of  his  activity.  The  province,  «f/^«^ 
regularly  constituted  since  118,  included  the  district  marked  off  by 
the  Rhone  from  the  lake  of  Geneva  to  the  Gulf  of  Lyons,  with  a  west- 
ward extension  to  take  in  Tolosa  {Toulouse)  and  the  country  between 
it  and  the  Pyrenees.  On  the  south-west  no  natural  boundary 
separated  it  from  the  Aquitani  ;  but  on  the  north-west  the  Cevennes 
severed  it  from  the  Arverni,  and  on  the  north  the  Rhone  divided  it 
from  the  Sequani.  The  rest  of  Gaul  is  divided  by  Caesar  into 
three  compartments — Central  or  Celtic  Gaul,  from  the  Sequana 
{Seine)  to  the  Garumna  {Garomte),  extending  westward  to  the  ocean ; 
Aquitania,  between  the  Garonne  and  the  Pyrenees ;  and  Belgic 
Gaul,  from  the  Seine  to  the  Rhine.  In  Celtic  Gaul  the  Aedui,  separ- 
ated on  one  side  from  the  Arverni  by  the  Loire,  and  on  the  other  by 
the  Saone  from  the  Sequani,  had  some  years  before  sought  protection 
from  Rome  against  their  dangerous  neighbours,  and  had  been  received 
as  "  friends  and  allies."  ^  But  in  the  midst  of  domestic  troubles 
Gaul  had  been  neglected.  In  78  L.  Manilius  was  defeated  by  the 
Aquitani  ;  in  76  and  75  Pompey  found  rebellious  movements  in  the 
province  itself  In  61  the  Allobroges  in  the  northern  part  of  the 
province  had  risen  and  were  put  down  with  difficulty.  These 
indications  of  weakness  or  neglect  had  encouraged  the  Arverni  and 
Sequani  to  combine  against  the  Romanising  Aedui,  for  whose  de- 
struction they  had  invited  the  Germans  across  the  Rhine.  The  Aedui 
sent  Divitiacus  to  Rome  for  help,  but  none  had  been  given  ;  and 
Ariovistus,  the  head  of  the  motley  German  horde  now  in  Gaul, 
had  even  found  means  during  Caesar's  consulship  (59)  to  be  recog- 
nised by  the  Senate  as  a  "  friend  and  ally."  There  did  not  seem, 
therefore,  any  immediate  need  of  the  legions  in  the  province. 

It  was  quite  a  different  danger  that  hastened  Caesar's  departure.  The 
The  Helvetii — between  Basle  and  Geneva — occupied  a  country  then 
much  covered  with  forest  and  marsh,  and  had  for  some  years  been 
contemplating  a  migration  to  a  better  district,  either  westward  to 
Aquitania  and  the  ocean,  or,  as  some  said,  eastward  into  Italy. 
Their  easiest  way  would  be  to  cross  the  Rhone  by  the  bridge  at  Geneva 
— the  first  town  of  the  Allobroges, — march  through  the  province, 
and  then  either  recross  the  Rhone  and  make  their  way  to  Aqui- 
tania, or  turn  eastward  towards  Italy.  The  news  of  the  contem- 
plated migration,  under  Orgetorix,  reached  Rome  in  61,  and  caused 
much  alarm.  But  the  treason  and  death  of  Orgetorix  (accused  of 
aiming  at  tyranny)  seems  to  have  delayed  matters.  It  was  only 
in    58    that    the    report  came   that   they  had    burnt   their  villages, 

^  Fratres  nostri,  Cicero  ad  Ati.  i.  19  (written  in  60). 


Helvetii. 


720 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAIV 


Caesar 
hastens  to 
Geneva, 


Defeat  and 
destruction 
of  the  Hel- 
vetii. 


The  Aedui 
ask  aid 
against  the 
Germans. 


Victory 
over  A  rio- 
vistus, 
autufnn  of 


prepared  their  train  of  wagg-ons,  and  meant  to  start  on  the  28th  of 
March. 

In  107  they  had  joined  the  Cimbri ;  and  the  Tigurini  had 
defeated  L.  Cassius  Longinus.  The  same  might  happen  again. 
Caesar  reached  Geneva  in  a  week,  ordered  a  general  levy  in  the 
province,  and  broke  down  the  bridge  over  the  Rhone.  He  thus  left 
the  Helvetii  only  the  narrow  road  between  the  lake  and  the  Jura,  and 
this  he  at  once  closed  by  an  earthen  rampart  and  ditch,  strengthened 
by  towers,  from  the  point  where  the  Rhone  leaves  the  lake  to  where 
it  passes  through  the  Jura  and  becomes  too  rapid  to  be  crossed. 
While  this  work — extending  for  more  than  ten  miles — was  being  com- 
pleted, the  Helvetii  were  kept  back  by  evasive  answers  to  their  request 
for  a  passage ;  and  after  a  vain  attempt  to  break  through  the  rampart 
they  went  into  the  territory  of  the  Sequani,  who  let  them  pass,  and 
thence  across  the  Arar  (Saone)  to  the  lands  of  the  Aedui.  But  a  crowd 
of  300,000,  including  women  and  children,  moved  slowly.  Caesar 
had  time,  leaving  Labienus  in  charge  of  the  earthwork,  to  hurry  into 
North  Italy  ;  summon  the  three  legions  from  Aquileia  ;  raise  two  fresh 
ones  ;  and  yet  catch  the  Helvetii  while  still  only  partly  across  the 
Saone.  The  Tigurini  were  cut  to  pieces  ;  the  rest  were  overtaken 
near  Bibracte  {Autun)^  and  defeated  with  immense  slaughter.  The 
survivors,  about  130,000,  were  sent  back  to  their  country. 

This  victory  brought  submissions  on  all  sides.  But  the  friendly 
Aedui  now  asked  for  help.  There  were  120,000  Germans  of  various 
tribes  in  Gaul  under  Ariovistus,  who  had  already  defeated  the  Aeduj 
more  than  once,  and  had  occupied  much  of  the  territory  of  the  Sequani 
who  had  joined  originally  in  asking  their  aid.  Caesar  at  once  under- 
took to  be  the  champion  of  the  Gauls.  Though  not  yet  a  province, 
Gaul  was  to  be  closed  to  foreign  invaders.  The  step  from  protection 
to  mastership  was  apt  to  be  a  short  one. 

But  Ariovistus  was  not  easily  cowed.  He  claimed  the  rights  of 
conquest  over  the  Aedui  ;  declared  himself  ready  to  fight  Caesar  ;  and 
showed  that  he  was  aware  of  the  political  divisions  at  Rome,  and 
that  he  would  be  pleasing  a  powerful  party  there  by  defeating  and 
even  slaying  him.  By  great  exertions  Caesar  anticipated  him  in 
occupying  Vesontio  {Besa7tgon)  on  the  Doube ;  and  after  some  diffi- 
culty with  his  soldiers,  who  feared  the  unknown  country  and  the 
warlike  character  of  the  Germans,  came  within  sight  of  Ariovistus 
between  Basle  and  Mulhausen.  After  fruitless  negotiations,  Ariovistus 
attempted  to  get  between  the  Romans  and  their  supplies  from  the 
Sequani,  and  Caesar  was  obliged  to  fight  for  his  own  safety.  For 
some  days,  however,  he  failed  to  induce  Ariovistus  to  give  him  battle. 
The  wise  women,  it  was  said,  refused  leave  till  the  next  new  moon. 
When   at   length    the   Germans   were   forced  to  fight,  the    Romans 


XLIV 


DEFEAT  UK  AKlUVTSTUS 


721 


charged  with  such  fury  that  they  did  not  wait  to  hurl  their  pila,  but 
rushed  upon  the  enemy,  and  dashed  to  pieces  the  close  circle  with  its 


locked  shields,  in  which  they  were  formed  ;  while  in  another  part  of 
the  field  young   P.  Crassus  led  a  brilliant  charge  of  cavalry  which 

3  A 


722 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Gaul 
cleared  of 


Second 
Campaign. 
Conquest  of 
north- 
west Gaul, 
57- 


Great 
victory 
over  the 
Nervii. 


carried  all  before  it.  The  slaughter  was  immense,  and  was  rendered 
still  more  complete  by  the  hostile  natives,  who  cut  off  stragglers  as 
they  were  traversing  the  thirty-five  miles  to  the  Rhine. 

By  this  victory  north-eastern  Gaul  was  cleared  of  the  foreigner, 
and  the  powerful  tribe  of  the  Suevi,  who  had  reached  the  river, 
returned  to  their  homes.  The  territory  thus  "  protected,"  moreover, 
was  not  to  be  abandoned.  The  legions  wintered  outside  the  pro- 
vince in  the  country  of  the  Sequani,  under  the  command  of  Labienus, 
while  Caesar  went  to  Cisalpine  Gaul  to  hold  the  co7iventus  and  to 
meet  his  friends. 

During  the  winter  a  new  danger  was  growing  to  a  head.  The 
Belgae,  in  the  north-west,  between  the  Seine  and  the  Rhine,  were 
collecting  their  forces.  "  T^hey  feared,  it  was  said,  an  attack  upon 
themselves  ;  but  an  even  stronger  motive  was  the  fact  that  by  the 
occupation  of  "  Celtic  Gaul  "  the  Romans  cut  off  from  the  various 
usurpers  in  the  Belgic  tribes  a  fruitful  recruiting  ground,  and  to  secure 
themselves  it  was  necessary  to  stop  the  Roman  advance.  Caesar, 
on  hearing  the  news,  enrolled  two  new  legions  ^  in  Cisalpine  Gaul, 
and  sent  them  to  Besangon.  Early  in  57  he  arrived  there  himself, 
and  by  a  rapid  march  of  fifteen  days  entered  the  territory  of  the 
Belgae,  received  the  submission  of  the  Remi,  and  advanced  across 
the  Aisne,  where  he  left  six  cohorts  to  guard  the  bridge.  He  came 
up  with  the  enemy  near  Bibrax,  which  he  occupied,  and  after  some 
days  of  desultory  fighting  advanced  to  Ndviodunum  {Soissons  sur 
Aisne).,  a  city  of  the  Suessiones,  which  presently  surrendered,  as  did 
also  the  chief  town  of  the  Bellovaci,  Bratuspantium  (^Beauvais)^ 
and  now  found  himself  in  the  presence  of  the  most  warlike  of  the 
Belgic  tribes,  the  Nervii,  who  were  encamped  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Sabis  {Samb7'e). 

Then  followed  the  most  formidable  struggle  in  which  he  had  yet 
been  engaged  ;  and  the  victory  was  due  above  everything  to  himself 
His  advanced  guard  selected  for  a  camp  a  hill  sloping  down  to  the 

^  In  his  first  year  Caesar  had  in  Gaul  :  (i)  one  legion  which  he  found  thcr- 
[loth];  (2)  two  which  he  enrolled  in  the  province  [nth  and  1 2th]  ;  (3)  threewhii 
he  brought  from  Aquileia  [7th,  8th,  and  9th].      These  six  legions,  with  auxili- 
aries of  horse  and  foot,  did  the  work  of  58. 

In  57  he  enrolled  two  more  in  Cisalpine  Gaul  [13th  and  14th].  These  eight 
were  his  whole  force  till  54. 

In  54  another  was  enlisted  in  the  province  [15th],  but  the  14th  was  only  kept 
at  half  strength — half  being  drafted  into  the  other  legions. 

In  53  the  14th  was  replenished,  and  Pompey  lent  two  more  [ist  and  3rd]. 

In  51-50  he  had  to  send  two  of  these  eleven  for  the  Parthian  war  [ist  and  15th]. 
but  fresh  levies  might  easily  make  up  for  them  (Dio.  xl.  65,  koX  /jl^Wcov  ewl  tt} 
7rpo(pda€L  TaiJTy  iroXX^  irXeiovs  crTpaTiwras  avrlKa  KaraXe^eiv),  so  that  in  49  Cicero 
reckons  him  to  have  eleven  legions,  besides  Gallic  cavalry  (ad  Att.  vii.  7).  The 
legions  now  contained  from  3000  to  3600  men,  including  cavalry. 


XLiv  DEFEAT  OF  THE  NERVII  723 

right  bank  of  the  Sambre.      Opposite  was  a  similar  hill  covered  with  ^y.  Coss. 
woods  in  which  some  of  the  Nervii  were  concealed.      They  had  been  ^^ 
told  that  the   Roman  legions  marched  singly  with  a  baggage  train    /^^^/"'"^ 
between  each  two.      When  Caesar  therefore  led  six  legions  into  camp,   spinther, 
and  the  men  were  engaged  in  fortifying  it,  and  the  long  baggage  Q. 
train  was  seen  following,  the  Nervii  rushed  from  their  hiding,  drove   Caecilius 
off  the  Roman  cavalry  which  had  already  crossed  the  river,  and  in  a  \f^^ 
moment  seemed  everywhere — in  the  river,  on  the  bank,  and  swarm- 
ing  up  the  hill.      Caesar,  calm  in  the  midst  of  the  storm,  recalled  Heroism  of 
by  bugle  the  fatigue  parties  gone  in  search  of  wood  ;  got  his  men  Caesar. 
into  some  sort  of  order,  and  gave  the  signal  for  battle.      Even  so,  if 
the  men  had  not  been  veterans,  capable  of  independent  action   in 
an  emergency,  there  must  have  been  a  disaster.      For,  though  the 
Roman  left  and  centre  repulsed  the  Atrebates  and  Veromandui ;  the 
right,  which  was  attacked  by  the  main  body  of  the   Nervii,  was  out- 
flanked, and  so  crowded  as  to  be  altogether  blocked  and  unable  to 
use  their  weapons.     Caesar  hurrying  to  the  spot  found  that  many  of 
the  cohorts  had  lost  all  their  centurions,  and  were  on  the  point  of 
giving  way  to  complete  panic.      He  snatched  a  shield  from  a  soldier, 
called  on  surviving  centurions  by  name,  forced  the  men  to  take  more 
open  order,  and,  getting  the  two  legions  together,  led  a  charge.      Its 
success  restored  confidence,  and  when  the  two  legions  which  had 
been  on  the  rear  of  the  baggage  came  up,  and  when  Labienus,  who 
had  crossed  the  river  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  sent  back  the  i  oth  legion  Destruction 
to  his  relief,  the  whole  face  of  the  battle  was  changed.      The  cavalry,  of  the 
which   had  been   driven  from   the  camp,  returned  ;  and  though  the  ^^'^"j 
Nervii  still  fought  desperately,  before  the  day  closed  they  had  been 
all  but  exterminated.      When  those  who  had  been   concealed  with 
women  and  children  in   the   forest   sent   in   their  submission,  they 
declared  that  of  60,000  only  500  fighting  men  remained.      Belgic 
Gaul  was  now  almost  subdued,  only  the  Aduatuci  held  out  in  their 
chief  town  on  the  Meuse.      Caesar  laid  siege  to  it,  and  the  garrison  and  of  the 
soon  offered  to  surrender,  throwing  their  arms  from  the  walls  as  a  Aduatuci. 
pledge  of  good  faith.      They  had,  however,  concealed  others,  and  in 
the  night  sallied  out  against  the  camp.      They  were  driven  back,  the 
gates  forced,  and  the  inhabitants  sold  into  slavery. 

As  P.  Crassus  had  meanwhile  secured  the  submission  of  the  tribes  North- 
of  Normandy  and  Britanny,^  the  whole  of  north-western  France  and  '^^^t^^n 
Belgium  was  now  subject  to  Rome.      The  peoples  were  dediticii^  and  ^"^',  ^^  ~ 
as  such  must  accept  Roman  orders.      They  were  not  yet  formed  into 
a  province.      They  were  in  that  transitional  state  in  which,  though 
not  formally  under  any  laws  other  than  their  own,  they  were  in  fact 

1  The  Veneti,  Unelli^    Osismi,   Curiosolitae,   Esubii,  Aulerci,  Redoiies  (Caes. 
B.C.  ii    34). 


724 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Coss. 


subjects  of  Rome,  unable  to  refuse  obedience  or  to  make  war  on 
their  own  account.^  In  return  they  would  be  protected  from  attack, 
and  would  presently  take  their  place  in  the  .imperial  system,  with 
legal  rights  varying  in  the  several  communities.  It  was  a  splendid 
achievement  to  have  brought  this  noble  country  with  its  vigorous 
inhabitants  to  share  in  the  civilisation  and  world-interests  of  Rome, 
and  to  stand  between  Italy  and  the  northern  hordes  which  were  in 
the  future  to  be  its  scourge. 

The  minor  tribes  of  Carnutes,  Andes,  and  Turones  were  reduced  ; 
the  troops  put  into  winter  quarters  ;  and  he  himself  went  to  hold 
the  coiiventus  in  North  Italy  and  Illyricum.  Caesar  could  now  see 
his  way  to  fame  and  power  beyond  his  highest  aspirations.  But 
to  put  the  finishing  stroke  to  his  successes  required  time.  His 
five  years  of  office  would  be  out  in  December  54 — five  years  before  the 
legal  term  for  a  second  consulship.  His  work  in  Gaul  would  pro- 
bably be  left  imperfect,  his  acta  reversed,  his  veterans  left  unpro- 
vided for,  and  at  least  the  laws,  passed  in  his  consulship,  neglected  or 
repealed.  Already,  since  his  return,  Cicero  had  attacked  the  policy 
of  the  triumvirs,^  and  had  even  carried  a  motion  in  the  Senate  fixing 
a  day  (i  5th  May)  for  the  revision  of  the  land  laws,^  a  subject  already 
started  in  the  previous  December  by  a  Tribune  ;  ^  while  L.  Domitius 
Ahenobarbus,  a  candidate  for  the  consulship  of  55,  who,  as  praetor  in 
58  had  moved  an  enquiry  into  the  validity  of  Caesar's  laws  on  the 
ground  of  the  obituntiatw  of  Bibulus,  was  openly  declaring  that  as 
consul  he  would  do  what  he  failed  to  do  as  praetor,  and  would 
secure  Caesar's  recall.  Nor  must  we  assume  that  such  a  policy 
depended  wholly  for  support  on  blind  party  animosity.  There  must 
have  been  many  who  sincerely  deprecated  an  extension  of  responsi- 
bility, and  some  who  even  sympathised  with  the  struggles  of  the 
Gauls  for  independence.  It  cannot  seem  incredible  to  Englishmen 
of  our  time  that  honest  men  should  be  found  to  Qppose  a  policy  of 
aggrandisement. 

Still  these  movements,  whatever  their  motives,  were  dangers  in 


^  Bellum  in  Gallia  maximum  gestum  est :  domitae  sunt  a  Caesare  maximae 
nationes,  sed  nondum  legibus,  nondum  jure  certo,  nondum  satis  firma  pace 
devinctae  (Cicero  de  Prov.  §  19  (spoken  in  56)). 

2  The  speech  p7'o  Sestio  (12th  March  56),  though  all  direct  blame  of  Caesar 
or  Pompey  is  carefully  avoided,  contains  a  sketch  of  the  different  objects  of  the  | 
Optimates  and  Populares  meant  to  bring  discredit  on  Caesar's  party. 

^  Ad  Q.  Frat.  ii.  5  ;  cp.  ib.  i.  9,  3.  Cicero  gave  notice  of  the  motion  on  thai 
5th  of  April,  and  there  was  at  once  a  scene  of  great  excitement  [clamore  senatus\ 
prope  concionali).  The  point  was  that  funds  were  wanting  to  compensate  dis-j 
possessed  holders  of  the  Campanian  lands  according  to  Caesar's  law.  It  took] 
place  just  as  Pompey  was  starting  to  visit  Caesar  at  Lucca. 

■*  P.  Rupilius  Lupus,  ad  Quint.  Fr.  ii.  i. 


XLiv  TERMS  AGREED  UPON  AT  LUCCA  725 

Caesar's  path.      Nor  did  Pompey  seem  to  be  able  or  willing  to  offer  Dissen- 
an  effective  opposition  to  them.      He  had  apparently  no  hold  on  the  ^^^ns  be- 
extreme  party,  and  could  not  cope  with  the  violence  excited  by  the  ^^^^ 
contests  of  Milo  and  Clodius.      When  Clodius  accused  Milo  de  vi  ^^d 
(6th  February  56)  Pompey,  who  desired  to  speak  for  Milo,  was  hooted  Crassus. 
by  the  Clodian  mob,  and  had  to  fly  for  his  life  amidst  a  scene  of 
indescribable  confusion.      He  was  inclined  to  put  down  much  of  the 
opposition   and   insult    which    he   encountered    to    the    influence   of 
Crassus,  against  whom  he  began  to  feel  some  of  the  old  bitterness. 
He  made  no  opposition  to  Cicero's  motion  as  to  the  Campanian  land, 
and   there   seemed   a   danger  of  his    becoming  detached  from  the 
interests  of  the  triumvirate  and  joining  the  senatorial  party. 

On  his  return  from   his  official   duties  in    Illyricum   Caesar  had   The  confer- 
been   visited  by  Crassus,   some  time  in    March,   at  Ravenna,^   and  ^"^^  ^^ 
there   a  meeting  of  the   party  was   agreed  upon.      Early   in   April     ^'^^'^'  ■^  ' 
Caesar  came  to  Lucca,  just  within  the  borders  of  his  province,  and 
was    visited    in    the    course   of  the    month    by   200    senators,    and 
so  many  magistrates  that  there  were  said  to  be   120  lictors  in  the 
town.      Pompey,  who  as  praefectus  an?t07iae  had  to  go  to  Sardinia  and 
Africa,  stopped  at  Lucca  on  his  way,      Caesar  effected  a  reconcilia-   The  terms 
tion  between  him  and  Crassus  ;  and  it  was  agreed  that  Ahenobarbus  '^S'^'^^d. 
should  not  be  allowed  to   be  consul  for   55,  but  that  Pompey  and  ^P^^^' 
Crassus   should  be  elected,  with   the  reversion  of  the  provinces  of 
Spain  and  Syria,      For  his  part  Caesar  was  to  have  a  farther  term 
of  five  years  in  his  province  (53-48),  and  to  be  allowed  to  stand 
for  the  consulship  of  48  without  making  his  professio  at  Rome.      He 
would  thus  have  imperium  till  31st  December  49,  and  before  the  time 
of  laying  it  down  would  have  renewed  it  as  consul,  and  at  the  end  of 
his  consulship  could  still  farther  extend  it  by  taking  another  province. 

The  effect  of  this  new  understanding  between  the  three  leaders  Effects  of 
was  at  once  manifest  at  Rome.      Pompey  and  Crassus  were  elected  the  renewed 
at   the  next   comitia,   though  not  without  violent  opposition,   which  ^S^^^^"-"-^^  • 
they   were   obliged  to  suppress  by  a  show  of  military  force.      But  jj-.  Coss. 
even   before  that   the  demands   of  Caesar  were  carried  out.      Not  Cn.  Pom- 
only  was  a  supplicatio — lasting  the  unprecedented  number  of  fifteen  ^^"^ 
days — decreed  in  honour  of  his  victories  ;  but  the  Senate  also  voted  jif^fjciniw! 
the    extension   of   his    imperium,   and   named    Spain    and    Syria    as  Crassus  II. 
consular  provinces  for  Pompey  and  Crassus.-     To  Caesar  also  was 

^  Cic.  ad  Fam.  i.  9. 

'^  The  senatus-consnltum  merely  excluded  the  Gauls  from  the  list  of  provinces 
to  be  assigned  to  consuls  for  that  and  following  years.  The  extraordinary  ex- 
tension of  Caesar's  command,  as  well  as  that  of  Pompey  and  Crassus,  was  held 
to  require  a  lex ;  and  that  was  accordingly  proposed  in  55  by  the  tribune  C. 
Trebonius.      This    law,    however,    is    sometimes    spoken   of  a  lex   Pompeia,  as 


725  HISTORY  OF  ROME 


allowed  the  unusual  number  of  ten  legates,  and  a  large  grant  of 
money  for  his  troops.  Cicero  himself,  who  looked  upon  the  pro- 
ceedings at  Lucca  as  an  abdication  on  the  part  of  the  Optimatist 
party,  voted  and  spoke  on  behalf  of  these  decrees  ;  and  henceforth 
professed — with  however  little  sincerity — to  be  devoted  to  the  in- 
terests of  Pompey  and  Caesar,  i 

Caesar  had  to  hurry  from  Lucca  to  his  Transalpine  province. 
The  Veneti,  living  in  the  modern  department  of  Morbihan  in 
Britanny,  had  seized  two  of  his  officers  who  had  during  the  winter 
entered  their  territory  to  buy  corn,  and  it  was  necessary,  lest 
their  example  should  infect  others,  that  they  should  be  suppressed. 
Their  country  was  intersected  by  firths,  and  their  towns  were  mostly 
on  projecting  headlands  such  as  that  of  Quiberon.  They  were,  there- 
fore, a  seafaring  folk,  possessing  numerous  ships  specially  constructed 
for  their  shallow  waters.  In  order  to  subdue  them  a  fleet  was 
necessary,  and  this  Caesar  had  ordered  to  be  built  during  the 
winter  and  spring  in  the  Loire.  It  was  now  ready  under  Dec. 
Brutus.  Sabinus  was  sent  to  the  north  to  prevent  the  Belgic  tribes 
from  giving  help,  Crassus  south  to  check  the  Aquitani.  Though 
the  flat-bottomed  ships  of  the  Veneti  could  elude  the  Roman  vessels 
in  the  firths,  they  could  not  escape  them  in  the  open.  They  only 
used  sails  ;  the  Roman  oars  outstripped  them ;  and,  when  caught, 
the  soldiers  on  board  easily  secured  them.  Hooks  on  long  poles 
i^falces)  were  invented  to  tear  down  their  rigging,  and  only  a  few 
out  of  220  eventually  escaped.  The  Veneti  were  practically  de- 
stroyed :  their  senators  were  executed,  and  such  of  the  people  as 
were  caught  sold  into  slavery.  The  Unelli  in  the  north  and  the 
Aquitani  in  the  south  were  conquered  by  his  legates.  Caesar  finished 
the  campaign  by  subduing  the  Morini  (^Boulogne)  ;  and  his  troops 
wintered  in  the  territory  of  the  Lexovii  {Bayeux). 

To  his  next  campaign  he  was  summoned  earlier  than  usual  by 
Campaign.  ^]^q.  news  that  certain  German  tribes  were  crossing  the  Rhine.  This 
meant  rebellion  amongst  the  Belgic  tribes  near  the  river,  and 
Caesar  at  once  marched  thither.  He  found  the  German  invaders 
or  immigrants,  the  Usipetes  and  Tencteri, — who  had  been  driven 
out  by  the  Suevi, — in  the  plain  'of  Goch,  between  the  rivers  Niess 
and  Meuse  ;  stormed  their  laager  of  waggons  ;  and  drove  the  motley 
crowd  of. men  and  women  and  children,  reckoned  at  430,000  souls,  in 
utter  confusion  towards  the  Rhine.  The  greater  part  of  them  perished 
by  the  sword  or  in  the  river.      A  certain  number  of  the  chiefs  who 

having  been  passed  in  his  consulship  (Cic.  de  Prov.  §§  21-30  ;  Dio.  xxxix.  33  ; 
2  Phil.  §  24).      Cato  opposed  it  and  was  arrested  by  Trebonius. 

^   "  Since  those  who  have  no  power  dech'ne  to  love  me,  let  me  see  that  I  am ; 
in  favour  with  those  who  have  power"  {ad  Att.  4,  5,  written  in  April  56). 


crosses  the 
Rhine, 


xLiv  FIRST  EXPEDITION  TO  BRITAIN  727 

had  come  to  Caesar's  camp  were  allowed  to  go  free,  and  Caesar 
justifies  his  action  by  alleging  a  treacherous  attack  upon  his  cavalry.   Disap- 
But  this,  as  well  as  the  severity  to  the  Veneti,  were  viewed  with  proval  at 
mixed  feelings  at  home  ;  and  Cato  actually  proposed  his   surrender  f^^^^- 
to  the  Germans.      His  party  in  the  Senate,  however,  was  now  too 
strong,  and  the  German  name  too  great  a  terror  at  Rome  for  such  a 
measure. 

But  Caesar  was  determined  to  still  farther  impress  the  Germans.   Caesar 
He  marched  to  a  spot  on  the   Rhine  opposite  Bonn  ;  in  ten  days 
caused   a   wooden   bridge   to   be  constructed,   by  which  he   crossed 
into  the  territory  of  the  friendly  Ubii  ;  and  thence  marched  against 
the  Sicambri,  who  had  entertained  the  cavalry  of  the  Tencteri  and 
Usipetes.     The  Sicambri  abandoned  their  villages  and  took  refuge  in  and 
the  forests  :  and  having  burned  their  houses  and  cut  down  their  corn,   returns 
Caesar,  after  eighteen  days,  recrossed  the  Rhine,  not  venturing  to  ^^   ^". 
penetrate  an  unknown  country  to  attack  the  Suevi,  who  were  said  ^^^  Suevi. 
to  have  concealed  their  property  in  the  woods  and  to  be  preparing 
to  fight  for  their  lives. 

Having  made,  as  he  thought,  the  necessary  impression  in  Ger-  First 

many,  he  resolved  to  finish  the  season  by  visiting  the  islands  of  the  crossing  to 

Britanni,    of   whose    close    intercourse    with    Gaul    he   had    become     ^^f^^"'' 

'     .  ,  .  .  ,       ,  ^  .        ^  ,  autumn  of 

aware  durmg  the   campaign   agamst  ttie  Veneti.      It  was,   perhaps,    -r 

jealousy  of-  possible  interference  with  their  British  trade  which  had 
caused  the  rising  of  the  Veneti.  Caesar  could  learn  little  about 
the  island  except  from  reports  of  traders  ;  and  they  only  knew  the 
east  and  south  coasts.  Of  the  interior  they  knew  little  or  nothing, 
and  even  what  they  knew  had  always  been  unwilling  to  tell.  But  the 
island  was  said  to  be  rich  in  the  precious  metals,  as  well  as  in  tin 
and  lead  :  and  partly  from  the  hope  of  booty,  partly  to  strike  terror  r 

into  all  who  aided  the  Gauls,  and  partly  from  curiosity,  Caesar 
resolved  to  cross.  After  sending  a  ship  to  reconnoitre,  he  set  sail  with 
eighty  vessels  carrying  two  legions.  The  Britons  had  tried  to  avert 
the  invasion  by  sending  ambassadors,  and  Caesar  in  return  had  sent 
Commius,  king  of  the  Atrebates,  to  persuade  them  to  submit.  But 
his  landing — probably  near  Deal — -was  bravely  resisted  by  the  natives,  The 
who  rushed  into  the  water  to  attack  his  men  ;  when  it  was  nevertheless  landing. 
effected  the  chiefs  submitted  and  gave  hostages.  But  four  days  after- 
wards a  violent  storm  damaged  or  destroyed  all  Caesar's  ships  and 
prevented  the  cavalry,  who  followed  him,  from  landing.  This  en- 
couraged the  British  chiefs  to  attack  him  again.  They  were  twice 
decisively  defeated  ;  but  Caesar  had  been  nearly  a  month  in  the 
island  without  making  any  advance.  It  was  now  about  the  end  of 
September  ;  all  his  ships,  except  twelve,  were  refitted,  and  when  the 
equinoctial  storms  abated  he  returned  to  Gaul.      There  after  punish- 


728 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Fifth 

Campaign. 
Second 
Invasion  of 
Britain, 
54- 


ing  an  attack  of  the  Morini  upon  a  party  of  his  troops,  he  put  his 
men  into  winter  quarters  in  Belgium,  where  the  Menapii  on  the 
lower  Rhine  had  during  his  absence  been  subdued  by  his  legates  Q. 
Titanus  and  L.  Cotta. 

The  expedition  to  Britain  seems  to  have  strongly  touched  the 
imagination  of  the  Romans.  Since  they  had  taken  the  place  of  the 
Carthaginians  in  Spain  the  knowledge  of  British  trade  must  have 
reached  their  merchants.  The  island  was  said  to  supply  "  corn, 
cattle,  silver,  iron,  hides,  slaves,  and  sporting  dogs  ; "  and  still  more 
valuable  things,  such  as  gold  and  pearls,  were  believed  to  be 
abundant  there.^  The  hope,  therefore,  of  opening  a  rich  field  of 
traffic  to  Roman  enterprise,  as  well  as  of  obtaining  large  immediate 
profit,  induced  Caesar  to  make  a  second  attempt,  although  he  was 
leaving  Gaul  by  no  means  secure,  and  in  fact  almost  certain  to  rebel 
again  if  he  met  with  disaster.  At  the  very  place  of  embarkation, 
the  porttcs  ftius  (probably  Wissaiit\  Dumnorix  with  some  Aeduan 
cavalry  attempted  to  leave  him,  and  had  to  be  pursued  and  killed. 
When  he  landed  (probably  near  Romney  Marsh)  the  natives, 
alarmed  at  the  number  of  his  fleet,  were  hiding  in  the  forests, 
and  his  disembarkation  was  not  opposed.  He  advanced  to  the 
river  Stour ;  drove  them  from  a  strong  camp  to  which  they  had 
retreated  ;  and,  after  halting  about  ten  days, — while  sending  men  to 
repair  his  ships,  which  had  been  beached  too  near  the  sea,  and  had 
been  much  damaged  by  a  high  tide  and  severe  gale, — he  crossed  the 
Thames  near  Brentford  ;  defeated  Cassivelaunus  ;  and  advanced  to 
his  capital,  standing  probably  on  the  site  of  St.  Albans.  He  occupied 
the  town  unopposed,  for  Cassivelaunus  had  made  his  way  by  another 
route  into  Kent,  and  was  attempting  the  naval  camp.  Failing  in  that 
he  sent  in  his  submission  ;  and  Caesar,  resolving  to  return  to  Gaul 
before  the  end  of  the  autumn,  was  content  to  receive  hostages  from 
such  tribes    as  had  submitted,  and  to  impose  a  tribute,  which  was 


^  It  has  been  suggested  with  some  plausibihty  that  the  British  tin  had  been 
driven  from  the  markets  by  that  of  Spain,  and  that  the  trade  did  not  revive 
till  the  regular  Roman  occupation.  When  Caesar  landed  no  gold  or  silver  was 
being  dug  there,  and  he  found  nothing  worth  taking  but  slaves.  Cicero's 
brother  Quintus  served  in  Britain  in  54,  and  though  the  orator  promised  to  use 
his  skill  to  magnify  the  exploit  [ad  Q.  Fr.  ii.  13),  he  soon  found  it  a  barren 
theme.  "As  to  British  affairs,  I  gather  from  your  letters  that  there  is  no 
occasion  either  for  exultation  or  fear"  [lb.  3,  i).  In  May  (54)  he  says  in  a 
letter  to  Trebatius  :  "I  hear  there  is  no  gold  or  silver  in  Britain"  [ad  Fatn.  vii. 
7,  i)  ;  and  to  Atticus  (October  54),  "It  has  been  now  thoroughly  ascertained 
that  there  is  not  a  drachm  of  silver  in  the  island,  and  no  hope  of  booty  except 
from  slaves"  {ad  Att.  iv.  16;  cp.  iv.  17).  These  expressions,  however,  show 
what  had  been  expected.  This  is  farther  illustrated  by  the  fact  that  Caesar's 
fleet  was  accompanied  by  a  large  number  of  corn  and  merchant  vessels  belonging 
to  private  speculators,  so  that  the  whole  flotilla  amounted  to  about  800  vessels. 


A, 


XLiv  FALL  OF  SABINUS  AND  COTTA  729 

not  likely  to  be  paid  with  great  regularity.      Late  in  September  he 
began  his  preparations  for  return.^ 

The    expedition,    in    one    sense    successful,    had    been    neither  Growing 
glorious  nor  profitable  ;   and  though  the  war  vessels  and  transports  dangers  m 
were  mostly  preserved,  a  large  number  of  the  corn  ships  accompany-    "^"  *  •^■^' 
ing  the  fleet  had  been  lost.      Caesar's  absence  through  the  summer 
had  also   been  a  cause  of  danger  in  Gaul,  where  a  rebellion  was 
maturing,  which  he  would  probably  have  crushed  in  the  bud  had  he 
been  in  the  country.      As  it  was,  he  helped  the  latent  treason  by 
placing  his  legions  in  winter  camps  at  some  distance  from  each  other, 
though  all,  it  appears,  within  the   radius  of  about    100   miles   from 
Amiens,  where  he  was  spending  the  early  part  of  the  winter  himself. ^ 
The  last  raised  of  his  eight  legions,  under  the  command  of  Sabinus 
and  Cotta,  was  stationed  at  Aduatuca  {Tongres\  between  the  Meuse 
and    Rhine,   where  Ambiorix   and    Catavolcus    ruled   the   Eburones. 
Suddenly  the  camp  was  assaulted  and  the  legion  driven  in.      They  Fall  of 
believed  that  help  from   Caesar  was  impossible,  and,  though   Cotta  Sabmus 
was  for  holding  out,  Sabinus  persuaded  him  to  try  to  join  Q.  Cicero  at  ^^.^^  ^^f 
Charleroi.      They  were   surrounded,  and,  after  a  vain   attempt   to  ^^^ 
treat,  the  legion  was  cut  to  pieces,  only  a  few  escaping  to  carry  the 
news  to  Labienus.     Ambiorix  was  then  able  to  rouse  the  Aduatuci, 
Nervii,  and  other  tribes  and  attack  Q.  Cicero.      He  defended  himself 
gallantly,  and  was  relieved  by  Caesar  when  almost  at  the  end  of  his 
resources.      But  though  this  success  produced  immediate  effect  on 
the  Treveri  and  other  rebellious  tribes,  the  danger  was  by  no  means 
over.    The  Treveri  were  secretly  trying  to  persuade  the  Germans  once 
more  to  cross   the   Rhine,   and    Caesar   for  the   first   time   found   it 
necessary  to  spend   the  whole  winter  in  Transalpine  Gaul,   and  to 
obtain   three  more  legions   in  the  Cisalpine  province,  two  of  which 
Pompey  had  raised  in  55,  but  had  apparently  dispersed  on  furlough. 

Thus  reinforced  Caesar  reduced  the  Nervii  before  spring  had  well  Sixth 
l^egun  and  overawed  the  Menapii  ;    while  Labienus  conquered   the  Campaign. 
Treveri  and  re-established  the  faithful  Cingetorix  as  their  ruler.      The  "y^^^V  ^and 
two  then  joined  forces  and  again  crossed  the  Rhine  by  a  new  bridge   TrevaH 

^   ' '  On  the  27th  of  October  I  received  letters  from  my  brother  Quintus  and   •^^^""'^'"• 
Caesar,   dated  from  the  British  coast  on   the  26th  of  September.      Britain  was 
conquered,  hostages  received — there  was  no  booty,  but  a  tribute  had  been  im- 
posed.     They  were  on  the  point  of  bringing  the  army  across  "  [ad  Alt.  iv.  17). 

-  The  legions  were  thus  placed  :  (i)  One  under  Q.  Cicero  among  the  Nervii 
at  Charleroi  ;  (2)  one  under  Labienus  among  the  Remi  near  Luxemburg  ;  (3) 
one  under  Trebonius  at  Samarobriva  {Amiefts)  ;  (4)  one  under  L.  Fabius  among 
the  Morini  at  St.  Pol;  (5)  one  under  L.  Roscius  among  the  Essuvii  at  S6ez  in 
Normandy  ;  (6)  one  under  M.  Crassus  among  the  Bellovaci  at  Mendidier  ;  {7) 
one  under  L,  Munatius  Plancus  at  Champlieu  ;  (8)  one  under  Titurius  Sabinus 
and  Aurunculeius  Cotta  at  Aduatuca  (  Tongrcs).  Caesar  set  the  fashion  of  putting 
one  of  his  legati  at  the  head  of  each  legion. 


730 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Second 
crossing  of 
the  Rhine. 

Q.  Cicero 
sjirprised 
by  the 
Sicambri. 


Seventh 
Campaign. 

Rebellion 
in 

southern 
Gaul. 


Unsuc- 
cessful siege 
of  Ger- 
govia. 

Capture  of 
Alesia, 
and  sur- 
render of 
Vercinge- 
torix. 


Eighth  and 
ninth  Cam- 
paigns, 


near  Bonn,  which  on  his  return  Caesar  left  partly  standing  and 
guarded.  The  later  summer  and  autumn  were  spent  in  Belgic  Gaul, 
where  the  Eburones  were  driven  to  take  refuge  in  the  Ardennes  or 
marshes.  Aduatuca  {Tongres)  was  made  the  headquarters  of  the 
army  under  the  care  of  Q.  Cicero,  and  Caesar  with  three  legions 
advanced  to  the  Scheldt.  In  his  absence  Cicero,  who  had  not  obeyed 
his  orders  to  keep  strictly  within  his  lines,  almost  suffered  a  disaster 
at  the  hands  of  the  Sicambri,  who  crossed  the  Rhine  in  hopes  of 
plunder.  They  were  eventually  repulsed  and  the  camp  and  town 
saved,  but  Q.  Cicero  did  not  remain  in  Gaul  next  year.  After  putting 
his  men  into  winter  quarters  Caesar  held  an  assembly  of  the  Gauls 
at  Rheims,  at  which  the  leaders  of  the  rebellious  tribes  were  con- 
demned, and  then  at  length  felt  that  he  might  go  to  Italy. 

But  next  year  the  danger  was  in  southern  Gaul,  close  to  the 
Province.  1  The  young  chief  of  the  Arverni  {Auverg?te\  Vercinge- 
torix,  took  advantage  of  a  movement  of  the  Canutes  (about  Orleans) 
to  rouse  his  own  and  the  neighbouring  tribes.  Caesar  hurried  across 
the  Alps,  drove  Vercingetorix  into  the  valley  of  the  Loire  among 
the  Bituriges,  and  followed  him  rapidly  with  such  troops  as  he  had, 
leaving  orders  for  the  rest  to  concentrate  at  Agendicum  {Sejts).  He 
seized  Genabum  {Orleans).,  and  having  thus  secured  a  bridge  over 
the  Loire,  advanced  upon  Avaricum  {Bourges).,  the  chief  town  of  the 
Bituriges.  It  was  taken  after  a  long  siege,  which  Vercingetorix 
vainly  attempted  to  interrupt.  Caesar  then  marched  down  the  Allier 
into  Auvergne.  He  was  delayed  by  Vercingetorix  having  broken 
the  bridges  over  this  river,  and  when  he  arrived  at  Gergovia  {Ger- 
govie)  he  found  it  strongly  guarded.  It  proved  almost  his  only 
failure.  After  some  weeks'  fruitless  siege  he  was  obliged  to  march 
against  the  Aedui,  who  had  revolted  and  seized  Noviodunum  {Nevers). 
Yet  for  the  present  he  let  the  Aedui  be,  and  directed  his  whole 
strength  upon  Alesia,  into  which  Vercingetorix  had  thrown  himself. 

Round  this  hill  (between  Tonnerre  and  Dijon)  the  final  struggle 
took  place.  Vercingetorix  had  had  time  to  send  messengers  to  rouse 
the  neighbouring  tribes  ;  and  before  long  an  army  of  24,000  men 
arrived  to  attack  Caesar's  line  of  circumvallation  from  the  outside. 
But  though  they  made  a  furious  assault  on  the  weakest  point  of  the 
Roman  lines,  they  were  beaten  back  with  great  loss.  Vercingetorix 
surrendered  himself  in  hopes  of  saving  his  men,  and  was  reserved  to 
adorn  a  triumph  and  to  die  in  a  Roman  prison. 

Gaul  was  now  subdued,  and  though  Caesar  wintered  at  Bibracte 
{Autun).,  and  in  the  spring  of  5  i  had  to  move  into  the  valley  of  the 
Loire,   and   thence   north  to  Beauvais  beyond  the  Gise,  to  fight  a 

1  News  of  the  disorders  at  Rome  following  the  death  of  Clodius  encouraged 
the  rebellion. 


XLiv  DISORDERS  AT  ROME  73i 

somewhat  severe  battle  on  the  plain  of  Choisy-au-Bec,  and  again  to 
inflict  some  severity  on  the  district  between  the  Meuse  and  the 
Rhine,!  the  greater  part  of  these  two  years  (51-50)  was  spent  in 
measures  of  conciliation  and  in  settling  counter-claims.  Caesar's 
chief  glory  is  that  after  so  many  years  of  fighting  he  left  this  great 
province  on  the  whole  thoroughly  loyal,  and  convinced  of  the  advan- 
tage of  taking  its  place  in  the  Roman  system. 

Meanwhile   the   course  of  afifairs  at   Rome  had  been  gradually  Political 
making   it  inevitable  that   supreme  power  should  be  in   one  man's  ^f^^^^ 
hands,  and  that  in  some  way  it  would  have  to  be  settled  whether    f^  A^^-/ 
that  man  should  be  Caesar  or  Pompey.      During  54  and  53  there  ^^^. 
had  been  frequent  and  bloody  struggles  between  the  ruffians  hired  ^^^^ 

by  Milo  and  Clodius.      They  prevented  the  election  of  consuls  for  Cn. 
53  until  six  months  of  the  year  were  passed  ;  and  as  this  year  was  Domitius 
drawing  to  an  end  it  became  certain  that  the  elections  for  52  would  ^Jt^^^!^^/' 
also  be  prevented.     The  first  of  January  arrived  without  a  consul,  ^^J-^^ 
and  after  nearly  three  more  weeks  of  violence,  Milo,  who  was  one  of  Messalla. 
the  candidates,  on  his  way  to  Lanuvium  met  Clodius  on  the  Appian  Murder  of 
way  near  Bovillae,  and  taking  advantage  of  a  squabble  which  arose  Clodius, 
between  their  slaves,  in  which  Clodius  received  a  wound,  caused  him  20th 
to  be  dragged  from  the  house  in  which  he  had  taken  refuge  and  -^^^"^'7 
despatched.      This  was  followed  by  fresh  disorders.      Clodius'  fate 
roused  his  followers  to  fury  and  awakened  sympathy  with  him  among 
the  people.      His  body  was  carried  by  the  mob  into  the  Curia  and 
burnt  on  a  pile  of  broken  benches,  during  which  the   Curia  caught 
fire  and  was  destroyed.     At  length,  on  the  25th  of  February  ^  the 
Senate  named  Servius  Sulpicius  interrex,  and  directed  him  to  declare  pompey 
Pompey  sole  consul,  with  authority  to  raise  troops  and  restore  order,  sole 
Pompey  published  an  edict  forbidding  the  wearing  of  arms  in  the  city  ;  consul, 
caused  the  ashes  of  Clodius  to  be  removed  ;  and  proceeded  to  carry  ^^^^"^^ 
a  series  of  laws  aimed  at  the  root  of  these  disorders.      One  was  dilex      , 
judiciaria^  which  arranged  for  the  selection  of  jurors  by  the  magis-      "  "''^^' 
trates,  with  a  definite  right  of  challenge  on  the  part  of  the  de^ndant.   ^.^^   .   _. 
It  also  limited  the  time  allowed  for  the  speeches  on  either  side,  and  ^'^ 
abolished  or  curtailed  the  system  of  laiidationes^ — speeches  by  power- 
ful friends  of  either  side, — which,  like  the   "maintenance"   in  the 
English  courts  of  the  fourteenth  century,  were  employed  to  overawe 
juries.      Another  law,  de  jure  magistraiuum,  ordained  that  consuls  and  Ve  Jure 
praetors  were  not  to  proceed  to  a  province  until  five  years  after  the  magis-, 

tratutim. 

1  The  last  place  to  hold  out  in  southern  Gaul  was  Uxellodunum  {ie  Puy 
d' Issolu).      Caesar  also  went  with  two  legions  into  Aquitania  in  the  course  of  51. 

2  This  was  nearly  two  months  since  Clodius'  murder  (20th  January)  because, 
in  order  to  correct  the  calendar,  it  had  become  the  custom  in  alternate  years  to 
intercalate  twenty  days  after  the  23rd  of  February. 


732 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


end  of  their  year  of  office,  and  renewed  the  rule  of  a  personal  pro- 
fessio  on  the  part  of  a  candidate.  After  the  law  was  engraved  he 
was  reminded  that  he  was  pledged  to  make  a  special  exemption  of 
Caesar  in  this  last  point,  and  he  thereupon  caused  the  alteration  to 
be  made  ;  but,  perhaps  because  the  legality  of  such  a  proceeding  was 
doubtful,  the  privilege  was  confirmed  to  Caesar  by  a  law  brought  in 
by  the  tribune  Caelius  at  Pompey's  request. ^  Finally  he  brought  in 
a  severe  law  against  ambitus^  which  was  to  be  retrospective  up  to  his 
own  first  consulship  (70),  and  under  it  numerous  prosecutions  at  once 
took  place.  Under  the  lex  jiidiciaria  the  condemnation  of  Milo 
{de  vi)  was  secured,  order  being  secured  by  Pompey  stationing  an 
armed  guard  round  the  court. 

For  the  moment  Pompey  was  regarded  by  the  Optimates  as  the 
saviour  of  Society,  and  seemed  all-powerful.  He  could  not,  indeed, 
get  all  he  desired.  He  had  wished  to  be  named  Dictator,  and  his 
six  months'  sole  consulship  was  a  compromise.  Moreover,  in  order 
to  prevent  the  nomination  of  Caesar  as  his  colleague,  he  was  obliged 
to  take  his  father-in-law,  Metellus  Scipio,  in  that  capacity.  Nor  had 
his  influence  been  able  to  prevent  the  condemnation  of  Gabinius  for 
majestas^  though  he  induced  Cicero  (much  against  his  wishes)  to 
undertake  his  defence.  Still  he  was  evidently  drawing  closer  to  the 
Optimates  and  drifting  away  from  his  friendship  with  Caesar.  One 
tie  which  had  bound  them  had  been  severed  at  the  latter  end  of  54 
by  the  death  of  Pompey's  wife  lulia  in  childbed.  There  was  no 
Crassus  now  to  oppose  him  ;  and  there  were  plenty  of  people  to  tell 
Caesar  that  he  meant  to  use  his  renewed  influence  against  him.  He 
had  obtained  from  the  Senate  a  farther  extension  of  five  years  to 
his  governorship  of  the  Spains,  which  he  had  been  conducting  since 
54  by  three  legates.  In  51  he  was  still  outside  the  walls  with 
imperium,  constantly  talking  of  going  to  Spain,  but  always  allowing 
himself  to  be  over-persuaded  to  stay.  The  consuls  for  that  year  also, 
whose  election  he  had  at  any  rate  not  prevented,  were  both  oppo- 
nents of  Caesar ;  and  when  one  of  them,  Marcellus,  moved  the 
question  of  naming  a  successor  in  Gaul,  although  Pompey  did  not 
support  it,  insisting  that  Caesar  would  at  any  time  obey  the  Senate, 
his  opposition  was  not  warm  ;  nor  did  he  oppose  the  measures  of 
Marcellus  calculated  to  cast  a  slight  on  Caesar,  such,  for  instance, 
as  refusing  the  citizenship  to  a  magistrate  at  Comum,  in  which  Caesar 
had  settled  a  colony  with  Latin  rights.  The  magistrates  in  such  a 
colony  had  the  full  civitas,  yet  Marcellus  on  some  pretext  ordered 
one  of  them  to  be  flogged,  as  though  he  had  no  such  privilege. 
This  was  meant  to  be  an  insult  to  Caesar,  and  was  followed  by  more 


^  Cic.  ad  Att.  viii.  3, 


xi.iv  THE  FALL  OF  CRASSUS  733 

attempts   to    supersede    him    in    Gaul.^      Marcellus    had    originally 
brought   the  subject  forward  in  the   Senate  on  the  ist  of  January, 
directly  he  entered  office.      On  that  occasion  Pompey  had  spoken  in 
favour  of  postponing  it  till  the  ist  of  January  next,  but  yet  had  not 
hesitated  to  express  his  dislike  of  the  idea  of  Caesar  becoming  consul 
while  in  possession  of  his  province  and  army.^     The  subject  was  Motion  for 
renewed  at  the  end  of  September,  and  a  resolution  passed  that  a  Caesar's 
motion  should  be  made  concerning  it  on  the  ist  of  March  (50)  along  ^^"^  '    ^ 
with  a  resolution  as  to  the  pay  of  Caesar's  troops.     These  resolutions  ^j 
were  vetoed  by  a  tribune,  and  did  not  become  se?tafus  co7isultaj  but 
Pompey,  who  was  present,  declared  that  after  the  ist  of  March  next 
the  arrangement  might  be  made  without  injury  to  Caesar,  and   that 
veto  or  no  veto  Caesar  would  yield  to  the  aiictoritas  of  the  Senate. 
"  What,"  said  some  one,  "  if  Caesar  should  choose  to  keep  his  army 
and   be   consul  too?"     "What,"  he  answered,  "if  my  son  should 
strike  me  with  his  stick  ?  " 

Caesar  saw  what  was  coming,  and  took  care  during  51   and   50  The  two 
to  ascertain  the  feelings  of  the  Cisalpine  towns  in  his  favour,  especially  legions 
in  the  spring  of  50,  when  he  visited  them  ostensibly  to  recommend  ^    .^^f 
M.   Antonius  to  their  suffrages  for    the    augurship  against  his   old  ^^^ 
enemy  Ahenobarbus.       But   late  in  51  or  at  the  beginning  of  50   a  jz-jo. 
still  more  open  blow  was  struck  at  him. 

During  the  year  5 1  there  had  been  frequent  rumours  of  a  Parthian   The 
war.     The  Parthians  (first  appearing  as  a  powerful  people  about  256)  Parthians. 
had  been  brought  into  contact  with  the  Romans  in  the  Mithridatic 
war.      Pompey  had  made  a  treaty  of  peace  with  Phraates  (63)  ;  and 
Gabinius,  while  governor  of  Syria  (57-55),  crossed  the  Euphrates  to 
take  part  in  a  dispute  as  to  the  succession  between  the  two  sons  of 
Phraates,  Mithridates  and  Orodes.      He  had,  however,  retired  with-  Crassus  in 
out  doing  anything.  ^  When  Crassus  came  to  Syria  at  the  end  of  5  5  Syria, 
his  head  was  full  of  a  great  Parthian  war,  *  which  should  make  him  •^■^'■53- 
equal  to  Pompey  and  Caesar  ;  and  early  in   54  he  started  for  the 
Euphrates,  took  Zenodotium,  in  Mesopotamia,  and  returned  to  Syria  He  attacks 
for  the  winter.      He  had  no  pretext  for  the  invasion,  and  had  taken  ^^^^ 
no  precautions   to  secure  the  alliance  of  the  Armenians  or  others  P^_^J^^^^^^ 
hostile  to  the   Parthians.      He  was  unfitted  by  age  and  manner  of  y^^^^  p^^, 
life  for  a  campaign,  and  everything  forboded  disaster.      In   53  he  text, ^4-^3. 

^  Cicero  exclaims  against  it  as  illegal  in  the  case  of  a  Transpadanus,  even 
without  the  privilege  given  him  by  office,  and  professes  to  be  as  indignant  as 
Caesar  himself  [ad  Att.  v.  11). 

2  Cicero,  Fam.  viii.  4  ;  viii.  9.  3  Because  bribed  to  go  to  Egypt,  p.  717:) 

4  By  the  lex   Trebonia  (the  plebiscitum  giving  him  and  the  other  triumviri 

their  prolonged  commands,  see  p.  725)  he  had  the  right  to  wage  war,   though 

one  of  the  tribunes  had  forbidden  it,  and  even  laid  him  under  a  solemn  curse  if 

he  attacked  the  Parthians. 


734 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


rejoined  his  army  in  Mesopotamia,  rejecting  the  request  of  Artavasdes 
that  he  should  come  to  Armenia,  which  Orodes  was  invading,  and 
which  as  a  rugged  country  would  be  less  suitable  for  the  Parthian 
cavalry.  Orodes  made  peace  with  Artavasdes,  and  sent  an  army 
under  Surenas  to  oppose  Crassus.  He  was  misled  by  an  Arab 
guide  ;  was  surprised  in  an  unfavourable  position  ;  and  after  a  long 
day's  battle,  in  which  his  son  fell,  retired  upon  Carrhae.  The 
Parthians  followed,  and  when  he  again  attempted  a  retreat,  he  was 
tempted  into  a  conference  and  killed.  His  quaestor  C.  Cassius 
Longinus  escaped  with  500  horsemen  across  the  Euphrates,  col- 
lected the  remains  of  the  army,  and  defended  the  province  of  Syria, 
which  he  held  as  proquaestor  for  the  next  year  and  a  half.  After 
some  feeble  attacks  in  52  the  Parthians  invaded  the  province  in 
earnest  in  5  i  under  Osaces  and  a  son  of  the  king  named  Pacorus. 
Cassius,  who  was  at  Antioch,  decisively  defeated  them,  thereby 
saving  Syria  and  relieving  Cicero,  who  was  governor  of  Cilicia  in 
51-50,  from  a  much-dreaded  struggle  with  them.i 

That  the  danger  was  over  could  only  have  been  known  at  Rome 
late  in  51.  During  the  year  suggestions  had  been  made  of  sending 
Pompey  or  Caesar  against  the  Parthians  ;  and  finally  the  Senate 
ordered  two  legions  to  follow  Bibulus,  who  had  started  for  Syria  in  the 
summer  of  51,  and  of  these  legions  Pompey  was  to  supply  one  and 
Caesar  the  other.  But  as  Pompey  now  claimed  the  return  of  one  of 
the  legions  he  had  lent  to  Caesar,  the  result  was  that  Caesar  was 
deprived  of  two,  as  the  Senate  no  doubt  wished.  He  had,  how- 
ever, satisfied  himself  that  he  could  raise  men  enough  in  Gaul,  and 
he  sent  the  ist  and  1 5  th  legions  without  remonstrance.  He  soon 
found  that  the  alarm  had  been  a  pretence,  or  at  any  rate  was  over : 
for  the  legions,  instead  of  being  sent  to  the  east,  were  handed  over 
to  Pompey,  and  stationed  temporarily  at  Capua. 

It  was  time  to  act  if  he  meant  to  hold  his  own  against  Pompey. 
He  had  more  than  made  up  for  the  two  legions  by  new  levies  in 
Gaul,  but  it  was  necessary  to  secure  himself  in  Rome  also  if  civil 
war  was  to  be  avoided.  The  two  consuls  were  hostile,  as  well  as 
one  of  the  tribunes,  C.  Curio,  and  might  be  expected  to  push  forward 
the  question  of  his  recall  by  including  Gaul  among  the  provinces  to 
be  allotted.  Caesar  by  promises  or  bribes  won  over  one  of  the 
consuls,  Paullus,  and  simply  bought  Curio,  who  was  overwhelmed 
with  debt.      To  every  one's  surprise  Curio  began  bickering  with  the 


1  Cicero,  Fam.  xv.  14  ;  iii.  8  ;  viii.  10  ;  ad  Ait.  v,  21.  Cicero  was  in  Cilicia 
(much  to  his  own  disgust),  owing  to  the  provision  in  Pompey's  law  ordering  a  five 
years'  interval  between  the  consulship  and  a  province.  In  order  to  supply  gover- 
nors for  the  interval,  the  Senate  had  to  pass  a  resolution  ordering  all  ex-praetors 
who  had  not  had  a  province  to  take  one  in  order  of  seniority. 


XLiv  THE  QUESTION  OF  CAESAR'S  RECALL  735 

Optimates.       He   wished  the   pontifices   to  intercalate  a  month   in  c.  Curio 

February,  though  it  was   the  wrong  year  ;  and  when    refused  began  Joins  the 

dropping  obscure  hints  as  to   Caesar's   claims,  and  putting  forward  ^^asar 

proposals  of   a   compromise   between   him   and   Pompey,   which   he 

knew  the  latter  would  not  accept ;  and  finally  showed  himself  as  an 

open  champion  of  Caesar.     The  first  part  of  50,  however,  was  quiet. 

There  seemed  a  kind  of  lethargy  after  so  much  excitement,  and  both 

sides    paused.       This   was    partly   caused    by   Pompey's    dangerous  Pompey  s 

illness    at    Naples,    which    called    forth    an    immense    outburst    of  i^^'^^^^- 

enthusiasm  in  the    Italian    cities,  where    prayers  were    offered    up 

with  great  fervency  for  his  recovery.     The  gods  offered  —  it  was 

afterwards   said — to   remove  him  from   the  evil  to  come  ;   but  the 

prayers  and  sacrifices  of   the   Italians   reserved  him  for  his  doom. 

In  one  sense  this  was  true,  for  the  feeling  thus  displayed  blinded  him 

to  his  true  position.    He  believed  Caesar's  troops  to  be  disaffected,  and  He  declines 

that  he  himself  had  only  to  stamp  on  the  ground  to  raise  soldiers  any-  ^^  ^'^"^ 

where  in  Italy,  and  till  December  took  no  precautions  against  him.^     roop. 

For  a  time  it  seemed  possible  to  avoid  extreme  measures.      The 
consul,   C.   Marcellus,    indeed,  was  anxious  to  push  on  the  decree 
for  naming  Caesar's    successor,   who  was  to  be  Ahenobarbus  ;  but   The 
though  it  had  been  arranged  that  the  motion  should  be  made  in  the  ^^^^^'^  {^ 
Senate  in  March  for  his  leaving  his  province  on  the  i  ith  of  November,   Caesar 
it  had  not  been  passed  in  June.      Curio  gave  out  that  he  would  do  vetoed. 
anything   rather  than    allow  it.      Pompey  professed   a  wish   to   do 
Caesar   full  justice,   but   plainly  showed  that  he  was  for  fixing  this 
day.     At  last,  after  the  consular  elections,  on  the  motion  being  made, 
Curio  vetoed  it  ;  and  a  proposal  to  remonstrate  with  him  {agere  cum 
tribimd)  was  lost  by  a  large  majority.     Clearly,  therefore,  nothing  would 
be  done  that  year.      But  the  consuls  for  49  were  vehement  opponents 
of  Caesar,  and  Curio  would  be  no  longer   in  office.      C.    Marcellus 
(cousin  of  the  consul  of  the  previous  year),  as  consul  designate,  had 
voted  for  the  recall,  and  the  attempt  would  no  doubt  be  renewed  when 
he  became  consul.      "  There  is  no  hope  of  peace  beyond  the  year's 
end,"  wrote  Caelius  to  Cicero  in  September,  "  Pompey  is  determined 
that  Caesar  shall  not  be  consul  designate  till  he  has  given  up  province 
and  army.      Caesar  is  convinced  that  he  cannot  leave  his  army  safely." 

The   words  were   quickly  justified.      "  I    have    a    partiality    for  49-  Coss. 
Curio  ;    I  wish  Caesar  to  act  like  an  honest  man  ;    I  could  die  for  ^• 
Pompey,"  wrote  Cicero  in  June  (50)  as  he  was  quitting  his  province.  Marcdlus 
But  when  he  reached  Rome  (4th  January  49)  he  found  the  time  for  /,.  cor- 
compromise  and  compliment  all  but  past.      Curio,  going  out  of  office  nelius 
on  the  loth  of  December,  at  once  went  to  Caesar  at  Ravenna,  and  ^^t^^lus. 

^  In  December,  at  the  urgent  instance  of  Marcellus,  Pompey  left  Rome  to 
look  after  troops,  but  seems  to  have  done  nothing  (Cic.  ad  Att.  vii.  4,  5). 


11^ 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


urged  him  to  march  straight  upon  Rome  and  wrest  his  rights  from  a 
tyrannical  cHque.  But  Caesar  wished  to  try  once  more  for  peace,  or 
to  put  his  enemies  more .  completely  in  the  wrong.  Curio  was  sent 
back  with  a  letter  addressed  to  the  Senate,  which  he  handed  to  the 
consuls  on  the  ist  of  January  (49),  requesting  them  to  read  it. 
They  refused  until  compelled  by  the  tribunes  M.  Antonius  and  Q. 
Cassius.  It  contained  a  recital  of  Caesar's  services  to  the  State,  and 
finally  expressed  his  readiness  to  hand  over  his  province  and  army 
if  Pompey  would  do  the  same.  In  his  view  this  was  the  least  he 
could  ask.  He  could  not  come  to  Rome  and  stand  the  inevitable 
trial  surrounded  by  Pompey's  soldiers.  He  speaks  of  the  demand  as 
"  of  the  mildest  possible  kind  "  ;  but  the  consuls  regarded  the  letter 
as  "  threatening  and  violent,"  and  refused  to  submit  its  proposals 
to  the  Senate.^  Instead,  they  made  a  formal  statement  as  to  the 
danger  of  the  State,  or,  as  the  phrase  went,  retulerunt  de  republica. 
A  stormy  debate  followed.  The  consul  Lentulus  proposed  to  fix  a 
day  at  once  for  Caesar's  resignation  of  his  province,  and  was  sup- 
ported by  Pompey's  father-in-law,  Metellus  Scipio,  who,  as  Pompey 
could  not  attend  a  meeting  on  the  Capitol,  was  supposed  to  express 
his  sentiments.  Marcellus,  the  other  consul,  wished  to  wait  till 
troops  had  been  levied.  But  Lentulus  overbore  all  opposition. 
Only  one  senator  voted  against  a  resolution  for  fixing  a  day  for 
Caesar  to  resign  on  pain  of  high  treason, ^  and  declaring  that  Pompey 
need  not  do  the  same.  This  was  vetoed  by  the  two  tribunes 
Antonius  and  Cassius.  The  debate  as  to  whether  they  should  be 
appealed  to  to  withdraw  the  veto  lasted  till  nightfall,  and  was 
renewed  on  the  four  days  following  on  which  the  Senate  could  meet.-^ 
It  was  not  till  the  evening  of  the  7th  that  the  two  obstructing  tribunes 
were  expelled,"*  and  the  senatiis  consulticm  ultiimim  was  passed, 
ordering  consuls,  praetors,  tribunes,  and  proconsuls  (the  last  to 
include  Pompey  and  Cicero),  "  to  see  that  the  republic  took  no 
harm."  Antonius  and  Cassius  fled  from  the  city,  where  their  sacro- 
sanct office  was  of  doubtful  protection  against  this  dictatorship  in 
commission,  and  started  to  join  Caesar. 


^  Caesar,  D.  Civ.  i.  5,  lenissima  postulata.  Cicero  [Fam.  xvi.  11),  menaces 
et  acerbas  literas.      So  much  depends  on  the  point  of  view  ! 

^  Eum  adversus  rempublicam  facturum  videri.      Caelius  was  the  single  voter. 

3  The  five  meetings  were  on  the  1st,  2nd,  5th,  6th,  7th.  A  meeting  of  the 
Senate  on  the  3rd  and  4th  of  January,  which  were  dies  comitiales,  seems  to  have 
been  specially  prohibited  by  the  lex  Pupia  (Cic.  ad  Q.  Fr.  ii.  33).  At  any  rate  the 
same  rule  does  not  seem  to  have  applied  to  all  comitial  days — i.e.  days  on  which 
business  was  done  in  the  comitia — for  the  7th  is  also  a  dies  comitialis.  See 
Willems'  Le  Sdnat,  vol.  ii.  p.  152  sqq. 

■*  Cicero  says  "  without  violence"  [nulla  vi  expulsi),  but  it  does  not  appear 
how  it  could  have  been  done  otherwise. 


XLiv  CAESAR  CROSSES  THE  RUBICON  737 

He  was  at  Ravenna  when  news  reached  him  of  these  proceed- 
ings.     Without  betraying  his  intention  to  the  townsfolk  he  started  Caesar 
after  nightfall  with  the  13th  legion,    for    Ariminum,    sending  orders  •^^^''^•^ 

to  the  others  to  leave  their  winter  quarters  and  follow  him.     Ariminum  ■''^"^'^ 

•  t-,  ,..,,-  Ravenna, 

was  the  first  town  out  of  his  provmce,  which  was  here  divided  from  January 

Italy  proper  by  the  little  stream  of  the  Rubicon.      To  cross  it  was  to  ^9, 

put  himself  definitely  in  a  position  of  hostility  to  the  government, 

and  the  final  step  may  well   have  caused  him  hesitation.      He  is 

said  to  have  turned  to  his  officers  with  the  words,  "  Even  now  we 

may   draw   back "  ;  and   to  have  finally   followed    the    spontaneous  and  crosses 

action  of  some  soldiers   who    dashed   across   the   stream    to    listen  *^^ 

to  a  shepherd  playing  a  flute  on  the  other  side.      Regarding  this  as 

providential    he    exclaimed,    "  Let    us    go   where   the   omen   of   the 

gods  and  the  iniquity  of  our  enemies  calls  us  ;  the  die  is  cast ! " 

But  of  all  this  he  tells  us  nothing  himself.      He  only  says  that  he 

addressed  his  men  ;  found  them  ready  to  avenge  the  wrongs  of  the 

tribunes,  and  at  once  led  them  to  Ariminum.      There  he  found  the 

expelled  tribunes ;    and    there    Lucius    Caesar   (a    distant    relative) 

came   with   offers   of    mediation,    along   with    the    praetor   Roscius,    Vain 

who  brought  a  message  from   Pompey.       He   listened  courteously,   negotia- 

and    answered  that    if   Pompey   would   go   to    Spain    and    disband  ^^^^f  ^.^ 

soldiers  in   Italy,  and  so  leave  the  comitia  free,  he  would  also  give  ^^^^^^ 

up  his  legions.     But  he  had  no  expectation  of  such  a  settlement,  and 

did  not  delay  a  single  day  in  securing  the  towns  along  the  coast. 

The  civil  war  had  begun.      It  was  too  late   to  speak  of  peace,^ —  Civil  war. 

utcndiim  est  iudice  bello. 

Authorities. — For  Caesar's  wars  in  Gaul  we  have  his  own  admirable  narra- 
tive. For  events  in  Rome  the  best  guides  are  Cicero's  Correspondence,  supple- 
mented by  the  Speeches  Pro  Sestio,  In  Vatinium,  De  Provinciis.consularibus, 
Pro  Milone.  Livy,  Ep.  105-109  ;  Appian,  B.  Civ.  ii.  15-33  ;  Plutarch,  Lives  of 
Caesar,  Crassus,  Cicero,  Pompey ;  Dio  Cassius,  xxxviii.  31-xli.  i  ;  Lucan's  Phar- 
salia.  For  Cicero's  change  of  policy  in  56  the  letter  to  Lcntulus  {Pam.  i.  9) 
should  especially  be  read. 


3  B 


CHAPTER    XLV 


THE    CIVIL    WAR    TO    THE    DEATH    OF    lULIUS    CAESAR 

Civil  war — Preparations  for  the  defence  of  Italy — Caesar's  rapid  advance — Fruit- 
less negotiations — Pompey  leaves  Italy — Caesar  at  Rome — Siege  of  Massilia — 
Campaign  in  Spain — Surrender  of  Massilia — Caesar  as  dictator  holds  consular 
elections  (49).  Caesar  as  consul  crosses  to  Macedonia  to  attack  Pompey — 
His  difficulties — Beleaguers  Pompey's  camp — Pompey  pierces  his  lines — Re- 
treat to  Thessaly — Battle  of  Pharsalus — Death  of  Pompey  in  Egypt  (48). 
Alexandrine  war  (48-47) — Expedition  into  Pontus — Battle  of  Zela — Second 
dictatorship  (47) — Pompeians  in  Africa  (48-46) — Caesar's  campaign  in  Africa 
— Battle  of  Thapsus — Province  of  New  Africa — Rectification  of  calendar  and 
legislation,  year  of  445  days  (46).  Campaign  in  Spain  against  Pompey's 
sons — Battle  of  Munda — Third  dictatorship  (45) — Plans  for  enlargement  of 
Rome — Scheme  of  colonies — Preparations  for  Parthian  expedition — The  con- 
spiracy— Murder  of  Caesar  (44). 


4c).    Coss. 

Claudius 

Marcellus, 

L. 

Cornelius 

Lepidus. 


The  consuls 

quit 

Rome. 

Caesar  s 
advance. 


The  vote  of  the  Senate  meant  war.  Italy  and  Sicily  were  divided 
into  districts  for  defence,  and  new  governors  were  allotted  to  the 
provinces,  Gallia  Narbonensis  falling  to  Ahenobarbus,  and  privati 
being  invested  with  impe7iuin  when  there  were  not  sufficient  ex- 
magistrates.  Pompey  seems  to  have  left  RomiC  immediately,  to 
raise  new  levies  in.  Campania  and  to  mobilise  the  two  legions  in 
winter  quarters  in  Apulia.  Before  another  ten  days  the  consuls  and 
a  large  number  of  the  senators  had  also  left  Rome.  For  the  news 
which  reached  the  city  by  the  1 8th  caused  such  a  panic  that  in  the 
very  act  of  opening  the  treasury  of  the  reserved  funds,  to  take  out 
the  money  voted  to  Pompey,  the  consuls  hurriedly  withdrew.  Caesar, 
it  was  said,  was  on  his  way  to  Rome.  He  had  seized  Pisanum, 
Fanum,  and  Ancona  ;  had  sent  Antonius  across  the  Apennines  to 
secure  Arretium,  and  intercept  any  attempt  of  Pompey  to  march 
through  Etruria  to  the  north  ;  and  Curio  to  occupy  Iguvium  on  the 
pass  of  the  Apennines.  No  one  had  resisted  him  except  Attius  Varus 
at  Auximum,  and  even  he  had  been  compelled  to  withdraw  by  the 
people  of  the  town. 

On  the  24th  of  January  Lucius  Caesar  delivered  Caesar's  answei 


I 


HAP.  XLV  POMPEY  LEAVES  ITALY  739 

to  Pompey  at  Teanum  Sidicinum.      The  consuls  and  Pompey  would  Faihire  of 
only  treat  on  condition  of  Caesar's  withdrawal  from  the  towns  he  had  negoH- 
occupied,  and  Caesar  would  not  do  that  unless  Pompey  would  fix  a  ^^^°^^- 
day  for  going  to  his  province  of  Spain  and  cease  levying  troops. 
Both    therefore  went  on.       Pompey  was   joined    oh    the    23rd    by 
T.  Labienus,  who  had  been  left  in  charge  of  Cisalpine  Gaul  by  Caesar. 
But  Caesar's  successes  were  not  interrupted.      The  strong  town  of  Aheno- 
Cingulum  (of  which  Labienus  was  the   patronus)  submitted  volun-  ^^^^^-J" 
tarily.      Firmum  was  easily  taken ;  and,  intercepting  several  Pompeian  ^^l^T^i^^^ 
officers  on  the  march,  he  arrived  on  the  river  Aternus,  three  miles 
from  Corfinium,  where  Ahenobarbus  had  twenty  newly-levied  cohorts. 
Pompey,  who  had  found  the  raising  of  troops    in   Campania  more 
difficult  than  he  expected,  had  on  the  25th  started  for  Apulia  \^  but 
refused  to  relieve  Ahenobarbus  at  Corfinium,  ordering  him  rather  to 
join  him  at  Brundisium.     Ahenobarbus  tried  to  conceal  this  from  his 
soldiers,  meatiing  to  escape  by  himself.      They  discovered  it  how- 
ever ;  arrested  him  ;  and  sent  legates  to  Caesar.     The  next  morning 
Ahenobarbus  and  the  chief  men  with  him  were  in  Caesar's  hands, 
who,  after  making  a  statement  justifying  his   measures,   dismissed 
them  all  unharmed,  even  returning  to  Ahenobarbus  a  large  sum  of 
public  money. 

Pompey  was  now  resolved  to  leave  Italy  and  summon  men  and  Pompey 
ships  from  the  East.      He  had  remained  some  days  at  Luceria  to  be  (grosses  to 
joined  by  the  consuls  and  senators.      But  when  he  heard  of  the  fall     ^'!'^'^' 
of  Corfinium  he  removed  to  Canusium  (i8th  February),  and  thence  Maj-ck 
to  Brundisium  (20th  February).      When  Caesar  arrived  there  on  the  \Jan.'\  ^9. 
9th  of  March,  he  found  that  the  consuls  and  a  considerable  part  of 
the  army  had  already  crossed  to   Dyrrachium.      Pompey  with   two 
legions  was  waiting  the  return  of  the  transports.     After  some  fruitless 
negotiations,   and    an    attempt   on    Caesar's    part    to    block    up  the 
harbour — which,  if  successful,  would  have  forced  Pompey  to  make 
terms  apart  from   the  main  body  of  his  supporters, — Pompey  and 

^  The  first  notions  of  Pompey' s  forces  were  much  exaggerated  (see  Cicero, 
ad  Att.  ix.  6  and  9).  As  a  fact  he  had  at  first  only  the  two  legions  in  Apulia. 
These  were  reinforced  by  recruits  ordered  to  concentrate  at  Brundisium,  and  by 
others  who  were  serving  under  other  magistrates,  until  he  crossed  with  five  legions 
(or  between  25,000  and  30,000  men,  counting  cavalry  and  auxiliaries)  (Plut.  Pomp. 
Ixii. ;  Caesar,  B.  Civ.  i.  25).  Caesar  was  supposed  to  have  at  his  command 
eleven  legions  with  unlimited  Gallic  cavalry  (Cicero,  ad  Att.  vii.  7).  In  reality  the 
"Army  of  Gaul"  consisted  of  nine  legions;  of  these  only  one  (the  13th)  was 
ready  at  the  beginning  of  January,  the  rest  being  in  winter  quarters.  It  was  this 
with  which  he  passed  the  Rubicon  (knowing  that  Pompey  had  only  two,  and  they 
in  winter  quarters).  The  12th  legion  joined  him  on  the  5th  February  [8th  Janu- 
ary], and  the  8th  on  the  17th  February  [20th  January],  and  by  taking  over 
captured  cohorts  and  fresh  enrolments  he  had  six  legions  and  1000  cavalry  when 
he  arrived  at  Brundisium. 


740 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Fabius  sent 
from  Narbo 
to  Spain, 
Sth  May 
isth  April] 
49- 


his  two  legions  succeeded  in  crossing  on  the  night  of  the  i8th  of 
March.i 

Caesar  had  not  sufficient  ships  to  follow  him.  He  must  leave 
him  to  gather  the  forces  in  the  East,  while  he  secured  the  West,  and 
especially  the  corn-growing  countries  ;  for,  as  Pompey  had  sent  for 
ships  from  Alexandria,  Phoenicia,  Cyprus,  Asia,  Rhodes,  Byzantium, 
and  other  places,  he  would  be  able  to  starve  out  Italy.  Caesar, 
therefore,  after  securing  the  harbours  of  Brundisium,  Tarentum,  and 
Sipontum,  sent  a  legion  under  Q.  Valerius  to  Sardinia,  and  arranged 
for  Curio  to  go  to  Sicily  with  another.  At  the  end  of  March  he 
went  with  six  legions  to  Rome,  where  he  found  some  senators  and 
magistrates,  though  he  could  not  persuade  Cicero,  whom  he  met  at 
Sinuessa  on  the  28th,  to  come.  He  did  not  stay  long  in  the  city. 
His  object  was  to  put  himself  in  a  constitutional  position.  Both  consuls 
being  absent,  and  the  praetor  L.  Aemilius  Lepidus  not  being  capable, 
as  Cicero  told  him,  of  naming  a  dictator  or  holding  consular  elections,^ 
he  proposed  that  the  Senate  should  appoint  an  interrex  for  the  purpose. 
But  he  found  so  much  opposition  and  indecision  that,  after  a  few 
days  of  fruitless  wrangling,  he  started  for  Massilia  to  secure  the 
road  for  Spain.  He  seems  to  have  obtained  some  authority  for 
his  legates  in  Sardinia  and  Sicily ;  and  he  left  Lepidus  in  charge 
of  Rome,  and  the  tribune  M.  Antonius  in  charge  of  Italy  with 
pro-praetorial  authority,  and  with  directions  to  prevent  farther 
emigrations  to  Pompey,  and  to  recall  those  banished  under  Pompey's 
laws. 

The  people  of  Massilia  refused  him  admission  within  their  walls  ; 
but  they  not  only  received  Ahenobarbus — who,  after  being  dismissed 
by  Caesar  at  Corfinium,  had  collected  a  fleet  at  Cosa  in  Etruria,  and 
manned  it  with  his  own  tenants  and  other  country  folk — but  made 
him  commandant  of  the  garrison.  Caesar  therefore  decided  that  he 
must  take  the  town,  and  to  do  so  must  build  ships.  In  thirty  days 
from  the  felling  of  the  timber  twelve  ships  of  war  were  built  at  Aries, 
and  put  under  the  command  of  Decimus  Brutus ;  towers  and  vineae 
were  constructed,  and  the  siege  committed  to  C.  Trebonius.  But 
this  had  seriously  delayed  him.  Two  of  Pompey's  legati  in  Spain,  L. 
Afranius  and  M.  Petreius,  had  united  their  forces,  and  were  stationed 
at  Ilerda  with  five  legions  to  resist  him.  He  had  sent  on  C.  Fabius 
from  Narbo  through  Perpignan  and  Barcelona  early  in  May:  and  when 
he  followed  him  in  June  he  found  Fabius  shut  up  in  a  narrow  strip 
of  country  between  the  rivers  Sicoris  {Segre)  and  Cincius.  It  had 
been  stripped  of  provisions  ;  the  rivers  were  impassable  from  floods  ; 

^  The  dates  are  those  of  the  unreformed  calendar.     Those  of  the  reformed 
luhan  Calendar  are  given  in  square  brackets, 

'^  Ad  Att.  ix.  9,  quod  tnaius  imperium  a  niinore  rogari  non  sit  ius. 


I 


CAESAR  SECURES  SPAIN  741 


and  his  bridges  were  broken  down.      Caesar  repaired  the  bridges  and  Caesar 

relieved   Fabius  ;   but  after  some  indecisive  skirmishes   the   bridges  follows, 

were  again  swept  away  by  a  storm.      Afranius  and  Petreius  holding  ^^^'^J^^^ 

the  only  sound  one,  near   Ilerda,  could  obtain  provisions,  while  he  May\ 

was  again  shut  up  in  the  fork  of  the  streams.     He  was  in  great  peril,   ^  ^ 

and   exaggerated   reports  of  his   defeat   reached   Rome,  where    the  difficulties 

town-house  of  Afranius  was  thronged  with  visits  of  congratulation,   in  Spain, 

and  many  who  had  before  hesitated  crossed  to  Dyrrachium  to  join  June-July. 

Pompey.     Among  them  was  Cicero,  who  embarked  at  Caieta  on  the 

1 1  th  of  June. 

But  the  position  was  suddenly  reversed.      A  long  train  of  pro-  Caesar 

visions  from  Gaul  had  been  stopped  by  the  flooded  Sicoris.      Caesar,  ^^^'^^^d  by 

however,  got  a  legion  across  in  coracles,  constructed  after  those  he  J  ^^"-y^y  V 
.      ,  .  .     .  ,  ,       .  ,  '  .  provisions, 

had  seen  m  Britam ;  and  havmg  thus  men  on  both  sides  of  the  river  jjth  July 

the  bridge  was  quickly  repaired  and  the  provisions  secured.      Before  \rjth 

long  Afranius   and   Petreius,   alarmed    at   the   advance   of  Caesar's  /««^]- 

lines,   and   at   the   defection   of  native    tribes,   attempted    to    retire 

beyond  the  Ebro.     But  they  were  outmarched  by  Caesar,  who  seized 

a  gorge  through  which  they  meant  to  pass,  and  they  had  to  choose 

between  fighting  and  surrender.      Their  men,  however,  were  against  Surrender 

fighting,  and  fraternised  with  Caesar's  soldiers;  and  after  some  toil-  of  Petreius 

some  marches,  harassed  by  Caesar's  cavalry,  they  surrendered,  and  '^^f     . 

were  permitted  to  quit  Spain  unharmed.     Those  of  their  soldiers  who  2nd  Au^' 

were  domiciled  in  Spain  were  allowed  to  go  to  their  homes,  the  rest  [2nd  July]. 

were  sent  to  Italy. 

The  third  of  Pompey's  legates,  M.  Terentius  Varro,  governor  of  M. 
Baetica,  felt  himself  still  bound  to  resist  in  the  interests  of  his  im-  Terentius 
perator,  and  was  actually  engaged  in  levying  fresh  troops  and  collect-  ^"^^T^'  • 
ing  stores.      But  the  citizens  of  Corduba  closed  their  gates  against  Baetica, 
him  ;  the  people  of  Gades  did  the  same  ;  one  of  his  legions  deserted  ;  surrenders 
and,  finding  it  impossible  to  proceed,  he  handed  over  his  remaining  to  Caesar, 
legion  to  Caesar,  as  well  as  his  provincial  accounts  and  the  balance  '^^^J-^  'f 
of  public   money   in  his  hands.       After  taking  some  measures  for  VAugA  40 
pacifying  the  country,  Caesar  placed  Q.  Cassius  Longinus  in  com- 
mand of  Baetica  ;  and  reaching  the  camp  at   Massilia  on  the  3rd  of  Caesar 
October,   found   the  Massilians  ready  to   surrender.      Ahenobarbus  returns  to 
managed  to  escape;  but  the  city,  with  all  arms,  engines  of  war,  and  ^^^J-^-^^^^- 
money,  was  given  up  to  him,  and  was  allowed  to  retain  its  position  TjofhAug] 
as  a  libera  civitas. 

Spain,  Sardinia,  Sicily,  and  Gaul  were  thus  secured  to  Caesar  ;  but  Sardinia 

Africa  was   in  the  meanwhile  lost,  and  remained  a  refuge  for  the  occupied  by 

defeated  Pompeians  in  the  next  year.      For  though  Q.  Valerius  had  ^'^^^^'^^^  > 
successfully   occupied    Sardinia,    the    senatorial   governor   M.    Cotta 
escaping  to  Africa  ;  and  though  C.  Curio  had  been  equally  successful 


742 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


and  Sicily 
by  Curio, 
2jrd  April 
l2sth 
March'] 
49- 

Fall  of^ 
Curio  in 
Africa, 
2oth  Aug. 
[20th  July] 
49- 

Caesar  at 
Rome,  27id 
Dec.  [28t/i 
Oct.]  to 
ijth  Dec. 
[8th  Nov.] 
49- 


48.    Coss. 

C.  lulius 

Caesar, 

P. 

Servilius 

Vatia. 


Caesar 
embarks  at 
Brundis- 
ium,  4th 
Jan.  48 
\_28th  Nov. 
49\ 

Caesar  at 
Apollonia, 
yth  Jan. 
48  [ist 
Dec.  4g]. 


in  Sicily,  which  Cato  abandoned  without  a  blow  (23rd  April), 
there  had  been  a  disaster  in  Africa.  The  Pompeian  governor 
P.  Attius  Varus  was  supported  by  luba,  king  of  Numidia,  who  was 
attached  to  Pompey  and  had  reason  for  hostility  to  Caesar  and 
Curio.  In  81  Pompey  had  restored  his  father  Hiempsal,  dethroned 
by  the  Marians  ;  but  in  62,  when  acting  as  his  father's  ambassador  in 
Rome,  he  had  a  violent  personal  altercation  with  Caesar,  then  praetor  ; 
and  in  50  C.  Curio  as  tribune  had  proposed  to  reduce  Numidia  to 
the  form  of  a  province.  luba  therefore  supported  Varus,  and  though 
he  did  not  arrive  in  time  to  save  him  from  a  somewhat  severe 
defeat,  yet  in  a  subsequent  engagement  with  the  king  C.  Curio  was 
defeated  and  killed. 

Caesar  had  not  time  to  attempt  to  retrieve  this  disaster.  While  on 
his  return  to  Massiha  he  learnt  that  the  constitutional  difficulty  had 
been  got  over,  and  that  he  had  been  named  dictator  comitiis  Jiabe7idis. 
He  hastened  to  Rome,  stopping  at  Placentia  to  put  down  a  mutiny 
on  the  15th  November  [October],  and  held  the  consular  elections,  at 
which  he  was  himself  returned  with  P.  Servilius  Vatia  Isauricus,  who 
had  joined  his  party.  He  carried  two  laws,  of  which  there  was  pressing 
need.  The  Civil  war  had  caused  a  commercial  crisis  :  credit  was 
shaken,  and  debts  could  not  be  collected.  His  first  law  established 
arbitrators  who  were  to  prevent  forced  sales  at  panic  prices.  The 
creditors  were  to  accept  the  property  of  debtors  at  a  price  estimated 
at  their  value  before  the  war.  His  second  law  gave  the  civiias  to 
the  Transpadani.  It  had  been  long  promised,  and  their  votes  were 
necessary  to  him.  He  also  directed  the  tribunes  and  praetors  to 
carry  on  the  work  of  Antony  by  bringing  in  laws  to  restore  those  who 
had  been  condemned  m.  judicia  overawed  by  Pompey's  arms.  He 
spent  only  eleven  days  in  Rome  altogether  ;  and  having  abdicated  the 
dictatorship,  hastened  to  Brundisium,  where  he  had  appointed  twelve 
legions  to  meet  him.  Though  he  found  his  legions  reduced  in  strength 
by  the  long  march  from  Spain  and  the  unhealthiness  of  Brundisium, 
and  though  the  number  of  transports  was  insufficient,  he  yet  got 
seven  legions  across  on  the  4th  of  January.  He  landed  at  Oricum, 
which  the  commandant  surrendered  to  him  as  consul,  and  marched 
to  Apollonia.  Pompey's  magazines-  were  at  Dyrrachium,  but  he 
was  himself  encamped  more  inland.  It  became  a  kind  of  race 
between  the  two,  which  should  reach  Dyrrachium  first.  Pompey 
outmarched  Caesar;  saved  Dyrrachium;  and  sent  ships  which] 
recovered  Oricum. 

Caesar  was  now  in  considerable  danger.      He  had  landed  withj 
seven    legions :  but    Pompey   had   nine,    besides    large    numbers   of 
auxiliaries  from  all  parts  of  Greece,  Thrace,  and  Asia  ;  and  was  alsc 
supported   by  a  numerous  and   powerful   fleet,  which,   stationed  af 


POMPEY  AND  CAESAR  NEAR  DYRRACHIUM 


743 


Corcyra  under  Bibulus,^  had  attacked  and  burnt  thirty  of  Caesar's 
transports    while   on    their   way   back   to   Brundisium   to    bring   the 
remainder  of  his  army  over.      Through  the  winter  months  he  awaited 
them  with  great  anxiety  ;  even,  it  is  said,  attempting  to  cross  himself 
in  an  open  boat  to  urge  their  coming.      He  nearly  lost  his  life  in  the 
attempt,  and  did  not  succeed.      He  then  sent  Postumius  with  positive 
orders  that  they  were  to  cross  at  any  risk  and  to  run  their  ships 
aground  anywhere.      It  was  not,  however,  till  the  spring  of  48  that  Arrival  of 
Antony  with  three  veteran  legions,  one  of  tirones,  and  800  cavalry,  ^-  Antojiy, 
arrived  at  Lissus,  about  30  miles  north  of  Dyrrachium.      Pompey  en-  ^^,      , 
deavoured  to  prevent  Caesar  effecting  a  junction  with  him.      In  this,  r^<5M  FebA 
however,  he  failed,  and  returned  to  his  old  quarters  between   Petra  48. 
and  Asparagium,  south  of  Dyrrachium.     Caesar  endeavoured  in  every 
way  to  provoke  him  to  give  him 
battle,    seizing    strong    places, 
raising  forts,  and  constructing 
lines  of  circumvallation,  which 
presently   extended   for    fifteen 
miles    round    Pompey's    camp, 
and  included  twenty-four  castles 
and  forts.    Pompey,  on  his  part, 
erected   defensive   lines  within 
Caesar's  from   Petra  round  to 
the  sea  again  ;  and  though  he 
was  cut  off  from   the   country 
he   could   get   provisions   from 
Dyrrachium  and  the  sea.      His 
agents    were    everywhere,    col- 
lecting corn,  and  raising  money 
by  loans   in   advance  of  taxes. 

He  was  suffering,  however,  from  shortness  of  fodder  for  his  horses, 
which  died  in  great  numbers  ;  and  as  the  cavalry  was  his  strong 
arm  he  was  anxious  to  put  an  end  to  this  state  of  things,  and  was 
less  able  than  ever  to  resist  the  pressure  of  his  followers,  who,  un- 
disciplined, luxurious,  and  insubordinate,  were  urging  him  to  attack. 
Caesar  was  really  in  a  still  worse  plight ;  his  corn  was  running  short, 
and  his  men  were  feeding  on  bread  made  of  a  root  called  "chava"  ; 
yet  their  spirits  were  unbroken,  and  they  threw  loaves  of  this  stuff 
over  the  ramparts  to  persuade  the  Pompeians  that  they  were 
well  off. 

Pompey  however  was  waiting  for  a  reinforcement  from  the  east, 
which  his  father-in-law  Metellus  Scipio  was  bringing  up  the  Egnatian 


IValkir  Gf  Botitall  sc. 


^  Bibulus  died  early  in  March  [February]  48. 


744 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Caesar's 
line 

pierced, 
jrd-sth 
July  [2jrd- 
2Sth  May] 
48. 

Retreat  of 
Caesar,  yi/i 
July  {zyth 
A/ay]. 


Pompey 
pursues  for 
one  day, 
8th  July 

[28  th  May]. 

Caesar 
joined  by 
Calvinus. 

Pompey  in 
Thessaly. 


The  two 
armies 
near  each 
other,  Aug 
\June]  48. 


road  (and  which  Caesar  had  sent  Domitius  Calvinus  to  intercept),  and 
still  avoided  making  any  movement ;  until,  as  the  summer  vi^as  wearing 
away,  two  Allobrogians,  in  whom  Caesar  had  placed  great  confidence, 
but  who  had  abused  his  trust,  deserted  to  Pompey  and  pointed 
out  a  weak  point  in  Caesar's  lines, — their  south  extremity  near  the  sea, 
where  they  were  as  yet  unfinished,  and  might  be  turned  by  landing 
troops  at  this  point.  This  was  done  ;  and  a  temporary  embankment, 
thrown  up  to  block  the  gap,  was  found  to  be  only  guarded  by  two 
cohorts  ;  and  though  the  quaestor  P.  Marcellinus,  Antony,  and  finally 
Caesar  himself  came  to  the  rescue,  it  was  too  late.  The  lines  were 
pierced  and  Pompey  was  entrenched  outside  them  close  to  the  sea. 
Caesar  fortified  a  new  camp  hard  by  ;  but  after  meeting  with  a 
fresh  disaster  in  attacking  a  Pompeian  legion,  which  was  march- 
ing into  a  deserted  camp  a  little  to  the  north  of  his  position,  he 
resolved  to  retire  to  Apollonia  and  thence  to  Thessaly,  in  hopes 
of  being  joined  by  Domitius  Calvinus  and  drawing  Pompey  from  the 
sea. 

The  Pompeians  were  highly  elated  at  this  retreat,  and  urged  a 
pursuit.  Pompey  yielded  for  one  day,  but  was  unwilling  to  venture 
farther.  He  returned  to  Dyrrachium  :  but  presently,  in  hopes  of  being 
joined  by  Metellus,  marched  down  the  Egnatian  road.  Domitius 
Calvinus,  warned  of  the  danger  of  being  thus  caught  between  two 
armies,  made  his  way  across  the  mountains  into  Thessaly  and  joined 
Caesar  at  Aeginium  on  the  upper  Peneius.^  Meanwhile  Pompey  had 
also  effected  his  junction  with  Metellus  Scipio,  and  leaving  the 
Egnatian  road  marched  to  the  vale  of  Tempe  and  thence  to  Larissa, 
1st  August  [21st  June];  and  on  the  5th  [25th  June]  advanced  by 
Scotussa  across  the  Enipeus  and  pitched  a  camp  about  four  miles 
from  Caesar. 

The  two  rivals  were  now  within  moderate  distance  of  each  other, 
with  a  country  of  plain  and  hill  between  them  suitable  for  fighting. 
Pompey  had  declined  to  follow  the  advice  of  Afranius  after  Caesar's 
retreat, — to  leave  him  to  be  hemmed  in  by  the  fleet,  while  he  went 
himself  to  Italy, — partly  out  of  regard  to  the  safety  of  his  father- 
in-law,  and  partly  from  a  dislike  to  appear  to  his  Eastern  allies  to 
be  afraid  to  fight.  Still  his  better  judgment  was  for  avoid- 
ing a  battle  and  gradually  exhausting  Caesar,  who  had  no  fleet  to 
bring  him  provisions,  and  had  to  depend  on  exactions  from  the 
country,  while  his  own  ships  were  at  every  point  of  the  coast  and 
could  supply  him  with  anything.  But  the  pressure  and  flattery  of 
his  followers,  elated  with  the  events  at  Dyrrachium  and  the  junction 
with   Metellus,  and  eager  to  get  back  to  Italy  and  enjoy  the  offices 

1  Caesar  had   marched  towards  Gomphi,    south  of  the   Peneius,   along  the 
same  route  as  Flamininus  in  163.     See  map  on  p.  440. 


J 


XLV  DEFEAT  OF  POMPEY  AT  PHARSALUS  745 

for  which  they  had  bargained  and  the  confiscated  properties  of  the  Contrast 
Caesarians,  impelled  him   to  give  battle  at   once.      His   army  was  between 
distracted   by  intrigues    and    cabals,    and   with  quarrels   as   to  the  t^^  (^^'^i^^- 
division    of    the    spoil.      The    dignity    of    pontifex    maximus   was 
especially   coveted,  and   the   claims   of  various   men   of  rank  were 
gravely  debated  as  though  Caesar  were  already  dead  or  a  prisoner. 
The  camp  was  a  scene  of  luxury  and  folly  ;  and  was   crowded  with 
men    from    the    provinces    of    Asia    and    the    Islands,    with    Jews, 
Armenians,  and  Arabians  ;    and  with  sovereigns  such  as  Deiotarus 
of    Galatia    and    Ariarathes    of   Cappadocia.       On    the    other    side 
was  a  smaller   army,   but    largely  composed  of  veterans,    enthusi- 
astically devoted  to  and  believing  in  their  chief     In  it  there  was 
no  division  of  counsels,  no  rivalry  of  claims,  and  no  hope  but  in 
victory. 

The  battle  was  to  decide  whether  the  evils  which  had  so  long 
sapped   the   strength   of  Rome, — the   selfish   grasp  on  power  of  a 
narrow  clique,  and  its  misuse  in  the  government  of  the  provinces, 
and   in   the  accumulation   of  enormous   fortunes   spent  in  personal 
luxury,  were  to  give  place  to  the  wisdom  of  a  statesman  and  the 
hand  of  a  master  of  men.      It  is  a  pity  therefore  that  its  details  are 
even  less  clearly  ascertainable  than  usual.      Pompey  trusted  to  the 
superiority  of  his  numbers,  especially  in  cavalry,  to  outflank  Caesar. 
His  army  actually   on   the  field   amounted   to  more   than   44,000,  Baitle  of 
with  7000  cavalry,  Caesar's  to  little  more  than   22,000,  with    1000  Pharsalus, 
cavalry.      The  left  of  Pompey's  line,  which  was  longer  than  Caesar's,  ?^f^'r^'  -i 
was  commanded  by  Ahenobarbus,  the  centre  by  Scipio,  and  the  right 
by  Lentulus.      Caesar  took   post  on  the  extreme  right  of  his  line, 
with    the    1 2th    legion;    P.    Sulla    commanded   the   left  j    Domitius 
Calvinus  the  centre  ;  and  M.  Antonius  the  right. 

Pompey's  plan  was  that  his  numerous  cavalry  on  his  left  (under 
Labienus)  should  outflank  Caesar's  line  on  the  right  and  throw  itself 
upon  the  rear  of  his  legions  ;  but  that  his  infantry  should  wait  to  be 
charged.  Caesar  criticises  this  as  failing  to  take  into  account  the 
ardour  generated  by  a  rapid  advance  ;  and  it  certainly  was  unsuccess- 
ful. Pompey's  cavalry  drove  back  Caesar's  horse,  but  was  in  its  turn 
repulsed  by  Caesar's  reserve,  or  fourth  line,  of  infantry  and  archers, 
and  fled  in  confusion  to  the  high  ground,  leaving  the  light  armed 
archers  and  slingers  unprotected.  Meanwhile  Caesar's  infantry,  find- 
ing that  the  enemy  did  not  move,  slackened  their  charge,  that  they 
might  not  arrive  out  of  breath  ;  hurled  Xhe\r  pila;  and  then,  drawing 
their  swords,  closed  in  deadly  embrace.  The  struggle,  which  was  victory  of 
severe,  was  decided  by  Caesar's  third  line  coming  fresh  on  to  the  Caesar. 
ground  ;  and  the  Pompeians  were  soon  in  full  flight. 

Pompey  had  given  up  the  battle  as  lost  when  he  saw  the  defeat 


746 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


48. 


Pompeys 
cainp  taken. 

Flight  of 
Pompey. 


of  his  cavalry  ;  and  returning  to  his  camp,  and  giving  orders  for  the 
guarding  of  the  vallum,  retired  to  his  tent.  Caesar  pushed  on  his 
advantage.  Though  it  was  midday,  and  the  heat  was  terrible,  he 
led  his  men  against  Pompey's  camp.  Before  long  its  defenders 
were  rushing  through  the  opposite  gate  ;  and  Pompey  had  mounted 
his  horse  and  was  galloping  to  Larissa.  There  he  was  joined  by  a 
few  followers,  and  without  resting  hurried  on  to  the  coast.  Finding 
a  corn  ship  ready  to  start  he  reached  Amphipolis  ;  and  after  one 
night  there  sailed  to  Lesbos,  where  his  wife  and  younger  son  were 
with  his  friend  Theophanes.  Taking  them  on  board  he  proceeded 
on  his  voyage  down  the  Asiatic  coast.  At  Attaleia  in  Pamphylia  he 
obtained  some  triremes  and  certain  Cilician  recruits,  and  heard  that 
his  fleet  under  Cato  at  Corcyra  had  taken  up  many  survivors  of  the 
battle,  as  well  as  those  left  at  Dyrrachium,  and  had  gone  to  the 
province  of  Africa.  During  his  stay  at  Apameia  he  collected  more 
ships  and  men,  and  was  joined  by  about  sixty  senators.  He 
was  looking  out  for  some  place  of  safety.  He  thought  of  Syria, 
which  he  had  in  part  granted  to  the  Parthian  king  Orodes  ;  but  by 
the  advice  of  Theophanes  at  last  decided  upon  Egypt.  Landing 
at  Paphos,  in  Cyprus,  he  collected  more  ships,  money,  and  men  ; 
and  about  the  middle  of  September  [August]  set  sail  for  Alexandria. 

The  sovereign  of  Egypt  was  the  youthful  Ptolemy  XIL,  son  of 
that  Ptolemy  Auletes  whose  cause  Pompey  had  supported  at  Rome. 
The  boy  had  been  Pompey's  ward  ;  and  was  at  present  at  Pelusium 
with  an  army  to  oppose  the  return  of  his  sister  Cleopatra  from  Syria. 
His  ministers  or  guardians  were  the  eunuch  Pothinus  and  the 
rhetorician  Theodotus  of  Chios.  His  army  was  commanded  by 
Achillas.  There  were  also  some  Roman  troops  at  Alexandria,  left 
there  by  Gabinius  when  he  restored  Auletes  in  57.  When 
Pompey's  message  reached  the  king,  announcing  his  arrival  at  the 
promontory  of  Casius,  and  asking  shelter,  the  royal  council  was 
divided  in  opinion,  but  eventually  decided  that  it  was  not  safe 
to  receive  him  or  to  let  him  go.  To  murder  him  would  be  best : 
"  dead  men  do  not  bite."  The  task  was  entrusted  to  two  Romans, 
— Septimius,  once  a  miHtary  tribune  in  Pompey's  army,  and  Salvius, 


greeted  Pompey  respectfully  and  invited  him  to  come  on  shore. 
On  the  beach  were  seen  armed  men,  and  ships  of  war  getting 
ready.  It  was  necessary  to  risk  all.  Amidst  the  agonised  anxiety 
of  wife  and  friends  Pompey  stepped  into  the  boat,  took  his  place 
in  the  stern,  and  recognised  and  addressed  Septimius  as  an  old 
comrade.  The  surly  reply  received  must  have  warned  him  of  his 
danger ;  and  when,  as  he  was  stepping  out  of  the  boat,  he  felt  the 
sword  of  Septiniius  at  his  back,  he  hastily  drew  the  folds  of  his  toga 


XLV  MURDER  OF  POMPEY  IN  EGYPT  747 


over  his  face  and  fell  without  a  struggle.      His  head  was  cut  off,  and  Pompey 
his  body  left  upon  the  sand,  until  his  faithful  freedman  Philip  found  ^urdered, 
some  fragments   of  a  stranded  boat,  with  which  he  made  a  rude 
funeral  pyre,  assisted  by  an  old  Roman  soldier,  who  found  him  at  his 
sorrowful  task. 

This  was  the  end  of  a  great  career.  No  contemporary  had  done 
greater  services  to  the  Empire.  From  his  earliest  youth  to  his  death 
he  had  been  employed  at  every  crisis.  The  hand  of  the  assassin 
had  indeed  aided  him  against  Sertorius  :  and  he  only  intervened  in 
the  war  with  Spartacus  when  the  chief  work  was  done.  But  the  Pompey  s 
delivery  of  the  sea  from  the  pirates  had  been  all  his  own  :  and  '^^^^^^^^f 
though  Mithridates  had  nearly  come  to  the  end  of  his  resources  ^  '^^'^^  ^^• 
when  Pompey  arrived,  it  was  his  energy  that  finally  drove  the  king 
from  Pontus,  and  his  honesty  and  ability  which  settled  the  new 
provinces  and  made  the  Euphrates  the  boundary  of  the  Roman 
Empire.  He  had  been  less  successful  in  politics.  Beginning  with 
a  leaning  to  the  Populares,  he  had  been  outbidden  and  outmanceuyred 
by  Caesar  ;  had  lost  control  of  the  extreme  left  wing  ;  had  declined 
to  join  the  Optimates  when  to  do  so  would  have  made  him  all- 
powerful  ;  and  had  joined  them  when  his  credit  was  failing  and 
their  cause  had  become  hopeless,  and  never  really  trusted,  or  was 
trusted  by,  them.  He  wished  for  two  inconsistent  things, — personal 
supremacy  and  the  strict  maintenance  of  the  constitution  ;  and  did 
not  see  that  reforms  had  become  impossible  except  by  arms.  He 
had  no  policy  to  propose,  and  trusted  blindly  to  the  position  which 
his  great  services  had  secured  ;  and  in  his  last  war  had  allowed  him- 
self to  be  overruled  by  incompetent  followers.  Caesar  was  six  years  Contrast  of 
younger,  and  with  boundless  confidence  in  himself,  with  which  he  Caesars 
inspired  others,  never  felt  his  career  closed  while  there  was  work  to  ^^«^«^^''- 
do.  He  had  a  distinct  policy,  small  respect  for  laws  or  customs 
which  barred  its  success,  and  little  scruple  as  to  the  character  of  the 
men  employed  to  carry  it  out.  He  felt  the  faculty  of  government  in 
him  and  desired  to  leave  his  mark  in  everything,  from  the  Calendar 
to  the  highest  matters  of  state.  Pompey' s  victory  would  have 
meant  the  perpetuation  of  a  system  which  had  proved  unworkable  ; 
Caesar's  meant  at  any  rate  a  change.  Though  it  was  impossible 
even  for  him  to  make  a  clean  sweep  of  ancient  forms,  yet  under 
those  ancient  forms  a  new  constitution  was  in  fact  to  be  created, 
which  would  make  the  government  of  the  En^pire  a  possibility. 

Caesar  had  lost  only  200  men  and  about  thirty  centurions  at  Caesar 
Pharsalus,  while  nearly  15,000  of  the  enemy  lay  on  the  field  or  were  follows 
killed    by    the   cavalry  in  the   pursuit;   and  nine   eagles   and    180  ^.^^^^l^^, 
standards  were  laid  at  his  feet.      The  victory  was  signal,  but  must  [-^^^  y^/^j 
be  followed  up  by  the  destruction  of  the  party,  which  still  had  a 


748 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Mithri- 
dates  of 
Pergamus 
arrives  at 
Pelusium, 
2nd  March 
[i2ih  Jan.] 
47- 


great  fleet  and  the  command  of  Africa.  Caesar  therefore  hurried 
forward  in  pursuit  of  Pompey  with  one  legion  and  some  cavalry, 
leaving  orders  for  another  legion  to  follow.  At  the  Hellespont  he 
was  overtaken  by  this  second  legion,  and  marched  through  Asia, 
where  he  stayed  for  about  a  week,  from  the  19th  to  the  25  th  Sep- 
tember [7th- 1 3th  August].  He  seems  to  have  been  kept  informed 
of  the  stages  of  Pompey's  flight ;  and  was  everywhere  received  with 
great  honour,  and  the  announcement  of  prodigies  from  complaisant 
temples.  He  arrived  at  Alexandria  on  the  5th  of  October  [24th 
August],  and  was  at  once  informed  of  Pompey's  death,  the  head  being 
shown  him  with  ready  officiousness.  He  turned  from  it  with  horror, 
and  shed  tears  at  the  sight  of  his  signet  ring. 

His  difflculties  however  were  not  over.  His  landing  with  lictors 
and  the  ensigns  of  imperium  was  resented  by  the  Alexandrine  mob  ; 
and  for  some  days  there  were  riots  in  which  Roman  soldiers  were 
murdered.  He  sent  for  reinforcements  from  Asia,  and  summoned 
both  Ptolemy  and  Cleopatra  to  Alexandria,  bidding  them  dismiss 
their  armies,  and  submit  their  differences  to  him,  as  head  of  the 
Roman  people,  who  by  their  father's  will  were  their  guardians.  The 
army  at  Pelusium  under  Achillas,  20,000  strong,  was  incited  by 
Pothinus  to  resist  his  decision  of  a  joint  reign  for  Ptolemy  and  his 
sister,  and  advanced  on  Alexandria.  Caesar  was  not  strong  enough 
to  fight,  and  induced  Ptolemy  to  send  envoys  to  Achillas,  who 
however  refused  them  a  hearing  and  put  one  of  them  to  death. 
Caesar  thereupon  secured  Ptolemy's  person,  and  shortly  afterwards 
put  Pothinus  to  death.  About  the  loth  of  November  [27th 
September]  Achillas  occupied  Alexandria  and  assaulted  the  palace. 
Caesar  burnt  the  docks  and  Egyptian  fleet,  and  transferred  his  men 
to  Pharos,  commanding  the  entrance  to  the  harbour  and  connected 
with  the  city  by  the  Heptistadium  and  drawbridges.  Achillas  was 
master  of  Alexandria,  and  set  up  Cleopatra's  sister  Arsinoe  as  queen, 
who  however  soon  quarrelled  with  him,  put  him  to  death,  and  made 
Ganymedes  commander.  Caesar  obtained  ships  from  Rhodes,  and 
was  promised  help  by  Mithridates  of  Pergamus,  who  collected  an 
army  in  Syria  and  Cilicia.  Towards  the  end  of  the  year  Ptolemy  per- 
suaded Caesar  to  allow  him  to  go  to  Alexandria  and  negotiate  a  peace ; 
but  immediately  joined  the  enemy  and  renewed  the  war,  cutting  off 
Caesar's  convoys  of  provisions  at  sea.  At  the  beginning  of  March  47 
[i  2th  January]  Mithridates  arrived  at  Pelusium ;  Ptolemy  was  defeated, 
and  drowned  in  attempting  to  escape.  Alexandria  surrendered  on  the 
27th  March  [6th  February],  and  Cleopatra,  whose  charms  won  Caesar's 
heart,  was  made  queen  with  a  boy  brother  called  Ptolemy  XIII. 

In  the  autumn  of  48,  while  at  Alexandria,  Caesar  was  informed 
that  he  had  been  named  dictator  for  a  year,  consul  for  five,  with  the 


XLV  CAESAR'S  EXPEDITION  INTO  ASIA  749 

tribimicia  potestas  for  life,  and  the  right  of  holding   all  elections  Caesar 
except  those  of  the  tribunes.  J'^TT^ 

But  there  was  still  work  to  do  in  the  East.     Pharnaces  (the  son  of  ^^thNov 
Mithridates  whom  Pompey  had  made  king  of  Bosporus)  had  invaded  [sgthSept] 
his  paternal  kingdom  of  Pontus  and  defeated  Domitius  Calvinus  and  48. 
Deiotarus,  who  tried  to  make  up  for  his  presence  at  Pharsalus  by 
offering    assistance    to    Calvinus.       Caesar    started    for    Asia    and  Caesar 
arrived  at  Antioch  on  13th  July  [23rd  May].      There  he  heard  bad  leaves Alex- 
news  from  home,  from  the  reports  of  his  Master  of  the  Horse,  M.  "'^Stii^ne 
Antonius.i     The  returned  soldiers  were  mutinous  and  clamouring  for  j-^^^  j^^y^ 
bounties.      M.  Caelius,  who  had  been  rewarded  for  his  "adhesion  by  ^7. 
the    praetorship    (48),    was    discontented    at    C.    Trebonius    being  Troubles 
preferred  as  praetor  urbanus,  and  at  not  getting  what  he  expected  in  Italy, 
from  confiscations.      He  refused  to  carry  out  Caesar's  law  as  to  the  4^-47- 
securities  to  be  surrendered  by  debtors,  and  even  instigated  the  as- 
sassination of  Trebonius.      Failing  in  that,  he  promulgated  a  law  for  Rebellion 
wiping  out  debts  and  rent.     The  consul  Servilius  Vatia  obtained  a  of  Caelius 
guard,  tore  down  the  tablets,  and  suspended  Caelius.      Driven  from  "'^       '  ^" 
Senate-house  and  Rostra,  Caelius  fled  to  Campania  to  join  Milo,  who 
had  been  at  the  head  of  a  band  of  ruffians  at  Capua,  in  wrath  at  not 
being    included    in   the   number  of  exiles   recalled.      Finding   Milo 
already  put  to  death  by  the  praetor  Q.  Pedius  near  Thurii,  he  continued 
his  flight  to  Bruttium,  where  he  was  overtaken  and  killed.     Next  year  P-  Cor- 
(47)  it  was  Dolabella  who  caused  trouble.      He  was  young,  profligate,   '"^^^^ 
and  overburdened  with  debt ;  and  not  getting  the  relief  he  expected  for   j.^  p^    _ 
his  services  at  Pharsalus,  he  got  himself  transferred  to  a  plebeian  gens  ; 
was  elected  tribune  for  47  ;  and  as  he  was  opposed  by  his  colleague 
Trebellius,    party   fights    were   constantly   going   on,    which   Antony 
could  not  control ;  and  when  Caesar's  difficulties  in   Egypt,  and  still 
more  his  departure  for  Asia  were  known,   Dolabella,  who  had  the 
ear  of  the  mob,  was  promising  novae  tabulae  and  the  rest  of  a  revolu- 
tionary programme,  while  Antony  was  called  away  from  Rome  by 
disorders  of  the  troops  at  Brundisium. 

Still  Caesar  determined  that  he  must  settle  affairs  in  Asia  before  Caesar  in 
returning.      His  movements  were  extremely  rapid.      Three  days  at  ^•^^'^' 
Antioch,  four  at  Tarsus,  three  at  Comana,  sufficed  to  settle  affairs  in  ^  ■' 

Syria,  Cilicia,  and  Cappadocia.  On  the  28th  July  [7th  June]  he 
met  Deiotarus,  whom  he  deprived  of  his  tetrarchy  in  Galatia,  and 
took  over  a  legion  which  he  had  with  him,  allowing  him  to  retain 


^  Cicero  (2  Phil.  §  62)  asserts  Antony  to  have  been  named  Magister  Equitum 
without  Caesar's  knowledge,  but  both  Plutarch  {Ant.  viii. )  and  Dio  (xlii.  21)  speak 
of  Caesar's  selection  of  him.  His  conduct  is  bitterly  attacked  by  Cicero,  whom 
Plutarch  copies.  There  was  at  any  rate  great  disorder,  which  he  could  not,  or 
at  any  rate  did  not  check  (Dio  xlii.  27). 


7SO 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Zela. 

Veni,  vidi, 
vici,  2nd 
Aug.   \^I2tk 
/zine]  4^. 


Caesar  in 
Rome,  4th 
Oct.  -4th 
Dec.  [m/i 
Aug.-joth 
Oct]  4j. 

Coss.  Q. 
Fuftus 
Calemis,  P 
Vatinius. 

Discedite 
Qtiirites. 


The 

Pompeians 
in  Africa, 
48-47. 


his  royal  title,  and  some  small  part  of  Lesser  Armenia.^  Next  day 
he  entered  Pontus,  and  answered  the  envoys  of  Pharnaces  by  ordering 
the  king  to  quit  that  country  and  restore  to  freedom  the  Roman 
publicani  whom  he  had  seized,  and  all  property  he  had  taken  from 
allies  of  Rome.  Pharnaces  pretended  obedience ;  but  when  he 
shuffled  and  delayed,  Caesar  moved  swiftly  upon  his  position,  on 
a  hill  three  miles  from  Zela  ;  defeated  him  ;  and  stormed  his  camp. 
Pharnaces  fled  to  Sinope,  and  thence  to  Panticapaeum,  where  he 
was  defeated  and  killed  by  his  own  rebellious  general  Asander. 
Caesar  left  Pontus  in  charge  of  Caelius  Vinicianus  with  two 
legions ;  gave  Bosporus  and  Deiotarus'  Galatian  tetrarchy  to 
Mithridates  of  Pergamus,  with  leave  to  drive  out  Asander ;  and 
hurried  back  through  Bithynia  and  Asia — settling  many  disputes  on 
the  way  and  leaving  the  rest  to  Domitius  Calvinus.  From  Athens, 
which  he  reached  in  the  middle  of  September,  he  went  to  Rome, 
where  he  arrived  on  the  4th  of  October  [nth  August]. 

He  only  stayed  two  months  in  the  city,  during  which  he  held 
elections  of  consuls  for  the  remainder  of  the  year ;  arranged  for 
his  own  consulship  with  M.  Aemilius  Lepidus  for  46 ;  and  suppressed 
the  disorders  going  on,  though  without  punishing  Dolabella  or 
others.  He  disappointed  many  of  his  followers,  who  had  bought 
confiscated  estates,  sometimes  beyond  their  marketable  value,  in  the 
confidence  that  they  would  not  have  to  pay,  by  insisting  on  the  discharge 
of  the  debt.  It  was  on  this  point  that  a  coolness  arose  between 
Caesar  and  Antony  (who  had  purchased  Pompey's  estate),  on  which 
Cicero  dwells  at  length  in  the  second  Philippic.  He  partly,  however, 
satisfied  his  partisans  with  offices,  priesthoods,  and  seats  in  the 
Senate  ;  and  suppressed  a  sedition  among  the  soldiers  by  addressing 
them  as  "  Quirites,"  and  granting  them  the  dismissal  they  asked  for, 
but  did  not  wish  to  have, — only  admitting  them  back  to  the  service 
as  a  favour,  and  taking  care  to  weed  out  the  most  unruly. 

Earlier  in  the  year  his  legate  Vatinius  had  successfully  driven  the 
Pompeian  M.  Octavius  from  Illyricum  ;  but  the  party  was  still  in 
great  strength  in  Africa.  When  the  news  of  the  defeat  at  Pharsalus 
arrived,  Cato,  who  had  been  left  in  charge  of  the  camp  at  Dyrrachium, 
joined  the  fleet  at  Corcyra.  There  he  found  Pompey's  elder  son 
Gnaeus,  who  had  been  deserted  by  the  Egyptian  ships  which  he 
commanded,  but  insisted  that  with  the  large  fleet  still  left  them  they 
might  maintain  the  war,  and  was  nearly  killing  Cicero  for  opposing 
it.  It  was  resolved  to  go  to  Africa,  where  they  expected  to  be 
rejoined  by  Pompey  himself,  and  by  Metellus  Scipio,  who  had  fled  to 
the  protection  of  King  luba  and  Attius  Varus.     When  they  arrived 

^  He  was  accused  of  trying  to  poison  Caesar,  and  was  defended  by  M.  Bniti 
at  Nicaea  [ad  Att.  xiv.  i]  and  by  Cicero  at  Rome. 


] 


XLV 


THE  POMPEIANS  IN  AFRICA 


751 


at  Cyrene  they  heard 
of  Pompey's  death 
from  his  younger  son 
Sextus  :  and  the  ships 
being  dispersed  by  a 
storm,  Cato  made  his 
way  by  land  to  the 
province  of  Africa,  and 
arrived  at  Utica  early 
in  April  47.  He  had 
refused  the  chief  com- 
mand on  the  ground 
that  Metellus  Scipio 
as  a  consular  was  his 
superior  in  rank. 
Scipio  therefore  was 
made  commander-in- 
chief  ;  and  Attius 
Varus,  who  had  been 
anxious  to  retain  this 
post  in  his  own  pro- 
vince, took  the  com- 
rnand  of  the  fleet ; 
while  Cato  remained 
at  Utica  to  support 
them  both. 

They  had  now  had  Caesar 
a  year  in  which  to  con-  leaves 
solidate    their    forces,  ^f^^  M 


Caesar     hastened     to 


Africa,  4th 


Dec.  [rof/i 
meet  them  before  it  OcL]  47. 
was  too  late.  On  the 
1 7  th  of  December 
[23rd  October]  he 
was  in  Lilybaeum. 
There  he  collected 
six  legions  and  2000 
cavalry  ;  set  sail  on 
the  25  th  December 
[31st  October];  and 
in  four  days  landed 
at  Adrumetum,  but 
with  only  3000  in- 
fantry and  I  50  cavalry. 


752 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


46.    Cos$. 
C.  lulius 
Caesar 
III. ,  M. 
Aemilius 
Lepidus. 


Caesar  in 
Ruspina. 


Scipio  and 
Caesar  both 
reinforced , 
March 
[Jan.  ]  46. 


Battle  of 
Thapsus, 
6th  April 
\_6th  Feb.^ 
46. 


The  rest  were  delayed  by  bad  weather.  Considius,  commandant  of 
Pompeian  troops  in  Adrumetum,  refused  to  yield  ;  and  attacked  him 
as  he  moved  down  the  coast  to  Ruspina,  where  he  arrived  on  the  ist 
of  January  46  [5th  November  47].  There  he  received  the  sub- 
mission of  Leptis,  and  stationed  guards  in  it.  He  was,  however,  in  a 
dangerous  position,  having  landed  in  Africa  with  forces  inadequate 
to  withstand  the  combined  forces  of  Scipio  and  luba,  which  were 
advancing  upon  him,  even  when  about  the  4th  January  [8th 
November  47]  a  part  of  his  scattered  fleet  suddenly  appeared. 
Up  to  that  time  he  had  been  obliged  to  let  his  small  force — farther 
diminished  by  the  despatch  of  Sallustius  Crispus  to  Cercina  for 
provisions — pass  the  nights  on  board  ship.  He  now  fortified 
himself  at  Ruspina,  and  waited  for  the  auxiliaries  and  provisions 
which  he  had  sent  for  from  Sardinia  and  Sicily.  But  he  would 
probably  even  so  have  been  crushed  but  for  the  timely  intervention  of 
P.  Sittius,  who  with  king  Bocchus  of  Mauritania,  invaded  the 
dominions  of  luba,  took  Cirta,  and  by  this -diversion  forced  luba  to 
return  to  the  defence  of  his  own  kingdom,  though  on  the  point  of 
joining  Scipio.  Meanwhile  Caesar  was  joined  by  many  Romans  of 
position  in  the  province  ;  and  his  ships  came  to  land  at  different 
points,  though  attacked  by  C.  Vergilius  at  Thapsus,  and  sometimes 
taken.  Scipio,  however,  advancing  close  up  to  Ruspina,  tried  to 
bring  Caesar  to  battle  ;  and  after  a  time  induced  luba  to  join  him 
with  three  legions  and  800  horse,  though  he  left  his  main  army 
under  Saburra  to  defend  his  own  kingdom. 

Scipio  being  thus  reinforced  by  luba,  and  by  fresh  troops  enrolled 
and  sent  by  Cato  from  Utica,  was  eager  to  fight.  Caesar  too  had 
been  reinforced  by  two  legions  from  Sicily,  though  in  a  feeble  and 
disorganised  state  [nth  March  =  nth  January];  and  offered  or 
pretended  to  offer  Scipio  battle.  But  though  there  was  some  cavalry 
skirmishing,  the  armies  stood  all  day  without  engaging.  It  was  now 
towards  the  end  of  March  [January],  and  nothing  decisive  had 
occurred.  Caesar  took  various  strongholds,  and  Varus  with  his  fleet 
hovered  off  the  coast  from  time  to  time,  capturing  Caesar's  transports. 
But  neither  side  gained  any  conspicuous  advantage,  till  at  last  on 
the  4th  April  [4th  February]  Caesar  advanced  to  attack  Thapsus. 
Scipio  followed,  keeping  on  high  ground,  and  attempted  to  throw 
a  reinforcement  into  Thapsus  along  a  narrow  neck  of  land  between 
a  salt  lagoon  and  the  sea,  defended  by  a  castle  and  three  legions. 

Scipio  began  pitching  a  camp  about  a  mile  from  this  castle, 
between  it  and  the  sea.  Caesar  recalled  his  men  from  the  siege  of 
Thapsus,  ordered  ships  up  to  the  shore  near  Scipio's  camp,  and  thus 
forced  Scipio  to  fight  while  his  army  was  partly  occupied  in, 
fortifying  the  camp.      Yet  Caesar  seemed  unwilling  to  begin,  in  spite] 


XLV         VICTORY  AT  TRAPS  US  AND   DEATH  Ub'  CATO  753 

of  the  entreaties  of  his   officers.     But   the   soldiers   could    not    be 

restrained.      The  men  on  the  left  wing  forced  the  trumpeter  to  sound 

the  charge,  and  Caesar,  finding  it  inevitable,  mounted  a  horse  and, 

giving   the    word   Feh'a'las,  led   it   himself.       luba's   elephants   took 

fright  and  rushed  through  their  own  lines  into  the  camp.      Deprived 

of  their  expected   support,  the   Mauritanian  cavalry  fled  ;    and  the 

Caesarians  with  little  resistance  forced  their  way  into  the  camp  of  the 

enemy.     A  sally  from  Thapsus  was  repulsed  ;  the  fugitives  from  the  Defeat  of 

camp  made  for  that  of  luba,  and,  finding  that  also  occupied,  retired  ^'^^P^'^  ^^^^ 

to  a  hill  and  gave  the  signal  of  surrender  by  dropping  their  arms. 

But  Caesar's  veterans  were  so  infuriated  by  long  restraint,  that   he 

could  not  prevent  them  from  cutting  the  unarmed  crowd  to  pieces,  or 

from  killing  some  of  their  own  officers  who  tried  to  prevent  them. 

He  is  said  to  have  lost  only  fifty  men  ;  the  enemy  50,000  in  killed, 

wounded,  prisoners,  and  missing.      Three  camps  fell  into  his  hands, 

with  many  elephants  and  immense  spoil.      Vergilius  still  held  out  in 

Thapsus,  but  Caesar  did  not  stay  to  attack  him.      Leaving  that  to 

Rebilus  with  three  legions,  and  the  attack  on  Considius  at  Thisdra 

to  Cn.  Domitius  Calvinus  with  two,  he  started  for  Utica,  occupying 

Uzita  and  Adrumetum  without  resistance. 

The  unarmed  people  of  Utica  had  been  mistrusted  by  Cato  and  Deaik  of 
forced  to  live  outside  the  walls.      Scipio's  defeated  cavalry  would  have  ^^'^'■/v    ), 
vented  their  fury  and  disappointment  on  them,  but  were  beaten  off"  by  p^j^  -i    (^ 
clubs  and  stones  ;  even  in  the  town  Cato  and  Faustus   Sulla  had  to 
bribe  them  to  desist  from  pillage.      But  Cato  had  now  made  up  his 
mind  that  his  cause  was  hopeless.      After  talking  cheerfully  on  philo- 
sophy to  a  large  number  of  guests,  and  commending  his  family  to  L. 
Caesar,  he  retired  to  his  bedroom  and  fell  on  his  sword.     The  wound 
was  not  mortal,  and  was  dressed  ;  but,  when  left  alone,  he  tore  away 
the  bandages  and  expired.     The  other  leaders   either    made    their 
peace  with   Caesar    or   fell    in    various    ways.       luba    was    refused 
admittance  to  his  capital  Zama,  and,  retiring  to  a  villa  with  Petreius, 
the  two  agreed  to  end  their  lives  by  a  duel.     luba  killed  Petreius,  Death  of 
and  then  induced  a  slave  to  stab  him.     Saburra  was  conquered  and  ^^''^^' . 
killed  by  P.  Sittius.      Faustus  Sulla  and  Afranius  soon  after  fell  into  ^^^''^^^^' 
Sittius'  hands,  and,  though  spared  by  him,  were  killed  in  a  military  Sulla,  and 
riot.      Scipio  tried  to  escape  to   Spain,  to  join  Gnaeus  and   Sextus  Metellus 
Pompeius,  but  was  intercepted  by  Sittius'  fleet  and  threw  himself  into  ^"pio. 
the  sea. 

Caesar  confiscated  and   sold    luba's   property,  and   reduced  his  Prcwince  of 
kingdom    to    the   form    of  a    province    (Numidia),    over    which    he  Numidia 
set    Sallustius    Crispus   as   proconsul.       Vergilius    then    surrendered  or  New 
Thapsus  ;  and  having  punished  or  degraded  other  towns  Caesar  em-     Z''^'^^'  4  • 
barked  at  Utica  on  the  1 3th  June  [April],  and  touching  at  Sardinia 

3C 


754 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


46. 

Caesar  s 
four 
triumphs. 


A  year  of 
44S  days. 
Last  year 
of  disorder. 


Caesar  s 
legislation. 


and  fining  some  towns  there,  arrived  at  Rome  on  the  25th  July 
[25th  May]. 

He  celebrated  four  triumphs — over  Gaul,  Egypt,  Pontus,  and 
Numidia,  avoiding  thus  all  reference  to  the  Civil  war,  and  leading  no 
Roman  citizen  among  his  captives.  It  was  now  that  most  of  such 
legislation  as  he  lived  to  carry  out  was  accomplished.  Though  he 
left  for  Spain  in  December,  the  reform  in  the  Calendar,  on  which  he 
had  employed  the  Greek  mathematician  Sosigenes,  gave  him  two 
months  more  than  appears.  The  Roman  year  since  the  time  of  Numa 
had  consisted  of  12  lunar  months  or  355  days  (really  354  d.  8  h.  48', 
36").  The  solar  year  consists  of  365  days,  5  hrs.,  48',  5i-|-".  The 
error  had  been  accumulating,  in  spite  of  intercalations,  and  a  correction 
by  the  decemvirs,  till  it  amounted  to  90  days.  This  was  now  to  end. 
A  month  of  23  days  had  already  been  intercalated  after  February  ; 
and  now  67  days  were  added  between  the  last  day  of  November 
and   the   first  of  December.       The   "  last  year  of  disorder,"  A.U.C. 

708  (B.C.  46),  thus  consisted  of  445  days,  and  the  first  of  January 

709  (B.C.  45)  was  brought  to  its  true  place  in  the  solar  year.  Caesar 
was  therefore  at  Rome  between  six  and  seven  months.  He  had 
before  his  arrival  been  declared  dictator  for  ten  years  ;  and  had  been 
granted  censorial  powers  under*  the  title  of  praefectus  moruiii.^ — with 
other  honours,  some  of  them  usually  appropriated  to  the  gods.  Well 
understanding  that  these  measures  were  the  effect  of  fear  rather  than 
affection,  he  took  an  early  opportunity  of  disclaiming  any  intention  of 
vengeance.  He  aimed  at  healing  the  wounds  of  the  last  twenty  years 
of  party  conflict  and  civil  war.  Among  others,  Cicero  was  allowed 
to  return  unharmed  to  Rome  ;  exiles  were  recalled ;  senatorial  rank 
restored  to  others  ;  and  the  Senate  allowed  to  recall  ^even  some  of 
his  most  violent  opponents,  such  as  M.  Marcellus. 

His  measures,  apparently  passed  now,  included  a  reform  of  the 
judicia  by  excluding  the  tribuni  aerarii ;  ^  a  sumptuary  law  regulating 
cost  of  banquets  and  dress,  and  levying  a  duty  on  foreign  luxuries  ; 
a  law  encouraging  marriage  by  granting  certain  privileges  to  fathers  ; 
a  law  prohibiting  senators  or  their  sons  from  residing  out  of  Italy  for 
more  than  three  years  except  on  military  service  ;  while  farther  to 
encourage  the  residence  of  free  men,  it  was  ordered  that  on  sheep 
farms  not  more  than  two-thirds  of  the  shepherds  were  to  be  slaves. 
He  wished  also  to  extend  the  civitas  so  as  to  embrace  all  worthy 
men.  The  Transpadani  had  been  enfranchised  by  him  in  49,  as  well , 
as  the  whole  of  his  favourite  legion  the  Alauda.  Now  the  citizen- 
ship was  granted  to  physicians  and  all  professors  of  the  liberal  arts' 
resident  in  Rome  ;  and  two  new  colonies,  at  Carthage  and  Corinth,  i 


^  See  p.  680  (note). 


XLV  CAESAR  GOES  TO  SPAIN  755 

were  projected  to  supply  his  veterans  and  others  with  land.  Finally, 
as  a  restraint  upon  ambition  in  the  future,  the  tenure  of  a  praetorial 
province  was  confined  to  one  year,  that  of  a  consular  to  two. 

But  as  a  set  off  to  these  wise  and  liberal  measures,  it  must  be  Inferiority 
owned  that  there  was  something  in  what  Cicero  alleged,  that  Caesar  of  Caesars 
cared  little  for  the   character  of  those  whom   he   admitted   to    his  "^^  '^^' 
confidence,  nay,  that  he  seemed  to  prefer  men  of  damaged  reputa- 
tion and  fortunes.      He  was  now  to  experience  the  results  of  such  a  Movements 
choice.      In  49  he  had  left  Baetica  in  charge  of  Q.  Cassius  Longinus,  in  Spain, 
who  had  already  in   54   gained  an   evil   reputation   there,  and  now  49-4^- 
made   himself  so   odious   that   he  was    assassinated    (47).      Caesar 
appointed  C.  Trebonius  in  his  place.      But  the  soldiers  in  Baetica 
were  exasperated  with  Caesar's  governors.     They  expelled  Trebonius, 
and  when  Gnaeus  Pompeius  (elder  son  of  Magnus)  crossed  to  Spain 
from  Africa,  and,  after  Thapsus,  was  joined  by  his  brother   Sextus, 
Attius  Varus,  and  Labienus,  he  was  able  to  collect  thirteen  legions 
and  defeat  C.  Didius,  whom  Caesar  sent  against  him. 

It  was  necessary  that  Caesar  should  go  himself.     As  soon  there-  Caesar  goes 
fore  as  necessary  arrangements  had  been  made  he  started.      He  left  ^^  Spain, 
Rome  on  the   3rd  of  December  (46),  and  was  back   again   at   the  -^^      ^^' 
beginning  of  the  following  September.     The  struggle   in  which   he 
was  engaged  till  the  17th  of  March  was  a  very  severe  one,  and  there 
were  at  times  disquieting  rumours  as  to  his  defeat.     The  two  armies 
were  almost  wholly  Itahan,  though  Bocchus,  one  king  of  Mauritania, 
sent  his  sons  to  Pompey,  and  the  other  king,  Bagouas,  served  with 
Caesar.      The  Pompeians  were  mostly  veterans,  who,  having  served  . 
against  Caesar  before,  and  having  been  granted  their  lives,  had  no 
hope  of  pardon.      Caesar's  army  also  consisted  mostly  of  veterans, 
incensed  at  being  called  on  to  fight  a  civil  war  again.     There  was 
likely  to  be  little  quarter  given  ;  and,  in  fact,  in  no  part  of  the  civil 
war  was  there  so  much  ruthless  slaughter. 

On  Caesar's  approach  Sext.  Pompeius  threw  hnnself  into  Corduba, 
and   sent  for  aid  to  his  brother  Gnaeus,  who  was  besieging  Ulia. 
Caesar,  not  being  able  to  assault  Corduba  at  once,  recrossed  the  Baetis  Campaign 
and  attacked   Pompey's  magazine,  Ategua  ( Teba\  commanded  by  ^'^  Baetica, 
L.   Munatius    Flaccus,   who   had  been   the   head   of  the   opposition  "^"'"^ 
to   Cassius   Longinus.       The  surrender  of  Ategua  (19th   February) 
brought  many  submissions  to   Caesar ;  and  after  various  minor  en- 
gagements   Gnaeus    Pompeius    finally   encamped   on   a    plain    near 
Munda.      Caesar  followed,  and  on  the  17th  of  March  forced  him  to  Battle  of 
fight.     The  struggle  on  both  sides  was  desperate.      For  a  long  time  ^i^^nda, 
the  two  armies  remained  locked  in  a  deadly  embrace,  hand  to  hand  'j^^  , 
and  foot  to  foot :  at  one  point  Caesar  barely  saved  a  panic  by  rushing 
to  the  front  himself;  and  it  was  only,  as  it  appears,  from  a  mistaken 


7S^  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap. 

notion  that  Labienus — who  rode  out  of  the  melee  to   beat   back  a 
charge  of  Bagouas — was  quitting  the  field,  that  the  Pompeians  gave 
way  and  fled.      No  quarter  was  given,  and  30,000  are  said  to  have 
been  killed,  Caesar  losing  1000  killed  and  many  wounded.      Gnaeus 
Pompeius  fled  to  Carteia,  there  embarked,  and  set  sail  with  twenty 
ships.      But  he  had  forgotten  to  take  water,  and  when  he  went  on 
shore  for  it  was  surprised  by  Didius  and  slain  (nth  April).    Labienus, 
Attius,  and  Varus  had  fallen  in  the  battle  ;   Corduba  was  taken  (Sextus 
Pompeius  escaping)  ;  and  the  whole  of  southern  Spain  fell  into  Caesar's 
hands.      Soon  after  the  battle  he  was  joined  by  his  grand-nephew 
Octavius,  then  in  his  eighteenth  year,  who  had  been  prevented  by 
illness  from  accompanying  him.      There  was  still  a  good  deal  to  do 
Settlement    before  Caesar  could  leave  the  country.      He  was  at  Hispalis  at  the 
of  Baetica     g^^j  of  April,  and  on  the  30th  found  time  to  write  to  Cicero  condoling 
^Cartha^e  ^  ^^^^  ^™  '^^  ^^^  death  of  his  daughter.      But  as  he  did  not  arrive  at 
April-     '     Rome  till  September,  there  is  a  considerable  time  to  be  accounted 
Sej>t.  4^.       for,  and  it  is  possible  that  Nicolas  of  Damascus  may  be  right  in 
saying,  as  he  alone  does,  that  he  went  to  Carthage  to  settle  certain 
matters    in    regard   to   the    colony   of  70,000  veterans   and   others, 
which  he  had  in  the  previous  year  determined  upon  in  opposition  to 
the  Pompeian  Utica.^ 
Honours  to  Every  kind  of  honour  had  been  voted  to  him  as  soon  as  the  news 

of  Munda  reached  Rome  (20th  April)  :  a  supplicatio  for  fifty  days  ; 
the  dictatorship  for  life  ;  the  right  of  being  consul  for  the  next  ten 
years ;   the  entire  control   of  the   treasury  ;    and   complete   military 
Shall  authority  by  the  title  of  perpetual  imperator.      He  was,  in  fact,  in  all 

but  name  absolute  king.  The  idea  of  giving  him  this  title  was 
indeed  openly  mooted.  There  were  two  points  in  the  Empire  which 
still  appeared  to  demand  active  measures  of  defence.  The  Getae 
or  Daci  were  forcing  their  way  over  the  Danube  and  eastward  into 
Pontus  ;  the  Parthians  were  again  crossing  the  Euphrates  into  the 
Roman  province  of  Syria.  It  was  known  that  Caesar  wished  to 
undertake  the  campaigns  against  them,  and  his  flatterers  were  not 
slow  to  urge  him  to  do  so,  Cicero  himself  writing  to  advise  it. 
Moreover  L.  Aurelius  Cotta,  one  of  the  XVviri  sacris  faciundis^ 
affirmed   from    the   Sibylline   books  ^  that  the  Parthians   could  only 

^  Nicolas  (fr.  11-12)  makes  Octavius  accompany  him  there.  A^^ainst  his 
statement  is  the  silence  of  all  other  authorities,  and  the  remark  of  Sueton.  [Aug. 
47),  Nee  est,  opinor,  provincia,  excepta  dumtaxat  Africa  et  Sardinia,  quam  non 
adierit.  But  we  must  observe  that  Nicolas  is  the  only  contemporary  writer  on 
Augustus, — and  from  Cicero,  Att.  xiii.  2,  it  appears  that  he  landed  at  Puteoli,  as 
he  naturally  would  from  Africa. 

2  The  original  Sibylline  books  had  been  burnt  in  82,  but  others  had  been 
collected  from  different  places  (Tac,  Ann.  vi.  18  ;   Dionys.  iv.  62). 


Caesar. 


Caesar  be 
a  ' '  rex 


XLV  CAESAR'S  PROJECTED  REFORMS  757 

be   conquered  by  a  Roman  king,  and  that  he  meant  in   the   next   The  Sibyl 
meeting  of  the  Senate  to  propose  that  Caesar  should  have  that  title,  and  the 
— not  perhaps  at   Rome,  but   in   the    provinces.^     This   proposition  P^^^"-^^"^^- 
was    put    before    Caesar    in  various    tentative  ways  during   the   six 
months  that  remained  to  him  of  life.     On  one  occasion,  as   he  was 
entering  the  city,  some  officious  partisans  addressed  him  as  rex^  and 
were  answered  by  him  that  they  were  mistaken  in  his  name, — he 
was  not  Rex  but  Caesar.     Again,  some  of  his  statues  were  found 
decorated  with  crowns,  and  when  the  tribunes   took  them  off  and 
arrested  some  leaders  of  the  mob,  Caesar  showed  his  displeasure  by 
causing  the  tribunes  to  be  suspended  from  their  office.     On  the  15  th   The 
February,  as  he  sat  on  his  high  seat  watching  the  Lupercalia,  Antony,  Lupercalia, 
in  the  semi-nude  state  of  a  Lupercus,  taking  advantage  of  the  licence  ^^       ^^' 
of  the    festival,  put   a  royal   crown   on   his   head,  which    Caesar — 
observing   the  feeling  of  the   people — three  times   rejected   amidst 
applause,  finally  ordering  it  to  be  dedicated  on  the  Capitol  to  the  only 
king  Jupiter.2 

But  though  the  name,  which  perhaps  Caesar  desired  as  impressing  Caesar  s 
the  eastern  peoples,  was  thus  rendered  impossible,  he  was  in  effect  S^^'^t 
king  ;  and  spent  the  last  months  of  his  life   in   royal    schemes  for  P^^J^^-^- 
organising  the  Empire  and  beautifying  the  city.      It  was  at  this  time, 
apparently,  that  the  lex  lulia  municipalis  was  passed,'  regulating  the 
internal  government  of  Rome  and  municipal  towns,  which  had  been 
draughted  under  his   directions  while  he  was  in  Spain. ^     Measures 
were  taken  to  enforce  the  sumptuary  law  which,  in  his  absence,  had 
been  much  neglected  ;^  and  that  his  law  for  the  yearly  tenure  of  pro- 
vincial office  might  be  observed  the  number  of  praetors  was  raised  to 
sixteen,  of  quaestors  to  forty.     He  made  also  large  plans  for  extending  Extension 
the  city.    T'\\^  pomoerium  was  to  take  in  the  Vatican  district,  the  Tiber  ofthePomo- 
being  diverted  into  a  great  canal,  starting  from  about  the  Milvian  ^^^"'"• 
bridge,  including  the  Campus  Vaticaitus^  and  rejoining  the  true  course 
below  the  city.      The  Campus  Martius  was  to  be  built  over,  an  open 
space  near  the  Vatican  taking  its  place.      The  architect  had  actually 
been  selected  ;^  and  the  houses  purchased  and  pulled  down  for  a  site 
of  a  new  theatre,  afterwards  completed  by  Augustus  as  the  Theatrum  New 
Marcelli.^     An  immense  temple  to  Mars  was  to  commemorate  his  buildings. 
victories.   A  new  Senate-house  was  to  be  built,  the  old  Curia,  burnt  in  the 
Clodian  riots,  was  to  be  replaced  by  a  temple  of  Felicitas.  Varro  was  to 

1  Appian,  B.  Civ.  ii.  no. 

2  The  entry  in  the  Fasti  asserted  that  Antony's  action  was  by  the   ' '  order 
of  the  people"  (Cic.  2  Phil.  §  87). 

^  Cicero,  ad  Fam.  vi.  18.      It  has  been  in  part  preserved  on  a  bronze  tablet 
found  near  Heraclea  in  1732.      See  C.  I.  L.  11 19.      Bruns,  p.  loi. 

^  ad  Att.  xiii.  7.  ^  ^^  ^^^   j^jji    ^3,  35.  6  ^^^^   xliii.  49. 


758 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Foreign 
colonies. 


Prepara- 
tio7is  for 
the 

Parthian 
expedition. 


The 

conspiracy 

44. 


Some 
causes  of  it. 

The 

Spanish 

triumph. 


collect  a  library ;  the  best  jurists  to  codify  the  laws.  The  lacus 
Fiicinus  was  to  be  drained ;  an  immense  harbour  constructed  at 
Ostia  ;  a  new  road  made  across  the  Apennines  to  the  coast  of  the 
Adriatic.  A  great  scheme  of  colonisation  was  also  formed.  Besides 
Corinth  (which  was  to  involve  a  canal  through  the  isthmus)  and 
Carthage,  numerous  veterans,  liberti,  and  others  were  to  be  settled 
in  Narbo,  Aries,  Forum  Julii,  Buthrotum,  Pharos  (Alexandria), 
Berytos  (Syria),  and  Heracleia  and  Sinope  on  the  Black  Sea  :  and 
Plancus  was  directed  to  found  a  colony  at  Lugdunum,  and  perhaps 
another  in  the  territory  of  the  Rauraci  near  Bale. 

Vast  preparations  were  made  for  the  expedition  against  the  Getae 
and  Parthians.  Six  legions  and  10,000  cavalry  were  sent  over  to  en- 
camp near  Apollonia,  ready  to  start  in  the  next  spring,  where  Octavius, 
Caesar's  now  acknowledged  heir,  was  to  study  during  the  winter  and 
learn  cavalry  exercises.  These  were  to  be  supplemented  by  archers 
from  Crete,  light  troops  from  Spain  and  Africa,  and  slingers  from  the 
Balearic  Isles,  while  immense  stores  of  arms  were  ordered  at  Demetrias 
and  Magnesia.  The  expedition  was  calculated  to  last  three  years, 
and  for  that  period  Caesar  availed  himself  of  his  dictatorial  and  other 
powers  to  name  the  consuls,  praetors,  and  provincial  governors.  He 
was  consul  with  Antony  for  44,  but  he  meant  to  abdicate  that  office 
in  favour  of  Dolabella  before  he  departed, — a  measure  resisted  by 
Antony,  who  wished  to  be  in  sole  charge,  and  had  had  experience  of 
Dolabella's  misconduct, — while  he  himself  as  dictator  would  have 
two  magistri  equitum  instead  of  legati,  his  nephew  Octavius  and 
his  old  officer  Cn.  Domitius  Calvinus. 

But  the  conspiracy  was  now  in  active  formation  which  was  to 
put  an  end  to  all  this.  No  doubt  it  was  largely  composed  of  men 
whose  selfish  views  had  been  baulked  by  Caesar.  The  prime  mover 
in  it,  for  instance,  C.  Cassius,  was  annoyed  at  not  being  urban 
praetor  instead  of  M.  Brutus,  who,  though  thus  favoured,  joined  in  the 
conspiracy  from  an  overstrained  notion  of  the  duty  of  slaying  a 
tyrant.  But  there  were  other  causes  of  dissatisfaction.  On  his 
return  from  Spain  he  had  again  triumphed,  and  allowed  a  similar 
honour,  against  all  precedent,  to  Fabius  Maximus  and  Pedius. 
This  time  there  could  be  no  concealment  of  the  fact  that  the  triumph 
was  over  Roman  citizens,  and  one  of  the  tribunes,  Pontius  Aquila, 
had  had  the  courage  to  protest  by  refusing  to  rise  when  Caesar's  car 
passed  him.  The  reduction  of  the  number  of  the  recipients  of  the 
public  corn,  though  a  righteous  measure  and  a  permanent  relief  to 
the  exchequer,  must  have  made  enemies.  His  nomination  of  con- 
suls, sometimes  for  a  few  days,  and  practical  nomination  of  other 
magistrates  by  letters  of  recommendation  to  the  comitia,  showed 
clearly  that  the   consulship  was   to  be  an   honorary  office,   and   the 


L 


THE  CONSPIRACY  AND  ITS  CAUSES  759 


other  magistrates  his  agents.  His  large  admissions  to  the  Senate  of  His  rela- 
provincials,  freedmen,  and  supporters  of  every  kind  was  really  a  tions-with 
blow  to  its  dignity  and  power,  which  he  farther  slighted  on  one 
occasion  by  receiving  the  fathers,  when  they  came  to  offer  some  new 
complimentary  votes,  without  rising.  He  lived  in  Rome,  indeed, 
without  a  guard  ;  but  when  he  travelled  in  Italy  he  was  escorted  by 
about  2000  men  ;  and  though  clement  and  easily  moved  to  pardon, 
he  seems  at  the  same  time  to  have  had  the  misfortune  of  exciting 
deep  personal  resentment.  Nearly  all  his  legati  in  Gaul  turned 
against  him  ;  and  there  is  point  in  Julian's  satire,  that  the  one  thing  Personal 
Caesar  could  not  do  was  to  make  people  love  him.i  He  had  some  q^t^Hties. 
habits  also  calculated  to  give  offence.  •  At  the  theatre  or  circus,  and 
even  at  the  table  of  his  friends,  he  showed  his  want  of  interest  in 
what  was  going  on  by  reading  and  answering  his  letters  ;  and  to 
some  it  must  have  seemed  offensive  that  the  author  of  a  marriage  law 
and  a  repressor  of  adultery  should  himself  be  the  subject  of  numerous 
scandals,  and  that  Cleopatra  should  be  living  in  his  house.^  Perhaps 
it  was  impossible  for  a  reformer  of  such  a  mass  of  corruption  to  escape 
immense  odium  ;  and  however  he  may  have  unnecessarily  excited  it, 
there  can  be  but  one  opinion  of  the  treachery  of  the  assassins,  many 
of  whom  owed  their  lives  to  Caesar's  clemency,  and  high  office  to  his 
favour. 

Libels  began  to  be  scattered  about,  and  sentences  to  be  mysteriously  The 
inscribed  on  walls  calling  on  Brutus  to  justify  his  name.     The  murder  murder 
was  finally  arranged  at  a  supper  in  the  house  of  Cassius,  where  the  ^^^'^^S^  • 
principal  members  of  the  conspiracy  met  ( 1 4th  March).     It  was  agreed 
that  it  must  be  done  at  once,  lest  the  plot,  to  which  more  than  sixty 
were  privy,  should  be  betrayed.     There  was  a  meeting"  of  the  Senate 
next  day  ;  and  Caesar,  in  spite  of  warnings,  was  accustomed  to  attend 
without  guards.      Antony  was  to  be  detained  by  C.  Trebonius  on 
some  pretext  outside  the  Curia  Pompei  ^  while  the  deed  was  done. 

Caesar  himself  seems  to  have  been  uneasy.      As  he  lay  at  supper  isth 
on  the  evening  of  the  14th  at  the  house  of  Lepidus  the  conversation  March. 
turned  on  the  question  as  to  which  kind  of  death  was  to  be  wished.     He    ,  '^^^?\  ^  ^ 
looked  up  from  his  correspondence,  which  as  usual  he  was  engaged  g^  t^  fji^ 
upon,  and  said  briefly,  "A  sudden  one."      Still  no  one  deliberately  Senate- 
courts  what  was  now  awaiting  him.      He  had  received  hints  couched  house. 
in  the  guise  of  predictions  ;  his  wife  had  evil  dreams  and  entreated 
him  to  put  off  going  to  the  Senate  ;  meteors  had  been  observed  ;  the 

^  Julian,  Conviv.  332A. 

'■^  Cicero,  ad  A  it.  xiv.  8  ;  ib.  20.  Some  have  supposed  that  Cicero  alludes  to 
Cleopatra's  sister  Arsinoe,  who  had  been  brought  to  Rome  to  grace  Caesar's 
triumph.      But  the  second  of  the  two  letters  settles  it  in  favour  of  Cleopatra. 

^  In  the  Campus  Martius,  near  the  Theatrum  Pompei.  The  old  Curia  was 
being  removed  for  the  temple  of  Felicitas. 


76o 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


The 

m7irder  of 
Caesar, 
iSth 
March  44. 


/fat  <jv 

T^KVOV 

{Suet.  82). 


The 

assassins 
go  to  the 
Capitol. 


omens  were  bad  ;  the  armour  of  Mars  in  the  palace  of  the  Pontifex 
Maximus  fell.  He  was  perhaps  unwell  or  unnerved,  and  decided  not 
to  go.  But  the  Senate  having  met  in  large  numbers,  as  important 
business  was  expected,  was  waiting  for  him ;  and  those  in  the 
secret  were  armed  with  daggers  concealed  by  the  cases  of  their 
styli.  Caesar's  delay  alarmed  them.  Hasty  conferences  were  held, 
and  Decimus  Brutus  undertook  the  part  of  Judas.  He  went  to 
Caesar's  house,  and  appealed  to  his  pride  not  to  let  it  be  said  that 
he  failed  to  meet  the  Senate  from  mere  fanciful  causes  and  super- 
stitious fears.  Caesar  Avas  convinced,  and  rose  to  go  about  11  A.M. 
As  he  crossed  the  hall  his  bust  or  statue  fell  and  broke  to  pieces, 
perhaps  overthrown  by  a  friendly  servant  to  warn  him.  As  he  walked 
along  the  street  the  usual  crowd  pressed  round  him  with  petitions, 
and  one  man  especially  thrust  a  paper  into  his  hand,  begging  him  to 
read  it  at  once,  as  it  concerned  him  ;  but  he  either  did  not  hear  or 
did  not  understand,  and  gave  it  with  others  to  his  attendant. 

When  he  entered  and  took  his  place  (the  senators  as  usual  rising), 
those  in  the  secret  crowded  round  him  on  the  pretext  of  supporting 
Cimber,  who  presented  a  petition  for  the  recall  of  a  brother.  He 
did  not  mean  to  grant  it,  and  with  some  anger  at  their  persistence 
turned  from  Cimber,  who  thereupon  clutched  his  toga  with  such 
eagerness  as  to  drag  it  from  his  neck.  Then  P.  Casca  struck  him 
with  his  dagger.  But  from  nervousness  or  haste  the  blade  did  not 
reach  his  throat,  but  struck  his  shoulder.  Caesar  sprang  up  and 
snatched  at  the  weapon,  crying,  "You  villain,  Casca!  what  do  you 
mean  ?  "  But  he  found  himself  surrounded  by  angry  faces  and  gleam- 
ing daggers  ;  and  when  among  them  he  saw  M.  Brutus — pardoned, 
promoted,  and  loved — he  gave  up  hope,  and  drawing  his  robe  over 
his  face  fell  pierced  by  more  than  twenty  blades,  aimed  at  him  with 
such  violence  and  in  such  confusion  that  several  of  the  conspirators 
were  themselves  wounded.  He  fell  near  the  base  of  Pompey's 
statue,  which  was  sprinkled  with  his  blood.  The  other  senators 
remained  rooted  to  the  spot  with  terror  whilst  this  was  going  on  ; 
but  when  M.  Brutus  raising  the  bloody  dagger,  and  calling  on  Cicero 
to  witness  that  he  had  freed  Rome,  would  have  addressed  the  house, 
the  senators  rushed  out,  spreading  the  dreadful  news  among  the 
people,  though  Cicero  apparently  tried  to  induce  them  to  meet  at 
once  again  in  the  Capitol.  1 

Antony  and  Lepidus,  fearing  that  they  might  share  the  same  fate, 
hastily  concealed  themselves  in  the  houses  of  friends.  But  the  con- 
spirators marched  through  the  streets  loudly  proclaiming  their  deed, 
and  calling  on  all  lovers  of  freedom  to  join  them.      They  expected  to 


^  Ad  Att.  xiv.  10. 


XLV  AFTER  THE  MURDER  761 

be  greeted  as  saviours  of  the  commonwealth  ;  but  though  one  or  two  44. 
did  join  their  train,  wishing  to  share  in  the  credit  of  a  deed  in  which 
they  had  had  no  part,  the  general  aspect  of  the  people,  who  hastily 
closed  their  shops  or  withdrew  into  their  houses,  was  so  far  from 
encouraging  that  they  retired  to  the  Capitol,  on  the  pretence  of 
offering  thanks  to  the  gods,  accompanied  by  gladiators  whom  Dec. 
Brutus  had  had  ready  near  the  Curia  Pompeii  on  pretence  of  some 
exhibition. 

The  corpse  of  the  murdered  dictator  was  carried  in  a  covered 
litter  by  his  servants  through  the  streets  to  his  house  in  the  Forum. 
The  curtains  waved  backwards  and  forwards,  showing  the  ghastly 
body  with  its  thirty-six  wounds,  and  the  hands  swung  loose  as  the 
litter  moved.  The  sight  caused  a  tempest  of  lamentation  from  the 
excited  crowd  in  the  street,  and  from  those  who  watched  from  door- 
steps and  housetops.  It  was  plain  that  the  temper  of  the  people 
could  not  be  trusted.  But  it  was  resolved  to  make  one  more  attempt 
to  gain  them.  Escorted  by  their  gladiators,  the  chief  conspirators  Speeches  of 
descended  into  the  Forum,  and  M.  Brutus  made  a  speech  from  the  M.  Brutus 
Rostra,  which  was  listened  to  quietly,  as  it  dwelt  rather  on  the  high  '^^  ^'^^^" 
patriotic  motives  of  the  assassins  than  on  the  demerits  of  Caesar  ; 
but  when  Cinna  followed  with  a  vehement  attack  on  Caesar's 
character,  there  was  such  a  threatening  exhibition  of  feeling  that  the 
assassins  retired  again  to  the  Capitol,  and  fortified  themselves  there 
during  the  night. 

Meanwhile  Antony  recovered  his  courage,  and  appeared  again  in  Negoti- 
consular   state.      Lepidus  brought   troops    into   the   Forum   to   keep  ^^^^^  "^^^^ 
order,  and  Dolabella  assumed  the  consular  robes  and  lictors,  in  spite  of 
the  doubt  as  to  his  election.  1     Negotiations  went  on  during  the  next 
day,  and  on  the  17th  {Liberalid),  at  a  meeting  of  the  Senate  in  the  Meeting  of 
temple   of  Tellus,   close  to  Antony's   house,   Antony,  who   had   got  ^^^  Senate 
possession  of  Caesar's  memoranda  and  other  state  papers,  as  well  as  ""fl/^'^fl^^ 
the  treasury,  made  a  conciliatory  speech,  agreeing  that  no  decree  of 
Caesar's  not  published  before  the  ides  of  March  should  be  held  to  be 
in  force,  and  that  the  dictatorship  should  be   declared  unconstitu- 
tional.2     In    return,  Cicero,   who   came   forward   with   great   vigour, 
proposed  an  amnesty,  and  some  alteration  in  the  provinces  assigned 

1  Because  whilst  it  was  going  on  Antony  attempted  to  invalidate  it  by  an 
obnuntiatio  (Cicero,  2  Phil.  §  82). 

2  Cicero,  i  Phil.  3  ;  2  Phil.  91.  The  measure  at  first  was  only  a  resolution 
of  the  Senate,  but  was  afterwards  embodied  in  a  law  (Cic.  5  Phil.  §  10  ;  Dio 
Cass.  xliv.  51).  Some  difficulty  has  been  made  on  the  subject,  because  the 
dictatorship  was  offered  to  Augustus.  But  what  had  been  abolished  by  a  lex 
might  be  restored  by  a  lex,  which  no  doubt  would  then  have  been  easily  carried. 
Moreover,  Augustus  declined  it  on  the  ground  that  it  was  illegal  [Monum. 
Ancyr.  5,  6  ;  Suet.  Aug.  52). 


762  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap,  xlv 

to  Brutus  and  Cassius  was  made,  which  they,  however,  afterwards 
declined  to  accept.  A  vote  of  thanks  was  passed  to  Antony  for 
having  prevented  a  civil  war  ;  Caesar's  acta  were  confirmed,  and  a 
public  funeral  was  ordered  for  his  body.  Thereupon  Antony  gave  his 
son  as  a  hostage  to  the  conspirators,  they  left  the  Capitol,  and  were 
entertained  that  evening  by  him  and  Lepidus  at  supper. 

It  seemed  for  the  moment  as  if  the  revolution  were  at  an  end, 
and  the  old  forms  of  the  republic  restored  to  real  life  :  that,  as  Cicero 
expressed  it,  the  regnum  was  abolished  with  the  death  of  the  rex. 
In  reality  it  was  the  beginning  of  twelve  years  of  confusion,  blood- 
shed, and  dissolution,  only  to  be  ended  by  the  establishment  on  a 
sounder  and  more  permanent  footing  of  the  autocracy  which  seemed 
to  have  received  its  death-blow. 


Authorities. — Caesar,  ^^//.  Civ.\.-\\\.  Bellum  Alexandriniim  ;  Africanum; 
Hispaniense  (of  uncertain  authorship,  but  probably  contemporary).  Cicero's 
Correspondence.  Appian,  Bell.  Civ.  ii.  c.  3,  30-154.  Plutarch,  Lives  of  Pompey, 
Caesar,  Cicero,  Brutus,  Antony.  Livy,  Ep.  109-116.  Dio  Cassius,  xli.-xliv. 
Velleius,  ii.  48-58.     Lucan's  Pharsalia.     Suetonius,  Caesar. 


CHAPTER    XLVI 

THE    SECOND    TRIUMVIRATE    AND    END    OF    THE    CIVIL   WARS 

Antony  and  the  acta  of  Caesar — Popular  feeling  against  the  assassins — Change  in 
the  provincial  arrangements  of  Caesar — M.  Brutus  and  C.  Cassius  resist — 
Arrival  of  C.  Octavius  (May) — His  disputes  with  Antony — He  enrols  a  legion 
of  veterans — Antony  made  governor  of  Cisalpine  Gaul  for  43,  besieges  Dec. 
Brutus  in  Mutina  (44) — Decrees  of  Senate  against  Antony — Battle  near 
Mutina — Antony  in  Gaul,  joined  by  Lepidus,  PoUio,  and  Plancus — Death  of 
Decimus  Brutus — Octavius  (now^  C.  Caesar  Octavianus)  comes  to  Rome  and 
is  elected  consul  (19th  August) — Makes  terms  with  Antony — The  Triumvirate 
—  The  proscriptions  and  death  of  Cicero  (43) — M.  Brutus  and  C.  Cassius  in 
Macedonia  and  Syria — Sext.  Pompeius  in  Sicily — Battles  of  Philippi — Death 
of  Brutus  and  Cassius — Division  of  the  Provinces  (42) — L.  Antonius  and  the 
siege  of  Perusia — M.  Antonius  and  Cleopatra — Disputes  between  Caesar  and 
Antony — Peace  of  Brundisium  (40) — Peace  of  Misenum  with  Sext.  Pompeius 
(39) — Defeat  and  death  of  Pompeius  (36-35) — Lepidus  deprived  of  power  (35) 
Antonius  in  the  East — Wars  in  Parthia  and  Armenia  (38-36) — Cleopatra's 
renewed  influence  (36-33) — Battle  of  Actium  (31) — Death  of  Antony  and 
Cleopatra  (30) — Egypt  a  Province — The  new  constitution — Literature  at 
the  end  of  the  Republic — New  buildings  begun  at  Rome. 

The  confirmation  of  Caesar's  acta  gave  Antony  an  opportunity  of  Antony's 
securing  enormous  pov^ers,  and  soon  made  it  plain  that  rejoicing  on  "^jf^"^, 
the  part  of  the  Optimates  was  premature.      It  was  left  to  the  consuls 
to  decide  what  these  ada  were, — with  the  help  indeed  of  a  committee,   Caesar. 
which  however  seems  not  to  have  met, — and  Antony,  who  had  got 
Caesar's  papers  from  his  widow,  was  able  to  carry  on  the  adminis- 
tration for  a  time  unchecked.      He  conciliated  Lepidus  by  consenting 
to  his  election  as  pontifex  maximus,  and  Dolabella  by  allowing  him 
to  take  up   the   consulship   with    the    reversion    of  the   province   of 
Syria  ;  he  obtained  the  disposal  of  a  vast  sum  of  money  deposited 
by  Caesar  in  the  temple   of  Ops ;  and  was  encouraged  to  neglect 
the  opposition  by  the  evidence  of  popular  feeling.      His  laudatio  at 
the  public  funeral  voted  by  the  Senate  had  roused  such  a  tempest  of 
indignation  that  the  people  burnt  the  body  in  the  Forum,  and  seizing 
brands  from  the  pile  were  with  difificulty  prevented  from  firing  the 


after  the 
murder  of 


764 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


houses  of  the  murderers.  C.  Helvius  Cinna,  poet  and  tribune,  was 
torn  to  pieces  in  mistake  for  Cornehus  Cinna  the  assassin  ;  and 
when  this  popular  feeHng  was  increased  by  the  publication  of 
Caesar's  will,  under  which  all  citizens  benefited,  it  was  no  longer 
possible  for  the  assassins  to  remain  in  Rome,  and  Brutus  was  relieved, 
on  Antony's  motion  in  the  Senate,  from  the  law  preventing  a  praetor 
urbanus  from  being,  more  than  ten  days  absent.  He  and  Cassius 
retired  to  Antium  waiting  for  the  tide  to  turn  :  and  meanwhile  Antony 
sought,  by  rearrangement  of  the  provinces,  by  conciliation  of  indi- 
viduals or  states,  and  by  securing  the  command  of  the  troops  in 
camp  in  Macedonia,  to  strengthen  his  position.  He  spoke  respectfully 
of  Brutus  and  Cassius  and  the  rest,  and  absolute  disorder  on  the  part 
of  the  angry  people  he  and  Dolabella  did  check.  A  man  who 
claimed  to  be  the  grandson  of  Marius,  and  so  a  connexion  of 
Caesar's,  had  signalised  this  claim  by  setting  up  a  column  on  the  spot 
on  which  his  body  was  burnt ;  and  it  became  the  rendezvous  of 
Caesarians  and  the  scene  of  frequent  riots,  until  Antony  (early  in 
April)  executed  some  of  the  rioters,  the  pseudo-Marius  among  them  ; 
and  later  on  Dolabella  pulled  down  the  column  and  executed  more 
rioters.  1  Still  the  arrangements  made  by  Caesar  for  the  consulship 
and  the  provinces  had  included  many  of  the  very  men  now  odious  for 
his  murder  ;  and  they  were  not  ashamed  to  claim  their  rights  in  virtue 
of  the  acta  of  the  very  man  whom  they  had  killed  for  "  tyranny." 

For  43  the  consuls  were  to  be  Aulus  Hirtius,  one  of  Caesar's 
officers  in  Gaul,  and  C.  Vibius  Pansa,  who  had  already  governed 
Bithynia  and  Gallia  Cisalpina :  for  42  Decimus  Brutus,  meanwhile 
governor  of  Cisalpine  Gaul ;  and  L.  Munatius  Plancus,  meanwhile 
governor  of  Transalpine  Gaul,  exclusive  of  the  "  Province." 

Syria,  where  there  was  a  mutiny  on  foot  under  Caecilius  Bassus, 
a  Pompeian,^  was  to  be  held  by  C.  Cassius  Longinus  ;  Africa  by  Q. 
Cornificius ;  Gallia  Narbonensis  and  Hispania  Superior  by  M. 
Aemilius  Lepidus  ;  Hispania  Ulterior  by  C.  Asinius  Pollio  ;  Mace- 
donia by  M.  Junius  Brutus  ;  Sicily  by  A.  Pompeius  Bithynicus  ; 
Asia  by  C.  Trebonius ;  Bithynia  by  L.  Tullius  Cimber.  Five  of 
these  twelve  men  were  among  Caesar's  assassins.^     Of  the  five,  Tre- 


^  This  pretender  seems  to  have  been  really  a  veterinary  surgeon  named 
Amatias  or  Herophilus.  He  had  tried  to  get  recognition  from  Octavius  and 
others  of  the  family  (see  Nicolas  Dam.  14,  Cic.  ad  Att.  xii.  49  ;  xiv.  6,  8  ;  i 
Phil.  §  S  ;  2  Phil.  §  107.     Valer.  Max,  91,  15,  2  ;  Appian,  B.Civ.  iii.  2,  3). 

2  Q.  Caecilius  Bassus  escaped  from  Pharsalus  to  Syria,  and  being  there  joined 
by  others  induced  the  soldiers  of  the  governor  Sex,  Julius  Caesar  to  murder  him. 
He  took  the  title  of  praetor  (46),  and  for  three  years  maintained  himself  in 
Apameia. 

3  L.  Cimber  (Bithynia),  C.  Trebonius  (Asia),  C.  Cassius  (Syria),  M.  Brutus 
(Macedonia),  Dec.  Brutus  (Gallia  Cisalpina). 


claim  their 
provinces^ 


XLVi  ANTONY'S  AMBITIOUS  POLICY  765 

bonius,  Cimber,  and  Decimus  Brutus,  who  were  not  detained  by  office,   The 

seem  at  once  to  have  gone  to  their  provinces.      But  M.  Brutus  and  (Assassins 

C.  Cassius,  being  praetors,  would  not  naturally  go  till  the  end  of  the 

year ;  and  Antony  soon  showed  that  he  did  not  mean  to  allow  them  ^^^ 

to  take  quiet  possession.      Early  in  April  he  had  let  Decimus  Brutus 

know  that  he  could  not  propose  in  the  Senate  the  confirmation  of 

the  provinces  of  M.  Brutus  and   C.  Cassius,  owing  to  the  anger  of 

people  and  veterans.  1     And  in  June,  after  several  different  proposals, 

he  carried  a  law  granting  Gallia  Cisalpina  to  himself  in  43,  Syria 

to  Dolabella,  Macedonia  to  his  brother  Gains  Antonius,  the  praetor. 

As  a  compromise,  and  as  a  means  of  getting  them  out  of  the  way,  M. 

Brutus  and  C.  Cassius  were  to  have  legatio7ies^  the  one  in  Asia  and 

the   other   in    Sicily,  to   superintend   the   corn   supply.  ^     This   they 

scornfully  rejected,   and  set  to  work  collecting   ships   and  men  to 

secure  the  provinces  they  regarded  as  theirs  by  right.      Civil  war  in 

many  places  seemed  imminent.     Gains  Antonius  went  to  Macedonia, 

which  he  was  to  govern  in  the  following  year,  to  send  over  the  legions 

with  which  Marcus  meant  in  43  to  expel  Decimus  Brutus  from  Gallia 

Cisalpina.      Dolabella  hurried  off  before  the  end  of  his  consulship  to 

wrest  Syria  from  Cassius,  who  had  arrived  there  before  him.    M.  Brutus 

leaving  Italy  with  Cassius,  and  parting  from  him  at  Athens,  spent  the 

autumn  there  in  preparing  to  oust  Gains  Antonius  from  Macedonia. 

The  constitutionalists,  now  led  by  Cicero,  who  since  the  Ides  of  Antony's 

March   had   thrown   himself  into   politics   with    immense  vigour, —  ^"^  °f  ^ 

viewed  the  proceedings  of  Antony  with  increasing  alarm  and  dislike.     '^^^"'^  ^ 

By  means  of  Caesar's  papers,  in  which  his  enemies  declared  that  he 

found  whatever  he  wished,   he  lavished  immunities  on  towns  and 

peoples,  restitutions  of  exiles,  grants  of  lands,  and  privileges  of  all 

description  ;  and  is  accused  of  using  the  treasure  which  fell  into  his 

hands  to  relieve  himself  of  an  enormous  burden  of  debt.      He  had  a 

large  body-guard  of  soldiers.      Through  his  brother  Lucius,  who  was 

a  tribune,  he  gratified  the   veterans,  whom  he  frequently  visited  in 

their  settlements,  by  an  agrarian  law,  and  by  adding  a  third  decuria 

to  the  juries  to  consist  of  those  who  had  served  as  centurions.      To 

secure  a  longer  hold  on  power  he  abrogated  Caesar's  law  limiting  the 

tenure   of  the  provinces.    He  had  also  outbidden  the  Ciceronians  in  His  deal- 

regard   to   Sextus  Pompeius,   who  since  the  battle  of   Munda  had  ^'^S^  '^^^^ 

collected  a  considerable  force  in  Spain.      Cicero  had  looked  to  his   J^^^^ . 

.       ^        ,     .     .  .       ,  Pompeius. 

certam  enmity  to  Antony  as  a  security  for  their  interests  m  the  west ; 

but  Antony  now  secured  his  alliance  by  agreeing  to  his  restitution  to 

his  father's  property.^     It  was  clear  that  Antony  meant   to  be  as 

1  Letter  of  Dec.  Brutus  in  Cic.  Fam.  xi.  i.         2  Cicero,  ad  Att.  xv.  9-1 1. 

2  Sext.  Pompeius  conquered  Asinius  Pollio  in  farther  Spain,  but  yielded  to 
the  persuasions  of  Lepidus,  who  went  to  visit  him  (Dio.  xlv.  10). 


766 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


powerful  as  Caesar,  and  that  the  crime  of  the   Ides  of  March  had 
not  restored  the  constitution. 

The  situation  was  farther  comphcated  by  the  intervention  of  the 
dictator's  great-nephew,  the  young  Gains  Octavius.  He  was  the 
son  of  Gains  Octavius  Rufus,  once  propraetor  of  Macedonia,  and 
Atia,  daughter  of  M.  Atius  Balbus  and  luha,  sister  of  luhus  Caesar. 
He  had  been  treated  for  some  years  as  his  great-uncle's  heir  pre- 
sumptive. On  taking  the  toga  virilis  in  48  he  had  at  once  been 
elected  a  pontifex  in  succession  to  Ahenobarbus,  killed  at  Pharsalus. 
His  health,  or  his  mother's  timidity,  prevented  his  accompanying 
Caesar  to  Africa  in  47-46,  but  he  took  part  in  the  triumphs  of  46,  and 
had  afterwards  been  put  in  charge  of  some  minor  official  duties. 
Though  he  was  again  prevented  by  illness  from  accompanying 
Caesar  to  Spain  at  the  end  of  46,  he  joined  him  there  in  45,  shortly 
after  the  battle  of  Munda ;  accompanied  him  to  Carthage  ;  and  on 
his  return  to  Rome  was  named  one  of  Caesar's  two  rnagistri  equitum 
for  the  Parthian  expedition.  Meanwhile  he  had  been  sent  to 
Apollonia,  with  Maecenas,  Agrippa,  and  other  friends,  to  pursue  his 
studies,  and  to  learn  military  duties  with  some  of  the  cavalry  from 
the  camp.  Here  he  was  informed  by  a  letter  from  his  mother  of 
the  murder  of  Caesar.  He  did  not  know  to  what  extent  he  was  his 
uncle's  heir  ;  but  he  determined  at  once  to  return  to  Italy,  and  reached 
the  villa  of  his  step-father,  L.  Marcius  Philippus,  near  Naples,  on  the 
1 6th  of  April.  He  had  declined  offers  of  help  from  the  army  in  Mace- 
donia, but  came  with  a  steady  resolve  to  avenge  his  uncle  ;  and, 
when  he  knew  that  he  was  his  heir  and  adopted  son,  he  determined 
to  accept  the  inheritance  with  all  its  consequences.  Proceeding  to 
Rome  he  cautiously  felt  his  way,  for  the  present  concealing  all 
intentions  of  revenge,  and  only  letting  it  be  known  that  he  would 
carry  out  his  "  father's  "  will.  The  legacies  to  the  citizens  were  paid, 
the  temple  of  Venus  Genetrix,  dedicated  by  the  dictator,  finished,  and 
the  games  vowed  by  lulius  with  it  given.  From  the  first  he  found 
himself  slighted  and  thwarted  by  Antony.  He  had  great  difficulty 
in  getting  possession  of  his  uncle's  money,  Antony  claiming  much  of 
it  as  public  property  ;  the  passing  of  a  lex  curiata  for  his  formal 
adoption  into  the  lulian  gens  was  vetoed  by  a  Tribune  (probably  L. 
Antonius)  ;  and  when  as  an  alternative  he  sought  to  be  himself  elected 
tribune  in  place  of  Helvius  Cinna,  the  patriciate  conferred  on  him  by 
his  uncle,  or  perhaps  his  age,  was  held  to  bar  his  wish.  Thus  checked 
he  appealed  to  the  veterans  planted  in  various  parts  of  Campania  ; 
and  Antony  in  alarm  came  to  some  terms  with  him,  whereby  he 
obtained  a  large  part  of  his  uncle's  property,  and  the  opposition  to 
his  acting  as  his  heir  was  withdrawn,  though  the  formal  adoption 
was    not    completed    until  after  the  war  of   Mutina.       Henceforth, 


1 


xLVi  OCTAVIUS  AND  ANTONY  7^7 

however,  he  is  known  by  his   uncle's  name,i  and  by  such  we  may 
speak  of  him. 

He  was  in  a  position  of  great  delicacy.      As  the  friend  of  his  Difficult 
uncle  and  the  vindicator  of  his  reputation,  he  must  have  felt  bound  ^Q^^^^^^f 
to  support  Antony  and  oppose  the  Ciceronians.      On  the  other  hand,  ^^ 
he  had  no  intention  of  allowing  Antony  to  use  Caesar's  name  to  obtain 
absolute  power  and  render  his  own  position  insecure.     Yet  while,  to 
protect  himself,  he  held  communication  with   Cicero  and  the  con- 
stitutionalists, he  was  well  aware  that  they  regarded  him  only  as  a 
means  of  opposing  Antony,  and  would  turn  on  him  as  soon  as  they 
had  got  rid  of  that  dangerous  enemy.     While  keeping  up,  therefore,  a 
semblance  of  respect  for  Antony  as  consul,  he  was  consulting  with 
Cicero  and  providing  for  his  own  safety.      He  was  even  accused  of 
hiring  assassins  to  kill  the  consul  as  he  was  about  to  start  for  Brun- 
disium  in   October,  to  meet  the  legions  brought  from  Macedonia.^ 
With  these  legions  some  believed  that  Antony  meant  to  come  to 
Rome  and  carry  all  his  measures  by  force.      Caesar,  on  this  pretext, 
enrolled  soldiers   on   his   own   account   among  the  veterans  in  Cam-  He  enrols 
pania  and  Samnium  ;    and  by  offering  a  liberal  bounty  had   3000  ^  legion. 
men  under  arms  before  the  end  of  November.      He  professed  to  be 
acting  for  the  protection,  and  under  the   authority,  of  the   Senate, 
though  in  reality  he  had  no  authority  and  no  official  position.      He 
also  sent  agents  to  win  over  the  four  legions  at  Brundisium,  where 
Antony  had  been  met  with  signs  of  mutiny,  which  he  repressed  with 
great  severity.      In  this  Caesar  was  so  successful  that  two  of  the  four 
legions,    the    4th    and    the    Martia,    instead    of  proceeding   by  the  Antony 
coast  to  await  Antony  at  Ariminum,  turned  off  the  road  and  came  returns  to 
to  Alba  Fucentia ;  and  the  legates  of  Antony,  who  meanwhile  had     ^^^^' 
returned  to  Rome  along  the  Appian  Way  with  a  strong  guard,  were  ^^^^^ 
repelled  from  the  walls  of  Alba  with  stones. 

The  two  antagonists  were  now  at  the  head  of  forces  in  Italy  : 
Antony  at  Rome,  Caesar  at  Capua.  Antony  met  the  Senate  on  the 
28th  of  November  ;  but  did  not,  as  was  expected,  demand  a  decree 
declaring  Caesar  a  hostis.  He  brought  forward  some  formal  busi- 
ness, among  other  things  a  sortitio  for  the  provinces,  by  which  Gaius 
Macedonia   fell  to  his  brother   Gaius.     The   edict   summoning   the  Antomus 

meeting  had  contained  severe  reflections  on  Caesar  :  but  the  evident  ^,  f^*'^^    . 

°  .  '  Macedonia. 

annnus  of  the  senators,   or  the   growmg  power  of  Caesar,    or  the 

^  Octavius,  as  soon  as  he  knew  of  his  uncle's  will,  took  the  name  of  Gaius 
lulius  Caesar  Octavianus,  and  is  henceforth  known  as  Caesar.  But  there  was  at 
first  some  hesitation  in  his  family  as  to  so  addressing  him  (Cicero,  ad  Att.  xiv.  12). 

2  Suetonius,  Aug.  10.  Cicero  believed  it,  though  most  people  thought  it  a 
trick  of  Antony's  to  discredit  him  {ad  Fam.  xii.  23).  Neither  Plutarch  nor  Appian 
seems  to  believe  it  {Anton,  xvi.  ;  B.  Civ.  iii.  39). 


768 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


44- 


Afttony'  s 
first  breach 
with  the 
Senate, 


defection  of  the  two  legions,  caused  him  to  alter  his  plans.  Instead 
of  stopping  in  Rome  till  May  (43)  he  withdrew  first  to  Tibur,  and,  being 
there  supported  by  fresh  levies  and  partisans,  joined  his  forces  at 
Ariminum  at  the  beginning  of  December.  His  purpose  was  to  eject 
Decimus  Brutus  from  Gallia  Cisalpina  ;  and  he  reckoned  on  the 
support  of  Lepidus  from  Narbonensis,  Asinius  Pollio  from  farther 
Spain,  Plancus  from  farther  Gaul. 

Antony  once  gone,  his  enemies  took  courage,  Cicero  in  August 
had  despaired  of  the  republic,  and  had  set  out  with  a  libera  legatio 
from  Dolabella  for  Greece.  He  had  returned  from  Rhegium, 
because  he  had  heard  that  Antony  was  using  more  conciliatory 
language,  but  on  the  2nd  of  September  had  been  goaded  by  Antony's 
attacks  to  declare  the  grievances  of  his  party  in  a  speech  known  as  the 
first  Philippic.  This  drew  a  bitter  answer  from  Antony  on  the  1 8th, 
to  which  he  had  replied  in  the  venomous  pamphlet  known  as  the 
second  Philippic.  No  compromise  was  possible  after  that.  And 
now  an  edict  sent  by  Decimus  Brutus  to  Rome  from  Gallia  Cisal- 
pina, forbidding  any  one  with  imperium  to  enter  his  province,  drew 
from  the  Senate  what  was  practically  a  declaration  of  war  in  the 
shape  of  a  resolution,  to  be  moved  on  the  i  st  of  January  by  the  new 
consuls  C.  Pansa  and  Aul.  Hirtius,  adopting  the  claims  of  Decimus 
Brutus  and  others  in  possession  of  provinces,  and  approving  the 
action  of  Caesar  and  of  the  two  legions  which  had  joined  him. 

When  the  Senate  met  on  the  ist  of  January,  Caesar  was 
already  on  his  way  to  Gaul  with  the  two  legions  from  Alba 
Fucentia,  and  the  third  which  he  had  enrolled  himself;  and  Antony 
was  already  besieging  Decimus  Brutus  at  Mutina.  After  several 
days'  debate  it  was  resolved  to  give  Caesar  a  distinct  position  as 
pro-praetor ;  to  send  Hirtius  to  the  seat  of  war  with  two  legions 
(the  3rd  and  35th,  which  had  volunteered)  ;  but  at  the  same  time  to 
send  three  legates  to  Antony  to  announce  to  him  the  decision  and 
endeavour  to  obtain  a  peaceful  solution.  Antony's  demands  in 
answer  were  held  to  be  impossible.  He  was  willing  to  accept 
Gallia  Comata  instead  of  Gallia  Cisalpina,  with  six  legions,  for  five 
years,  or  for  so  long  as  M.  Brutus  and  Cassius  were  consuls  or  pro- 
consuls, on  condition  that  all  his  acta  were  confirmed,  including  his 
dealing  with  the  treasure  in  the  temple  of  Ops,  the  assignments  made 
under  his  agrarian  law,  and  his  judicial  law.  The  Senate  in  reply 
voted  that  there  was  a  tumulhisj  that  Lepidus  and  Plancus  should 
be  summoned  to  the  aid  of  the  state  ;  and  that  the  suppression  of 
the  tumultus  should  be  entrusted  to  the  consuls  and  Caesar.  Lastly, 
an  indemnity  was  offered  to  all  soldiers  serving  with  Antony  who 
quitted  him  before  the  Ides  of  March.  Cicero  was  for  more  extreme 
measures  :  for  acknowledging  a  "  war,"  and  for  proclaiming  Antony  a 


XLVi  BATTLES  NEAR  MUTINA  769 

hostls.     But  the  consulares  in  the  Senate  were  more  timid  or  cautious^ 
and  Antony's  name  was  omitted. 

From  the  latter  part  of  February  till  the  i  5  th  of  April  the  armies  Siege  of 
of  the  Republic  were  watching  Antony,  who  held  places  on  both  sides  Mutina. 
of  Mutina  along  the  via  Aemilia — Rhegium  Lepidi  and  Parma  on 
the  west,  Bononia  on  the  east — while  Hirtius  was  at  Claterna,  eleven 
miles  east  of  Bononia,  and  Caesar  at  Forum  Cornelii,  nine  miles 
farther  east.     The  Ciceronians  were  vainly  expecting  Decimus  Brutus 
to  break  out  from  Mutina,  and  deliberating  on  the  necessity  of  sum- 
moning  M.    Brutus   and  his   army  from    Macedonia.      But  though 
some  skirmishing  took  place,  nothing  decisive  occurred  till  the  i  5th 
of  April.      On  the  evening  of  the  1 4th  Pansa  had  arrived  at  Bononia 
with  another  consular  army.      An  attempt  on  the  part  of  Antony  to 
intercept   the   advance  of  the   combined   armies   half-way  between 
Bononia  and  Mutina,  though  at  first  successful,  was  finally  defeated  Battle  at 
with  great  loss  ;  and  on  the  next  day  his  camp  was  all  but  stormed  I'^rum 
by   Caesar   and    Hirtius.      The    latter,    however,    was   killed    in    the  \ra^/^^"^ 
struggle,  and  his  death  was  soon  followed  by  that  of  Pansa,  who  had  pranco), 
been  wounded  in  the  engagement  of  the  1 5th.      But  Antony  had  ijtk  April 
suffered  so  severely  that  he  broke  up  the  siege  of  Mutina,  retreated  43- 
along  the  via  Aemilia;  reached  Vada  Sabbata  by  the  pass  between  Death  of 
the  Apennines    and    the   Maritime    Alps  ;    and  being  there  joined  ^^^,  consuls 
by  a  reinforcement    under    the    praetor  Ventidius,i   entered    Gaul,  ijltl^^and 
hoping    to    be   joined    by  Lepidus    and    Plancus.      These    men    in  Pansa. 
their  despatches  had  been  loud  in  expressions  of  fidelity  to  the  Senate,  Antony  s 
but  did  in  fact  presently  join  him — Lepidus   on  the   29th   of  May,  retreat  into 
Plancus  later  in  the  summer.      Decimus  Brutus  had  followed  Antony  Gallia 
two  days  after  he  left  Mutina  ;  but  Caesar  refused  to  join  in  the   ^^^^■^- 
pursuit,  or  to  allow  him  any  of  his   legions  ;    and    Brutus   did  not  ^^^^^^' 
venture  to  Vada  Sabbata.      His  despatches  up  to  the  3rd  of  June  ^^^^^^^ 
show  him  to  be  intending  to  enter  Gaul  by  the  pass  of  the  Little  St.  piancus. 
Bernard,  in  hopes  of  a  junction  with  Plancus.      This  towards  the  end 
of  June  he  effected ;  but  when  Plancus  joined  Antony  and  Lepidus, 
he  was  obliged  to  recross  the  Alps,  and  endeavour  to  reach  Ravenna  Death  of 
in  order  to  join  M.  Brutus  in  Macedonia.      From  this  he  was  cut  off  Decimus 
by  the  advance  of  Caesar.      His  army  dispersed,  and  he  endeavoured  ^'^^^^^l 
to  reach  the  Rhine  ;  but  was  eventually  captured  and  put  to  death  by 
a  chief  of  the  Sequani,  acting  under  orders  from  Antony. 

^  P.  Ventidius  Bassus  of  Picenum  was  said  to  have  been  brought  a  captive  to 
Rome  in  the  Social  war.  He  had  served  Caesar  in  Gaul  and  been  nominated 
by  him  praetor  for  43.  In  virtue  of  his  office  and  of  the  special  decree  of  the 
Senate  he  enrolled  a  legion  and  marched  to  Potentia,  but  instead  of  proceeding 
to  Mutina  turned  off,  and  by  a  forced  march  across  the  Apennines  joined 
Antony  at  Vada  Sabbata. 

3D 


autumn  of 
43- 


770 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP 


C.  Cassius 
in  Syria. 

M.  Brutus 
in  Mace- 
donia. 


The  Senate 

slight 

Octavian. 


He 

demands 
the  consul- 
ship. 


Meanwhile  Caesar  had  secured  himself  at  Rome.  The  defeat 
and  flight  of  Antony  left  him  in  a  peculiar  position.  The  Ciceroniai 
party  in  the  Senate  might  feel  that  they  no  longer  needed  him 
They  were  encouraged  by  the  success  of  Brutus  and  Cassius.  Dola 
bella,  after  treacherously  murdering  C.  Trebonius  in  Asia,  had  beei 
defeated  by  Cassius  at  Laodicea  and  driven  to  commit  suicide,  anc 
Cassius  was  in  undisputed  possession  of  Syria.  In  December  4^ 
M.  Brutus,  having  collected  a  considerable  force  in  Greece,  took  ove 
Macedonia  from  Q.  Hortensius  at  Demetrias,  advanced  to  Dyr 
rachium,  and  in  the  spring  of  43  captured  C.  Antonius  nea 
Buthrotum.  One  decree  of  the  Senate  in  the  month  of  April  addec 
Illyricum  to  the  province  of  Brutus,  and  another  committed  th( 
defence  of  the  Empire  east  of  the  Adriatic  to  Brutus  and  Cassiu: 
jointly.  Encouraged  by  these  circumstances,  the  Senate  soon  showec 
that  they  meant  to  dispense  with  Caesar.  On  the  news  of  the  battl( 
of  the  15th,  the  complimentary  decrees  passed  conveyed  no  specia 
honour  to  him,  and  the  messengers  who  carried  them  to  the  arm] 
communicated  directly  with  the  soldiers  without  taking  notice  o 
Caesar.  His  demand  of  the  consulship  and  of  a  triumph  wa: 
rejected,  though  he  was  granted  consular  rank  {pr7iainc7ita  consii 
laria)  and  an  ovation.  At  the  same  time  votes  were  passed  con 
firming  Brutus  and  Cassius  in  their  provinces,  and  nominating 
Sextus  Pompeius  commander  of  the  fleet.  Pansa  on  his  death-bee 
had  warned  Caesar  that  the  Ciceronians  were  only  using  him  t( 
thwart  Antony,  and  he  was  informed  of  a  saying  of  Cicero's  tha 
"the  young  man  was  to  be  praised,  complimented,  and  got  rid  of." 

Finally,  on  the  death  of  the  consuls,  decemviri.,  among  whon 
Cicero  was  one,  had  been  nominated  {constitiiendae  reipiiblicae 
to  undo  the  acta  of  Antony  ;  and  they  were  already  meddling  wit! 
the  assignation  of  lands  to  the  veterans.  Caesar  therefore  had  ; 
double  reason  for  trusting  his  legions,  of  whom  the  4th  and  th( 
Martia  absolutely  refused  obedience  to  the  decree  ordering  them  t< 
join  Decimus  Brutus.  After  some  fruitless  messages,  he  sent  a  depu 
tation  of  400  men,  under  a  centurion  named  Cornelius,  to  ask  th( 
Senate  for  the  consulship,  and  Cornelius  in  the  Senate-house,  touching 
the  hilt  of  his  sword,  said  bluntly,  "  If  you  do  not  give  it,  this  will.' 
Cicero  seems  during  the  summer  to  have  wished  for  some  compromise 
when  M.  Brutus  failed  to  come  over  from  Macedonia.  But  he  wa: 
believed  to  have  a  scheme  for  a  second  consulship  with  Caesar,  anc 
was  laughed  down.  The  extreme  party  had  got  beyond  him,  anc 
still  trusted  in  the  forces  gathered  round  M.  Brutus  and  Cassius  in  th< 
East,  and  in  the  legions  which  Cornificius  was  sending  from  Africa. 


^  Laudandum  adolescentem  ornandum  tollendum  (Cicero  ad  Fam.  xi.  20,  21), 


XLVI  THE  TRIUMVIRATE  771 

Caesar  sent  a  conciliatory  message  to  Antony,  and  set  out  for  Caesar 
Rome  with  his  three  legions.      The  Senate  ordered  the  army  not  to  Octavianus 
approach  within  a  hundred  miles  of  the  city.      It  was  its  last  inde-  ^^^"  ' 
pendent  decree.      By  the  middle  of  August  Caesar  was  in   Rome, 
interreges  duly  appointed,  and  on  the   19th  he  and  his  cousin,  Q. 
Pedius,  were  elected  consuls.     The  rest  followed.      The  soldiers  were 
satisfied  with  pay  and  bounties  ;  Caesar  was  named  commander  both  of 
his  own  legions  and  those  of  Decimus  Brutus,  with  imperium  superior  to 
all  others  in  all  camps  ;  the  care  of  the  city  was  committed  to  him  ; 
and  a  lex  curiata  for  his  admission  to  gens  lulia  passed.      Pedius  also  Trial 
carried  a  law  constituting  a  qicaestio  for  the  trial  of  the  assassins,  of  the 
in  which  sentence  of  oudawry  was  passed  on  all.      One  of  them,  ^^^^^^^^^' 
Casca,  was   a   tribune,  but  had  fled  from  Rome   at   the   approach 
of  Caesar,  and  was  now  solemnly  deprived  and  condemned  with  the 
rest. 

After  less  than  a  month  in  Rome  Caesar  advanced  northward  to  Negotia- 
attack  Decimus  Brutus.     This  advance,  as  we  have  seen,  had  been  .^^'^/^^^^ 
sufficient  to  cut  off  his  escape  to  Ravenna,  and  had  indirectly  caused 
his  death  in  Gaul.     But  Caesar  was  now  anxious  for  a  reconciliation 
with  Antony  and  Lepidus  ;  for  only  so  could  he  hope  to  be  able  to 
crush  M.  Brutus  and  Cassius.     Pedius,  no  doubt  by  his  suggestion, 
carried  a  decree  in  the  Senate,  reversing  those  which  had  declared 
Antonius,  Lepidus,  and  their  followers  hostes j  and  Caesar,  on  hear- 
ing of  the  death  of  Decimus  Brutus,  again  opened  communications 
with  Antony,  now  joined  by  Plancus  from  farther  Gaul,  and  Pollio 
from  Spain,  neither  of  whom  stood  in  the  way  of  peace.     A  meeting  Meeting  of 
was  arranged  on  an  island  in  a  tributary  of  the  Po  ;  and  arrangements  ^«^-^«^  ««^ 
made  on  the  second  day,  which  practically  suspended  the  republican  yyr^/^^' 
constitution.      Caesar,  Antony,  and  Lepidus  were  to  be  iresviri  rei- 
publicae  co?tstittcendae  for  five  years,  with  absolute  powers,  were  to 
form  in  fact  a  dictatorship  in  commission — Caesar  abdicating  the 
consulship.      The  ordinary  magistrates  were  to  be  appointed,  but  the   Trium- 
triumvirs  were  to  nominate  them  at  once  for  the  quinquennium.     The  '^^^^^us  rei 
western  provinces  were  to  be  divided  between  the  three,  who  were  ^ndaf^^^' 
to  nominate  legati  in  them, — Antony  taking  all  the  Gauls  except 
Narbonensis ;    Lepidus,    Narbbnensis    and   Spain ;    Caesar,    Africa, 
Sardinia,  and  Sicily  with  other  islands.      Lepidus  was  to  have  charge 
of  Rome  with  three  legions  ;  Caesar  to  have  three,  and  Antony  four, 
with  which  to  crush  Brutus  and  Cassius.      As  a  confirmation  of  the 
peace  thus  made   Caesar  was  betrothed    to   Clodia,   a   daughter  of 
Antony's  wife  Fulvia  by  her  former  husband  Publius  Clodius.     Finally,   The  pro^ 
a  clause  in  the  agreement,  concealed  for  the  present  from  the  army,  scription. 
arranged  for  the  execution  of  certain  members  of  the  opposite  party. 
Caesar  seems  to  have  wished  to  confine  the  list  to  the  assassins  of 


772 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


The 

triumviri 
reipublicae 
constitu- 
endae 
appointed 
by  law, 
sytli  Nov. 
43- 


Death  of 
Cicero, 
Decejnber 
43- 


lulius,  and  is  indeed  said  by  several  of  our  authorities  to  have  been 
opposed  to  it  altogether.^  It  seems  certain  that  he  endeavoured  to 
save  Cicero,  but  gave  way  to  Antony,  who  in  his  turn  allowed  Lepidus 
to  place  his  uncle  Lucius  Caesar  on  the  list  in  return  for  the  privilege 
of  inserting  the  name  of  Lepidus'  own  brother  L.  Paullus.  Seven- 
teen names  were  in  the  first  list  sent  forward  to  the  consul  Pedius, 
who  tried  to  calm  the  excitement  and  terror  at  Rome  by  assuring  all 
(apparently  believing  what  he  said)  that  no  more  were  to  be  punished. 
But  when  the  three  triumvirs  arrived  at  Rome,  each  with  a  praetorian 
guard  and  a  legion,  at  the  end  of  November,  and  were  duly  con- 
stituted in  their  new  office  by  a  law  proposed  by  the  tribune  Publius 
Titius  (November  27),  this  assurance  was  quickly  falsified.  Next 
morning  a  long  edict  was  fixed  up  in  the  Forum  justifying  the 
measures,  and  containing  a  list  of  130  names,  followed  shortly 
afterwards  by  another  list  of  150.2  Death  was  denounced  on  all 
who  sheltered  or  concealed,  a  large  reward  offered  to  every  freeman, 
and  liberty  to  every  slave,  who  betrayed  or  killed  them.  The  blood- 
shed in  Rome  itself  must  soon  have  been  over,  as  it  would  not  be 
difficult  to  find  the  condemned  ;  but  in  December  and  January  the 
dreadful  work  went  on  in  Italy,  soldiers  scouring  towns  and  villages 
in  search  of  the  proscribed. 

The  most  illustrious  victim  was  M.  Tullius  Cicero.  He  had  com- 
mitted himself  with  such  rancour  against  Antony,  and  had  taken 
such  a  foremost  place  in  the  policy  of  the  Senate  since  the  death  of 
the  dictator,  that  he  could  hardly  have  hoped  to  escape.  The 
limits  of  vituperation  in  political  life  at  Rome  were  wide ;  but  the 
second  Philippic  was  hard  to  forgive,  and  supported  as  it  was  by 
speech  after  speech  scarcely  less  offensive,  it  explains  if  it  does  not 
justify  Antony's  implacability.  Nor  had  Caesar  any  reason  to  trust 
him.  When  he  came  to  Rome  in  August  for  the  consulship,  Cicero, 
who  had  corresponded  with  and  professed  friendship  to  him,  had 
caught  at  a  rumoured  intention  of  the  legions  to  abandon  him,  and 
joined  in  a  last  attempt  to  bring  fresh  republican  forces  to  over- 
whelm him,  and  had  fled  by  night  from  Rome  when  the  rumour 


1  Velleius  ii.  66  ;  Suet.  Aug.  xxvii.  ;  Dio.  xlvii.  7.  Velleius  writing  in  the  time  of 
Tiberius  could  hardly  have  spoken  out  even  if  he  had  wished.  Dio  remarks  that 
Caesar's  youth  prevented  him  from  having  many  enemies  on  whom  he  would 
wish  to  wreak  vengeance.  Suetonius  says  that  he  opposed  the  proscription,  but 
carried  it  out  when  settled  more  severely  than  either. 

2  Appian  says  300  senators  and  2000  equites  were  proscribed  [Bell.  Civ.  iv.  5); 
Livy  (Ep.  120),  130  senators  and  plurimi  equites.  Livy  perhaps  refers  to  the 
number  actually  killed,  Appian  to  those  on  the  lists.  Two  havens  of  refuge  were 
open — i.e.  the  camp  of  M.  Brutus  in  Macedonia,  and  that  of  Sext.  Pompeius  in 
Sicily,  Of  sixty-nine  names  mentioned  by  Appian  he  narrates  the  escape  in  one 
way  or  another  of  thirty-one. 


M.  BRUTUS  AND  C.  CASSIUS  773 


proved  false.  He  and  his  brother  Quintus  were  at  his  Tusculan 
villa  when  they  heard  of  the  proscription.  They  started  for  Astura, 
intending  to  take  ship  tt)  join  M.  Brutus  in  Macedonia.  In  their 
haste  they  had  forgotten  to  bring  money,  and  Quintus  turned  back  to 
Rome,  where  he  and  his  son  were  discovered  and  put  to  death  with 
great  cruelty.  Cicero  succeeded  in  getting  on  board  a  ship  ;  but 
from  irresolution  or  stress  of  weather  landed  again  at  Circeii,  whence 
he  started  for  Rome,  but  returned  and  re-embarked,  and  again  landed 
at  Caieta,  going  to  his  villa  at  Formiae.  As  he  lay  resting  there, 
news  came  that  the  soldiers  were  approaching.  His  slaves  hurried 
him  into  a  litter,  and  took  the  most  unfrequented  way  to  the  coast. 
Some  traitor  informed  Laenas,  who  commanded  the  company,  and 
who  had  once  been  defended  by  Cicero,  of  the  route.  They  quickly 
overtook  him  ;  and  when  Cicero  heard  the  tramp  of  their  feet  he 
ordered  his  slaves  to  set  down  the  litter,  and  thrusting  his  head  out  of 
the  curtains,  received  the  fatal  stroke  from  Herennius.  The  head 
and  hands  were  taken  to  Antony  at  Rome,  and  nailed  up  on  the 
Rostra,  and  Fulvia  is  said  to  have  thrust  her  bodkin  through  the 
tongue  that  had  spoken  such  bitter  words  of  her. 

But  the  triumvirs  found  themselves  in  straits  for  money,  in  spite  Fresh  con- 
of  the  reimposition  of  the  tributum  in  44.     It  was  impossible  to  realise  fiscations, 
full   value    for  confiscated   property  at    such   a  time,  or  to  punish  ^^• 
dishonest  agents,  who  were  mostly  soldiers.     A  kind  of  bloodless  pro- 
scription therefore  followed,  by  which  a  fine  of  10  per  cent  was  im- 
posed on  certain  persons.     Among  them  were  some  ladies,  who  by  Coss.  L. 
the  mouth  of  Hortensia  (daughter  of  the  orator)  loudly  protested,  and  Munatius 
with  partial  success.     It  was  a  relief  to  all  when  the  triumvirs  separated,  ^ 
after  making  provision  for  the  magistrates  to  be  appointed,  and  the  Aemilius 
execution  of  the  acta  of  lulius.      Lepidus  remained  at  Rome  ;  Antony  Lepidus  II. 
went  to  Brundisium  to  arrange   for  the   transport   of  the   army  to 
Macedonia ;   Caesar  to  Rhegium  to  put  down  Sextus  Pompeius,  now 
master  of  a  large  fleet  and  of  Sicily. 

M.  Brutus  had  been  acting  as  in  all  respects  lawful  governor  of  m.  Brutus 
Macedonia,  and  had   engaged  in  war  with  the  barbarians,  always  in 
attacking  its  frontier.      But  he  had  precluded  all  reconciliation  with  ^^^^^fjl'j" 
Antony — if  any  had  ever  been  possible,  by  ordering  or  allowing  the  ^j.^2. 
execution  of  his  brother  Gains,  some  say  in  retaliation  for  the  pro- 
scriptions, though  it  seems  probable  that  it  took  place  before  then. 
Towards  the  end  of  43  he  had  gone  to  the  Asiatic  side  of  the  Propontis, 
— still  maintaining  the  authority  granted  him  with  Cassius  over  all  east 
of  the  Adriatic, — and  had  collected  a  considerable  fleet  at  Cyzicus. 
Thence  in  42  he  sent  to  Cassius  to  meet  him  at  Smyrna.      Cassius   c.  Cassius 
had  been  equally  successful  in  Syria.      He  had  taken  over  the  troops  of  in  Syria, 
the  propraetors  Statius  Murcus  and  Marcus  Crispus,  as  well  as  those  of  '^■3-4^- 


774 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Caecilius  Bassus  ;  i  he  had  driven  Dolabella  to  suicide,  and  had  been 
joined  by  most  of  his  troops  ;  and  lastly,  had  also  collected  a  large  fleet, 
with  which  he  prevented  Cleopatra  from  sending  aid  to  Antony  and 
Caesar.  After  their  meeting  at  Smyrna  they  farther  extended  their 
operations  in  Asia  and  Rhodes,  collecting  money  and  troops.  Later 
Union  of  in  the  summer,  hearing  that  Antony  and  Caesar  were  at  length  com- 
Drutus  and  ing  to  Macedonia,  they  united  their  forces  at  Sardis  ^  and  proceeded 
to  the  Hellespont.  Thence  they  marched  along  the  coast  road 
and  found  Antony's  advanced  guard  stationed  between  Philippi 
and  Amphipolis.  They  occupied  two  heights  south  of  Philippi, 
between  it  and  the  sea  ;  drove  the  Caesarians  from  a  point  command- 
ing the  road  between  their  camps  and  the  shore,  called  Symbolum  ; 
and  were  thus  in  easy  communication  with  their  fleet,  which  under 
Cimber  held  the  island  of  Thasos  and  secured  them  their  provisions, 
Caesar  and  Antony  were  not  yet  arrived  at  Amphipolis.  Caesar  had 
been  engaged  all  the  spring  and  early  summer  in  a  doubtful  struggle 
with  Sextus  Pompeius  in  the  straits  of  Messina ;  Antony  had  been 
prevented  from  transporting  his  main  army  from  Brundisium  by  the 
opposition  of  Murcus  and  Ahenobarbus,  who  were  cruising  off  the 
coast.  Caesar  had  at  length  to  come  with  his  fleet  to  the  assistance 
of  his  colleague,  and  about  August  the  whole  army  was  across. 
Even  then  Caesar  was  detained  by  illness  :  and  when  he  arrived  at 
the  seat  of  war  he  found  the  army  somewhat  discouraged.  Brutus 
and  Cassius  were  too  strongly  posted  to  be  attacked  ;  could  not 
be  drawn  into  giving  battle  in  the  plain  ;  and  were  much  better  off 
than  their  opponents  for  provisions,  owing  to  the  presence  of  their 
fleet.  It  was  not  until  late  in  October  that  Antony,  by  laboriously 
constructing  a  causeway  across  a  marsh,  which  intervened  between 
the  camp  of  Cassius  and  the  sea,  induced  his  soldiers  to  descend  ; 
drove  them  back  with  great  slaughter  ;  and  seized  the  camp.  Mean- 
while Brutus  had  defeated  the  division  of  Caesar,  who  was  not  present 
in  person  from  illness,  and  had  sent  some  cavalry  to  announce  his  victory 
to  Cassius.  But  from  short  sight  or  haste  Cassius  mistook  them  for 
the  enemy,  and  retiring  to  his  tent  with  his  legate  Pindarus  stabbed 
himself  with  the  very  dagger,  it  is  said,  with  which  he  had  struck 
Caesar. 

Brutus    was    still    strongly   posted    and    equal    in   forces   to    his 
antagonists,  and  for  about  fourteen  days  refused  to  give  them  battle. 
He  was  farther  encouraged  by  hearing  that  some  reinforcements  sent 
from   Brundisium  to  Antony  had  been  cut  off  by  Ahenobarbus  ;  and! 
by  knowing  that  Antony  and   Caesar  were  in  great  straits  for  provi-j 
sions.       But    his    troops    were    so    confident   that   they   insisted   on  J 

^  See  p.  764  (note). 
2  This  is  the  time  of  the  famous  quarrel  and  reconciliation. 


Cassius  at 
Sardis,  ^2. 

The 

situation 
at  Philippi. 


Caesar  at 
Rhegiujn, 
Antony  at 
Brimdi- 


Difficultie. 
atPhilippi 


Fi7'st 
battle  of 
Philippi, 
and  death 
of  Cassins. 


Second 
battle  of 
Philippi, 
and  death 
ofM. 
Brutus, 
Nov.  42. 


x^  VI  THE  WAR  OF  PERUSIA  775 


ficrhtin^.  After  a  desperate  struggle  the  army  of  Brutus  broke  and 
fled  •  his  camp  was  stormed  ;  and  he  himself  retreated  with  four 
leL^ions  to  the  hills.  Next  morning  he  would  have  renewed  the 
fi^ht  but  his  officers  bade  him  consult  for  himself;  they  meant  to 
submit  and  try  to  save  their  lives.  Upon  this,  Brutus  exclamimg, 
"Then  I  am  of  no  more  use  to  my  country,"  persuaded  his  friend  Strato 
of  Epirus  to  give  him  the  death-stroke. 

With  the  death  of  Brutus  and  Cassius  fell  the  resistance  of  those  Effects  of 
nobles  who  had  for  so  many  centuries  guided  the  destiny  of  Rome  ;  the 
and  who,  with  many  glaring  vices,  had  on  the  whole  played  a  splendid 
part  in  the  world's  history.      Henceforth  it  was  only  a  question  who 
should  be  master  of  the  Empire.     A  new  distribution   was  made.  Fresh 
Antony  was  to  take  Gaul  and  Africa:  Caesar  Spain  and  Numidia.  ^---^^ 
Italy  was  to  be  common  to  both,  as  the  head  of  the  Empire  and  the 
recruiting  ground  for  the  armies.      If  Lepidus  was  proved  not  to  have 
held  treasonable  correspondence  with  Sextus  Pompeius,  as  he  had 
been  accused  of  doing,  he  was  to  have  Africa.      Meanwhile  Antony 
was  to  go  to  Asia  to  put  down  opposition  in  the   East   and   collect 
money  ;  Caesar  to  Rome,  to  carry  on  the  war  with  Sextus  Pompeius 
and  arrange  for  assignments  of  lands  to  the  veterans. 

From  this  moment  began  the  rivalry  which  was  only  ended  ten  41-  Coss. 
years   later    at    Actium.      Caesar  returned   to    Rome,  after    another  ^^^^^^^.^^ 
illness,  early  in  41,  and  found  an  opposition  prepared  for  him  by  ^.^^^^^ 
Antony's  wife  Fulvia  and  his  brother  Lucius,  who  had  triumphed  p, 
for  some  insignificant  successes  in  Gaul,  and  was  now  consul.    Lucius  Servihus 
and  Fulvia  soon  got  material  for  a  quarrel  in  the  distribution  of  land  ^^^^^.^^^^ 
to  the  veterans  :  Caesar  retaliated  by  divorcing  Fulvia's  daughter,  still  ^j 
a  mere  child.     Prices  were  high  at  Rome,  because  Sextus  Pompeius  ^^^^^^^_ 
and  Ahenobarbus  infested  the  seas  and  stopped  the  supply  of  corn.  ^-^^^ 
Dispossessed    landowners  naturally  resented  their  loss  ;  while,  if  the  i>eizveen 
confiscations  were  not  carried  out,  the  soldiers  mutinied.      Fulvia  and  Caesar 
Lucius  contrived  to  turn   the  odium  for  all  these  difficulties  upon  ^^^^^/.^^^ 
Caesar,  as  though  he  had  the  means,  if  he  chose,  of  satisfying  the  ^^^^ 
veterans  without  farther  confiscations  :  and  refused  to  fulfil  the  part  Fu 
of  the  agreement  between   Caesar  and    M.  Antony  (though   it  was 
written  and  sealed),  whereby  Caesar  was  to  have  two  of  his  legions. 
Both  sides  armed.    Caesar's  men  came  to  Rome  in  great  numbers, 
and  in  public  meeting  ordered  both  to  appear  at  Gabii  on  a  fixed  day 
to  state  their  case.      Lucius  refused  to  appear,  and  was  condemned 
in  his  absence,  while  Caesar's  a^a  were  confirmed.     Lucius,  having 
wrung  from  the  Senate  a  decree  authorising  him  to  conduct  a  war 
(no  enemy  apparently  being  mentioned),  endeavoured  to  lead  his  men 
to  Ariminum.     But  Caesar  had  occupied  Nursia  and  Sentinum  on 
the  Flaminian  road,  and  Lucius  and  Fulvia  turned  aside  to  Perusia. 


^"ulvia. 


776 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Siege,  and 
fall  of^ 
Perzisia, 
March  40. 


Ahenobar- 
bits  ceases 
to  hifest 
the  Italian 
coast. 

Antony 
and 

Cleopatra, 
41-40. 


Invasion  of 
Syria  and 
Asia  by  Q. 
Labienus 
and  the 
Parthians, 
40. 


40.    Coss. 

Cn. 
\    Domitius 
!    Calvimis 
*   //..  C. 
■:.   Asinius 
\   Pollio. 


Peace  of 
Brundi- 
sium, 

autmnn  of 
40. 


There,  after  a  long  siege,  they  were  reduced  by  hunger  to  submit 
(March  40).  Fulvia  and  her  children  went  to  Greece  ;  Lucius  was 
allowed  to  go  free,  and  was  presently  sent  on  service  to  Spain  ;  but 
considerable  severity  was  exercised  on  the  senators  and  equites  found 
in  the  town,  as  many  as  300,  it  is  said,  being  put  to  death,  and  the 
old  party  of  the  Optimates  seems  here  to  have  found  its  final  doom. 
No  other  outbreak  occurred  in  Italy,  except  a  short  and  easily 
suppressed  rising  of  dispossessed  landowners  in  Campania,  headed 
by  Tib.  Claudius  Nero,  the  husband  of  Caesar's  future  wife  Livia. 
The  pressure  on  the  market  was  also  relieved  by  the  departure  of 
Ahenobarbus,  who  sailed  away  to  join  Antony  :  and  Caesar  entered 
Rome  in  triumphal  robes  and  was  regarded  as  a  saviour  of  society. 

But  though  Caesar  seemed  now  securely  master  of  Italy  there 
appeared  to  be  danger  of  a  civil  war  between  him  and  M.  Antonius. 
When  the  two  parted  at  Philippi  Antonius  had  gone  to  Asia  to 
raise  money,  which  he  or  his  agents  did  with  great  severity.  But  at 
Tarsus  he  had  been  visited  by  Cleopatra,  summoned  to  answer  for 
help  given  by  her  generals  to  Cassius.  She  appeared  in  a  state  barge 
on  the  Cydnus,  lying  on  a  couch  in  the  guise  of  Venus,  surrounded  by 
Cupids  and  Graces.  Sweet  scents  were  wafted  to  the  banks,  and  the 
strains  of  flute  and  pipe  kept  time  for  the  silver  oars.  From  that 
moment  Antony  became  her  slave.  He  accompanied  the  queen  to 
Alexandria,  and  forgot  the  cares  of  state  in  banquets,  shows,  and  the 
chase.  From  this  dream  of  pleasure  he  was  wakened  in  April  (40) 
by  the  news  that  the  Parthians  were  invading  Syria  under  Q.  Labienus, 
a  son  of  Caesar's  old  officer,  who  having  been  sent  to  king  Orodes 
by  Cassius  had  remained  in  Parthia,  when  he  heard  of  the  disaster 
of  Phihppi.  Antony  roused  himself  to  go  with  his  fleet  to  Tyre  ;  but 
finding  that  Labienus  had  overrun  the  country  and  had  entered  Asia 
Minor,  and  that  nothing  could  be  done  at  present,  he  went  to 
Greece,  on  the  plea  that  his  presence  was  required  in  the  war  against 
Sext.  Pompeius.  There  he  met  Fulvia,  fresh  from  Perusia,  and  his 
mother  Julia,  who  had  since  been  with  Pompeius.  On  their  instiga- 
tion, though  he  roughly  rebuked  Fulvia,  he  resolved  to  make  terms 
with  Sextus  Pompeius  and  attack  Caesar ;  and,  in  fact,  with 
Ahenobarbus  and  Pompeius  did  make  some  raids  on  southern  Italy. 
But  on  the  death  of  Fulvia,  which  occurred  while  this  was  going  on, 
he  consented  to  treat  with  Caesar.  Ahenobarbus  was  sent  to 
l^ithynia,  Sextus  Pompeius  to  Sicily  ;  and  by  Maecenas  for  Caesar, 
and  Pollio  for  Antony,  an  arrangement  known  as  the  peace  of  Brun 
disium  was  made.  Antony  was  to  govern  all  east  of  the  Adriatic 
and  undertake  the  Parthian  war;  Lepidus  was  to  have  Africa; 
and  Caesar  all  the  rest,  undertaking  to  put  down  Pompdus.  Antony 
was  to  confirm  the  peace  by  marrying  Caesar's  sister  Octavia,  recently 


I 


XLVi  DEATH  OF  SEXTUS  POMPEIUS  777 

left  a  widow  by  Marcellus.  Asinius  Pollio,  who  seems  to  have 
abdicated  his  consulship,  had  next  year  the  conduct  of  an  expedition 
against  the  Parthini,  in  which  he  earned  a  triumph. 

This   was    followed    a  few  months   later  by  a   pacification  with  peace  with 
Sextus   at    Misenum,  in    accordance   with   which   he  was   to   cease  Sextus 
obstructing  the  corn   supply,  but  was  to  retain  the  government  of  Pompeius, 
Sardinia,    Corsica,    Sicily,    and    Achaia,    with    a    fleet,    during    the  ^^isenum. 
triumvirate,  and  to  have  the  consulship  in  due  course.      Those  who 
had  joined  him  (except  the  murderers  of  Caesar)  were  to  recover  their 
full  rights ;  and  he  was  to  receive  a  large  sum  of  money  in  compensa- 
tion for  his  father's  property.     Antony  then  returned  to  the  East  to 
make  his  preparations  against  the  Parthians. 

The  peace  with  Pompeius  did  not  last  long.     He  complained  that  Renewed 
the  terms  were  not  loyally  kept,  especially  on  the  part  of  Antony  in  acts  of 
regard  to  Peloponnese  ;  and  the  raids  on  corn  ships  began  again,  hostility  by 
and  with  them  the  distress  in  the  markets  at  Rome.      Antony  and  po^pgi-us 
Caesar  also   found  many  causes  of  mutual   dissatisfaction,  though  J8-36. 
from  time  to  time  they  were  allayed  by  the  influence  of  Octavia,  with 
whom  Antony  lived  for  nearly  two  years  in   Greece.      Finally,  how- 
ever, Caesar  was  left  to  cope  with  Pompeius  alone  :  and  it  was  not 
till  36,  after  many  dangers  and  some  reverses,  that  his  able  minister 
M.  Vipsanius  Agrippa  defeated   Pompey's  fleet  off  Naulochus   (3rd  Flight  ana 
September),  and  drove  him  to  fly  to  Asia,  where,  though  in  pur-  death  of 
suance  of  the  agreement  of  Misenum  he  was  consul  in  35,  he  was     ompeius, 
put  to   death   by    Marcus    Titius    on    Antony's    order,    of  which  he 
repented  too  late.      In  the  course  of  the  last  campaign  against  Sextus 
Lepidus  had    been   summoned   from  Africa   to  the  help  of  Caesar. 
Having  taken  Lilybaeum  and  Messana,    and    being   joined  by  the 
Pompeian   legions,    he   claimed    Sicily   for  himself,    and  was    even 
believed  to  have  made  a  plot  against  Caesar's  life.      But  his  army 
abandoned  him,  and  he  had  no   resource  but  to  fall  at  Caesar's  feet 
and  beg  for  pardon.      His  life  was  spared,  and  he  retained  his  office  Lepidus 
of  pontifex  maximus  till  his  death  (15);  but  henceforth  he  had  to  deprived  oj 
live  as  a  privatus  at  Circeii,  and  Africa  was  added  to  the  provinces  {'"  share 
under    Caesar's   control.      Moreover,  the    defeat  of  Pompey  was   so  /y/^^^^. 
great  a  relief  to  Rome  that  Caesar  at  once  became  the  hero  of  the  virate,  j6. 
day,  and  every  kind  of  honour  was  voted  to  him. 

The  triumvirate  had  been  renewed  for  a  second  five   years  in   The  secona 
a  conference  at  Tarentum  in   37,  apparently  without   a   fresh   law.   trium- 
One  member  of  it  had  been  since  deposed  or  forced  to  abdicate.      It  '^^^'^^"^'  ^^ 
would  be  a  question  which  of  the  other  two  was  to  be  supreme  when  j^^f  ^^^ 
the  period  ended.  j.j>. 

Antony  had  had"  a  chequered  career  since   2>'^.      His  legate  P. 
Ventidius  had  conquered  the  Parthians  in  that  year,  killed  Pacorus, 


778 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


son  of  king  Orodes,  and  driven  Labienus  (who  now  called  him- 
self "Parthian  Imperator")  into  Cilicia,  where  he  was  discovered 
and  killed.  But  Antony  was  jealous  ;  deposed  Ventidius,  who,  how- 
ever, was  allowed  a  triumph  ;  and  took  over  the  command  himself 
with  very  poor  results.  He  failed  in  the  siege  of  Samosata,  and  had 
to  make  inglorious  terms  with  Antiochus,  king  of  Commagene.  The 
war  in  the  next  year  (37)  was  continued  by  C.  Sosius,  governor  of 
Syria  and  Cilicia,  who  took  Jerusalem  and  restored  Herod  as  king 
of  ludaea.  In  36  Antonius  carried  on  a  disastrous  campaign  against 
Phraates,  king  of  Parthia.  His  legate  Oppius  was  cut  off  with  a 
whole  division  ;  and  Antony  in  hurrying  to  his  assistance,  though 
winning  some  minor  battles,  lost  large  numbers  of  men  ;  had  to  raise 
the  siege  of  Ecbatana ;  was  deserted  by  his  ally  Artavasdes  of 
Armenia  ;  was  continually  attacked  at  various  passes  in  Armenia  ; 
and  eventually  retired  inglorious  to  Egypt.  From  that  time  he  again 
fell  under  the  fascination  of  Cleopatra.  He  had  left  Octavia  in  Italy 
in  2)7 ■,  and  never  returned  to  her,  and  even  declined  to  see  her  in  35 
when  she  came  to  Greece  with  money  and  soldiers  from  Caesar, 
though  he  accepted  the  presents.  Henceforward  he  assumed  more 
and  more  the  position  of  an  emperor  of  the  East,  carving  out  king- 
doms and  setting  up  or  deposing  rulers.  Alexander,  his  son  by 
Cleopatra,  was  made  nominal  king  of  Abilene  (Palestine),  Crete, 
Cyrene,  and  Cyprus  ;  and  after  a  comparatively  successful  expedition 
in  Armenia  (34),  to  exact  vengeance  from  Artavasdes,  in  which  that 
king  was  treacherously  captured  and  brought  in  silver  chains  to 
Alexandria,  the  policy  of  treating  the  East  as  entirely  subject  to 
himself  and  Cleopatra  was  still  farther  extended.  Cleopatra  was  now 
styled  queen  of  queens  ;  her  son  Ptolemy,  openly  acknowledged  as  a 
son  of  lulius  and  named  Caesarion,  was  made  king  of  Syria  to  the 
Euphrates,  and  called  "king  of  kings"  ;  Alexander  was  made  king 
of  Armenia  and  all  beyond  the  Euphrates  ;  and  a  daughter  born  to 
him  by  Cleopatra  declared  queen  of  Libya  and  Cyrene  ;  while  in  t,'^^ 
though  going  on  an  expedition  nominally  directed  against  theParthians, 
he  contented  himself  with  making  a  treaty  with  the  king  of  Media. 
These  arrangements  he  desired  to  be  confirmed  by  the  Senate  at 
Rome.  But  the  accounts  of  his  proceedings  were  so  shocking  to  the 
pride  of  the  Romans,  who  believed  that  his  object  was  to  transfer  the 
centre  of  government  to  Alexandria, ^  that  the  consuls  for  32,  who 
were  his  friends,  endeavoured  to  suppress  the  despatch,  though  Caesar 
took  care  that  it  should  be  known. 

It  was  indeed  impossible  that  the  contrast  between  him  and 
Caesar  should  not  be  striking.  While  Antony  was  suffering  reverses 
in  Asia  or  revelling  in  Alexandria,  Caesar  had  been  performing  sub- 

^  A  similar  design  was  once  attributed  to  lulius  Caesar  (Suet.  ////.  79). 


XLVi  FINAL  QUARREL  OF  CAESAR  AND  ANTONY  779 

stantial  services  to  the  state.      His  friend  and  minister,  M.  Vipsanius  Contrast 
Agrippa,  had  in  38  suppressed  a  dangerous  rising  in  Gaul  ;  had  crossed  Caesar's 
tlie  Rhine  to  the  territory  of  the  Catti  ;  and  had  afterwards  subdued  ^^  ^^^* 
the   revolted   Aquitani.       In   35,   after    reHeving    the    city  from   the  ^^^f^"^^ 
distress  caused  by  Sextus   Pompeius,  Caesar  had  in  person  or  by 
legati   carried   on  difficult   expeditions  in   Illyricum  and  Pannonia, 
sailing  down  the  Danube  and  the  Save  as  far  as  Siscia  {Sissek),  lUyrian 
and  forcing  the  barbarians  to  respect  the  security  of  the  Roman  pro-  and 
vinces.     In  34  Messalla  had  suppressed  the  Salassi  for  him.      Statilius  Pannoma 
Taurus  had  pacified  Africa,  Norbanus  Flaccus  Spain.      He  had  also  ^^^  ^" 
at  his  own  expense,  or  that  of  his  friends,  begun  those  buildings  or 
restorations  which  made  his  reign  an  era  in  the  architectural  history 
of   Rome.       Accordingly,    though    Antony    still    had    partisans,    the 
people  generally  had  come  to  look  upon   Caesar  and  his  ministers 
as  offering  a  guarantee  for  peace  and  honour,  while  Antony's  name 
was  connected  with  scandalous  stories  or  unsuccessful  expeditions. 

The  second  tenure  of  the  triumvirate  was  to  expire  at  the  end  of  The 
33,  and  Antony  wrote  to  the  Senate  that  he  did  not  wish  to  be  grounds  ^ 
reappointed.  He  hoped  that  he  might  be  regarded  by  them  as  their  ^^^^^^  • 
champion  against  the  ambition  of  Caesar,  who  he  presumed  would 
not  be  willing  to  abandon  his  position  in  a  similar  manner.  The 
causes  of  mutual  dissatisfaction  between  the  two  had  been  con- 
tinually accumulating.  Antony  complained  that  Caesar  had  exceeded 
his  powers  in  deposing  Lepidus,  in  taking  over  the  countries  held  by 
Sextus  Pompeius,  in  enlisting  soldiers  for  himself  without  sending 
half  to  him.  Caesar  complained  that  Antony  had  no  authority  for 
being  in  Egypt ;  that  his  execution  of  Sextus  Pompeius  was  illegal  ; 
that  his  treachery  to  the  king  of  Armenia  disgraced  the  Roman 
name  ;  that  he  had  not  sent  half  the  proceeds  of  the  spoils  to  Rome 
according  to  his  agreement ;  that  his  connexion  with  Cleopatra  and 
the  acknowledgment  of  Caesarion  as  a  legitimate  son  of  lulius  were 
a  degradation  of  his  office  and  a  menace  to  himself 

The  quarrel  came  to  a  head  in  32.      The  consuls  of  that  year  j2.  Coss. 
had,  as  we  have  seen,  determined  to  conceal  the  extent  of  Antony's  Cn. 
demands.      Ahenobarbus  seems  to  have  wished  to  keep  quiet ;  but  ^^"^"'-^ 
C.  wSosius  on  the  ist  of  January  made  an  elaborate  speech  in  favour  i^arbtis,  C. 
of  Antony,  and  would  have  proposed  the  confirmation  of  his  acta  had  Sosius. 
it  not  been  vetoed  by  a  tribune.      Caesar  was  not  present,  but  at  the 
next  meeting  made  a  reply  of  such  a  nature   that   the  consuls  both 
left  Rome  to  join  Antony  ;  and  Antony,  when  he  heard  of  it,  after 
publicly  divorcing  Octavia,  came  at  once  to  Ephesus  with  Cleopatra,  Antony 
where  a  vast  fleet  was  gathered  from  all  parts  of  the  East,  of  which  and  his 
Cleopatra  furnished  a  large  proportion.      Thence,  after  some  months  ^^^^^  ^" 
of  splendid  festivities  with  the  crowd  of  princes  and  generals  collected 


78o 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


at  Samos,  he  removed  to  Athens.  His  land  forces  which  had  been 
in  Armenia  were  brought  down  to  the  coast  of  Asia,  and  embarked 
under  L.  Canidius  Crassus. 

Caesar  was  not  behindhand  in  preparations.  By  the  publication 
of  Antony's  will,  which  had  been  put  into  his  hands  by  the  traitor 
Plancus,  and  by  carefully  letting  it  be  known  at  Rome  what  prepara- 
tions were  going  on  at  Samos,  and  how  entirely  Antony  was  acting 
as  the  agent  of  Cleopatra,  he  had  produced  such  a  violent  outburst 
of  feeling  that  he  easily  obtained  his  deposition  from  the  consulship 
of  31,  for  which  he  was  designated,  and  a  vote  for  a  proclamation 
of  war  against  Cleopatra,  well  understood  to  mean  against  Antonius, 
though  he  was  not  named. 

He  meant  to  anticipate  an  attack  by  a  descent  upon  Italy  towards 
the  end  of  32,  and  came  as  far  as  Corcyra.  .  But  finding  the  sea 
guarded  by  a  squadron  of  Caesar's  ships  he  retired  to  winter  at 
Patrae,  while  his  fleet  for  the  most  part  lay  in  the  Ambracian  Gulf, 
and  his  land  forces  encamped  near  the  promontory  of  Actium,  while 
the  opposite  side  of  the  narrow  strait  into  the  Ambracian  Gulf  was 
also  protected  by  a  tower  and  a  body  of  troops. 

Caesar's  proposals  for  a  conference  with  Antony  having  been 
scornfully  rejected,  both  sides  prepared  for  the  final  struggle  next  year. 
The  early  months  passed  without  notable  event,  beyond  some 
successes  of  Agrippa  on  the  coasts  of  Greece  meant  to  divert  Antony's 
attention.  It  was  not  until  the  latter  part  of  August  that  troops 
were  brought  by  land  into  the  neighbourhood  of  Antony's  camp  on 
the  north  side  of  the  strait.  Still  Antony  could  not  be  tempted 
out.  It  had  required  some  months  before  his  full  strength  could  be 
collected  from  the  various  places  in  which  his  allies  or  his  ships  had 
wintered.  But  during  these  months  not  only  was  Agrippa  continuing 
his  descents  upon  Greek  towns  and  coasts,  but  in  various  cavalry 
skirmishes  Caesar  had  so  far  worsted  the  enemy  that  Antony 
abandoned  the  north  side  of  the  strait  and  confined  his  soldiers  to 
the  southern  camp,  Cleopatra  now  earnestly  advised  that  garrisons 
should  be  put  into  strong  towns,  and  that  the  main  fleet  should 
return  to  Alexandria.  The  large  contingent  furnished  by  Egypt  gave 
her  advice  as  much  weight  as  her  personal  influence  over  Antony  ; 
and  it  appears  that  this  movement  was  really  resolved  upon. 

Caesar  learnt  this  and  determined  to  prevent  it.  On  the  first 
day  of  September  he  issued  an  address  to  his  fleet,  preparing  them 
for  battle.  The  next  day  was  wet,  and  the  sea  was  rough  ;  and  when 
the  trumpet  signal  for  the  start  rang  out,  Antony's  fleet  began  issuing 
from  the  straits,  and  the  ships  moving  into  line  remained  quiet. 
Caesar,  after  a  short  hesitation,  ordered  his  vessels  to  steer  to  the 
right  and  pass  the  enemy's  ships.      Then  for  fear  of  being  surrounded 


xLVi  BATTLE  OF  ACTIUM  781 

Antony  was  forced  to  give  the  word  to  attack.      His  fleet  numbered  ji. 
500,    many   of  them   large   galleys  of  eight  or  ten  banks  of  oars, 
furnished  with  towers  full  of  armed  men.      Caesar  had  about  250 
ships,  generally  of  smaller  size,  but  more  manageable  in  the  heavy 
surf,  capable  of  reversing  their  course  at  a  short  notice,  and  returning  to 
the  charge,  or,  after  pouring  in  a  volley  of  darts  on  some  huge  adversary, 
able  to  retreat  out  of  shot  with  speed.      Antony's  ships  were  often 
furnished    with    grappling    irons,   which   were    effective   if  the  cast 
succeeded  ;  but,  if  it  failed,  were  apt  to  damage  the  ship,  or  to  cause 
so  much  delay  as  to  expose  the  men  on  board  to  the  darts  from  the 
smaller  vessel.     The  battle  raged  all  the  afternoon  without  decisive 
result.      But  Cleopatra,  on  the  rear  of  the  fleet,  could  not  bear  the  Cleopatra 
suspense,  and  in  an  agony  of  anxiety  gave  the  signal  for  retreat.  ^^^^  the 
A  breeze  sprang  up  in  the  right  direction,  and  the  Egyptian  ships  ^^JJ^  ^  ^^ 
were  soon  hurrying  out  of  sight.     Antony  had  not  observed  the  signal, 
and    believing   that  it   was   a  mere   panic,   and   that   all   was   lost, 
followed  the  flying  squadron.      The   contagion  spread  fast  ;    every- 
where sails  were  seen  unfurhng,  and  towers  and  other  heavy  fight- 
ing gear  going  by  the  board.      Yet  some  still  fought  on  ;   and  it  was 
not   till   long   after   nightfall,   when  many  a  ship  was  blazing  from 
the  firebrands  thrown  upon  them,  that  the  work  was  done.      For  General 
when  resistance  was  over,  Caesar  exerted  himself  to  save  the  crews  "^^^iory  of 
of  the  burning  vessels,  and  had  to  spend  the  whole  night  on  board. 
Next  day  such  of  the  land  army  as  had  not  escaped  to  their  own 
lands  submitted,  or  were  followed  in  their  retreat  to  Macedonia  and 
forced  to  surrender,  and  Antony's  camp  was  occupied.      It  was  all 
over,  and  the  Empire  had  a  single  master. 

Antony,  though  he  had  not  laid  down  his  imperium,  was  a  fugitive 
and  a  rebel,  without  that  shadow  of  a  legal  position  which  the  pres- 
ence of  the  consuls  and  senators  had  given  him  in  the  previous 
year.  Some  of  the  victorious  fleet  were  in  pursuit  of  him  ;  but  Caesar 
himself  spent  the  rest  of  the  year  in  Greece  and  Asia,  wintering  at 
Samos  ;  though  he  was  obliged  to  go  for  a  short  time  to  Brundisium 
to  settle  a  mutiny  and  arrange  for  assignations  of  land. 

At  Samos  he  received  a  message  from  Cleopatra  with  the  present  Cleopatra 
of  a  gold  crown  and  throne,  offering  to  abdicate  in  favour  of  her  sons.  ^^^^-^  ^^ 
The  queen  was  allowed  to  believe  that  she  would  be  well  treated,  ^^^^  ^^^^ 
for  Caesar  was  anxious  to  secure  her  for  his  triumph.      Antony,  who  jx-jo. 
had  found  himself  generally  deserted,    after  vainly  attempting   to 
secure  the  army  stationed  near   Paraetonium   under  Pinarius,   and 
sending  his  eldest  son  Antyllus  with  money  to  Caesar  and  an  offer  to 
live   at  Athens   as   a  private   citizen,   found   himself  in   the   spring 
attacked  on  two  sides.      C.  Cornelius   Callus  was  advancing   from 
Paraetonium;    and    Caesar  himself  landed  at  Pelusium,  with   the 


782 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


Death  of 

Antony 

and 

Cleopatra, 

30. 


Atitony 
and  Oct. 
Caesar 
contrasted. 


Changes  i?i 
the  Empire 
since  the 
death  of 
Julius. 


Mauri- 
tania. 


Egypt. 


connivance  it  was  believed  of  Cleopatra.  Antony  was  defeated  by 
Gallus,  and  returning  to  Egypt  advanced  on  Pelusium.  There  a 
slight  success  over  Caesar's  tired  soldiers  encouraged  him  to  make  a 
general  attack,  in  which  he  was  decisively  beaten.  Failing  to  escape 
on  board  ship  he  stabbed  himself;  and,  as  he  did  not  die  at  once, 
insisted  on  being  taken  to  the  mausoleum  in  which  Cleopatra  was 
shut  up,  and  there  died  in  her  arms.  The  queen  was  shortly  after- 
wards brought  from  this  place  to  the  palace ;  and  after  vainly 
attempting  to  move  Caesar's  passions  or  pity,  eluded  the  vigilance  of 
his  guards,  and  put  an  end  to  her  life,  as  it  was  believed,  by  the 
bite  of  an  asp  conveyed  to  her  in  a  basket  of  fruit : 

saevis  Lihurnis  scilicet  invidens 
privata  deduci  superbo 

nan  humilis  mulier  triumpho. 

Antony  had  some  attractive  qualities,  but  no  virtues.  His  dis- 
position was  open  and  not  ungenerous  ;  yet  his  easy  temper  permitted 
flagrant  oppression  on  the  part  of  subordinates,  and  made  him  the  slave 
of  now  one  passion  and  now  another.  It  was  a  good  thing  for  the 
world  that  the  victory  rested  with  his  colder  and  more  passionless 
rival.  Caesar  began  public  life  with  one  strong  feeling — a  desire  to 
revenge  the  murdered  lulius.  In  exacting  that  vengeance  he  was 
more  than  once  guilty  of  cold-blooded  cruelty.  But  that  accomplished, 
and  his  own  supremacy  established,  he  devoted  a  long  life  to  a  re- 
construction of  his  vast  Empire,  which  on  the  whole  infinitely  extended 
and  secured  the  happiness  of  the  world. 

The  fourteen  years  which  had  elapsed  since  the  death  of  lulius 
had  added  little  to  that  Empire.  For  a  time  indeed,  Cilicia  and 
Syria  seemed  almost  lost  to  it,  the  dissensions  of  revolted  Roman 
officers  giving  an  opportunity  to  the  ever  watchful  Parthian  enemy. 
This  state  of  things  had  been  checked  by  the  successes  of  Antony's 
officers,  and  Caesar  had  nothing  to  fear  west  of  the  Euphrates.  In 
Africa  the  kingdom  of  Mauritania  had  been  taken  over  on  the  death 
of  Bocchus  in  33.  It  was  not,  however,  kept  permanently  as  a  Roman 
province.  In  25  luba,  son  of  the  king  of  Numidia  conquered  by 
lulius,  who  had  been  brought  up  at  Rome,  was  established  as  its 
king,  and  it  was  not  again  reduced  to  the  form  of  a  province  till  A.D. 
40.  A  permanent  addition  however  was  made  at  once  in  Egypt. 
Cleopatra  was  the  last  of  the  Lagidae  to  reign.  Caesarion  was  put 
to  death,  and  the  two  sons  and  a  daughter  whom  she  bore  to  Antony 
were  taken  to  Rome  and  generously  received  and  educated  by 
Octavia.  But  though  Egypt  was  made  a  province,  it  was  on  some- 
what different  terms  to  the  other  provinces.  It  was  so  important  as  a 
granary  of  Rome,  that  it  was  thought  necessary  to  jealously  guard  it 


J 


XLvi  THE  NEW  GOVERNMENT  783 

from  the  ambition  of  party  leaders.  Its  governor  was  an  cqiccs^  not 
called  propraetor  or  proconsul,  but  praefectiis  Acgypti^  who  did  not 
take  the  fasces  or  other  signs  of  imperium,  and  who  was  immediately 
answerable  to  the  Emperor.  No  man  of  senatorial  rank  might  enter 
the  country  without  special  permission  ;  and  it  did  not  share  with  the 
other  provinces  in  the  privilege  granted  by  the  lex  Saenia  (30)  of 
furnishing  members  to  the  Senate.  Two  legions  were  permanently 
kept  in  the  country,  which  was  divided  into  three  large  districts 
(upper,  lower,  and  middle)  and  subdivided  into  nomes  and  comae,  the 
governors  of  which  were  nominated  by  the  praefectus. 

With  these  exceptions,  and  with  certain  rearrangements  of  client  jo-27. 
kings  in  the  East,  caused  by  the  deposition  of  those  who  had  served 
with  Antony  at  Actium,  the  Empire,  now  practically  under  the  rule  of 
Caesar,  was  the  same  as  it  had  been  at  the  death  of  lulius.     Nor  were 
the  constitutional  forms  at  once  changed.      The  magistrates  were  still   Co7istiiu- 
elected,  though  in  the  case  of  the  consuls  this  had  become  a  mere  form.   ^^^'^^'^ 
We  have  seen  that  at  the  time  of  his  death  luHus  had  "designated"  ^^"-^  S 
consuls  for  three  years  in  advance.     At  the  treaty  of  Misenum  (39) 
the  same  had  been  done  for  eight  years  ;  and  practically  henceforth 
it  was  in  the  hands  of  Caesar,  the  old  forms  being  however  maintained. 
The  Senate  in  the  course  of  the  twenty  years  of  civil  disorder  had    The 
steadily  declined  in  prestige,  while  it  had  increased  in  number  by  the  ^^^<^^^- 
repeated  admissions  of  various  party  chiefs,  and  by  the  cessation  of 
anything  like  censorial  action  ;  ^  but  it  still  conducted  much  of  the 
business  of  administration,  especially  in  regard  to  the  provinces  ;  and 
one  of  the   first    of  Caesar's  reforms  was  directed   to   purifying  it 
and  defining  its  powers.      Immediately  after  the  victory  of  Actium 
the   process   commenced  of  centring    in   his    person    the  functions 
of  the    different    magistrates.      Without    being    either    tribune    or  The 
censor,  he  was  invested  with  tribunician  and  censorial  powers,  the  I^^pcrator. 
former  especially  making  his  person  sacred,  and  giving  him  a  veto 
on  all  proceedings,  nominally  for  a  limited  time,  which  however  was 
always  extended.      But  he  had  also  imperiuui,  which  gave  him  the 
command  of  the  army,   the   right   of  levying  troops,   and  coercing 
citizens.      He  had  had  imperium  ever  since  43, ^  and  seems  to  have 
adopted  the  title  or  prjenomen  Imperator  very  early,  and  is  entered 

^  At  Caesar's  first  review  of  the  Senate  in  29  there  were  said  to  be  1000  names 
on  the  roll  (Dio.  lii.  42). 

2  Cicero,  5  Phil.  §§  45-47  ;  Monument.  Ancyr,  i.  But  Cicero  seems  to  have 
regarded  this  as  irregular,  and  only  arising  from  the  necessities  of  the  times,  11 
Phil.  §  20,  Imperium  C.  Caesari  belli  necessitas,  fasces  senatus  dedit.  As  triumvir 
he  would  still  have  imperium,  and  though  the  triumvirate  legally  ran  out  at  the  end 
of  33,  he  had  not  abdicated  the  imperium.  In  44-43  there  were  two  decrees,  one 
giving  him  imperium  as  propraetor,  the  other  (after  15th  April)  giving  him  con- 
sular rank. 


I 


AP.  XLVi  LITERATURE  AT  THE  END  OF  THE  REPUBLIC    785 

as  Imperator  Caesar  in  the  Fasti  for  33.      But  for  this  somewhat  Procon- 
irrcg^ular  imperium  a  more  regular  proconsulare  imperiiim  was  now  ^^iln^e  hn- 
substituted,  which  was  held  to  give  him  the  command  in  every  province,  P^^^^^- 
even  in  those  which  he  afterwards  left  to  the  care  of  the  Senate.      The 
title  princcps  seems  at  first  not  to  have  been  official,  though  it  was 
used  as  expressing  a  fact, — that  he  was  chief  citizen  {princeps  civitini). 
The  title  Augustus  (27)  expressed  the  almost  divine  character  that 
the  Senate  was  prepared  to  attribute  to  him,  but  added  nothing  to 
his  powers. 

These  arrangements  were,  for  the  most  part,  made  within  three  The  new 
years  of  the  battle  of  Actium  (28-27),  and  their  effect  was  to  produce  monarchy. 
a  really  new  constitution  under  old  forms.  The  magistrates  became 
executive  officers  answerable  not  to  the  people  but  to  the  Imperator  ; 
the  Senate,  the  one  remaining  trace  of  the  old  Republican  govern- 
ment, became  outwardly  more  important  than  ever,  both  as  an 
administrative  and  judicial  body,  but  practically  it  had  to  yield  to  the 
master  of  the  Legions  and  the  controller  of  the  Exchequer. 

We  have  thus  traced  the  marvellous  rise  of  a  single  city,  till  its   The  rise 
magistrates  controlled  (as  will  be  seen  in  the  annexed  map)  the  whole  of  Rome 
of  Europe  south  of  Germany  and  the  Danube,  Asia  Minor,  Syria,  Egypt,  A^^  "^f 
and  a  large  part  of  the  northern  district  of  Africa.     The  constitution  f^fji^  gjfd 
under  which  it  rose  to  this  extraordinary  power  broke  down  under  the  of  the 
stress  of  its  extended  responsibilities.      After  nearly  a  hundred  years  Republic, 
of  more  or  less  acute  civil  war,  a  statesman  had  been  found  capable  "^SS-Jo- 
of  remodelling  that  constitution   and  organising  that  vast  Empire. 
It  was  to  remain  for  many  centuries  much  as  he  left  it,  until  dis- 
integrating forces  from  within   and  violent  incursions  from  without 
slowly  resolved  it  into  the  separate  countries  of  our  modern  world. 


Of  the  literature  produced  during  the  last  century  of  the  Republic  Literature 
we  have,  in  comparison  with  the  amount  once  existing,  what  may  be  ^f  ^^^^  ^^^^ 
considered  but  a  fragment.      The  first  in  quantity,  as  well  as  in  im-  ^!)^^/^/ 
portance,  are  the  works  of  M.  TuLLius  CiCERO  [106-43].      Setting  '. 

aside  their  importance  to  the  historian,  he  is  to  be  specially  noted  as  ^cicero. 
the  founder  of  a  literary  style,  at  once  brilliant,  correct,  and  clear,  to 
which  nearly  all  subsequent  writers  looked  as  a  standard.  Though 
he  followed  the  Greek  schools  of  rhetoric  in  the  construction  of  his 
speeches,  and  translated  or  epitomised  Greek  writers  in  his  philo- 
sophical writings,  his  language  is  always  the  purest  Latin,  exquisite 
but  not  laboured,  learned  but  not  pedantic.  His  works  fall  into  four 
divisions:  (i)  Speeches;  (2)  Rhetorical  Treatises;  (3)  Essays  on 
Moral,  Metaphysical,  or  Political  Philosophy  ;  (4)  Correspondence. 

I.   Of  about  one  hundred  and  ten  speeches  known  to  have  been 

3  E 


786  HISTORY  OF  ROME  chap. 

delivered  by  him  we  possess  fifty-seven,  with  fragments  of  about  twenty 
more.  They  date  from  8 1  to  the  last  year  of  his  life.  He  seems  to  have 
carefully  prepared,  and  perhaps  written  them  before  delivery,  and  at 
any  rate  to  have  edited  them  afterwards.  To  the  historical  student 
the  most  important  are  those  delivered  on  public  affairs.  The  three 
speeches  against  the  agrarian  bill  of  Rullus,  and  the  four  against 
Catiline,  were  delivered  in  the  year  of  his  consulship  (63).  The  four- 
teen Philippics  (the  second  of  which  is  a  pamphlet  cast  in  the  form 
of  a  speech)  belong  to  44-43,  in  which  nearly  every  step  in  the  con- 
troversy with  Antony  from  September  44  to  April  43  can  be  traced. 
To  this  group  might  be  added  the  speeches  against  Verres,  for 
though  in  form  they  are  the  speeches  of  an  advocate,  and  in  great 
part  were  never  delivered,  they  are  the  most  valuable  state  papers 
we  possess  on  the  government  of  the  provinces.  So,  too,  the  four 
speeches  delivered  on  his  return  from  exile  (57),  those  for  P.  Sestius 
and  M.  Caelius,  and  the  de  Provinciis  Cojistilaribus  (56),  as  well  as  the 
earlier  speech  de  hnperio  Cn,  Pompeii  (66),  give  striking  pictures  of 
the  politics  of  the  time.  The  more  purely  forensic  speeches  depend 
for  their  interest  partly  on  the  subject,  but  more  still  on  the  skill  and 
often  the  sophistry  with  which  the  argument  is  handled,  and  above 
all  on  the  beauty  and  musical  cadence  of  the  language. 

II,  The  rhetorical  treatises,  except  the  de  Inventione^  which  is  a  frag- 
ment of  an  early  work  called  Rhetorica^  were  produced  between  5  5  and 
46,  when  the  state  of  public  affairs  kept  him  (with  the  exception  of 
one  year)  from  engaging  much  in  politics.  They  are  in  the  form  of 
dialogues,  and  deal  with  style  {de  Oratore),  history  of  Roman  oratory 
{de  Oratoribiis)^  the  ideal  of  an  orator  {Orator  ad  M.  Brutuin\  besides 
the  minor  essays  Partitiones  oratoriae  and  Topica. 

III.  The  philosophical  essays  were  also  the  fruits  of  an  enforced 
abstention  from  politics  in  45,  and  were  continued,  in  spite  of  re- 
newed political  activity,  to  the  year  of  his  death.  During  these  years 
he  threw  himself  with  such  energy  into  this  new  field  of  literature  that 
he  is  said  to  have  regarded  it  as  the  true  work  of  his  life,  and  all 
his  speeches  and  rhetorical  treatises  as  comparatively  unimportant. 
Though  they  are  compilations  from  the  later  Greek  philosophers,  yet 
the  amount  done  in  these  three  years,  in  the  last  part  of  which  (from 
March  44)  he  returned  with  intense  eagerness  to  politics,  is  astonish- 
ing.. They  are,  (i)  five  books  de  Finibus^  on  the  Summum  Bonum  ; 
(2)  the  Academica^  the  first  book  of  the  second  edition  containing 
a  sketch  of  the  history  of  philosophy  from  Socrates  to  Arcesilaus,  and 
the  second  book  of  the  first  edition  the  doctrines  of  Antiochus  and 
Philo  ;  (3)  five  books  of  Tusculan  Dispiitatio7is  on  the  elements  of 
happiness,  from  Plato,  the  Stoics,  and  Peripatetics  ;  (4)  de  Natura 
Deorujn,  in  three  books;  (5)  de  Settectutc ;  (6)  de  Divinatione^  in 


'J 


XLVi  THE  PROSE  WRITERS  787 

two  books,  in  which  the  Greek  oracles  as  well  as  the  Roman  auguries 
are  discussed  ;  (6)  de  A7nicitia  ;  (7)  de  Officiis,  in  three  books,  a 
treatise  on  practical  ethics  addressed  to  his  son.  There  are  frag- 
ments of  many  other  works,  especially  of  two  treatises  on  the 
philosophy  of  politics  and  law,  called  de  Repttblica  and  de  Legibus^ 
written  in  54  and  53,  just  before  his  government  in  Cilicia. 

IV.  The  correspondence,  not  counting  twenty-five  possibly  spurious 
letters  to  and  from  M.  Brutus,  contains  861  letters  (some  of  them 
including  copies  of  others),  of  which  ninety  are  addressed  to  Cicero. 
Little  else  which  has  come  down  to  us  from  antiquity  can  be  com- 
pared in  interest  with  this  unconscious  contemporary  record,  in  which 
— as  far  at  any  rate  as  the  letters  to  Atticus  are  concerned — the  writer 
is  speaking  with  entire  candour  of  the  events  of  the  day  and  his  views 
and  feelings  in  regard  to  them.  They  were  mostly  preserved  and 
edited  after  Cicero's  death  by  his  freedman  Tiro.  They  extend  from 
the  year  68  to  within  a  few  months  of  Cicero's  death.  There  are  how- 
ever only  eleven  before  63,  and  none  during  that  year  of  his  consulship. 
With  that  exception  there  is  very  little  break  in  them.  Some  are 
mere  formal  letters  of  introduction,  some  evidently  elaborate  docu- 
ments meant  to  give  a  more  or  less  false  impression  ;  but  a  large 
proportion  of  them  are  genuine  letters,  expressing  the  writer's  true 
self, — a  man  vain,  restless,  eager  ;  a  violent  partisan  and  a  violent 
enemy  ;  but  still  a  man  of  high  aims,  real  patriotism,  and  at  bottom 
of  true  candour  and  humanity.  He  loved  Rome  as  Dr.  Johnson 
loved  London,  and  was  never  quite  happy  out  of  it,  and  never  so 
brilliant  as  when  describing  scenes  in  the  city.  He  hungered  for 
praise,  but  was  also  generous  in  giving  it ;  and  his  constant  friendship 
with  Atticus  was  hardly  ever  dimmed  by  even  a  passing  shadow. 

M.  Terentius  Varro  [116-28]  was  ten  years  older  than 
Cicero,  and,  though  his  name  was  in  the  proscription  list  of  43-42, 
survived  him  fifteen  years.  Of  the  490  books  which  he  is  said  to 
have  written,  in  prose  and  verse,  embracing  almost  every  subject  of 
learning,  philosophy,  jurisprudence,  and  history,  only  one  has  come 
down  to  us  entire,  the  Res  Rustzcae,  in  three  books,  and  a  portion  of 
another,  the  de  Lingica  Latina.  The  Res  Rusticae  is  addressed  to 
his  wife  Fundania,  and  contains  a  long  list  of  Greek  writers  on  agri- 
culture, as  well  as  extracts  from  Cato  and  others,  and  enters  into  full 
details  of  the  management  of  land.  It  was  written  in  his  eightieth 
year  (36),  and,  like  Cicero's  treatises,  is  cast  in  the  form  of  a 
dialogue,  but  lacks  the  literary  grace  of  his  great  contemporary.  Of 
the  twenty-five  books  of  the  de  Lingua  Latina  only  V.  to  X.  survive, 
in  a  somewhat  mutilated  form.  They  contain  useful  information, 
though  the  etymology  is  unscientific  and  often  merely  conjectural, 
and  the  style  ungraceful. 


788 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Among  the  most  valuable  remains  of  the  literature  of  the  period 
are  the  Commentaries  of  lULius  Caesar  [100-44],  containing  the 
history  of  the  first  seven  years  of  the  Gallic  war,  in  seven  books,  and 
of  the  Civil  war  down  to  the  occupation  of  Pharos  (47).  An  eighth 
book  added  to  the  history  of  the  Gallic  war,  and  three  on  the 
Alexandrine,  African,  and  Spanish  wars  are  by  some  of  Caesar's 
officers,  A.  Hirtius  and  others,  and  are  of  very  unequal  merit. 
Caesar's  own  books  are  admirable  for  the  conciseness  with  which 
military  movements  are  fully  described,  or  the  results  of  investiga- 
tions in  unknown  countries  are  stated.  There  is  nothing  rhetorical 
in  them,  and  no  attention  to  style  in  the  Ciceronian  sense ;  yet  the 
language  is  pure,  and  its  directness  and  business-like  brevity  present 
an  admirable  model  for  such  records.  In  the  Civil  war  Caesar  had 
to  justify  himself,  and  is  more  open  to  the  charge  of  at  least  modifying 
facts  for  that  purpose.  His  work  on  grammar  {de  Analogia),  on 
astronomy  {de  Astris\  and  his  pamphlet  against  Cato,  as  well  as  his 
speeches  and  poems,  have  not  survived. 

Of  C.  Sallustius  Crispus  [86-33]  we  have  two  monographs 
on  the  conspiracy  of  Catiline  and  the  Jugurthine  war.  He  was 
tribune  in  52,  expelled  from  the  Senate  for  scandalous  life  in  50, 
served  with  Caesar  and  was  restored  to  the  Senate  in  47,  and  made 
governor  of  Africa  in  46,  where  he  obtained  great  wealth.  After 
Caesar's  death  he  lived  in  retirement,  and  devoted  himself  to  litera- 
ture. He  took  as  his  models  the  writings  of  Thucydides,  in  regard 
to  the  introduction  of  sketches  of  character  and  the  use  of  imaginary 
speeches, — a  regular  feature  of  Greek  historical  writing,  as  opposed 
to  the  dry  annalistic  form  which  Roman  history  had  up  to  his  time 
taken.  He  may  therefore  in  this  respect  seem  to  have  set  a 
fashion  to  be  followed  and  extended  by  Livy.  He  also  imitated 
his  Greek  models  in  choosing  subjects  on  which,  as  in  the  Catiline 
conspiracy,  he  may  have  had  personal  knowledge  or  information  from 
eye-witnesses  ;  and,  as  in  the  Jugurthine  war,  from  relations  or  imme- 
diate descendants  of  those  engaged.  His  style  is  rhetorical  and 
didactic,  he  affects  Graecisms  and  archaic  words,  or,  as  some  say, 
introduces  words  in  common,  though  not  generally  in  literary,  use. 
The  accuracy  of  his  account  of  the  Catiline  conspiracy  has  been 
seriously  impugned  ;  and  at  any  rate  the  invectives  against  the  cor- 
ruptions of  the  age  in  both  monographs  lose  much  of  their  force 
when  his  own  character  is  taken  into  consideration.  Of  the  five 
books  of  Histories  from  the  death  of  Sulla  only  fragments  remain. 

Of  the  poets  whose  work  survives  only  two  properly  belong  to 
this  period.  Of  T.  LUCRETIUS  Carus  (?  95-52)  we  hardly  know 
anything  for  certain,  even  the  dates  of  his  birth  and  death.  A  brief 
criticism  of  Cicero's  in  a  letter  to  his  brother  in  ^/^—Lucretii poemata, 


\ 


XLVi  THE  POETS  789 

lit  scribis^  ita  sunt :  inultis  luminibus  ingenii^  muliae  tamen  artis — 
is  the  only  indication  we  have  of  the  date  of  the  de  Reriim  nattira^  or 
of  contemporary  opinion.  The  poem  (in  six  books)  is  the  result  of 
the  study  of  the  Greek  philosophers,  which  had  been  steadily  spread- 
ing among  the  cultivated  classes  at  Rome.  Its  object  is  to  free  men 
from  the  terrors  of  superstition,  resting  on  the  supposed  active  inter- 
vention of  the  gods  in  the  affairs  of  men,  and  the  horrors  awaiting 
them  after  death.  To  this  end  he  expounds  the  doctrine  of  Epicurus 
as  to  the  impassiveness  of  the  gods  ;  and  the  atomic  theory  of 
Leucippus,  to  explain  the  origin  and  order  of  the  material  universe 
apart  from  divine  creation  or  directing  energy.  The  difficulty  of 
introducing  Greek  philosophic  terms  into  Latin  verse  is  overcome 
with  masterly  power,  and  the  dryness  of  a  didactic  poem  is  relieved 
by  splendid  outbursts  of  poetry.  His  use  of  the  Greek  hexameter  is 
an  immense  advance  on  all  known  predecessors,  and  marks  a  stage 
between  the  roughness  of  Ennius  with  the  earlier  writers  generally, 
and  the  elaborate  work  of  Vergil. 

A  still  more  careful  attention  to  the  artistic  use  of  metre  marks  c. 
Gaius  Valerius  Catullus  (87  to  about  47),  who  was  a  native  of  Valerius 
Verona  and   possessed  an  estate  on   Sirmio  and   a  villa  at  Tibur.   ^<^^^^^^^^' 
He  came  to  Rome  early,  and  was  a  friend  of  Cicero  and  other  men 
of  letters  ;  and,  though  his  father  was  intimate  with  Caesar,  he  attacked 
him  with  great  bitterness.      His  surviving  work  is  small  in  bulk,  but 
contains  experiments  in  several  metres.     What  he  made  especially  his 
own  was  the  Hendecasyllabic  verse,  which  has  never  been  used  by 
any  poet  with  equal  effect.      The  wild  Galliambics  of  the  Attis  have 
no  parallel  in   Roman  literature,  and  prove  him  to  have  possessed 
supreme  lyrical  skill  and  imagination.     His  love-poetry  centres  round 
a  passion  for  one  heroine,  to  whom  the  fancy  name  of  Lesbia  is  given, 
by  some  identified  with  Clodia,  the  sister  of  Cicero's  enemy.      Some  of 
his  less  successful  work  is  founded  on  the  Alexandrine  writers. 

P.  VeRGILIUS  MaRO  (70-19)  and  Q.  HoRATIUS  FlACCUS  (65-8)    Vergil  ana 
belong,  partly  at  least,  to  the  next  generation  ;  and  their  most  im-  Horace. 
portant  work  was  produced  after  Augustus  had  become  virtual  monarch. 
But   Vergilius  suffered   from  the   confiscations   of  41-40,    and   was 
restored  to  his  property  by  the  friendship  of  Asinius  Pollio,  and  two 
out  of  his  three  works  belong  to  the  last  period  of  the  civil  wars. 
The  Eclogues^  founded  on  the  pastoral  poems  of  Theocritus,   were   The 
composed  between  42  and   39,  and  the  four  books  of  the   Georgics,  Eclogae  or 
founded  partly  on  the  Works  and  Days  of  Hesiod,  and  tinged  with  Bucolica. 
the  same  physical  philosophy  as  the  poem  of  Lucretius,  occupied  him   ^'^^ 
from  37  to  31,  or  perhaps  later.      Like  Catullus,  he  was  a  native  of  ^^'^''^^"• 
Gallia  Transpadana  (being  born  at  Andes  near  Mantua),  and  there- 
fore not  a  Roman  citizen  until   49,  though  part  of  his  education  was 


790 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAP. 


at  Rome.  The  glory  and  fertility  of  Italy  from  the  great  theme  of  the 
Georgics^  although  a  desire  on  the  part  of  his  patron  Maecenas  to 
render  country  pursuits  fashionable  may  have  contributed  to  the  choice 
of  his  subject.  It  was  not  till  the  policy  of  Augustus  had  given  new 
life  to  the  Empire  of  Rome  that  he  undertook  the  great  national  epic 
which  was  to  glorify  her  origin  and  destiny  (27-20). 

Horace  had  been  studying  at  Athens  when  Brutus  arrived  there 
in  44,  and  had  taken  service  with  him  and  shared  the  disaster  of 
Philippi.  He  had  shared  also  in  the  amnesty  granted  to  the  army  of 
Brutus  and  Cassius,  but  returned  to  Rome  to  find  himself  penniless. 
He  was,  however,  introduced  to  Maecenas  by  Vergil  (about  38),  and 
before  the  return  of  Augustus  from  the  East  after  Actium  had  pub- 
lished the  two  books  of  his  Satires  and  the  Epodes  (35-30).  Though 
the  Satires  do  not  pretend  to  be  "  poems  "  but  sermones^  his  use  of 
the  Hexameter  is  much  more  conformable  to  the  stricter  rule  followed 
by  Vergilius  than  that  of  his  model  Lucilius  ;  and  the  Iambics  of  the 
Epodes  were  a  first  essay  in  the  adoption  of  other  Greek  metres, 
which  in  a  few  years  was  to  be  extended  with  such  success  in  the 
Odes,  chiefly  founded  on  Sappho  and  Alcaeus.  Being  a  native  of 
Venusia  he  was  a  citizen  by  birth,  but  as  the  son  of  a  freedman  was 
in  an  inferior  social  position,  and  for  some  years  acted  as  a  public 
clerk  or  scriba,  until  relieved  from  all  care  by  the  gift  of  a  small 
Sabine  estate  from  Maecenas. 

Albius  Tibullus  (circ.  59-18)  has  left  some  beautiful  elegiac 
poems,  chiefly  on  love  subjects,  though  there  are  also  certain  personal 
details  of  interest.  Like  Horace  and  Vergil  he  suffered  from  the 
confiscations,  and  like  them  was  restored  or  remunerated  by  a  patron, 
— M.  Valerius  Messalla.  The  bulk  of  his  writings,  however,  appear  to 
belong  to  the  period  after  27,  when  he  accompanied  his  patron  to 
Aquitain,  though  detesting  war.  He  is  the  poet  of  quiet  life,  and 
makes  no  pretence  to  Roman  sentiment  as  to  martial  glory. 

Before  the  battle  of  Actium  the  adornment  of  Rome  with  splendid 
buildings  had  begun.  The  temple  on  the  Capitol  burnt  down  in  83 
was  restored  and  dedicated  in  69.  L.  Aemilius  Paullus  had  spent 
large  sums  in  54  on  restoring  and  erecting  basilicae.  Pompeius 
Magnus  had  finished  his  great  theatre,  capable  of  holding  40,000 
people,  in  52;  a  porticus,  called  also  the  "Hall  of  the  Hundred 
Columns  "  {Hecatostylon\  outside  the  theatre  ;  and  a  curia  adjoining 
the  porticus,  in  which  lulius  was  murdered.  This  last  was  burnt 
down  at  the  time  of  Caesar's  funeral,  but  the  statue  was  saved.  lulius 
Caesar  had  made  vast  plans  both  for  extending  and  beautifying  Rome, 
but  most  of  them  were  prevented  by  his  death.  He  erected  stone 
seats  in  the  Circus  ;  dedicated  in  46  a  new  Forum  (the  Foricvi  Itdiwii), 
though  it  was  still  unfinished  at  his  death  ;  actually  began  a  new 


XLVi  THE  IMPROVEMENTS  IN  ROME  791 

theatre,  afterwards  completed  by  Augustus  as  the  Theatrum  Marcelli  ; 
dedicated  a  temple  to  Venus  Genetrix  in  46  ;  built  new  rostra  at  the 
east  of  the  Forum  ;  began  marble  septa  in  the  Campus  Martius  for 
voting  at  the  Comitia  ;  began  a  basilica,  afterwards  completed  by 
Augustus.  The  regia,  attached  to  the  temple  of  Vesta,  had  been 
rebuilt  with  great  magnificence  by  Domitius  Calvinus  in  36.  Before 
the  battle  of  Actium,  besides  carrying  on  some  of  these  works,  and 
restoring  many  temples.  Augustus  had  begun  the  '  opera  Octaviae^^  a 
curia,  a  porticus,  and  library  ;  Agrippa  had  begun  the  aqueduct  called 
the  Aqua  lulia  (33),  as  well  as  a  large  number  of  fountains  in  the 
city ;  and  probably  the  vast  building  which  still  stands  and  is  known 
as  the  Pantheon.  Thus  Rome  was  already  beginning  to  assume  a 
splendour  worthy  of  the  capital  of  the  world. 

Authorities, — The  14  Philippics  of  Cicero  and  the  Letters.  Appian,  Bell. 
Civ.  iii.  and  iv.  Dio  Cassius,  xhv.-li.  Livy,  Ep.  1 16-133.  Suetonius,  Augustus 
46.  Plutarch,  Lives  of  Cicero,  M.  Antonius,  M.  Brutus.  Nicolas  of  Damascus. 
Fragments  of  the  Life  0/ Augustus.  Velleius  Paterculus,  ii.  58-89.  Augustus  himself 
left  a  precis  of  his  administration  which  was  to  be  inscribed  on  a  column  at  Rome 
and  in  the  provinces.  Nearly  all  of  it  survives  on  a  temple  at  Ancyra  in  Galatia. 
The  first  part  gives  his  version  of  his  conduct  in  the  Civil  war,  and  is  here  ap- 
pended as  one  of  the  few  contemporary  records  of  Roman  History  before  the  Empire. 
Annos  undeviginti  natus  exercitum  privato  consilio  et  privaia  impensa  comparavi, 
per  quern  rempublicam  dominatione  factionis  oppressam  in  libertatem  vindicavi. 
Ob  quae  senatus  decretis  honorificis  in  ordinem  suum  me  adlegit  C.  Pansa  A. 
Hirtio  consulibus,  consularem  locut?t  simul  dans  sententiae  ferendae,  et  imperium 
mihi  dedit.  Res  publica  ne  quid  detrimenti  caperet  me  pro  praetore  simul  cum 
consulibus  providere  iussit.  Populus  autem  eodem  anno  me  cotisulem,  cum  cos. 
uterque  bello  cecidisset,  et  trium  virum  rei  publicae  constituendae  creavit.  Qui 
parentem  meum  interfecerunt ,  eos  in  exilium  expuli  iudiciis  legitimis  uttus  eorum 
f acinus,  et  postea  bellum  inferentes  rei  publicae  vici  bisacie.  From  the  same,  c.  2, 
we  learn  that  the  census  of  B.C.  28  showed  4,063,000  citizens. 


1 


INDEX 


Abydos,  siege  of,  427 

Acarnania,  413 

Achaean  League,  276,  414,  415;  decide 
on  war  with  Philip,  434-436 ;  states- 
men   deported,   515  ;    end    of,   523- 

527 

Achillas,  746-748 

Acilius  Glabrio,  M'.,  475-480 

Actium,  battle  of,  780,  781 

Adherbal,  260 

Aduatuca,  729,  730;  Aduatuci,  723,  729 

Aebutius  Elva,  T. ,  70 

Aediles,  97,  211,  212  ;  curule,  170 

Aedui,  the,  719,  720 

Aegean  Sea,  war  in  the,  483 

Aemilius,  L.  (Cos.  478),  79.  Barbula, 
L.,  181.  Papus,  Q.  (Cos.  282), 
campaign  in  S.  Italy,  180-182,  191. 
L.  (Cos.  225),  wars  with  the  Boii, 
278-280.  Paulus,  L.  (Cos.  216), 
falls  at  Cannae,  323-327.  Paulus,  L. 
(Cos.  182,  168),  conquers  Perseus, 
508-510.  Regulus,  L.,  commands  in 
the  Aegean,  483,  484.  Lepidus  M. 
(Cos.  78),  659,  660.  L. ,  envoy  to 
PhiHp,  427,  M. ,  praetor  in  49, 
740,  750,  759,  760,  761,  764,  769; 
triumvir,  771,  772,  777 

Aeneas,  legends  of   21,  22 

Aequi,  11,  29,  72,  73,  75,  104,  151, 
152 

Aesculapius,  worship  of,  52 

Aesis,  R. ,  6 

Aetolian  League,  276,  413,  414;  makes 
peace  with  Philip,  416  ;  treaty  with 
Rome,  418  ;  joins  Romans  in  second 
Macedonian  war,  430 ;  discontent 
of,  443,  464  ;  invites  Antiochus,  465- 
468  ;  war  with,  471-482,  495-497 


Afranius,     L.     (dramatist),     657.       L. 

(Cos.  60),  710,  740 
Africa,  province  of,  536  ;  new,  753 
Agathocles  of  Syracuse,  193,  223 
Ager  publicus,     93,     167,     168,     552  ; 

complaints    of    Italians    as   to,    557, 

568,  697  (note).      Romanus,  29,  30 
Agger  of  Servius,  43 
Agis  of  Tarentum,  181 
Agrigentum,     194  ;    occupied    by    Car- 
thaginians,    239  ;    siege   and   fall   of, 

240,  241  ;    sale  of  inhabitants,   284  ; 

holds    out    against    Marcellus,    342  ; 

taken  by  Laevinus,  361,  362 
Agrippa.      See  Vipsanius 
Aius  Locutus,  altar  to,  121 
Alba,  king,  22 
Alba   Longa,  kings  of,  22  ;   destruction 

of,   57.     Fucentia,  349,  767 
Alban  lake,  emissariuvi  of,  85,  86 
Albani,  Pompey's  battles  with,  685 
Albinus,  L. ,  97 
Albula,  old  name  of  Tibtr,  22 
Album  of  Pontifices,  57 
Alesia,  730 
Alexander  the  Great,  the  division  of  his 

empire,  409-411  ; 
Alexander,    king  of  the  Molossi,   in   S. 

Italy,  19,  136-138 
Alexandria,  Caesar  at,  748,  749 
Algidus,    Mt.,    battles    near,    t^)^    75; 

camp  at,  104 
Allia,  battle  of  the,  117 
Allifae,  battle  at,  149 
Allobroges,  Hannibal  among  the,  301  ; 

conquered,  569  ;  envoys  of,  in  Rome, 

701  ;   rebellion  of,  712 
Alps,  the,  5,  9  ;  passage  of  by  Hannibal, 

301-303 


794 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Ambiorix,  729 

Ambitus,  laws  against,  403,  521 

Ambracia,  taken  by  Nobilior,  496,  497 

Ambrones,  the,  270,  578,  579 

Amphipolis,  774 

Amulius,  uncle  of  Romulus,  22 

Anaxilas  of  Rhegium,  78 

Ancus  Marcius,  39,  40 

Andriscus,  522,  531 

Andronicus,  Livius,  287 

Amtales  ma^nii,  57 

Annius  Milo,  P.,  716,  731,  732,  749 

Antiochus  III.,  the  Great,  of  Syria, 
424,  465,  466  ;  visited  by  Hannibal, 
467;  comes  into  Greece,  471-473  ;  war 
with,  475-492.  IV,,  Epiphanes, 
ordered  out  of  Egypt,  516.  Asiaticus, 
67s  (note) 

Antium,  29,  67 ;  struggles  with  Vol- 
scians  for,  73  ;  surrender  of,  125 

Antonius  M.  (orator),  657.  C.  (Cos. 
63),  699,  705,  706,  708.  M.  733, 
736,  740,  745,  749,  750,  757,  759  ; 
his  policy  after  Caesar's  death,  763- 
741  ;  triumvir,  771  ;  at  Philippi, 
773-775  ;  his  government  of  the 
East,  775-778  ;  breach  with  Augustus 
and  death,  779-782.  Gaius,  765, 
773.      Lucius,  766,  775 

Apennines,  the,  6 

Apollo,  worship  of,  52,  405  (note) 

Apollonia,  742,  744 

Appius  Herdonius,  73 

Appuleius  Saturninus,  L.,  his  legisla- 
tion and  death,  583-585 

Apuani  (Ligurians)  removed  to  Sam- 
nium,  457,  458 

Apulia,  6  ;   conquest  of,  198,  199 

Apuli,  the,  19  ;  join  Samnites,  141 

Aquae  Sextiae  founded,  564,  568  ;  battle 
of,  578 

Aquilius  M'.  (Cos.  129),  in  Asia,  605. 
(Son)  in  Sicily,  550  ;  in  Asia,  613  ; 
defeated  by  Mithridates,  616,  617  ; 
doubt  as  to  fate,  617  (note),  635  (note) 

Aquilonia,  160 

Aratus,  415 

Archidamus,  of  Sparta,  in  Italy,  19, 
136  (note) 

Archimedes  at  Syracuse,  338,  339  ;  his 
death,  341 

Ardea,  29  ;  siege  of,  53 

Argei,  36 

Ariarathes  V. .  of  Cappadocia,  608. 
VI.,  of  Cappadocia,  610 


Aricia,  besieged  by  Etruscans,  67,  68  ; 
obtains  civitas,  133 

Ariminum,  6  ;  demanded  by  the  Boii, 
273  ;  Caesar  at,  737 

Ariobarzanes  of  Cappadocia,  611 

Ariovistus,  720 

Aristobulus,  686,  689 

Aristodemus  of  Cumae,  68 

Aristonicus  of  Pergamus,  558,  561 

Army,  Roman,  first  receives  pay,  84  ; 
mutiny  of,  at  Capua,  and  reforms, 
130,  131  ;  organisation  before  the 
time  of  Marius,  214-218  ;  number 
in  third  century,  278 ;  mutiny  of, 
in  Spain,  373  ;  rorarii  reorganised 
as  vehtes,  347  (note),  399  ;  socii  in, 
214,  399 ;  changes  by  Martins  in, 
582,  583 

Arnus,  R.,  7,  314 

Arpi,  Hannibal  at,  317;  taken  by  Fabius, 

343 

Arretium  (Etruria),  153,  396 

Arruns,  son  of  Tarquin,  49  :  of  Por- 
sena,  67,  68 

Arsian  Wood,  63 

Arsinoe,  748,  759  (note) 

Arvales,  40  ;  their  prayer,  406  (note) 

Arverni,  719 

Ascanius,  21,  22 

Asculum,  victory  of  Pyrrhus  at,  190  ; 
beginning  of  Social  war  at,  589 

Asia,  kingdoms  in,  600,  680-609 

Asia  or  Syria,  kingdom  of,  411  ;  settle- 
ment of,  494  ;  province  of  Asia,  561, 
602 ;  the  picblicani  and  tiegotiatores 
in,  602,  603  ;  Mithridates  in,  603, 
616  ;  massacre  of  Itahans  in,  617  ; 
fined  by  Sulla,  638 

Asinius  Pollio,  C,  764,  768,  771 

Athens,  412,  427 ;  joins  Mithridates, 
620,  621 ;  siege  of,  by  Sulla,  624-626  : 

Athesis,  R. ,  14 

Atilius  Regulus,  C.  (Cos.  257),  246.  \ 
M.  (Cos.  256,  426)  ;  his  victory  at  ■ 
Ecnomus,  247 ;  lands  in  Africa,  ; 
246-249  ;  defeated  and  captured,  ' 
251  ;  mission  to  Rome  and  death,  j 
256-257.  Calatinus,  Aul.  (Diet.  249),  ,j 
261.  C.  Atilius  Regulus  (Cos.  225), 
falls  in  battle  with  Gauls,  278-280 

Attains  I.  of  Pergamus  joins  the  Romans,] 
417,    418  ;    purchases   Aegina,   419 
joins  in  attack  on  Euboea,  420  ;   proj 
claims    war    with     Philip,    425  ;     hi 
death,    439   (note).       II.,    511,    53; 


INDEX 


795 


Attalus    III.,    leaves   his   kingdom    to 

Rome,  558,  561 
Atta  Naevius,  41,  42,  59 
Attius,  L.  (dramatist),  657.    Varus,  P., 

738-742,    750,   751,  755,  756 
Atys,  king  of  Alba,  22 
Aufidus,  R.,  7 
Augustus,  6 
Aurelius   Cotta,    C.    (Cos.    200),    397. 

M.  (Cos.  74),  in  the  Mithridatic  war, 

669.     L.,  756 
Ausones,  132,  134  ;  destruction  of,   145 
Aventinus,  Mons,  fortified,  35,  39 
Aventinus,  king  of  Alba,  22 

Bacchanalia,  the,  520,  521 

Baecula,  battle  of,  370 

Baebius  Tamphilus,  M. ,  469,  475 

Baetica,  362,  363,  370,  371 

Bagradas,  R. ,  270 

Balearic  Isles  subdued,  569 

Bassus,   Caecilius,   764,   773,   774.      P. 

Ventidius,  769  (note),  777 
Belgae,  722 

Bellovisus,  king  of  the  Bituriges,  14 
Beneventum,  battle  of,  155 
Bibracte,  720,  730 
Bithynia,  kingdom  of,  411  ;  left  to  the 

Romans,  668 
Bithynia  and  Pontus,  677,  686 
Bituriges,  the,  14 
Blosius,  C. ,  of  Cumae,  555,  657 
Bocchus  of  Numidia  betrays  lugurtha, 

577.      Bocchus   and    Bagouas,    752, 

755.  782 
Boii,    the,    14,    177,    273,    278,    280 ; 

attack  Placentia  and  Cremona,  298  ; 

wars  with,  451-455 
Bomilcar  in  Sicily,  340 
Bona  Dea,  mysteries  of,  708 
Bononia,  334 
Bovianum,  146,  150,   155,  160  ;  in  the 

Social  war,  591 
Bratuspantium,  722 
Brennus,  115 

Britain,  invasions  of,  727-729 
Brundisium,  17,  199,  200,  739 
Bruttii,    the,    19  ;    subdued,    198,    199 ; 

punished  for  assisting  Hannibal,  395 
Bruttium,      6 ;     invaded,      196  ;     joins 

Hannibal,  331 
Bruttius  Sura  at  Demetrias,  623 
Brutus.      See  Junius 
Brutus  Albinus,   Dec,   726,    740,    760, 

764,  768,  770 


Buxentum,  17 

Byrsa,  meaning  of,  224 

Cabira,  battles  of,  672,  676 

Caecilius  Metellus,  L.  (Cos.  251),  his 
victory  at  Panormus,  256.  Statius, 
519.  Metellus  Macedonicus,  Q. , 
defeats  Andriscus,  522  ;  in  Greece, 
524,  525.  Metellus,  Q. ,  campaign 
against  lugurtha,  573-576 ;  banish- 
ment and  return  of,  584,  586. 
Metellus  Creticus,  Q. ,  680,  681. 
Metellus,  Q.  (Cos.  51),  706,  715. 
Pius  Scipio,  Q.  (Cos.    52),  743,  744, 

750-753 
Caelius,  Mons,  included  in  the  city,  35, 

37 

Caelius,  M.,  736,  749 

Caere,  Caerite  franchise,  127,  133 

Caesar.      See  lulius 

Calabria,  6 

Calagurris,  siege  of,  663 

Calatia,  149,  151  (note) 

Calendar,  reform  of,  754 

Callipolis,  17 

Calpurnius  Bestia,  L. ,  bribed  by 
Jugurtha,  572.  Piso,  L.  (Cos.  148), 
in  third  Punic  war,  531 

Camarina,  shipwreck  off,  254 

Camillus.      See  Furius 

Campania,  68  ;  Samnites  in,  83,  128, 
129 ;  Hannibal  in,  320,  332,  343 ; 
treatment  of  after  second  Punic  war, 
395  ;  settlement  of,  133  ;  senatus  con- 
sultum  de  Campanis,  351 

Campus  Martius,  47,  62 

Canae,  Roman  fleet  at,  481-483 

Cannae,  seized  by  Hannibal,  323  ; 
battle  of,   325-327 

Capitolinus,  Mons,  25,  31  ;  fortified, 
35  ;  temple  on,  51 

Capitolium  vetus,  25,  31 

Capena,  83,  84 

Capetus,  king  of  Alba,  22 

Capua  (formerly  Volternuni),  83  ; 
Hannibal  at,  332,  333  ;  siege  of,  346, 
347  ;  fall  of,   350  ;  colonists  at,  598 

Capys,  king  of  Alba,  22 

Carrhae,  battle  of,  734 

Carthage,  first  treaty  with,  41,  57  ; 
foundation  and  dominions  of,  224- 
226  ;  constitution  of,  228-230  ;  mer- 
cenary armies  of,  230  ;  city  and  har- 
bours, 231,  232  ;  treaties  with  Greeks 
in  Sicily,  227  ;  supremacy  of,  at  sea, 


796 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


242  ;  severe  terms  to,  267,  392,  529  ; 
siege  and  destruction  of,  532-536  ; 
Marius  at,  595.  Carthaginians  send 
gold  crown  to  Rome,  130  ;  in  Sicily, 
191-193  ;  make  treaty  with  Romans 
against  Pyrrhus,  193  ;  at  Tarentum, 
198  ;  terms  to,  after  second  Punic 
war,  392  ;  their  quarrels  with  Masan- 
nasa,  527 

Carthage,  New,  277,  293  ;  description 
of,  367  ;   taking  of,  368,  369 

Carthalo,  261,  262 

Carvilius,  Sp.  (Cos.  292),  160,  161 

Casa  Romuli,  59 

CasiHnum  taken,  343 

Casinum,  320  (note) 

Cassius  Viscellinus,  Sp.,  defeats  the 
Sabines,  69  ;  negotiates  with  Latins, 
70,  72  ;  his  agrarian  law,  98  ;  his 
death,  99.  Longinus,  L. ,  615.  C. , 
734.  758,  764.  773.  774-  Q-.  736. 
741.  755 

CasiHnum,  320  (note) 

Cassivelaunus,  728 

Castitas  Patricia,  Chapel  of,  175 

Castor  and  Pollux,  71 

Castulonensis  saltus,  361,  362 

Catana,  194 

Catilina,  L.  Sergius,  early  life  of,  698  ; 
his  conspiracy  and  death,  698-706 

Cato.     See  Porcius 

Catulus.      See  Ltitatius 

Caudinae  Furculae,  141-144 

Caudium,  144 

Caulonia,  16 

Celtiberian  war,  the,  540 

Celts,  13,  114 

Cenomani,  14 

Censors  appointed,  109  ;  functions, 
209 

Centuriae,  45,  46,  91 

Ceres,  mysteries  of,  329  (note) 

Chaeroneia,  battle  of,  630 

Chalcedon,  battle  of,  668 

Chalcis,  Antiochus  at,  474,  475  ;  occu- 
pied by  Glabrio,  477 

Cilicia,  province  of,  enlarged,  666 

Cilnii  of  Etruria,  the,  153.  Cilnius 
Maecenas,  C. ,  766 

Cimbri,  the,  569,  570,  578-580 

Ciminius  saltus,  88,  147 

Cincinnatus.      See  Quintius 

Cincius  Alinientus,  L. ,  288 

Cineas,  minister  of  Pyrrhus,  188 

Cingetorix,  729 


Cinna,  battle  of,  146 

Cinna.     See  Cornelius 

Circeii,  51,  72 

Circus  Maximus,  41  ;  Flaminius,  285 

Cirta,  siege  of,  572  ;  fighting  near,  577 

Civitas,  2,  90,  91,  202,  591,  592  ; 
gained  by  military  service,  583 

Civitas  foederata,  268,  589 

Clanis,  R.,  115 

Classes,  45,  46,  596 

Claudius,  Appius,  the  decemvir,  95, 
99,  102-105.  Caecus,  Appius  in 
Umbria,  156  ;  his  writings,  163, 
164  ;  his  censorship,  171,  172,  209  ; 
his  speech  against  terms  with  Pyrrhus, 
188.  Caudex,  App. ,  237-239. 
Cento,  App.,  defeated  at  Uscana, 
507.  L. ,  at  Rhegium,  237.  Pulcher, 
P.  (Cos.  249),  defeated  at  Drepana, 
260.  Marcellus,  M.  (Cos.  222), 
wins  spolia  opima,  281  ;  at  Ostia, 
330;  campaigns  against  Hannibal, 
332,  335;  in  Sicily,  338-342;  three 
days'  fight  near  Canusium  with 
Hannibal,  352  ;  his  death,  353,  354. 
Marcellus,  M. ,  in  Spain,  541.  Nero, 
C.  (Cos.  207),  355,  356,  365. 
Pulcher,  App. ,  673.  Nero.  Tib. , 
776 

Clausus,  Atta,  migrates  to  Rome,  69 

Cleomenes  of  Sparta,  415 

Cleonymus  of  Sparta,  19,  178 

Cleopatra,  748,  759,  774,  776,  778, 
779,  781,  782 

Cloaca  maxima,  41  (note),  51 

Clodia,  771 

Clodius  Pulcher,  P.,  673  ;  prosecutes 
Catiline,  698  ;  violates  the  mysteries, 
708,  709  ;  joins  the  populares,  712- 
717  ;  murdered,  731 

Cloelia,  66 

Cluilius,  king  of  Alba,  36 

Clupea,  249,  253 

Clusium,  besieged  by  Gauls,  115  ; 
fighting  at,  159,  279 

CoUatia,  41,  54 

CoUatinus,  62 

Collegia  sodalicia,  714 

Collegium,  pontificum,  38,  171,  212, 
213  (note)  :  augurum,  171  ;  election 
to,  650 

Colline  Gate,  battles  at  the,  597,  644 

Colonies,  lists  of,  164  (note),  654  (note) 

Coloniae  (Italian) — Aesernia,  269  ; 
Aesium,    ib.  ;    Alba    Fucentia,    151 


INDEX 


797 


Alsium,  269 ;  Anxur,  134,  397  ; 
Aquileia,  456,  457  ;  Ardea,  396  ; 
Ariminum,  200 ;  Auximum,  276 ; 
Beneventum,  200 ;  Bononia,  456 ; 
Brundisium,  200,  269  ;  Buxentum, 
396  ;  Cales,  134  ;  Carseoli,  396  ; 
Casinum,  146  ;  Castrum  Novum, 
175  ;  Circeii,  51,  396  ;  Copia 
(Thurii),  396  ;  Cora,  ib.  ;  Cremona, 
26,  281,  298,  397,  451  ;  Croton, 
396;  Cyzicus,  siege  of,  670  ;  Firmum, 
200  ;  Fregellae,  134  ;  becomes  Fabra- 
teria,  559  ;  Fregenae,  269  ;  Graviscae, 
450  ;  Hatria,  175  ;  Interamna  Lirinas, 
146  ;  Litermum,  396  ;  Luceria,  145  ; 
Luca,  458  ;  Luna,  450 ;  Minervia 
(Scylacium),  551  ;  Minturnae,  156, 
397 ;  Mutina,  298  (note),  456  ; 
Narnia,  153  ;  Nepete,  396 ;  Nep- 
tunia  (Tarentum),  559  ;  Ostia,  397  ; 
Parma,  456  ;  Pisae,  458  ;  Pisaurum, 
456;  Placentia,  281,  397,  451  ; 
Pollentia,  456  ;  Pontiae,  146  ; 
Salernum,  396  ;  Saturnia,  450,  643  ; 
Sena  Gallica,  177,  276,  397  ;  Satri- 
cum,  124;  Setia,  396;  Signia,  51, 
72  ;  Sinuessa,  156,  397  ;  Sipontum, 
396  ;  Sora,  145,  149,  152 ;  Spole- 
tium,  269  ;  Suessa,  146,  396  ; 
Sutrium,  396  ;  Tempsa,  ib.  ;  Valentia 
(Vibo),  ib.  ;  Velitrae,  124  ;  Venusia, 
396  ;  Volturnum,  ib. 

Cotnitia  cnriata,  44,  47  :  centuriata, 
45,  47,  48,  91  ;  SuUan  reform  of, 
39S>  396 :  tributa,  100,  106,  170. 
See  also  209,  649 

Comum  taken,  453  ;  status  of,  733 

Consulship,  the,  54,  169,  203-211  ; 
begins  on  ist  January,  541  (note)  ; 
second  forbidden,  544 

Consus  and  Consualia,  32 

Corfinium,  591,  592,  739 

Corinth,      destroyed      by      Mummius, 

525 

Coriolanus,  74,  75 

Cornelius  Cossus,  Aul. ,  wins  the  spolia 
opima,  81.  Aulus  (Cos.  343),  129, 
T30.  Lentulus,  L.  (Cos.  327), 
138 ;  (Cos.  237),  subdues  Ligur- 
ians,  273.  Publius  in  command 
of  ships,  146.  Arvina,  P. ,  141,  149, 
150.  SciPio  Barbatus  (Cos.  298),  in 
Etruria  and  Samnium,  154 ;  his 
epitaph,  154  (note).  ScipioAsina,  Cn. , 
defeated  at  Lipara,  243  ;  (Cos.  254), 


255  (note).  Scipio,  L. ,  takes  Corsica, 
245  (note).  Scipio,  P.  (Cos.  221), 
275.  Scipio  Calvus,  Cn.  (Cos.  222), 
takes  Mediolanum,  281  ;  in  Spain, 
311,  333  ;  death,  363,  364.  Scipio,  P. 
(Cos.  218),  his  campaign  against 
Hannibal,  298-312  ;  in  Spain,  322  ; 
death,  363,  364.  Scipio,  Cn.,  in  Spain, 
311,  312,  322;  death,  364.  Scipio 
Africanus,  p.,  saves  his  father's 
life  at  Ticinus,  306  ;  conduct  after 
Cannae,  328  ;  volunteers  for  Spain, 
365  ;  takes  Nevv'  Carthage,  368,  369  ; 
checks  Hasdrubal  at  Bacculae,  370, 
and  defeats  Hasdrubal,  son  of  Cisco, 
at  Ilipa,  371  ;  visits  Syphax,  372, 
373;  quiets  a  mutiny,  373,  374;  re- 
turns to  Rome,  375  ;  consul  (205)  ; 
goes  to  Sicily,  375-377  ;  at  Locri, 
377,  378  ;  crosses  to  Africa,  379  ; 
takes  camps  of  Syphax  and  Has- 
drubal, 381,  382  ;  meets  Hannibal, 
388  ;  wins  battle  of  Zama,  389  ;  re- 
turns to  Rome  in  triumph,  393,  394  ; 
Legatus  to  Lucius  in  war  with 
Antiochus,  481  ;  last  years  and 
death,  499-501  ;  his  sons,  488  (note). 
Scipio  Asiaticus,  L. ,  brother  of 
Africanus,  in  Spain,  371  ;  (Cos. 
190),  goes  against  Antiochus,  481- 
492  ;  impeached,  500,  501.  Centho, 
C. ,  in  Attica  and  Euboea,  428,  429. 
Scipio  Nasica,  P.,  crushes  the  Boii, 
455.  Corculum,  509 ;  opposes  de- 
struction of  Carthage,  528.  Serapio, 
556.  Scipio  Aemilianus,  in  Africa, 
530 ;  (Cos.  147),  besieges  and 
takes  Carthage,  532-536 ;  in  the 
Numantine  war,  541-545  ;  his  death, 
557>  558-  Lentulus,  Cn.  (Cos.  201), 
393.  P.  (praetor  in  63),  700-705. 
Scipio,  P.  (son  of  Africanus),  288. 
Sulla,  in  the  lugurthine  war,  576, 
577  ;  in  the  Social  war,  592,  593  ; 
(Cos.  88),  592-594 ;  puts  Sulpicius 
to  death,  594  ;  his  temporary 
measures,  596  ;  goes  to  Greece, 
622  ;  siege  of  Athens  and  campaign 
in  Boeotia,  623-634  ;  makes  terms 
with  Mithridates,  635  ;  returns  to 
Italy,  641 ;  defeats  Norbanus,  Marius, 
the  younger,  and  Carbo,  641-645  ; 
his  proscriptions,  645,  646  ;  dictator 
(82-79),  646  ;  his  reforms,  649-651  ; 
abdication  and  death,  652-653.    Sulla 


798 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Faustus,  L.,  689.  CiNNA,  L.  (Cos. 
87),  recalls  Marius,  597  ;  the  pro- 
scriptions and  revolutionary  laws, 
598  ;  his  death,  599.  Dolabella,  P. , 
176,  177.      P.  (Cos.  44),  749,  761 

Cornelii  cives,  649 

Corcyra,  Romans  in,  413,  418 

Corsica,  reduced  by  L.  Scipio,  245 

Corvi,  243 

Cossyra,  254 

Cotta,  Aurunculeius,  729 

Country  life,  abandonment  of,  400 ; 
described  by  Cato,  405 

Crathis,  R. ,  136 

Cremera,  R.,  79 

Crimisus,  R. ,  battle  of  the,  193 

Crotona,  16  ;   war  with  Sybaris,  17,  19 

Crustumerium,  29 

Cumae,  17,  67,  68,  78  ;  attempted  by 
Hannibal,  335 

Cures,  battle  at,  69 

Curiae,  the,  43-47 

Curio,  C. ,  734-736,  740-742 

Curius  Dentatus,  M*.  (Cos.  290),  162  ; 
wins  battle  of  Beneventum,  197 

Curtius,  Mettius,  a  Sabine,  32 

Cynoscephalae,  battle  of,  441,  442 

Cyrene  left  to  the  Romans,  586 

Dalmatians,  the,  537,  538 
Damasippus,  L. ,  643,  644 
Debt,  laws  of,  94,  165-168,  598 
Decemvirate,    first,    102 ;  second,    103- 

105 
Decemviri  sacrorum,  170 
Decius  Mus. ,  P.  (Cos.  340),  131,  132  ; 

(Cos.    295),    157,    158  ;    (Cos.   279), 

190.      P. ,    conquers    Umbrians    and 

Etruscans  at  Mevania,  149 
Deditio,  meaning  of,  129  (note),  529 
Deiotarus,  745,   749,  750 
Delium,  Roman  cohort  cut  off  at,  473 
Demaratus  of  Corinth,  40 
Demetrius,  son  of  PhiUp,  502,  503  :  of 

Pharos,    275,    276,    290,    295,    296, 

319  ;  his  surrender  demanded,  417 
Diaeus  defeated  at  Corinth,  524,  525 
Dictatorship,    the,  208,  317  (note),  321 

(note),  647  (note) 
Difninutio  capitis,  285 
Dion  of  Syracuse,  192 
Dionysius,  the  elder,  19,  192  :  younger, 

ib.  :  of  Halicarnassus,  55 
Divorce  of  Sp.  Carvilius,  286 
Domitius  Calvinus,  Cn.   (Cos.   53),  13, 


744.    745.    750.    755.    758-    Aheno- 

barbus,    L. ,    in   Sicily,    550.       Cn., 

conquers  the  Allobroges,    568,    569  ; 

defeated  by  Pompey  (65).      L.  (Cos. 

54),  718,  724,  739,  740.      Cn.  (Cos. 

32),  774.  776,  779 
Drama,  the,  134,  287,  288 
Drepana,  255,  256  ;   sea  fight  off,  260 
Ducetius,  leader  of  Siceli,  221 
DuilHus,  M. ,  105,  106.    C.  (Cos.  260), 

his  victory  at  Mylae,  244 
Duoviri  capitales,  38,  697 
Dyrrachium,  413,  742-3 

Ebro,  R.  ,  boundary  of  Carthaginians 
in  Spain,  279,  362,  363 

Eburones,  729 

Ecbatana,  Antony  at,  778 

Ecnomus,  battle  of,  247 

Egeria,  36 

Egnatius,  Gellius,  a  Samnite,  155 

Egypt,  198  ;  Roman  commission  in, 
504  ;  invaded  by  Antiochus  •  Epi- 
phanes,  515  ;  Popilius  Laenasin,  516  ; 
Pompey  killed  in,  747  ;  Caesar  in, 
748-749  ;  Antony  in,  776,  778 ; 
province  of,  783 

Elissa,  224 

Elymi,  221 

Enna,  massacre  at,  339 

Ennius,  Q. ,  26,  400,  401 

Ephesus,  decree  at,  632  (note) 

Epicydes  at  Syracuse,  336-340 

Epirus  spoiled,  513 

Equites,  procession  of,  71  ;  cease  to 
furnish  the  cavalry,  582  ;  posteriores, 
41,  42  :  ordo  equester  ?iX\di  the  judicia, 
561,  581,  587,  649,  651 

Equus  publicus,  45 

Era,  the  Roman,  26,  27 

Eryx,  Mt.  and  town,  263,  264 

Etruria,  6,  8,  279  ;  decadence  of,  78 

Etruscans,    12,    13,    41  ;  in  Campania, 
13,  6^  ;  disasters  to,  80  ;  invasion  o 
Latium  under   Porsena  and  Arruns 
64-68  ;  combine  against  Rome  (389 
123  ;  wars  with,  126,  127,  147,  153 
defeated  at  Mevania,  149 

Eumenes,  king  of  Pergamus,  482,  484, 
492,  498  ;  denounces  Philip,  502, 
and  Perseus,  504  ;  attempted  assas- 
sination of,  505  ,  ordered  to  leave 
Italy,  511,  512 

Eunus,  leader  of  Sicilian  slaves,  548 

Evander,  city  of,  on  the  Palatine,  23 


INDEX 


799 


Fabii,  fall  of  the,  79 

Fabius,  Q, ,  and  the  Gauls,  115.  Maxi- 
mus,  Q.  (Mag.  Eq.  325),  140;  (Cos. 
310),  147.  Gurges,  Q.  (Cos.  292), 
161,  196.  Ambustus,  daughters  of, 
174,  175.  Rullianus,  victories  in  Sam- 
nite  wars,  155-158.  Cunctator,  80  ; 
conquers  Ligurians,  273  ;  opposes 
Flaminius,  277  ;  envoy  to  Carthage, 
297 ;  as  Dictator  (217),  follows 
Hannibal,  317-321  ;  saves  Minucius, 
322  ;  retakes  Tarentum,  352  ; 
opposes  plan  of  Scipio  Africanus, 
376.  Sonof  above,  328,  343.  Maxi- 
mus  Aemilianus,  Q. ,  in  Macedonia, 
509  ;  in  Spain,  539.  Hadrianus,  M. , 
676.     Pictor,  288,  333 

Fabricius  Luscinus,  C. ,  mission  to 
Pyrrhus,  189  (Cos.  278),  191 

Falerii,  83  ;  truce  with,  127  ;  removal 
of  inhabitants,  270 

Fannius  Strabo,  C.  (Cos.  122),  564 

Fasces,  the,  203 

Feroniae  fanum,  37 

Fetiales,  39,  213 

Fictis  ruminalis,  22,  59 

Fidenae,  37,  So 

Flainen  DialtA,'  Martis,  Quirini,  36 

Flaminius,  C. ,  his  land  bill,  276,  277  ; 
(Cos.  223),  defeats  the  Insubres, 
280,  281  ;  as  censor  (220)  constructs 
via  Flaminia,  281  ;  (Cos.  217), 
falls  at  the  battle  of  Thrasymene, 
3i3-3i'6 

Flavius,  Cn.,  divulges  \&g2l  formulae, 
172,  Fimbria,  C. ,  legate  of  Flaccus, 
633  ;  causes  murder  of  Flaccus,  635  ; 
successes  in  Bithynia,  635  ;  his  death, 
637.  638 

Fregellae,  138  ;  taken  by  Samnites, 
144  ;  rebellion  at,  558  ;  receives 
colony  as  Fabrateria,  559 

Frentani,  8,  11 

P'ulvia,  775,  776 

Fulvius  Maximus,  Cn.,  154.  Flaccus, 
M.,  conquers  Volsinii,  239.  Nobi- 
lior,  M. ,  in  Spain,  477  ;  takes 
Ambracia,  496,  497  ;  his  acts  annulled, 
500.  Nobilior,  Q. ,  defeated  in  Spain, 
541.  Flaccus,  M. ,  supporter  of  C. 
Gracchus,  556,  565,  566  ;  victory  over 
Salluvii,  568 

Funerals,  expense  of,  208,  285 

Furina,  grove  of,  565 

Furius  Camillus,   M.,  at  Veil,  86,   87; 


exiled,  iii  ;  recalled,  119-121  ;  de- 
feats the  Volscians,  124 ;  repels 
Gallic  invasion,  125  ;  death,  125, 
126.     L. ,  126 

Gabii,  siege  of,  51 

Gabinius,  A.,  681,  689,  712,  733 

Gaesatae,  the,  279-281 

Gallia  Cisalpina,  5,  6,  8  ;  province  of, 
455  :  Transalpina,  569,  718-731 

Gauls  in  N.  Italy,  14,  15,  114,  115  ; 
capture  Rome,  117;   subsequent  in- 

'  vasions,  125,  126  ;  aUied  with 
Samnites,  156 ;  Hannibal  and  the, 
307,  308,  313  ;  their  attack  on 
Placentia  and  Cremona,  397  :  in 
Asia,  411,  413,  493,  494,  600 

Gaurus,  Mt. ,  victory  at,  130 

Gelo  of  Syracuse,  99,  192 

Genthius  of  Illyria,  505,  509 

Genucius,  T. ,  102.  Clepsina,  L. 
(Cos.  271),  takes  Rhegium,  199 

Gergovia,  730 

Germans  in  Gaul,  720-722,  726,  730 

Gladiators,  first  show  of,  285  ;  rebellion 
of,  663 

Gracchus.      See  Sempronius 

Great  Plains,  battle  of  the,  384 

Greece,  freedom  of,  412  ;  chief  powers 
in,4i2-4i5  ;  settlement  by Flamininus, 
444,  445  ;  Roman  commissioners 
in,  514  ;  settlement  of,  after  fall 
of   Corinth,    526 ;    depopulation   in, 

527 

Greek  cities  in  Italy,  16-20  ;  name  of 
Magna  Gi-aecia,  16  (note)  ;  decadence 
of,  19  ;  attacked  by  Italian  tribes,  135, 
136  ;  treatment  of,  after  second  Pvmic 
war,  395.  Greek  influences  in  Rome, 
286,  400,  402,  518-519  ;  Cato's  opposi- 
tion to,  519.  Greek  works  of  art  in 
Rome,  341,  507,  518.  Greek  religion 
identified  with  Roman,  402,  403 

Greeks,  first  diplomatic  relations  with, 
276  :  after  the  war  of  Antiochus,  501 

Haedui,  14.      See  Acdui 

Hamilcar  at  Panormus,  244  ;  at 
Ecnomus,  247,  Father  of  Hannibal, 
at  Hercte,  262-267  ;  takes  Spendius, 
272  ;  in  Spain,  277,  290,  291. 
Phameas,  531 

Hannibal  defeated  at  Mylae,  244  ;  at 
Lilybaeum,  259.  Rhodius,  259. 
Son    of    Hamilcar,    his   oath,    291  ; 


8oo 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


commands  in  Spain,  293  ;  takes 
Saguntum,  296  ;  his  march  to  Italy, 
298-303  ;  his  victories  in  the  valley  of 
the  Po,  304-311  ;  marches  south  to 
Arpi,  314-317  ;  foils  Fabius  in  Cam- 
pania, 320  ;  his  policy  after  Cannae, 
332  ;  at  Capua,  333  ;  beats  Fulvius 
at  Herdonea,  346  ;  his  march  on 
Rome,  347,  348  (note),  349  ;  three 
days'  fight  with  Marcellus  at  Canusium, 
352  ;  foiled  at  Salapia,  355  ;  on  the 
Lacinian  promontory,  353,  399  ; 
leaves  Italy,  386  ;  meets  Scipio,  388*; 
defeated  at  Zama,  389-391  ;  insists 
on  accepting  Roman  terms,  393  ; 
forced  to  leave  Carthage  and  goes  to 
Antiochus,  467,  468  ;  story  of  his 
meeting  with  Africanus,  469  (note) ; 
his  death,  498,  499 

Hanno  at  Messana,  237  ;  at  Ecnomus, 
247  ;  at  New  Carthage,  367,  368 

Hasdrubal  at  Lilybaeum,  256  ;  in 
Spain,  treaty  with,  277,  291-293. 
Brother  of  Hannibal,  left  in  Spain, 
299,  322,  333,  363-371  ;  starts  for 
Italy,  355  ;  defeated  and  killed  on 
the  Metaurus,  357-359.  SonofGisco, 
355.  363.  366,  371.  372,  381,  382, 
388,  389.       In  third  Punic  war,  529- 

535 
Helvetii,  the,  719,  720 
Heracleia  (i),  in  Magna  Graecia,   16  ; 

battle   of,   186  ;    (2)   in   Phocis,  477, 

478  ;   (3)  in  Pontus,  673 
Hercte,  264,  265 
Herdonea,  battle  of,  346 
Hermaeum,  248  ;  battle  off,  254 
Hermodorus  of  Ephesus,  102 
Hernici,  11,  149 
Herod,  778 
Hiero  I.  of  S5Tacuse,  78.    II.,  199,  223; 

joins  in  siege  of  Messana,  238  ;   makes 

peace  with  Romans,  239  ;  lends  ships, 

256  ;  sends  corn  and  men  to  Rome, 

323  ;   death  of,  334 
Hieronymus,    grandson    of    Hiero    II., 

336,  337 
Himilco    in    Lilybaeum,    258  ;    sent    to 

relieve  Syracuse,  339 
Hippo  Zarytus,  271 
Hippocrates  at  Syracuse,  336,  337 
Hirtius,  Aul.,  764,  768,  769 
Hispania,    the    Carthaginians    in,    290- 

296;   the  Scipios   in,  311,  312,  322, 

333.    334.   362-365  ;    operations     of 


Africanus  in,  365-375  ;  affairs  in,  after 
Punic  war,  458-463  ;  two  provinces 
in,  459  ;  Cato  in,  459,  460  ;  settle- 
ment of  Tiberius  Gracchus,  462-463  ; 
wars  in,  with  Lusitani  and  Celtiberes, 

538-545 
Horatii  and  Curiatii,  the,  37 
Horatius  Codes,  64.    Flaccus,  Q.,  789, 

790.    Pulvillus,  M. ,  dedicates  temples 

on  the  Capitol,  63 
Hortensius,  L. ,  his  plundering  in  Greece, 

507  (note)  :  legate  of  Sulla,  627-630. 

Q.,  orator,  681,  682 
Hostilius  Mancinus,  C. ,  disasters  of,  in 

Spain,  543 
Hydruntum,  17 
Hyrcanus,  686 
Hyria,  19 

lAPYGIANS,  the,   II,   17 

Iberes,  Pompey's  battle  with,  685 

Ilipa,  battle  of,  371,  372 

Illium  Novum,  422  (note) 

Illyrian   war,   first,   274,   275  ;    second, 

295,  296 
Illyrians  subjected  to  tax,  512 
Illyrium,  Caesar  in,  718^24 
Imperium,  2,  47  ( note ),v7o3- 205 
Indibilis  and  Mandonius,  Spanish  chiefs, 

370,  373.  374.  458 
Insubres,  defeat  of,  280,  281  ;   join  the 

Boii,  451,  452  ;  dispersed,  453 
Interreges,  35  (note) 
Isthmian  games,  proclamation  at,  445 
Istri,  the,  275 
Italy,  geography  of,  5-9  ;  inhabitants  of, 

10-20  ;   Italia  vetus,   16 

lANicULUM,    the    Veientines    on,    80  ; 

secession  to,  173 
lanus,  temple  of,  36  ;   closed,  273 
Jerusalem  taken  by  Pompey,  688,  689  ; 

by  C.  Sosius,  778 
Jews   seek  Roman   alliance,  516,  674  ; 

defence  of  the  Temple,  689 
luba,  742,  750,  752-753  ;   his  son,  782 
lubellius,  187,  199 
Indicia,  561,  585,  651,  679,  695,  754. 

765 
lugurtha,  570-572;  war  with,  ST^'Sll 

in     Rome    (no),    572  ;     starved    in 

Mamertine  prison,  578 
lulia,  wife  of  Pompey,  711,  732 
lulius   Caesar,    Sext. ,   in   Greece,    524. 

Sext.  killed  in  Syria,  764  (note).      L. 


INDEX 


80 1 


(Cos.  90),  590;  his  mission  to  lulius  at 
Ariminum,  737,  738  ;  proscribed, 
772.  C.  lulius,  his  early  Ufe,  695,  696; 
prosecutes  Rabilius,  697 ;  Pontifex 
Maximus,  697,  698  ;  speech  on  tfce 
Catilinarian  conspirators,  704 ;  his 
praetorship,  706 ;  in  Spain,  707  ; 
(Cos.  59),  711 ;  his  conquest  of  Gaul, 
718-731  ;  question  of  his  recall,  732- 
736  ;  crosses  the  Rubicon,  737  ; 
in  eastern  Italy,  738,  739  ;  at  Mar- 
seilles and  Spain,  739-741  ;  consul 
II, ,  and  dictator,  742  ;  war  with 
Pompey  in  Greece,  742-747  ;  at 
Alexandria,  748,  749  ;  in  Asia,  749, 
750;  dictator  II.,  748;  in  Africa, 
751-754  ;  his  triumphs  and  legisla- 
tion, 754  ;  in  Spain,  755,  756  ;  last 
triumph  and  projects,  756-759  ;  his 
death,  760 

lunius  Norbanus,  C.  (Cos.  83),  640, 
641.  Pullus,  L.,  261,  263.  Brutus, 
L.,  53.  Dec,  gives  the  first  show 
of  gladiators,  285  ;  (Cos.  131),  in 
Spain,  540.  Brutus,  M.,  partizan  of 
Car  bo,  641.  M. ,  partizan  of  Lepidus, 
660.  M.  (assassin  of  Caesar),  759, 
764,  765,  773-775 

luno,  statue  of,  at  Veii,  87 

lunonia  (Carthage),  559,  564 

lupiter  Indiges,  22  ;  Capitolinus,  41,  51 ; 
Latiaris,  29,  133 

lustiiium,  594 

Kings  expelled,  53,  54 ;  substitute 
for,  89,  90,  203 

Labienus,  T.  ,  697,  720,  729,  739,  745, 

755.  756:  Q.,  776.  778 
Lacinian  promontory,  353,  359 
Laelius,  C. ,  368,  369,  374,  377,  379, 

384,  385,  390 
Laevi  (Gauls),  14 
Lanassa,  wife  of  Pyrrhus,  193 
Lanuvium  obtains  Roman  civitas,  133 
Larinum,  skirmish  near,  321 
Latinitas,  133,  589,  592,  654 
Latinus,  king,  21,  22.     Silvius,  22 
Latium,  6;  vetus,  11,  29;  subdued  by 

Tarquin,  41  ;  rebellions  in,  124,  126  ; 

the  Latin  league,  29  ;  war  with,  39  ; 

Rome  excluded  from,  61  ;  hostility  of, 

during  Etruscan  invasion,  68  ;   Latini, 

great  war  with    (340-338).  131-133  ". 

end  of  Latin  League,  133 


Laudationes,  57,  58;   of  women,  121 

Laus,  16 

Lautulae,  battle  of,  145 

Lavinium,  21 

Lebecii  (Gauls),  14 

Legiones  (see  Army)  ;    of  Caesar,    722 

(note)  :   linteatae,  160 
Lentulus   Spinther,   Corn.    (Coss.    57), 

715 

Leontini,  194,  337 

Lepidus.     See  Aemilius 

Leucopetra,  6 

Lex:  Acilia  (121),  561  ;  Aelia  (160), 
713  ;  Aemilia  (435),  109,  209  ; 
Aemilia  Baebia  (182),  521  ;  Annalis 
(180),  532  (note)  ;  Aternia  Tarpeia 
(454).  97.  loi  ;  Aufeia  (123),  605; 
Aurelia  (70),  679,  695  ;  Caecilia 
Didia  (98),  588  ;  Calpurnia  (149), 
518  ;  Canuleia  (445),  108 ;  Cassia 
(137).  521  ;  Cincia  (204),  658  ; 
Claudia  (257),  284 ;  leges  Clodiae 
(158),  714  ;  Cornelia  Fulvia  (159), 
521  ;  leges  Corneliae  (81-79),  649- 
651,  667  ;  Cornelia  (70),  707  ;  Didia 
(143),  518  ;  Domitia  (104),  650  ; 
Duillia  (449),  106  ;  duodecim  Tabu- 
larum  (451-450),  107,  108  ;  Fannia 
(161),  518;  Flaminia{-22,2.),2Z^;  Ga- 
binia  (139),  521  ;  (67),  681 ;  Ho7'tensia 
(286),  173  ;  Icilia  sacrata  (492),  97, 
100,  206  ;  lulia  (90),  591  ;  leges 
luliae  {c^g),  711,  754,  757;  Licinia- 
Mticia  (95),  586,  587  ;  Licinian  (367), 
167-169;  Manilia  (66),  682;  Ogulnia 
(296),  172  ;  Oppia  (215),  286,  518  ; 
Orchia  (182),  518  ;  Papiria  (421), 
III  ;  Papiria  Plajitia  (89),  592  ; 
Plotia  (73),  695  ;  Poetilla  (326),  167; 
de  ambitu{2,S^)'  170  (note)  ;  Pompeia 
(89),  592  ;  leges  Pompeiae  (70),  679, 
(55).  725;  (52),  731.732;  Porcia, 
93  (note)  ;  Publiliae  (339),  106 
(note),  133,  170  ;  Publilia-Voleronis 
(471),  99,  100  ;  Piipia  (?6i)  736 
(note)  ;  regiae  leges,  92  ;  Rupilia, 
(132),  549;  Rutilia  (105),  170; 
(265),  210  ;  Saenia  (30),  783  ;  Sem- 
pronia  (133),  553,  554;  Semproniae 
(123),  559,  562,  602  ;  Servilia  (100), 
585  ;  Trebonia  (52),  725  (note),  733 
(note)  ;  Valeria  (508),  38,  93,  204  ; 
(300),  93  (note)  ;  Valeria- Horatia 
(447).  105,   112;    Vatinia  (59),  71 

Libertini  in  city  tribes,  284,  285 


3   F 


8o2 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Libri  li?itei,  57,  58,  81  (note) 

Libui  (Gauls),  14 

Libyans,  subdued  by  Carthage,  252 

Licinius  Crassus,  L.  (orator),  657.  C. , 
97.  Spurius,  99.  C.  Licinius  Stolo, 
167.  Crassus,  P.  (Cos.  171),  de- 
feated at  Larissa,  506.  Lucullus,  L. 
(Cos.  151),  in  Spain,  541,  542. 
Nerva,  praetor  in  Sicily,  549.  M., 
695,  725  ;  his  fall  in  Parthia,  733, 
734.  Lucullus,  L.  ,  collects  a  fleet 
for  Sulla,  625-635  ;  quaestor  in  Asia, 
639  ;  commands  in  the  second  Mith- 
ridatic  war,  670,  677  ;  mutiny  in  his 
army,  676,  677 ;  his  history,  657. 
Lucullus,  M. ,  in  Macedonia,  666 ; 
in  the  Sullan  war,  644  ;  in  the  war 
of  Spartacus,  665.  Murena,  L. ,  his 
war  with  Mithri dates,  666,  667 

Liguria,  5  ;  the  Ligurians,  13,  14,  273; 
wars  with,  451,  452,  457,  458  ;  Lig- 
ures  Corneliani  et  Baebiani,  458 

Lilybaeum,  rise  of,  195,  226  ;  strength- 
ened by  Carthaginians,  255  ;  invest- 
ment of,  258-262  ;  surrender  of,  267 

Lingones,  14,  115 

Liris,  R. ,  7 

Literature,  163,  164,  286-288,  400-407, 
657,  658,  785-791 

Livia,  776 

Livius  Drusus,  M.,  outbids  C.  Gracchus, 
563,  564.  Drusus,  M.  (the  younger), 
his  reforms,  587,  588.  Macatus,  M. , 
atTarentum,  342-345,  352.  Salinator, 
C. ,  commands  in  the    Aegean,    481- 

483 
Locri  Epizephyrii,  16,  19  ;  troubles  at, 

377.  378  ;  status  of,  395  (note) 
LoUius,  Samnite  hostage,  199 
Lucania,  6,  8  ;  invaded,  196  ;  subdued, 

198,  199 
Lucanians,    19 ;      join     the    Samnites, 

139  ;    attack  Thurii,  177,    180  ;  join 

Pyrrhus,    187  ;    join  Hannibal,    331  ; 

in  the  Social  war,  589 
Lucca,  717 
Luceria,   144,  145 
Lucretia,   53,  54 
Lucretius,  C. ,  commands  fleet  in  Greek 

waters,    506.       Carus  T. ,   788,   789. 

Ofella,   645,  651 
Lzicus  deae  Diae,  40 
Luna,  6,  453 
T^usitani,  the,  538-540 
Lutatius  Catulus,  C. ,  victory  at  Aegusa, 


265,  266.  Q.  (Cos.  103),  defeated  at 
Verona,  but  victorious  at  Vercellae, 
579,  580,  657  (Cos.  78),  659, 
660,  701 

Macedonia,  history  of,  408,  409  ;  its 
connexion  with  Greece,  410;  first 
Macedonian  war,  417-422  ;  effects  of, 
on  Rome,  408  ;  second  Macedonian 
war,  423-443;  third  Macedonian  war, 
505-511  ;  division  of,  512  ;  plunder 
of,  513  ;  becomes  a  province,  522 

Macella,  capture  of,  244  (note) 

Machanidas  of  Sparta,  419 

Macra,  R. ,  6 

Maelius,  Sp. ,  no 

Magister  equitum,  208 

Magistracies,  continuation  of,  554  (note) 

Magnesia,  battle  of,  490,  491,  632 

Magna  Mater,  52,  520 

Mago  in  Spain,  366,  367,  371,  372  ; 
ordered  to  Italy,  374  ;  defeated  in 
Cisalpine  Gaul,  385  ;  dies  on  board 
ship,  ib. 

Mahabal  after  Cannae,  329  (note) 

Maiestas,  584  (note),  649,  650 

Mamertines,  the,  193,  194,  234-236 

Mamilius,  C. ,  brings  in  a  law  to  try 
those  bribed  by  lugurtha,  572,  575 

Manliana  imperia,  131 

Manlius,  Aul. ,  sent  to  Athens,  loi.  T. 
Manlius  Torquatus,  131,  132.  M. 
Manlius  defends  the  Capitol,  119; 
his  popular  measures  and  death,  165, 
166.  T.  Manlius  Torquatus  (Cos. 
235),  reduces  Sardinia,  273.  Cn. 
Manlius  Vulso  (Cos.  189),  in 
Galatia,  493 

Marcellus.      See  Claudius 

Marcius  C. ,  first  plebeian  dictator, 
127  ;  (Cos.  342),  130.  Coriolanus, 
74.  Tremulus,  Q. ,  victory  over  Sam- 
nites, 150.  L. ,  saves  the  armies  in 
Spain,  364,  365;  subsequent  services, 
373,  374.  Philippus,  Q. ,  deceives 
Perseus,  506  (Cos.  169) ;  enters 
Macedonia,  507,  508.  Figulus,  C. , 
537.      RexQ.,   569;    (Cos.   68),  677 

Marius,  C,  573;  birth  and  early  life, 
574  ;  (Cos.  107),  575  ;  finishes  the 
lugurthine  war,  576,  578  ;  defeats 
the  Teutones  at  Aquae  Sextiae,  578  ; 
the  Cimbri  near  Vercellae,  579  ;  as  a 
politician,  582,  585,  592  ;  his  army 
reforms,  583  ;  in  Asia,   586 ;    in   the 


INDEX 


803 


Social  war,  591  ;  appointed  to 
supersede  Sulla,  594  ;  his  flight,  594, 
595  ;  return  of  and  death,  597,  598. 
C. ,  the  younger  (Cos.  82),  642, 
643  ;  defeat  of,  at  Sacriportus,  643  ; 
death  of,  645,  M,  (the  One-Eyed), 
adherent  of  Sertorius,  669,  671. 
Gratidianus,  M.,  644.  A  pretended 
Marius,  764 

Marrucini,  8,  11,  589 

Mars,  22,  25,  35  ;  flamen  Martis,  36  ; 
as  god  of  blight,  405  (note) 

Marsi,  11,  153,  589 

Masannasa,  363,  371,  375,  377,  379, 
380,  382,  384,  385,  390,  527,  528, 
570 

Massilia,  569,  741 

Mauretania,  782 

Mediolanum  taken,  281 

Medma,  16 

Melpum,  13  ;  taken  by  Gauls,  88 

Memmius,  C.  (Tril.  PI.  112),  572; 
assassinated,  585 

MeneniusAgrippa,  96.    T.  Menenius,99 

Mercenary  war  in  Africa,  270-272 

Messana,  223  ;  besieged,  237,  238 

Matapontum,  5,  6,  16,  19 

Mettius  Fufius,  37 

Mevania,  149 

Milo,  officer  of  Pyrrhus,  182,  198 

Milo.     See  A?tnias 

Minucius,  L.  (Cos.  458),  75.  Rufus, 
M.  (Mag.  eq.  217),  321,  322.  Ther- 
mus  Q.  (Cos.  193),  in  the  Ligurian 
war,  453,  454 

Misenum,  peace  of,  777 

Mithridates,  Eupator,  king  of  Pontus, 
refuses  aid  to  the  Socii,  592  ;  early 
life  and  character,  603,  604,  606  ;  his 
conquest  of  the  Crimea,  607  ;  invades 
Paphlagonia  and  Cappadocia,  609, 
610  ;  first  war  with  Rome,  615  ; 
occupies  Asia  and  Greece,  616-619  ; 
his  army  defeated  at  Chaeroneia  and 
Orchomenus,  630-633  ;  makes  peace 
with  Sulla,  636  ;  attacked  by  Murena, 
667 ;  second  Mithridatic  war,  668  ; 
successes  of  Lucullus  against,  669- 
673 ;  recovers  Pontus,  676  ;  de- 
feated by  Pompey,  683  ;  retreats  to 
Bosporus,  684  ;  his  death,  687,  688. 
Of  Pergamus,  748,  750 

Motye,  in  Sicily,  192,  226 

Mucius  Scaevola,  C,  656,  657.  Q.  (jur- 
ists), 657 


Mummius,    L.,   in  Spain,    538  ;    (Cos. 

146),  takes  Corinth,  525,  526 
Munatius,  Flaccus,  L. ,  755.      Plancus, 

L.,  764,  768,  769,  780 
Munda,  battle  of,  755 
Municipia,  589 
Murcus,  Statius,  773,  774 
Muthul,  R.,  battle  on  the,  573 
Mutina,  war  of,  769 
Mylae,  battle  of,  244 

Nabis,  of  Sparta,  422,  470 

Naebian  meadow,  63 

Naevius,  Cn. ,  288 

Narbo  Martius,  566,  655 

Navy,  appointment  of  duoviri  navales, 
146  ;  absence  of,  at  the  beginning  of 
Punic  war,  237  ;  first  construction 
of,  241,  242  ;  wreck  off  Camarina, 
254  ;  a  new  fleet,  255  ;  again 
wrecked,  249 ;  a  new  fleet,  265 ; 
fleet  during  the  first  Macedonian  war, 
418;  fleet  for  the  war  with  Antiochus, 
469-487.  Sext.  Pompeius  commander 
of,  770 

Neapolis,  17,  139,  188,  323 

Nebrodes  montes,  6 

Nemean  games,  proclamation  at,  448 

Nequinum,  153 

Nervii,  722,  723,  729 

Nexus,  93,  94,  166  ;  abolition  of,  167 

Nicaea,  congress  at,  437 

Nicomedes  II.,  king  of  Bithynia,  549, 
609,  610,  611,  613:  III.,  king  of 
Bithynia,  613,  614,  668 

Nobility,  the  new,  165,  399 

Nola,  Marcellus  at,  333,  335 

Nomentum  obtains  civitas,  133 

Nonius,  A.,  murdered,  584 

Noviodunum,  722 

Nuceria,  149,  150 

Numa  Pompilius,  35,  36 ;  pretended 
writings  of,  521 

Numantia,  war  of,  540-545 

Numidia,  province  of,  753 

Numitor   father  of  Rea,  22 

Numus,  silver,  200,  245 

OcTAViA,  776,  778,  782 ;  Opera 
Octaviae,  790 

Octavius,  M. ,  opposes  Tib.  Gracchus, 
553.554-  C.  (Caesar  Augustus),  756, 
758,  766-769  ;  his  first  consulship, 
770,  771  ;  triumvir,  771  ;  his  part  in 
the  proscription,  772  ;  his  policy  and 


3  F  2 


8o4 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


acts,  775-780  ;  his  victory  at  Actium, 

781  ;  his  reforms,  783 
Oenotri,  17 
Opici,  II 
Opimius,  L.  (Cos.  121),   puts  followers 

of  C.  Gracchus  to  death,    564-566  ; 

commissioner  to  lugurtha,  571 
Oppius,  Q. ,  615,  616,  635  (note) 
Optimates,    the,    581  ;    compared   with 

Populares,  693,  694 
Orchomenus,  battle  of,  633,  634 
Orgetorix,  719 
Oscans,  the,  11 
Otacilius,  Tit.,  in  Sicily,  323 
Ovinium  plebiscitum,  173 

Pacorus,  778 

Pacuvius,  M. ,  519 

Padus  {Fo)  R.,  5,  304,  311 

Paestum,  6,  16,  19,  323 

^(^£^^>  45  (note),  92 

Palaepolis,  9,  17,  138 

Palatinus,  Mons,  22  ;  site  of  first  city, 
23-25.      King  of  Alba,  22 

Palilia,  the,  24,  27 

Pandosia,  136 

Panium,  battle  of,  465 

Panormus,  in  Sicily,  192,  226  ;  taken 
by  L.  Scipio,  255  ;  battle  at,  256 

Papirius,  M.,  118.  L.  Papirius  Cursor 
(diet.  325),  140-144 ;  recovers 
Luceria  (diet.  310),  147.  L.  Papir- 
ius Cursor,  son  of  above,  160,  198. 
C.  Papirius  Carbo  (Cos.  120),  566. 
Cn.  Papirius  Carbo  opposes  Sulla, 
599,  641-644  ;  his  death,  651 

Papius,  Mutilus,  Q.,  Samnite,  590 

Parthians,  the,  612,  686,  733,  734,  756, 

758-  71^^  778 
Patres  minorum  gentium,  41 
P atria  potestas,  92 
Pedius,  Q. ,  749,  758,  771 
Pedum  obtains  civitas,  133 
Peiraeus,  destruction  of,  by  Sulla,  627 
Peligni,  11,  321,  589 
Perduellio,  38,  92,  584  (note),  697 
Peregrini,  285,  654 
Pergamus,    kingdom    of,    411  ;    left    to 

Rome,  558,  561,  602;  its  extent,  600; 

treaty  of,  636,  637,  667 
Perpenna,  M.,  kills  Sertorius,  661-663 
Perseus,  king  of  Macedonia,  430,  502  ; 

accession  and  character,  503  ;   policy, 

504,  505;  war  with,  505-511 
Perusia,  siege  of,  775,  776 


Pestilences  at  Rome,  74,  119,  161 

Petreius,  M.,  740,  753 

Phalanx,  the,  441,  490,  491 

Pharnaces,  749,  750 

Pharsalus,  battle  of,  745 

Philip  V. ,  290  ;  hears  of  Thrasymene, 
318,  319  ;  treaty  with  Hannibal,  335, 
336,  416,  417  ;  his  scheme  for  invad- 
ing Italy,  416,  417  ;  opposition  in 
Greece,  417,  418  ;  war  with,  418- 
421  ;  makes  peace  at  Phoenice,  421  ; 
secretly  supports  Hannibal,  423  ; 
agrees  with  Antiochus  to  partition 
Egypt,  424  ;  at  war  with  Rhodes  and 
Attalus,  425 ;  takes  Abydos,  427, 
428  ;  defends  Stena  Aoi,  431,  432  ; 
has  a  conference  with  Flamininus, 
432  ;  at  the  congress  of  Nicaea,  437  ; 
defeated  at  Cynoscephalae,  441,  442  ; 
aids  Romans  against  Antiochus,  474, 
475,  438,  439,  482  ;  his  later  designs, 
502  ;  his  death,  503 

Philippi,  battles  of,  774,  775 

Philochares  of  Tarentura,  180 

Philonides  of  Tarentum,  181 

Phocaea,  victory  at,  481,  487 

Phoenice,  treaty  of,  421 

Phoenicians  in  Sicily,  192  ;  in  Africa 
and  W.  Europe,  223,  224 

Phraates,  686 

Picenum  and  Picentini,  11,  154,  200 

Pirates,  the,  680,  681 

Pisae,  harbour  of,  273  ;  fighting  with 
Ligurians  at,  454 

Pistoria,  705 

Placentia.     See  Colonies 

Plautus,  T.  Maccius,  401-405 

Plebs,  origin  of,  44  ;  rise  of  plebeians, 
84  ;  disabilities  of,  91  ;  informal 
meetings  of,  95  ;  first  secession  of, 
96  ;  last,  173  ;  concilia  plebis,  100, 
105  ;  plebiscita,'  105,  106,  173,  286, 
399'  572.  584.  Plebeians  obtain 
conubium,  108  ;  the  quaestorship, 
III  ;  the  consulship,  169  ;  censor- 
ship, 170  ;  the  sacred  colleges,  172  ; 
first  plebeian  dictator,  127 

Pleminius,  Q. ,  propraetor  at  Locri, 
377.  378 

Polybius  (quoted),  14,  56,  63  (note), 
165,  219,  228,  230,  231,  238,  302 
(note),  321  (note),  333  (note),  368 
(note),  488  (note),  514  (note),  529 
(note) 

Pomoeriu7n,  31 


INDEX 


80s 


Pompadius,  Q. ,  Marsian  leader,  590 

Pompeia  divorced  by  Caesar,  709 

Pompeii  Curia,  759 

Pompeius,  Rufus,  Q.,  in  Spain,  542. 
Strabo,  Cn, ,  591.  Rufus,  Q.  (Cos. 
88),  592 ;  murdered,  596.  Strabo, 
Cn.  (Cos.  89),  in  Social  war, 
591,  592,  596;  his  death,  597. 
Magnus,  Cn.,  enrols  legions  in 
Picenum,  641  ;  joins  Sulla,  641-643  ; 
triumphs  from  Sicily  and  Africa,  651, 
652  ;  sent  against  Sertorius,  661-663  ; 
cuts  off  surviving  gladiators,  666 ; 
consul  (70),  678  ;  Piratic  war, 
680-682;  supersedes  Lucullus  in 
Pontus,  682-691  ;  his  position  in 
Rome,  708-717 ;  sole  consul  (52) 
731-733.  734.  735'  736  ;  leaves  Italy, 
739  ;  his  defeat  and  death,  743-747. 
Gnaeus  (the  younger),  750,  755. 
Sextus,  751,  755,  765,  773,  ^^6,  777 

Pons  Sublicius,  39 

Pontijices,  38,  57,  213,  697 

Pontius,  C, ,  Samnite,  141-144  ;  put  to 
death,  161 

Pontus,  kingdom  of,  603-606 

Popilius,  Laenas,  C,  in  Egypt,  516. 
P.  (Cos.  132),  tries  adherents  of 
Tib.  Gracchus,  556,  559 

Populus,  43,  90,  202 

Porcius,  Cato,  M.,  26,  56,  288; 
quaestor  in  Sicily,  379  ;  his  writings, 
405,  406  ;  (Cos.  195)  in  Spain,  453  ; 
his  character  and  views,  519-520:  the 
Basilica  Porcia,  404  (note)  ;  at  Ther- 
mopylae, 476.  C,  in  Macedonia,  569. 
L.  (Cos.  89),  591.  M.  (Uticensis), 
speech  in  the  Senate,  704,  705,  710, 
711,  742,  746,  750-753-  C.  (Tr.  PI., 
56),  712.     Licinus.L.,  355,  357 

Porsena,  63-67 

Porta  Collina,  25  :  Capena,  40 : 
Mugionis,  22  :  Romanula,  22 

Postumius  Elva,  70 ;  L.  Postumius, 
ambassador  at  Tarentum,  180,  181. 
Sp.  Postumius  at  the  Caudine  Forks, 
141-144.  L.  Postumius  (Cos.  291), 
161,  162.  C.  Postumius,  killed  at  the 
Silva  Litana,  323,  334.  Sp.  and 
Aulus  Postumius  Albinus  in  Numidia, 
572,  573 

Pothinus,  746,  748 

Potitia,  gens,  172 

Praetoria  cohors,  583 

Praetors,  early  name  of  consuls,  89 


Praetorship,  169,  210-21 1 

Proca,  king  of  Alba,  22 

Proconsul,  first,  138 

Proeneste,  rebellion  at,  124 

Proscriptions,  by  Marius,  598  ;  by  Sulla, 
646  ;  by  the  triumvirs,  771,  772 

Provincia,  meaning  of,  455 

Provinces,  the,  649,  655  (note) ;  revenue 
from,  656.  Africa,  536  ;  Africa 
Nova,  753  ;  Asia,  561,  656  ;  Bithynia 
and  Pontus,  677  (note)  ;  Cilicia,  586  ; 
enlarged,  666  ;  Crete  and  Cyrenaica, 
585,  681,  682;  Gallia  Cisalpina,  455; 
GaUia  Transalpina,  569  ;  Hispania 
citerior,  459  ;  Hispania  ulterior,  459  ; 
Macedonia,  522  ;  Sardinia  and  Cor- 
sica, 273 ;  Sicily,  267,  656 ;  Syria, 
687 

Provocatio,  38,  91,  106,  205  ;  extended 
to  the  army,  217  (note) 

Prusias,  king  of  Bithynia,  498,  511 

Ptolemy,  Philadelphus,  198.  Ptolemy 
XL,  Auletes,  716,  717.  XII.,  746, 
748.      XIII. ,  748 

Publicani  in  Asia,  561,  602,  668 

Pubhlius  Philo,  Q.  (Cos.  327),  138, 
144 

Punic  wars,  I.  (264-242),  232-268  :  II. 
(218-202),  289-394  '•  HI-  (I50-I46). 
527-536 

Pydna,  battle  of,  510 

Pyrrhus,  king  of  Epirus,  6  ;  invited  to 
Tarentum,  181  ;  parentage  and  early 
hfe,  183,  184  ;  first  campaign  in  Italy, 
185-191  ;  goes  to  Sicily,  191-195  ; 
second  campaign  in  Italy,  195-197  ! 
his  death,  197 

Pythagoras,  18  ;  schools  of,  19 

Pyxus,  17 

QUAESTIONES,  92  ;  ferpetuae,  518,  650 
Quaestorship,  90,  211  ;  open  to  ple- 
beians, III 
Quintius  Cincinnatus,  L. ,  75,  76;  dic- 
tator, no.  T. ,  124.  Flamininus,  T. 
(Cos.  198),  goes  to  Epirus,  431  ;  to 
Thessaly,  433  ;  at  the  Congress  of 
Nicaea,  437  ;  conquers  at  battle  of 
Cynoscephalae,  441  ;  at  conference 
of  Tempe,  443  ;  his  settlement  of 
Greece,  444-449  ;  forces  Nabis  to 
surrender  Argos,  447 ;  triumphs, 
448 ;  discontent  of  Aeolians  with, 
443,  444  ;  sent  again  to  Greece,  470. 
L.,  447.     Atta,  T.  (dramatist),  659 


8o6 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Quirinalis  collis,  25 

Quirinus,  35  ;  Quirini  flamen,  36 

Quirites,  quiris,  33 

Quiritium,  fossa,  25,  40 

Rabirius,  C,  prosecution  of,  697 

Ramnes,  Titii,  Luceres,  33 

Ravenna,  739 

Rea,  mother  of  Romulus,  22 

Regillus,  battle  of  lake,  70 

Regulus.      See  Atilius 

Religion,  identified  with  Greek,  404, 
405  ;  novelties  in,  520,  521 

Republic,  fall  of,  3 

Rex  sacrorum,  89 

Rhegium,  17,  19,  187,  199,  350 

Rhine,  crossed  by  Caesar,  727,  730 

Rhodes,  419  ;  proclaims  war  with  Philip, 
425,  427  ;  policy  of,  in  third  Mace- 
donian war,  505,  511  ;  its  commerce 
crippled,  514 ;  resists  Mithridates, 
619 

Rhone,  Hannibal  on  the,  300,  301 

Rome,  growth,  i  ;  position,  28  ;  street 
life  in,  404 ;  adornment  of,  779, 
790 

Romulus  and  Remus,  legend  of,  22,  23  ; 
first  king,  31-35 

Romulus  Silvius,  king  of  Alba,  22 

Rubicon,  R. ,  6,  737 

Rubra  Saxa,  79 

Rufuli,  170 

Rupilius,  P.,  in  Sicily,  548,  549 

Ruspina,  752 

Rutih,  21 

Rutilius  Rufus,  P.,  his  unjust  condem- 
nation, 603  (note) ;   Memoirs  of,  657 

Sabellians,  the  11,  12 

Sabine  women,  the,  32 

Sabines  in   Rome,    32-34 ;    wars  with, 

37,  381  69-73,  104!  assist  the  Veien- 

tines,  80 
Sabinus,  Titurius,  729 
Sacred   Mount,    first  secession  to,   96  ; 

second,  105 
Saguntum,    alliance   with,    277,     293  ; 

capture  of,  by  Hannibal,  295,  296 
Salassi,  779 

Salii  CoUini  and  Palatini,  29 
Sallentini,  17,  200 
Sallustius  Crispus,  C. ,  752,  753,  788 
Salluvii     in    Gallia   Cisalpina,    14 ;     in 

Transalpina,  568,  592 
Samnium,    6  ;  Samnites,    12,    83,    127  ; 


attack  Sidicini,  129  ;  first  Samnite 
war,  129 -131;  second,  135-151  ; 
third,  154-162  ;  joins  Pyrrhus,  187  ; 
invaded,  196  ;  in  the  Social  war,  590  ; 
in  the  war  of  Sulla,  644  ;  desolation 
of,  by  Sulla,  648 

Sardinia,  245  ;  Sardinia  and  Corsica  a 
province,  273 

Satuminus.     See  Appuleius 

Scerdilaidas  of  lUyria,  416,  417 

Scidrus,  16 

Scipio,  see  Cornelius 

Scipionic  party  in  literature,  519 

Scribonius  Curio,  C,  conquers  the  Dar- 
dani,  666 

Segesta  in  Sicily,  239,  241,  244 

Sempronius,  P.  (Cos.  304),  151. 
Longus,  Tib.  (Cos.  218),  298,  304, 
308-310  ;  defeats  Hanno,  335.  P., 
commands  in  first  Macedonian  war, 
421.  Longus,  Tib.  (Cos.  194),  453. 
Gracchus,  Tib. ,  in  Spain,  462.  Grac- 
chus, Tib.  (son  of  last),  Tr.  PI.  (133), 
553.  554  ;  his  death,  555.  Gracchus, 
Gains,  Tr.  PI.  (123),  559-563;  his 
death,  564,  565 

Senators  restrained  from  commerce, 
399 

Senatus,  2,  206-298,  283,  284  ;  its  posi- 
tion after  first  Punic  war,  283  ;  in- 
creased influence  during  second  Punic 
war,  397-399  ;  its  decadence  in  first 
century,  581  ;  bankrupts  expelled 
from,  593  ;  Sulla's  changes  in,  649  ; 
position  under  Augustus,  785 

Senatus  consultum  de  Latinis,  133  ;  de 
Campanis,  351  ;  de  Macedonibus, 
512  ;  de  Bacchanalibus,  521  ;  7iUi- 
mutn,  736 

Senones,  14,  157,  176 ;  lands  of, 
divided,  277 

Sentinum,  battle  of,  158 

Septem  pagi,  34 

Septimontium,  25 

Septumeleius,  L. ,  kills  C.  Gracchus,  565 

Sequani,  719,  720,  769 

Sertorius,  Q.,  642  ;  war  with,  in  Spain, 
660-663 

Servilius,  Sp.  (Cos.  476),  80.  Ahala, 
C,  no.  Geminus  Cn.  (Cos.  217). 
sails  to  Africa,  322.  Caepio,  Q. , 
secures  the  murder  of  Viriathus,  540. 
Caepio  (Cos.  106),  570 ;  killed  in 
Social  war,  589.  Glaucia,  C. ,  584- 
585.     Vatia,  P.,  in  Isauria,  166 


INDEX 


807 


Servius  Tullius,  42-50  ;  his  agger,  43  ; 

his  reforms,  43-49,  90 
Sibyl,  the,  52  ;  the  SibylHne  books,  52, 

.319.  717.  756 

Sicambri,  727 

Sicani  and  Siclei,  221,  222 

Sicily,  history  to  time  of  Pyrrhus,  191- 
193  ;  inhabitants  of,  220-223  ;  Car- 
thaginians in,  223,  226,  227  ;  object 
of  first  Punic  war,  219  ;  becomes  a 
Roman  province,  267  ;  war  in,  336- 
342  ;  Carthaginians  wholly  expelled 
from,  362;  slave  wars  in,  546-550 

Sicinius,  murder  of,  104 

Sicoris,  R.,  740,  741 

Sidicini,  129 

Signia,  51 

Sila,  6,  199 

Silva  Litana,  334,  453 

Slaves,  increased  numbers  of,  284  ;  in 
comedy,  403,  404  ;  tax  on  sale,  518  ; 
slave  wars,  546-550 

Social  war,  the,  589-592 

Socii  navales,  242 

Soloeis  in  Sicily,  192,  226 

Solon  of  Athens,  laws  of,  10 1 

Sopater,  423,  426 

Sora,  taken  by  Romans,  145  ;  retaken 
by  Samnites,  149  ;  recovered,  150 

Sosigenes,  754 

Sosistrates  of  Agrigentum,  192 

Sosius,  C. ,  778,  779 

Spain.      See  Hispania 

Sparta,  413 

Spartacus,  663-666 

Spendius,  270,  271 

Spolia  opima,  35,  81  (note),  281 

Suevi,  722,  727 

Suffetes,  228 

Sulla.     See  Cornelius 

Sulpicius,  Sen,  sent  to  Athens,  101. 
Q.,  negotiates  with  Brennus,  120. 
Galba,  P.,  commands  fleet  against 
Philip,  419,  520 ;  (Cos.  200)  in 
Epirus,  428,  430.  Ser.,  treacherously 
destroys  the  Lusitani,  538,  539. 
Rufus,  P.,  revolutionary  laws  and 
death  of,  592-594.  595 

Sutrium,  147 

Sybaris,  16,  17  ;  its  fall,  18 

Syphax,  363  ;  visited  by  Scipio,  372, 
373  ;  renounces  Roman  friendship, 
379  ;  negotiations  with,  380,  381  ; 
burning  of  his  camp,  382  ;  captured, 
384,  385  ;  at  Rome,  394 


Syria,  made  a  Roman  province,  687 
Syracuse,  190,  192  ;  territory  of,   223  ; 
revolutions  in,  336-338  ;   siege  of,  by 
Marcellus,  338-341  ;  topography  of, 
338  ;  art  treasures  of,  241 

Tabellariae  leges,  521 

Talys  of  Sybaris,  17 

Tanaquil,  42,  43 

Tannetum,  298 

Tarentum,  5,  17 ;  Archidamus  and 
Alexander  invited  to,  136  ;  quarrels 
with  Rome,  177-182  ;  Pyrrhus  at, 
185  seq.  ;  taken  by  Papirius,  198  ; 
guarded  in  second  Punic  war,  334  ; 
plot  to  surrender  to  Hannibal,  343, 
344 ;  entered  by  Hannibal,  345  ; 
citadel  of,  defended  by  Livius,  345, 
352  ;  recovered  by  Fabius,  352  ;  its 
position  after  Punic  war,  395 

Tarquinii,  62,  83  ;  forty  years'  truce 
with,  127 

Tarquinius  Priscus,  40  -  42  :  Lucius 
Superbus,  49-54,  70;  death  of,  71. 
Sextus,  53,  70.    Collatinus,  L. ,  61,  62 

Tarracina,  72 

Tarraco,  362 

Tatius,  Titus,  32,  33 

Taurini  conquered  by  Hannibal,  304 

Tauromenium,  Pyrrhus  at,  194  ;  slaves 
in,  548 

Teanum,  129 

Telamon,  279,  597 

Tempe,  conference  of,  443 

Temples  of  Bellona,  645  ;  Concord, 
126,  566  ;  Diana,  49,  59  ;  Fors  For- 
tuna,  59  ;  Jupiter,  Juno,  Minerva,  on 
Capitol,  23  ;  Jupiter  Stator  and  Fere- 
trius,  59  ;  Mater  Matuta,  59  ;  Vesta, 
59 ;  Venus,  334 ;  Venus  Genetrix, 
790  ;  Honor  and  Virtus,  341  (note) 

Teos,  sea-fight  in  Bay  of,  486 

Terentius  Afer,  519,  Varro,  C.  (Cos. 
216),  323  ;  at  Cannae,  324-327  ;  his 
energy  after  the  battle,  328-330  ;  in 
Greece,  426.     Varro,  M. ,  741,  787 

Terina,  16 

Teuta,  Queen,  274-276 

Teutones,  the,  569,  570  ;  defeated  at 
Aquae  Sextiae,  578 

Thapsus,  battle  of,  752 

Theatre  begun  but  demolished,  520  ;  of 
Pompey,  790 

Thebes,  412  ;  destroyed  by  Sulla,  631 

Thermopylae,  battle  of,  476 


8o8 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


Thoenon  of  Syracuse,  194,  195 
Thrasymene  lake,  battle  of,  314-316 
Thurii,    16  ;  dissensions  at,    19  ;  Spar- 

tacus  at,  664 
Tiber,  R.,  7  :  insula  Tiberina,  62 
Tiberinus,  king  of  Alba,  22 
Tibullus,  A.,  791 
Ticinus,  R.,  battle  on  the,  306 
Tifata,    Mt. ,     129,     320 ;     Hannibal's 

camp  on,   342  ;  defeat  of  Norbanus 

near,  641 
Tigranes,  king  of  Greater  Armenia,  611, 

671,  673,   684.     Tigranes  (his  son), 

682,  684  ;   sent  to  Rome,  685,  715 
Tigranocerta,  671,  673-675 
Tigurini,  569,  570 
Timaeus,  25,  56 
Timoleon,  in  Sicily,  192,  227 
Titles  taken  from  conquered  countries, 

286 
Tolosa,  570 
Tolumnius  of  Veii,  82 
Trebia,  R. ,  battle  on  the,  308,  309 
Trebonius,    C. ,    740,    749,    755,    759, 

764,  770 
Treveri,  729 

Tribes,  44  ;  increase  of,  125,  134,  145  ; 
Italians  in,  593,  596 

Tribuni  plebis,  first  appointed,  96-98, 
205,  206  ;  powers  curtailed  by  Sulla, 
596,  650  ;  restored  by  Pompey,  679. 
Militares  consulari  fotestate,  109. 
Aerarii,  680  (note),  754.  Militum, 
elected,  170  ;  nominated,  203.  See 
Rtifuli 

Tributum  of  citizens  suspended,  517  ; 
reimposed,  773 

Trifanum,  battle  of,  132 

Triumvirate,  first,  710,  725  ;  second, 
771  ;  renewed,  jj'j.     See  also  585 

Tullia,  49,  50 

Tullius  Cicero,  M. ,  on  the  Republic, 
55,  56  ;  his  political  views,  693,  694  ; 
(Cos.  63),  699-706  ;  his  exile,  709- 
717  ;  meets  Caesar,  740 ;  joins 
Pompey  in  Greece,  741  ;  returns  to 
Rome,  750,  754,  756  ;  at  the  murder 
of   Caesar,     760 ;    opposes    Antony, 

765,  767,  768  ;  connexion  with 
Octavius,  766,  770 ;  death,  772, 
773;  works,  785-7.  Q-.  729.  730. 
773 

Tullus  Hostilius,  36-39 
Tunes,   occupied  by  Regulus,  249  ;  by 
Scipio,  384 


Tusculum,    67  ;  rebellion  at,    124  ;  ob- 
tains the  civitas,  141 
Tuscus  Vicus,  68 
Tyndarion  of  Naxos,  194 
Tyndaris,  in  Sicily,  naval  battle  off,  246 
Tyrrhenian  Sea,  6 

Umbria,  6,  8,  151  ;  the  Umbro-Latini 
and  Umbrians,  11  ;  defeated  with 
Etruscans,  149  ;  outbreak  in,  153 

Urban  State,  the,  2 

Utica,  271,  381-383,  751-753 

Vada  Sabbata,  6,  759 
Vadimonian  Lake,  the,  149,  177 
Valerius  PubHcola,  P.,  62,  63,  69. 
M.,  69.  Publius  (Cos,  475),  80. 
Corvus,  M. ,  129,  130.  Maximus,  M. , 
153.  Lucius,  killed  in  harbour 
of  Tarentum,  180.  Laevinus,  P., 
defeated  at  Heraclea,  185,  186. 
Maximus  Messala,  M.  (Cos.  263), 
defeats  Hiero,  239,  394.  Flaccus,  L. 
(Cos.  195),  397.  Laevinus,  M. , 
(Cos,  210),  takes  Agrigentum,  361  ; 
wins  naval  battle  off  Lilybaeum,  362  ; 
commands  fleet  against  Phihp,  418, 
419.  Flaccus,  L.  (Cos.  86),  sent  to 
supersede  Sulla,  633  ;  murdered, 
635.  Triarius,  L. ,  legate  of  Lucullus, 
676,  677.  Catullus,  C. ,  789.  Mes- 
salla,  C.,  779,  780 
Varius,  Q. ,  his  prosecutions  for  majestas, 

589.  593 

Veii,  13,  62;  wars  with,  77-85  ;  fall  of, 
86-88  ;  effects  of  siege  of,  84  ;  pro- 
posed migration  to,  III,  121  ;  Roman 
fugitives  in,  117 

Velabrum,  the,  24 

Velea  or  Elea,  17 

Velites,  583 

Veneti,  in  Gaul,  726  ;  in  Italy,  5,  8,  14, 
120 

Ver  sacrum,  319 

Vercingetorix,  730 

Veretrum,  17 

Vergilius,  C,  752,  753,  Maro,  P, ,  789, 
790 

Vermina,  son  of  Syphax,  391 

Verres,  C, ,  668,  758 

Veseris,  battle  of,  132  (note) 

Vesontio,  720 

Vestini,  8,  11 

Vetilius,  C. ,  killed  in  Spain,  539 

Vettius,  L. ,  706,  712 


INDEX 


809 


Veturia,  mother  of  Coriolanus,  75 

Via  Appia,  171,  281 ;  Aemilia,  456, 
769  ;  Aemilia  Scauri,  458  ;  Aurelia, 
ib.\  Egnatia,  522;  Flaminia,  281, 
775  ;  Latina,  329  ;   Portuensis,  40 

Vibius  Pansa,  C. ,  764,  768,  769.  Vibius 
Virius  of  Capua,  350 

Vipsanius  Agrippa,  M. ,  766,  777,  791 

Viriathus,  539,  540 

Voltumnae,  fanum,  123 

Voltur,  Mt. ,  7 

Volturnus,  R. ,  7  ;  gorge  of,  320 


Volumnia,  wife  of  Coriolanus,  75 
Volumnius,    L.   {Cos.  296),  defeats  the 
Samnites,  156 

Wall,   begun  by  Tarquin,   41  ;   com- 
pleted by  Servius,  43 

Xanthippus  of  Sparta,  250-252 

Zama,  battle  of,  389  ;  Macedonians  at, 

423 
Zela,  battle  of,  750 


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